Category: God and Morality

  • Sunday Study: Joshua and the Genocide of the Canaanites Part I

    Critics of Christianity often claim that the book of Joshua teaches that God commanded genocide. Raymond Bradley for example states,

    In chapters 7 through 12, [the book of Joshua] treats us to a chilling chronicle of the 31 kingdoms, and all the cities therein, that fell victim to Joshua’s, and God’s, genocidal policies. Time and again we read the phrases “he utterly destroyed every person who was in it,” “he left no survivor,” and “there was no one left who breathed.”[1]

    Similarly, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong cites passages in Joshua with the same point in mind.[2]

    The objection that Bradley and Armstrong raise in highlighting these passages is that Christians are committed to an inconsistent set of propositions.

    [1] Any act that God commands is morally permissible.
    [2] The scriptures are an authoritative revelation of God’s commands.
    [3] It is morally impermissible for anyone to commit genocide.
    [4] According to the book of Joshua, God commanded Israel to commit genocide.

    If we are to rationally affirm both [1] and [2] then we must give up either [3] or [4]. So which one should we reject?

    Philip Quinn has developed a way of addressing clashes such as this. He suggests that we can draw on a principle whereby “whenever two conflicting claims differ in epistemic status, the claim with the lower epistemic status is to be rejected.”

    [3]Given this approach, if a particular interpretation of any passage conflicts with one of our moral intuitions then we should ask whether or not the case for that interpretation is as convincing as the principle that it clashes with. Now, the principle that genocide is wrong is, I think, a highly plausible one. Therefore, if one is to prefer [3] to [4] then the case for a literal reading must at least be this plausible, and preferably even more plausible. In this series of posts I will argue, perhaps surprisingly to some, that [4] is doubtful. While it is true that taken in isolation and interpreted in a strict literal fashion the book of Joshua does appear to state that God commanded Genocide, I contend that when the text is read in its literary and textual context this conclusion is far from evident and is, in fact, rather questionable.

    In the tenth chapter of the book of Joshua we read,

    They [Joshua and his troops] took the city, its king and its villages, and put them to the sword. Everyone in it they totally destroyed. They left no survivors. They did to Debir and its king as they had done to Libnah and its king and to Hebron. So Joshua subdued the whole region, including the hill country, the Negev, the western foothills and the mountain slopes, together with all their kings. He left no survivors. He totally destroyed all who breathed, just as the LORD, the God of Israel, had commanded. Joshua subdued them from Kadesh Barnea to Gaza and from the whole region of Goshen to Gibeon. (Joshua 10:39-41)

    This text summarises Joshua’s campaign in southern Canaan. The northern campaign is summarised in a similar fashion in the following chapter,

    So Joshua took this entire land: the hill country, all the Negev, the whole region of Goshen, the western foothills, the Arabah and the mountains of Israel with their foothills, from Mount Halak, which rises toward Seir, to Baal Gad in the Valley of Lebanon below Mount Hermon. He captured all their kings and struck them down, putting them to death. Joshua waged war against all these kings for a long time. Except for the Hivites living in Gibeon, not one city made a treaty of peace with the Israelites, who took them all in battle. For it was the LORD himself who hardened their hearts to wage war against Israel, so that he might destroy them totally, exterminating them without mercy, as the LORD had commanded Moses. At that time Joshua came and wiped out the Anakim from the hill country, from Hebron, from Debir, from Anab, and from all the hill country of Judah, and from all the hill country of Israel; Joshua utterly destroyed them with their towns. No Anakites were left in Israelite territory; only in Gaza, Gath and Ashdod did any survive. So Joshua took the entire land, just as the LORD had directed Moses, and he gave it as an inheritance to Israel according to their tribal divisions. Then the land had rest from war. (Joshua 11:16-23)

    If these passages are taken in a strict literal fashion and read in isolation from the proceeding narrative they record the divinely authorised commission of genocide. Taken literally these passages state three things.

    Firstly, that Joshua conquered and subdued the entire regions of southern and northern Canaan. Verse 11:23 states that “Joshua took the entire land” and then “gave it as an inheritance to Israel according to their tribal divisions.” This suggests that the region in question is the same land that is later divided between the Israelite tribes, which was the entire land of Canaan.

    Secondly, the passage repeatedly emphasises that Joshua exterminated all the Canaanites in this region. Verse 11:21 states “Joshua came and wiped out the Anakim from the hill country, from Hebron, from Debir, from Anab, and from all the hill country of Judah.” Verse 11:22 states that no Anakites were left living in Israeli territory after this campaign.  Repeatedly it states that Joshua left “no survivors” and “destroyed everything that breathed” in “the entire land.” Alongside these general claims the text goes to identifies several specific places and cities where Joshua exterminated everyone and left no survivors and killed all who breathed. These include Hebron, Debir, the hill country and the Negev.

    Thirdly, the text states that God commanded these actions. Verse 23 identifies the commands with those laid down in the Law of Moses, which refers back to passages like Deut 20:16-19 and Deut 7.1-5.

    The first thing I want to note is that the text should not be read in isolation from the narrative in which this occurs. This hermeneutical point may seem rather obvious but when it is taken seriously immediate and obvious problems occur with a strictly literal reading of the ‘genocide passages’ I mention above. The most glaringly obvious issue relates to the opening of the book of Judges. In the first chapter of Judges we read of events that occurred after the death of Joshua (and, hence, after the campaigns mentioned in Josh 10 and 11). Here it is explicitly stated that Canaanites are living in the land which had been allotted to various Israeli tribes, the land that Joshua is said to have conquered and “left no survivors” in. Note that this was not a small remnant. They existed in such numbers that each of the tribes of Israel needed to fight in order to dislodge them from the land. Several of the tribes were unable to do so and so Israel failed to dislodge them.

    Of particular interest, however, are the several cities and regions mentioned. In the first chapter we are told that the Canaanites lived Gaza (Judg 1:18), the Negev (1:9), in the hill country  (Judg 1:9) in Debir (Judg 1:11), in Hebron (Judg 1:10) and in the the western foothills (Judg 1:9). Moreover, they did so in such numbers and strength that they had to be driven out by force. These are the same cities that Joshua 10 tells us Joshua had annihilated and left no survivors in.  Moreover, the text explicitly states that Anakites are in Hebron, yet Joshua 11:22 tells us that “No Anakites were left in Israelite territory.” This seems rather odd if Joshua had exterminated everyone there and left no survivors. It is also odd given that Joshua is said, in the genocide passages, to have conquered and subdued the entire region.

    Moreover, the account of what God commanded also differs in Judges 2:1. Here no mention of genocide or annihilation is made, instead we hear of how God had promised to drive them out and has commanded the Israelites to not to make treaties with them and to destroy their shrines. Taken in a straight-forward literal manner then, Joshua’s actions are at odds with the first two chapters of Judges.

    It is not just Judges that this problem occurs in. There are numerous places within the book of Joshua itself where the same picture is presented. As noted, Joshua 11 ends by stating that “the entire land, just as the LORD had directed Moses” was given “as an inheritance to Israel according to their tribal divisions.” When the text turns to giving an account of these tribal divisions it is evident that the Israelites do not actually occupy it, but living, breathing, Canaanites do.

    The allotments begin with God telling Joshua, “You are very old, and there are still very large areas of land to be taken over” (Josh 13:1). Moreover, when one examines the allotment given to Judah we see Caleb asking permission to drive the  Anakites (Josh14: 11) from the hill countries and we also hear how Caleb has to defeat Anakites living in Hebron and, after this, marches against the people “living in Debir” (Josh 15:13-19). Similarly it is evident with several of the other allotments that the people have yet to drive Canaanites entrenched in the area and that Israelites were not always successful in doing so.

    We read, for example, that Ephraimites and Manassites “did not dislodge the Canaanites living in Gezer; to this day the Canaanites live among the people of Ephraim” (Josh 16:10). Similarly, in Chapter 17 it states “Yet the Manassites were not able to occupy these towns, for the Canaanites were determined to live in that region. However, when the Israelites grew stronger, they subjected the Canaanites to forced labor but did not drive them out completely” (Joshua 17:12-13). We hear that “Danites had difficulty taking possession of their territory, so they went up and attacked Leshem, took it, put it to the sword and occupied it. They settled in Leshem and named it Dan after their forefather” (Joshua 19:47). Here, we see the same land said to be subdued and conquered by Joshua in battles where he exterminated and left alive nothing that breathed. This land is yet to be occupied by the tribes of Israel and is occupied by Canaanites, often heavily armed and deeply entrenched (17:17-18).

    Brevard Childs notes the apparent contradiction,

    Critical scholars have long since pointed out the tension – usually it is called a contradiction – in the portrayal of the conquest of the land. On the one hand, the conquest is pictured in the main source of Josh. 1-12 as a unified assault against the inhabitants of the land under the leadership of Joshua which succeeded in conquering the entire land. On the other hand, there is a conflicting view of the conquest represented by Judges 1 and its parallels in Joshua which appears to picture the conquest as undertaken by individual tribes, extending over a long period beyond the age of Joshua, and unsuccessful in driving out the Canaanites from much of the land.[4]

    More recently Kenneth Kitchen has taken issue with Childs’ picture of Joshua 1-12. He notes that, apart from the passages cited at the beginning of this post, a careful reading of Joshua 1-12 makes it clear that Israel did not actually occupy or conquer the areas mentioned at all. Kitchen notes that after crossing the Jordan the Israelites set up camp in Gilgal “on the east border of Jericho” (Joshua 4:19). He notes that after every battle in the next six chapters the text explicitly states that they returned to Gilgal,

    The conflict with Canaanite city-state rulers in the southern part of Canaan is worth close examination. After the battle for Gibeon, we see the Hebrews advancing upon six towns in order, attacking and capturing them, killing their local kings and such inhabitants that had not gotten clear, and moving on, not holding on to those places. Twice over (10:15, 43), it is clearly stated that their strike force returned to base camp at Gilgal.  So there was no sweeping take over and occupation of this region at this point. And no total destruction of the towns attacked.[5]

    Kitchen goes on to note,

    What happened in the south was repeated up north. Hazor was both leader and famed center for the north Canaanite kinglets. Thus as in the south the Hebrew strike force defeated the opposition; captured their towns, killed rulers and less mobile inhabitants, symbolically burned Hazor and Hazor only[6] to emphasis its end to its local supremacy. Again Israel did not attempt to immediately hold on to Galilee: they remained based at Gilgal (14:6).[7]

    Kitchen notes that the first “real indication of a move in occupation beyond Gilgal comes in 18:4.” This is after the first allotment of “lands to be occupied are made” and as we saw above the Israelites did not find occupying these allotments easy. He concludes, “these campaigns were essentially disabling raids: they were not territorial conquests with instant Hebrew occupation. The text is very clear about this.”[8]

    So a straight-forward, literal, reading of the passages cited at the beginning of this post does not cohere with the rest of the narrative. The best account I have come across for explaining this apparent contradiction between a literal reading of the “genocide passages” and the rest of Joshua and Judges is one recently defended by Nicholas Wolterstorff.[9] Wolterstorff suggests that the phrases such as, “Everyone in it they totally destroyed,” “They left no survivors,” etc are not intended to be read literally but function as hyperboles. The analogy he gives is of a high school student who, after a baseball game states, “we totally slaughtered the opposition, we annihilated them just as coach told us to.”[10]

    Plantinga suggests a similar line as a possibility. That phrases such as, “put to death men women infants and cattle” are to be understood more like a person who in the context of a boxing match states, “knock his block off, hand him his head” or  in a football or baseball game where it is stated that the team should “kill the opposition” or that “we totally slaughtered them.”[11] Understood in a non-literal sense the phrases probably meant “something like, attack them, defeat them, drive them out; not literally kill every man, woman, child donkey and the like.”[12] Wolterstorff elaborates,

    When a high-school basket ball player says his team slaughtered the other team last night he’s not asserting, literally now, that they slaughter the other team. What is he asserting? Not easy to tell. That they scored a decisive victory? Maybe, but suppose they barely eked out a win? Was he lying? Maybe not. Maybe he was speaking with a wink of the eye hyperbole. High school kids do.[13]

    In the same way,

    To say Joshua struck down all the inhabitants with the edge of the sword is a way of saying something like Israel scored a decisive victory and once you recognise the presence of hyperbole it is not even clear how decisive the victories were. Joshua did not conquer all the cities in the land nor did he slaughter all the inhabitants in the cities he did conquer. The book of Joshua does not say that he did.[14]

    In my next Sunday Study, Sunday Study: Joshua and the Genocide of the Canaanites Part II,  I will attempt to defend Wolterstorff’s position.


    [1] Raymond Bradley “A moral Argument for Atheism” Presented at the University of Western Washington, May 27, 1999, and–in a revised form–at the University of Auckland, September 29, 1999.
    [2] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 110.
    [3]
    Philip Quinn “Religion and Politics” in ed William Mann The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Religion (Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005) 316.
    [4]
    Brevard Childs An Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture (Fortress Press Philadelphia: 1979) 247.
    [5]
    Kenneth Kitchen On the Reliability of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids and Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2003) 162.
    [6]
    See Joshua 11:13 “But Israel burned none of the towns that stood on mounds except Hazor, which Joshua did burn.”
    [7] Kitchen, above n 5.
    [8]
    Ibid.
    [9] Nicholas Wolterstorff “Reading Joshua” a paper presented to “My Ways Are Not Your Ways: The Character of the God of the Hebrew Bible” Conference at the centre for Philosophy of Religion, University of Notre Dame, Saturday 12 September 2009
    [10] Ibid.
    [11]
    Alvin Plantinga “Comments on Evan Fales’ Satanic Versus: Moral Chaos in Holy Writ” a paper presented to “My Ways Are Not Your Ways: The Character of the God of the Hebrew Bible” Conference at the centre for Philosophy of Religion, University of Notre Dame, Friday 11 September 2009.
    [12]
    Ibid – stated by Plantinga in the Q&A session.
    [13] Nicholas Wolterstorff “Response to Louise Anthony” a paper presented to “My Ways Are Not Your Ways: The Character of the God of the Hebrew Bible” Conference at the centre for Philosophy of Religion, University of Notre Dame. Saturday 12 September 2009.
    [14]
    Wolterstorff, above n 9.





    More recently Kenneth Kitchen has taken issue with Childs’ picture of Joshua 1-12. He notes that, apart from the passages cited at the beginning of this post, a careful reading of  Joshua 1-12 makes it clear that Israel did not actually occupy or conquer the areas mentioned at all. Kitchen notes that after crossing the Jordan the Israelites set up camp in Gilgal “on the east border of Jericho” (Joshua 4:19). He notes that after every battle in the next six chapters the text explicitly states that they returned to Gilgal,

    RELATED POSTS:
    Sunday Study: Joshua and the Genocide of the Canaanites Part II

  • Does Abortion Benefit the Fetus? A Critique of Himma Part 2

    In my previous post, Does Abortion Benefit the Fetus? A Critique of Himma Part 1, I discussed Kenneth Einar Himma’s argument that even if a fetus is a human being, laws permitting feticide are compatible with the harm principle.I elaborated an important objection to Himma’s argument, an objection articulated by Mark Murphy, which appeals to the common law doctrine of novus actus interveniens. In this post I will address three objections that Himma has made to this line of criticism to his argument.

    Objection 1: Inevitability

    One objection Himma makes to Murphy’s line of critique is to point out that there is an important disanalogy between Murphy’s illustration of the Good Samaritan and a person who aborts an innocent fetus. If a person aborts a fetus, it is logically inevitable that God will confer eternal life upon the fetus,

    If God has resolved to confer eternal life upon moral innocents who die, eternal bliss is the inevitable outcome… Indeed there is no logically possible world in which a perfect God has made such a decision and acted contrary to that decision on any single instance.[1]

    On the other hand,

    Even if we knew that (1) the Samaritan would appear at the crime scene and (2) the traveller would have a transformative response to being rescued, we have no reason to think it inevitable, in any meaningful sense, that the Samaritan will rescue the traveller. Though it might be very unlikely that the Samaritan would do so, it is none the less possible.[2]

    Himma’s point is that in the case of the Good Samaritan the benefits conferred upon the traveller were not logically inevitable; it was possible that the Samaritan would not rescue the traveller. This is why in this case we do not claim that the robbers benefited the traveller. In the case of abortion, however, salvation is inevitable.

    This seems mistaken. First, it is not true that it is logically inevitable that abortion will result in the fetus receiving eternal life. If we are talking in terms of logical possibilities, as Himma is, then it is possible for the fetus to be aborted and yet not gain eternal life. It is possible for the abortion to be botched and for the fetus to survive; it is possible for the fetus to miraculously survive or to be risen from the dead post-abortion. These outcomes are very unlikely but they are, nonetheless, possible.

    Secondly, the fact that it is possible that no rescue will be enacted by the Samaritan seems to have no bearing on whether the robbers are said to have harmed or benefited the traveller. Consider an analogous case that Himma himself mentions, the case where doctors perform a preventive mastectomy to prevent the development of breast cancer. Himma take this as an obvious case where a doctor benefits his patient. However, in this case the result is not logically inevitable. It is possible for the doctor to botch the operation and even if he did not it is possible that the patient would not have contracted cancer anyway. Moreover, if the patient had contracted cancer, it is possible that the cancer would miraculously disappear even if it was contracted. However, none of these possibilities led us to suggest that a doctor who performs such surgery does not benefit the patient. So it is hard to see why our judgement, that the robbers do not benefit the traveller but rather harm him or her, depends upon the mere possibility that the Samaritan will fail to carry out a rescue.

    Objection 2: Equivocation between Harm and Blame

    Himma’s second objection is to contend that the doctrine of novus actus interveniens “conflates two questions:

    (1) The conceptual question as to whether A should properly be characterised as harmful; and,

    (2) The normative question of whether the agent should be praised or blamed for A.[3]

    Himma notes that these two questions are not the same thing; a person can, in certain circumstances, be punished for benefiting a person, such as when he performs life saving surgery on another person without their consent. Similarly, a person can be non-culpable for certain harms they accidentally inflict. Himma goes on to assert,

    as far as our conceptual and moral practises are concerned it is uncontroversial only that the intervening act of a free agent insulates the performer of some proceeding act from moral responsibility of the consequences; it is not uncontroversial that the intervening act of a free agent necessarily figures into whether a proceeding should be characterised as beneficial or harmful.[4]

    This response again seems irrelevant. First the fact that it is “not uncontroversial that the intervening act of a free agent necessarily figures into whether a proceeding should be characterised as beneficial or harmful” [emphasis added] is hardly an argument against this claim. Himma’s own argument is, after all, not uncontroversial but that fact alone does not suffice to refute it.

    Secondly, I think the examples I cited previously do suggest that the intervening act of a free agent do factor into whether an action is characterised as harmful. Consider the example I cited from Augustine; it is not, in this case, that we think the person who refused to commit adultery actually killed the suicide victim in an innocent, non-culpable fashion; rather, our intuition is that the person did not kill the suicide victim at all.

    Thirdly, in the context of the harm principle, it is unclear that the distinction Himma draws here carries much relevance. The harm principle, after all, is a principle about what actions the criminal law should punish by law and it requires that one should only punish harmful actions. In this context it seems the question then of what harms we can justly be punished for is the relevant question.

    Objection Three: The Argument from Sharm

    This brings us to Himma’s last objection. This involves granting Murphy’s point that the fetus is not benefited by the abortion but instead reformulating the harm principle in terms of what he calls “the sharm principle.”

