Author: Matt

  • Debate Review: Sam Harris and William Lane Craig on Ethical Naturalism Part II

    William Lane Craig v Sam HarrisIn Part I of my review of the debate between Sam Harris and William Lane Craig on the moot “Is the Foundation of Morality Natural or Supernatural? I discussed Craig’s defence of the contention that:

    1. If God exists then we have a plausible account of (a) the nature of moral goodness and (b) the nature of moral obligation.

    I noted that Harris’s attempt to refute this conditional failed miserably. However, he did not just offer a negative case; Harris contended that:

    2. If atheism is true then we have a plausible account of (a) the nature of moral goodness and (b) the nature of moral obligation.

    Harris defended 2(a) by contending that moral goodness could be identified with human well-being, which he “in turn” identified with physical states of the brain. Harris defended 2(b) by identifying our moral obligations with the property of promoting human well-being. Harris suggested that this means that moral questions are scientific questions that can be answered by science.

    Harris’s Argument for Ethical Naturalism
    Harris’s argument for 2(a) consisted of three claims. First, he proposed a thought experiment of a world without conscious beings. Intuitively, we judge that nothing is good or bad in this world because nothing matters to anyone in such a world, since there is no one for anything to matter to. Harris concluded that the existence of goodness is dependent on conscious beings.

    Second, Harris asked us to imagine a world full of conscious creatures who live forever in excruciating pain. We intuitively judge this state of affairs to be bad and we intuitively assume a duty to avoid it.

    Third, since states of consciousness are brain states, science can develop ways of promoting these states.

    However, this argument fails to establish Harris’s conclusion. The first claim shows only that goodness depends on the existence of conscious beings. It does not show that goodness is a state of consciousness. Moreover, the second and third premises affirm that we have a duty to avoid maximising pain and that science can tell us how to fulfil this duty. It does not show that moral obligation is the property of promoting or enhancing human flourishing. Nor does the argument show that science can answer moral questions.

    The argument, in fact, relies on people determining, by moral intuition, what things are good and what obligations we have prior to scientific investigation. After this is determined science is used to ascertain how to fulfil these duties. Nothing in Harris’s argument implies that science can discover what our duties are or what is good in the first place.

    Moreover, as I noted in my previous post, this method involves accepting moral beliefs as properly basic. However, if it is the case that we can accept moral beliefs as properly basic then what is the problem with Alvin Plantinga’s contention that belief in God is properly basic? What exactly is it about religious beliefs that disqualifies them from being basic in the same way Harris contends moral beliefs are? (more…)

  • Friday Fallacy: Equivocation

    In my post on Assessing Arguments I noted that a valid argument is one where it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. I gave the following example:

    Premise: All men are under 10 feet tall;
    Premise: John is a man;
    Conclusion: John is under 10 feet tall.

    This argument is valid because it is impossible for both premises to be true and the conclusion false. If it is true that all men are under 10 feet tall and if it is true that John is a man then John cannot be over 10 feet tall. If it were possible for John to be over 10 feet tall then the first premise would mean he could not be a man, which, of course, would contradict the second premise.

    In this post I want to note an important feature of this type of argument. There is an obvious link between the first and the second premises. The first premise makes a claim about all men; it identifies a class of beings, those we call men, and it attributes a property to members of this class. The second premise identified John as a man – a member of the class mentioned in premise one. The fact that both premises refer to the same class of beings is important to the validity of the argument because John is a member of the same class that is stated to be under 10 feet tall; the conclusion, that John is under 10 feet tall, cannot be logically avoided. This argument is valid because the word ‘man’ refers to the same thing in both premises. If the word ‘men’ in the first premise did not refer to the same class John is said to be a member of in the second premise then the argument would not follow.

    This brings me to this weeks fallacy: the fallacy of equivocation. Sometimes the same word has more than one meaning. The fallacy of equivocation occurs when a person uses the same word in different premises but not the same meaning. Because the same word is used the argument appears valid but when one looks at what the word actually refers to in each premise, the argument is not valid.  A obvious example is as follows:

    1. Money put in a bank will earn interest;
    2. A bank is the body of land at the side of a river;

    Therefore:

    3. If you want to earn interest on your money you should put it in the body of land at the side of a river.

    This silly example shows quite nicely how the fallacy works. Both premise 1. and premise 2. make reference to a bank; at a superficial glance the argument might appear valid if what the first premise says of a bank is true and if what the second premise says of a bank is true. The problem is (and in this example it is fairly obvious) the word ‘bank’ in each premise has a different meaning. In the first premise it refers to a financial institution, in the second it refers to a body of land at the side of a river. When one looks at what the terms actually refer to, as opposed to their verbal form, the argument is invalid.

