Category: Legal Obligations

  • Yet Another Lawyer Agrees: Marriage Amendment Act Bill is an Affront to Freedom of Religion and Belief

    Barrister Ian Bassett has given another opinion describing the risks to freedom of religion and belief of Louisa Wall’s Marriage Amendment Act Bill if it is enacted in its presently proposed form, which would include this amendment:

    “Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), no celebrant who is a minister of religion recognised by a religious body enumerated in Schedule 1, and no celebrant who is a person nominated to solemnize marriages by an approved organisation, is obliged to solemnize a marriage if solemnizing that marriage would contravene the religious beliefs of the religious body or the religious beliefs or philosophical or humanitarian convictions of the approved organisation.”

    It is clear that any marriage celebrant exercising their public function who is not covered by the amendment risks being in breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993 if they refuse to perform their public function as marriage celebrants because it is a same sex couple seeking to be married.

    Injustice

    Church ministers, marriage celebrants, court registrars, church elders, leaders, photographers and caterers and any other person or entity supplying services to the public risks being in breach of the Human Rights Act 1993 if they refuse to supply services to a couple seeking to be married because the couple are same sex. For some this could also mean risking their employment.

    Service providers to the public risk being in breach of the Human Rights Act 1993 if they refuse to supply services to a married couple because the couple are same sex.

    The New Zealand Law Society’s Law Reform Committee headed by Professor Paul Rishworth LLB (Hons) M Jur highlighted the risk to freedom of religion and belief in the Bill in its submission to Parliament:

    “The proposer of the Bill said that the Bill was not intended to compel marriage celebrants to perform marriages contrary to their religious beliefs. However, in the Law Society’s view, Professor Rishworth says it is arguable that marriage celebrants who refuse to perform same-sex marriages will be acting unlawfully under the Human Rights Act 1993, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, or both.

    “We want to highlight arguable conclusions which seem to be at odds with the settled intentions of the Bill’s drafters. Whatever the position, the Law Society believes it makes sense to put the matter beyond doubt,” Professor Rishworth says.

    The only thing that the amended Bill puts beyond doubt is that the critics of those raising fears about the Bill’s threat to freedom of religion and belief were wrong. By recommending an amendment the Select Committee are agreeing that a risk existed, as the likes of Ian Bassett, Grant Illingworth have argued, contra to The Human Rights Commission’s claim that all “…religious officials and leaders are free to refuse to perform marriages that are not in accordance with their religious beliefs.”

    Bassett, Illingworth and Rishworth are not alone with their concerns among the legal fraternity.

    Graeme Edgeler, a Wellington Barrister has been quoted in the Herald saying:

    … if an independent celebrant declined to marry a same-sex couple, the couple could then complain to the Human Rights Commission.

    “It’s not about [celebrants] being forced, it’s about people getting in trouble afterwards if they didn’t,” he told APNZ.

    “They’re not breaking any rule in the Marriage Act, but rules in other acts. The main one would be the Human Rights Act, which says you can’t discriminate on the basis on sexual orientation or gender.”

    Auckland Barrister Rachel Wong has raised issues against the Bill.

    This blog’s Madeleine Flannagan LLB, Associate Barrister and Solicitor at Coast Legal, adds her voice:

    “The Bill, in its present form, fails to protect individual freedom of religion and belief (belief being a comprehensive viewpoint not based on religion). The proposed amendment only protects group religious rights, which is little protection at all for most religious celebrants as few denominations hold formal views on marriage, many practitioners of religion do not belong to a group and for those that do they might hold a different personal view on this topic to the group view. The amendment then fails to protect the religious freedom of most religious celebrants just as it utterly fails to protect the freedom of belief of non-religious celebrants who have no group to appeal to to protect their freedom.”