    I could respond simply by defining a new concept and reformulating the harm principle to include that concept in the following way. First, define sharm as follows: act a is sharmful to another person P if and only if a harms P and a does not make logically inevitable some benefit that would, from the standpoint of P’s self interest, infinitely out-weigh the harm to P from a. Second define the sharm principle as follows: the state may legitimately criminalise those acts that are sharmful to others.[5]

    I will say two things in response to this fairly creative move. The first is that as Himma has defined his terms it does not entail that abortion should be permitted. For abortion to be permitted it would have to be the case that it does not sharm the fetus and this would be the case only if abortion makes it “logically inevitable” that the fetus will gain eternal life. But it does not. Even if the woman has an abortion it is logically possible for the fetus to not die. It is logically possible for the surgery to be botched or for the fetus to miraculously live or for God to raise the fetus from the dead post-abortion. Of course none of these things are terribly likely but they are logically possible and hence the outcome of fetal salvation is not logically inevitable.

    Secondly, Himma’s move here seems to me merely an ad hoc manoeuvre. He has stipulated that the harm principle be reformulated a certain way precisely to ensure it gives him the result of justifying abortion rights. Apart from this, there seem no independent reasons for accepting the reformulated principle. If this is so then his argument is circular. He adopts a principle because it fits a given moral conclusion and then he uses the principle to justify that conclusion. Moreover, not only is there no independent reason for accepting the sharm principle, I contend that there are good reasons for not accepting it. This is because the sharm principle entails that infanticide should be permitted.

    Himma himself anticipates and tries to circumvent this; he notes that his argument “ would justify a law permitting infanticide,” he notes, “since infants are no more capable of sin than fetuses, it follows, according to this line of analysis that, that premature death is also infinitely benefits an infant by providing her with a free pass to heaven.”[6] The sharm principle would then entail that women have a right to commit infanticide. Himma grants that this implication would constitute a reductio ad absurdum of his position but argues that he can avoid endorsing laws in favour of infanticide by focusing “on the harmful effects of allowing infanticide.” He contends,

    On this line of reasoning, societal tolerance for killing of even new born infants would diminish the respect we have for human life in general and hence would be likely to increase the rates of violent crime. Thus, allowing infanticide, even in limited circumstances would have psychological effects that are likely to result in an increase in violent crime against people who are morally culpable and hence are at risk of damnation.[7]

    Himma thinks this is likely because of the “physical similarities between infants and older adults.”[8] He maintains that “our ethical judgements about and behaviour towards non-infants are shaped in part by our ethical judgements about infants because of the physical similarities between the two.”[9] The basic idea here is that because infants look like adults (that is, they are physically similar to mature adult human beings) a development of an ethic justifying the killing of infants will, as a matter of human psychology, lead to increased killing of older human beings. For this reason infanticide is harmful and so should not be permitted.

    I find this rejoinder implausible for two reasons. First, if it is sound then an analogous line of reasoning can be made with regard to fetuses. Fetuses, after all, from fairly early on in the pregnancy, physically resemble human being. Boonin notes that there is “a general consensus that the fetus is recognisably human after six weeks, and certainly after eight.”[10] If, as Himma claims, rules against killing adults require us to prohibit the killing of beings which look like and physically resemble human beings, despite the fact that they lack a grasp of moral concepts, then it follows that there should be prohibitions on killing fetuses from at least eight weeks gestation (most abortions are performed 8-12 weeks gestation).

    The second and more serious problem, however, is that the argument relies on a questionable premise. Himma thinks that because infants physically resemble adult human beings, human psychology means that the allowing of killing one will inevitably lead to the killing of another. Unfortunately he provides no empirical evidence for this claim; he simply asserts it as being true. It is unclear however that it is true. Sociological studies show that historically most cultures widely practiced and endorsed infanticide throughout history.[11] It was the rise of Judeo-Christian and Islamic beliefs about homicide that led to Westerners having a divergent attitude. However, there does not appear to be any evidence that these pre-Christian cultures were any more violent towards adults than Christian societies were. Moreover, one can think of plenty of examples where people have been able to deprive rights of a class of human beings and seek passionately the welfare of another class of human beings despite the fact that the class “resemble people physically.” For centuries people enslaved Africans and did not enslave Caucasians, despite the fact that the Africans and Caucasians physically resemble each other. People have treated women in ways they would never have treated men, despite the fact that men and women physically resemble each other in numerous respects. Jews were put in gas chambers and fellow Germans were not. Human societies appear quite capable of depriving one class of people of their rights and exalting the status of another class, despite the fact that the two are physically similar. Prima facie, Himma’s psychological claim appears dubious.

    Himma then cannot, it seems, consistently permit abortion and rule out infanticide on the grounds he gives. In fact, I am inclined to think that the implications of his position go even further than merely permitting infanticide. If the sharm principle is correct, it would follow not just that infanticide is permissible but that the killing of any human being who lacks moral culpability is permissible. However, it is not just infants and fetuses that lack moral culpability, as Himma himself notes, mentally retarded adults lack moral culpability for their actions. Similarly, the laws of most countries recognise that even up to their early teens, children are not moral agents who can be held culpable for their actions. Hence, it is difficult to see why Himma’s argument does not commit one to permitting the killing of not just fetuses but also infants, children and mentally retarded people. If a moral principle clashes so violently with our pre-theoretical intuitions as this one does, and there is no independent reason for accepting it, then I submit we have good reasons for rejecting it.


    [1] Kenneth Einar Himma “Harm , Sharm and One Extremely Creepy Argument: A Reply to Mark Murphy” 21:2 Faith and Philosophy (2004) 251.
    [2] Ibid.
    [3] Ibid, 252.
    [4] Ibid.
    [5]
    Ibid.
    [6] Kenneth Einar Himma “No Harm, No Foul: Abortion and the Implication of Fetal Innocence” 19:2 Faith and Philosophy (2002) 186.
    [7] Ibid, 187.
    [8]
    Ibid.
    [9] Ibid, 187-188.
    [10] David Boonin A Defense of Abortion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 95.
    [11] See Lalia Williamson “Infanticide: An Anthropological Analysis” in Infanticide and the Value of Life ed M Kohl (New York: Prometheus Books, 1978) 61-73.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Does Abortion Benefit the Fetus? A Critique of Himma Part 1

  • Does Abortion Benefit the Fetus? A Critique of Himma Part 1

    This series was developed from the paper I gave to the Auckland STAANZ Conference: Eschatology and Pneumatology.

    In Is Abortion Liberal? I suggested that one cannot simultaneously affirm the harm principle, accept that a fetus is a human being, and support permissive abortion laws. If abortion is homicide then it harms a human being, and the harm principle entails that we should prohibit harmful actions.

    Kenneth Einar Himma contests this conclusion. Himma argues that even if one grants that a fetus is a human being, feticide (the killing of a fetus) does not harm the fetus. Consider the doctrine of final punishment which is articulated in chapter 33 of The Westminster Confession of faith.

    I. God hath appointed a day, wherein he will judge the world in righteousness by Jesus Christ, to whom all power and judgment is given of the Father. … all persons, that have lived upon earth, shall appear before the tribunal of Christ, to give an account of their thoughts, words, and deeds; and to receive according to what they have done in the body, whether good or evil.

    II. The end of God’s appointing this day, is for the manifestation of the glory of his mercy in the eternal salvation of the elect; and of his justice in the damnation of the reprobate, who are wicked and disobedient. For then shall the righteous go into everlasting life, and receive that fullness of joy and refreshing which shall come from the presence of the Lord: but the wicked, who know not God, and obey not the gospel of Jesus Christ, shall be cast into eternal torments, and punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power.

    Himma suggests that, to be plausible, this doctrine should be interpreted so that human beings who lack moral culpability, are saved directly by Gods mercy.

    Insofar as culpability presupposes moral knowledge, someone who lacks moral knowledge through no fault of her own is incapable of culpability and is hence exempt from divine punishment. Thus, for example, someone who instantiates a severe cognitive disability is saved without regard to either her behaviour or her attitude towards Christian doctrine. Such a person is saved no matter how she behaves or what she believes.

    The same is true of children before they have developed the capacity for moral reasoning. Such persons are incapable of culpability in either deed or belief and, as Abelard puts the point, “Are saved without merit of their own, as for instance, infants, and attain eternal life by grace alone.”1

    Himma is not alone in thinking this is the most plausible interpretation of this doctrine. Loraine Boettner, citing Charles Hodge, W. G. T. Shedd, and B. B. Warfield, notes “most Calvinistic theologians have held that those who die in infancy are saved,”2 these theologians, “entertained a charitable hope that since these infants have never committed any actual sin themselves, their inherited sin would be pardoned and they would be saved on wholly evangelical principles.”3

    The implication for feticide is obvious; fetuses have not yet developed the capacity for moral reasoning, hence, according to the Eschatological doctrines Himma has sketched, “fetuses that die before birth are, as a matter of moral necessity, saved without regard to personal merit”4 hence they are “as a matter of moral necessity saved without regard to personal merit.” Himma contends that abortion does not harm the fetus but, in fact, benefits it;

    It can plausibly be argued that premature death conduces maximally to the fetus’s self-interest. To see this, imagine yourself in the following situation. While in the womb, you are temporarily made fully rational and offered the choice between premature death and the opportunity to live a worldly life. The choice is expressed as follows. Should you choose a premature death, you will immediately experience a profound and eternal bliss – an ecstasy beyond any possible in this world. Should you choose an opportunity to live a worldly life, you will be judged at the end of your life for your deeds and beliefs. If you are judged favorably, you gain eternal bliss; if not, you will suffer eternal torment. You are also told there are many temptations that may lead you down a path that culminates in an unfavorable judgment so that the risk of such torment at the end of your worldly life is substantial. Finally, you are told that, after having made our choice, you will forget everything you have been told. Assume that you have no idea whatsoever of what your post-natal circumstances will be. What should you do? 5

    Himma suggest that a rational person would choose to be killed. This is because “the odds of a favourable judgment after a worldly life are probably not in [anyone’s] favor.”6 He notes that if the probability of a favourable judgment is “less than 1. The smallest chance of an unfavorable judgement”7 is multiplied by an infinite cost. Whereas any benefits one gains from a worldly life will be finite.

