Category: Philosophy of Religion

  • The Christian Delusion: Why Faith Fails – A Philosophia Christi Review of John Loftus’ Book

    On the list of blurbs just inside the cover of The Christian Delusion: Why Faith Fails, edited by John W. Loftus (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books) 2010, the following appears:

    The Christian Delusion Blurb by Matthew Flannagan

    As a result of being published on the blurb of the book, the current edition of Philosphia Christi, Vol. 13, no. 1 – Summer 2011, shows the following in the table of contents under “Book Reviews”:

    Philosophia Christi Table of ContentsThe Editor of Philosophia Christi has kindly granted Matt permission to reproduce his review of The Christian Delusion: Why Faith Fails here on MandM.

    A Review of The Christian Delusion: Why Faith Fails

    by Matthew Flannagan

    In The Christian Delusion John Loftus brings together a series of articles by contemporary free thinkers all focused around a common epistemological critique. It is the sequel to Loftus’s Why I Became an Atheist: A Former Preacher Rejects Christianity.

    The book is divided into five parts, each addressing a different aspect of Christianity. Part 1 is entitled “Why Faith Fails” and comprises four chapters. In chapter 1, David Eller argues that religions both deeply influence and are deeply influenced by culture; he argues that different cultural contexts lead to different forms of Christianity. In chapter 2, Vallerie Tarico draws on cognitive science to offer naturalistic explanations for why people believe in God. In chapter 3, Jason Long explains how people believe in Christianity despite its obvious absurdity by documenting how humans frequently engage in certain fallacies, have certain biases, believe things that are comfortable and resist changing their minds.

    By themselves it is hard to discern how these chapters provide arguments against Christianity. They appear to assume Christianity is false and provide naturalistic explanations as to why people believe such falsehoods. The relevance is explained in chapter 4, where John Loftus uses them to defend what he calls the Outsider Test for Faith (“OTF”). Loftus argues that a rational person should adopt the same skeptical stance towards her own religious beliefs that she does towards religions she rejects. The OTF (more…)

  • Stark Wars

    Darth VaderThom Stark has written a lengthy response (304 pages!) to Paul Copan’s book Is God a Moral Monster? which he has published on his blog, Religion at the Margins; it is entitled Is God a Moral. Compromiser? A Critical Review of Paul Copan’s. “Is God a Moral Monster?” In it, alongside his criticisms of Copan, Stark makes several criticisms of the work of Richard Hess and Matt.

    Matt has not yet had time to read Stark’s book-length review, much less respond to it, but Copan and Hess have. Copan has published the following blog posts on his blog, Parchment and Pen:

    Is God a Moral Monster Revisited: Preliminary Replies to Thom Stark

    Richard Hess’s Response to Thom Stark

    Matthew Flannagan’s Interactions with Thom Stark

    Stark has responded to these posts with:

    Copan and Company, Part 1: A Brief Introduction

    Copan and Company, Part 2: Response to Matt Flannagan

    Copan and Company, Part 3: Response to Paul Copan

    Copan and Company, Part 4: Response to Richard Hess

    Other blogs have chimed in:

    Thom Stark’s Sweeping Claims by Christopher Copan Scott

    Reflections on the Thom Stark-Paul Copan debate by Randal Rauser

    Matt has on his ‘to do’ list an intention to wade through Stark’s review and write a response, at the very least, to the parts that critique his work. He also intends to answer Stark’s questions put to him on this blog post. However, Matt has several publication, conference and marking commitments to meet first and Matt simply cannot churn material out at the prolific rate Stark can.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Thom Stark on Wolterstorff and Hagiographic Hyperbole
    Is God a Moral Monster? A Review of Paul Copan’s Book
    God and the Genocide of the Canaanites Part I: Wolterstorff’s Argument for the Hagiographic Hyperbolic Interpretation
    God and the Genocide of the Canaanites Part II: Ancient Near Eastern Conquest Accounts
    God and the Genocide of the Canaanites Part III: Two Implications of the Hagiographic Hyperbolic Account

  • Lawful Authority and Just Wars

    A reader pointed me to this interesting post on Pacifism and Just War Theory from Baylor University Philosophy Professor, Alexander Pruss.

    Just WarInterestingly Pruss offers an argument similar to the one I presented at a panel discussion on the ethics of war recently. In this discussion I suggested that traditional Christian Just War Theory follows from the contention that a government has the right and duty to use force to uphold justice within the geographical area over which it has jurisdiction. A just war is simply an extension of the government’s police powers. If a criminal attempted to rape or kill people within the geographical realm over which a government has authority then the government could justifiably use force to prevent this. It could also use force to try and punish anyone who did do these things; this is why we have a police force, court system and prisons. Just war theorists cannot see why this should cease to be the case when the person committing the offence is a soldier from another country as opposed to a domestic criminal.

