Tag: Atheism

  • Does God Exist? Christopher Hitchens v William Lane Craig

    A live blog debate will be held between atheist journalist Christopher Hitchens author of the best-selling God is Not Great and Christian Philosopher and Theologian Dr William Lane Craig author of too many things to list here.

    They will debate the topic: Does God Exist? Catch the live blog debate here on Sunday 5 April 2009 at 3.30pm NZ time [4 April 2009 at 7:30 pm (PST)];

    Hitchens v Craig
    Dr Craig debated Dr Bill Cooke at Auckland University in 2008 on the topic “Is God a Delusion?” Video footage of that debate here.

  • More on God, Negatives and the Burden of Proof: Some responses to Mark V

    In my last post I took a swipe at certain popular dismissals of theism on the grounds that “God’s existence can’t be proved.” Mark V offered a measured and thoughtful response in the comments section. We enjoy feedback from our readers and I have always enjoyed his, particularly those on the Euthyphro dilemma and I think Mark raises some interesting points in his latest response. So, in order to advance these issues a bit further I will use this post to respond to Mark V. I do so, in part, because I think the issues he raises reflect broader views of God and religion in our culture.

    Mark writes:

    My position is not that I deny God exists, but that I am not convinced by the arguments that he does exist.

    Simply someone claims that God exists; I look about me and cannot see this God so I ask the person to prove this God exists. My response would be the same if the person claimed to believe in ghosts or telepathy.

    I will take Mark’s position here as agnosticism, the position that neither affirms nor denies the existence of God. Strictly speaking Mark does not say this, he claims merely that he, “is not convinced by the arguments that God does exist,” however, I assume he means to affirm more than this. After all, there are many theists who find the arguments for God’s existence unconvincing. Some theist’s influenced by Pascal or William James, for example, believe that there are no arguments either for or against theism but nevertheless hold that practical considerations mean one should accept God’s existence. Some, such as Plantinga in God and Other Minds, hold that while the arguments for and against God’s existence both fail, belief in God is justifiably believed in the absence of evidence as a properly basic belief. In contrast to these positions I think Mark V is intending to adopt a position incompatible with theism.

    Assuming this, if I read Mark correctly, his comments in this citation presuppose a certain method which goes something like this:

    [1] If something cannot be detected by the five senses then it needs to be proven to be true.
    [2] If something cannot be proven to be true then we should not deny its existence but we should not believe it exists either i.e. adopt some form of agnosticism towards the object.

    He applies this method to God and concluding that God’s existence can’t be proved, embraces agnosticism.

    I think this objection to theism is problematic; [1] and [2] appear to me to have at least two problems (a) they entail skepticism about rational beliefs; and, (b) [1] is self-contradictory.

    Turning to the first of these points, (a), consider the belief that the universe has existed for more than six seconds or the belief that minds other than mine exist. One cannot “see” with the five senses that these claims are true. What we can see is limited to the present and while we can see physical beings engaging in certain behavior, we cannot feel or detect their thoughts or feelings. Hence by [1] the existence of these objects would need to be proven. However, I think it’s pretty evident from the history of philosophical discussion on these matters that one cannot prove these things to be true.

    Everything we see is in fact logically compatible with the claim that the entire universe (including all traces of age) popped into existence six seconds ago or that other people merely behave in certain ways and have no thoughts or feelings at all. Similar things can be said about the existence of physical objects. We assume that certain objects such as trees, logs, rocks, etc exist independently of whether we are looking at them or not. We cannot test that they are there when we go inside or turn our backs as by hypothesis we can only see them when we are looking at them. Their existence would need to be proven and proven from premises that do not assume that there exists anything independent of our senses from the outset. However, given that these things can’t be proven in this manner acceptance of [2] means we should be agnostic about the existence of trees, logs, rocks and any physical object, other people, the existence of a world that is more than six seconds old, etc.

    Turning now to (b), that [1] is self refuting, take the claim explicitly articulated in [1] that if something cannot be detected by the five senses then it needs to be proven to be true. Now the truth of this claim itself cannot be detected by sight, hearing, touch, etc. So, if [1] is true, Mark needs to prove that [1] is true using the method he proscribed. He has not done so. Moreover if [2] is true, the failure of Mark to provide such a proof would mean that neither he nor I nor you should believe [1], but rather be agnostic towards it.

    Note also that any proof Mark attempts to offer can only appeal to premises which can be ascertained by the five senses. If they do not, we will be required to disbelieve the premises and hence the proof.

    This, then, is what I think is the problem with this kind of critical rejection of theism. The skeptic rejects God’s existence out of allegiance to certain assumptions about what constitutes a rational belief. The problem is that these assumptions are in the same boat as theism is alleged to be; a person who rejects theism because he believes these assumptions is acting inconsistently. Moreover, if these assumptions were consistently applied, almost all knowledge would be destroyed.

    Similar things can be said about Mark’s other argument, which I take to be an expression of a very similar line of thought.

    People belive in the existence of many things e.g. ghosts UFOs telepathy. To prove these phenomena exist various experiments are conducted using a range of instruments. If these experiments do not detect the phenomena the conclusion is that the phenomena do not exist.

    The exception is God. God cannot be detected by our senses or by any instrument. God’s existence can only be established by the use of logical arguments. But then almost anything can be proven or disproven by carefully wording a logical argument.

    No one outside the individual believeing in God can conduct a test to confirm that the God the individual believes exists in fact does exist. The existence of God is personal to each individual believing in God.

    Here I think Mark’s reasoning is similar to what I criticised above. If I understand him correctly he reasons something like as follows,

    [1] Existence claims can only be known by experiments “conducted using a range of instruments” or by logical arguments.
    [2] God cannot be detected by experiments conducted using a range of instruments” as “No one outside the individual believing in God can conduct a test to confirm that the God the individual believes exists in fact does exist.”

    [1] and [2] entail:

    [3] God can only be determined by logical arguments.

    However, Mark also contends:

    [4] “[A]lmost anything can be proven or disproven by carefully wording a logical argument.”

    These premises jointly entail that God’s existence cannot be known. If one accepts [1] and [2], it follows that, “God’s existence can only be established by the use of logical arguments,” but then [4], prima facie rules out the idea that anything can be known by logical argument.

    I find the argument fascinating because it is a good expression both of contemporary exaltation of science as sole paradigm of knowledge, seen in Mark’s claims about experiments “conducted using a range of instruments” and his concerns that God cannot be subjected to scientific testing, alongside a kind of relativistic dismissal of all non-scientific sources of knowledge, seen in Mark’s claim that “almost anything can be proven or disproven by carefully wording a logical argument.” I also, predictably, think this mindset is mistaken.

    Turning first to [1], I think Mark’s first premises again leads to skepticism on a wide scale. Take my previous examples of belief in other people or the existence of physical objects that continue to exist when people do not perceive them or the belief in the past. None of these things can be determined by the type of empirical testing Mark refers to, they can only be determined by logical arguments. However, given [4], no such arguments are ever conclusive as almost anything can be proved or disproved by them. So presumably we should not believe in other people, the past or enduring physical objects.

    In addition, in this context one could reflect on what these assumptions do to moral knowledge. Take the claim ‘rape is wrong.’ This suggests that there exists some kind of binding prescription ‘do not rape’ that we are required to follow, presumably one that holds even if I or my society or my peers think rape is a good idea. However, such a prescription cannot be detected by experiments “conducted using a range of instruments,” hence, we need logical arguments.

    I happen to think, however, that the claim ‘rape is wrong’ is not self-evident and something that cannot be proved by argument and does not need to be. However, if it can be proved by argument then Mark’s advancement of [4] suggests that it probably can be disproven by argument and hence we have no real rational grounds for believing that rape is wrong. Surely this is absurd. We do know rape is wrong independent of scientific experiments and independently of logical arguments.

    I think Mark’s premise [4] is self refuting. Mark is offering an argument for his position. But if [4] is true and almost anything can be proved or disproved by logical argument, it would seem everyone, including Mark, has good reasons for not trusting conclusions based on argument, therefore we should reject his argument.

    As a final comment I would like to broaden my comments a bit. I noted above that Mark’s comments appear to reflect an epistemological paradigm which exalts science as the sole method of knowledge and dismisses what science cannot accommodate as a kind of private personal preference. Many Christian thinkers have responded to this charge by trying to show this paradigm can accommodate God. They offer scientific type arguments for God’s existence by appealing to things like the big bang, the fine-tuning of the universe, laws of nature, etc as evidence for God’s existence. While I have some sympathy for this response I am inclined to think that in one sense these arguments are irrelevant as the more important point is to note the paradigm itself is mistaken. In Mark’s case applying the paradigm consistently would rule out not just God but all kinds of knowledge which even an ardent atheist would hold as rationally held. Moreover, the paradigm appears to invalidate itself. Hence, even if it is the case that such methods cannot establish the existence of God the problem lies with the methods and not with theism.

    Matt

  • On Negatives and the Burden of Proof

    One common reason I hear for atheism is the claim that there is no proof that God exists. Several questions can be asked about this objection. What exactly does the objector mean by proof? If all things need to be proved to be sensibly believed then what is the proof that all things require proof? Further, what is the proof for the claim that there is no proof? Finally, if some things can be believed without proof, why is God in the “must be proved” category?

    There is however another question. If the absence of proof for a thesis provides rational grounds for claiming the thesis is false then wouldn’t absence of proof for atheism provide grounds for claiming that atheism is false? The person who is an atheist on the basis of this objection seems, on the face of it, to work with a double standard here. He claims that theism requires proof and that the absence of such proof requires us to reject theism as false. However, he thinks that atheism can be believed in the absence of proof for it.

    What is the basis for this distinction on the atheist’s part? To avoid this prima facie inconsistency the atheist needs to provide some reason why theism requires proof but atheism does not. In the absence of any good reason his position seems simply arbitrary.

    This brings me to the issue I want to address. One common reason, one I often hear expounded is that theism asserts a positive claim, it affirms the existence of something. Atheism, however, makes a negative claim, it denies the existence of something. According to the line of argument I want to address negative statements cannot by their nature be proven. The objector argues that it is impossible to prove a universal negative; however, positive claims can be proven. Hence, for this reason, positive claims need to be proved and negative ones do not. We can assume the denial of somethings existence in the absence of proof but we cannot affirm the existence of something without proof.

    I have heard this claim repeated in cyber space over and over. I think it’s a very bad argument for three reasons.

    First, the claim that “you cannot prove a negative” is false. Here are some examples of negatives which can be proved:

    a) there is no 1,000,000 mile high pile of African elephants in New Zealand
    b) there are no promiscuous virgins
    c) there are no married bachelors
    d) there is no planet between earth and the mars
    e) there is no such thing as a square triangle

    One can prove a negative statement in several ways. One can show that an existential statement would, if true, entail a contradiction or metaphysical absurdity or the denial of things which we know are the case.

    Second, if one claims that positive existential statements always need to be proved, one is lead into a fairly radical skepticism about everything. Take the claim that there exists a physical world independent of my senses. Or that other people (with thoughts and feelings) exist. Or that there exists a world that is more than six seconds old. There are well known problems with being able to prove these things and yet each one is a positive existential statement. On the view sketched above we are committed to denying these things exist.

    In fact I think a little reflection shows that it would, on the assumption that positive existential always need to be proved, be almost impossible to prove everything. If I prove the existence of something I do so by appealing to other premises which assert facts. But facts are things that exist in the world. Consequently, I would need to prove these facts exist before I can appeal to them but I can’t prove these facst unless I appeal to them as proof.

    It follows that if I cannot prove anything, and one should deny the existence of whatever cannot be proven, then the only option is to deny the existence of everything.

    Let me turn to my third reason for thinking this line of argument is flawed. Suppose one grants [a] that it is impossible to prove negatives; and also that for this reason, [b] one should deny a positive existential statement unless proof is provided. Both [a] and [b] create problems for an atheist. Consider the following claim, there exist some material objects that were not created by God. This claim is a positive existential statement. Hence, until the atheist can provide proof that it is true, until he can prove that some material objects were not created by God, he must deny that such objects exist. However to deny this statement is to affirm that every material object was created by God and hence that God exists.

    In conclusion, the claim that theists bear the burden of proof because they are making a positive claim and that the denial of positive claims is the default position until proven is a problematic claim.

    Matt

  • William Lane Craig, Raymond Bradley and the Problem of Hell. Part Two.

    In a previous post I mentioned Professor Raymond Bradley’s (Bradley) contention that,

    [3] The bible teaches that God will torture people endlessly for their beliefs.

    In his article he cites several scriptural passages in support of this contention. I think his exegesis is problematic; I cannot go into huge detail in a blog post but I will endeavour to address the main arguments he offers.

    In essence, Bradley cites from three sections of the New Testament: Matthew, Acts and the Epistles, and Revelation. I will examine each in turn.

    Matthew
    Bradley writes:

    In the Gospel of Matthew alone he characterizes it in terms which evangelists adore: “unquenchable fire,” “fiery hell” (twice), “torment,” “burned with fire,” “furnace of fire” (twice), “weeping and gnashing of teeth” (five times), “eternal fire,” and “eternal fire which has been prepared for the devil and his angels. [Emphasis Original]

    Bradley refers to references to “fire,” “torment” and “weeping and gnashing of teeth.” He assumes, without argument, that each of these phrases refer to torturing people. However, an examination of the relevant passages shows this to be false.

    Unquenchable Fire
    The phrase “unquenchable fire” occurs Matt 5:12 and does not refer to torture.

    His winnowing fork is in his hand, and he will clear his threshing floor, gathering his wheat into the barn and burning up the chaff with unquenchable fire. [Emphasis Added]

    The phrase originates in the Old Testament. There it refers not to a fire that tortures but one that consumes what it devours, because it is never put out. (see Isa 1:311, 34:10, 11; Jer 4:4, 7:20, 17:27, 21:12; Ezek 20:47, 48; Amos 5:6). The context bears this out; Matt 5:12 states “burning up the chaff with unquenchable fire” [emphasis added]. The metaphor here is a farmer burning chaff. Now when burned, chaff is consumed and destroyed by fire and not tortured (unless Bradley is asserting that Chaff has consciousness). The picture then is of separation and annihilation, not everlasting torture.

    It is worth noting that not only does this passage not support Bradley’s contention (a), it does not support (b) either. In v 10-11 the reason people might be subject to judgement is not because of what they believe, but because of unrepentant wrongdoing. Moreover, the earlier context alludes to “lack of fruit,” an Old Testament idiom for lack of virtuous conduct.

    Fiery Hell
    The references to “hell fire” do not bear Bradley’s point out either. The Greek word for hell is Ge-Hinnom. Ge-Hinnom was a valley outside of Jerusalem. In the time of Manasseh, this valley was used for human sacrifices to the Canaanite God Molech. For this reason the area became a euphemism for disgrace, shame and contempt. Later after the Assyrian invasion, it was a place where dead bodies were piled up and cremated. Isaiah used metaphors of mass cremation as a metaphor for future judgement. This imagery became a metaphor for final judgment in Jewish Apocalyptic writings.

    The term “fiery hell” does not necessitate a picture of everlasting torture; again the references to hell in Matthew bear this out. In 5:29-30 the contrast is drawn between cutting off your hand and throwing it into hell or throwing your whole body into hell. This again is not an allusion to torture (unless severed hands have consciousness?). In Matt 10:28, the contrast is between a person who kills a body and God who kills body and soul in hell. The picture is, again, not of torture but of being discarded and destroyed. Moreover, in all these references things are thrown into hell not because of what they believe but because of what they do.

    Burned with Fire
    Again when one looks at the actual passages in context, one sees they do not say what Bradley alleges. The repeated picture is of a tree being cut down and burned due to its lack of fruit (Matt 3:11 and Matt 7:19). The imagery is again of throwing something away and destroying it and not of torture (trees are not conscious). Moreover, fruitlessness is standard apocalyptic imagery for unjust conduct, not for mistaken belief.

    Furnace of Fire
    The references to a “furnace of fire” in Matt 13 do not convey endless torture. In 13:40 the explicit metaphor is of weeds which are pulled out and burned. Moreover in v 47, the furnace stands in a Semitic parallel to fish that are already dead but are thrown away as rubbish. Moreover, in both passages it is clear that judgement is inflicted upon people because they “do evil” or are “wicked”; it is again actions not beliefs.

    Gnashing of Teeth
    Similarly Bradley appears to interpret the phrase “weeping and gnashing of teeth” as referring to the agony of torture. This again is unlikely. The phrase occurs many times in the Old Testament (Job 16:9; Ps 35:16, 36:16, 37:12; Lam. 2:16) and in the New Testament, and in almost every instance signifies hatred or rage at God or the righteous. Not the agony of pain and torture.

    Eternal Fire
    It is equally doubtful that the phrase “eternal fire” means eternal torture. Jude v7, for example, uses the term “eternal fire” to describe the judgment that befell Sodom and Gomorrah, towns that were reduced to rubble and not tortured forever.

    The passages in Matthew referred to are firstly symbolic, and secondly, do not support Bradley’s contention that they teach that God will torture people forever because of their beliefs. Its also worth noting Bradley’s citations from Matthew are selective. He cites the “fire” metaphor but ignores the metaphors for judgement of being incarcerated or of being expelled from a party which also occur in Matthew, etc and in each case it is the person’s deeds and not their beliefs, which are the basis for judgment.

    Epistles and Acts
    Bradley’s citations from Acts and the Epistles similarly do not back up his point. He notes,

    According to Luke, the reputed author of The Acts, there is salvation in no one else; for there is no other name under heaven that has been given among men, by which we must be saved.” (Acts 4:12). And St. Paul makes it clearer still when he tells us that “the Lord Jesus Christ shall be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels in flaming fire, dealing out retribution to those who do not know God [my emphasis]and to those who do not obey the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ. And these will pay the penalty of eternal destruction” (II Thess. 1:7-9). [Emphasis Original]

    The problem is that neither passage affirms that people are tortured for ever because of what they believe. The passage in Acts asserts that people are saved in Jesus’ name and does not state that people will be tortured because of their beliefs. Similarly, Paul does not state that people will be tortured but that they will be destroyed and the basis is not that they do not have certain beliefs but that they “do not know God” and “do not obey the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ.”

    Revelation
    At the Auckland Craig v Cooke debate Bradley cited a further passage from the Book of Revelation,

    If anyone worships the beast and his image and receives his mark on the forehead or on the hand, 10 he, too, will drink of the wine of God’s fury, which has been poured full strength into the cup of his wrath. He will be tormented with burning sulfur in the presence of the holy angels and of the Lamb. 11 And the smoke of their torment rises for ever and ever. There is no rest day or night for those who worship the beast and his image, or for anyone who receives the mark of his name.” 12 This calls for patient endurance on the part of the saints who obey God’s commandments and remain faithful to Jesus.

    There are several metaphors in this passage, a reference to the “wine of God’s fury” the picture of torment in burning sulphur and the picture of rising smoke. Bradley appears to have attached on to the latter two and interpreted them rather literally. The problem here is that the genre of Revelation is Apocalyptic literature. Such literature is highly metaphorical and uses stock symbols (common symbols repeatedly used in this type of literature). Careful note should be taken when reading Revelation of the metaphors in it and also the Old Testament background of these metaphors. The position is far more nuanced than Bradley appears to think.

    The picture of fire and sulphur followed by rising smoke is drawn from the account of Sodom and Gomorrah’s destruction by “burning sulphur.” Gen 19 adds,

    27 Early the next morning Abraham got up and returned to the place where he had stood before the LORD. 28 He looked down toward Sodom and Gomorrah, toward all the land of the plain, and he saw dense smoke rising from the land,

    This imagery of sulphur being poured upon people and smoke rising was later used in the Old Testament to symbolise the destruction of various nations. (Deut 29:23; Job 18:15-17; Ps 11:6; Isa 30:33). Perhaps one of the clearest uses of this imagery is seen in Isaiah 34

    9 Edom’s streams will be turned into pitch, her dust into burning sulfur; her land will become blazing pitch! 10 It will not be quenched night and day; its smoke will rise forever. From generation to generation it will lie desolate; no one will ever pass through it again.

    Now Edom did not literally burn forever in sulphur. In fact, taken literally, the differing metaphors in Isa 34 for Edom’s destruction would contradict each other. But Apocalyptic literature is not supposed to be taken this literally (just as many of the phrases we use today are not meant to be taken literally). What Apocalyptic literature does in this instance is use various differing, dramatic, visual images to describe total the destruction of Edom. Similar imagery to this passage is used thought the book of Revelation. In fact, in Rev 18 when the destruction of a city, named Babylon but probably a reference to Rome or Jerusalem, the city is said to be tormented by fire and onlookers watch the rising smoke. The message is that Babylon has been judged and destroyed.

    ***

    In essence, then, [3] is mistaken. It is based on an excessively literalistic reading of Apocalyptic literature. Bradley’s argument is not an argument for atheism. It can only succeed as an argument for atheism if one accepts both the infallibility of scripture and an excessively literalistic reading of the text, one that fails to take into account the genre of Jewish Apocalyptic writings. The correct response to this objection is not to become an atheist but to reject poor hermeneutics.

    RELATED POSTS:
    William Lane Craig, Raymond Bradley and the Problem of Hell Part Two
    The Battle of the Bill’s: A Review of the Craig – Cooke Debate

  • Is God a Delusion? The Auckland Craig v Cooke Debate Online

    Dr William Lane Craig and Dr Bill Cooke debated the moot “Is God a Delusion?” at Auckland University on 17 June 2008. The debate was chaired by Professor John Bishop and was organised by New Zealand Association of Rationalists and Humanists and Tertiary Students Christian Fellowship with MandM.

    High quality DVD copies of the debate are available from John Welch for $39.95 NZD + P&P.

    Our review of the debate is here. Enjoy 🙂

  • William Lane Craig, Raymond Bradley and the Problem of Hell Part One

    During the Q & A at the recent Auckland Cooke – Craig debate, Professor Raymond Bradley (Bradley), Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at Auckland University, offered an argument, which he has laid out in more detail in his article A Moral Argument for Atheism, as follows:

    Christians accept that:

    [1] Any act that God commits, causes, commands or condones is morally permissible;
    [2] It is morally wrong to torture people endlessly for their beliefs;
    [3] The bible teaches that God will torture people endlessly for their beliefs;

    From this he inferred that:

    [4] God does not exist.

    Dr William Lane Craig (Craig) responded that the conclusion does not follow from the premises unless one assumes that the Bible is infallible. [1] and [2] entail that God will not endlessly torture people for their beliefs. However, [3] entails the negation of this only if one adds the further premise, that whatever the bible teaches about God is true. If one does not grant this assumption, the fact that the bible records that God will do something does not entail that he actually will do this. Hence, even if Bradley’s argument is sound it is really an argument against theism conjoined with biblical infallibility, not against theism per se.

    In his article, Bradley argues that this option is unavailable to the Christian theist. He writes:

    this would be to be to abandon the chief foundation of religious and moral epistemology (ways of obtaining religious and moral knowledge) … the question arises as to how we are supposed to know of God’s existence let alone look to him for moral guidance. After all, it is a distinguishing feature of theism, as opposed to deism, to hold that God reveals himself to us and, from time to time, intervenes in human history. And the Bible, according to theists, is the principal record of his revelatory interventions. If the Bible, with its stories of Moses and Jesus, is not his revealed and presumptively true word, then how are we to know of him? If God doesn’t reveal himself through the Old Testament Moses and the New Testament Jesus, then through whom does he reveal himself? To be sure, a theist could well claim that God also reveals himself through other channels in addition to the Bible: reason, tradition, and religious experience all being cases in point. But to deny that the Bible is his main mode of communication would be to deny that the principal figures in Judaism and Christianity can really be known at all. Apart from the scriptural records, we would know little, if anything, of Moses or Jesus, it being doubtful that secular history has anything reliable to say about either. Apart from the scriptural records we would know nothing of the so-called Ten Commandments that God supposedly delivered to Moses, or of the ethical principles that Jesus supposedly delivered in his sermons and parables.

    Bradley is mistaken. He confuses the claim (i) that scripture is reliable, with the claim (ii) that scripture is infallible. In order for the Bible to give us reliable, trust-worthy information about God, (i) needs to be the case. However, (i) is compatible with admitting that on some issues scripture is mistaken.

    Therefore, Bradley’s argument does not have the bite he (and some members of the audience on Tuesday) thought it did. Nether-the-less as an evangelical, Craig is committed to some form of scriptural infallibility and I share this commitment with him. So it is best to see if another line of attack is available.

    Craig’s second point alluded to an ambiguity in [2]. [2] states it is wrong to endlessly torture people for their beliefs. However, this could be interpreted two possible ways, it could be interpreted as:

    [2a] It is wrong for human persons to endlessly torture people for their beliefs;
    [2b] It is wrong for any person including God to endlessly torture people for their beliefs.

    Now in order for Bradley’s argument to follow, [2b] needs to be the case. It needs to be the case that God is engaging in wrongdoing if he tortures people for their beliefs. However, in the article Bradley cites in support of this argument, he provides reasons only for [2a]. He argues that to deny principles such as do not torture people endlessly for their beliefs,

    … would be to ally oneself with moral monsters like Ghenghis Khan, Hitler, Stalin, and Pol Pot. It would be to abandon all pretense to a belief in objective moral values. Indeed, if it is permissible to violate the above principles, then it isn’t easy to see what sorts of acts would not be permissible. .. [It] would be tantamount to an embrace of moral nihilism. And no theist who believes in the Ten Commandments or the Sermon on the Mount could assent to that.

    What Bradley fails to appreciate is that these absurd consequences follow from the rejection of (2a) and not from the rejection of (2b). Moreover, as Craig noted there are good reasons for thinking that it is (2a) and not (2b) that is true. This is because (2b) assumes that God has duties. Both, Craig and I believe in a meta-ethical view known as the Divine Command Theory (DCT). According to this position, it is wrong for a person to perform an action, if and only if, God commands them to not perform this action. It follows from a DCT that God has duties only if he issues commands to himself. Given he does not issue commands to himself, it follows that God cannot have duties.

    God does issue commands to human beings. One command is to not torture people for their beliefs. It follows that (2a) is true and (2a) prevents us allying ourselves with moral monsters such as Pol Pot, Stalin, Hitler, etc.

    Craig’s response, then, is correct. I am inclined to think, however, that Bradley’s argument can be recast without presupposing that God has duties. It is essential to theism and to the defensibility of a divine command theory to maintain that:

    [1’] God is good (where good is referred to in terms of virtues as opposed to (duties).

    And a person, following Bradley’s lead, could argue that:

    [2’] A good person does not torture people for their beliefs.
    [3] The bible teaches that God will torture people endlessly for their beliefs.

    And [1’], [2’] and [3’], when conjoined to a commitment to biblical infallibility, entail a contradiction.

    The best response to Bradley is to attack [3]. Now note that [3] asserts at least two things; first: (a) scripture states that God will torture people forever; second, (b) God does so because of what such people believe. The crucial question then is what reasons Bradley offers for the truth of (a) and (b)? In my next post William Lane Craig, Raymond Bradley and the Problem of Hell Part Two I will examine some of these reasons and argue that they are mistaken.

    RELATED POSTS:
    William Lane Craig, Raymond Bradley and the Problem of Hell Part Two
    The Battle of the Bill’s: A Review of the Craig – Cooke Debate

  • Just in – the Palmy Debate

    I have an initial report from the Palmerston North Bill Craig v Bill Cooke debate held last night:

    There was a massive turnout of 1399 exactly in attendance. The word is that Cooke stepped it up and performed better than in Auckland but that Craig still won. Feedback from those in attendance was that it was a fantastic evening, thoroughly enjoyed by all.

    I have been promised a more thorough report later today so will update this post accordingly.

    Madeleine

    UPDATE:

    Author of Confusion wrote this review, reproduced in part below:

    William Lane Craig & Bill Cooke Public Debate (Palmy)

    Last night (19th June, 2008) I attended the debate which I talked about in a previous post.
    I was astounded at the attendance – the Regent Theatre in Palmerston North has a capacity of about 1,400 and it was easily 90% full for most of the night. There was an impressive diversity of age, gender, and race evident in the audience and I would say it was a fairly accurate cross-section of adult society (it certainly wasn’t an old white men’s club!). From responses to the speakers the audience was polite but predominantly Christian and this reinforces my impression is that there is a growing religious movement pushed by several of fairly active church groups in Palmerston North and it is something I am going to start keeping a closer eye on.

    My overall impressions of the debate were disappointing, and pretty much match Damian’s initial impressions. Craig had a definite game plan in the debate, and it was clearly a game plan from a skilled formal debater. Set up premises and then defend them. Sadly Cooke’s game plan was to dismiss the moot, largely ignore Craig’s premises (begrudgingly discussing them, almost as after thoughts) and mostly talking to three points almost despite whatever Craig said. I will raise these first and then go on to discuss Craig’s arguments:

    Cooke’s Approach

    1. Atheists do not assert there is no god but that they do not see the case for god as compelling or even a coherent claim (based on weak definitions). Unfortunately, while an interesting point, Craig never really tried to pin this on Cooke so it was really not a point worth making in the debate.
    2. He used Lloyd Geering’s idea that the notion of “God” is a barrier to understanding the world around us, and that focusing too much on god gets in the way of rational discourse and promotes undue authority amongst those who claim to understand it. This was an interesting tactic but it failed against the so-called “logic” of Craig because most people (including Craig) missed the connection.
    3. Cooke’s final point was that we should stop arguing about our differences and instead focus on our similarities and on solving real problems. This sort of argument, while noble, is not the way to win debates. He talked about how he was happy that Craig was a Christian and that he encouraged diversity of opinion. Again very noble, but in debates it is about point scoring not nobility (one reason I dislike the format) and this counted against Cooke especially in an audience of largely opposing views.

    So overall it didn’t really seem like Cooke came to debate. The only life really came from him during the Q&A when some quick witted answers did score some points, but by then it was far too late. If the debate was scored he would have clearly lost.