    Consequently, even if one grants that a fetus is a human being, traditional Christian eschatology entails that a fetus is not harmed if it is killed via an induced abortion. The harm principle, however, affirms that the state should permit, and people should have a legal right to engage in, any activity that does not harm another person; consequently, there should be a legal right to procure an induced abortion.

    Novus Actus Interveniens Objection

    Mark Murphy has argued that Himma’s argument errs by suggesting that the thesis of infant salvation entails that fetuses and infants are not harmed by being prematurely killed. He writes,

    If the fetus enjoys the beatific vision upon being aborted … the fetus’ enjoying that good is caused not by the agent’s act of aborting the fetus but by God’s graciously conferring the gift of eternal life on the child. For not every good or evil that occurs downstream from an act counts as a benefit or harm conferred by that act. This is particularly clear in those cases in which the benefit or harm would not have occurred but for some agent’s free intervention. That the causal chain from act to effect is broken by the intervention of a free agent is a standard view, both in common sense’s attribution of responsibility and in the law’s.8

    Murphy illustrates the point with an example,

    If … a traveler is beaten and left for dead by robbers, is rescued by a Samaritan, and by this transformative experience comes to have a much better life than he or she would otherwise have had, it is nevertheless incorrect to say that the robbers did not harm, or even benefited, the traveler. The robbers merely harmed the traveler; the Samaritan benefited the traveler.9

    Murphy here appeals to the common law doctrine novus actus interveniens. He notes that there is a difference between what a person causes and what one foresees will be caused by others in response to what one does. In a discussion of the doctrine of double effect, utilised in post-reformation Catholic casuistry, Donagan suggests that Catholic and Kantian ethicists,

    … and in general, all moralists who accept the freedom of the will in a non-combatibilist sense, limit an action’s effects, and a fortiori what its agent intends to bring about in doing it, to those that follow from it in course of nature and the ordinary operation of social institutions, and from the free reactions of others to it. (Thus actions in the ordinary course of business, for example, those of postal officers in delivering a letter that has been mailed, are not counted as free reactions.) The principle on which they do is that a free reaction to an action, is a ‘new action’ (‘novus actus’), the effects of which are their effects, and not those of the action to which they are reactions.10 [Emphasis added]

    Donagan does note that another person’s actions can be considered an effect of one’s actions if they follow in the ordinary operation of social institutions. For example, if I mail poison to another person and this kills him or her then I have killed him or her despite the fact that numerous other people’s actions intervened between my action of placing the poison in the mailbox and the person’s death. This is because social institutions are in place whereby the mail service acts as an agent on my behalf and such institutional rules mean that my actions can be attributed to it.11 For similar reasons, taking out a contract to kill another is culpable homicide because the institution of contract means that the killer kills on my behalf and hence I act in his or her actions. In the absence of such institutions, the free actions of others to my actions are not effects that I cause. Donagan notes that in some situations12 a person is culpable of wrongdoing if he does something which he foresees will be met with an immoral action on the part of others. However, he does not cause these actions.

    I think this is plausible. Augustine proposed the following example. Suppose a man approaches a woman and tells her that he will kill himself if she refuses to have sex with him. Does that mean that she is a murderer if she refuses?13 Her refusal would not constitute homicide even though his death is a foreseeable result of her choice. Although she foresaw his or her death, she did not cause it. It was caused by the free decision of the tempter to commit suicide. Similarly, a company knows that some people will use the roads they build to engage in reckless conduct that will kill innocent people.

    Applied to the context under discussion, a person who kills a fetus causes the evils inflicted on the fetus, such things as, damage to the fetus’s bodily integrity and deprivation of their earthly life. However, these actions do not cause the fetus to attain eternal life; this is brought about by the gracious mercy of God. Hence when a person kills a fetus they do not benefit it, they only cause it harm.

    In my next post in this series I will argue that Himma’s response to this line of argument fails.

    1Kenneth Einar Himma “No Harm, No Foul: Abortion and the Implication of Fetal Innocence” 19:2 Faith and Philosophy (2002) 179.
    2
    Loraine Boettner The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination by Loraine Boettner The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company
    (Philadelphia, PA; 1963) 143.
    3
    Ibid.
    4Himma “No Harm No Foul” 179.
    5Ibid 180.
    6
    Ibid.
    7Ibid.
    8Mark Murphy “Pro-Choice and Presumption: A Reply to Kenneth Einar Himma” 20:2 Faith and Philosophy (2003) 241.
    9Ibid.
    10Alan Donagan “Moral Absolutism and the Double-Effect Exception: Reflections on Who Is Entitled to Double-Effect?” 16 Journal of Medicine and Philosophy (1991) 498.
    11This is not to say that an agent acting unknowingly, such as the mail-man, is culpable for this action only that his actions are attributable to me. If I therefore do this willingly, I am culpable for his actions on my behalf while he is not.
    12
    Theses situations are ones where one incites, induces or persuades a person to engage in wrongdoing or where in “pursuing his legitimate ends, a man finds that several effective courses of action are open to him, each legitimate in itself , but one of which will be foreseeable be met with a wrongful action by somebody else.” Alan Donagan The Theory of Morality (University of Chicago Press, Chicago; 1979) 48-50.
    13 Augustine On Lying 9.

  • Rangiora New Life College, Religion and Discrimination

    On Wednesday I flew to Christchurch for an interview regarding a religious education (RE) teaching position in a Catholic School. On having the interview and receiving the subsequent rejection email, it was clear what the reason I did not get the position was: I am a protestant, the school has a particular Catholic ethos that it was trying to instill in the students; this ethos involved such things as Marian devotions, praying the rosary, prayers for the dead and regular involvement in the Eucharist. As a leader in the school I would be expected to, by my teaching and life, encourage and model this ethos. Given I am an evangelical protestant I could not do this. I could, of course, explain to students what the Catholic teaching was on these issues and respect the special character of the school but due to my religious convictions, I could not truly fit with the ethos of the school because I could not model it, as fact, in my own example.

    Now in no way do I think I was treated unfairly, it was afterall a Catholic School and this was something that was  obvious both from the name on the advertisement in the education gazette and from the website linked to from the same ad. The function of this school was not simply to impart information; it was to imbibe a particular religious way of life, some of it involving what Nicholas Wolterstorff calls “educating for responsible action,”

    The ultimate goal of all education, as Christians see it, is that those who are taught shall live in such a way as to carry out their responsibilities to God and find joy and delight in so doing. … But if responsible action is to ensue, more is necessary than for the students to have knowledge of the relevant matters and the ability to perform the relevant actions. Knowledge and ability are not yet performance. It is also necessary that the students’ tendencies, ranging all the way from their unreflective habits to highly self-conscious commitments, be those of acting in accord with the normative laws for right action. Education, accordingly, must have among its goals to secure–always in morally defensible ways–the formation of right tendencies.[1] [Emphasis original]

    Wolterstorff argues that modelling plays an important role in cultivating tendencies. He notes that a series of studies show that students who view other people resisting the temptation to act in an immoral or inappropriate way fortify their own resistance to temptation.[2] Wolterstorff states, “The evidence seems to be that not only do a model’s low standards influence the student to lower the standards which otherwise he or she would adopt, but also a model’s high standards influence the child to raise his or hers.”[3] [Emphasis original]. An important caveat of this is that studies show “the self-denial induced by a stringent model gives way rather readily when the subject is confronted by another model with lower standards.”[4] Because the school was seeking to train students to internalise a Catholic ethos, and an important part of the pedagogy of internalising such an ethos is modelling, it follows that leaders within communities committed to this goal must themselves follow and be committed to the basic moral teachings of the community. I was not. I am a protestant and so would buck (internally) against many of the tendencies the RE department were trying to teach.

    This does not seem terribly controversial to me. Schools dedicated to inculculating a religious way of life into their students have the right to demand that the leaders in their schools be committed to and reflect this way of life. It is perfectly reasonable for Jewish schools to expect people in positions of leadership to be faithful followers of the Torah. It is perfectly reasonable for Muslim schools to expect leaders in their community to be faithful Muslims; for atheist schools devoted to promoting atheism to expect their leaders to be atheists.

    I reflect on this because of the recent outcry in response to a Campbell Live story that a Christian school in Rangiora, Rangiora New Life School, expelled a student for getting pregnant and subsequently revoked the deputy head-boy status given to her fiancé, the father of her child. Now, in light of what the media has reported, I will say I am not in agreement with everything the school did (I should qualify this by stating that I have very little faith that the media to report events like this terribly accurately – so take that concession with a grain of salt).

    For example, Ollie Sterrit the deputy head-boy and his fiancé Sara Etherington stated that “if we decided not to keep her [abort their daughter] they didn’t support it, and they still didn’t support us if we did keep it. So we were stuck in the middle and couldn’t do anything to please them.” The media reports that the teen couple “are engaged and determined to stay together.” Now, I am inclined to think that if a teenage couple respond to getting pregnant unmarried by taking their responsibilities seriously by refusing to kill their child, getting engaged, making a commitment to stay together and to continue their education they should be supported and commended for doing the right thing. They are of course not yet “legally married” but given their age, in this country, that is impossible; hence it is not clear cut to me that this couple’s choice should not be supported. In fact, I think that a scriptural case could be made that people in this situation can, in certain circumstances, be viewed as being in a constituted kind of common law marriage and that, in fact, it is the duty of the father to marry the woman he has impregnated and to take his responsibilities to her and the child seriously (which is what appears to be happening in this situation).  However, Sara’s parents tell a different story (see the second comment on the Campbell Live link) “We have consistently tried to encourage Ollie and Sara to see the bigger picture (others affected by there decisions) all along, their choice of course. Sara has had every love and support from RNLS  [the school] and her family.“

    Whatever the truth is on the matter of the school supporting the couple, stripping someone of a position of leadership is not the same thing as not supporting them –  though not permitting Sara to finish her education (she was apparently asked to leave the school) might be. Also giving someone a position of leadership, knowing about the pregnancy and then removing it from them, perhaps demonstrated a lack of wisdom in the first place on the part of the school or some dud processes (or bad media reporting).

