Category: Philosophy of Religion

  • Friday Fallacy: Equivocation

    In my post on Assessing Arguments I noted that a valid argument is one where it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. I gave the following example:

    Premise: All men are under 10 feet tall;
    Premise: John is a man;
    Conclusion: John is under 10 feet tall.

    This argument is valid because it is impossible for both premises to be true and the conclusion false. If it is true that all men are under 10 feet tall and if it is true that John is a man then John cannot be over 10 feet tall. If it were possible for John to be over 10 feet tall then the first premise would mean he could not be a man, which, of course, would contradict the second premise.

    In this post I want to note an important feature of this type of argument. There is an obvious link between the first and the second premises. The first premise makes a claim about all men; it identifies a class of beings, those we call men, and it attributes a property to members of this class. The second premise identified John as a man – a member of the class mentioned in premise one. The fact that both premises refer to the same class of beings is important to the validity of the argument because John is a member of the same class that is stated to be under 10 feet tall; the conclusion, that John is under 10 feet tall, cannot be logically avoided. This argument is valid because the word ‘man’ refers to the same thing in both premises. If the word ‘men’ in the first premise did not refer to the same class John is said to be a member of in the second premise then the argument would not follow.

    This brings me to this weeks fallacy: the fallacy of equivocation. Sometimes the same word has more than one meaning. The fallacy of equivocation occurs when a person uses the same word in different premises but not the same meaning. Because the same word is used the argument appears valid but when one looks at what the word actually refers to in each premise, the argument is not valid.  A obvious example is as follows:

    1. Money put in a bank will earn interest;
    2. A bank is the body of land at the side of a river;

    Therefore:

    3. If you want to earn interest on your money you should put it in the body of land at the side of a river.

    This silly example shows quite nicely how the fallacy works. Both premise 1. and premise 2. make reference to a bank; at a superficial glance the argument might appear valid if what the first premise says of a bank is true and if what the second premise says of a bank is true. The problem is (and in this example it is fairly obvious) the word ‘bank’ in each premise has a different meaning. In the first premise it refers to a financial institution, in the second it refers to a body of land at the side of a river. When one looks at what the terms actually refer to, as opposed to their verbal form, the argument is invalid.

    In this example the fallacy is obvious; the conclusion is so outrageously silly and the premises so uncontroversial that the mistake is obvious. However, in other cases the fallacy can be more subtle.

    The Fallacy of Equivocation

    Here is an example I recently spotted on Common Sense Atheism’s (more…)

  • Undesigned Coincidences in the Gospels – Tim McGrew

    Timothy McGrewIf we have a question on the historicity of the resurrection, Timothy McGrew is our first port of call; there is no one we would turn to before him on the subject. Tim is also highly regarded for his work on probability theory and on miracles – he is the author of “Miracles” for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. We have previously linked to his Library of Historical Apologetics.

    I mention all this because Tim recently gave an excellent talk, which is available free as an MP3 and is entitled “Undesigned Coincidences in the Gospels.” Tim’s wife, Lydia McGrew, who first alerted us to this talk, writes:

    Undesigned coincidences in the Gospels … is an argument that was well-known in the nineteenth century but has, for no really clear reason, simply been forgotten as time has gone on. It is a cumulative case argument that the Gospels reflect, to an important extent, independent knowledge of actual events. Please note that this argument is quite independent of one’s preferred answer to the synoptic question. That is to say, even if, e.g., Mark was the first Gospel and others had access to Mark and show signs of literary dependence on Mark, the argument from undesigned coincidences provides evidence for independent knowledge of real events among the Gospel writers. There are many more of such coincidences beyond those given in the talk.

    Two of Tim’s other talks, which overlap the material in this talk but also extend it, “Beyond Minimal Facts, Part I: External Evidences” and “Beyond Minimal Facts, Part II: Internal Evidences” can be ordered for a small fee – details here. Matt and I have both of these and can highly recommend them.

