Category: Social Commentary

  • Some subversive thoughts on immigration

    I’ve been thinking recently about the moral issues surrounding immigration. This is partly because it’s an issue I’ve never really studied in depth, and partly because it’s become a massive political football.

    Here’s a thought that came to me. As I understand it, the right of a refugee to seek asylum in international law has Christian roots, which in turn draw on certain passages in the Torah, such as this one:

    You shall not hand over to his master a slave who has escaped from his master to you. He shall live with you in your midst, in the place that he chooses in one of your towns where it pleases him; you shall not mistreat him.(Deut 23:15-16)

    This law contrasts with common legal practice in the ancient Near East, where people were legally required to return any runaway slaves. Consider, for example, the Laws of Hammurabi (c. 1750 BCE):

    LH §16: If a man should harbor a fugitive slave or slave woman of either the palace or of a commoner in his house and not bring him out at the herald’s public proclamation, that householder shall be killed.

    Or a fifteenth-century BCE treaty between two Syrian kings:

    If a fugitive slave, male or female, of my land flees to your land, you must seize and return him to me; (or), if someone else seizes him and takes him to you, [you must keep him] in your prison, and whenever his owner comes forward, you must hand him over to [him].[1]

    Jefferey Tigay explains:

    The only thing remotely close to this biblical law in the ancient world is the practice at certain temples of granting asylum to slaves fleeing harsh treatment by their masters. Generally, such asylum was not permanent; it protected the slave until he could come to terms with his master or, as a last resort, was sold to another master. By contrast, the biblical law is absolute and treats the whole land of Israel as a sanctuary offering permanent asylum.[2]

    Notice what the Torah passage states: it forbids Israel from deporting someone who has escaped into their nation to escape slavery, and it prohibits restricting their freedom of movement within Israel or limiting their choice of where to live. (Here the “you” is a collective reference to Israel, not simply “your” towns.)

    I was familiar with this passage, but I was struck by its possible application to modern immigration.

    Let’s begin with some historical examples.

    Example 1 (1850). The Fugitive Slave Act required citizens of states where slavery had been criminalized to assist in the capture and return of escaped slaves who had made their way into those states. Abolitionists at the time quoted Deuteronomy 23:15–16 to justify refusing to comply with this law.

    So: you live in a free state in 1850. You discover the whereabouts of a runaway slave who is fleeing an abusive master. Do you (a) comply with the Fugitive Slave Act and hand him over to the authorities, or (b) conceal his whereabouts to prevent his capture? I think most of us would agree that (b) is the right thing to do.

    Example 2 (1930s). The Nazis persecute Jewish people across Europe. Thousands of Jews flee and seek to emigrate, but protectionist U.S. immigration policies mean many are refused entry. You discover a German Jewish overstayer. Do you (a) inform the authorities so he is deported back to Germany, or (b) help conceal his whereabouts? Intuitively, (b) again seems the morally right course; (a) would be immoral.

    Example 3 (contemporary). It is 2025. The Taliban rule Afghanistan. You discover an Afghan overstayer who fled the Taliban; if reported, he will be deported. Do you (a) report him, or (b) conceal him? Or you discover an undocumented Mexican restaurant owner in California who fled cartels, or a Nigerian Christian overstayer who fled persecution? Do you disclose their legal status or do you conceal it? From what I read, many American evangelicals appeal to Romans 13—“obey the government”—to argue that Christians must support the deportation of illegal aliens because the law has been broken in these cases.

    So here is my question: how do these 2025 cases differ in principle from examples 1 and 2? In all cases, the person is illegally in the country while fleeing life-threatening danger—slavery, genocide, Taliban rule, cartels. Is there a principled difference between returning a slave to his master and sending someone back to the Taliban or cartels? If those who defied the Fugitive Slave Act were doing the right thing, why must we follow the law here?


    [1] Jeffrey H. Tigay, Deuteronomy, JPS Torah Commentary (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1996), 387.

    [2] Tigay, Deuteronomy, 215

  • Goodbye NCEA, Farewell, Get lost, Good Riddance

    Some readers of this blog will know that I work as a secondary school teacher. Recently, several people have asked my opinion on the government’s decision to ditch the National Certificate of Educational Achievement (NCEA). My thoughts follow.