    However, these issues are not the focus of my concern in this blog post. First, Dave Crampton at Big News seems to suggest that the school had no policy on sex outside of marriage and as such they could not claim that this was part of the ethos they were trying to impart, meaning the school had no right to suddenly make an issue of the sexual conduct of its students, “The schools handbook has no mention of policies on sex, although swearing and alcohol are forbidden in school grounds, as are piercings for males.” If you visit Rangiora New Life’s website a very different picture emerges. First of all, the name of the school  “New Life” immediately suggests it is evangelical or pentecostal. On the front page the school mission states “Providing quality Christian education that equips and inspires all students to reach their life’s potential in order to serve God’s purposes.” There is a clear indication by the use of words such as “their life’s potential” and “serve God’s purpose” that the type of education they are seeking to inculculate is holistic, they hope that it will impact all aspects of the students’ lives. Click through to their Mission, Vision and Values page and you’ll find under the heading “Vision,”

    GODLINESS – Building character in the students that will enable them to lead by example.

    LIFE SKILLS – Equipping students with skills in relationships, home-life and vocation.

    EVANGELISM – Taking every opportunity to share the life changing message of the gospel.

    SERVICE – Impacting our region and beyond through sacrificial service and giving. [Emphasis added]

    Here we see concern with character, leading by example, reference to relationship skills, home-life and vocation tell us they mean more than relationships with their school peers and teachers. Evangelism and reference impacting the region and beyond show, again, the broader ethos of the school. The “guiding values” on this page continue these motifs and among these we find “Ensuring school relationships, procedures and policies reflect Biblical principles and the highest Christian conduct” and “Promoting personal responsibility in learning and conduct, and community responsibility by way of service and leadership skill.” Does anyone really think, on reading these, that banging your fellow teenage school peer and knocking her up is compatible with Rangiora New Life’s understanding of these terms and is the sort of example in leadership or high biblical standard that the school is seeking to promote by example and that this sort of conduct is what the other parents with kids in the school want modelled to their kids?

    Now, as Madeleine points out, when contracts are formed (I’m getting at here Dave Crampton’s contractual suggestion) all aspects of the communication between the parties, the information freely offered about the parties states of mind, intent, etc as well as the surrounding documentation speak to how the minutae of the handbooks and policies should be read and interpreted. The school is clearly a conservative, pentecostal/evangelical bible believing Christian school. Did anyone miss the memo that people with such beliefs tend to frown on pre-marital sex and that such people have high expectations of the example of their leaders – that’s why church leaders being hypocrites is such a big deal.

    Second, what is my concern is the widespread belief of some commentators that a religious school cannot demand that leaders in their community abide by the moral teachings of the religious ethos the school seeks to inculculate. Idiot/Savant of No Right Turn’s comments are typical,

    This is clearly unlawful discrimination on the basis of marital status and family status, in violation of sections 21(1)(b) and s21(1)(l) of the Human Rights Act 1993. It may also constitute discrimination on the basis of religious belief in violation of s21(1)(c). Rangiora New Life School is a religious school, so it has an exemption for the latter – but not for the former. It can not legally exclude or punish students who have children or are in de facto relationships, any more than it can exclude or punish them for being divorced (or the children of people who are divorced).

    Regardless of the merits (or lack thereof as Madeleine insists) of Idiot/Savant’s legal analysis here there is a moral point here worth addressing. Idiot/Savant seems to think that religious schools can discriminate on the grounds of religious belief but not on grounds of sexual behaviour. It is hard to see the sense in this because in many circumstances, and certainly in this case, a person’s religious beliefs include a set of beliefs about sexual morality. If we are to take this line of argument seriously a religious school can discriminate against people who believe that sex outside of marriage is wrong but they cannot discriminate against people who refuse to practice this belief. It is hard to see how such a view could be taken seriously; surely the whole point of these teachings is that they be followed.

    Idiot/Savant continues,

    But there’s another aspect to this: Rangiora New Life School is a state integrated school, and therefore effectively part of the state education system. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act therefore clearly applies. By discriminating against its students and denying them any involvement in the decisions about them, the school has violated the right to be free from discrimination and the right to justice. And that is something we should not be tolerating from any part of our government. Rangiora New Life School’s board must be told to obey the law, cease its discrimination, and reinstate the student it has excluded. And if they do not, they should be replaced.

    Idiot/Savant here makes heavy weather over the fact that Rangiora New Life is an integrated school. While this is true, it is also a religious school which aims to inculculate a particular religious way of life. Integrated religious schools, with special characters allowing them to promote a particular religion, are extremely common. If Idiot/Savant’s, position is correct none of these schools should be allowed to require leaders in the school or students who attend the schools to uphold a certain religious ethos. This would of course make a mockery out of their mission to promote such a way of life.

    Lurking behind this complaint is, I think, a mindset that schools that promote a particular religious ethos (or at least take the ethos seriously) should not get public funds; only secular schools should get such funds. In practice this means that a school that promotes a secular perspective antithetical to a particular religion will get state funds whereas a school that inculculates certain religious beliefs will not. It’s odd that people like Idiot/Savant who maintain the right to be free from discrimination on the part of the state would support such a policy that clearly discriminates against tax paying parents with religious views.

    Wolterstorff notes a deeper problem,

    there are parents within society for whom it is a matter of religious conviction that their children receive a religiously integrated education. … If those parents are forbidden by law to establish and patronize schools that teach in accord with their religious convictions, then the discrimination is embodied in law. If they not legally forbidden to establish and patronize such schools then the discrimination is embodied in economics. Were those parents to establish and patronize schools that teach in accord with their convictions, they would have to pay for those schools out of their own pockets, while still contributing to the general tax fund for the other schools, obviously there free exercise of religion is thereby infringed upon in a way in which that of others is not. They do not enjoy equal freedom to live their lives as they see fit.[5]

    To insist that schools either forgo public funds or compromise the religious ethos they seek to inculculate is itself discrimination. Wolterstorff notes the only escape from this dilemma apart from privatising education entirely is to “fund equitably all schools that meet minimum educational requirements” and this means allowing schools to take public funding that will require strict standards of sexual morality from student leaders. Of course one could always admit that one does not actually support the right of all to be free from religious discrimination…


    [1] Nicholas Wolterstorff Educating for Responsible Action (Grand Rapids MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co) 14-15.
    [2]
    Ibid 51-55.
    [3]
    Ibid 55.
    [4] Ibid.
    [5]
    Nicholas Wolterstorff “The Role of Religion in Political Issues” Religion in the Public Square

    RECOMMENDED READING:
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy

    While it is not central to my point I cannot ignore the fact that in two places now (see the second comment on the Campbell Live link for one) I have seen the parents express anger at Campbell Live’s intrusion into their home without their consent. They had apparently categorically told the producers that they did not give permission for their property to be used for the interview but Campbell Live ignored their wishes and waited til they were not home to film the piece. Appalling.

  • Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part VI

    In my last posts, beginning Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I,  I set out the doctrine of religious restraint and critiqued some of the key arguments in support of it. I looked at the objection that the argument from respect is too thin, that applied consistently it excludes too much and Audi’s response to this. I examined and critiqued Gerald Gaus’ attempt to salvage the argument from epistemic inaccessibility and his idea of open justification. In this post I will look at the dangers of religion as a justification for its asymmetrical treatment within the DRR and conclude the series.

    B          The Dangers of Religion

    One explanation as to why this asymmetry is applied to religious reasons is offered by Quinn; “Some people fear that religious argument is apt to be dangerously divisive.”[82] Audi concurs, “[religious reasons] are special in relation to liberal democracy even by contrast with [secular reasons] … that are not accessible to any normal adult.” [83] He gives five “salient points” to support his case, all based on the idea that religious reasons are dangerous to society. [84]

    First Audi claims that religious reasons are often “directly or indirectly taken to represent an infallible authority”.[85] The second point is that religious people often “believe that anyone who does not identify with [the ultimate divine source] is forsaken, damned, or in some other way fundamentally deficient.”[86] Third, “religious reasons often dictate practices that are distinctively religious in content (such as prayer) or intent (such as preserving the fetus on the ground that it is a gift from God)”.[87] Fourth, with many religious leaders, especially leaders of cults, there is a risk that they are “cloaking their prejudices with absolute authority.”[88] Finally, Audi contends that religious people tend to be “highly and stubbornly passionate about the importance of everyone’s acting in accordance with religious reasons”.[89]

    Again these features are not unique to religion. As McGrew argues, all these features can be equally present in secular people and movements;[90]

    It is sadly amusing to read this list and to consider how well its negative aspects apply to secular people and movements. Communism, for example, is as fanatical as any conventional religion and demands group-think on an unrivaled scale. Contemporary feminism aspires to control worldview, language, and behavior. The New Atheists are exceedingly passionate about making people behave in accordance with their own beliefs (making sure children are taught Darwinism as unquestioned fact, for example), and Richard Dawkins and P.Z. Myers have an inflated sense of self-importance that would make many a Christian megachurch pastor look modest by comparison. Dawkins is infamous for having repeatedly and insistently called a religious upbringing “child abuse,” and while Dawkins has shied away from the obvious legal implications of this accusation, not everyone who thinks as he does is so cautious. Other secularists, self-styled “comprehensive liberals,” have expressly advocated the use of the power of the state to monitor and limit parents’ ability to transmit their religion to their children (see Hitchcock, 2004). As for the vicious condemnation of children who do not fully conform to their parents’ secular ideology, a good example of this phenomenon is the strange story of Rebecca Walker, daughter of feminist icon Alice Walker. And, on the other hand, there are plenty of religious people who do not display such negative characteristics. It simply does not appear to be true that we reduce fanaticism, self-important leadership, attempts at thought control, and the like in society by reducing the role of religion in public life.

