Tag: Philosophy of Religion

  • William Lane Craig, Raymond Bradley and the Problem of Hell. Part Two.

    In a previous post I mentioned Professor Raymond Bradley’s (Bradley) contention that,

    [3] The bible teaches that God will torture people endlessly for their beliefs.

    In his article he cites several scriptural passages in support of this contention. I think his exegesis is problematic; I cannot go into huge detail in a blog post but I will endeavour to address the main arguments he offers.

    In essence, Bradley cites from three sections of the New Testament: Matthew, Acts and the Epistles, and Revelation. I will examine each in turn.

    Matthew
    Bradley writes:

    In the Gospel of Matthew alone he characterizes it in terms which evangelists adore: “unquenchable fire,” “fiery hell” (twice), “torment,” “burned with fire,” “furnace of fire” (twice), “weeping and gnashing of teeth” (five times), “eternal fire,” and “eternal fire which has been prepared for the devil and his angels. [Emphasis Original]

    Bradley refers to references to “fire,” “torment” and “weeping and gnashing of teeth.” He assumes, without argument, that each of these phrases refer to torturing people. However, an examination of the relevant passages shows this to be false.

    Unquenchable Fire
    The phrase “unquenchable fire” occurs Matt 5:12 and does not refer to torture.

    His winnowing fork is in his hand, and he will clear his threshing floor, gathering his wheat into the barn and burning up the chaff with unquenchable fire. [Emphasis Added]

    The phrase originates in the Old Testament. There it refers not to a fire that tortures but one that consumes what it devours, because it is never put out. (see Isa 1:311, 34:10, 11; Jer 4:4, 7:20, 17:27, 21:12; Ezek 20:47, 48; Amos 5:6). The context bears this out; Matt 5:12 states “burning up the chaff with unquenchable fire” [emphasis added]. The metaphor here is a farmer burning chaff. Now when burned, chaff is consumed and destroyed by fire and not tortured (unless Bradley is asserting that Chaff has consciousness). The picture then is of separation and annihilation, not everlasting torture.

    It is worth noting that not only does this passage not support Bradley’s contention (a), it does not support (b) either. In v 10-11 the reason people might be subject to judgement is not because of what they believe, but because of unrepentant wrongdoing. Moreover, the earlier context alludes to “lack of fruit,” an Old Testament idiom for lack of virtuous conduct.

    Fiery Hell
    The references to “hell fire” do not bear Bradley’s point out either. The Greek word for hell is Ge-Hinnom. Ge-Hinnom was a valley outside of Jerusalem. In the time of Manasseh, this valley was used for human sacrifices to the Canaanite God Molech. For this reason the area became a euphemism for disgrace, shame and contempt. Later after the Assyrian invasion, it was a place where dead bodies were piled up and cremated. Isaiah used metaphors of mass cremation as a metaphor for future judgement. This imagery became a metaphor for final judgment in Jewish Apocalyptic writings.

    The term “fiery hell” does not necessitate a picture of everlasting torture; again the references to hell in Matthew bear this out. In 5:29-30 the contrast is drawn between cutting off your hand and throwing it into hell or throwing your whole body into hell. This again is not an allusion to torture (unless severed hands have consciousness?). In Matt 10:28, the contrast is between a person who kills a body and God who kills body and soul in hell. The picture is, again, not of torture but of being discarded and destroyed. Moreover, in all these references things are thrown into hell not because of what they believe but because of what they do.

    Burned with Fire
    Again when one looks at the actual passages in context, one sees they do not say what Bradley alleges. The repeated picture is of a tree being cut down and burned due to its lack of fruit (Matt 3:11 and Matt 7:19). The imagery is again of throwing something away and destroying it and not of torture (trees are not conscious). Moreover, fruitlessness is standard apocalyptic imagery for unjust conduct, not for mistaken belief.

    Furnace of Fire
    The references to a “furnace of fire” in Matt 13 do not convey endless torture. In 13:40 the explicit metaphor is of weeds which are pulled out and burned. Moreover in v 47, the furnace stands in a Semitic parallel to fish that are already dead but are thrown away as rubbish. Moreover, in both passages it is clear that judgement is inflicted upon people because they “do evil” or are “wicked”; it is again actions not beliefs.

    Gnashing of Teeth
    Similarly Bradley appears to interpret the phrase “weeping and gnashing of teeth” as referring to the agony of torture. This again is unlikely. The phrase occurs many times in the Old Testament (Job 16:9; Ps 35:16, 36:16, 37:12; Lam. 2:16) and in the New Testament, and in almost every instance signifies hatred or rage at God or the righteous. Not the agony of pain and torture.

    Eternal Fire
    It is equally doubtful that the phrase “eternal fire” means eternal torture. Jude v7, for example, uses the term “eternal fire” to describe the judgment that befell Sodom and Gomorrah, towns that were reduced to rubble and not tortured forever.

    The passages in Matthew referred to are firstly symbolic, and secondly, do not support Bradley’s contention that they teach that God will torture people forever because of their beliefs. Its also worth noting Bradley’s citations from Matthew are selective. He cites the “fire” metaphor but ignores the metaphors for judgement of being incarcerated or of being expelled from a party which also occur in Matthew, etc and in each case it is the person’s deeds and not their beliefs, which are the basis for judgment.

    Epistles and Acts
    Bradley’s citations from Acts and the Epistles similarly do not back up his point. He notes,

    According to Luke, the reputed author of The Acts, there is salvation in no one else; for there is no other name under heaven that has been given among men, by which we must be saved.” (Acts 4:12). And St. Paul makes it clearer still when he tells us that “the Lord Jesus Christ shall be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels in flaming fire, dealing out retribution to those who do not know God [my emphasis]and to those who do not obey the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ. And these will pay the penalty of eternal destruction” (II Thess. 1:7-9). [Emphasis Original]

    The problem is that neither passage affirms that people are tortured for ever because of what they believe. The passage in Acts asserts that people are saved in Jesus’ name and does not state that people will be tortured because of their beliefs. Similarly, Paul does not state that people will be tortured but that they will be destroyed and the basis is not that they do not have certain beliefs but that they “do not know God” and “do not obey the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ.”

    Revelation
    At the Auckland Craig v Cooke debate Bradley cited a further passage from the Book of Revelation,

    If anyone worships the beast and his image and receives his mark on the forehead or on the hand, 10 he, too, will drink of the wine of God’s fury, which has been poured full strength into the cup of his wrath. He will be tormented with burning sulfur in the presence of the holy angels and of the Lamb. 11 And the smoke of their torment rises for ever and ever. There is no rest day or night for those who worship the beast and his image, or for anyone who receives the mark of his name.” 12 This calls for patient endurance on the part of the saints who obey God’s commandments and remain faithful to Jesus.

    There are several metaphors in this passage, a reference to the “wine of God’s fury” the picture of torment in burning sulphur and the picture of rising smoke. Bradley appears to have attached on to the latter two and interpreted them rather literally. The problem here is that the genre of Revelation is Apocalyptic literature. Such literature is highly metaphorical and uses stock symbols (common symbols repeatedly used in this type of literature). Careful note should be taken when reading Revelation of the metaphors in it and also the Old Testament background of these metaphors. The position is far more nuanced than Bradley appears to think.

    The picture of fire and sulphur followed by rising smoke is drawn from the account of Sodom and Gomorrah’s destruction by “burning sulphur.” Gen 19 adds,

    27 Early the next morning Abraham got up and returned to the place where he had stood before the LORD. 28 He looked down toward Sodom and Gomorrah, toward all the land of the plain, and he saw dense smoke rising from the land,

    This imagery of sulphur being poured upon people and smoke rising was later used in the Old Testament to symbolise the destruction of various nations. (Deut 29:23; Job 18:15-17; Ps 11:6; Isa 30:33). Perhaps one of the clearest uses of this imagery is seen in Isaiah 34

    9 Edom’s streams will be turned into pitch, her dust into burning sulfur; her land will become blazing pitch! 10 It will not be quenched night and day; its smoke will rise forever. From generation to generation it will lie desolate; no one will ever pass through it again.

    Now Edom did not literally burn forever in sulphur. In fact, taken literally, the differing metaphors in Isa 34 for Edom’s destruction would contradict each other. But Apocalyptic literature is not supposed to be taken this literally (just as many of the phrases we use today are not meant to be taken literally). What Apocalyptic literature does in this instance is use various differing, dramatic, visual images to describe total the destruction of Edom. Similar imagery to this passage is used thought the book of Revelation. In fact, in Rev 18 when the destruction of a city, named Babylon but probably a reference to Rome or Jerusalem, the city is said to be tormented by fire and onlookers watch the rising smoke. The message is that Babylon has been judged and destroyed.

    ***

    In essence, then, [3] is mistaken. It is based on an excessively literalistic reading of Apocalyptic literature. Bradley’s argument is not an argument for atheism. It can only succeed as an argument for atheism if one accepts both the infallibility of scripture and an excessively literalistic reading of the text, one that fails to take into account the genre of Jewish Apocalyptic writings. The correct response to this objection is not to become an atheist but to reject poor hermeneutics.

    RELATED POSTS:
    William Lane Craig, Raymond Bradley and the Problem of Hell Part Two
    The Battle of the Bill’s: A Review of the Craig – Cooke Debate

  • Is God a Delusion? The Auckland Craig v Cooke Debate Online

    Dr William Lane Craig and Dr Bill Cooke debated the moot “Is God a Delusion?” at Auckland University on 17 June 2008. The debate was chaired by Professor John Bishop and was organised by New Zealand Association of Rationalists and Humanists and Tertiary Students Christian Fellowship with MandM.

    High quality DVD copies of the debate are available from John Welch for $39.95 NZD + P&P.

    Our review of the debate is here. Enjoy 🙂

  • William Lane Craig, Raymond Bradley and the Problem of Hell Part One

    During the Q & A at the recent Auckland Cooke – Craig debate, Professor Raymond Bradley (Bradley), Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at Auckland University, offered an argument, which he has laid out in more detail in his article A Moral Argument for Atheism, as follows:

    Christians accept that:

    [1] Any act that God commits, causes, commands or condones is morally permissible;
    [2] It is morally wrong to torture people endlessly for their beliefs;
    [3] The bible teaches that God will torture people endlessly for their beliefs;

    From this he inferred that:

    [4] God does not exist.

    Dr William Lane Craig (Craig) responded that the conclusion does not follow from the premises unless one assumes that the Bible is infallible. [1] and [2] entail that God will not endlessly torture people for their beliefs. However, [3] entails the negation of this only if one adds the further premise, that whatever the bible teaches about God is true. If one does not grant this assumption, the fact that the bible records that God will do something does not entail that he actually will do this. Hence, even if Bradley’s argument is sound it is really an argument against theism conjoined with biblical infallibility, not against theism per se.

    In his article, Bradley argues that this option is unavailable to the Christian theist. He writes:

    this would be to be to abandon the chief foundation of religious and moral epistemology (ways of obtaining religious and moral knowledge) … the question arises as to how we are supposed to know of God’s existence let alone look to him for moral guidance. After all, it is a distinguishing feature of theism, as opposed to deism, to hold that God reveals himself to us and, from time to time, intervenes in human history. And the Bible, according to theists, is the principal record of his revelatory interventions. If the Bible, with its stories of Moses and Jesus, is not his revealed and presumptively true word, then how are we to know of him? If God doesn’t reveal himself through the Old Testament Moses and the New Testament Jesus, then through whom does he reveal himself? To be sure, a theist could well claim that God also reveals himself through other channels in addition to the Bible: reason, tradition, and religious experience all being cases in point. But to deny that the Bible is his main mode of communication would be to deny that the principal figures in Judaism and Christianity can really be known at all. Apart from the scriptural records, we would know little, if anything, of Moses or Jesus, it being doubtful that secular history has anything reliable to say about either. Apart from the scriptural records we would know nothing of the so-called Ten Commandments that God supposedly delivered to Moses, or of the ethical principles that Jesus supposedly delivered in his sermons and parables.

    Bradley is mistaken. He confuses the claim (i) that scripture is reliable, with the claim (ii) that scripture is infallible. In order for the Bible to give us reliable, trust-worthy information about God, (i) needs to be the case. However, (i) is compatible with admitting that on some issues scripture is mistaken.

    Therefore, Bradley’s argument does not have the bite he (and some members of the audience on Tuesday) thought it did. Nether-the-less as an evangelical, Craig is committed to some form of scriptural infallibility and I share this commitment with him. So it is best to see if another line of attack is available.

    Craig’s second point alluded to an ambiguity in [2]. [2] states it is wrong to endlessly torture people for their beliefs. However, this could be interpreted two possible ways, it could be interpreted as:

    [2a] It is wrong for human persons to endlessly torture people for their beliefs;
    [2b] It is wrong for any person including God to endlessly torture people for their beliefs.

    Now in order for Bradley’s argument to follow, [2b] needs to be the case. It needs to be the case that God is engaging in wrongdoing if he tortures people for their beliefs. However, in the article Bradley cites in support of this argument, he provides reasons only for [2a]. He argues that to deny principles such as do not torture people endlessly for their beliefs,

    … would be to ally oneself with moral monsters like Ghenghis Khan, Hitler, Stalin, and Pol Pot. It would be to abandon all pretense to a belief in objective moral values. Indeed, if it is permissible to violate the above principles, then it isn’t easy to see what sorts of acts would not be permissible. .. [It] would be tantamount to an embrace of moral nihilism. And no theist who believes in the Ten Commandments or the Sermon on the Mount could assent to that.

    What Bradley fails to appreciate is that these absurd consequences follow from the rejection of (2a) and not from the rejection of (2b). Moreover, as Craig noted there are good reasons for thinking that it is (2a) and not (2b) that is true. This is because (2b) assumes that God has duties. Both, Craig and I believe in a meta-ethical view known as the Divine Command Theory (DCT). According to this position, it is wrong for a person to perform an action, if and only if, God commands them to not perform this action. It follows from a DCT that God has duties only if he issues commands to himself. Given he does not issue commands to himself, it follows that God cannot have duties.

    God does issue commands to human beings. One command is to not torture people for their beliefs. It follows that (2a) is true and (2a) prevents us allying ourselves with moral monsters such as Pol Pot, Stalin, Hitler, etc.

    Craig’s response, then, is correct. I am inclined to think, however, that Bradley’s argument can be recast without presupposing that God has duties. It is essential to theism and to the defensibility of a divine command theory to maintain that:

    [1’] God is good (where good is referred to in terms of virtues as opposed to (duties).

    And a person, following Bradley’s lead, could argue that:

    [2’] A good person does not torture people for their beliefs.
    [3] The bible teaches that God will torture people endlessly for their beliefs.

    And [1’], [2’] and [3’], when conjoined to a commitment to biblical infallibility, entail a contradiction.

    The best response to Bradley is to attack [3]. Now note that [3] asserts at least two things; first: (a) scripture states that God will torture people forever; second, (b) God does so because of what such people believe. The crucial question then is what reasons Bradley offers for the truth of (a) and (b)? In my next post William Lane Craig, Raymond Bradley and the Problem of Hell Part Two I will examine some of these reasons and argue that they are mistaken.

    RELATED POSTS:
    William Lane Craig, Raymond Bradley and the Problem of Hell Part Two
    The Battle of the Bill’s: A Review of the Craig – Cooke Debate

  • Just in – the Palmy Debate

    I have an initial report from the Palmerston North Bill Craig v Bill Cooke debate held last night:

    There was a massive turnout of 1399 exactly in attendance. The word is that Cooke stepped it up and performed better than in Auckland but that Craig still won. Feedback from those in attendance was that it was a fantastic evening, thoroughly enjoyed by all.

    I have been promised a more thorough report later today so will update this post accordingly.

    Madeleine

    UPDATE:

    Author of Confusion wrote this review, reproduced in part below:

    William Lane Craig & Bill Cooke Public Debate (Palmy)

    Last night (19th June, 2008) I attended the debate which I talked about in a previous post.
    I was astounded at the attendance – the Regent Theatre in Palmerston North has a capacity of about 1,400 and it was easily 90% full for most of the night. There was an impressive diversity of age, gender, and race evident in the audience and I would say it was a fairly accurate cross-section of adult society (it certainly wasn’t an old white men’s club!). From responses to the speakers the audience was polite but predominantly Christian and this reinforces my impression is that there is a growing religious movement pushed by several of fairly active church groups in Palmerston North and it is something I am going to start keeping a closer eye on.

    My overall impressions of the debate were disappointing, and pretty much match Damian’s initial impressions. Craig had a definite game plan in the debate, and it was clearly a game plan from a skilled formal debater. Set up premises and then defend them. Sadly Cooke’s game plan was to dismiss the moot, largely ignore Craig’s premises (begrudgingly discussing them, almost as after thoughts) and mostly talking to three points almost despite whatever Craig said. I will raise these first and then go on to discuss Craig’s arguments:

    Cooke’s Approach

    1. Atheists do not assert there is no god but that they do not see the case for god as compelling or even a coherent claim (based on weak definitions). Unfortunately, while an interesting point, Craig never really tried to pin this on Cooke so it was really not a point worth making in the debate.
    2. He used Lloyd Geering’s idea that the notion of “God” is a barrier to understanding the world around us, and that focusing too much on god gets in the way of rational discourse and promotes undue authority amongst those who claim to understand it. This was an interesting tactic but it failed against the so-called “logic” of Craig because most people (including Craig) missed the connection.
    3. Cooke’s final point was that we should stop arguing about our differences and instead focus on our similarities and on solving real problems. This sort of argument, while noble, is not the way to win debates. He talked about how he was happy that Craig was a Christian and that he encouraged diversity of opinion. Again very noble, but in debates it is about point scoring not nobility (one reason I dislike the format) and this counted against Cooke especially in an audience of largely opposing views.

    So overall it didn’t really seem like Cooke came to debate. The only life really came from him during the Q&A when some quick witted answers did score some points, but by then it was far too late. If the debate was scored he would have clearly lost.

  • The Battle of the Bills: A Review of the Craig – Cooke Debate

    My small idea of getting Dr William Lane Craig to have a debate at Auckland University ended up being an event that far exceeded my expectations. Despite the New Zealand Association of Rationalists and Humanists (NZARH) booking a larger lecture theatre at the last minute we still had to open up three additional lecture theatres with live video feeds and we still had people sitting on the floor! Question time had to be extended because of the interest. The range of people in attendance was excellent; hardened skeptics, evangelical Christians and everyone in between, young and old, high school students through to tertiary faculty.

    My experience within the tertiary sector and NZ Christiandom has lead me to believe that despite the secular and popular veneer one sees in New Zealand culture and often in the church, there is a real interest in questions about God, religion and morality. The reaction last night to a civil, rational, intellectual exchange over these issues confirms my suspicion that not only are people hungry for articulate and well thought out answers to these questions but that they can handle these answers coming in a sophisticated and academic manner; the trend of dumbing down these issues in order to be seeker friendly or to have lay appeal is misguided.

    Anyway to the debate; the moot was “Is God a Delusion?” Bill Craig opened by defining a delusion, in accord with the dictionary, as a false belief. He then contended (A) there are no good reasons for thinking atheism is true; and, (B) there are good arguments or reasons for believing in God.

    In support of (B), he summarised five arguments which he has defended in more detail in the Philosophical literature, very briefly they were: (i) the Kalam Cosmological argument (God is the best explanation for the origin of the Universe); (ii) The New Teleological argument (God is the best explanation for the fine-tuning of the Universe); (iii) The Meta-Ethical Moral argument for theism (God is the best explanation for the existence of objective moral norms); (iv) God is entailed by the best explanation of certain facts about the historical Jesus and his resurrection; and, finally, (v) a brief summary of Plantinga’s thesis that immediate experiences about God provide prima facie grounds for affirming that God exists.

    Cooke’s opening was disappointing. I am not saying this because I am a theist and he is not, I have read many skeptical Philosophers who provide brilliant and powerful arguments for atheism (Paul Draper and Michael Tooley are obvious examples) and although I disagree with them I think they provide challenging cases that I can respect. However, Cooke did not follow their lead. Instead Cooke opened by defining atheism as the claim that “we do not know what the word God means.” Cooke then went on to state he does not think Thiesm is false but is rather a distraction. His argument then appeared to consist of claims that the concept of God has evolved throughout history, that this belief has been used by some to commit atrocities and to not follow important social and political reforms. He stated that there are numerous other accounts of God and there are non-cognitive forms of Liberal Christianity which are more helpful to the humanistic aims he shares.

    Cooke also stated his distaste for a debate format where there were rebuttals. He alluded briefly to the problem of evil; however, he did not offer or defend any of the rigorous probabilistic arguments from evil proposed in the literature by people such as Tooley, Draper and Rowe. A crucial premise of many probabilistic arguments from evil is that God has no adequate reasons for allowing the evils which exist in the world. Craig (along with many Philosophers of Religion such as Wykstra, Plantinga, Van Inwagen, Tooley, Alston) has argued this premise is unwarranted as no reasons have been given for thinking the premise is true. The arguments on this topic are fairly detailed but not complex. Cooke did not offer a rebuttal but simply declared Craig’s position as distasteful.

    In rebuttal, Craig noted that Cooke’s definition of atheism was incorrect. He quoted from a standard philosophical encyclopedia a definition of atheism as the belief that God does not exist which is quite different to Cooke’s definition which is actually something more like verificationism. Craig also offered a definition of what he means by God so Cooke could be clear on the meaning of God for the purpose of the debate. Craig then pointed out that Cooke had not offered any arguments for atheism in his speech. He had dismissed a response to the problem of evil but had not argued for it.

    Much of the rest of Cooke’s speech was irrelevant as the question was not whether God had good political consequences but whether theism was true. Even if a belief is the result of social evolution over time, it does not entail that it is false (people’s understanding of democracy has evolved over time, it does not follow that democracy is mistaken because it has evolved and developed over time). Craig also noted that the truth or falsity of a belief is a separate issue from the conduct of those who hold to the belief. Similarly, the fact that a belief distracts some people from certain causes does not necessitate that it is false.

    Craig also pointed out contradictions in Cooke’s speech. Cooke had stated that he did not contend that theism is false but later on he had stated that God was a human invention. Craig also noted that merely pointing out that other theologians disagree with Craig’s cognitive theism and offer alternative accounts of God does not show Craig’s position is false. The existence of differing opinion on a matter does not render the matter false, the reasons offered are what must come under scrutiny.

    Cooke’s rebuttal of Craig was weak. Cooke responded briefly to the meta-ethical moral argument noting that theists and atheists are both aware of certain moral truths and should work together on certain worthy projects. This response, as Craig pointed out, confuses the question of whether an atheist can know moral truths with the question of whether atheism can provide an adequate meta-physical foundation for these truths. Cooke’s position that human beings have no real significance, that morality was simply an evolved convention of some sort, was, in essence, a concession of the meta-ethical argument.

    Cooke addressed the Kalam Cosmological argument and New Teleological argument by stating that he was not a cosmologist and neither was Craig. He also suggested Craig’s knowledge of the historical facts surrounding Christ were mistaken, that scholars disputed the alleged facts Craig appealed to. He suggested that Craig was not familiar enough with Gerd Ludemann whose later works Cooke himself had read.

    Unfortunately for Cooke, Craig was able to counter these claims. First, as noted Craig has studied contemporary cosmology; he did his doctoral work on the theological implications of big bang cosmology and has authored a book on it as well as several published articles. In addition, he has debated Gerd Ludemann and co-written a book with him and so could point out that Ludemann in fact did accept the facts he appealed to. Moreover, Craig could produce published review articles that surveyed the voluminous literature on the subject and the results showed that the consensus was as Craig had suggested. Craig also produced a fairly amusing illustration from Kai Neilson (perhaps more ironic given that Cooke frequently cites Kai Neilson in his debates) which illustrated the counter-intuitive nature of asserting that something could come out of nothing by nothing.

    Cooke did make another claim that Craig did not counter, which was that scientific discoveries are subject to change and so it is questionable to base theological claims on such an unstable foundation. This may be a valid point, the problem is it would appear to uncut a key motif of Cooke’s rationalism. After all, don’t rationalists promote science as a source of knowledge and often attack Christian belief because it allegedly conflicts with science?

    So in my opinion Craig was the clear winner. He offered five arguments, Cooke offered weak responses to which Craig adequately responded. Cooke at times refused to argue at all and kept trying to address side issues and did not really offer a case for atheism.

    Of course it needs to be noted in fairness, that in many respects this was a mismatch. Craig is one of the best Philosophers of Religion in the world. He has published hundreds of articles defending arguments for God’s existence in the philosophical literature and is an extremely experienced debater. Cooke is a historian of the history of free thought with little or no publications in this area. Some of Craig’s previous debate with philosophical heavyweights like Michael Tooley and Quentin Smith were less one-sided.

    I thought some of the real interesting issues and arguments came out in the Q&A. Robert Nola from the Philosophy department made an important point about the New Teleological argument noting that the fact that something is highly improbable does not mean it is irrational to hold to. Craig’s response was probably not as clear as it could be, he noted that the fine-tuning argument is not based merely on the claim that fine-tuning is improbable but rather that fine-tuning constitutes an improbable sequence of patterns. (Craig has made this point more thoroughly in the literature.)

    Ray Bradley, a retired Philosophy Professor, raised a version of the deontological problem of evil noting that God seems to violate certain moral duties such as do not kill. Craig’s response was that if one holds to a divine command (DCT) theory of ethics then right and wrong are constituted by God’s commands. From this, it follows that because God does not issue commands to himself, he does not have duties. If God has no duties then God cannot violate any.

    However, this is not the full story; one powerful objection to a DCT is to note that God could command abhorrent things like torture and hence a DCT would entail the counter-intuitive conclusion that torture is morally required. Divine Command theorists (like Craig and myself) typically avoid this objection by noting that God is perfectly virtuous and hence there are certain things he would not command. Bradley’s question could be rephrased in terms of whether a virtuous person would command or do these things and Craig’s initial response would not settle this but there are plenty of lines of thought in the literature which could.

    In another exchange Bradley raised the issue of Hell noting that the book of revelation portrays this as a place of eternal torment in fire. Craig pointed out that such passages are in fact highly metaphorical and do not in fact say what Bradley thinks they do. Cooke responded by stating that Craig was being inconsistent he sometimes takes the bible literally and sometimes figuratively and Craig (who has a DTheol in New Testament studies) does not understand that the genre of the new testament is myth.

    In fact Cooke is wrong and Craig is right. Revelation has a particular genre, it is Jewish Apocalyptic and this genre is known to use special types of recognisable symbolism. Burridge has shown the gospels are written in the genre of greek biography and not myth. Moreover, the implicit assumption on Cooke’s part that when reading a piece of writing with multiple genres (such as the bible) one should either reads everything literally or everything figuratively is absurd. Even in every-day conversation one uses a mixture of both literal and metaphorical phrases and things like context and genre determine which reading one engages in. As Madeleine pointed out to me, one of her favourite books is a sci-fi fantasy novel that contains an index of characters and terms at the back. Despite the fact the index and the story are contained in one book, she would be in error to read the index figuratively or the story literally; it is not uncommon for one book to have more than one genre. Unfortunately in the short exchange, before an audience untrained in biblical hermeneutics, these points may not have been grasped. As a result I think Cooke came across the better in this exchange despite the fact he was wrong.

    Critical questions were raised about Craig’s theodicy as well. Craig’s position is that God allows certain evils because they are the best way to bring about greater good that otherwise would not be achieved. Some members of the audience found this counter-intuitive. Craig responded that the goods he envisaged infinitesimally outweigh the evil permitted. Craig’s position is utilitarian; one can allow (or cause) evil in order to bring about greater good. Of course utilitarianism is a sophisticated ethical theory and there have been numerous sophisticated defenses of a utilitarian framework in the literature but of course Craig was not able to go into it in sufficient depth last night.

    Overall the night was excellent, a huge turnout and a stimulating discussion of some really deep and important issues. As we left we heard people all around us discussing the ideas offered by both sides and lots of positive feedback about how much they had enjoyed the evening. NZARH arranged to have the event filmed and a copy should be online over the weekend.

  • Patrick Nowell Smith on Divine Commands

    In a widely-anthologised essay Morality: Religious and Secular. Patrick Nowell Smith offers a influential criticism of “religious morality” It is clear from his definition of religious morality that it is Voluntarism ( or a Divine Command Theory of Ethics) he has in mind. Smith states that the religious moralist has “assumed that just as the legal propriety of an action is established by showing it to emanates from an authoritative source, so also the moral propriety of an action must be established in the same way; the legal rightness has the same form as moral rightness, and may therefore be used to shed light on it.” He goes on to state “ … Morality, on this view, is an affair of being commanded to behave in certain ways by some person who has a right to issue such commands; and once this premise is granted, it is said with some reason that only God has such a right” Smith’s critique then should be interpreted as a critique of Voluntarism.

    Readers of this blog will know I have considerable sympathy for Voluntarism. I have defended it against some common objections in previous posts. So it will not suprise anyone that, despite the popularity of Smith’s essay, I think his criticisms fail. Here I wish to comment on two lines of argument he proposes.

    1. One major contention Smith makes is that “religious morality is infantile” Smith’s thesis is that a Voluntarist possesses an ethical consciousness that is frozen or arrested at the pre-critical stage of a child. A mature adult whose cognitive faculties are functioning properly would have outgrown it.

    In arguing for this thesis, Smith draws upon the theories of moral development proposed by Piaget. According to Piaget, children start out with a view of morality that Smith labels deontological, heteronomous and realist. Children view morality as obedience to certain rules (deontology) which hold because an authority figure, usually the parent, has promulgated them (heteronomous) and wrongdoing is perceived as any external action that violates these rules (realism). This view of ethics is appropriate for small children; however, as they mature and become more rational their consciousness changes. They begin to see the point of certain rules and understand the reasons behind them and the function of such rules. This is the stage where ethics become in Smith’s words “autonomous”. Instead of just accepting a parent’s word for it the child learns to figure these things out for him/herself.

    Smith goes on to argue that these same features of heteronomy, realism and deontology are present in “religious morality” or, more specifically, Voluntarism. Consequently, Voluntarism reflects a childish way of viewing ethics, one not worthy of a grown-up, educated adult.

    Smith’s analogy between Voluntarism and childish morality ignores a fundamental dis-analogy between the case Piaget describes and that of the divine/human relationship. As Richard Mouw has pointed out, Piaget views the transition from heteronomy to autonomy as corresponding to the time when a child begins to be on an increasingly-equal footing with his or her parents. The infantile stage of morality is appropriate while the child is in infancy because of its limited rationality and knowledge. In this state the child is unable to make decisions as competently as the adult, hence it relies on and defers to the judgement of adults. However, as the child grows equal to the parent in these respects he or she ceases to rely on parental judgement. He or she is now just as competent to answer these questions as his or her parent is and so his or her thinking becomes autonomous.

    Consequently, Piaget’s model of development applies to situations where the subordinate is temporarily in a stage of inferiority to the authority but is undergoing a process of growth towards equality. It is when this equality is reached that the authority relationship is no longer appropriate. However, the relationship between adult humans and God is fundamentally different. Adults are not growing into divinity so that when mature they will equal God in rationality and knowledge. Rather, they are permanently in a state where they are inferior to God in these respects. In this context the failure to reach a moral consciousness that is equal to God’s is not a sign of arrested development and the infantile charge loses its sting. It is inappropriate for adults to behave like children but not inappropriate for them to fail to think like God.

    2.Another argument Smith utilises appeals to the epistemic priority of moral principles over theological ones. Smith offers an argument that is “familiar to philosophers but of which the force is not always appreciated”. The argument essentially points out,

    [W]e must be persuaded independently of his goodness before we admit his right to command. We must judge for ourselves whether the Bible is the inspired word of a kind and benevolent God or a curious amalgam of profound wisdom and gross superstition. To judge this is to make a moral decision, so that in the end, so far from morality being based upon religion, religion is based upon morality.

    In Philosophical Problems and Arguments. James Cornman and Keith Lehrer express the same argument.

    Consider what we would do if we read that Moses had returned with such commandments as ‘make love to thy neighbor’s wife,’ ‘steal thy neighbor’s goods,’ and ‘take advantage of thy parents.’ We would decide that what-ever was revealed to Moses, it was not the will of God, because these are immoral commandments. We do not justify that something is moral by showing it is God’s will, because the only available way to evaluate conflicting claims about what God wills is by finding which one is in accordance with what is moral.

    This objection notes that in order to know whether a given action is, in fact, the type of thing God has commanded, one first needs to know whether the act is wrong. Therefore, ethics is prior to, and independent of, theology.

    This objection again confuses the question of epistemological priority with the question of metaphysical independence. What these examples show is that we can know certain ethical truths prior to and independently of our knowledge of theological truths. However, it does not follow from this that deontic principles are metaphysically independent of, or non-identical to, theological ones. Consider the following analogy. In order to know that a clear liquid in front of me is water I need to examine its atomic structure to see if it is H20. It would not follow from this that water is not H20. Similarly, the fact that in certain contexts one needs to examine the moral appropriateness of commands to ascertain whether they are from God or not does not make it follow that wrongness is not the property of being contrary to God’s commands.

  • The Body Snatchers and the Problem of Pluralism

    As I was driving around Auckland this morning talkback was rife with people discussing the recent body snatchers case; an estranged father, against the wishes of both the deceased and her next of kin stole his daughters body and buried it in a family plot. Of course I remember the furor over the previous case, and my thoughts now are as they were then.

    What people seem unaware of, or at least have not articulated clearly, is that the controversy over this case is symptomatic of a deep problem with the popular liberal response to pluralism. Let me elaborate.

    The problem of Pluralism is this: we have in New Zealand people who hold to and live in accord with various differing “comprehensive views” as Rawls called them. A comprehensive doctrine can be theistic like Islam or Christianity or it can be secular like certain forms of Naturalism; Marxism, Liberal rationalism, humanism etc. However such views function as religions in that they answer fundamental questions such as who are we, what is the nature of good, what is real, etc. Now the problem such plurality creates is this: How does one maintain peace and order in a society characterized by radical disagreement over these fundamental questions? Each group believes (and cannot but believe) that their view is true and the others mistaken. Failure to find a solution to this problem can be deadly people can and have killed each other over these questions.

    In New Zealand the answer popularly given is “tolerance”. One should allow each person to believe and act in accord with whatever view they think is correct and no one should be compelled to adopt some form of enforced orthodoxy. However there is one immediate problem with this response. Sometimes believers in different comprehensive doctrines will interact with one another. Hence, there needs to be rules or norms governing the relationships between believers of different “comprehensive doctrines” and the obvious difficulty is that these different groups frequently disagree over precisely what the correct norms or rules which constitute our duties are.

    This is the case in the body snatchers incident. One group of people come from a community in which individual autonomy is an important value (this btw reflects certain religious and philosophical beliefs articulated in the late middle ages). Under this understanding of the world, when a person dies the individual who died can, prior to death decide ( within reason) how their body is to disposed of. Moreover certain relatives, become next of kin and aquire the responsibility to carry the deceased’s wishes out. The problem is that people from other cultures have quite different understandings of the world. I am not an expert on Maori culture and so will not try and elaborate. But the idea seems to be that individual autonomy is subordinated to the wider family and certain traditions which this family are required to uphold. Hence the wider community decides where one is buried in accord with their traditions regardless of the individual in questions wishes. Moreover there are different understandings of what constitutes membership in the relevant group. One group tends to think that if one is not brought up within a culture or does not conciously adopt it they are not part of a group that embodies this culture. Another however believes that mere biological lineage determines ones membership in the culture.

    In this case a person dies. According to group A the deceased is not part of group B and the right thing do do is X. According to group B, she is a member of group B and the right thing to do is Y. Y however is incompatible with X only one of the two options is possible. I maintain that there is no *culturally or religiously neutral* way of adjudicaticating this dispute. At the end of the day we must decide which view of the world is correct and side with the solution they propose.

    This case shows up the popular liberal response to the problem. The popular response is to suggest that the no group can impose the norms they believe in upon another group. Instead, norms governing relationships between practioners and believers of different comprehensive doctrines should be governed of norms that all reasonable people can accept regardless of their religious or quasi religious beliefs. This idea is often described as “public reason” the notion that there is a set of premises which are accepted implicitly by all reasonable people from which public policy regarding what rights everyone has can and coercive laws enacted can be decided.

    The problem, which this case shows, is that public reason is something of a myth. If one defines a “reasonable person” broadly there is simply does not exist a set of principles which is both accepted by all reasonable people and also sufficiently “thick” and comprehensive to provide a basis for answers to public policy questions. On the other hand if one defines “a reasonable person” narrowly to exclude radical disagreement the very concept of a reasonable person will depend on the truth of a particular comprehensive perspective for its plausibility. The debate over Gods existence is a good example. Alvin Plantinga has argued, correctly I think, that if God exists and created men in his image and then revealed himself to them, much of what Christians believe is probably rational. If however God does not exist, its probably a delusion. However, its impossible to come to an answer on the rationality of theism without presupposing a stance on the ontological question of its truth. In fact it’s difficult to see how one can come to an understanding of what constitutes a *reasonable person* if without appealing to premises specific to some comprehensive doctrine about what exists and what sort of beings people are.

    That’s what’s seen in this case. We have two very different views of understanding the world. Each one if true entails that a certain course of action is mandated. If certain notions of individual autonomy then the body snatchers are wrong. If one does not they are not. The problem is according to a popular conception of liberal democracy the state has to be neutral with regard to differing faith or quasi faith positions. It should not privilege any group by writing its views into law and demanding that the others who don’t accept the tradition live in accord with them. The state therefore can do nothing one way or the other. Interestingly that is precisely whats happend.

    There is a solution to this. It’s an older view, and it’s far less palatable to many modern or post modern people, but it has the advantage of being correct. On this view the whole popular liberal idea of tolerance is a chimera. In his book Reason in the Balance Berkeley Law professor Philip Johnson argues that while liberal societies do not (and I would add should not) have established Churches they must always have a defacto “established religious philosophy.” By religious philosophy Johnson means “a way of about ultimate questions” and by saying its esthablished he means not that “dissenters are subject to legal punishment” but that “it provides the philosophical basis for law making and public education”. People who dissent will be tolerated within reasonable limits and what constitutes a “reasonable limit” will be determined by the esthablished religious philosophy.

    In NZ the established religious philosophy ostensibly includes the proposition that killing non combatants in war is wrong hence Al Qaeda does not gain religious tolerance in NZ. In Saudi Arabia the established religious philosophy considers apostasy intolerable. In some “progressive” quarter’s today believing and teaching that homosexual conduct so violates the sensibilities of liberal orthodoxy that it cannot be tolerated. In each case we have a accepted orthodoxy and tolerance of dissenters limited by the values of the orthodoxy in question.
    In his book Foreordained Failure, Steven Smith demonstrates that there is no such thing as a right to freedom of religion which is upheld by some traditions and opposed by others. Instead there is a spectrum of views about religious tolerance that comes in degrees; no state tolerates all religious sects and very few states tolerate none. He notes that Aquinas, Cromwell, Locke and Mill all advocated and defended forms of religious tolerance. However, each disagreed as to which religions such tolerance should apply to and the proper limits upon those they disagreed with. Smith argues further that these differing accounts of freedom of religion all depended upon comprehensive views to justify them and one cannot adjudicate between them without appeal to such views. Attempts to articulate a right to freedom of religion from a neutral or public stance are quite hopeless.
    That’s what we have in this case. I think that those who stole the body should be prosecuted because I believe that the ideas about individual autonomy undergirding those who complain are correct and I think tolerance of diversity should not extend to allowing others to violate norms based on these ideas. Our political climate needs to stop hiding behind slogans of “tolerance” and “respect for diversity” and admit that it supports a particular religious orthodoxy and here are the limits on dissent. Then we can debate whether the orthodoxy is true. If we continue to hide behind the façade of “tolerance” and “respecting and celebrating all diverse view points” it will not be able to do anything in these situations.