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  • Craig v Hitchens: Dissecting the Debate UPDATE 2

    The debate between atheist journalist Christopher Hitchens and Christian Philosopher and Theologian Dr William Lane Craig has finished.

    There is an, albeit very brief, summary of the debate here and a more comprehensive one from a Philosopher here. One point of interest is that Hitchens appears to have given up towards the end and “yields his entire closing speech”. It will be interesting to see the video and read a more detailed transcript to see exactly what transpired.

    I find this debate particularly interesting as when, along with the New Zealand Association of Rationalist Humanists, Madeleine and I organised Dr Craig’s debate with Dr Bill Cooke in Auckland last year, the most common claim we heard from amongst our rationalist co-organisers was “the debate would go very differently if Craig was up against Hitchens” (after conceding that Dr Cooke got slaughtered).

    I strongly had my doubts, so I look forward to seeing the video and comparing it with my thoughts on the Craig v Cooke debate.

    [We are thinking of having Thinking Matters Auckland, our Apologetics group, purchase a copy and then we will screen it at one of our seminars so stay posted].

    UPDATE:
    When Debunking Christianity puts up a post entitled William Lane Craig “Won by a Landslide” Against Hitchens I think it is safe for all to say Craig bested Hitchens.

    UPDATE 2:
    Common Sense Atheism states “Craig was flawless and unstoppable. Hitchens was rambling and incoherent, with the occasional rhetorical jab. Frankly, Craig spanked Hitchens like a foolish child.”

  • Belief without Proof: Is Belief in God Rational if there is no Evidence? Part II

    In my previous post I criticised the rationalist objection to belief in God. In this post I want to sketch an alternative view of faith and reason defended by Alvin Plantinga. In my next post I will address two common objections to this conception.

    Belief in God as Properly Basic
    In several of his works Alvin Plantinga has suggested that the best way for Christians to proceed is to take belief in God as properly basic. Let me explain what this statement means. In Part I, I quoted Roy Clouser to the effect that if everything needs to be proven we get an infinite regress of proofs and can never know or rationally believe anything. One obvious way of avoiding this problem is to get to a point where proof is no longer needed, to have a set of beliefs which are rationally believed independent of proof. Plantinga refers to these beliefs as properly basic beliefs. It is important to elucidate carefully how such beliefs function.

    First and very importantly, properly basic beliefs are not arbitrary or groundless. While one does not believe a basic belief based on an inference or proof, basic beliefs are often based on some form of experience. Plantinga discerns two types of experience; sensory evidence, such things as appearing to see, hear or feel a given object and doxastic evidence, which he describes as “the belief feels right, acceptable, natural,”[1] “the belief seems true, appropriate, the right thing to believe.”[2]

    An example of sensory evidence would be the grounds for perceptual beliefs; I have an experience of a certain shape, colour and sound and so I form the belief that a car has driven past. I do not infer the belief from the experience by way of argument yet the belief is nevertheless grounded upon this experience.

    An example of doxastic evidence is belief in basic axioms of logic; when one entertains the conditional of modus ponens it just seems to be correct, modus ponens feels obviously true in a way that an overtly-fallacious inference does not. Similarly, with memory beliefs; for me the claim that I used to live in Hamilton seems true. I have a strong experiential pull towards it. It feels right in a way that the belief that I used to live in Iran does not. I seem to remember one being the case and not the other.

    The second thing to note is that while properly basic beliefs are rational in the absence of proof for their truth, it does not follow that they remain rational when one is aware of good arguments against them.

    If I see John screwing his face up in a particular way and grasping his leg, I might form the belief that John is in pain. However, if later John tells me that he was not in pain but rather rehearsing his death scene in the coming dramatic play he is acting in. I take his word for it and believe he was not in pain.

    The initial belief was properly-basic; however, because of what I later discovered its rational status was defeated. Sometimes we form other beliefs that lead us to question or deny our basic beliefs. Plantinga refers to these types of beliefs as defeaters.[3]

    There are two types of defeaters, undercutting defeaters and rebutting defeaters. The former are beliefs that cause you to question the grounds on which the original belief was held. The latter are beliefs that are inconsistent with the original belief so that accepting the defeater entails rejection of the original belief.[4]

    Finally, properly basic beliefs are foundational beliefs. Beliefs that we believe on the basis of proof are inferred from other beliefs which themselves must be rational if the proof is to stand. These further beliefs will need proofs and so on. Eventually the demand for proof will terminate in a set of beliefs that do not need proof. This is what I have referred to as a properly basic belief. What needs to be noted is that these beliefs will be the starting points that one reasons from to prove and assess everything else. Everything else one accepts or believes will be justified on the basis of whether or not it is supported by basic beliefs.