    When I was at teachers’ college, we were taught that New Zealand had the best curriculum in the world. Unlike other curricula, which focused on subject content, New Zealand’s curriculum focused on certain kinds of skills—analysis, critical thinking, research, etc.

    A comparison between the NCEA standards for Religious Studies (my specialist subject) and Cambridge illustrates the contrast. For IGCSE World Religions, students study two major religions over the course of a year. The syllabus requires them to learn a huge amount of content—about the religion’s history, doctrines, modes of worship, and so on. The assessment is an examination in which any of these topics could be assessed.

    By contrast, Level 1 NCEA has standards such as: Demonstrate understanding of the development of a community that shares religious or spiritual beliefs. This is flexible—teachers can choose any religion. One gets an Achieved if they show understanding of the development of the religious community, a Merit if they can explain it, and an Excellence if they examine it. The focus is on analytical skills. Prima facie, this is a good idea. Education should not be about regurgitating facts; it should develop skills of understanding, explaining, and examining.

    This appearance, however, has not withstood my experience at the coalface, teaching Religious Studies to Year 11–13 boys.

    My first practical experience with NCEA was during my practicum in 2009. I was placed at a low-decile school in South Auckland. The school was almost entirely in Pasifika in its demographic. Despite being in a poor area and having a demographic that statistically underachieves, the school was getting good results—large numbers of students were getting Achieved. Here was the method I encountered:

    • Period 1: Tell the students the questions they will be assessed on. Get them to copy them down.
    • Period 2: Tell them the answer to Question 1. Write it down.
    • Period 3: Tell them the answer to Question 2. Write it down.
    • Rinse and repeat
    • Then the assessment: Take the sheet of paper you’ve copied the answers onto into an exam where you will be asked the memorised questions.

    I am not joking. What was interesting was that even under these conditions, students would talk during the assessment and not finish. So extensions were given until the students all passed. Or they were held in till they finished.

    Here I discovered the perverse incentive structures of NCEA. Because there were certain prescribed skills (such as “explain” and “describe”) which were internally assessed by the school, and because the school’s reputation was tied to how well it got traditionally low-achieving groups to pass, tactics like this actually made the school “successful.” Students who struggled with basic skills and academic discipline would pass at high rates.

    My experience in the teaching sector has suggested to me that this sort of thing is not an aberration. I have seen many NCEA programmes where students who lack basic skills pass because they are spoon-fed the answers. I have seen, for example, courses where students copy notes into a workbook in each class, then have a week of classes to copy those notes into a resource, and are then given a structured worksheet on how to write an essay. They fill in the worksheet with the material from the resource. Despite the apparent ease of this, I have witnessed teachers offer several weeks of classes—including lunchtime and after-school sessions—to get students to complete the task. If all else fails, threaten a detention until they fill out the sheet. Instant, Achieved. In a short time, this student who can’t write an essay or hand one in on time gets University Entrance. A school has managed to get large numbers of students known for lack of academic ability to university level. It looks impressive—but of course, in the long term, it is fraudulent. These students haven’t achieved the “skills”; they’ve ticked boxes and been micromanaged on how to tick them.

    My next experience was doing professional development on NCEA marking. At a best-practice workshop, I was given a model answer for the standard Describe the beliefs of a religious community. It stated: “According to Christianity, Jesus was a good moral teacher.” Achieved or Not Achieved?

    I said Not Achieved. My reason: this is not an accurate description of what Christianity teaches. Muslims believe Isa (Jesus) was a prophet, so they would consent to this statement. An agnostic could—and many do—accept that Jesus was a good moral teacher. Christianity teaches Jesus is the Messiah and God incarnate.

    I was told I was being too precise. To meet the standard, they only need the most generic answer. The student should get an Achieved simply for writing that down.

    We went on to look at exemplars of Merit and Excellence. To get an Excellence, a student needs to “evaluate.” I pointed out that the evaluation provided was extremely poor. I was told that the standard didn’t say “evaluate well”—it simply said “evaluate.” That meant the student used words like therefore and in conclusion. If they used such words, they were using evaluative language and hence got an Excellence.