  • Debate Review: Sam Harris and William Lane Craig on Divine Command Theory Part I

    William Lane Craig v Sam HarrisLast week Sam Harris and William Lane Craig debated the question: “Is the Foundation of Morality Natural or Supernatural?” at the University of Notre Dame. Given my interest in divine command meta-ethics I found the debate and the subsequent online discussion concerning it extremely interesting. I was particularly interested in how the ‘new atheist’ movement would address this issue given Dawkins’ neglect of moral arguments in The God Delusion. Unfortunately, the debate turned out to be very one-sided. [Both the debate video and the debate MP3 are now online.]

    In this review I will analyse the debate in two parts. In Part I, I will look at the discussion of Craig’s contention that,

    1. If God exists then we have a plausible account of (a) the nature of moral goodness and (b) the nature of moral obligation.

    In Part II, I will examine Harris’s contention that,

    2. If atheism is true then we have a plausible account of (a) the nature of moral goodness and (b) the nature of moral obligation.

    A couple of definitions are necessary here; what both Craig and Harris are defending are rival accounts of what both goodness and moral obligation are. When Craig or Harris offers an account of the nature of goodness, each is offering an account of what moral values and obligation are, that is, their ontological or metaphysical nature. Similarly, when Craig refers to God, he is referring to a personal immaterial being who is necessarily existent, omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect.

    Craig’s Argument for a Divine Command Theory
    In support of 1(a) Craig argued that if theism is true, goodness could be identified with God himself. His view is that goodness is best understood in terms of an exemplar, that good is identified with the perfect paradigm of a good person and that the goodness of everything else is measured by its resemblance to this paradigm. An analogy to this idea is the official “metre stick” that exists in France today. The metre stick is exactly one metre long, and the length in metres of every other length is determined by comparison with it. In the same way, God is both perfectly good and is the standard of goodness for everything else. God’s goodness, for Craig, is cashed out in terms of certain character traits. To claim God is good is to claim that he is truthful, benevolent, loving, gracious, merciful and just, and that he is opposed to certain actions such as murder, rape, torturing people for fun and so on.

    In support of 1(b) Craig argued that if God exists, moral obligations can be identified with Gods commands. He therefore advocated the version of a divine command theory of obligation proposed by Robert Adams in Finite and Infinite Goods.

    While Craig sketched his account of goodness and obligation in his opening statement, he never offered any actual argument for why he thinks that if theism is true, this account is correct; yet later in the debate he said it was obvious. While I myself agree with a certain version of divine command theory, I think this suggestion is inadequate. There have been many objections raised against such theories in the literature, and hardly any of them presuppose the non-existence of God. I think these objections fail, and most of them fail miserably. But it would be a gross overstatement to claim that, given the truth of theism, a divine command theory is obvious.

    Later in the debate, (more…)

  • Ethical Naturalism and the Euthyphro Dilemma

    Some people argue that moral obligations can be grounded in scientifically verifiable facts about human wellbeing and flourishing. This view is a form of ethical naturalism.  For these people moral rightness is just the property of promoting or enhancing human flourishing.

    Plato and Aristotle arguing in the School of Athens

    Plato refuted this argument over 2,000 years ago in his famous dialogue The Euthyphro. The Euthyphro argument is commonly appropriated in the form of a dilemma: “is an action right because it promotes human flourishing or does it promote human flourishing because it is right?

    If ethical naturalists take the second horn of this dilemma and claim that something promotes human flourishing because it is right then things are right prior to, and hence independently of, whether they promote human welfare; so the ethical naturalists’ position here is false.

    If the ethical naturalists take the former horn then morality is arbitrary. If rape or murder or cruelty for fun had the natural property of promoting happiness then rape and murder and cruelty for fun would be morally required but it is impossible for these things to be morally required; so ethical naturalism is clearly absurd.

    Moreover, if things are right because they have natural properties, like promoting human flourishing, then one cannot meaningfully say that human flourishing is good. To say “human flourishing”  is good is just to say that  “human flourishing is human flourishing,” which is just an empty tautology.