    McGrew suggests there are secular analogues of even Audi’s third reason, that religious reasons often dictate practices that are distinctively religious in content or intent;[91]

    It would certainly be undesirable if people were being coerced to pray to any God, even the true God. But then, secular ideology can and sometimes does demand that we do homage to itself—in the form of changing our language to make it politically correct, for example, or treating two men or two women as “married” in all of our business activities. The problem with forcing people to pray to the true God is that the true God is not truly worshiped in that fashion. The problem with forcing people to pray to false gods and to pledge allegiance to false ideologies is that they are false. You will not avoid the problem of the coercion of conscience by limiting the role of religion in public life. You will only shift that problem so that the unreasonable coercion comes from some quarters rather than others.

    Audi’s first point invites a parallel rejoinder. He defines infallible propositions as those that are “impossible that they be both endorsed or accepted by God and false”.[92] On this definition of infallibility every proposition is infallible. God, as Audi understands him, is omniscient. God only believes true propositions. It follows then that any proposition God accepts cannot be false; this is true whether it is a religious proposition or a secular one.

    Audi’s main concern is that a person who believes an action is commanded by God believes that an omniscient, infallible being has endorsed that action. Appeals to purported divine commands are therefore problematic. However, some secular ethical theories face precisely the same problem.  One of the most influential secular theories, endorsed by ethicists as diverse as David Hume, Adam Smith, Henry Sidgwick, Richard Hare, Roderick Firth, John Stuart Mill, Tom Regan, Richard Brandt, Immanuel Kant and others, is the ideal observer theory. On this theory an action is wrong, if and only if, it would be proscribed by an ideal observer, by a person who is perfectly impartial and perfectly informed on all the relevant facts. A hypothetical ideal observer is no less infallible than religious believers take God to be. It is hard to see how invoking religious reasons is not acceptable but invoking the secular reasons is.[93]

    C         Argument from Religious Wars
    A more forcible danger of religion argument invokes the spectre of religious wars. Audi states “if religious considerations are not appropriately balanced with secular ones in matters of coercion, there is a special problem: a clash of Gods vying for social control. Such uncompromising absolutes easily lead to destruction and death”[94] Wolterstorff articulates the concern;[95]

    One reason which liberals have offered ever since the emergence of liberalism in the seventeenth century is that it’s just too dangerous to let religious people debate political issues outside of their own confessional circles, and to act politically, on the basis of their religious views. The only way to forestall religious wars is to get people to stop invoking God and to stop invoking canonical scriptures when arguing and determining politics.

    The adequacy of this argument can be contested on several grounds. First, Quinn, Greenwald and Wolterstorff note that while it was true of 17th century England, “social peace did depend on getting citizens to stop invoking God, canonical scriptures, and religious authorities when discussing politics in public”,[96] it is not plausible that such a danger exists in 21st century Western countries like New Zealand, Australia and the United States. Quinn notes, “current political debate in the United States exhibits failure to comply with Audi’s principles on a massive scale and yet shows no tendency to reignite the Wars of Religion of the early modern era.”[97]

    Wolterstorff makes two other related points. He notes that “the slaughter, torture, and generalised brutality of our century has mainly been conducted in the name of one or another secular cause–nationalism of many sorts, communism, fascism, patriotisms of various kinds, economic hegemony.”[98] Second, he notes that “many of the social movements in the modern world that have moved societies in the direction of liberal democracy have been deeply and explicitly religious in their orientation”[99] He cites the abolitionist movement, the civil rights movement and movements resisting communism, facism and apartheid as examples. The invocation of religious reasons risks war and civil strife when certain types of religious reasons are invoked in particular socio-political contexts. This is equally true of secular reasons; certain types of secular reasons can be dangerously incendiary in particular socio-political contexts. There seems no basis for an asymmetry between secular and religious reasons on these grounds.

    Eberle and Cuneo add that 17th century “confessional conflict … [was] typically rooted in egregious violations of the right to religious freedom, when, for example, people are jailed, tortured, or otherwise abused because of their religious commitments.”[100] Given that few, if any, who appeal to religious reasons advocate such violations or could plausibly bring them about, such appeals are unlikely to have tumultuous effects.

    In terms of protecting freedom of religion from these kinds of abuses it is not obvious that secular reasons fare any better, “secularists have a long history of hostility to the right to religious freedom and, presumably, that hostility isn’t at all grounded in religious considerations”.[101] Moreover when[102]

    religious believers have employed coercive power to violate the right to religious freedom, they themselves rarely have done so in a way that violates the DRR … when such rights have been violated, the justifications offered, even by religious believers, appeal to alleged requirements for social order, such as the need for uniformity of belief on basic normative issues. One theological apologist for religious repression, for example, writes this: ‘The king punishes heretics as enemies, as extremely wicked rebels, who endanger the peace of the kingdom, which cannot be maintained without the unity of the faith. That is why they are burnt in Spain’.

    Similarly, Aquinas, in a Rawlsian vein, famously justified the suppression of heretics by appealing to the accepted political culture of his day which required that counterfeiters be executed.

    Consequently, the religious wars of the 17th century were caused, not by the appeal to religious reasons per se but rather by the violation of religious freedom; this violation has often been defended on secular grounds. It is unlikely that the DRR provides a bulwark against such abuses.

    III        Conclusion

    On examining the DRR it appears that there is no good reason for singling out religious reasons for a particular restraint and limiting discourse to secular reasons. The grounds offered for doing so, the golden rule, the epistemic accessibility of religious premises, the dangers of religion and the potential for religious wars all apply with equal force to secular beliefs. Hence, the restriction appears arbitrary. Moreover, as applied, the DRR is often incoherent and if applied consistently would render most substantive coercive laws unjustified. The current practice of equating secularism with neutrality is flawed.

    As Carter eloquently puts it,[103]

    What is needed is not a requirement that the religiously devout choose a form of dialogue that liberalism accepts, but that liberalism develop a politics that accepts whatever form of dialogue a member of the public offers. Epistemic diversity, like diversity of other kinds, should be cherished, not ignored, and certainly not abolished. What is needed, then, is a willingness to listen, not because the speaker has the right voice but because the speaker has the right to speak. Moreover, the willingness to listen must hold out the possibility that the speaker is saying something worth listening to; to do less is to trivialize the forces that shape the moral convictions of tens of millions of Americans.

    This series was written as a supervised research paper in pursuit of my LLB.


    [82] Phillip Quinn “Political Liberalisms and Their Exclusions of the Religious” (1995) 69:2 Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 35, 143.
    [83]
    Robert Audi “Liberal Democracy and the Place of Religion in Politics” in Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (eds) Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, Lanham Md, 1997) 1-66, 31.
    [84]
    Ibid 31-32.
    [85]
    Ibid 31.
    [86]
    Ibid.
    [87] Ibid.
    [88]
    Ibid 31-32.
    [89]
    Ibid 32.
    [90]
    Lydia McGrew “The Irrational Faith of the Naked Public Square” (2008) 1 The Christendom Review (at 2 October 2009).
    [91]
    Ibid.
    [92]
    Audi, above n83, 63.
    [93]
    I am grateful to Matthew Flannagan for the development of this point.
    [94]
    Robert Audi Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2000) 103.
    [95]
    Nicholas Wolterstorff “Why we should Reject what Liberalism tells us About Speaking and Acting in Public for Religious Reasons” in Paul Weithman (ed) Religion and Contemporary Liberalism (University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame IN, 1997) 167.
    [96]
    Nicholas Wolterstorff “The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues” in Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (eds) Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, Lanham Md, 1997) 67-120, 79.
    [97]
    Quinn, above n82, 39.
    [98]
    Wolterstorff, above n96, 80.
    [99]
    Christopher J. Eberle and Terence Cuneo “Religion and Political Theory” (2008) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (at 9 August 2009).
    [100]
    Ibid.
    [101]
    Ibid.
    [102]
    Ibid.
    [103]
    Stephen Carter The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialise Religious Devotion (Basic Books, New York, 1993) 230.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I

    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part II

    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part III

    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part IV

    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part V

  • Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part V

    In my last posts, beginning Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I,  I set out the doctrine of religious restraint and critiqued some of the key arguments in support of it. I looked at the objection that the argument from respect is too thin, that applied consistently it excludes too much and Audi’s response to this. I examined Gerald Gaus’ attempt to salvage the argument from epistemic inaccessibility. In this post I will examine and critique Gaus’ idea of open justification in more detail.

    (ii)        Are religious reasons ever subject to open justification?

    Gaus might rejoin that commitments to freedom of religion can be defended in terms of open justification. Consider some of the cases that divide society that I listed earlier; at least one side in such debates is mistaken, has made an error in rejecting the purported open justification presented to them. This is entirely possible. It could also be true of Qutb; perhaps he mistakenly rejected a premise that, given other things he believes, he should have embraced.

    While this rejoinder would avoid the thinness objection, the problem is that it would no longer be clear or obvious, in the absence of substantive argument, that any viewpoint could be openly justified. Neither side in the above debates is likely to concede its position as the one in error. Cuneo and Eberle note the problem;[66]

    Were we to ask Qutb whether he would have reasons to support laws that protect a robust right to religious freedom if he were adequately informed and reasonable, surely he would say: no. Moreover, he would claim that his compatriots would reject the liberal protection of such a right if they were adequately informed about the divine authorship of the Quran and the proper rules of its interpretation. While Qutb’s say-so doesn’t settle the issue of who would believe what in improved conditions, liberal critics maintain that his response indicates just how complicated the issue under consideration is. Among other things, to establish that Qutb is wrong it seems that one would have to deny the truth of various theological claims on which Qutb relies when he determines that he would reject the right to religious freedom were he adequately informed and reasonable. That would require advocates of the standard view to take a stand on contested religious issues. However, liberal critics point out that defenders of the standard view have been wary of explicitly denying the truth of religious claims, especially those found within the major theistic religions.

