Tag: Guest Post

  • Guest Post: A Reader Response Theory of Meaning?

    The following is authored by Glenn Peoples of Say Hello to my Little Friend: The Beretta Blog and Podcast. Glenn writes:

    I take some things for granted. People with a background in theology, biblical studies and hermeneutics or literature will be familiar with theories of meaning, but not everyone has (or wants) this background, and not everyone is familiar with theories of meaning. I thought it might be interesting to some readers to say a few words about it. Think of this as a very introductory post to the subject.

    The question has importance for scholarship in general, but as a professing Christian the issue has a special importance to me because I believe that in the Scripture of the Old and New Testament we have something with a unique type of authority, so the way we interpret it is important. The issue centres on the following question: What does a piece of writing mean? To some the questions seems a bit silly. If you want to know what it means you just read it and find out. It means what it says! But strictly speaking, even someone who says this is likely to admit that not everything means exactly what it says. Writing comes in all genres: literal history, biography, poetry, parable, apocalypse and so forth. There are cases where meaning is bound to be unclear to many readers. So what, in principle, does a piece of writing mean? To the unfamiliar reader, I’m going to outline two major alternatives: an authorial intent theory of meaning and a reader response theory of meaning.

    “it leads to outrageous consequences that proponents of, say, gay or feminist readings of history and literature would never accept.”Easily the most traditional theory of meaning is the authorial intent theory. Authorial intent is just the intent of the writer. According to an authorial intent theory of meaning, the actual meaning of a text is the meaning that the author of the text intended to convey. If we want to find out what a piece of writing means, we need to ask what the author meant to convey when he wrote it. In our day to day life, I submit that everyone holds to the authorial intent meaning. If we get a flier in the mailbox about all ovens being on special at a nearby department store and we want to know whether or not this includes microwave ovens, we would not feel free to decide for ourselves or we may end up being embarrassed in the store. What we do instead is ask a representative of the store whether or not the information in the flier was meant to include microwave ovens. Similarly if we are asked to write an essay for class, we put care into the way we write it because if we don’t, the person marking our essay might not realise what we actually know and understand. We assume that if we get the facts right and express them well, the marker will see that we know our stuff, because our intended meaning will be clear and it will express certain pieces of information. We assume the authorial intent theory in many other obvious settings; when reading a weather forecast, when reading an account of a significant battle at sea, when reading directions for finding somebody’s house and so forth.

    What then is the alternative? What does a reader response theory of meaning propose in place of the above?

    An enthusiastic advocate of the reader response theory of meaning, Elizabeth Berg Leer explains:

    Because reader-response theorists posit that each reader is actively and individually involved in the construction of meaning, they question the New Critical view that if readers attend closely enough to a text, they should come up with its “correct,” intended meaning. Reader-response critics insist that because individuals bring different backgrounds, cognitive abilities, and reading experiences with them to a given text, one “correct” response to literature cannot exist. According to Louise Rosenblatt (1978), one of the earliest reader-response theorists, objective meaning cannot be found within a given text any more than it can be found exclusively within the reader of that text. Instead, Rosenblatt argues that meaning is derived, or, in her terms, a poem is evoked from the transaction between the reader and the text during a particular act of reading, and therefore meaning is unique to an individual within a specific context and in each successive act of reading. A change in either the reader, the text, or the situation will, in Rosenblatt’s terms, result in “a different event—a different poem.” No two readers will have the exact same response to any text, and no single reader will have the exact same response to a text read multiple times.

    Elizabeth Berg Leer, “Reader Response: Learning from Teacher Research,” Minnesota English Journal, 42:1 (2006), 129-130

    What has really taken hold as an extension of this thinking is that rather than individual readers determining the meaning of a text, perhaps we should think, not in terms of communal readings. Communities of readers with shared concerns approach the text together and interpret the narrative or thrust of any given text in a way that speaks to them in their unique context. Rather than thinking of “my reading” or “your reading” of a text, perhaps we should think of, for example “a feminist reading” of the New Testament Epistles, or “a homosexual reading” of the Gospels. What arises here is the practice of reading a piece of text “as” something. “Reading Shakespeare as queer theorist,” “The Apostle Paul as feminist critic,” “Moby Dick as sexual metaphor,” and so forth. Using the reader response theory of meaning, whether the authors in question really had those intentions is not the determining factor in asking whether or not these themes are really there to be found.

    One telling criticism of this approach (but not the main one), however, is that it leads to outrageous consequences that proponents of, say, gay or feminist readings of history and literature would never accept. One clear example would be a holocaust denier’s reading of twentieth century history. It’s no secret that there are people (including many white supremacists and Muslims) who deny that the Nazi holocaust against Jews took place, or that it was anything like the travesty that is portrayed in mainstream history. Their reading of history confirms this belief. They deconstruct mainstream accounts of Nazi treatment of European Jews as a Zionist misrepresentation in an effort to seize institutions of power and influence or to drum up support for the Zionist cause in the Middle East.

    If a reader response theory of meaning really is the correct one to take, what, precisely, is wrong with this way of interpreting historical accounts? Would it be oppressive, arrogant, condescending or patriarchal to tell these people that they’ve simply got the facts wrong and they should read history as we do? Even if it is none of these things, are we factually in the right if we tell them that their reading of historical documents is just incorrect? In fact we do not. We do not regard it as a legitimate view of history just because it is a view held by a reading community. On the contrary, we are much more likely to use cases like this as clear cut cases where ideological “group think” can distort the way people in a group do read.

    But over and above this I think that there is a much more fundamental flaw with the reader response theory of meaning. How, precisely, are we supposed to tell what it means? If this seems facetious, consider the following dialogue:

    Ken: I hold to a reader response theory of meaning.

    Barry: Oh? What’s that?

    Ken: It means that I think the correct meaning of a piece of text is not fixed, but rather is created by the reader in an interaction with the text.

    Barry: Wow. So you think that texts have fixed meanings as determined by the author, huh?

    Ken: No, that’s not what I said. I said that texts do not have fixed meanings, but that meaning is created by the reader in an interaction with the te-

    Barry (interrupting): Yes, like I said. You think that texts have fixed meanings determined by the author.

    Ken: What? How could you think I said that?

    Barry: Well, it’s what your statement means, isn’t it?

    Ken: No! It means the opposite!

    Barry: The opposite? Are you sure?

    Ken (getting irate): Of course I’m sure!

    Barry: Well, I’m just telling you what your words meant to me, that’s all. And to me, you reject a reader response theory of meaning. You accept authorial intent. I’m going to tell my friends that you just told me that you accept authorial intent, because that’s what you said, as I see it.

    Ken: I can’t believe this! That’s dishonest! I did not say that and I did not mean that!

    Barry: How do you know?

    Ken: How do I know what my own words meant?

    Barry: Yes, how do you know that your words really mean that texts have no fixed meaning, but that meaning is created by the reader in an interaction with the text?

    Ken: because they are MY words! I said them! I presented them! I gave them meaning, and you have to right to twist them to mean something else!

    Barry: So you’re the author, and because of your intentions in using those words, you get to tell me what they mean, and my response is mistaken somehow if I take your words to mean something else altogether? But I thought you advocated the reader response theory of meaning. What happened?

    What’s ironic is that proponents of the reader response theory of meaning invest time and care into spelling out their position so that the reader will understand precisely what it is, all the while declaring that what an author (or speaker or artist) actually mean is in the eye of the beholder. Stated differently, the problem I am identifying is that if a reader response theory of meaning is correct, then it’s not really possible to misunderstand somebody, because whatever meaning you see in the text is the one created by the reader’s experience and hence is correct. The only way for a proponent of the reader response theory, therefore, to expect that her readers will understand her theory properly is for her to presuppose that the theory is just not true.

    Did you find this blog post interesting? If so, let Glenn know below; he is contemplating writing the occasional post that simply introduces the reader for the first time to an issue in any of the subjects covered in his blog and most of ours.

  • Guest Post: The Virtue of Christian Dogma

    The following is authored by Dominic Bnonn Tennant, of the blog Dominic Bnonn Tennant – Developing the Mind of Christ. Please support Bnonn by clicking through to his site. Bnonn writes:

    Damian over at ‘And Slaters Go Plop’ has recently written on Dogma, arguing against its intellectual legitimacy, and asking how we can avoid it. He says,

    By ‘dogmatic’ I am describing an absolutist kind of belief that, if I could summarise in my own words, boils down to the fact that you would really rather hold to what you believe than accept an alternative even if the alternative is true. Dogma is the belief you refuse to interrogate.

    Dogma in Christianity
    “I consider my dogmatism an intellectual virtue”I’d like to note, for the record, that this is not how dogmatism is typically perceived in Christianity. Dogma is a mainstay of biblical Christianity, and where it is rejected the religion crumbles. Dogma is there whenever a doctrine is taken as authoritative, or presupposed as true—such as when we treat the Bible as the word of God. So, for the sake of avoiding confusion, let it be noted that Christians do not define dogma in such a negative way. That is not the primary meaning of the word, as most dictionaries reflect. William Shedd’s Dogmatic Theology, for instance, is a seminal and highly positive dissertation on the theoretical truths of faith concerning God and his works.

    Why is dogmatism bad anyway?
    As regards this colloquial, negative view of dogmatism, however, some questions need to be asked. Damian seems to be taking absolutism in one’s beliefs as inherently undesirable, assuming we do want truth. But this doesn’t seem a very sustainable attitude if he wishes to be consistent and avoid special pleading.

    A dogma, he says, is the belief you refuse to interrogate. But what of beliefs which are not readily interrogatable? Presumably, for instance, we all believe that our sense perception correlates accurately to a real, external world. Is that belief undesirable or unlikely merely because it cannot be readily interrogated? In fact, since we resist attempts to interrogate that belief, and don’t take them seriously, are we acting in a poor or intellectually shoddy manner? It certainly doesn’t seem so. Thus, there look to be at least some beliefs we may hold quite rightly and properly as being basically unquestionable, without shirking our philosophical responsibilities. Why is it, then, that Christians should not take the divine inspiration of Scripture as such a belief? Damian needs to make a better case as regards the negative nature of dogmatism, spell out just when it does and does not apply, and why.

    “should he jump up in dismay and hire a private detective to find me and stake out my home to verify that, indeed, I am a real person who makes real blog posts?”Similarly, what of beliefs which are held on good grounds? Damian presumably thinks he has good grounds for believing that I am a real person and not, say, an advanced computer program writing posts in a convincingly human way. Should he be condemned for resisting the compulsion to interrogate his belief in my existence as a real person on every possible occasion? Were someone to say to him: Your belief in that chap Bnonn Tennant is dogmatic because you refuse to interrogate it! should he jump up in dismay and hire a private detective to find me and stake out my home to verify that, indeed, I am a real person who makes real blog posts? In fact, is he not being entirely rational to refuse to interrogate this belief, in the absence of any good evidence that it is false? If so, why should a Christian be criticized for refusing to interrogate his belief in God, when he has no good reasons to think that it’s false?

    Good reasons
    And what, indeed, would constitute a good reason for thinking that God doesn’t exist? No doubt Damian believes there are many. But on the other hand, a delusional out-patient from the halfway house down the road might think that there are good reasons for believing I don’t exist and am in fact a complicated artificial intelligence. He could probably find all sorts of evidences which, if looked at the right way and with the right mindset, seem quite compelling; and he might produce all sorts of arguments showing that Damian really has the burden of proof. Should Damian be persuaded—should he even look at these evidences or accept this burden of proof—if he already knows that the fellow is a schizophrenic who reverts to believing that Christian bloggers are really internet-capable AIs whenever he’s off his meds? If not, why should a Christian act differently when he knows from Scripture that atheists are self-deceiving fools who deny the existence of God because of their sin?

    The skeptic’s false humility
    The last point I’d like to make is as regards Damian’s assertion that if we refuse to honestly put our beliefs to the test then we ought to show a little more humility when telling others what we ‘know’ to be true. As I’ve already suggested above, this is a perfectly silly attitude to knowledge—its implication being that a belief which is not tested cannot constitute knowledge in any proper sense.

    Even ignoring his obvious imposition of a scientific method of knowledge-acquisition onto religious or philosophical matters, where it doesn’t belong, is this reasonable? Does Damian need to verify my existence, for example, before he can say that he knows I’m not an artificial intelligence? Is this the way he really operates in terms of making knowledge claims? Or take another example: say he sees an acquaintance, Roger, at the supermarket. He doesn’t speak to Roger for whatever reason, and no one else at the supermarket knows him, so Damian is the only one to recognize him. Say Roger is arrested the next day on some charge. Damian thinks Roger can’t be guilty, because he saw him at the supermarket at the time the crime was committed. Is Damian really going to say that he does not know Roger was there, since he did not (and no longer can) test that belief? Is it reasonable for me to get up before the jury when he is testifying in Roger’s defense, and say that he ought to show a little more humility when telling them that he ‘knows’ Roger is innocent? Or imagine the situation is reversed, and Damian ‘knows’ Roger is guilty on a similar basis. Is this sort of stringent view of things really sensible? How would it cash out in the real world?

    Maybe Damian means to confine this constraint on knowledge to religious claims. This seems arbitrary, but it doesn’t get him anything in any case, since Christian beliefs enjoy far better attestation than the trivial amount of support in the example above. In fact, Christians have excellent grounds for saying that they know certain things—so why should they shuffle and slink and pretend false humility, as if they really aren’t certain when they are? A Christian grounds his beliefs in God’s word—does he then need to interrogate these beliefs, or find ways to test them, in order for them to constitute knowledge? Of course not.

    The plain fact that they are God’s own testimony is all the justification required. Thus, rather than being commendable, this “humility” of which Damian speaks is despicable. Imagine a Christian who knows the gospel witnessing to someone as follows:

    I don’t presume to say I know this, but, well, I believe you’re under God’s wrath and liable to judgment if you don’t repent and trust in the work of Jesus. And…well, I don’t know that Jesus really existed…but I’m sure you should believe anyway!

    This is certainly an ignoble way of witnessing. If we, in fact, have good reasons for believing the gospel—if we indeed know the gospel to be true—and then do not urgently entreat others to heed it, attempting to persuade them of its truth as well, we aren’t being “humble”. We are being cads. It doesn’t matter if we have tested our knowledge, or if we can defend it against attack. Speaking for myself, I can—but some Christians can’t for whatever reason. That doesn’t invalidate what they know. Christians don’t accept Damian’s views on epistemology, and neither should they.

    So let’s not throw around the “dogmatism” charge too hastily. I am proud to be a dogmatic Christian, and I consider my dogmatism an intellectual virtue. Saying that I am dogmatic is essentially the same as saying that I am a presuppositionalist in my Christian philosophy—a position which I’ve defended on many occasions. If Damian or other atheists would like to dogmatically oppose that, let them start by showing that it even makes sense to do so.

    If you are interested in guest posting on MandM see our guest posting policy.

  • Guest Post: Laidlaw College’s Mark Strom Responds to Critics

    Some weeks ago I wrote a review on the launch of Laidlaw College. I commented on the new vision for the future and my own reflections and frustrations of studying at its previous incarnation, Bible College of New Zealand.

    The comments section of this post saw the eruption of strong sentiment and criticism of Laidlaw College. The level of tension evident in what was said and the volume of readers concerned about the issue was quite surprising; our site stats record that this entry is one of our most read and most commonly Googled-for blog posts. Under fire was the seriousness of Laidlaw’s commitment to its new stated vision, its ability to commit to it and the employment process around the appointment of one of the new heads of department.

    As we are not party to the hiring practices of Laidlaw and as I was an unsuccessful candidate for the position that came under fire, we did not feel it appropriate to participate in the discussion. However, given the nature of some of the claims made, we have granted Dr Mark Strom, Principal of Laidlaw College, a right of reply.

    Matt

    Mark Strom’s Response:

     

    I’m delighted that the changes at Laidlaw have drawn so much interest. I’m also amazed that so many people (claim to) know (alleged) relationships between institutions, the intentions of board members, the processes of faculty appointments, my motives, the extent of faculty members’ knowledge, and so much more.


    Perhaps I can clarify one or two things.

    First of all, a big thanks to Matt and Madeleine for their very fair and balanced comments on Laidlaw. I personally appreciate encouragement and support from fair-minded friends able to be constructively critique and provoke us to push on.

    Second, people are right that Laidlaw still has a very long way to go. Our best over 86 years has been very significant. But did we become somewhat captive to a dualistic piety and its attendant culture(s)? Yes. Was this true of everyone and everything at college? No. Are we genuinely imagining, articulating, designing and making concrete something more holistic and engaged? Yes. Are there gaps between what we espouse and what we deliver? Yes. Is the trajectory clearly toward teaching, researching and championing real integration of thought and culture around a critically-informed evangelical theology at the highest standards of academic quality, intellectual rigour and serious faith? Yes, yes, and yes. This is our commitment. Piece by piece we are rethinking things and taking decisions that move us toward this. And we’ll take all the constructive criticism we can get from people who can imagine what a difference Laidlaw College could make to New Zealand and beyond, and who will give us room to try, to fall short, to grow and just maybe to succeed.

    Third, a few comments on details raised by respondents.

    Matt is right to note that evangelical organisations sometimes do not follow through on significant reforms. Like every other western institution, two legacies shape us: a Classical tradition that (for the greater part) censured change; and a Judeo-Christian tradition that introduced the appalling innovation (to classical minds) that one could break with conformity and be transformed by a radically changed mindset. Centuries of dialogue, intrigue, enmity and plagiarism between the traditions, overlaid by wave upon wave of Christian convention, has bequeathed an uneasy juxtaposition of conformity and innovation to evangelical institutions and leaders. I know this only too well within myself.

    I am loathe to comment on a colleague (and Rod will be appalled that I have defended him). Were there other candidates? Yes. Were some better qualified as per degrees and writings? Yes. Were these the only criteria for the appointment? No. The following competencies were crucial. First, an ability to see the disciplines of theology through the lens of the Bible’s own narrative structures and in particular the NT witness that the story and its great themes have reached their culmination in Jesus Christ. In other words, to read Christology not as one of many loci of Christian theology, but as that which makes theology Christian. [Barth surely had that right.] Second, an ability to model the teaching of theology as engaged in matters of historical, intellectual and public discourse, ie. worldviews and their impact on society. Third, an ability to inspire teaching around these themes. Fourth, an ability to model a realistic and effective mentoring of students as they seek to choose patterns of personal and public response to God and his world that reflect an integrated faith grounded in the historic gospel. Fifth, the maturity and gifts to nurture a relational culture between academics. Rod was a very strong choice on all these criteria.

    Has Laidlaw reached its full potential as an academic institution? Not by a long shot. Do we have some fine scholars with impressive PhDs and publishing records? Yes. Do we need more of both? Absolutely, and we will seek them. Respondents may be interested to know that earlier this year we completed a faculty restructure process. Three faculty chose not to apply for new roles. All others were rehired under improved conditions for the express purpose of completion of PhDs and the generation of peer-reviewed research publications. Eleven already have PhDs. Six are underway on their PhDs (some nearing completion). Two have begun advanced studies (with highest grades) to progress into PhD studies: one in philosophy at the University of Auckland, and one in ancient history at Macquarie University. We have set the bar high for ourselves, and we have embarked on an ambitious programme of making good on these aspirations. These things do not happen overnight.

    The conspiracists may be interested to know that the Laidlaw board represents a very healthy mix of theological perspectives (within a broad evangelical consensus) and political and economic perspectives, and we enjoy spirited banter and debate on these things. The board ‘relationship’ with Maxim amounts to a few friendships. And why wouldn’t there be?! Many respondents have noted there are far too few individuals and groups in NZ prepared to engage in serious thought and action on matters that shape society. So when you find some, you engage. Do we always agree? Far from it. Do you shun the dialogue because someone has caricatured your dialogue partner (even in this blog)? I choose not to. Ignorant caricatures are one thing, but when someone writes “that Laidlaw, like many other NZ Christian organisations has been captured by Maxim institute and appointments are being made not on academic ability but from the approved Maxim checklist”, this is a stupid comment. Plain stupid…and offensive. If it were naming an individual, it might be considered defamatory. There is no agenda. There is no captivity. There is no list. This comment is ignorant, untrue and offensive to the good people of Laidlaw and of Maxim. [On a personal note, had I voted in the last Australian election (I’m an Aussie), I would have voted for Rudd – I doubt that fits the assumptions of the conspiracists.]

    The question has been raised about whether “we really need a Christian liberal arts college”. I am on record as being against the idea. Like doctoral mentor, Emeritus Professor Edwin Judge of Macquarie University, I always read the early Christians’ distinctive innovations and interactions with Greco-Roman society and thought as evidence for arguing against the idea of a distinctively Christian educational institution. Our forebears showed no sense of need nor ambition to establish Christian structures as alternatives to those of their societies. That evidence and line of inference is still suggestive to me for the modern context. Personally I have long argued against the establishment of university type programmes in Christian colleges. In my opinion, a public university education has afforded both a better education (greater breadth and less cloistered) and a stronger platform for progression into places of influence.

    However, more recently I have come to a different place. Since 2006 I have found myself arguing in favour of this College offering a small number of first class qualifications equal to or better than the best New Zealand universities (yes that is an audacious goal – but closer than some might think in some areas; yes we have a long way to go). My shift of argument has 3 pillars:

    1. I am alarmed at the loss of faith among undergraduate students (some student workers estimate it is as high as 70-80% of students by the end of their programmes). This trend includes Maori and Pacific Island students. I have come to believe the College can and should address this tragedy through the provision of first class tertiary education grounded in a biblical worldview.

    2. I believe the reductionism of knowledge in university programmes has diminished their intellectual and academic rigour and integrity (not of course in every case). I believe in time this diminishes public discourse to the detriment of the nation. I have come to believe Laidlaw can offer a credible alternative education capable in time of influencing public discourse through literate and articulate graduates. Are we there? No. This is an audacious goal that will not come quickly, easily or cheaply.

    3. I believe Laidlaw should prepare (particularly young) women and men more deliberately for leadership in society, as well as in the churches. I have come to believe Laidlaw can equip such leaders for society most effectively through first class qualifications in education and the humanities (we are moving towards a School of Humanities with a PPE style BA degree: philosophy, politics, economics). I believe these qualifications offer appropriate ‘generalist’ educations for placing leaders of faith within education, media, business, health, social services, arts, politics and community leadership as well as continuing to serve the churches. My experience advising heads of corporations (commercial and government) confirms the sense that many employers are frustrated by the narrowness of many bright young university graduates of law, accountancy, commerce, business and engineering. Many are looking for classics and PPE grads. [This was confirmed earlier this year by the global managing partner of one of the world’s highest profile consultancies when I spoke at their global partners conference.]

    My argument for Laidlaw becoming such a College is not a reaction to ‘liberal’ humanism, nor an apologetic for a retreat into a Christian ghetto. On the contrary, I want to argue for a turning of the tables on the assumed hegemony of public universities over higher education. Most of the famed European and American universities began as colleges teaching a breadth of knowledge unified by theology as the core discipline. In short, they started like us. Over time almost every one of these institutions abandoned this theological and epistemological core. In the USA in particular this has prompted the rise of the Christian liberal arts college. [Yes, you may well hear echoes of Wolterstorf, Plantinga and others, as well as my own teacher of many years ago, Cornelius Van Til (and no, I am not a card-carrying VanTillian). By the way, Nick Wolterstorf enthused with me about the vision of Laidlaw when I visited him last year. And yes, that is name-dropping to counter some respondents’ assertions that no one knows or has read anyone.]

    The current education situation seems unnecessarily polarised: it seems we either accept the hegemony of the public university over intellectual discourse; or we retreat into the parallel universe of the Christian college. I no longer accept these as the only options. The time may be propitious for quietly, slowly building a credible alternative to university education on behalf of a nation: an alternative grounded in the theological worldview of historic Christianity, free of the dualistic legacies of traditional piety, and genuinely world-engaging and world-serving in the quality and openness of its teaching, mentoring and research and its contribution to public discourse. As Madeleine points out, this will require and make possible new engagements between Laidlaw College and the public universities.

    To all this talk of excellence I hasten to add our gospel commitment to strength-in-weakness and wisdom-in-foolishness. God delights in nullifying the “things that are” by the “things that are not”. Personally, I am a university drop-out who went on to consult to CEOs of major commercial and government institutions; I am a labourer who earned a PhD in the history of ideas; I am a spare parts salesman who become a principal. Some of the finest young men and women whom we seek as our students dropped out of school, did poorly at school, and generally do not think themselves capable of the kind of academic and personal formation we are seeking to make a reality. So in all our plans for “lifting the bar” we are working hard to establish a dignified, high-quality, effective pathway for those who would otherwise be overlooked.

    We don’t for one moment think any of this can be done easily or quickly. If this is a worthy task, it is a commitment to a generation.

    The notes about William Lane Craig are a bit of a mystery to me. I certainly know who he is (recall my VanTillian heritage). So do others at Laidlaw. I do recall hearing about it late. That happens. It had far more to do with poor communication (perhaps by us) than with ignorance or reluctance. We will endeavour not to make another “academic faux pas of this magnitude”.

    This has ended up a lot longer than I intended when I started. I’d like to frame my final comments (for now) around a thought I muse upon:

    I wonder how many respondents have lead significant institutions and been charged with effecting large-scale structural and cultural change? Or let me put it another way: a lot of people who point out our inadequacies, nonetheless join us in longing for high calibre Christian scholarship that has broken with the captivity of dualism to play a significant role in influencing a nation, society and church, with the gospel. I wonder if these people have the foggiest idea what it takes to position a traditional institution to deliver on such a desire.

    In other words, the ease with which people offer their opinions on what we should or shouldn’t have done at Laidlaw to this point is remarkable. Having been charged with being naïve, it seems only fitting to turn the table.

    Changing an 86 year old institution takes imagination, courage, humility and patience. Fortunately I am surrounded by people with far more of each than I possess. The pace at which we have instituted change has been mind-bogglingly fast for some, and too slow for others. One must honour a heritage and its continuing rich contributions even as one frames a vision that calls for radical changes. You cannot go from financial uncertainty to fully funded PhDs, new faculty and facilities overnight. Governance must be tightened. Financial reporting must be reworked. Deficits must be turned into surpluses. Assets must be reexamined. Accrediting and funding agencies must be given time to appraise and support the new directions. Cultures must begin to shift.

    Those expecting overnight adoption of the conventions and facilities of fine public universities will be deeply disappointed. Public lectures putting theological reflection on the table for the first time for hundreds of people will be viewed as populism. Hiring people with outstanding capacity to forge new trust and integration of gospel, culture and faith will be viewed as far less important than getting impressive CVs. Those with an eye to the long term will recognise strategy; the laying of further foundations (in addition to the fine existing legacies) upon which a great institution can be reimagined and redesigned by people in whom is combined an acuity and humility that will welcome scholars and students who exceed them.

    Can Laidlaw “see past their discovery of the basics”? I think so.

    Will people who read theology and philosophy beyond the popular, and who long for change within churches and evangelicalism and academies and public discourse in New Zealand, give us room to try, to fail, to grow, and just maybe to succeed? Time will tell.

    The Tall Poppy Syndrome is a pernicious, cowardly trait. Laidlaw College seeks an end to its hold over the imaginations and wills of New Zealanders. The fact that we have named a big vision makes us a target. We welcome the support of those with the faith, heart and guts to back something that just might make a difference.

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