    Ian Bassett’s latest opinion thoroughly analyses the legal effects of the amended Bill, a summary as to whose freedom of religion and belief it protects and whose it does not follows: (more…)

  • Why Defamatory Speech is not Free Speech

    The following argument as to why a remedy requiring the removal of defamatory speech from a publication was not a violation of the right to free speech is representative of one I have previously put before the court:

    1. The right to Freedom of Expression is protected by s14 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 (“BORA”).
    2. The operational provisions of the BORA provide in section 5 that a reasonable limit to Freedom of Expression can be justified in a free and democratic society where that limit is prescribed by law.
    3. Section 5 is subject to section 4, which states in mandatory terms that no court can decline to apply any provision of an enactment on the sole grounds that the provision is inconsistent with the BORA.
    4. Notwithstanding this, section 6 requires the court rule in a manner as consistent as possible with Bill of Rights.
    5. It is submitted that the Respondent’s actions constitute a breach of s4 of the Defamation Act 1992 therefore the remedy sought, removal of the defamatory material from the publication, does not violate the Respondent’s right to Freedom of Expression.

    Freedom of SpeechWhile this is the standard argument it feels wrong to me. There is something unsatisfactory about appealing to a mechanism in the law that, as argued, feels like it is shearing off a part of an important right and freedom, even if the law says that it is ok.

    I find this argument unsettling and lacking something; at the same time defamatory speech is insidious, causes harm, hurts; intuitively it just feels wrong to say that one is morally justified in spreading harmful falsehoods about a person and is not required to account for the wrongs done, because of their right to free speech.

    After discussions with Matt about this I have decided that I prefer the following argument:

    1. Freedom of Expression is defined in the BORA as “the freedom to … impart information and opinions …”.
    2. Defamation is expression imparted to another that lowers the standing of a person in the eyes of their peers and is not true and is not honest opinion which is genuinely held.(I am ignoring the third defence, privilege).
    3. A person who expresses defamation is not engaging in Freedom of Expression as where there is no truth or honest opinion then a person is neither attempting to inform another or attempting to express their opinion.
    4. The basis for this is that to attempt to inform someone is to attempt to increase that person’s repertoire of true beliefs’ and to impart an opinion is to express what one honestly believes to be the case.
    5. Therefore the speech the BORA protects is all speech that is true or honestly held to be true by the speaker.

    That is much better.

    Defamatory speech is not free speech therefore legal sanctions against it proportionate to the harm caused are entirely appropriate in both legal and moral senses.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Pluralism and Being Right
    Of course I think I’m right!


  • Klingon Cloaking Devices Unmasked by Boat People

    It was inevitable.  Sooner or later a boat filled with desperate people would set out from India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, whatever, for New Zealand.  We have been “protected” to date only by an accident of geography–New Zealand’s relative distance.  Australia has faced the problem for decades.

    Sri Lankan Boat PeopleA group of Sri Lankan poor (allegedly Tamils previously caught up in the former civil war) have boarded a boat large enough to make it all the way here.  They have been declaring their intent to sail to New Zealand to seek asylum.  The Prime Minister, Mr Key has made dark hints that he has received intelligence briefings that leave him in no doubt that New Zealand was the intended destination.  Others have accused him of overreacting.  We believe Mr Key in this instance.

    The Commentariat is having conniptions.  The most consistent amongst us are represented by Green MP, Keith Locke and Amnesty International caudillo, Patrick Holmes.  They have urged the desperate plight of the economic refugees.  Doubtless they have suffered grievously, and New Zealand beckons as a wonderland.  Even the poorest in New Zealand would be comparatively rich to them.  They have urged pity as a motivation to accept and welcome these folk. We reiterate: these are the consistent Commentariat members.

    Others in the Commentariat are emphatic in their refusal to have anything to do with the boat people.  Their posturing is empty.  Offensively hypocritical.  The entire ethos of  New Zealand is built upon the principle that  all people,  by right of being human, have a legitimate and just claim to a certain amount of other people’s property.  Call it “a living wage”, a “fair go”, maintaining dignity–whatever.  It’s all the same in the end.  The supreme authority, our semi-divinised state, has both a duty and license to extract property by force from some and deliver it to others who have less.  Everybody believes this.  Except Christians who read their Bibles, but they don’t count.  Sure, the Commentariat maintains an inter-mural argument about how much extraction, and upon which subjects it will be bestowed, and on what terms and conditions, but these are mere details.  Everyone acknowledges the universal principle of the thing.