    Gaus’ case for open justification can only succeed if one makes certain assumptions as to the merits of substantive contentions about morality, philosophy of religion, the truth or falsity of various religious doctrines and questions of meta-ethics. However, such contentions are controversial.

    An additional problem is that open justification commits one to the DRR only if one assumes that religious reasons can never be openly justified. Recall that Audi’s definition of a religious reason is one that possesses “normative force, that is, its status as a prima facie justificatory element, does not (evidentially) depend on the existence of God.” This suggests that proponents of the DRR must assume that belief in God cannot ever be openly justified. I would dispute this.

    Philosophers and theologians have offered arguments for God’s existence entailing that the beliefs most rational people already accept commit them to theism.  Richard Swinburne has written several works arguing that Christianity is more probable than not on the public evidence than any alternative.[67] Robert Adams has argued that the best account of moral obligation is such that they are the commands of a loving God.[68] Alvin Plantinga sketched 26 arguments for God’s existence, which are currently being defended in the literature.[69] Blackwell recently published an encyclopaedia containing 11 current arguments used to defend the existence of God.[70] Edward Feser agrees,[71]

    Versions of these arguments were defended by the likes of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, and Newton, and their defense had absolutely nothing to do with ignorance of modern science — indeed, some of these thinkers were among the founders of modern science — because the arguments do not ultimately stand or fall with any scientific results in the first place. … Among the contemporary defenders of the arguments are writers like Alvin Plantinga, Richard Swinburne, John J. Haldane, James F. Ross, Richard Taylor, William Lane Craig, David S. Oderberg, David Braine, Barry Miller, Robert Koons, Charles Taliaferro and many others — analytic philosophers highly respected within the field and applying the most rigorous methods of analysis and argumentation. … anyone familiar with the classical and contemporary literature on philosophical theology [cannot] deny that the arguments for the theistic worldview mentioned above are every bit as defensible today as any other philosophical argument.

    Just as there are numerous secular arguments, each defended by intelligent and capable scholars, held to be sound by their proponents even if rejected by their opponents, so too are there arguments for the existence of God that meet these criteria. In light of this it seems arbitrary to simply assume that religious arguments cannot meet the standard of public justification. Critics can argue the merits of these arguments and claim that only secular arguments can succeed but this will not give proponents of religious reasons a real reason for accepting such claims. Religious believers hold quite different assessments on the cogency of these arguments. Therefore, the demand of open justification does not appear to be a sufficient reason for the restriction of religious reasons but not others.

    (iii)       Are secular reasons for coercive laws subject to open justification?
    Gaus contends that religious reasons cannot be openly justified and that secular beliefs can. Many thinkers have argued that secular perspectives cannot justify the core commitments of a liberal democracy. Nihilist thinkers have argued that secular naturalistic views of the world entail that all moral claims are false.[72] Stephen Layman[73] and George Mavrodes[74] have argued that a secular view renders belief in morality irrational. Using a Kantian line, John Hare has argued that atheism makes the moral life rationally unstable.[75] Mark De Linville argues that atheism, when combined with evolutionary theory, provides good reason for thinking our moral beliefs are unreliable.[76] Alvin Plantinga has articulated the case for the conclusion that evolution, when combined with atheism, provides a reason for being sceptical about everything we believe (public policy would be no exception).[77] Michael Perry and Wolterstorff claim that human beings possessing inherent rights (a fundamental commitment of liberal democracy) cannot be adequately defended on secular grounds and is only defensible if one assumes religious doctrines.[78]

    As with many secular arguments, religious justifications for coercive policies have been advocated by intelligent and capable scholars, held to be sound by their proponents even if they are rejected by their opponents. It would be arbitrary to simply assume that secular arguments meet the criteria of open justification and that religious ones do not.  Cuneo and Eberle note the problem;[79]

    Liberal critics maintain that we are simply not in good epistemic position to judge the reasons an agent would have to support laws that protect basic liberal commitments were he better informed and more reasonable. More exactly, liberal critics maintain that we are not in a good epistemic position to determine whether a secular agent who is reasonable and better informed would endorse or reject the type of theistic commitments that philosophers such as Wolterstorff claim justify the ascription of natural human rights. The problem is that we don’t really have any idea how radically a person would change his views were he to occupy these conditions. The main, and still unresolved, question for this version of the standard view, then, is whether there is some coherent and non-arbitrary construal of the relevant counterfactual conditions that is strong enough to prohibit exclusive reliance on religious reasons but weak enough to allow for the justification of basic liberal commitments.

    Given the divide between intelligent and capable people over various arguments for and against particular coercive policies it is not prima facie evident that any of these arguments can meet the standard of open justification. Moreover, if an argument could, there appears to be no reason to assume that it could not be a religious one. Now Gaus could examine all currently unsettled policy disputes in society and defend the ones he agrees with and attack the others but the inevitable result will be that many who do not share Gaus’ position will likely be unconvinced. If this is the outcome, there seems no reason why those who do not agree should accept the DRR.

    Feser suggests that this arbitrary singling-out of religious reasons for restraint with little or no basis seems to be based more on ignorance and bigotry than reason,[80]

    The problem, in the view of many liberals, is that religious considerations are matters of faith, where “faith” connotes in their minds a kind of groundless commitment, a will to believe that for which there is no objective evidence. Opinions on matters of public policy, they would say, can only appropriately be arrived at via methods of argument assessable by all members of the political community, not by reference to the idiosyncratic and subjective feelings of a minority.

    If religious arguments were in general really like this, then I would agree with the liberal that they ought to be kept out of the public square. But in fact this liberal depiction of religion is a ludicrous caricature, and manifests just the sort of ignorance and bigotry of which liberals frequently accuse others.

    Jeremy Waldron makes a similar point,[81]

    Secular theorists often assume that they know what a religious argument is like: they present it as a crude prescription from God, backed up with threat of hellfire, derived from general or particular revelation, and they contrast it with the elegant complexity of a philosophical argument by Rawls (say) or Dworkin. With this image in mind, they think it obvious that religious argument should be excluded from public life, … But those who have bothered to make themselves familiar with existing religious-based arguments in modern political theory know that this is mostly a travesty;

    A common theme in the arguments from respect, despite both possessing the features considered relevant, is the asymmetry between religious reasons and secular reasons. On the golden rule argument, Audi privileges secular reasons over religious reasons even though secular reasons were potentially subject to the same charges of being false and burdensome. Similarly with the argument from epistemic inaccessibility, reasonable people are able to reject both secular and religious reasons in a pluralistic society yet Audi and Rawls use this fact to exclude the latter and not the former. Likewise, with open justification, prima facie, there is no reason to accept that religious beliefs cannot be openly justified whilst secular beliefs can. Nor is there a prima facie reason for assuming that liberal commitments can be openly justified on secular grounds. In both cases intelligent and capable scholars have advanced arguments from premises which they believe others are committed to holding. Further in both cases the cogency of these arguments can be reasonably disputed.

    In my next post, Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part VI, I will look at the dangers of religion as a justification for its asymmetrical treatment within the DRR and conclude my argument.


    [66] Christopher J. Eberle and Terence Cuneo “Religion and Political Theory” (2008) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (at 9 August 2009).
    [67] Richard Swinburne The Coherence of Theism (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977); The Existence of God (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979); Faith and Reason (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2005); Responsibility and Atonement (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989); Revelation (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2007); The Christian God (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994); Providence and The Problem of Evil (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998).
    [68]
    Robert Adams Finite and Infinite Goods (Oxford University Press, New York, 1999); “Divine Command Meta-Ethics Modified Again” (1979) 7:1 Journal of Religious Ethics 66; “Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief” in Robert Adams (ed) The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology (Oxford University Press, New York, 1987) 144; “Divine Commands and the Social Nature of Obligation” (1987) 4 Faith and Philosophy 262.
    [69] Alvin Plantinga “Appendix: Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments” in Deane-Peter Baker (ed) Alvin Plantinga
    [70] JP Moreland and William Lane Craig Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Blackwell Publishing, Malden MA, 2009).
    [71]
    Edward Feser “How to Mix Religion and Politics” (20056) TCSDaily (at 6 October 2009).
    [72]
    Prominent examples are: JL Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1977); Michael Ruse “Evolutionary Theory and Christian Ethics” in Michael Ruse (eds) The Darwinian Paradigm (Routledge, London, 1989) 251-273.
    [73]
    C Stephen Layman “God and the Moral Order” (2002) 19:3 Faith and Philosophy 304; “God and the Moral Order: Replies and Objections” (2006) 32:2 Faith and Philosophy 209.
    [74]
    George Mavrodes “Religion and the Queerness of Morality” in Robert Audi and William Wrainwright (eds) Rationality, Religious Belief and Moral Commitment (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1986) 213-226.
    [75]
    John Hare The Moral Gap (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996); “Naturalism and Morality” in JP Moreland and William Lane Craig (eds) Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal (Routledge, London, 2000) 189-211; “Kant and the Rational Instability of Atheism” in Andrew Dole and Andrew Chignell (eds) The Ethics of Belief (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005).
    [76]
    Mark D Linville “The Moral Argument” in JP Moreland and William Lane Craig (eds) Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Blackwell Publishing, Malden MA, 2009) 391 449.
    [77]
    Alvin Plantinga Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford University, New York, 1993) 216-239; “The Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism” and “Replies to Beilby and his Cohorts” in James K Beilby (ed) Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (Cornell University Press, New York, 2002) 1-15 & 204-277; “Naturalism vs Evolution: A Religion Science Conflict” in Paul Draper (ed) God or Blind Nature? Philosophers Debate the Evidence (at 3 September 2009).
    [78]
    Nicholas Wolterstorff Justice Rights and Wrongs (Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 2008); Michael Perry Toward a Theory of Human Rights: Religion, Law, Courts (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006).
    [79]
    Eberle and Cuneo, above n 65.
    [80]
    Feser, above n 71.
    [81]
    Jeremy Waldron God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations of John Locke’s Political Thought (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002) 20. Gaus appears to agree; in his book review of Eberle’s work on the subject he writes, “At the outset, however, let me stress that Eberle has written a very good book indeed. It is manifest that he has thought much harder and deeper about justificatory liberalism than justificatory liberals have thought about religious justification and belief. His analysis of religious epistemology and mysticism (ch. 8) clearly demonstrates the extent to which many liberals have attacked caricatures of religious justification. After Eberle’s book, secular liberals must be much more careful in their claims about religious beliefs and their justifications.” Gerald Gaus “Religious Convictions in Liberal Politics” (2003) Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (at 13 September 2009) (book review).
    (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007) 203-229.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I