    In this example the fallacy is obvious; the conclusion is so outrageously silly and the premises so uncontroversial that the mistake is obvious. However, in other cases the fallacy can be more subtle.

    The Fallacy of Equivocation

    Here is an example I recently spotted on Common Sense Atheism’s (more…)

  • Debate Review: Sam Harris and William Lane Craig on Divine Command Theory Part I

    William Lane Craig v Sam HarrisLast week Sam Harris and William Lane Craig debated the question: “Is the Foundation of Morality Natural or Supernatural?” at the University of Notre Dame. Given my interest in divine command meta-ethics I found the debate and the subsequent online discussion concerning it extremely interesting. I was particularly interested in how the ‘new atheist’ movement would address this issue given Dawkins’ neglect of moral arguments in The God Delusion. Unfortunately, the debate turned out to be very one-sided. [Both the debate video and the debate MP3 are now online.]

    In this review I will analyse the debate in two parts. In Part I, I will look at the discussion of Craig’s contention that,

    1. If God exists then we have a plausible account of (a) the nature of moral goodness and (b) the nature of moral obligation.

    In Part II, I will examine Harris’s contention that,

    2. If atheism is true then we have a plausible account of (a) the nature of moral goodness and (b) the nature of moral obligation.

    A couple of definitions are necessary here; what both Craig and Harris are defending are rival accounts of what both goodness and moral obligation are. When Craig or Harris offers an account of the nature of goodness, each is offering an account of what moral values and obligation are, that is, their ontological or metaphysical nature. Similarly, when Craig refers to God, he is referring to a personal immaterial being who is necessarily existent, omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect.

    Craig’s Argument for a Divine Command Theory
    In support of 1(a) Craig argued that if theism is true, goodness could be identified with God himself. His view is that goodness is best understood in terms of an exemplar, that good is identified with the perfect paradigm of a good person and that the goodness of everything else is measured by its resemblance to this paradigm. An analogy to this idea is the official “metre stick” that exists in France today. The metre stick is exactly one metre long, and the length in metres of every other length is determined by comparison with it. In the same way, God is both perfectly good and is the standard of goodness for everything else. God’s goodness, for Craig, is cashed out in terms of certain character traits. To claim God is good is to claim that he is truthful, benevolent, loving, gracious, merciful and just, and that he is opposed to certain actions such as murder, rape, torturing people for fun and so on.

    In support of 1(b) Craig argued that if God exists, moral obligations can be identified with Gods commands. He therefore advocated the version of a divine command theory of obligation proposed by Robert Adams in Finite and Infinite Goods.

    While Craig sketched his account of goodness and obligation in his opening statement, he never offered any actual argument for why he thinks that if theism is true, this account is correct; yet later in the debate he said it was obvious. While I myself agree with a certain version of divine command theory, I think this suggestion is inadequate. There have been many objections raised against such theories in the literature, and hardly any of them presuppose the non-existence of God. I think these objections fail, and most of them fail miserably. But it would be a gross overstatement to claim that, given the truth of theism, a divine command theory is obvious.

    Later in the debate, (more…)

  • Ethical Naturalism and the Euthyphro Dilemma

    Some people argue that moral obligations can be grounded in scientifically verifiable facts about human wellbeing and flourishing. This view is a form of ethical naturalism.  For these people moral rightness is just the property of promoting or enhancing human flourishing.

    Plato and Aristotle arguing in the School of Athens

    Plato refuted this argument over 2,000 years ago in his famous dialogue The Euthyphro. The Euthyphro argument is commonly appropriated in the form of a dilemma: “is an action right because it promotes human flourishing or does it promote human flourishing because it is right?

    If ethical naturalists take the second horn of this dilemma and claim that something promotes human flourishing because it is right then things are right prior to, and hence independently of, whether they promote human welfare; so the ethical naturalists’ position here is false.

    If the ethical naturalists take the former horn then morality is arbitrary. If rape or murder or cruelty for fun had the natural property of promoting happiness then rape and murder and cruelty for fun would be morally required but it is impossible for these things to be morally required; so ethical naturalism is clearly absurd.

    Moreover, if things are right because they have natural properties, like promoting human flourishing, then one cannot meaningfully say that human flourishing is good. To say “human flourishing”  is good is just to say that  “human flourishing is human flourishing,” which is just an empty tautology.

    So in short, Plato’s Euthyphro dilemma refuted ethical naturalism 2,000 years ago. Contemporary ethical naturalists who say otherwise just have not read Plato and have never come across this argument before.

    In any event, ethical naturalism is deeply problematic. Throughout history people have appealed to human flourishing and forms of ethical naturalism to justify atrocities. The Inquisition, for example, was often justified by Dominican Theologians on the basis that it was in accord with natural law, and natural law was understood to be grounded in human flourishing. Similarly, wars have been justified on the basis of moral theories based on human flourishing. Stalin and Lenin wanted to bring about human flourishing through a communist utopia and murdered millions in their pursuit of that. And the Americans dropped an atomic bomb on Japan because they wanted to promote the flourishing of American soldiers that were going to invade.

    Finally, it is obviously insulting to suggest that right and wrong are grounded in scientifically verifiable properties like this. There are a large number of people who live morally upright lives who do not believe in ethical naturalism. The suggestion that these people are all immoral is obviously false. Name me one moral action a person who is not an ethical naturalist cannot do? This unanswerable question shows that ethical naturalism is clearly false.

    RELATED POSTS: (more…)

  • Fallacy Friday: Ad Ignorantiam (Arguments from Ignorance)

    In the discussion following last week’s Fallacy Friday topic, Ad Populum, LJ asked about the ad ignorantiam fallacy. In particular she wanted to know about its relationship to creationism. I suspect LJ was being sarcastic but despite this it is worth exploring this issue a bit.

    First, we should recall that a fallacy is not simply a false position on some subject. The fact that someone expounds a mistaken view in theology, philosophy, science, law, ethics or any other subject does not necessarily mean that that person has committed a fallacy. A fallacy is a common mistake in reasoning. A fallacy occurs when one attempts to infer a conclusion from a premise in an invalid manner. I noted in Assessing Arguments that an argument can be valid even if it has false premises and false conclusions. So the fact that someone believes in or propounds contemporary evolutionary theory or creationism or something else does not, in and of itself, mean that that person has committed the ad ignorantiam fallacy.

    What is an Ad Ignorantiam?
    "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" Carl SaganSo what exactly is the mistake being made when one commits an ad ignorantiam fallacy and how does one commit it? The ad ignorantiam fallacy is as an argument from ignorance. It occurs when a person argues that a conclusion is false because no one has shown it to be true or when a person argues a position is true because no one has shown it to be false.  Applied to evolution, the argument has the form:

    1. No one has shown that evolutionary theory is true;

    Therefore:

    2. Evolutionary theory is false.

    Similarly, with creationism:

    1. No one has ever shown creationism is true

    Therefore:

    2. Creationism is false.

    What the person who makes this inference fails to appreciate is that the failure to provide a reason for affirming a conclusion is not the same as providing a reason for thinking the conclusion is false. It is possible, and probably actual, that there are many things that are true which we do not yet know about. In such situations, no one will have shown these things to be true and no one will be able show them to be false yet they are true; we simply will not know that they are.

    An example from history might illustrate this; consider the heliocentric hypothesis, (more…)

  • Thom Stark on Wolterstorff and Hagiographic Hyperbole

    Earlier this year I finished a forthcoming article in which I defended Nicholas Wolterstorff’s take on the Canaanite massacre recorded in the book of Joshua. Wolterstorff argues that the Book of Joshua is a highly figurative, hagiographic and hyperbolic account of Israel’s early skirmishes and it is not intended to be taken literally in its details.[1] The accounts of killing everything that breathes function something like the boast of a high school student who describes winning a football game in terms of totally slaughtering the opposition.[2]

    Joshua Slaughters the CanaanitesMy article was a revised version of a paper I presented in Atlanta in November last year (my God and the Genocide of the Canaanites series gives a good overview of my position). Around the same time I presented this paper, Thom Stark, posted a critical review of Douglas S. Earl’s book The Joshua Delusion? Rethinking Genocide in the Bible. As a review, much of it was addressed to the specifics of Earl’s book. However, in the introduction Stark offered a critique of Wolterstorff’s position and made reference to my defence of it.

