Category: Philosophy of Religion

  • Response to William Lane Craig’s Question 225: “The ‘Slaughter’ of the Canaanites Re-visited” Part II

    Samuel rebukes SaulIn my last post “Response to William Lane Craig’s Question 225: “The ‘Slaughter’ of the Canaanites Re-visited” Part I” I discussed William Lane Craig’s position on the Canaanite Conquest account (in light of the fact that Craig referred to my argument in his question of the week: “Question 225: The “Slaughter” of the Canaanites Re-visited”). I clarified the delineations as to where he agrees and disagrees with the position I presented at the Evangelical Philosophical Society’s session at the Society for Biblical Literature Meeting in Atlanta last year and I established that the point of divergence in our agreement rests on 1 Samuel 15.

    In my Atlanta paper I argued that Nicholas Wolterstorff’s reading of the Canaanite conquest accounts in Joshua can also be applied to the account of Saul exterminating the Amalekites in 1 Sam 15.

    First, the so-called ‘genocide accounts’ in 1 Sam 15 are part of a broader context that includes the rest of Samuel and also other canonical books, such as 2 Samuel and the book of Chronicles. When one reads the whole sequence, one observes that while 1 Samuel 15 describes Saul, at God’s command, exterminating the Amalekites, later passages in Samuel and Chronicles proceed on the assumption this never literally happened.

    The key passage is God’s command to Samuel, “strike [nakah] Amalek [the Amalekites] and utterly destroy [haram] all that he has, and do not spare [hamal] him; but put to death both man and woman, child and infant, ox and sheep, camel and donkey.”[1] The text goes on to explicitly state that the Amalekites were all wiped out:

    “So Saul defeated [nakah] the Amalekites, from Havilah as you go to Shur, which is east of Egypt. He captured Agag the king of the Amalekites alive, and utterly destroyed [haram] all the people with the edge of the sword. But Saul and the people spared [hamal] Agag and the best of the sheep, the oxen, the fatlings, the lambs, and all that was good, and were not willing to destroy them utterly; but everything despised and worthless, that they utterly destroyed.” [2]

    A few verses later (15:33) the text records that Agag, the sole survivor, was executed. So, read literally, this passage states that all the Amalekites were killed and all their livestock were either destroyed or taken as plunder to be sacrificed to God at Gilgal.[3]

    Now the language of “defeated” (or struck), “utterly destroyed”, the reference to “sparing” and to livestock parallels the language of the command in 15:3. Given this, it seems implausible that we should interpret the command in verse 3 as literal but the fulfilment, just 4 verses later, as hyperbolic; the text requires that the command and fulfilment be read in the same sense.

    That said, when one reads this passage as part of as a single narrative a literal reading appears untenable; the proceeding text states quite emphatically that the Amalekites were not, in fact, literally wiped out. In 1 Samuel 27:8-9 David invaded a territory full of Amalekites:

    “Now David and his men went up and raided the Geshurites, the Girzites and the Amalekites. (From ancient times these peoples had lived in the land extending to Shur and Egypt.) Whenever David attacked an area, he did not leave a man or woman alive, but took sheep and cattle, donkeys and camels, and clothes. Then he returned to Achish.”

    Not only does this text affirm that the Amalekites still existed but the reference to Egypt and Shur states that they existed in the very same area that Saul ‘utterly destroyed every single one of them’ in in the previous passages. Moreover, David took sheep and cattle as plunder; again, livestock was another of the things Saul was said to have already eradicated.

    After the text has told us that Saul “utterly destroyed all the people”, including King Agag, and despite the text telling us that when David attacked an area (the very same areas as Saul) he did “not leave a man or woman alive”, three chapters later we read that a sizeable Amalekite army attacked Ziklag![4] David apparently pursued this army and fought a long battle with them and 400 Amalekites fled on horseback!![5] Where are all these Amalekites coming from?

    These are not the only examples. In 2 Samuel 1:8 an Amalekite took credit for killing Saul –but didn’t Saul “utterly destroy all the people”? In 1 Chronicles 4:43 Amalekites were still around in battle-ready numbers during the reign of Hezekiah who reigned after Saul and David.