    In a short treatment like this a full examination of Plantinga’s work is impossible. Instead I will simply spell out briefly a summary of his position. Plantinga notes that when rationalists argue that belief in God is irrational independent of proof they typically use the word ‘rational’ in what is called an internalist sense.

    [W]hether for all I can tell from the inside, so to speak, my beliefs meet the appropriate internal standards … whether I have properly taken account of other things I know, whether I have paid proper attention to objections and to what others say. [5]

    The basic idea here is that of “epistemic responsibility,”[6] “believing responsibly given ones evidence … being formed responsibly in light of the available evidence.”[7] He notes that in this sense of rationality a belief can be totally deluded, even false but still formed responsibly given the evidence. “My memory unbeknown to me starts malfunctioning; I remember things that never happened. If I see no reason to think my memory is malfunctioning, and no reason to think those things didn’t happen.”[8]

    Plantinga suggests that in this sense of the word ‘rational’ belief in God can be justified in the absence of proof. He notes that “for many people the doxastic evidence for belief in God is very strong.”[9] In Reason and Belief in God he gives a series of examples,

    Upon reading the Bible, one may be impressed with a deep sense that God is speaking to him. Upon doing what I know is cheap, or wrong, or wicked, I may feel guilty in God’s sight and form the belief God disapproves of what I have done. Upon confession and repentance I may feel forgiven, forming the belief God forgives me for what I have done. A person in grave danger may turn to God asking him for help; and then of course he or she has the belief that God is indeed able to hear and to help if he sees fit.[10]

    Plantinga suggests that if a Christian has some doxastic or perceptual experience that makes it seem to them that God exists then provided that they have no defeaters for this belief and they have done things such as “carefully considered the objections”[11] they have encountered and “considered how it [theism] fits with other beliefs they hold”[12] then they are rational in continuing to believe. If one finds oneself in certain situations with a strong sense that God exists and on reflection finds no defeaters for this claim then one is internally rational in believing God exists. One may be deluded but one is not acting irresponsibly in believing what seems to oneself to be true and for which, one has no reason for doubting.

    This internalist sense is contrasted with a more externalist sense, a conception of rationality “that is more attuned to truth or falsehood or probably of truth or falsehood,”[13] An externalist sense of rationality implies “not just that, that a justified belief has been formed in relation appropriately in response to doxastic evidence but, also that the doxastic evidence is not seriously misleading.”[14] The basic idea is that the belief “is produced by a cognitive faculty or process that is reliable, one that produces a preponderance of true over false beliefs.”[15]

    With regards to external rationality, Plantinga’s position is more nuanced. Plantinga argues that if Christian beliefs are in fact true then one is externally rational in believing in God in the absence of proof. This is because if Christian beliefs are true then the kinds of process mentioned above are reliable processes. On the other hand if God does not exist then it is not reliable. Hence any argument that Theism belief is externally irrational will have presupposed from the outset that it’s false.

    Of course the Christian cannot demonstrate that these processes are reliable in a non-circular fashion. This, however, is not as significant as one might think because one cannot provide a non-circular argument for the claim that reason or our perceptual faculties, are reliable either; nor can I provide a non-circular argument to the conclusion that my memory is reliable. To do so I would need good reasons for thinking my memory is reliable. Clearly, such reasons are not forthcoming as any argument I use to try to demonstrate my memory would be circular. I could attempt to show that most of the times I used my memory in the past it was correct but then I would need to remember how I had used my memory in the past and remember whether or not it was accurate. However, as I am not permitted to utilise memory in this way until I have reason for trusting it, any such argument could not get off the ground.

    Nor would any other argument be forthcoming. Reasoning is a temporal process; one begins with the first premise and follows an inference through to a conclusion. One does not hold every step of an argument in one’s mind at the same time. Rather one relies on one’s memory to remember the first steps while the second is assessed and then remembers this step while the third is examined and so on. Hence, without first assuming the reliability of memory, one cannot reason at all.