    On another occasion, I was learning the ropes of moderation. The course was on the Reformation. To get an Achieved, the student had to describe the key facts. To get a Merit, they had to show the implications of the facts. I  was told that because the word “facts” is plural, NZQA required that a student get two facts correct. Facts were things like names, places, and dates. This meant that if a student, after studying the Reformation for several weeks, wrote only: “Martin Luther, Wittenberg 1517,” they got an Achieved.

    Here I learned how words like “describe,” “evaluate,” “discuss,” and “analyse” did not mean what they appeared to. Due to bureaucratic requirements and moderation procedures, they had highly specific meanings which reduced them to a checklist. A student could know in advance what the checklist was and tick the boxes. They didn’t need to understand, analyse, or evaluate in the ordinary sense of those terms. Or at least not in terms of what would be expected by the canons of the discipline.  

    Students were often aware of this. I’ve had several classes where I assigned an essay and got the response: “Sir, if I don’t write an intro and a conclusion, but just write X, Y, Z, will I still get an Achieved?” The honest answer, according to the requirements I had been told, was yes. What do the students do? They don’t bother learning to write an essay. They can Google the basic “facts” they need to meet the minimum standard. Do it, pass. They haven’t learned to write an essay, or research, or think critically. They’ve learned that they don’t have to. The most efficient path to success is to not do these things. They know the game.

    This was exacerbated by a third feature of NCEA. When I was teaching it, a student could pass an entire course by doing two or three internal assessments early in the year. Once they had ticked the box and got an Achieved, they could tune out for the rest of the course. They could fail to show up for the exam and still get an Achieved. I had many students ask me: “Sir, if I don’t hand in X and Y or do the exam, I’ll still get an Achieved, right?” They were right. I saw large numbers of students pass subjects without ever successfully sitting an exam. They left with University Entrance.

    The school I currently teach at has a dual pathway: NCEA and Cambridge. A few years ago, the leadership began assigning me fewer NCEA classes and more Cambridge ones. Here’s what I noticed.

    First, students were much more concerned about learning the content. They knew that anything they learned might be in the examination—and they didn’t know which topics would be. Second, they were keenly aware of risk. They understood that if they failed the exam, that was it—they failed the year. They also knew I couldn’t give them a break; I wasn’t the examiner—Cambridge was. A re-sit might mean they would repeat another six months of work. It couldn’t be done for two days during my lunch hour.

    Third, I discovered that appearances can be deceiving. While Cambridge had a huge amount of content, when it asked questions in the exam, it used terms like “discuss,” “describe,” and “explain.” These terms were not redefined in non-standard ways. The people marking the exams were subject specialists who knew what these terms meant, and the marking schedule reflected that. Students were assessed on things like “used relevant information,” “took into account various views,” and “some inaccurate information.” “detailed evidence” “technical precision”. They also had to write answers in essay form. Through the process of doing practice exams, students learned those skills. To prepare, they had to research a massive body of content and ask how they could put it into essay form—how to analyse and draw on relevant information. They weren’t just regurgitating facts; they were developing the requisite skills.

    Fourth—and most disturbing—I noticed that every year I taught bright students with potential who told me they were going to transfer to NCEA because it was easier. They could get into university without doing an exam and could, with minimal stress, get an Excellence in every subject—often in the first half of the year. Even more pernicious, I encountered Māori and Pasifika students who told me that because of their race, they are “too dumb” for Cambridge. These students—often bright and full of potential—lack self-belief. Because of this, they doubt themselves, and they know they can get academic success without the risk, effort, or fear of failure. Every year, I try to talk students out of dropping out and switching to NCEA because “it’s easier to pass.”

    Here I reflect on the irony of my first experience with NCEA. People were concerned about Māori and Pasifika fail rates. They were using NCEA to fix the problem. Large numbers were passing. The problem is—they were not being educated. We were defrauding society and the students themselves by declaring they were educated and certifying them as having skills they didn’t have. Academic skills are acquired through work, practice, and the risk of failure. Making errors is part of the process. It requires students to take ownership and responsibility for their learning. It cannot just be given for free by a teacher or from the ministry. These students were learning that they didn’t need any of that to pass. Someone else would just give them the results if they checked a box.  

    So, when I heard the government was scrapping NCEA, my initial response was this: Goodbye NCEA. Farewell, get lost. Good riddance.

    Cross-posted at kiwiblog

     

     

  • Michael Huemer on Wokeness

    Political Philosopher Michael Huemer weighs in on the question: what is wokeness?

    I have been known to describe the essence of wokism as “reverse bigotry”. In the past, various forms of bigotry were common: prejudice against blacks, against women, against gays, against transgender people, and more. Wokism proposes, rather than to eliminate bigotry, to reverse the direction of traditional bigotry: replace anti-black racism with anti-white (or pro-black) racism; replace anti-female sexism with anti-male sexism; etc.

    Now you might think this an unfair description of the views listed in section 1. For instance, just because someone thinks that America is systemically racist against blacks, doesn’t mean that they support racism against whites, does it?

    Two things to note:

    One, the people who say that are basically blaming white people for the problems suffered by blacks as a group. They are saying that racism (which is, on their view, one of the greatest evils of the world) on the part of white people is responsible for black disadvantage. Sometimes they say the racism is “systemic”, which means that there need not be any actual racists, but many of them say that the racism is ongoing in the hearts of white people today. Anyway, even the systemic racism was caused by evil white people in the past.

    For a thought experiment, ask yourself what you would think about a person who explained most of the evils of the modern world as the product of wrongful behavior or evil character on the part of the Jews, either now or in the past. There are actually people like this. We call them “anti-Semites”, and they are obviously racists. If you replace “Jews” with “whites”, then you just have a different form of racism.

    The full article is available here at Huemer’s blog Fake Nous.

  • When bigots call out “bigots”

    Albert Giubilini and I would not agree on a lot. Giubilini has defended not only abortion rights but what he calls “after-birth abortion”( which of course is a reference to infanticide). He also opposes religious conscientious objection in medicine. I disagree with him on both topics and disagree strongly. I find his conclusions repugnant. 

    However,  it is the nature of moral philosophy that people will debate controversial moral opinions, opinions both sides feel strongly about. When the issue is a serious one, such as the ethics of war, abortion, or capital punishment, where you are literally discussing who can and cannot be killed people will find the views of their opponents repugnant and sincerely believe their views are harmful. This does not mean I attempt to harangue and shut down any lectures he does, or lobby for journals to not publish his work. It means I do the best I can to critique his views, as well as defend and sketch an alternative ethic which better accounts for our considered moral judgements. 

    Studying moral philosophy has also taught me that often people you disagree with on one topic will say insightful and interesting things on another. In fact, they often say insightful things on the topic you disagree with them on. Those you disagree with are almost never always wrong and those in your camp are almost never always right. You can learn a lot reading people whose worldviews are very different to your own. 

    To this end. I recently found an interesting piece Gulibani wrote on the. Practical Ethics blog at Oxford  University. 

    One thing that stands out from the article is this, which reflects ideas I have myself expressed on occasion. 

    The problem I am talking about is that on university campuses there is today a tendency towards bigotry. Being offended by certain topics to the point of wanting to shut down discussions can, in certain circumstances, turn political correctness into a kind of bigotry. Following the dictionary, we can define bigotry as “intolerance towards those who hold different opinions from oneself.” In this dictionary sense, bigotry does not describe the content of one’s moral beliefs, but rather the extent to which someone is prepared to expose her ideas to counter-arguments and evidence. Also, a more philosophical definition of “bigotry” – such as the one provided by John Corvino – does not tie bigotry to any particular political or moral view, whether “conservative” or “liberal.” According to Corvino, bigotry is “stubborn and unjustified contempt toward groups of people, typically in the context of a larger system of subordination.

    Giubilini points out that bigotry, or “being a bigot” is not determined by the fact a person holds a particular opinion on race, gender, abortion, religion, political policy or economics to you. According to both the normal dictionary meanings of the word[1], and also more detailed philosophical analyses such as that of John Corvino. Bigotry is a function of *how* the opinion is held, and how one responds to those who disagree with that opinion.

    Two aspects of what constitutes bigotry are noteworthy. Bigotry involves not just strongly held opinions, but *stubbornly* held opinions. If one holds an opinion strongly but is prepared to listen to counterarguments and revise your opinion in the face of new information and argument rather than just stubbornly affirm it no matter what, then you are not a bigot. You might be mistaken, but you aren’t a bigot. 

    Similarly, bigotry involves intolerance towards those who hold rival ideas. Intolerance is not “disagreement”. If I said to you, “I tolerate my wife’s cooking” you would assume my wife was a bad cook and her cooking was something I had to endure dispute not liking it. You are not tolerant if you agree with certain views. Tolerance is determined by how one responds to views one disagrees with or finds distasteful, mistaken and so on.  

     So if you try and ban and shut down, or express hatred towards people who disagree with you, demeaning them banning them, trying to have them removed from the country, intimidating them insulting and shaming them and so forth then you are intolerant. It doesn’t matter what those views are and what views you hold. If you do those things you are not tolerating those who disagree with you. 

    To his credit, Gulibani realizes this: 

    “The aforementioned reactions of some pro-life (and, to a smaller extent, of some pro-choice) people to the after-birth abortion paper are a clear example of bigotry. But it would be a mistake to think that in academia bigotry is a prerogative of the pro-life or conservative camp. Actually, as the feminists’ disruption of the OSFL’s event demonstrates, pro-lifers and conservatives in academia are often victims of bigotry on the part of (some) feminists, pro-choice supporters, and liberals more generally. This is because bigotry is a function of the (un)ease with which someone is offended by other people’s opinions or even by scientific hypotheses, and there is no reason to think that feminists, so-called liberals or pro-choice advocates are less susceptible to being easily offended than conservatives. One can hold the most progressive or liberal ethical and political views and still be a bigot in the sense of I have defined. As Teresa Bejan recently wrote in an article in The Atlantic, today, “[w]hile conservative students defend the importance of inviting controversial speakers to campus and giving offense, many self-identified liberals are engaged in increasingly disruptive, even violent, efforts to shut them down.” As a self-identified liberal, I have to say that, sadly, this claim finds confirmation in my experience.” 

    The irony is that today, many people who confidently pride themselves on “calling out bigotry” are actually bigots. 

    If you turn up to angry protests demanding that people who express certain views be silenced, shut down. You are doing two things, first, you are showing, that will not consider rival views, listen to them or consider them, instead, you will just angrily shut those views down, refuse to listen and make sure no one else can. You will not examine any counterarguments, in fact you are demanding such arguments not be made. If you do this have not just strong views, but stubborn views, views immune to counter-evidence. Second, you are also exercising intolerance towards those with whom you disagree. So, you are a bigot. 

    Saying “ I am calling out bigotry” doesn’t make you, not a bigot just as the claim by the characters in Orwell’s 1984 claiming they worked for the Ministry of Truth, didn’t change the fact they were publishing lies. Stating a claim over and over doesn’t make it true. Nor does chanting slogans about how much you hate bigotry make you, not a bigot. Words have meanings and we know what a bigot is. If you hold your opinion stubbornly and use it to act intolerantly against others you meet the core criteria of a bigot.

    So, when I am confronted with a young first-year university student, straight out of high school, who tells me some view I hold “makes me a bigot” and concludes am to be shunned or insulted, or silenced, because of this. My reaction is to roll my eyes. 

    I have spent years studying questions in moral philosophy and in theology, reading and exposing myself to people on all sides of the issue. I have engaged in public debates and panel discussions with people I disagree. I read the works of the best opponents of the views I hold and I have published responses to some of them in the literature. On some occasions, I have discussed and debated issues with them. I have learnt a lot from this, on several occasions my views have shifted, or I have revised what I thought. It is, of course, possible that I am holding my views stubbornly and if you have some reasons or arguments, you want me to consider I am happy to listen. 

    However, if you are just going to assert without argument, I am a bigot, refuse to listen and then demand I be shunned, hated, fired, muzzled etc. etc. I am afraid that your claim to be calling out bigotry is self-deceived bull shit. It is true I might be a bigot. However, your behaviour makes it abundantly clear that you are.  

    Your claim to be calling out bigotry is on par with someone standing in a room shouting, in English, “I don’t speak a word of English”. That’s funny, it is something one might see an epic Monty Python skit on. But don’t expect me to take your conclusions remotely seriously. When you grow up and can have a rational discussion rather than throw a tantrum let me know. In the meantime, stop the bullshit you’re a bigot. If you want to call out bigotry, try the mirror.

     

    [1] Some examples:

     Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines a bigot as: someone who is ‘obstinately or intolerantly devoted to his own opinions and prejudices’,

    The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language says a bigot is:‘one who is strongly partial to one’s own group, religion, race, or politics and is intolerant of those who differ’.

    Miriam Webster defines a bigot as “a person who is obstinately or intolerantly devoted to his or her own opinions and prejudices especially : one who regards or treats the members of a group (such as a racial or ethnic group) with hatred and intolerance

    The Oxford Dictionary of English defines bigotry as: ‘obstinate and unenlightened attachment to a particular creed, opinion system or party’.

    Oxford Languages defines a bigot as “a person who is obstinately or unreasonably attached to a belief, opinion, or faction, especially one who is prejudiced against or antagonistic towards a person or people on the basis of their membership of a particular group.

  • IS A FETUS A HUMAN BEING? Part one: Viability

    This is one of a series of posts based on a class I teach for level 3 NCEA Religious Studies.

    In the last few posts we saw that most of the Christian religious tradition sketched the following argument against feticide;

    Premise [1] Killing a human being without justification violates the law of God.

    Premise [2] A formed conceptus (i.e. a fetus) is a human being.

    Premise [3] In the case of feticide (at least in the majority of cases) insufficient or no justification is forthcoming.

    In this next series of posts, we will look at [2], the claim that a fetus, is a human being.

    Viability

    A very common position put forward today is that a foetus doesn’t become a human being until the point of viability. Viability refers to the point in pre-natal development where a foetus can live outside the mother’s womb. The idea is that fetus is not a human being until it is capable of surviving independently of another individual, before this period, it does not have an independent existence from its mother.

    Philosopher Susan Sherwin expresses this idea when she states that a fetus “is wholly dependent on her [the mother’s] unique contribution to its maintenance, while a newborn is physically separate, though still in need of a lot of care”[1]. Current medical technology means that viability occurs around 22-24 weeks after conception. At this point in time an infant that is born prematurely survive and be placed in an incubator.

    Objections to viability

    Obviously, the claim that a fetus is not a human being until viability is controversial. Several important objections have been raised to this position. We will look at the main ones below.

    A. The problem of differing technology

    The Philosopher Peter Singer contends that just because a fetus cannot survive independently of its mother that does not mean it is not a human being. This is because whether a fetus is viable or not depends more on the medical technology of a particular culture than any feature of the fetus itself. A fetus that is not viable in a more impoverished country like Chad is viable in a city like Los Angeles. If viability is necessary for something to be a human, then a woman pregnant with a viable fetus in Los Angeles who flies from Los Angeles to Chad carries a human being when she leaves, but this human being ceases to exist when she arrives in India and yet becomes human again when she returns.

    2. The problem of conjoined twins

    The Philosopher Michael Tooley offers a different criticism of people who claim that viability is the point where a human comes into existence. Tooley argues this claim has the strange implications that conjoined (Siamese) twins are not humans either[2]. Consider conjoined twins Bob and Scott. If Bob is a human being, then since Scott cannot live independently of Bob, Scott must not be a human person. However, it is difficult to see what property Bob has that Scott lacks which would justify considering one a human and the other not. It appears then that one would be forced to conclude that they both are, and are not, human. However, both Bob and Scott are humans and killing one or both of them would be homicide despite this entailing that they are both human beings even though one cannot live independently of the other.

     C. Does Dependence end at Birth

    Above we quoted the philosopher Susan Sherwin, Sherwin argued that the difference between a fetus and a newborn infant is that a fetus is dependent on the mothers care and cannot live independently of her. Some Philosophers have argued this is false, they claim that when you reflect on the facts carefully, it is clear that dependence doesn’t end at birth. Philosopher David Oderberg is an example:

    A born baby is also totally dependent on its mother, only instead of being fed and sheltered by the mother’s automatic internal processes, it is fed and sheltered by the mother’s consciously controlled external, behaviour. How can that make a difference to whether or not a foetus is a human being?[3]

    Peter Singer points out that a new-born is entirely dependent on its mother if it happens to be born in an isolated area where there are no other lactating women or the means of bottle-feeding. An elderly woman may be entirely dependent on her children looking after her. A hiker who breaks her leg a week’s walk from a road will die if her companions do not bring help. Yet in these situations. Yet the hiker, the elderly women or the baby are still t human beings.  He concludes it is not plausible to suggest that the dependence of the non-viable fetus upon its mother makes it non-human.


    [1] Susan Sherwin, “Abortion a Feminist Perspective,” in Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine, 5th ed., ed.

    Bonnie Steinbock & John D. Arras (Mountain View CA: Mayfield Publishing Co, 1999), 364.

    [2] Michael Tooley, “Abortion and Infanticide” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Autumn, 1972), 51

    [3] David Oderberg, Applied Ethics: A Non-Consequentialist Approach (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Co, 2000), 5.

     

  • FETICIDE IN CHRISTIAN MORAL THOUGHT (Part Four) : Feticide in the Reformed Protestant Tradition

    In our last post we saw how Medieval Christian’s adopted the same position on abortion we saw developed in Alexandrian Judaism and by Patristic theologians. We also saw how this position found its way into European and English law.  Of course during the medieval period, Christian’s in Europe were Catholic.  However, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Protestant Reformation happened.

    I. Martin Luther

    In 1517 Martin Luther nailed 95 theses: propositions of protest, to the Wittenberg chapel door, sparking off a debate which would split Europe into religious factions. Luther began a movement known as Protestantism.  Protestants departed from several teachings that were advocated by the Roman Catholic Church during the Middle Ages.  These teachings predominately dealt with issues of whether a person is saved by faith or works and questions of authority and church government. There were however also some differences in opinion on certain moral issues such as divorce and celibacy.

    What is interesting however is that on abortion, the leaders of the Protestant Reformation came to essentially the same answer as their Catholic predecessors.

    In his writings, Luther addressed the issue of feticide briefly stating, “those who have no regard for pregnant women and do not spare the tender fruit are murderers and infanticides”[1].93  Luther claims that killing a fetus is both murder and infanticide.

    II. Philip Melanchthon (1497 –1560)

    A similar stance was taken by Philip Melanchthon. Melanchthon was a close companion of Luther and, next to Luther, was probably the most important leader in the Protestant Reformation and one of the first Protestant theologians. Melanchthon stated that on the forty-fifth day after conception a “fetus with formed distinct members begins to live” and he added, “souls are inserted into children about the forty fifth-day and then not only should it [the conceptus] be called an embryo but even an infant”.[2]   The reference to the forty-fifth day is probably a reference to the biological theories of ancient Greek philosophers which we looked when we studied  Alexandrian Judaism.

    III. John Calvin

    After Luther and Melanchthon, the next most important figure in the Reformation was John Calvin. Calvin established one of the most important schools of Protestant Theology in Geneva and wrote the most important defence of Protestant theology in the period.  In his Commentary on the Five Books of Moses. Calvin wrote that:

    [T]he fetus, though enclosed in the womb of its mother, is already a human being, (homo,) and it is almost a monstrous crime to rob it of the life which it has not yet begun to enjoy. If it seems more horrible to kill a man in his own house than in a field, because a man’s house is his place of most secure refuge, it ought surely to be deemed more atrocious to destroy a fetus in the womb before it has come to light.[3]

    This comment occurs in Calvin’s discussion of Exodus 21:22-25. The is the passage we looked at when we studied Alexandrian Judaism.  Calvin appeals directly to the law regarding a pregnant woman, which was cited by Alexandrian Jews, such as Philo, and Patristic writers like Jerome, Augustine.  Calvin concludes that killing a fetus in the womb is homicide.  Like these other writers, Calvin takes abortion to violate the fifth of the ten commandments. The quote above occurs in a commentary on the ten commandments specifically in the section that explains the meaning of the commandment “you shall not kill.”