    Read literally, the narrative affirms both that the Amalekites were and were not totally wiped out. This apparent contradiction in the Samuel narrative is (more…)

  • “Confronting the Challenge of Secularism” Madeleine to Speak at the Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture

    The Notre Dame Center for Ethics and CultureNot too long ago I wrote a post entitled We’re Going to San Francisco! In it I announced that in November 2011 Madeleine and I will jointly be giving a paper to the Society of Biblical Literature Annual Meeting, and that I will be giving a paper to the Evangelical Philosophical Association Annual Meeting and also to the Evangelical Philosophical Association’s Annual Apologetics Conference. Well, now we are also going to South Bend, Indiana.

    The Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture recently advertised a call for papers for its 2011 Flagship Fall Conference, “Radical Emancipation:  Confronting the Challenge of Secularism.” The stated aim of the conference is:

    “… to bring together a large number of respected scholars representing all the main academic fields, from Catholic, Christian, and secular institutions, to engage in a spirited discussion of this theme from the perspectives of philosophy, theology and religious studies, law, history, the social sciences, literature and the arts, as well as other fields of intellectual inquiry and endeavor.”

    Given that the conference will be held only a few days before the San Francisco cluster of conferences, given that both Madeleine and I work in religion in public life from within our separate disciplines of philosophy of law and analytic theology and both of us draw from the writings of Notre Dame scholars, we decided to both put in papers. It seems that a lot of other people had the same idea as an announcement appeared on the website “Record number of conference abstracts submitted!” This is not surprising given the reputation and calibre of the Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture so when we saw this we thought neither of us stood a chance.

    So, you can imagine our delight, and how proud I was of my wife, when she received the following email notification yesterday,

    “I am pleased to accept your paper proposal for presentation at the conference to be held at the University of Notre Dame from November 10-12, 2011. Congratulations! … This year, we turned down an unprecedented number of worthy paper proposals: well over 200 individuals submitted abstracts for consideration.”

    My paper was not successful but I have been invited to chair a session 🙂

    Madeleine wrote a very good abstract:

    “No Privileges, No Penalties” and the De-Privileging of Secularism

    Madeleine Flannagan – University of Auckland, New Zealand

    The dominant Establishment Clause jurisprudence reflects a separationist reading of the First Amendment that advances and protects the hegemony of secular perspectives in public life. Each test, Lemon, Endorsement and Coercion, requires the State to place a restraint on the exercise of religion in public life that effectively privatizes religion and contributes to the radical emancipation of man from God.[1]

    I will argue that the requirement of public conformity to secular perspectives exceeds the traditional understanding of separation of church and state by privileging secular perspectives over religious ones. A clear asymmetry in the way religious beliefs are treated by the State is visible in the requirement that religious believers bracket beliefs they hold as true, important and relevant when they participate in public life while secular citizens are free to utilize the beliefs central to their perspective.

    Vincent Phillip Muñoz has argued for a move away from Separationist jurisprudence and towards a test found in the writings of Founding Father James Madison, a “no privileges, no penalties” test.[2] I will argue that a “no privileges, no penalties” test could uphold freedom of religion and separation of church and state by permitting religion to have a place in public life as long as those who engage in public religious conduct do not gain a privilege for doing so and those who do not wish to participate are both free to opt out and are not penalized for doing so. The adoption of a “no privileges, no penalties” test would ensure that those seeking to bring balance to our secularized culture would not be restrained by the State from doing so.


    [1] The Lemon Test insists that public policy have a valid secular purpose; that a non-religious rationale be offered for all state actions. The Endorsement Test prohibits the state from “endorsing” religion over irreligion. The Coercion Test provides that the state must not coerce religious practice; not only must it not be required, but in Lee v Weisman the application was shifted to what Justice Scalia, in his dissent, termed a “test of psychological coercion”. The Supreme Court held that being one of few (or the only one) to opt out of a religious practice in a public setting is a form of state coercion by peer pressure. (Notably it did not hold that the same is true in reverse.)

    [2] Vincent Phillip Muñoz documents in God and the Founders: Madison, Washington and Jefferson (Cambridge University Press, Ney York, 2009) 33  that when Madison was editing the religious freedom amendment to Virginia’s Declaration of Rights, Madison proposed the following revision: “That Religion or the duty we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, being under the direction of reason and conviction only, not violence or compulsion, all men are equally entitled to the full and free exercise of it accord[in]g to the dictates of Conscience; and therefore that no man or class of men ought, on account of religion to be invested with peculiar emoluments or privileges, nor subjected to any penalties or disabilities …” [Emphasis mine]

    If you would like to make a donation to assist Madeleine and I in getting to the US for all of the above conferences this November please visit our “Support page” or see our “Donate” button in the side-bar.

    If you would like to book either of us to speak whilst we are in the US please let us know asap as we will be purchasing flight tickets very shortly.

  • Response to William Lane Craig’s Question 225: “The ‘Slaughter’ of the Canaanites Re-visited” Part I

    Every week William Lane Craig answers a question on his website; this week’s question of the week is entitled “The “Slaughter” of the Canaanites Re-visited”. The questioner asked what Craig thinks of the Canaanite Conquest account. I got a mention in Craig’s reply:

    The EPS Session at the SBL: Richard Hess, Randal Rauser, Paul Copan, me, Michael Rea

    “The topic of God’s command to destroy the Canaanites was the subject of a very interesting exchange at the Evangelical Philosophical Society session last November at the Society of Biblical Literature Convention in Atlanta. Matt Flannagan defended the view put forward by Paul Copan in his Is God a Moral Monster? that such commands represent hyperbole typical of Ancient Near Eastern accounts of military conquests. Obviously, if Paul is right about this, then the whole problem just evaporates. But this answer doesn’t seem to me to do justice to the biblical text, which seems to say that if the Israeli soldiers were to encounter Canaanite women and children, they should kill them (cf. Samuel’s rebuke of Saul in I Sam. 15.10-16).”

    Craig raises an important issue. In God and the Genocide of the Canaanites I, II and III I defended Nicholas Wolterstorff’s take on the Canaanite massacre in “Reading Joshua”.[1] Wolterstorff argued that the book of Joshua is a highly figurative, hagiographic and hyperbolic account of Israel’s early skirmishes and it is not intended to be taken literally in its details. My adaptation of Wolterstorff’s argument consists of three points.

    First, taken as a single narrative, and taken literally, Joshua 1-11 gives a contradictory account of events to that narrated by Judges and also to that narrated by the later chapters of Joshua itself.

    Second, those who put these books into a single narrative would have been well aware of the obvious contradictions mentioned above. These editors were not mindless or stupid, particularly if we hold that God spoke through them.

    Third, while Judges reads more like “down-to-earth”[2] history, a careful reading of Joshua shows it to be full of ritualistic, stylised accounts and formulaic language. I supported this third point with research into Ancient Near Eastern conquest accounts. Studies show such accounts are hyperbolic, hagiographic, figurative and follow a common transmission code. Comparisons between these accounts and the early chapters of Joshua suggest Joshua was written according to the same literary conventions and transmission code. I suggest these three points, taken together, provide compelling reasons for thinking that one should interpret the text as a hyperbolic, hagiographic and figurative account of what occurred; it was not meant to be taken as literally true in all its details.

    Craig’s objection to my position (and that of Paul Copan’s whose position is very close to mine) is a reference to 1 Samuel 15. Craig referred specifically to verses 10-16, where Samuel rebuked Saul “because [Saul] has turned away from [God] and has not carried out [God’s] instructions.”[3] The instructions in question were given in verse 3; God commanded Saul, “Now go and strike [nakah] Amalek [the Amelekites] and utterly destroy [haram] all that he has, and do not spare [hamal] him; but put to death both man and woman, child and infant, ox and sheep, camel and donkey.”[4] Craig suggests this “seems to say that if the Israeli soldiers were to encounter Canaanite women and children, they should kill them”. I think Craig pushes an important objection (more…)

  • Contra Mundum: Consenting Adults and Harm

    In debates over abortion, homosexual conduct, euthanasia, prostitution, drugs, those who call themselves liberals often mount the same basic argument; a socially or morally permissive stance is necessitated towards such practices because people have a right to choose do what ever they like with their own bodies. As John Stuart Mill put it in his book On Liberty:

    “The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.” [Emphasis added]

    John Stuart Mill

    Here Mill articulates the harm principle. He makes a distinction between other-regarding actions, actions that harm other people, and self-regarding actions, those that harm oneself. He argues that society, either by law or by social pressure, cannot justly regulate any action a person performs unless it is other-regarding; that is, it harms people other than the agent him/herself.

    As Mill’s position is typically interpreted, harm is understood to be governed by the principle volenti non fit injuria (where there is consent there is no injury); it refers to things done to other people without their consent. Mill states that a self-regarding action is one “which affects only himself, or affects others with their free and voluntary, and undeceived consent”.

    Mill intended his principle to be criteria as to what should and should not be made a criminal offence; he did not consider it criteria for determining what is right and wrong. Yet many contemporary liberals appear to use it in this latter way. They contend that as long as the action involves only consenting adults it is morally permissible. It is often asserted in our society, as though it were self-evident, that people have a moral right to do whatever they like with their own bodies.

    I think this claim is far from self-evident. Irving Kristol famously proposed this counter-example in a 1971 article in New York Times Magazine:

    “[T]he plain fact is that none of us is a complete civil libertarian. We all believe that there is some point at which the public authorities ought to step in to limit the “self-expression” of an individual or group even where this might be seriously intended as a form of artistic expression, and even where the artistic transaction is between consenting adults. A playwright or theatrical director might, in this crazy world of ours, find someone willing to commit suicide on stage, as called for by the script. We would not allow that-any more than we would permit scenes of real physical torture on the stage, even if the victim were a willing masochist. And I know of no one, no matter how free in spirit, who argues that we ought to permit gladiatorial contests in Yankee stadium, similar to those once performed in the Coliseum of Rome-even if only consenting adults were involved.”

    The examples Kristol gives are all cases where any person of common sense would condemn the act but where all the victims consent to be harmed.

    In his book Harmless Wrong Doing: Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Liberal Political Philosopher Joel Feinberg considers Kristol’s objection as the most important and potentially-devastating counter-example to the harm principle and he spends considerable energy attempting to circumvent it. He offers four responses. Here I will argue that these responses fail.

    First, Feinberg questions whether such cases are really cases of consensual homicide. He suggests (more…)

  • This Wednesday @ Auckland Uni: A Godless Public Square – Do ‘Private’ Christian Beliefs Have a Place in Public Life?

    A common slogan in western liberal societies is that religion is a private matter; it has no place in public discussions of law, economics, public policy, education, social ethics, culture and so on. This “separationist” view is often attributed to US Founding Father, Thomas Jefferson “Wall of Separation Letter” and has become the orthodox view in liberal thought receiving important advocacy by philosophers such as John Rawls.

    This idea is often enforced in the courts with public displays or manifestations of religion being challenged on freedom of religion grounds. This has recently been seen in European countries; recent laws and cases have seen bans on religious emblems being worn in schools, employment situations and in public generally. The UK courts recently ruled that Christians could not foster children out of fear their private beliefs about homosexual conduct might be taught to the children.

    In the US, a confusing, and often contradictory, array of cases on everything from public displays of the ten commandments, home-schooling, school vouchers and so on has rendered the position in the position more and more hostile towards religion being exercised in public and the law has become more and more difficult to comply with because of increasing lack of clarity as to how it works.

    Increasingly in the West we are seeing the idea of religion being something private being accepted by Christian believers who feel that while they personally believe something it is inappropriate for them to apply or utilise these beliefs when thinking about or going about issues that may affect others.

    An increasing body of theological, philosophical and legal scholarship has called this orthodox view into question. These scholars have argued that the orthodox view is unjust, contradictory and arbitrary. It is unjust in that it places moral and social restraints on religious advocacy that are not imposed on non-religious views. It is arbitrary and contradictory in that the reasons typically offered for this view, if sound, seem to apply with equal force to any controversial view whether religious or secular and, in fact, to many doctrines central to liberal thought itself. Moreover, it suggests that even if religious beliefs are true and relevant to public issues, believers are to conduct themselves in public in a manner which ignores these beliefs or treats them as if they are not true if they cannot be justified from a secular viewpoint; in private they are free to believe what they want.

    Critics of orthodoxy contend this separation of faith and self in public is unrealistic at a psychological level and that it fails to understand how religions function in the lives of believers who believe their religion to be true and not merely just a personal private preference.

    New Zealand jurisprudence has not seen the litigation on this subject that the United States and Europe has so it is largely untested. The practice of being influenced by international precedent from the commonwealth and US jurisdictions coupled with our secular society which contains strong factions in favour of the liberal view – secular humanist groups, some politicians, scholars, media, bloggers – suggests that it will fall the way of the rest of the western world unless a robust counter-view is developed and advanced in the New Zealand across disciplines.

    Further to the issue of justice, the tendency to view religious beliefs as a merely private preference that is isolated from one’s public actions, decisions and choices is pervasive in the New Zealand evangelical church and it leads to a view of religion that ignores questions of truth and focuses instead on private benefit and piety of religious belief.

    For these reasons it is important this conversation be had across disciplines; particularly the three disciplines of theology, philosophy and law need to understand and hear each other so we can work together on this problem.

    With this backdrop in mind, Thinking Matters and Evangelical Union bring you, as part of Jesus Week, the following event:

    Godless Public Square

    A Godless Public Square:

    Do ‘Private’ Christian Beliefs Have a Place in Public Life?

    A Jesus Week Dialogue between Theology, Philosophy and Law

    7pm Wednesday 3 August
    Lib B28 (Library Basement, 5 Alfred St) University of Auckland

    Organised by: Thinking Matters and Evangelical Union
    Format: Panel Discussion followed by Q&A
    Moderated by: Patt Brittenden
    Speakers: listed in the order they will speak in: (more…)

  • Jesus: The Cold Case a Guest Post by Glenn Peoples

    Glenn Peoples shares his thoughts on TV One’s recent episode Jesus: The Cold Case.

    Jesus: The Cold Case

    Like a number of others tonight I have just watched Jesus: The Cold Case on TV One, presented by Bryan Bruce. Here are my thoughts on what I have seen. First off, who is Bryan Bruce?

    Bryan Bruce

    Bryan Bruce is an award winning producer, writer & director who lives in Wellington, New Zealand. He has a MA in Sociology, Psychology & philosophy from Canterbury University. A former musician and schoolteacher, he began his television career in 1984 as front person and writer for a TVNZ arts show. Since then has won awards for Best Director and Best Factual Writer and his work has made the finals of several international festivals, including the New York Television Festival and the prestigious Banff Awards.

    The overarching message that Bryan Bruce is gravitating towards in this documentary is that the biblical and subsequent Christian message on who killed Jesus, namely, “the Jews” in some broad sense, is false, and what’s more it is responsible for centuries of great evil.

    Something that strikes the viewer quite early on is that Bruce quite simply doesn’t believe that the Gospels accounts are true in general terms. “Many,” he says, “now believe that the Gospels contain more fiction than fact.” Throughout the documentary we hear from a number of academics who lend their credibility to the various claims Bruce makes.

    One of the immediate worries about the presentation is that although we’re led to believe that the presenter is applying rigorous criminal investigation methods to the case, to those familiar with the world of biblical scholarship, his list of authorities suggests otherwise:

    • Emeritus Prof. Geza Vermes (Oxford)
    • Emeritus Prof John Dominic Crossan ( St Pauls)
    • Prof. Elaine Paigels (Princeton)
    • Bishop John Shelby Spong (USA)
    • Prof. Lloyd Geering (New Zealand)
    • Dr Helen Bond ( Edinburgh)
    • Prof . Israel Hershkovitz (Tel Aviv)
    • Dr Shimon Gibson (London)

    Does this read like the list a careful investigator consults if he wants a decent shot at getting to the unvarnished truth, rather than a somewhat partisan perspective?

    According to Vermes, Jesus was resurrected in the hearts of his followers, but not literally from the dead.

    Crossan claims that Jesus’ followers had a kind of spiritual visionary experience
    Paigels writes that early Christians didn’t believe in physical resurrection at all, seeking instead a state of spiritual knowledge and enlightenment Spong says that Jesus’ resurrection had nothing to do with him coming back to life, but with the subjective – but real – experiences in the hearts of his followers.

    Lloyd Geering, who himself does not believe in any such being as God, claims that the body of Jesus remained buried and that the story of his resurrection was a later story concocted on the basis of a re-reading of the Old Testament.

    Now of course this isn’t a documentary on the resurrection, but the pattern is somewhat striking. It looks fairly clearly as though the presenter has intentionally stacked the witness stand with those hostile to the Christian story. It will hardly come as a surprise that, given such a uniform and narrow sample, the testimony will (rather gleefully!) point away from the traditional version of events surrounding the death of Christ. We might just as easily consult the faculty of Dallas Theological Seminary and claim that using rigorous scrutiny, we have reached the conclusion that the biblical portrait of Jesus’ death is, well, inerrant! Given that those consulted would be placed at one extreme of the spectrum on whether or not we can generally trust the Gospel accounts or the teaching of the early Christian movement, the interests of balance would surely call for less radical voices, the likes of Craig Evans, James Dunn, Luke Timothy Johnson or N. T Wright. One example – Lloyd Geering is quoted as assuring viewers – completely unchallenged – that the details of the crucifixion was no more than what people “imagined” had probably taken place. When it comes to the story of the resurrection, Geering is explicit – Jesus was probably buried by the Romans and that was that. No tomb, no stone rolled away, and no angels. Geering laughs, “the very fact that you’ve got angels [in the story] shows that we’re dealing with myth, not history.” There was not a single challenge raised. Not even an innuendo that Geering’s view isn’t the scholarly consensus. This was said just minutes after the narrator told us that the Gospel was more fiction than fact.

    This type of concern rears its head among a more sceptical audience when the evangelical likes of Lee Strobel seeks to do just what Bryan Bruce is doing: Apply critical scrutiny to the facts concerning the life of Christ. And yet we frequently hear the complaint that Strobel consults only committed and usually conservative Christians, people who are unlikely to disagree strongly with each other – or with Strobel. I would hope, then, that this same type of sceptical, professedly critical audience will likewise regard Bruce’s offering as a biased, selective survey of a very thin slice of the scholarly community. For example (more…)

  • Does Moral Commitment Presuppose Belief in Providence?

    John HareLast week I had the privilege of hearing Professor John Hare, of Yale Divinity school, speak on God and morality at the Naturalisms in Ethics and APRA conferences. One idea Hare proposes, which fascinates me, is that commitment to morality presupposes belief in what he calls “strong providence” the position that “the world is so ordered that a person’s own virtue is consistent with her own happiness, whether other people are virtuous or not.”[1]

    Here is one line of argument he gives for this conclusion:

    “Consider the fact that we try to teach our children to be moral. We also want them to be happy. If we thought that being virtuous would make them miserable, we would be more ambivalent about teaching them virtue than we actually are. But many people persevere in the attempt to bring up their children to be morally good people even though they do not think their children will be living in a society in which most of their fellows are morally good people. … What lies behind such perseverance is surely a belief that the world is so ordered that when their children grow up, they can be both morally good and happy, and that this is secured not by general human virtue but by something else. The nature of this something else is often, I think, left indeterminate.”[2]

    This example is interesting because it focuses not on one’s own happiness but on the happiness of others. Appeals to self-interest and one’s own happiness are often dismissed as corruptions to moral motivation. In Hare’s example, one is concerned about the happiness of others, in particular one’s children, so the concerns he highlights are altruistic as opposed to egoistic.

    I am inclined to think there is something to Hare’s argument.  I do think that if we thought being virtuous would make our children miserable then a lot of parents might be less disposed towards bringing up their children to be pursue good. Most I talk to agree;  it is hard to comprehend how a loving and caring parent could teach children to be virtuous if doing so would result in their unhappiness. However, our practice of trying to teach our children to be moral suggests we do not believe being virtuous and being happy are incompatible.

    This has me wondering, does commitment to morality as an institution, where we attempt to follow its precepts and encourage them in others, commit us to assumptions about some kind of moral providential order to the world? What would happen to morality if we rejected this? Would there be something sadistic about inculcating moral virtue in our children or encouraging it in others?


    [1] John Hare Moral Faith and Providence, a paper presented at the 1996 Annual Wheaton Philosophy Conference, accessed 27 December 2010.
    [2] Ibid.

    Don’t miss hearing John Hare speak in Auckland next week, he is not in New Zealand for long. All the following events will be held at the University of Auckland and are open to the public, click on the links to get the details: