Category: Philosophy of Religion

  • A Godless Public Square: Do ‘Private’ Christian Beliefs Have a Place in Public Life? @ Auckland Uni

    Mon 1- Friday 5 August marks Jesus Week. A number of events will be held on the University of Auckland campus of which we are part of including this one brought to you by the Evangelical Union and Thinking Matters:

    Godless Public Square

    A Godless Public Square:

    Do ‘Private’ Christian Beliefs Have a Place in Public Life?

    A Jesus Week Panel Discussion
    7-9pm Wednesday 3 August
    Lib B28 (Library Basement) University of Auckland

    Christian theological convictions ought to impact the whole of life both in the private and public spheres; this is what the idea of an “undivided life” means, Jesus is Lord of all aspects of our lives.

    Yet this consequence of Christian faith conflicts with a pervasive contemporary attitude: the view that that religion is fundamentally a private matter. It is accepted that a Christian is free to utilise theological convictions when they make decisions about their own life but in a pluralistic society it is increasingly deemed inappropriate to bring such convictions into public discussions about morality, law, politics, economics, education, scholarship and so on. The desire to influence society with Christian ideals or to convert others to the faith is viewed by many as an intolerant desire to impose one’s private views onto others.

    It is widely accepted that theological convictions can govern churches and the private lives of believers yet we are told that the public square – government, public policy, the courts, the academy, education, business, arts, media, etc – should be secular only.

    This event looks at this issue. The conversation will span Theology, Philosophy and Law led by a panel made up of Christian representatives from each discipline along with you the audience.

    Up for discussion are issues like:

    – Is it wrong for Christians to impose their ‘private’ religious beliefs onto others?
    – Is secularism the neutral perspective it is claimed to be?
    – Are public expressions of religion regulated by law?

    Bring your own questions and ask them at the Q & A session.

    This is a free event open to the public, which will be lay friendly – a university degree is not necessary in order for you to attend!

    Panel:

    Moderator:

    RSVP on Facebook here (or just turn up with your friends)

  • Ethics: What Does God have to do with it? @ Auckland University

    World class Ethicists John Hare (Yale Divinity) and Mark Murphy (Georgetown Philosophy) are in town for the Naturalisms in Ethics Conference and the Meeting of the Australasian Philosophy of Religion Association at the University of Auckland where they will be speaking along with New Zealand’s top Ethicists.

    We leaped on the opportunity to organise the following event, brought to you by the University of Auckland Department of Philosophy and Thinking Matters Auckland:

    Ethics: What does God have to do with it?

    Ethics: What Does God have to do with it? 
    A Conversation with Three Christian Philosophers

    7pm Tuesday 26 July
    Room OGGB4/260-073 (Owen Glenn Building)
    University of Auckland

    The question of the relationship between religion and morality has long been the subject of discussion and debate in western culture. Some philosophers and theologians contend the two cannot be separated; theological beliefs about God and the afterlife are needed to explain the existence and nature of moral obligations, and to ground motivation to live a moral life.

    Others contend the opposite. They claim that morality is entirely independent of religion and that religion encourages immorality. Questions have also been raised as to whether religion adds anything to morality in terms of its ideas about atonement, forgiveness and moral faith which are lacking in secular views.

    This panel brings together several of the world’s leading Christian thinkers on this question to discuss issues such as:

    – Why do we have to do what is right?
    – Can someone be a ‘good’ person without belief in God?
    – What role do grace and forgiveness play in morality?

    Bring your own questions and ask them at the Q & A session.

    This will be a free, lay friendly event open to the public – a university degree is not necessary in order for you to attend!

    Panel:
    Prof John Hare – Yale Divinity School
    Prof Mark Murphy – Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University
    Dr Glen Pettigrove  – Department of Philosophy, University of Auckland

    (Click on each of their names – they are each seriously cool!)

    Moderator:
    Dr Matthew Flannagan

    RSVP on Facebook or just turn up – bring your friends. This is soooo not to be missed!

  • The Australasian Philosophy of Religion Association Conference @ Auckland University

    The Australasian Philosophy of Religion Association (APRA) conference will be running at the University of Auckland from 16-17 July and will feature this blog’s own Matthew Flannagan and our good friend Glenn Peoples.

    The APRA conference is an annual event usually taking place over two days in mid July. Speakers include:

    More information at APRA’s website (which includes registration information) or at the Facebook Event page.

    Matt’s paper, “Armstrong on Divine Commands” will be chaired by John Hare of Yale Divinity School. Matt’s abstract is below:

    Abstract for: Armstrong on Divine Commands

    In several debates and addresses, William Lane Craig has defended the conditional,

    1. If God exists then a divine command theory provides a plausible account of the nature of moral obligation.

    In support of 1, Craig has appropriated the divine command theory of Robert Adams. He has identified the property of being morally obligated to do X with the property of being commanded by God to do X. Recently, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has contended Craig’s conditional is “incredible” and that the divine command theory is “vulnerable to a cavalcade of devastating objections.” Armstrong has claimed that his criticisms do not just call into question Craig’s argument for a theistic based system of ethics; he contends that his arguments are conclusive against any theistic account of ethics compatible with Christian theism. I will argue that none of the objections Armstrong raises are persuasive, much less “devastating”; and that most of them have, in fact, been anticipated and addressed by defenders of divine command theories.

  • Naturalisms in Ethics Conference @ Auckland Uni

    The Naturalisms in Ethics conference will be running at the University of Auckland from 14-15 July and will feature this blog’s own Matthew Flannagan.

    Here is the blurb from organiser Chris Tucker’s page (which includes registration information – see also the Facebook Event page):

    ‘Naturalism’ is a multiply ambiguous term—hence the title Naturalisms in Ethics— but it is related to a range of questions concerning the relationship of morality to science, evolution, biology, religion, and natural properties (whatever those are). Many otherwise disparate moral theories have been labeled as ethical naturalisms, including virtue ethics (both neo-Aristotelian and neo-Humean), moral functionalism, Cornell realism, and natural law theories. Some potential paper topics include the following (but the list is hardly exhaustive):

    • What are the different types of ethical naturalism?
    • Why should we endorse/reject ethical naturalism or some specific version thereof?
    • What can science or evolution tell us about morality, moral psychology, or the rationality of moral judgments?
    • Are naturalistic accounts of morality better off than theistic ones?

    Speakers include:

    Matt’s paper, “Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism? A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong” will be chaired by Erik Wielenberg of DePauw University. Matt’s abstract is below: (more…)

  • Guest Post: Paul Copan Replies to Hector Avalos – Deuteronomy 25:11-12, an Eye for an Eye, and Raymond Westbrook

    My book review of John Loftus’s The Christian Delusion: Why Faith Fails prompted several responses from Hector Avalos, one of the book’s contributors. Avalos has offered critiques of not just my arguments but also those of my good friend Paul Copan. This Guest Post, written by Paul Copan, responds to some of Avalos’s charges. Paul Copan writes:

    Paul CopanRecently Hector Avalos has responded to a particular argument in my book Is God a Moral Monster? (Baker).  In it, I follow biblical scholar Jerome Walsh’s interpretation of Deuteronomy 25:11-12:[1] If two men, a man and his countryman, are struggling together, and the wife of one comes near to deliver her husband from the hand of the one who is striking him, and puts out her hand[yad] and seizes his genitals, then you shall cut off her hand [kaph]; you shall not show pity.

    I first came across Walsh’s perspective by way of Richard Davidson’s book on sexuality in the Old Testament, Flame of Yahweh (Hendrickson)—a book I highly recommend.  I follow both Walsh and Davidson on the view that this text is not referring to amputating the hand, but rather depilation.  This was a punishment of humiliation involving shaving a woman’s pubic hair in thekaph—the curved region below the waist.  I won’t elaborate on what my book says, but I’ll simply address Deuteronomy 25:11-12 in the bulk of this blog posting.  In the post, I’ll address the question of lex talionis (“an eye for an eye”) and the work of Raymond Westbrook.

    1. Preliminary remarks: I have been in communication with Jerome Walsh, who prefers to stay out of the discussion.  Walsh has read Avalos’s post, though, and noted too that he did not see anything new in Avalos’s arguments that he hasn’t encountered before.  He simply saw nothing linguistically to persuade him to alter his views.

    Avalos’s repeated identification of kaph = “hand” as the “literal” meaning is misleading.  While it may be the commonest meaning, the term has less-common usages too (the bowl of a spoon, the frond of a palm tree).  It’s unproductive to start from the assumption that commonest meaning is the only one allowable unless one can prove otherwise.  The point in the article is that yad tends to refer to the hand without connotation or nuance, or when the hand is envisaged, as an instrument of pointing, hitting, doing.  Kaph, so far as he can see, connotes the hand as an instrument of grasping and holding, thus the curvature and the focus on the palm.

    In Walsh’s estimation, Avalos seems to be operating from the position of a methodological absolutism:  “X” is the common opinion, and unless one can definitively prove not-X, then one must espouse X.  He doesn’t appear to leave much room for “more likely” or “less likely” as the possible evaluation of a hypothesis.

    Avalos cites Marc Cortez for support: “The Law on Violent Intervention: Deuteronomy 25.11-12 Revisited,” Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 30:3 (2006), 431-47.  As I note in my book, though, it is unfortunate that Cortez fails to interact with Walsh’s essay, which had been published two years earlier.

    In correspondence with Walsh (May 2010), he commented on an online version of Cortez’s article.  He pointed out that while Cortez dismisses Eslinger’s attempt to identify kaph with gynecological exactitude (and he can agree with Cortez on that point), Cortez does not deal with the fact that kaph is used not just for the palm of the hand, but for several other curved, arched objects, both corporeal (sole of foot) and not (bowl of a spoon, frond of a palm tree).  Walsh’s argument simply treats kaph as the curve of the groin, a very likely meaning in Song of Solomon, and (pace Cortez) in Genesis as well.

    Cortez wants to retain without discussion the understanding of kaph as “hand.”  But Walsh notes that Cortez’s explanation of why a “talionic” law would equate “hand” as an instrument of offense with “palm of the hand” as the object of “cutting-off” is, basically, “why not?”  That begs the question.  Further, he ignores completely that there is no reason whatsoever for treating the qal of qatsats as if it were the piel.  In the piel, it clearly means “to cut off.”  In the few other instances of its appearance in the qal, it means “to cut (hair).”  Why, in this unique case, should the qal be translated as if it were a piel?

    Now, Walsh readily acknowledges that his article is not the standard reading of the passage, and that Cortez’s evaluation of others’ interpretations of Deut 25:11-12 is judicious, careful, and sober.  He would agree with Cortez completely that the peculiarities of this unique law in the Israelite corpus have led scholars to some truly egregious attempts to make sense of its oddity.  And Cortez is very good indeed at identifying the unpersuasive lengths to which some scholars have gone.  But he, like all of those scholars, has not looked at the words.  This is the contribution that Walsh’s article proposes to make.  Instead of accepting unquestioningly that “you shall cut off her hand” is what the Hebrew words mean, he has argued that that is a misreading of the Hebrew terms.  To put the disagreement in a nutshell, let me quote a line from Cortez’s article.  Cortez says:  “The first and most important question that must be addressed with respect to the woman’s punishment is (more…)

  • Hector Avalos and Careful, Non-Selective Citation of Sources

    On Debunking Christianity, Hector Avalos has posted a response to my critique of his post A Reply to Hector Avalos’ “Why Flannagan Fails History”. His latest post is entitled Flannagan Versus Westbrook: Understanding the Problem; it pretty much repeats points I have addressed in my critique, basically Avalos pretends I did not answer them.

    In the comments section, Avalos pretty much admits that Westbrook holds the view I maintained he does. When a questioner asks Avalos about the lex talionis he stated:

    “This is a highly contested issue. Some think that the literal interpretation could still be held even in post-Christian Jewish texts (I cited some in my initial post). Westbrook believes that both the literal and monetary co-existed, each applied depending on circumstances, in the biblical period.”

    Compare this with my comment to Max explaining my position:

    “Westbrook argues that serious wrongs “gave rise to a dual right in the victim or his family, namely to take revenge on the culprit, or to make composition with the culprit and accept payment in lieu of revenge”. He goes on to note, “[t]his right was a legal right, determined and regulated by the court”. The courts could “fix the level of composition payment” making “revenge a contingent right, which was only revived if the culprit failed to pay”.

    When talionic legal formulae occur in A.N.E. legal texts they merely express that the punishment be proportional to the crime. This could involve punishment in kind (which would be proportional to the crime) but in most cases it would probably involve monetary compensation.”

    Avalos is aware of my dialogue with Max as he quotes from it in his post. Readers will note the position he now attributes to Westbrook. This is almost exactly the view I said Westbrook held in my response yet, oddly, this comment by Avalos occurs under a post he entitled “Flannagan versus Westbrook” where he continues to argue to Debunking Christianity’s readers that I misrepresented Westbrook’s position.

    I am flat tack with mid-semester marking at the moment, in the coming month I have two conferences looming I am giving papers to, I am moderating a panel discussion and speaking in another so unfortunately I cannot respond to all of Avalos’ claims. However, I do want to address one objection he raised in Why Dr. Flannagan Fails History, Dr. Hector Avalos Responds, which was part of  Avalos’ case that I engaged in “a very selective and uncritical reading of the sources” I cited to support my position:

    “As it is, Flannagan might need to update his Copan readings. On page 121 of Is God A Moral Monster: Making Sense of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2011), Copan reluctantly admits that Deuteronomy 25:11-12 might be “the only biblical instance of punishment by mutilation.” So now Copan has gone from arguing that the Bible represented an advance over other cultures that practiced legal mutilation to making a case for the Bible’s superiority because it might have ONLY ONE case of mutilation for a poor woman helping to save her husband. What a magnificent improvement.”

    MirrorThe conclusion people are supposed to draw from this is that I am unaware of Copan’s latest writings. However, as my readers know, I have read Copan’s book (Paul sent me an electronic copy before it was published because he wanted my feedback on the manuscript; he also sent me post publication electronic and hard copies as well). It is worth comparing Avalos’ citation, and summary with a copy and paste from the original, as it is revealing to do so. Here is what Copan actually says on page 121 (more…)

  • A Reply to Hector Avalos’ “Why Flannagan Fails History”

    It seems my recent Philosophia Christi review of  John W. Loftus’ The Christian Delusion: Why Faith Fails has hit something of a nerve. Professor Hector Avalos, who wrote “Yahweh is a Moral Monster” in The Christian Delusion, has written a response entitled “Why Dr. Flannagan Fails History, Dr. Hector Avalos Responds”.

    Avalos raises several points which I cannot address in a single post. Here I will simply address his claim that I that I relied “on a very selective and uncritical reading of the sources”, misrepresented the views of Raymond Westbrook and utilised “careless scholarship”.

    1. My Sources
    In my review I stated,

    “On p215, Avalos dismisses Copan’s contention that the lex talionis does not call “for bodily mutilation, but rather just (monetary) compensation” as “mere assertion”. However, only a page later, Avalos criticizes Copan’s comments about the manumission of slaves citing the authority of “Raymond Westbrook, one of the foremost biblical legal specialists”. In fact, Westbrook has defended Copan’s position on the lex talionis [“The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law” in A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003) 74].”[1]

    Here I state the position that Avalos attributes to Paul Copan, the position that that the lex talionis does not call “for bodily mutilation, but rather just (monetary) compensation”, has been defended by Raymond Westbrook in a particular book that I referenced. Avalos contended I have “misrepresented Westbrook”; he provides four arguments for this conclusion. None of them is sound.

    A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law by Raymond WestbrookFirst Avalos stated that I offered “no actual quote to support this allegation so that we can verify whether he is even reading Westbrook correctly.” This is false, I did provide a way of verifying my claim. While, due to word count restrictions, I did not give a direct quote, I did provide a reference; I referred the reader to page 74 of Westbrook’s “The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law” in A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003). This is clear from the quotation above, which, oddly, Avalos cited in his criticism.

    Moreover, even if I did not provide a citation (which I patently did) Avalos’ conclusion that I misrepresented Westbrook would not follow from this. What would follow would be that he would have no way of checking that I had not misrepresented Westbrook; however, the fact one cannot check that something  is not the does not mean it is, in fact, the case. From my living room in New Zealand tonight I cannot check the whether Loftus has  not robbed a bank, so can I conclude he is a bank robber? Of course not.

    It is logical howlers like this in Avalos’s work that has lead me to be so critical of it. If Avalos cannot check whether my citation was accurate then he cannot know I misrepresented it, which raises the question: why then has he claimed that I did?

    2. Wrong Book
    Avalos’ second argument was to ignore my citation and refer to a different book by Westbrook. He states:

    “Westbrook has made himself quite clear in Everyday Law in Biblical Israel: An Introduction[Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 2009], pp. 78-79). Therein he discusses how later Rabbinic literature, and specifically Mekhiltah Neziqin 8 to Exodus 21:24, claimed that “An eye for an eye’ [means] money.”

    Westbrook comments: ‘This interpretation seems strained to a modern reader. The introduction to the formula in Leviticus 24:19 is unequivocal: “If anyone maims a fellow, as he had done so shall it be done to him.’” [Emphasis Avalos’]

    There are several problems here.

    First, this does not refute my claim. I said Westbrook defended a certain position in his article “The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law” in A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law. Pointing out that Raymond Westbrook argued for a different view in a different book, does not show that my claim was false or a misrepresentation.

    Second, the quote Avalos provided from the different book by Westbrook does not contradict my claim. By prefacing the quotation with “Westbrook has made himself quite clear”, “Therein he discusses how … and specifically…” and “Westbrook comments”, Avalos creates the impression that Westbrook claimed that the rabbinic position is “strained” and is “unequivocally” contradicted by the biblical text.  However, the careful reader will note that the citation does not actually say this. In the citation, (more…)