    IV. Early Calvinists

    Calvin’s influence on later Protestants was immense. People who followed Calvin’s ideas were often called “Calvinists” or “reformed”. In England, a group of Calvin’s followers emerged who historians call “the Puritans” they wanted to reform the Church of England along much more Calvinist lines and make its liturgy less  Catholic.

    A leader of this group was a man called William Gouge (1575–1653) Gouge was the chairperson of a committee which drew up a document called “The Westminster Confession in 1640. The Westminster Confession was an official statement of Protestant belief and is still the official belief statement of Presbyterian and Reformed Churches today. Gouge wrote that it was a violation of the fifth commandment to abort “that which hath received a soul formed in it by God” and that “if it be unjustly cast away, shall be revenged”.[4]

    Calvinists understood the sixth commandment to forbid killing a human being without justification. Calvin had argued that “The sum of this Commandment is, that we should not unjustly do violence to anyone”.[5][Emphasis added]

    Calvin acknowledged that sometimes killing or violence are justified and in his commentary proceeded to justify homicide in certain situations based on the law itself. The conclusions that he reached were summarized in the Westminster Catechism under the question, “What is forbidden by the Sixth Commandment?” the answer was, “The sins forbidden in the Sixth Commandment are, all taking away the life of ourselves, or of others, except in case of public justice, lawful war, or necessary defence”[6] Seeing it makes no sense to punish a fetus for a crime or literally go to war with a fetus. These conclusions suggest that in the reformed tradition feticide can be justified, if at all, only under the justification of self-defence.


    [1] Ewald M Plass, What Luther Says: An Anthology, (St Louis, MO: Concordia Publishing House, 1959) 509, cited in G. Willams, “Religious Residues and Presuppositions in the American Debate on Abortion,” Theological Studies 31:1

    [2] Melanchthon, “Definitio Animae Usitata in Eccesia,” Corpus Reformatorum 13, cited in G. Willams, “Religious Residues and Presuppositions in the American Debate on Abortion,” Theological Studies 31:1 (1970).

    [3] John Calvin, Harmony of the Law, Vol. 3 http://www.ccel.org/c/calvin/comment3/comm_vol05/htm/TOC.htm.

    [4] W Gouge, Of Domesticall Duties, Eight Treatises 506, cited in G. Willams “Religious Residues and Presuppositions in the American Debate on Abortion,” Theological Studies 31:1 (1970).

    [5] Plass, What Luther Says, 509, cited in G. Willams, “Religious Residues and Presuppositions in the American Debate on Abortion” Theological Studies, 31:1 (1970).

    [6] Larger Westminster Catechism, question 136

  • Matthew Flannagan (MandM) and Jason Thibodeau (Secular Outpost) Debate God and Morality

    Yesterday, I had a long and enjoyable public discussion with Jason Thibodeau on the topic of The Euthyphro dilemma.

    Jason is a writer for the Secular Outpost and teaches philosophy at Cypress college in California. He also is the author of a recent article entitled “God’s Love is Irrelevant to the Euthyphro Problem” published in Sophia  The team at Real Atheology recently interviewed Jason about his paper a couple of weeks prompting  Cameron Bertuzzi from Capturing Christianity to have both of us discuss the matter further on his youtube channel.

    Those who follow MandM regularly will know, Jason and I have been engaging in written exchanges on this issue for several years and he has always been a thoughtful and intelligent dialogue partner. Jason has raised some challenging responses to my arguments and yesterday’s two-hour discussion/ debate was no different. It was one of the better dialogues I have had on religion and morality in a long time. Hopefully, the dialogue generates more light than heat.

    The whole dialogue is available on YouTube here: