Year: 2009

  • Darwinian Evolution, God and Ockham’s Razor

    In a previous post, Darwinian Evolution, Chance and Design, I argued that the contention that Darwinian evolution occurs by chance does not entail that it shows the world was not designed. Once one sees how the concept of chance is defined in evolutionary theory one can see that it does not rule out design.

    It is possible at this stage to argue that evolutionary theory rules out design by appeal to Ockham’s razor. Suppose one grants that chance is used in a limited sense to refer to the fact that, following Sober, “there is no physical mechanism (either inside organisms or outside of them) that detects which mutations would be beneficial and causes those mutations to occur.”[1] Or following Mayr, it means, “that there is no correlation between the production of new genotypes and the adaptation needs of an organism in a given environment.”[2] Suppose that evolution occurring by chance in this sense is well supported by the evidence. One could go on to interpret this theory in at least two ways; one might argue that evolution was in some sense guided by God or that it occurred by chance in a stronger sense that precludes design. Both arguments would be compatible with the empirical evidence. However, the sceptic could argue that the latter is preferable in virtue of the principle of Ockham’s razor, “entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily.”

    The idea is that that the hypothesis of unguided evolution is simpler, more in accord with Ockham’s razor, than the hypothesis that God guided evolution. The former theory explains everything in terms of natural causes without appeal to a supernatural being such as God; hence, to claim God did it is to add an extra entity and is superfluous. Something like this argument is sometimes given by scientists writing in the field. George Gaylord Simpson writes,

    Although many details remain to be worked out, it is already evident that all the objective phenomena of the history of life can be explained by purely naturalistic or, in a proper sense of the sometimes abused word, materialistic factors.[3]

    Similarly, Douglas Futuyma states,

    By coupling undirected, purposeless variation to the blind, uncaring process of natural selection Darwin made theological or spiritual explanations of the life processes superfluous.[4]

    In this post I will respond to this appeal to Ockham’s razor and identify two problems with this line of argument. The first is that Ockham’s razor is only one criteria used to adjudicate rival hypotheses; the fact that one hypothesis is preferable on grounds of simplicity does not entail that it is preferable all things considered. There are at least couple of other considerations to take into account.[5]

    One other consideration to bear in mind is which hypothesis is more probable? To answer this question one would need to assess whether the probability that the history of life coming to be by a process of guided evolution is significantly higher than the probability of life coming to be by an evolution of blind chance and it seems to me, on the face of it at least, quite plausible to suggest that the chances of life evolving by chance is significantly lower than its coming about by divine guidance. If this is correct, then while atheistic evolution gives a simpler or more economical explanation of the origin of species it is considerably less probable.

    A further consideration is that Ockham’s razor tells us that if two theories can explain the phenomena equally well then the one that postulates the least entities is the preferred one. For naturalistic evolution to be preferable to theistic evolution it would need to be argued that it explains all the data equally as well.[6] The person who proposes the above line of argument, however, does not do this; all he or she does is show that both theories equally explain the history of life on earth. However, the history of life is only one feature of the world that scientists seek to explain. Showing that your theory explains one feature as well as a rival theory is a long way from showing that it explains all features as well.

    This is important because one of the arguments theists offer is that God can explain numerous features of the world better, better than theism’s rivals. It has been argued that theism explains the origin of the universe, the continued existence of the contingent universe, the existence of laws of nature, the existence of cosmic fine-tuning, the existence and nature of objective moral duties  and so on. To show that unguided evolution is a better theory then, one would need to show that unguided evolution provides a better explanation of all these phenomena together than theistic evolution does. If it does not then theism explains the history of life equally as well as atheistic naturalism but it also provides a better explanation of various other features of the world, thus it is a better overall theory.

    So even if we grant that unguided evolution conforms to Ockham’s razor better than theistic evolution, it is not at all clear or obvious that this means it is a better theory, all things considered. Theistic evolution may be a significantly more probable theory and have significantly greater explanatory scope and comprehensiveness.

    A second problem with the appeal to Ockham’s razor is that what constitutes a simpler hypothesis in a given context depends on the background information one has about what exists. Plantinga makes this point,

    The theistic noetic structure already, of course, includes the existence of God.  Relative to that noetic structure, therefore, there is no additional Ockhamistic cost in the hypothesis of guided evolution.  As an analogy: suppose we land a space ship on a planet we know is inhabited by intelligent creatures.  We find something that looks exactly like a stone arrowhead, complete with grooves and indentations made in the process of shaping and sharpening it.  Two possibilities suggest themselves: one, that it acquired these characteristics by way of erosion, let’s say, and the other, that it was intentionally designed and fashioned by the inhabitants.  Someone with a couple of courses in philosophy might suggest that the former hypothesis is to be preferred because it posits fewer entities than the latter.  He’d be wrong, of course; since we already know that the planet contains intelligent creatures, there is no Ockhamistic cost involved in thinking those structures designed. The same would go for evolution; theists already accept divine design, and do not incur additional Ockhamistic cost by way of thinking of evolution as guided.[7]

    Plantinga’s insight is correct. He goes on to note that if we did not know the planet was inhabited by intelligent beings and the erosion hypothesis was not significantly less probable then an appeal to Ockham’s razor in favour of the erosion hypothesis would have “teeth.”  If this argument works at all, it only works if one begins with an agnostic perspective and then postulates “the existence of a divine designer in order to explain the course of evolution.” If, however, one already knows that God exists and rationally believes God and has created the world on other grounds then we do not violate Ockham’s razor by appealing to the existence of God to explain the evolutionary process.

    Evolutionary theory then might mean that an agnostic has reason for accepting atheistic evolution over theistic evolution as an explanation of the origin of species (I say “might” because the problem of relative probabilities and explanatory comprehensiveness still would need addressing). However, it does not show that those who believe in God, are irrational in doing so, nor does it provide a theist with any rational reason to reject his or her belief.

    Again then, it seems that evolution by itself does not make belief in God untenable. Before it could the objector would first need to show there were no other grounds for believing in God other than the evolution of life on earth. Then he or she would need to show that one could construct a theory that has as much explanatory power as theism and on which the evolution of life by blind chance was not significantly less probable than its occurrence by divine guidance. Only after both these things were done could evolution be used to defeat theism. It is evident, however, that evolutionary theory by itself establishes none of these claims. Whether they are defensible is a substantive philosophical question over and above anything established in contemporary evolutionary theory.

    This post draws from parts of my paper “Does Evolution Make Belief in God Untenable?” given at the recent TANSA conference, Faithful Science? – Just How Well Do Science and Faith Get Along?


    [1] Eliot Sober “Evolution Without Metaphysics” (unpublished).
    [2]
    Ernest Mayr Toward a New Philosophy of Biology; Observations of an Evolutionist (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998) 98.
    [3] George Gaylord Simpson The Meaning of Evolution (Yale University Press, rev ed., 1967) 344-345.
    [4]
    Douglas Futuyma Evolutionary Biology (Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates Inc, 1986) 2.
    [5]
    Alvin Plantinga
    “Science and Religion: Where Does  the Conflict Really Lie?” (unpublished).
    [7]
    Ibid.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Darwinian Evolution, Chance and Design
    God, Darwinian Evolution and The Teleological Argument
    TANSA Faith and Science Conference
    Faith and Science Conference Write-Up

  • Recyling: Rawls on Religion and Public Life

    A common theme appeared in the comments section of my Investigate Magazine article, Contra Mundum: What’s Wrong with Imposing your Beliefs onto Others? Commenters suggested I had not addressed the standard liberal conception of the role of religion and public life, the view that no law should be based on premises that not all reasonable people accept. Mention was made of Rawls’ particular version of this argument so I thought it would be timely to recycle a series I wrote on this topic that many current regular readers might not have seen.

    Thanks to the wonders of WordPress’ more tag it is complete in this post.

    Rawls on Religion and Public Life

    One common line of argument for excluding theological premises from public debate is that not everyone accepts the truth of such premises. Any policy decisions based on such a purported divine law would be binding upon these people in spite of the fact they do not accept such theological doctrines.

    One obvious problem with this line of argument is that exactly the same thing can be said about many secular, non-theological, beliefs. Phillip Quinn articulates this point,

    … if the fact that religious reasons can not be shared by all in a religiously pluralistic society suffices to warrant any exclusion of religious reasons for advocating or supporting restrictive laws or policies, then much else ought in fairness also be excluded on the same grounds.[1]

    Quinn notes correctly that secular moral theories such as Utilitarianism or Kantianism, Intuitionism, Socialism, Libertarianism, can all be reasonably rejected in a philosophically-pluralistic society.

    Indeed, it would seem that the appeal to any comprehensive ethical theory, including all known secular ethical theories, should be disallowed on the grounds that every such theory can be reasonably rejected by some citizens in a pluralistic democracy. And if justification of restrictive laws or policies can be conducted only in terms of moral considerations no citizen of a pluralistic democracy can reasonably reject, then in a pluralistic democracy such as ours very few restrictive laws or policies would be morally justified, a conclusion that would, I suspect, be welcome only to anarchists.[2]

    One influential attempt to avoid these problems is proposed by John Rawls in Political Liberalism.[3] Rawls defends the thesis that it is wrong to appeal to religious or theological beliefs in debates pertaining to “constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice”.[4] Rawls does this on the same grounds that Quinn refers to above; such beliefs can be “reasonably rejected by some citizens in a pluralistic democracy”.[5] Rawls states,

    Our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.[6]

    (more…)

  • A Review of Last Night’s Boscawen, McCoskrie, Evans, Baldock Meeting UPDATED

    Last night’s meeting with John Boscawen, Bob McCoskrie, Jim Evans and Larry Baldock on amending s59 of the Crimes Act to decriminalise the use of reasonable force for the purposes of parental correction was encouraging. The main themes I came away with from each speaker were:

    John Boscawen – ACT Party MP
    John Boscawen has not given up on his Bill and will use the time between now and 15 October 09, the date he expects his Bill to go to first reading, to rally support for it. He needs us to keep the issue live. So commenters, keep commenting; bloggers keep blogging. Everyone keep the pressure on the MP’s, especially the Nats  and everyone keep an eye out for public meetings as John travels around and turn up to them with friends – we want the media to be able to report that there are bums on seats everywhere he goes in support of this Bill.

    Despite John Key’s refusal to act, keep in mind that MP’s feel political pressure, they are human beings, they are not immune to it.

    Jim Evans – Emeritus Professor of Law at the University of Auckland
    Professor Evans confirmed that the dominant purpose of any act of force in the course of parenting cannot be correction. He spoke of his concern for the danger to the rule of law caused by reliance on police discretion for acts that are clearly criminal. He said it might be one thing for the police to exercise discretion over issuing a traffic fine but when it comes to criminal acts it is not an adequate solution. If you have a situation where conduct that should not be criminal in fact is then the solution is not to just not prosecute but to change the law.

    Highlighting Fitzgerald v Muldoon [1976] 2 NZLR 615 (NZSC) he spoke of the legal principle that required this contained in the Bill of Rights Act 1689, Article 1, which provides:

    “That the pretended power of suspending of laws or the execution of laws by regal authority without consent of Parliament is illegal.”

    Essentially this means that only parliament can change the law and it must make a statute to do so. Professor Evans pointed out that being governed by discretion, as opposed to law, makes it impossible for one to stand on the law.

    Bob McCoskrie – Family First
    Bob spoke on research on the real causes of child abuse and called for more action on that.  Not one, even those done by the likes of UNICEF, CYFS and the Children’s Commissioner, cited smacking as a cause.  I support this research and action being done but not by government.

    He also put up some excellent quotes:

    John’s Key speaking on Radio Live on 4 Sept 09 at 11:40 am to Michael Laws:

    “It’s a complete and utter dog’s breakfast – let’s acknowledge that”, that it’s badly drafted, “extremely vague”, and “we believe the Borrows amendment was the right place to settle.”

    Hat tip: S59Blog, Voxy

    [I won a chocolate bar at the meeting for knowing who said that – it was very nice]

    Sue Bradford’s contradictory and confusing statements on the law;

    Will ban smacking: “Greens draw up their own anti-smacking bill”

    Won’t ban smacking:
    Sue Bradford: “It won’t be legal but that won’t mean…
    Barry Soper (interviewer): “So it’s banning smacking.”
    Bradford: “No it’s not”

    Smacking is banned: “Ms Bradford says parents need to accept that it is no longer legal to hit children.”

    Smacking isn’t banned: “Smacking has never been a criminal offence, and still isn’t”

    Smacking already banned: “it is already illegal to smack children but her bill removes a defence of reasonable force for the purpose of correction.” (March 2007)

    There is no such law:
    “There is no specific law relating to smacking on New Zealand’s statute books. People like Mr McCoskrie have fostered a myth that what has happened is that a new law has been created that specifically outlaws smacking. This is simply not true.”

    Smacking bill won’t help: “The epidemic of child abuse and child violence in this country continues – sadly. My bill was never intended to solve that problem.” (National Radio – 21 Dec 07)

    Sue Bradford attempts to explain the effect of the anti-smacking law to National Radio’s Sean Plunket (18 June 2009) – click here to listen [or read Dave Crampton’s summary of the interview.]

    Sue Bradford says it’s not a decision that should be left to the people – watch her on YouTube.

    Hat tip: Vote No

    A great one by former Labour Prime Minister Michael Moore (not the faux-documentary maker) in the Herald,

    The expensive, puerile, futile controversy over the ill-considered anti-smacking legislation is a monument to political cowardice and opportunism.

    Hat tip: Big News, Contra Celsum

    [Many thanks to the readers who sent these quotes to me; I have had a very bad run with pain lately and sitting through the meeting on hard plastic chairs was really difficult and I was paying for it yesterday which is why I did not hunt them down myself.]

    Larry Baldock – Kiwi Party
    Larry spoke of his plans to promote another referendum; a non-binding referendum to ask the question “should Citizens Initiated Referenda seeking to amend or repeal a law be binding?’ He asked for people to sign up to help promote it, once it is approved by the Clerk of the House.

    I did not sign up and will not help to promote it.

    Direct democracy is a flawed concept. Legislating is a skill, it is not something that every person is capable of. This is why we must take care to elect skilled and capable and ethical people to parliament when we vote. We elect them to consider the issues, all of them and wisely legislate on our behalf. They should listen to the people but democracy is not mob rule, it is not and should not constitute bowing to the will of the majority. The majority can and have and continued to jump on the wrong bandwagons; the majority once supported slavery, circuses in Rome, they elected Hitler to power and in New Zealand if we held binding referenda today abortion on demand and the removal of the defence of provocation would fly through – positions that are wrong (see here and here respectively) that are held on the basis of knee-jerk emotionalism instead of reason.

    Much philosophical literature has been written over the centuries against direct democracy.  If I have not convinced you, read some before you sign your name to Larry’s petition or agree to help promote it.

    I agree with Larry’s frustrations, I agree there is a massive problem with our political system in New Zealand but the solution is that we need an upper house. An upper house vets legislation sent up by the lower house. It is typically elected by a different system so you get quite a different makeup. Essentially it means that all legislation gets a second look by skilled, knowledgeable eyes, gets re-debated, amended and tweaked before it becomes law. This is a far better safeguard that the option to call a binding referendum where only a vague conception can be communicated to parliament in the form of the referenda question to which one can only offer a yes or a no. A bill still has to be drafted in response to a binding referendum and who gets to write that or determine how much it is in line with the referenda question?

    If Larry’s petition was a clearly worded call for an upper house I would be behind him completely.

    UPDATE:
    You Tube videos of the speakers are here.

  • Philosophy Carnival XCVI

    The Philosophy Carnival XCVI is now online.

    Matt’s posts: Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part I and Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part II are featured.

    There are a number of other interesting reads also linked to so head on over and check them out.

  • Sunday Study: Interpreting the Sixth Commandment Part I

    One of the most well known biblical commands is the sixth commandment of the Decalogue (according to protestant enumeration). This commandment occurs in the 20th chapter of the book of Exodus and the fifth chapter of the book of Deuteronomy. In its most well-known rendition, the King James Version (KJV), this commandment states “thou shalt not kill.”[1] The Hebrew term translated as ‘kill’ here is rasah. The New International Version (NIV) and New Revised Standard Version (NRSV) translate it as “murder.”

    Both interpretations, kill and murder, face problems; in this post I will offer critical comments on both interpretations. Next week, in Sunday Study: Interpreting the Sixth Commandment Part II, I will articulate and defend what I think to be the best approach to interpreting this passage, an approach advocated by Augustine of Hippo in the fifth century which has been dominant in Christian ethical thought ever since.

    The King James Version: Thou Shalt not Kill
    As stated, the most known formulation of the sixth commandment is rendered “thou shall not kill.” Taken on its own (and out of its context) this faces problems, some identified as far back as at least the time of Augustine. Eating plants or harvesting food involves killing plants, living creatures. As Augustine notes, “for though this class of creatures has no sensation, yet they also are said to live, and consequently they can die; and therefore, if violence be done them, can be killed.”[2] He then asks rhetorically, “Must we therefore reckon it a breaking of this commandment, “Thou shalt not kill”, to pull a flower?”[3] In fact, modern knowledge brings other perplexities. Scraping the inside of my mouth kills hundreds of living cells. Taking antibiotics kills bacteria. Understood strictly as a prohibition against all killing, the command is manifestly absurd.

    However, contemporary translators have noted that “kill” is not the best English equivalent of rasah, as rasah is not the general Hebrew term for killing. Rather, it is a term that is used only of killing humans; the word literally means “to slay.” For this reason, the N.R.S.V. interprets the noun as “manslay.” However, even as a term for homicide, rasah is comparatively rare in Hebrew. It appears only 46 times in the Hebrew Bible compared with other more frequently-used terms such as harag and hemit,[4] which also refer to killing. It is also not lost on readers of the Hebrew Bible that in many surrounding passages certain forms of homicide are either permitted, such as killing a thief in the night (Ex. 22: 1-2)[5] or even commanded, such as the execution of murderers, (Ex. 21:12).

    The Modern Version: You shall not Murder
    For this reason, most modern translations translate the verb as murder, as we saw in the NRSV and NIV. However, this is inadequate. Childs notes, “it was soon recognised that the basic distinction between murder and killing, namely the factor of intentionality, cannot be sustained for the verb r.s.h.”[6] In several places the verb is used to designate  accidental or unintentional killing. Koheler suggested that it probably prohibited taking the law into one’s own hands and hence had the sense of private killing.[7] However, as Smedes points out,

    As a matter of fact, however, rasah is used at least once for capital punishment (Num. 35:30) and also for accidental manslaughter (Deut. 4:41-43; Josh. 20:3). From a textual point of view, we do not have a clear case for limiting the commandment to private killings or murder.[8]

    One of the more thorough studies is that of Stamm. After analysing several uses of rasah, Stamm concludes that rasah means “illegal killing.” He suggests that the most concise English would be “you shall not manslaughter” which would be clarified along the lines that “the life of an Israelite” was to be protected from “illegal, impermissible violence.”[9]

    Stamm’s analysis is arguably one of the best to date; however, there are a couple of problems with it. Firstly, as Stamm himself admits, rasah is used at least once of a lawful execution and hence does have a range of meaning which includes killing in a context where killing is lawful. Secondly and perhaps frequently less noted, Stamm’s analysis turns the law into a tautology. To claim, “you shall not kill when it is against the law,” is hardly informative and somewhat states the obvious; of course it is wrong to kill when it is illegal. I think that the commandment is supposed to be saying something substantive so I doubt Stamm is completely on the mark here.

    The study of Reventlow modifies Stamm’s position somewhat. Reventlow argues that the vast majority of uses of the verb rasah relate to the idea of “blood vengeance.”[10] This is an idea which has origins in Genesis 4; in some cases of killing the victim’s blood metaphorically cries out to God for vengeance, guilt and responsibility for the crime attaches to the person who committed it, and, in certain circumstances, the land and community in which it occurs. This is atoned for only by the death of the murderer, if the killing was premeditated or the natural death of the high priest, in cases where the killing was accidental or a sacrifice, only in cases where the community authorities are unable to ascertain who is guilty. Milgrom elaborates this motif,

    The most vivid examples of this belief appear in connection with unlawful homicide, where innocent blood (dam naki’; Jonah 1:14) cries out for vengeance (Gen. 4:10). Rejected by the earth (Isa. 26:21; Ezek. 24:7), it attaches itself to the slayer and his family, literally “dancing around their heads”(2 Sam. 3:28-29) for generations (2 Sam. 21:4-6 2 Kings 9:26) and even affecting his city (Deut. 21:1-9; Jer. 26:15), nation (Deut 19:10,13), and land (Num 35:33-34). The latter two citations illustrate the variant grounds that provide the rationale for homicide laws in the Deuteronomic and priestly texts. In the former, the people Israel bear bloodguilt; in the latter, it is the land that is polluted by it. The technical term for bearing bloodguilt damo bo or damo be-ro’sho, meant originally “his blood [remains] on him/on his (the murderer’s) head” (Josh. 2:19; I Kings 2:33; Ezek. 33:5), and the legal formula mot yumat damav bo (Lev 20:9-16) means that in the case of lawful execution, the blood of the guilty victim remains on his own person and does not attach itself to the executioner.[11] [Emphasis original]

    Reventlow suggests that rasah means a homicide liable for blood vengeance. The problem with this analysis is that it appears to get things backwards. A killing is liable for blood vengeance and requires punishment or atonement presumably because it is wrong or unlawful. It is not unlawful because it requires punishment. The commandment must be prior to the ground for blood vengeance not vice versa. This observation also leads to a conclusion that does not really differ from Stamm’s. After all, a killing is liable for blood vengeance only if it is wrong so a killing liable for blood vengeance and an unlawful killing are in fact co-extensive.

    By itself then neither interpretation seems entirely correct. In my next post, Sunday Study: Interpreting the Sixth Commandment Part II, I want to suggest a way of interpreting the passage which avoids the above problems. It is hardly original; it was suggested by Augustine of Hippo in the fifth century.


    [1] Exodus 20:13 KJV.
    [2]
    Augustine The City of God 1:21.
    [3] Ibid.
    [4]
    Johann J. Stamm The Ten Commandments in Recent Research (London: S.C.M. Press, 1967) 98.
    [5]
    This passage is perhaps best illuminated by a passage in Job 24:14, “When daylight is gone, the murderer rises up and kills the poor and needy; in the night he steals forth like a thief.” This suggests that a person who broke in at night could not be distinguished from a person with murderous intent. The law also contrasts with Ancient Near Eastern case law of the same period, which allowed a person to summarily execute a thief caught on his property. The Torah states by contrast, “A thief must certainly make restitution, but if he has nothing, he must be sold to pay for his theft.” Hence, it teaches that a thief cannot be executed for theft; a thief can be killed only if he or she is perceived to be a threat to one’s life. If not, the thief must pay restitution.
    [6]
    Brevard S Childs Exodus: A Commentary (London: SCM Press, 1974) 419-420.
    [7]
    Ibid, 420.
    [8]
    Lewis B Smedes “’Respect for Human Life’ Thou Shall not Kill” in On Moral Medicine: Theological Perspectives in Medical Ethics Ed. Stephen E Lammers & Allen Verhey (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1987) 144.
    [9]
    Stamm The Ten Commandments in Recent Research 99.
    [10]
    Childs Exodus 420.
    [11]
    Jacob Milgrom Numbers: The Traditional Hebrew Text with the new JPS Translation (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1990) 509.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Sunday Study: Interpreting the Sixth Commandment Part II

  • Christian Blog Ranking Report for August 09 – HalfDone

    Here are the top 10 NZ Christian blogs based on HalfDone’s NZ blog stats for August; these stats will make up part of the calculations for the MandM top 10 NZ Christian Blog rankings for August 09:

    1. MandM 5
    2. NZ Conservative 10
    3. Something Should Go Here, Maybe Later (HalfDone) 13
    4. MacDoctor Moments 18
    5. Keeping Stock 23
    6. Say Hello to my Little Friend (Beretta) 24
    7. The Humanitarian Chronicle 25
    8. The Briefing Room 46
    9. Liturgy worship spirituality 48
    10. Being Frank 49

    Top 10. name of blog HalfDone Rank

    Of Note: (more…)

  • Monday Night: John Boscawen, Bob McCoskrie and Jim Evans on Amending s59

    Fresh from Facebook’s “5000 Demanding Anti Smacking Law Change” group is this invitation:

    ACT MP John Boscawen is holding a series of public debates on the smacking referendum result and how his bill to amend S59 will bring the legislation into line with public opinion.

    John Boscawen will be holding the first debate in Phil Goff’s electorate MT Roskill this Monday. He has challenged Phil Goff to front up and defend his position on ignoring the referendum result.

    The debate will be held on Monday, September 7 2009, 7.30pm, Hay Park School, 670 Richardson Road, Mt Roskill, Auckland.

    Speakers include John Boscawen, Bob McCoskrie and Professor Jim Evans from the Auckland Law School.

    If you live in the Auckland area, please do come along and learn more about John Boscawen’s bill while demanding that the politicians listen to the people and change the anti-smacking law.

    I’ll be there; Matt, sadly, will be in Tauranga.