    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part II
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part III
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part IV
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part VI


  • Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part IV

    In my last posts, beginning Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I,  I set out the doctrine of religious restraint and critiqued some of the key arguments in support of it. I looked at the objection that the argument from respect is too thin, that applied consistently it excludes too much and Audi’s response to this. In this post I will look at Gerald Gaus’ attempt to salvage the argument from epistemic inaccessibility.

    (d)        Gaus’ attempt to salvage the argument from epistemic inaccessibility

    I have argued that the argument from respect is subject to two objections, incoherence and thinness. One should not appeal to religious reasons to justify coercive legislation because people can reasonably reject religious reasons; as religious reasons are not shared by all reasonable people there is a duty to not appeal to them.  However, if this is true then both the DRR in its “public reason” form, as exemplified by Rawls, and in its more secularist form, as exemplified by Audi, should also be rejected. Reasonable people do not agree on secular moral theory nor do they agree on the principles of public reason.

    In addition to being incoherent the DRR excludes far too much. It leaves us with content that is insufficiently thin to justify substantive legislative questions. I cited Gaus above who agreed that “little, if anything, is the object of consensus among reasonable people.”

    In response to the thinness objection Gaus introduced the idea of “open justification.”[55]

    Open justification … takes a person’s current system of beliefs and asks, first, whether given this system that person is committed to accepting some new piece of information, and, second, whether that person is then committed to revising his or her system of beliefs in the light of that new information.

    According to Gaus, what respect requires is not that laws be justified to all reasonable people in such a way that those reasonable people can be expected to accept the justification, but rather “a coercive law is justified to an agent only if, were he reasonable and adequately informed, then he would have a sufficient reason from his own perspective to support it.”[56] [Emphasis added]

    Peoples explains,[57]

    [One] might hold to all kinds of prejudices and false beliefs that would lead him to reject a policy, and yet we might still be justified in advocating that this policy be imposed on him because if he were a bit more reasonable and open to new information, he would have a reason to endorse it. Stated differently, a person can be openly justified in accepting a policy, and yet consciously reject that policy because he doesn’t realise that if he only knew a bit more, understood the situation a little better, or was more open minded, he would have reasons to accept the policy.

    Gaus prefers open justification over two other forms he identifies as “closed justification” and “strong externalism.” Gaus describes closed justification as being justified internally from the viewpoints that person currently holds.[58] He defines strong externalism as being justified from a viewpoint where one was adequately informed and had no mistaken beliefs. Gaus suggests that respecting others means that one is able to openly justify the policies one supports to other reasonable people in society. He does not require that persuasion is achieved or that a person’s current comprehensive viewpoint endorses the policy in question. Rather he holds that one must be able show the person that his or her current viewpoint provides grounds or reasons for believing things they currently do not. Further, that if they did accept these other things then they would have reasons for embracing the coercive policy being advocated.

    Gaus’ opinion does appear to improve on that of Rawls. He is not alone in suggesting this. Audi has offered a solution to the thinness problem along the lines Gaus suggests.[59]

    Two people who disagree on the justice of allowing a Nazi group to present its case may share intuitions about freed speech in general and be divided by, for instance, paranoia about Nazis, which one party has and the other does not. When this happens, there is often a possible route from the shared intuitions about the justice of protecting freedom of expression to agreement on the case in hand. It appears, moreover, that among rational civilized people, establishing agreement on what factual information is relevant and on what the relevant facts are tends to bring intuitions closer together.

    Often when two people disagree there will be a set of moral intuitions[60] on which they do agree. The disagreement stems from other facts brought about by certain biases. If people can be shown that they are mistaken on these facts, it is possible that the biases can be corrected and agreement might occur. Audi suggests that something like open justification will decrease the amount of disagreement between rational people on at least some issues of justice.

    As Audi’s example is simply that of a dispute between two people I am not sure that it escapes the thinness objection. It is one thing for a person to openly justify his or her position to one other but, according to Gaus, it is wrong to advocate a coercive law unless one can provide open justification to all reasonable people. Further, in the context of a defence of the DRR, and in the face of a charge of unjust asymmetry, Gaus must also contend both that religious reasons can never achieve open justification in this manner and that secular reasons can.

    (i)         Open justification and the thinness objection
    According to Gaus, the provision of open justification for a policy, to another person who rejects that policy, should proceed in two stages. First, one should assess whether the other person’s viewpoint commits that person to “accepting some new piece of information”. If it does, then one should assess whether the person is then “committed to revising his or her system of beliefs in the light of that new information.” Consequently, a person is only permitted to advocate a position if he or she can show that the position follows from premises that all reasonable people in society currently accept and according to a type of inference that all reasonable people recognise as valid.

    An immediate problem arises, namely that few, if any, laws are justified by arguments that meet this standard (probably because few arguments on any substantive topic meet this standard). Marilyn McCord Adams notes, “the defence of any well-formulated philosophical position will eventually involve premises which are fundamentally controversial and so unable to command the assent of all reasonable persons.”[61] Consider the list of controversial issues I gave earlier: welfare, abortion, state funding of social projects, euthanasia, pornography, genetic modification of foods, climate change, capital punishment, Maori seats and so on. Do any of the proponents on either side of these debates offer arguments that ultimately appeal to premises that all rational people accept, without ever appealing to some premise, that is either drawn from or depends for its plausibility on, a comprehensive perspective that only some reasonable people accept? Could anyone advance such a justification? I doubt it.

    This doubt stems from the fact that in such ethical debates often the very foundations of the subject are a matter of dispute. Nihilists deny moral claims are defensible at all. Non-nihilists disagree fundamentally over whether moral language is descriptive, prescriptive, both or merely an expression of emotion. There is disagreement over how moral knowledge is gained, what the fundamental criteria for right actions are and so on. Given this, almost any moral premise will be subject to dispute by some reasonable people.[62]

    Eberle and Cuneo raise a related point by citing the example of Islamic intellectual, Sayyid Qutb.[63]

    While in prison, Qutb wrote an intelligent, informed, and morally serious commentary on the Koran in which he laid the ills of modern society at the feet of Christianity and liberal democracy. The only way to extricate ourselves from the problems spawned by liberal democracy, Qutb argued, is to implement shariah or Islamic legal code, which implies that the state should not protect a robust right to religious freedom. In short, Qutb articulates what is, from his point of view, a compelling theological rationale against any law that authorizes the state to protect a robust right to religious freedom.

    People like Qutb are not alone in society. Whatever we might think of the conclusions they draw, Islamic intellectuals appear to be educated, rational and morally serious people. Qutb rejects “a robust right to religious freedom” and liberal democracy itself. A coercive law that protects a robust right to freedom of religion and any of the other substantive commitments of a liberal democracy is only defensible if secularists can provide a valid argument for these commitments, from premises that Qutb accepts, to the conclusion that such commitments are correct. It is doubtful that secularists have done this or even that they would be able to.[64] Cuneo and Eberle note the conclusion.[65]

    If respect for persons requires that each coercive law be justified to those reasonable persons subject to that law, and if a person such as Qutb were a citizen of a liberal democracy, then the argument from respect implies that laws that protect the right to religious freedom are morally illegitimate, as they lack moral justification—at least for agents such as Qutb.

    In my next post, Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part V, I will examine and critique Gaus’s idea of open justification in more detail.


    [55] Gerald Gaus Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory (Oxford University Press, New York, 1996) 32.
    [56]
    Christopher J. Eberle and Terence Cuneo “Religion and Political Theory” (2008) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (at 9 August 2009).
    [57] Glenn Peoples “Religion in the Public Square: Is it Justified?” (speech delivered at Thinking Matters, Laidlaw College, 12 May 2009, 14; text obtained via Email from Glenn Peoples to Madeleine Flannagan, 12 October 2009.
    [58]
    Gaus, above n 54, 36.
    [59] Robert Audi “Liberal Democracy and the Place of Religion in Politics” in Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (eds) Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, Lanham Md, 1997) 1-66, 132-133.
    [60] Audi is a moral intuitionist. He believes people can discern basic moral truths through moral intuition; hence, for Audi, agreement on intuitions means agreement on basic moral principles.
    [61] Marilyn McCord Adams Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY, 1999) 180.
    [62] I am grateful to Matthew Flannagan for the development of this point.
    [63] Eberle and Cuneo, above n 55.
    [64] For a critical discussion on the standard arguments for religious freedom and the controversial premises on which they rest see, Philip Quinn “Religion and Politics” in William E Mann (ed) The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Religion (Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Reference Online 2004) (at 7 October 2009).
    [65]
    Eberle and Cuneo, above n 55.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I

    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part II
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part III
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part V
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part VI