    So in short, Plato’s Euthyphro dilemma refuted ethical naturalism 2,000 years ago. Contemporary ethical naturalists who say otherwise just have not read Plato and have never come across this argument before.

    In any event, ethical naturalism is deeply problematic. Throughout history people have appealed to human flourishing and forms of ethical naturalism to justify atrocities. The Inquisition, for example, was often justified by Dominican Theologians on the basis that it was in accord with natural law, and natural law was understood to be grounded in human flourishing. Similarly, wars have been justified on the basis of moral theories based on human flourishing. Stalin and Lenin wanted to bring about human flourishing through a communist utopia and murdered millions in their pursuit of that. And the Americans dropped an atomic bomb on Japan because they wanted to promote the flourishing of American soldiers that were going to invade.

    Finally, it is obviously insulting to suggest that right and wrong are grounded in scientifically verifiable properties like this. There are a large number of people who live morally upright lives who do not believe in ethical naturalism. The suggestion that these people are all immoral is obviously false. Name me one moral action a person who is not an ethical naturalist cannot do? This unanswerable question shows that ethical naturalism is clearly false.

    RELATED POSTS: (more…)

  • Unbelievable? Is God a Moral Monster? Paul Copan & Norman Bacrac

    Paul Copan recently debated Norman Bacrac on the topic “Is God a Moral Monster?” on a recent episode of Unbelievable? on the UK station Premier Christian Radio.

    Matt and I just listened to it and we both thought it was worth sharing as Copan really handled himself well and very clearly articulated his position on the hyperbolic reading of the Canaanites (a position he has co-authored with Matt on). The interaction between Copan, Bacrac and the show’s host Justin Brierly was very good too.

    Unbelievable?Listen here: Unbelievable? 9 Apr 2011 – Is God a Moral Monster? Paul Copan & Norman Bacrac
    [If the link will not load the Copan v Bacrac debate directly go to the Unbelievable? page then locate the 9 April 2011 episode ]

    The blurb from the show is:

    Richard Dawkins describes the Old Testament God as “a vindictive, bloodthirsty ethnic cleanser” (among other things).  Paul Copan is a Christian apologist and has written a book, “Is God a Moral Monster?” aiming to show why God’s actions in the Old Testament are not immoral when taken in context.

    Norman Bacrac is an atheist humanist and part ot the South place Ethical Society. He believes that Old Testament morality was barbaric and we don’t need a God to tell us how to behave.  He holds that God’s morality is called into question if we take the Old Testament literally.

    So how do we interpret passages where the Israelites were commanded to wipe out whole towns including women and children?

    “The blog of Matthew and Madeleine Flannagan in New Zealand” rates a mention from the host, Justin Brierly, about 38 mins in 😉

  • Video: Sam Harris v William Lane Craig Debate “Is the Foundation of Morality Natural or Supernatural?”

    Sam Harris and William Lane Craig debated the moot “Is the Foundation of Morality Natural or Supernatural?” at the University of Notre Dame on 7 April 2011. We’ve already linked to the debate  MP3 but here is the video of the whole debate.

    Hat tip: Pondering the Preponderance

    See Matthew Flannagan’s:
    Debate Review: Sam Harris and William Lane Craig on Divine Command Theory Part I

     

  • Sam Harris v William Lane Craig Debate @ Notre Dame – UPDATE MP3 Online

    The debate between Sam Harris and William Lane Craig at The University of Notre Dame on the topic “Is the Foundation of Morality Natural or Supernatural?” will be streamed free and live on Notre Dame TV at 7:00pm EST on 7 April 2011 [11:00am NZ time on 8 April 2011].

    William Lane Craig v Sam Harris

    Hat tip: The Apologist

    UPDATE: The audio is now available as an MP3 over at Apologetics 315.

    RELATED POSTS: Matt has written a few posts here on MandM defending Divine Command Theory for those interested in reading a little more on the position William Lane Craig defended.

    Also see Matt’s:
    Debate Review: Sam Harris and William Lane Craig on Divine Command Theory Part I