    Why, then, the emphatic rejection of the boat people?  Why are they “beyond the pale”?  Are they not human?  Do they not have economic rights?  Does not their being human entitle them to a just extraction by force from others better off  to make them more economically equal?  Apparently not.  Why? we wonder.  Out of one side of his mouth our Prime Minister argues vehemently for involuntary seizure of the property of some (via taxation) and for its distribution to others, appealing to justice, rectitude, and rights.  Everybody, everybody agrees–apart from those obnoxious Christians who read their Bibles. But out of the other side of his mouth he brusquely rejects these desperate folk.

    When it’s boat people, the universal principles of human rights are suddenly found to have geographic limitations.  Our gods turn out to be local deities after all. Our self-righteous, simpering notions of justice transform into harsh xenophobia, just like that.  Who would have thought.

    The Commentariat has some explaining to do. If the goose’s sauce is withheld from the gander we smell hypocrisy in the kitchen. Maybe the high faluting principles of Unbelief are worthless and empty, venal and self-serving?  Maybe justice and rights are not universal after all, but have geographical boundaries.  But (more…)

  • No Special Rights, So . . . One Law for All

    Tama ItiWe remain militantly critical of contemporary Maori ideology. We believe it excuses personal and family accountability by resorting to the fallacy of historical determinism: Maori, their leadership tells them, are victims of predatory exploitation by European or imperial powers; the significant cause of social and cultural and spiritual degradation amongst Maori stems from the unjust extortions of the Pakeha. We believe this ideology enslaves Maori and subjugates them more subtly and more potently than any European migration.

    We believe this ideology is a neo-Marxist variant. Maori represent the exploited poor, the weak, from which the hegemonic Pakeha have extracted their pound of flesh. It makes many within Maoridom sunburnt strawberries: brown on the outside, red on the inside. We have smiled at Hone Harawira’s call to arms: he wants to stand up now for poor and disadvantaged Maori, the working stiffs. He opposes exploitative Pakeha, but also (now) monied tribal interests. Maori neo-Marxism is undressing and exposing itself. This is a false Gospel and will betray those seduced by it to their destruction.

    But, at the same time, we believe there are historical injustices wrought by our government which should be addressed. They should be addressed because it is just to do so. At a personal or communal level, our lives should not be made to depend upon the redress of past wrongs and grievances, whether real or imagined. Evil happens in our sinful world. The Christian call is to accept such without bitterness, seek to begin again under the wonderful aegis of Christ Himself, and arise to serve Him where we are, with what we have.

    But there is an obligation to restitute, where possible, those who have suffered injustices at the hands of the state. (Restitution is not always possible, but if it can be done, it ought to be. The state must at all times be under law, and held to account by the law; if not, then we are governed not by law, but despots.)

    In this regard, we were pleased (whilst saddened, and provoked) by historian Paul Moon’s piece in the NZ Herald on the injustice being perpetuated against the Tuhoe people. (For the benefit of our overseas readers, the Tuhoe is a Maori tribe located on the South Eastern part of the North Island of New Zealand.) Here is a synopsis of Moon’s account:

    At the start of May last year, all the indications were that the Crown and Tuhoe were putting the finishing touches on a deal that would see Te Urewera National Park returned to Tuhoe, with enough caveats to ensure that access and other rights for the public would remain practically unchanged.

    Tuhoe would have what all the evidence shows (more…)

  • Sovereignty and The Treaty of Waitangi

    In the Theory of Morality, Alan Donagan has a concise discussion of the morality of contracts. At one point he makes the following plausible argument,

    Obviously, the normal conditions of the existence of a contract are not fulfilled if the promisee misunderstands what the promiser intends. … a promiser is morally bound to perform whatever he believed his promisee to have understood him to promise. He cannot reasonably do less; for he should have corrected any misunderstanding he was aware of. And not even his promisee can fairly claim that he has knowingly bound himself to do more.[1]

    Donagan here notes that when two parties enter into a contract they are bound by the terms of the contract because they agreed to them. Given this, they are only bound to do what they agreed to do, or what it is reasonable to assume that they agreed to do, given the circumstances. They cannot be required to do more than this as they did not agree to do more and could not reasonably have been expected to forsee needing to do more.

    I think these points are fairly obvious; however, they have implications that are often less obvious. Today is Waitangi Day in New Zealand. One common argument proposed in the debate around the Treaty of Waitangi is that in the Maori translation, under Article 2, the Crown promised,

    … to protect the chiefs, the subtribes and all the people of New Zealand in the unqualified exercise of their chieftainship over their lands, villages and all their treasures.[2]

    Now there is some debate about whether the phrase translated “chieftainship” (tino rangatiratanga) entails the idea of sovereignty or self-determination in this context or whether it simply conveys an idea of property rights.

    Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the former is correct. The fact that the Maori translation promises Maori sovereignty does not mean that the Crown promised this. In order for the Crown to be bound in this manner, the Crown would have to have believed (or been in a position where it was reasonable for them to have believed) that they were promising various Iwi (tribes) “sovereignty” in this sense. This clearly was not the case. The crown thought that they were merely promising what the English translation affirms they were:

    Her Majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand and to the respective families and individuals thereof the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other properties which they may collectively or individually possess so long as it is their wish and desire to retain the same in their possession;[3]

    It is clear that, under the English version, the Crown intended to guarantee Maori property rights in their land and it promised to protect these rights. Any promise of sovereignty was due to a translation error or not speaking Maori fluently. The representatives of the Crown could not have reasonably believed they were doing anything else. They relied in good faith on a translator to put their terms accurately into Maori and had no reason for thinking he had done anything other than this; hence, the Crown did not agree to provide Maori sovereignty and so did not promise it under the Treaty. It may be that some leaders mistakenly thought they did, but they were mistaken. Whatever the Maori version says, the Crown is not bound by it.

    I can think of two objections to this line of argument. The first, as Madeleine tells me, is the contention that the majority of Iwi signed the Maori version and under international treaty jurisprudence, where there is a conflict in translation the version that the majority of the parties signed is the valid one.

    This argument, however, misses the point. It is not that I am claiming that the English version is valid and the Maori one is not. I am quite willing to grant that the Maori version is valid, the point is that the Crown is morally bound only to do what they reasonably believed they were agreeing to do when they accepted the terms of the Treaty and the terms they believed they were agreeing to were those contained in the English version of the Treaty.

    Moreover, this argument appeals to international law. International law recognises that the Crown is the legal sovereign of New Zealand as it has been a stable de-facto government, recognised as such, by the majority of its citizens.

    A second objection is to note reciprocity; just as the Crown was not bound by what it reasonably believed it was agreeing to, so too the various Iwi are only bound by what they reasonably believed they were agreeing to. If one grants for the sake of argument that “tino rangatiratanga” means sovereignty, then Iwi were not bound to relinquish this sovereignty over to the Crown. They believed, quite reasonably given the translation they had, that they were not promising to relinquish sovereignty to the Crown but rather to maintain it.

    If this were the case the problem still arises that today in New Zealand, in 2010, the Crown is Sovereign. We do not have independent tribal nations that hold sovereign political power over their lands. All land in New Zealand is under the sovereignty of parliament and is subject to English common law and NZ statutes. Hence, the question is not whether Iwi are required to relinquish sovereignty to the Crown under the Treaty as, for better or worse, justly or unjustly, they have done so. The question today becomes, whether, after 170 years of the Crown being sovereign, Iwi should attempt to gain this sovereignty back? On this issue the Treaty is silent. It says nothing about what various parties are entitled to if another party misunderstood the agreement.

    The question then of Maori sovereignty is not a question of the Treaty at all. It is simply a question of morality in general. The real question is this, if one lives under a de-facto government that has been sovereign in practise for 170 years and if this government is relatively just then should one continue to defer to its sovereignty?

    I think the answer to this question is yes. I believe that when a stable de-facto government exists and has existed for over a century and when there is an absence of gross abuses of human rights then its sovereignty should be recognised as legitimate by the citizens of that nation. I will not further advance this argument here but I will simply note that whatever the answer to this question it seems reasonable to say that the Crown never promised sovereignty to Maori and claims that it did are based on the mistaken idea that a person can be bound by the terms of a contract which he or she both did not agree to and could not reasonably have been expected to have agreed to – to expect anything else is nonsense.