    With basic beliefs we simply trust the grounds upon which they are based are reliable and proceed on the assumption that they are and that what they deliver us is true. We cannot prove any of this by a non-circular argument; nevertheless we continue to trust them in the absence of evidence that the beliefs they deliver are false or that they are unreliable.[16] There is no reason why Christians should treat their basic beliefs any differently.

    In my next post I will address two common objections to Plantinga’s position.

    [1] Alvin Plantinga Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) 110-111.
    [2] Alvin Plantinga “Reply to Tooley’s Opening Statement” Knowledge of God ed. Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008) 175.
    [3] For further elaboration of Plantinga’s understanding of defeaters see Alvin Plantinga “Naturalism Defeated” (1994) http://philofreligion.homestead.com/files/alspaper.htm.
    [4] Ibid.
    [5] Alvin Plantinga “On Being Evidentially Challenged” in The Evidential Argument from Evil ed. D Howard-Snyder (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996) 259.
    [6] Plantinga “Reply to Tooley’s Opening Statement” 174.
    [7] Ibid.
    [8] Ibid, 175.
    [9] Ibid.
    [10] Alvin Plantinga “Reason and Belief in God,” in Faith and Rationality ed. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre Dame, ID: Notre Dame University Press, 1983) 80.
    [11] Alvin Plantinga Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) 225.
    [12] Ibid.
    [13] Plantinga “Reply to Tooley’s Opening Statement” 176.
    [14] Ibid.
    [15] Ibid.
    [16] For a good discussion of this point see William Alston Perceiving God: An Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991) Ch 3-5.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Belief without Proof: Is Belief in God Rational if there is no Evidence? Part I
    Belief without Proof: Is Belief in God Rational if there is no Evidence? Part III

  • Does God Exist? Christopher Hitchens v William Lane Craig

    A live blog debate will be held between atheist journalist Christopher Hitchens author of the best-selling God is Not Great and Christian Philosopher and Theologian Dr William Lane Craig author of too many things to list here.

    They will debate the topic: Does God Exist? Catch the live blog debate here on Sunday 5 April 2009 at 3.30pm NZ time [4 April 2009 at 7:30 pm (PST)];

    Hitchens v Craig
    Dr Craig debated Dr Bill Cooke at Auckland University in 2008 on the topic “Is God a Delusion?” Video footage of that debate here.

  • Belief without Proof: Is Belief in God Rational if there is no Evidence? Part I

    This series is effectively the talk I gave to Thinking Matters Auckland on Belief without Proof; It will be split into three posts.

    First, I will examine a common objection to belief in God, the objection that it is irrational to believe in God without proof; I will unpack this objection and argue that it fails. Second, I will propose an alternative view of faith and reason, that defended by Alvin Plantinga. Third, I will address two common objections to this view of faith and reason.

    The Rationalist Objection
    Since the 17th century, one of the most common objections to the Christian faith is the claim that Christianity is irrational because its central tenets cannot be proven to be true.[1] John Mackie raises this argument,

    If it is agreed that the central assertions of theism are literally meaningful, it must also be admitted that they are not directly verified or directly verifiable. It follows that any rational consideration of whether they are true or not will involve arguments . . . it [whether or not God exists] must be examined either by deductive or inductive reasoning or, if that yields no decision, by arguments to the best explanation; for in such a context nothing else can have any coherent bearing on the issue.[2]

    Mackie claims that the “rationality consideration” of theism (by which he means belief in God) depends on the arguments that can be mustered in support of theism; if belief in God cannot be proven then it is irrational.

    Mackie’s method here is not unusual. In the 19th century Clifford wrote a famous article about the rationality of Theism entitled The Ethics of Belief.[3] Clifford writes, “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence.”[4] The same thesis can be seen in the writings of prominent atheists such as Michael Scriven,[5] Bertrand Russell,[6] Antony Flew,[7] Gordon Stein,[8] Michael Tooley[9] and Michael Martin.[10] A particularly lucid example of the same approach is seen in the writings of Antony Flew,

    [T]he debate about the existence of God should properly begin from the presumption of atheism, that the onus of proof must lie upon the theist…What the protagonist of my presumption of atheism wants to show is that the debate about the existence of God ought to be conducted in a particular way, and that the issue should be seen in a certain perspective. His thesis about the onus of proof involves that it is up to the theist: first to introduce and to defend his proposed concept of God; and second, to provide sufficient reason for believing that this concept of his does in fact have an application.[11]

    Central to these writers is an important contention. It is contended that Theism is rationally acceptable only if there is good evidence for it. In this context it is clear that the word evidence is being used synonymously with the idea of an argument or proof. Mackie states, “[whether or not God exists] must be examined either by deductive or inductive reasoning or, if that yields no decision, by arguments to the best explanation;” Flew talks of a “burden of proof” their contention is that if theism cannot be proven in the manner laid down, it is irrational. This contention is often known as “Rationalism.”

    Why Accept Rationalism?
    The initial question to ask is why assume this? It is important to note that not everything one believes needs to be proven to be rational for at least two reasons. First the claim that everything must be proven to be rationally believed leads to a regress problem. Roy Clouser notes,

    If everything needs to be proven then the premises of every proof would need to be proven. But if you need a proof for every proof, you need a proof for your proof, and a proof for your proof of a proof and so on-forever. Thus it makes no sense to demand that everything be proven because an infinite regress of proofs is impossible.[12]

    A second problem is that there are many things that we believe quite rationally which cannot be proved. Such things as there is a chair in front of me or that other people have thoughts and feelings.

    Consider my belief that I was in New Market yesterday. I reflect on what I did yesterday and automatically find myself strongly inclined to accept the belief ‘I was in New Market.’ In this instance, I believe ‘I was in New Market’ because I remember being there. Yet I am unable to provide any argument or proof for this claim.

    Nevertheless, my belief that I was in New Market yesterday and numerous other beliefs about the mental states of other people and the existence of various objects are obviously rational. So if not everything needs to be proven, why does Theism need to be proven to be rational? This question was put to a conference by Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga; the answer he received from a leading sceptic is interesting;

    All of us can agree, at least for a large range of cases, whether somebody is in pain, whether he’s thinking, feeling anxious or the like. We do in general agree about these things. Only a madman would claim that no one is ever in pain or that no one ever knows that another person is in pain. The same is true for thinking, feeling anxious or sad and the like… Now the situation is very different in religion.[13]

    Others have offered similar answers;

    Part of the justification for believing that our perception or memory is not faulty is that in general it agrees with the perception or memory of our epistemological peers … one knows that one’s memory is reliable by determining whether it coheres with the memory reports of other people whose memory is normal and with one’s other experiences. As we have already seen, lack of agreement is commonplace in religious contexts.[14]

    Richard Grigg argues in response to Plantinga,

    [T]here is a universality about the genesis of the paradigm beliefs that does not attach to the genesis of belief in God. For example, nearly all persons upon having the perceptual experience X, will automatically form the belief that they are seeing a tree.[15]

    Ernan McMullin has made a similar suggestion as to why belief in God cannot be utilised as a premise, as opposed to a conclusion, in an argument in scientific theorising. This is because, “It appeals to a specifically Christian belief, one that lays no claim to assent from a Hindu or an agnostic.”[16]

    The basic idea, then, is that religious beliefs are private beliefs that not all people (at least all sane people educated people) believe; whereas the belief that other people have thoughts and feelings are public beliefs that all people accept and no sane person would doubt. Once we see this, then, I think we can make sense of the objection here.

    [1] A belief is rational if it is either:
    (a) acknowledged to be true by all sane people; or,
    (b) can be proven from premises that are acknowledged to be true by all sane people;

    [2] Religious beliefs are not acknowledged by all sane people nor can they be proven to be true from beliefs acknowledged by all sane people.

    Critiquing Rationalism
    Alvin Plantinga has levelled two powerful objections against Rationalism.

    The first is to note that if it is true then almost every philosophical position of any significance is irrational. This is because, as Marilyn Adams points out,

    [D]efense of any well formulated philosophical position will eventually involve premises that are fundamentally controversial and so unable to command the assent of all reasonable people.[17]

    In a slightly different context Philip Quinn makes a similar point, “it would seem that the appeal to any comprehensive ethical theory, including all known secular ethical theories, should be disallowed on the grounds that every such theory can be reasonably rejected by some.”[18]

    The second, more pertinent, response to this objection is to note that [1] is self-refuting. Take the claim explicitly articulated in [1] that if something is not acknowledged to be true by all sane people then it needs to be proven to be true. Now the truth of this claim itself is not acknowledged by all sane, educated people. Many theologians, philosophers and lay people don’t accept [1] so by [1] we are irrational in believing it unless someone offers a proof for its truth. However, to the best of my knowledge no one has done this; therefore, if [1] is true then the rational response is to reject [1].

    Note also that any proof the proponent of this argument attempts to offer can only appeal to premises that are accepted by all sane people. If the proponent does not, we will be required to disbelieve the premises and hence the proof.

    This, then, is the problem with this kind of critical rejection of theism; the sceptic rejects God’s existence out of allegiance to certain assumptions about what constitutes a rational belief. The problem is that these assumptions are in the same boat as theism is alleged to be; a person who rejects theism because he or she believes these assumptions is acting inconsistently.

    In my next post I will sketch and defend an alternative view of faith and reason and in the post after that, I will address two common objections to this view.

    [1] For an essay arguing that this objection has its origin in the 17th century, see Nicholas Wolterstorff “The Migration of Theistic Arguments: from Natural Theology to Evidentialist Apologetics” in Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment, ed. Robert Audi and William J. Wainwright (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986).
    [2] John Mackie The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) 4-6.
    [3] William Kingdon Clifford “The Ethics of Belief” in Lecture and Essays ed. William Kingdon Clifford (London: Macmillan, 1879) 339-63.
    [4] Ibid, 186.
    [5] Michael Scriven Primary Philosophy (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966) 87.
    [6] Bertrand Russell “Why I am not a Christian,” in Why I am not a Christian, ed. Bertrand Russell (London: Routledge Publishing, 2004) 3.
    [7] Antony Flew The Presumption of Atheism (London: Pemberton Publishing, 1976).
    [8] See his debate with Bahnsen www.geocities.com/jeremyandrobin/bahnsensteindebate.html.
    [9] See his debate with Craig http://www.origins.org/articles/craig_tooley_2.html.
    [10] Michael Martin Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990) particularly Chapter 1.
    [11] Flew The Presumption of Atheism 14-15.
    [12] Roy Clouser Knowing With the Heart 69.
    [13] Kai Nielsen “The Skeptics Reply” in Faith and the Philosophers, ed. John Hick (London: Macmillan, 1964) 274.
    [14] Martin Atheism 274.
    [15] Richard Grigg “Theism and Proper Basicality: A Reply to Plantinga” The International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (1983) 123-27; see also, “Crucial Disanalogies between Properly Basic Belief and Belief in God” Religious Studies 26 (October 1990) 389-401.
    [16] Ernen McMullin “Plantinga’s Defense of Special Creation” Christian Scholars Review XXI:1 (1991) 55-79 http://www.asa3.org/ASA/dialogues/Faith-reason/CRS9-91McMullin.html
    [17] Marilyn McCord Adams Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999) 180.
    [18] Phillip Quinn, “Political Liberalism and their Exclusion of the Religious,” in Religion and Contemporary Liberalism, ed. Paul Weithman (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 144.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Belief without Proof: Is Belief in God Rational if there is no Evidence? Part II
    Belief without Proof: Is Belief in God Rational if there is no Evidence? Part III

  • Christian Blog Ranking Report for March 09 – HalfDone UPDATED

    UPDATE: There has been an error in the ranking calculations and I have had to adjust the top 10 and list of those making the top 100 below. Scrubone explains why here and in the below comments. Apologies and congrats (as applicable) to those affected.

    Here are the top 10 NZ Christian blogs based on HalfDone’s NZ blog stats for March; these stats make up part of the calculations for the MandM top 10 NZ Christian Blog rankings for March 09:

    Top 10. name of blog HalfDone Rank

    Of Note:

    Note: This list only includes Christian blogs that are openly identified as Christian blogs on HalfDone’s ranking list.

    When Tumeke’s March stats are out we will compare them with HalfDone’s and publish the overall MandM top 10 NZ Christian Blog rankings for March 09 later in the month.

  • MandM is the 7th most read Blog in New Zealand

    Just out, the New Zealand Blog Rankings for March on HalfDone.

    Not only are we the 7th most read public discourse blog in New Zealand but we’ve also achieved something else… check out those crosses.

    Top 10 Blogs

    Top 10 Christian Blog report for HalfDone will be out soon.

  • Happy Birthday Madeleine

    Happy Birthday Madeleine; Brittany and Noah made this for you .