    Pruss gives a similar argument; he starts by defining problematic violence as “lethal violence, i.e. violence that, if successful, has a high probability of resulting in the opponent’s death, counts as problematic, even when the death is not intended.” He then argues,

    “If it is permissible to use problematic violence to stop a citizen wife from murdering her citizen husband, it should also be permissible to use problematic violence to stop a non-citizen woman who sneaked into one’s country to murder her citizen husband. Moreover, this should be permissible even if the woman was commissioned by another state to kill her husband. But if we allow that it is permissible to use problematic violence against criminals acting on behalf of foreign states, then there seems to be no way to deny that it is permissible to use problematic violence to stop invaders.”

    He makes this illustration,

    “When the invading army marches in, burning crops and murdering citizens, they are breaking the victim country’s laws. If problematic violence is permitted to enforce the laws of one’s territory, it should be permissible to use problematic violence to stop them. But this seems to be a case of war.”

    This argument is common in the Reformed or Presbyterian traditions. John Murray, in his book Principles of Conduct, notes the Pauline teaching that the  “governing authorities” are “established by God.” One is morally bound to submit to rulers because “rulers do not bear the sword for no reason. They are God’s servants, agents of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer.” He then asks, “by what kind of logic can it be maintained that the magistrate, who is invested with the power of the sword, may and must execute vengeance upon evil doers within his own domain must sheath the sword of resistance when evil doers from without invade his domain.”

    The Westminster confession makes a similar argument. It argues that because a Government has the authority to use force to maintain justice and peace within the realm over which it governs it can fight wars to maintain justice and peace within this realm.

    I think this is one of the most important lines of argument in defence of Just War Theory. In my talk, I argued that the standard six criteria of a just war: just cause, lawful authority, last resort, the use of proportionate and discriminate force and so on simply unpack the general circumstances in which governments are permitted to us force and apply it to warfare. Here I simply want to explore one implication of this line of argument that Pruss raises. (more…)

  • In Defense of Reasonable Disagreement

    At the close of his 1967 book “God and Other Minds”, Alvin Plantinga argues that if theistic belief is to be dismissed as “irrational”, or in some sense “epistemically sub-par” on the basis that it lacks a rationally compelling argument, then likewise we should also reject belief in other minds, since the best argument for the belief in such minds (the analogical argument) is not rationally compelling[i]. What this implies is that if belief in other minds is justified even in spite of the fact that it lacks a rationally compelling argument, then equally so, belief in God may be justified in spite of such an argument[ii]. To hold then, that belief in God is unjustified in the absence of a compelling theistic proof, would be to hold a double standard[iii].

    What elephant?For obvious reasons, few people would dare to dispute the contention that belief in other minds is rational. However, Plantinga’s critics have two options: (1) they might contend that belief in other minds is rational, but only in virtue of a rationally compelling argument. Hence their burden would be to produce a rationally compulsive version of the analogical argument. (2) They could admit that there is no rationally compulsive version of the analogical argument, but argue that there is a relevant difference between theistic belief and belief in other minds, such that the two beliefs are not epistemically equivalent or, as it were, “equiprobable”.

    In this paper, I am not concerned to argue against (1), but suffice to say I think it thoroughly wrong-headed. I am concerned however, to argue against one particular version of (2). Some of Plantinga’s critics have charged that belief in God and belief in other human minds are epistemically unalike in the sense that reasonable people do not disagree about whether or not other minds exist, whereas reasonable clearly disagree about whether or not God exists.

    While he doesn’t explicitly respond to Plantinga or any of the so called “Reformed Epistemologists”, Richard Feldman argues something akin to in his article entitled “Reasonable Religious Disagreements”. Hence it makes sense to analyze his argument in the context of an objection against Reformed Epistemology.

    I do not find his argument convincing. In-fact, as I will go on to argue, un-sharable private evidence in the form of religious experience proves an intractable problem for Feldman’s argument with respect to religious disagreements. That is not to say that there is no epistemic parity between theistic belief and belief in other minds, rather it is simply to say that at least one attempt to establish any such parity is not successful.

    Feldman’s thesis is that reasonable disagreement between epistemic peers who have fully disclosed their evidence is not possible[iv]. That is to say, reasonable disagreement cannot subsist between two parties that are equivalently intelligent, have approximately equal powers of reasoning, are equal with respect to background information and have shared all relevant evidence[v]. When he says that reasonable disagreement cannot subsist between such people, Feldman does not mean to say that both parties should agree. Rather, what he means to say is that both parties should suspend judgement[vi]. In other words, those who are party to the discussion cannot simply “agree to disagree” (at least they can’t do so rationally) . Rather, they must opt for a position that can only be described as “agnostic”. The final preliminary point to clarify is the issue of “reasonability”. By this Feldman means to say is that a belief is “reasonable” just if it has sufficient evidential support. This point is important, because as Feldman points out, if by “reasonability” one simply means that there is no “obvious blunder”, then it’s possible to be “reasonable” and yet base ones beliefs on confusion and misunderstanding etc[vii]. Feldman introduces his thesis by way of the following questions: (more…)

  • I’m so Objective about how You’re so Subjective

    One general objection to theistic arguments for God is that no such argument could be based on the subjective experience of one’s own cognitive processes, and that therefore it suggests delusions of grandeur to think that one can get from such a basis to God necessarily existing.

    I have an experiential awareness of a sign but I can't empirically prove it existsBut to deny that a sound argument could be based on one’s subjective experience of one’s own cognitive processes is self-exempting if it is -itself- claimed to arbitrate the status of that experience in relation to such an argument. This is the same old self-referential inconsistency that itself claims to be above that which it is itself an instance of by sheer force of the domain of its subject term.

    The delusion of grandeur is in thinking that one has the logical standing to predicate the -denial- of such an inferential move with any authority beyond one’s -own- cognitive subjectivity by exempting oneself from that alleged limitation in order to make that trans-subjective claim and thus pass judgment on the entire scope and limits of that very subjectivity itself for all thinking subjects.

    Moreover, how could one’s own subjectivity be capable of such a universal claim about what one can or cannot know or infer, if subjectivity itself is as self-limited as that claim itself asserts? Especially when no argument or criteria is ever even mentioned.

    In fact, how does this differ from a religious-like admonition: “Believe in my arbitrarily subjective self-stultifying claims about the possibility of knowledge and thou shalt be saved”?

    In other words, how does an unargued self-contradictory prohibition on everyone’s thinking differ from the religious proof-texting of an arbitrarily-protected claim that restricts all other claims except itself?

    Such self-exemption is never mentioned for a reason, although not a logical one.

  • Guest Post: One Less God

    Bethyada from True Paradigm writes:

    I have read a few posts on the ‘one less god’ proposition. Stephen F Roberts originally put it,

    “I contend we are both atheists, I just believe in one fewer god than you do. When you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours.”

    elsewhere he says,

    “We are all atheists, some of us just believe in fewer gods than others.”

    I have read a few responses against this illogical claim.

    Some of us just go one god further

    One retort is to state that Christians do believe in several gods, it is just that the lesser gods are demons and Christians claim allegiance to the true God. Yahweh is not just a local deity (1Ki 20:23) but the true God, creator heaven and earth

    And Hezekiah prayed before the LORD and said: “O LORD, the God of Israel, enthroned above the cherubim, you are the God, you alone, of all the kingdoms of the earth; you have made heaven and earth. (2 Kings 19:15)

    the most high God,

    Abram said to the king of Sodom, “I have lifted my hand to the LORD, God Most High, Possessor of heaven and earth,…” (Genesis 14:22)

    Though there is truth to this, depending a little on how one defines God, I do not think this rebutal gets to the crux of the problem.

    Another response is to state that polytheists believe in gods for different reasons than monotheists believe in God. Polytheists believe X and monotheists believe Y, thus the monotheist’s refutation of X does not refute Y, which the atheist is claiming. In other words, the reason Christians reject other gods is not the same as the reason they accept the Christian God. This is logically true, and hints at the atheist error, but does not get to the heart of it. It is inadequate though because it is not immediately obvious that polytheists and monotheists have significantly different reasons for theism. Romans 1 suggests that there are some basic reasons why all people are theists, but our fallen nature means this may be distorted such that theism becomes polytheism or, as per Romans, animism and pantheism.

    A related response is to state that Christians see polytheism is a distortion of monotheism. As such, removal of the distortion does not remove the argument. The dismissal of the wrong elements of theism is not an argument against theism. This gets closer to the problem.

    The primary problem with the atheist position is that it makes a category error. The following analogy demonstrates this central issue. As such the analogy is useful, but for several reasons I think it is inadequate and could be improved upon. Nevertheless, if it illustrates the problem it is helpful.

    “Let’s say that people are debating the best colour for stop signs. One person may prefer red for stop signs. Another green. Still others think that any colour can be used and no standardisation is necessary, and others promote the use of all colours on every sign.

    The atheist response is like saying you can’t agree on what colour to use because there are in fact no colours. Colours do not exist.”

    Debating colour preference is not the same as debating the existence of colours. Dropping from one god to no gods is not a continuation of the number-of-gods argument, it is a completely different argument.

    Consider the deity set. It is either empty: atheism; or not empty: theism. The argument over the number of members in a non-empty theism set is unrelated to argument about whether or not the set is in fact empty.

    Douglas Wilson put it well in his response to Sam Harris,

    “You say, “Understand that the way you view Islam is precisely the way devote Muslims view Christianity. And it is the way I view all religions.” Well, no, not exactly. And well, actually, no, not at all.

    Suppose we are considering a phenomenon that is, by most accounts, inexplicable by an unsupervised occurrence—three of us attend a sophisticated party uptown, and halfway through the evening at the party we find a trout in the punch bowl. At this point, the three of us divide into three schools of thought. I think that Smith, a practical joker, put it there; our friend Murphy thinks that Jones, the avant-garde performance artist, put it there; and you think that it has simply shown up as the result of natural forces. My central point is not to interact with the truth or falsity of your naturalistic position—except perhaps through the use of this absurd example of the punchbowl—but rather to show that you are arguing for something completely different from what Murphy and I are arguing. We all have an explanation but your explanation is of a different kind altogether.

    The differences between two of us (between Murphy and me) concern who put the trout in the punchbowl. The difference between the both of us together and you iswhether someone put a trout in the punchbowl. And who and whether represent different questions entirely. Quite apart from who is right and who is wrong about this, it is important to note that we are not disagreeing in the same way or over the same kind of issue at all. Murphy and I are disagreeing over the relative behaviours of Smith and Jones, but not over whether the trout calls for an explanation. Maybe I am more hostile to Smith than I ought to be, and maybe Murphy is deeply prejudiced against Jones. Maybe we are both wrong about who put it there. But thinking someone’s explanation is inadequate (when we agree the phenomenon must be explained) is quite different from arguing with someone who says it calls for no outside explanation whatever.” (Letter from a Christian Citizen)

    RELATED POST:
    Selling Atheism

  • Guest Post: Tim McGrew defends “The Argument from Miracles: A Cumulative Case for the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth”

    Tim McGrewA little while back we published a post linking to some talks by Tim McGrew on Undesigned Coincidences in the Gospels. For some bizarre reason this post of ours prompted fellow kiwi blogger Deane Galbraith to write a post on the Bulletin for the Study of Religion, linking to our post, on the separate topic of Tim and his wife Lydia McGrew’s article “The Argument from Miracles: A Cumulative Case for the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth” which was published in the The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology.

    Here is a snippet of Galbraith’s post from the beginning:

    There are quite a few academic and quasi-academic studies in which statistical analysis seems to be employed as a substitute for thinking. It is, perhaps, fairly understandable why some people are tempted by the allure of numbers. Those mysteriously complex formulae, mindnumblingly boring statistics and obscure mathematical notations lend a magical aura of scientific objectivity and plausibility to even the most patently absurd claims.

    What gets me talking about this at this moment is my dumbfounded reading last night of an article published by Timothy McGrew and Lydia McGrew, entitled“The Argument from Miracles: A Cumulative Case for the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth” (2009). In this article, the McGrews utilize Bayesian probability in order to argue to the “scientific” conclusion that the probability of the resurrection of Jesus is a “staggering” 100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,
    000,000,000,000,000 to 1.

    Are you staggered? overwhelmed? swooning? Were you previously skeptical about the Christian claim that Jesus was resurrected, but now you’re feeling pretty silly? Perhaps not.

    The post goes on in the same vein to accuse the McGrews of trying to trick people into belief in the resurrection. It is littered with terms like “flimsy basis”, “populist apologetics”, “fanciful” and “deeply and unavoidably farcical” and is illustrated complete with a giant white-robed Caucasian Jesus wistfully looking heavenward as he steps out of the tomb. It finishes with Galbraith laying out his understanding of their mathematical reasoning, the tone at this point is dripping with lashings of smug, self-congratulation at how easily he, PhD student from Otago whose research area is giants in the Old Testament narrative, had dispatched two of the top philosophers of religion working in this field, both specialists in probability theory.

    Not being qualified remotely in Bayesian probability theory myself, and therefore not wanting to presume anything beyond assessing the tone as exceedingly arrogant, I passed on Galbraith’s criticisms to the McGrews on Facebook. Well it turns out that Galbraith isn’t the only non-qualified liberal/atheist to take a punt at their reasoning on this piece. Tim McGrew explains that straw men have been popping up all over.

    Straw Men Burning: Misinterpretations of our Article on the Resurrection

    One of the hazards of writing technical philosophy is the risk that someone who lacks the appropriate expertise will attempt to critique it. In the case of the article on the resurrection that Lydia and I wrote for The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, this has already happened. It is hard enough to correct misimpressions of this sort on a relatively neutral topic; when the subject rouses passions of the sort that, as Hume reminds us, religious disputes are apt to generate, then the difficulties are redoubled.

    But one thing that we did not anticipate is that (more…)