    [1] Alan Donagan The Theory of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977) 91.
    [2] “Treaty of Waitangi” Kawharu Translation Article 2.
    [3]
    “Treaty of Waitangi” English Version Article 2.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Maori and Pakeha are Not Partners to the Treaty of Waitangi

  • Tune in to Marae Tomorrow

    Yesterday Matt and I participated in filming a debate on the Treaty of Waitangi. The moot was “That the Treaty of Waitangi is holding NZ back.” There were four panelists, Stephen Franks, Tim Wikiriwhi, Matthew Hooten and Hana O’Regan and an active audience, of which Matt and I were asked to be members of to represent blogging New Zealand (apparently they considered David Farrar but decided we’d be more interesting on the basis of Matt’s blog post, Maori and Pakeha are Not Partners to the Treaty of Waitangi).

    The audience, who comprised a range of commentators, Members of Parliament and even activist John Minto, were expected to comment and ask questions, which we dutifully did. Who knows if we’ll make the editing room cut, or how what we said will play on screen (it always feels different in the moment to how it looks on air I find)  – one way to find out I guess!

    The debate will screen on Marae tomorrow morning, Saturday, 6 Feb, from 8:00am – 9:30am on TV One.

    Here is a brief rundown of our thoughts:

    • Speaker of the Day goes to Stephen Franks for presenting the best case and for managing to use terms like “fake treaty”, “bogus” and “spurious” whilst still managing to come across calm, pleasant and reasonable.
    • The Most Inflammatory award goes to Tim Wikiriwhi – you can read his transcript at Not PC. The award was for his  student-politician-styled-delivery coupled with claims later on in the debate that there had not been a single past injustice towards Maori, which earned him shocked and awed hissing. (That aside his message was good and his historical claims were fascinating.)
    • Best Impersonation of Peter Dunne award goes to Matthew Hooten for trying to take the middle ground and please everyone whilst effectively saying nothing but sounding profound.
    • The Loonie Leftie Why–Didn’t–Her–Over-Sized–Tiki–Explode? award goes to Hana O’Regan for (and it was hard to pick a winner from the many incoherent and internally inconsistent examples she had on offer) arguing for the confiscation of property  (tax dollars) to support the promotion of Maori language “because it is beautiful” [so too is the NZ countryside] citing the Treaty as justification for said confiscation of property (I kid you not!). We both called her on this in the Q&A.
    • Funniest Moment was when the producer decided that our paper voting forms didn’t look so good on camera so had the audience pretend to push invisible electronic voting buttons and to vote multiple times so that the camera could grab a range of shots. Shane Taurima, the host, completely lost it with laughter when he delivered the instructions to the audience to push the green button for the affirmative and the red button for the negative “on the small electronic device you see before you” and he had to re-shoot it. (Then they decided to have us vote with the paper ballots).

    I must note that at the beginning of the debate the audience was asked for a show of hands as to who was for the motion and who was against it. At the outset less than 5 people were for the motion. This is an important consideration to factor into the voting results announced at the end of the debate. As Stephen said to me afterwards, I think the for’s won it as they gained votes and the againsts lost them.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Maori and Pakeha are Not Partners to the Treaty of Waitangi

  • Fisking Margaret Mayman: The Flawed Moral Theology on the Smacking Referendum

    In “A Christian Perspective on the Child Discipline Referendum,” Rev Dr Margaret Mayman presents a theological justification for retaining the amended section 59 of the Crimes Act 1961, which has criminalised force used against a child for the purposes of parental correction.

    Mayman began by offering three standard arguments for repealing the old section 59, the defence of reasonable force for the purposes of parental correction. The first is that, “Prior to the law change, there had been terrible cases of child abuse that had not resulted in an assault conviction because of the use of this defence.” The second is that, “New Zealand has appalling rates of lethal and non-lethal child abuse and there is strong evidence that abuse often occurs as an escalation of physical punishment.” The third is that, “The law needed to be changed to ensure that the children received equal protection.” Despite their popularity and repetition in the media, these arguments are seriously flawed.

    Some Accuseds Get Off
    Turning to the first, it may be true that the existence of the defence of reasonable force meant that some child abusers escaped conviction. What Mayman fails to note is that this is true of any defence in Criminal Law. Section 48 of the Crimes Act allows a person to use reasonable force in defence of oneself or another from assault. Undoubtedly some serious assaults have not resulted in criminal prosecution as a result of the existence of this defence. Similarly, the law allows those accused of rape to mount a defence that the victim consented; this defence undoubtedly has lead to serious rapes not resulting in conviction. In fact, the very existence of a requirement for the prosecution to prove an assault has occurred, beyond reasonable doubt, has resulted in untold number of serious criminal actions not resulting in criminal convictions. Hence, if the mere fact that the former s59 occasionally resulted in criminals not being convicted entails that it should remain abolished then all defences should be abolished; clearly this is an absurd conclusion.