    He offered three lines of argument; two against the conclusion Wolterstorff and I offered and one against Wolterstorff’s argument itself. Since then several people have asked me my thoughts on his critique. In this post I will look at his critique of Wolterstorff’s argument, which I defended and adapted in my article.

    Before one can criticise an argument it is important to be clear as to what it is. As I note in my forthcoming article (and in the post I linked to above) Wolterstorff’s argument consists of three points and a basic assumption. The assumption is that “Joshua as we have it today was intended as a component in the larger sequence consisting of Deuteronomy, Joshua, Judges, I and II Samuel, and I and II Kings”.[3] On the basis of this assumption Wolterstorff contends “…  I propose that we interpret the Book of Joshua as a component within this larger sequence – in particular, that we interpret it as preceded by Deuteronomy and succeeded by Judges.”[4] In taking this approach, Wolterstorff engages in a more canonical approach to the text; he focuses on the meaning of the final form as part of a canonical sequence.

    The three premises are as follows. First, the so called genocide accounts in Joshua 1-11 are part of a broader context which includes both the rest of Joshua but also other canonical books, such as the book of Judges. When one reads the whole sequence one observes that while early passages in Joshua describe Israel exterminating the inhabitants, later passages in Joshua and Judges proceed on the assumption this never literally happened.[5] Taken literally these accounts of the conquest contradict each other (more…)

  • World Health Day: Abortion is Not a Health Issue

    Fetus7 April is “World Health Day” and some are using this fact to argue that “abortion is a health issue, not a crime” by way of a “blogswarm”. I find this contention a little curious; claiming that abortion is simply a health issue is an assertion which is supposed to mean that abortion is not a moral issue in any way. However, an assertion is not an argument and proves nothing.

    If a fetus is a human being then feticide is homicide and this obviously makes abortion more than a health issue. But suppose (contrary to what I think is the case) a fetus is not a human being. How does it follow that abortion is a health issue?

    Cutting tissue out of a person’s body does not make something into a health issue. Suppose, for example, that a woman has a boob job. Is this a health issue? No, this  is cosmetic surgery. It might be done in a hospital and by a surgeon but this does not make it into a health issue any more than the fact that a chef might kiss his wife in a resurant makes his romance of her a question of diet. Contrary to what some juvenile males may think, having small breasts is not a disease.

    Of course, one can imagine situations where a boob job might be a health issue. Suppose a woman has breast cancer and the surgeon surgically removes her breast tissue to prevent the cancer spreading. This would be a health issue because cancer is a disease; it is something that threatens life, limb or bodily function and the surgery is necessary to prevent the body succumbing to the disease.

    Pregnancy, however, is not a disease and I find it quite odd that people who claim to be pro-women would suggest that it was.

    Of course, there might be some types of abortion which are a health issue; cases where the pregnancy threatens the life of the mother or threatens to cause her serious injury, for example. But these are not the normal cases or reasons women have abortions.

    I suppose an obvious rejoinder will be raised here; any time a woman does not want to be pregnant carrying the pregnancy to term will be a source of anguish. Similarly, as the World Health Organisation (“WHO”) likes to tell us, health is broader than simply physical integrity like the absence of disease, loss of limb or death. Health is more holistic – it includes economic and emotional well-being, it is the absence of stress and so forth. Hence, abortion is a health issue because women use abortions to gain health in this broader sense.

    We can define health the way WHO does if we like; and if we do, abortion is a health issue. But the problem is that on this definition almost anything one does is a “health issue”. My choice to take a particular career path, marry a particular woman, live in a certain house all can adversely effect my economic well-being, cause me emotional stress and so on.  We can call abortion a health issue only by calling everything a health issue and once we do this the fact that abortion is a health issue becomes of little significance – there would be little point in observing World Health Day.

    So abortion is not a health issue. Moreover, even if it was, it is hard to know what saying it is a health issue is supposed to prove. The whole reason there is a field called medical ethics is because even “health issues” can be subject to moral and ethical critique.  Perhaps instead of chanting slogans about abortion, people should actually examine the moral and ethical issues the abortion procedure raises and engage in some moral reasoning and analysis. Hiding behind “it is a health issue, not a crime” is simply avoidance.

    Check out the counter-blogswarm.