    Criminalisation Because of Escalation
    The second argument fares no better. Mayman asserts that, “abuse often occurs as an escalation of physical punishment.” This may be true. It is also true that spousal abuse often occurs as an escalation from a verbal argument between spouses. Does it follow that we should criminalise verbal arguments with one’s spouse.

    Equal Protection
    Mayman’s third argument, that children must receive “equal protection” under the law, is also problematic. It is true that the law does not allow a parent to smack an adult. However, it is also true that the law does not allow an adult to prevent another adult from leaving the house; to do this would be to commit false imprisonment. The law also does not allow an adult to confiscate the property of another adult; this is the crime commonly known as theft. Nor does the law allow an adult to subject another adult to medical treatment without their consent; this would be both a form of assault and a violation of the Bill of Rights’ protection of life and security of the person.

    If we were to truly give children equal protection under the law then it should be illegal for parents to send their children to their room, to ground them, to confiscate their property or keep their immunisations up to date. Clearly no sensible person advocates this because no sensible person really believes that children should receive equal protection under the law.

    After presenting these ill-thought out arguments, Mayman offers a theological case for her position. Mayman cited Jesus, “Let the little children come to me, and do not stop them; for it is to such as these that the kingdom of heaven belongs. And he laid his hands upon them and went on his way” (Matthew 19: 13-15). She also cited, “Take care that you do not despise one of these little ones; for, I tell you, in heaven their angels continually see the face of my Father in heaven. … So it is not the will of your Father in heaven that one of these little ones should be lost.” (Matthew 18:10, 14). Mayman then drew two conclusions from these passages. First, these passages call us to a “radical respect for the personhood, and therefore the bodily integrity of children.” Second, that Mayman finds, “no justification for physical punishment, let alone any directive for it.”

    Personhood and Bodily Integrity
    Turning to the first, I agree that we should respect the personhood and bodily integrity of children. I also think (as I am sure Mayman does) that we should also respect the personhood of adults. Mayman assumes, without argument, that the use of force for correction is always incompatible with respecting someone’s personhood or their bodily integrity. This claim is clearly false. Certain forms of physical punishment that cause injury or harm can damage a person’s personhood or bodily integrity but not all forms do. Moreover, if correction by force always contradicts our duty to respect personhood or bodily integrity then Mayman would have to conclude that criminal punishment of child abusers themselves is unjustified. Such criminals often do not voluntarily go to jail; they have to be forced to. The fact that Mayman supports laws against child abuse shows that she does not believe her own argument; she accepts that sometimes physical force for correction is justified (for adults anyway).

    No Directive for Physical Punishment
    Her second argument is equally problematic. Mayman states she finds, “no justification for physical punishment, let alone any directive for it.” Here she is correct; nothing in the passages she cited provides any justification for physical punishment or any directive for it. Nor, for that matter, do these particular passages provide any justification for refraining from rape, kidnapping, adultery or theft. That is because these particular passages do not address these issues; they have nothing to say about them at all. Whether such things are justified or not depends on other passages or arguments that are actually about those things. Hence, appealing to them in this context is irrelevant.

    Interestingly, immediately after citing these passages, Mayman notes that another passage in scripture does seem to imply the permissibility of corporal punishment. She provides four responses to this, none of which hold any weight.

    First she notes that people have historically appealed to the book of Proverbs, “Those who spare the rod hate their children, but those who love them are diligent to discipline them”, to justify “physical violence and assaults.” This may be true but only in the same way that historically people have appealed to notions of equality to murder millions of people in Gulags. Does it follow that all appeals to equality are wrong (and should be criminalised)? Incorrect use or application of an idea tells us nothing about whether the idea itself is true.

    Second Mayman states this passage needs to interpreted in light of the “knowledge about child development and of the damage caused by physical punishment” that we have acquired since “the scriptures were written.” I agree that one should take into account relevant empirical facts when interpreting scripture. The problem is that Mayman simply assumes that it is an empirical fact that “physical punishment” causes damage; the problem is that this is far from obvious. In “Corporal Punishment,” Professor David Benatar surveys several studies and notes,

    Although there is evidence that excessive corporal punishment can significantly increase the chances of such psychological harm, most of the psychological data are woefully inadequate to the task of demonstrating that mild and infrequent corporal punishment has such consequences.

    Moreover, he goes on to note that, “even the data suggesting that very rare instances of mild corporal punishment do have some negative effects also suggest that the effects are not substantial.” In fact, the empirical data is nowhere near as conclusive as Mayman suggests; several studies found little or no adverse effects of physical correction once the difference between severe and abusive types of physical punishment was distinguished from other, milder forms. Theologians should take into account empirical data; they should not, however, uncritically accept unsubstantiated empirical claims about what science allegedly shows.

    Literal Interpretation
    Mayman also attacks the idea that one should take the Bible literally. She backs this up by citing Deuteronomy 21: 18-21. Mayman claims that this verse teaches that parents are required, “to put to death the persistently disobedient youth.” In fact, Mayman’s interpretation of this verse is flawed. As Christopher Wright notes, in the Ancient Near East it was common for fathers to have rights of life and death over their adult children. Deuteronomy 21, in this context, actually subverts this by taking these decisions out of the hands of fathers. The passage probably refers to adult sons, not children as it describes the sons and gluttonous drunks. Moreover, many scholars have provided evidence that penal sanctions, like those recorded in this passage, serve a rhetorical function of denouncing the action and are not intended to be taken literally.

    Even if one ignores these problems, Mayman’s position remains erroneous. Mayman assumes that if one should not take Deuteronomy 21 literally it follows that one should not take any other part of Scripture literally. This is mistaken. Such a conclusion would follow, only if, one assumed that either every statement in Scripture is to be taken literally or none is. Almost any piece of writing will contain a mixture of metaphor, figures of speech, hyperbole and so on, alongside literal comments. In any event, Mayman seems to want it both ways, in several places in her article she takes the teachings of Jesus literally in an attempt to substantiate her view on corporal punishment!

    Similar contradictions inflict the rest of Mayman’s exegesis. She dismisses the Epistle to the Hebrews on the grounds that “Nowhere does the author invoke the teaching of Jesus to confirm his beliefs.” She then immediately cites Paul’s commands to “provoke your children, or they may lose heart,” despite the fact that Paul does not, in this verse, “invoke the teaching of Jesus” to confirm this instruction. Even if Mayman’s exegesis were coherent (which it is not) the claim to not provoke one’s children is not the same as the claim to never physically correct them.

    Slavery
    Mayman finally asserts “that Paul accepted the institution of slavery” but that “Nineteenth century Christians realised that to take seriously the teaching of Jesus about the dignity of all people, required that slavery be ended.” Even if Mayman’s exegesis of Paul and her historical claims about abolitionists were correct (which scholar’s dispute) it again proves nothing at all. Even if Paul was mistaken on one issue, it does not mean he was mistaken on all issues nor does it mean he is mistaken on this issue (Mayman authoritatively quotes Paul elsewhere herself). To show Paul is mistaken on this matter requires an actual argument.

    Slogans About Violence
    After the above dubious moral theology Mayman turns to a series of slogans. She suggests that physical punishment constitutes violence, she insinuates that violence is always wrong and that violence begets violence. In fact, none of these claims are true.

    The Oxford Shorter Dictionary defines violence as “the use of physical force so as to inflict injury on others or cause damage to property.” However, not all force inflicts injury or damages property. Further, violence does not always beget violence; sometimes violence stops violence. The existence of the police force, army, armed offenders squad, courts and prisons show that even civilised societies recognise that violence and force can be justly used against others and are necessary to stop and deter further violence. Therefore, while it is correct to suggest that force and violence are often unjustified, sometimes they are not, and a sensible and just social policy will recognise the difference.

    David Benatar “Corporal Punishment” in Social Theory & Practice (Summer 1998) Vol 24, Issue 2, 237.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Fisking Ian Hassall: The Arbitrary Ethical Reasoning on the Smacking Referendum
    We’re Confused about the Anti-Smacking Referendum Question
    No Defences Permitted for the Accused