Category: Divine Command Theory

  • Carrier on infantile moral reasoning: one more time

    In a previous post, I discussed Carrier’s defence of “The infantile Objection” to divine a command theory (DCT) of meta-ethics. Some comments he makes in the same paper, suggest a slightly different version of the argument. Seeing I have found this version of the objection relatively common in oral discussions. It is worth having a second look.

    As we saw, Carrier distinguished between “mature” or “adult” moral reasoning which is “based on actually caring about the people affected by our actions” and immature reasoning “which involves “actually not wanting to do good but begrudgingly doing it anyway to avoid punishment (or get paid).”

    At one-point Carrier argues as follows:

    CarrierDCT in practice (regardless of what claims are made of it in theory) interferes with the development of this mature form of moral reasoning, by not basing moral motivation on the compassion of the agent (and their own reasoning and observation), but on the commands of a third-party (God) who supposedly knows better. DCT thus abrogates moral reasoning, and all too often becomes an excuse not to engage in it (we just do what God commands; we don’t think about whether that’s actually good or right). It also replaces an agent’s own compassion with the hypothetical compassion of a hypothetical being constructed in the imaginations of certain supposed religious authorities. Though one can theoretically avoid these defective forms of moral reasoning on DCT, in practice DCT is not very successful at it. That Christianity has endorsed slavery and war and mass torture and murder as moral only verifies the point. When it comes to actual adult decision-making, ethical naturalism works far more consistently, because it requires the agent to engage their own moral reasoning and to motivate their behavior on their own compassion for others (and not someone else’s). [1]

    What carrier here claims is that, whatever may or may not be true of in theory in practise, DCT interferes with mature reasoning, as he defines, it and encourages immaturity. On the other hand, Naturalism more consistently leads to mature reasoning.

    He provides two reasons for this conclusion. The first (a) is that DCT, identifies moral requirements with on “the “hypothetical compassion” of “a hypothetical being” “who knows better” whereas ethical naturalism which requires the agent to engage there “own” reasoning, and their own compassion not someone else’s. The second is that (b) “Christianity has endorsed slavery and war and mass torture and murder as moral”. Neither argument is compelling,

    Actual Compassion Vs Compassion of a Hypothetical Being who knows better

    let’s turn to (a). Only a few paragraphs earlier, Carrier spells out his own version of ethical naturalism. He states: “I have demonstrated elsewhere that the ground for morality must be motivational (the consequences of moral behavior must actually be what the moral agent would most want, if he or she knew better)”[2] Carrier here is explicit, on the view he defends, which he takes to have demonstrated, is that morality is based on what a person would most want, if he or she knew better. Hence, Carrier grounds moral requirements in the claims of a hypothetical being who knows better.

    Similarly, on p 208 he states:

    “S morally ought to do A” means “If S’s desires were rationally deduced from as many facts as S can reasonably obtain at that time (about S’s preferences and the outcomes of S’s available alternatives in S’s circumstances), then S would prefer A over all the available alternative courses of action (at that time and in those circumstances).”[3]

    Notice the word “if” in the first line here, Carrier does not base moral requirements in the actual compassion of the agent, but rather in the compassion the agent would have under hypothetical circumstances where they knew better. So, it’s difficult to understand why, when he wants to accuse DCT of being immature, he claims that DCT relies on a hypothetical being who knows better, whereas naturalism relies on a person’s actual compassion. Because this is false.  Both views attempt to identify moral requirements with the demands of a compassionate person who knows better.

    Slavery, War, and Torture

    I turn then to (b) Carrier’s second reason for thinking that, in practise DCT encourages “immature reasoning” while naturalism more consistently leads to mature reasoning. This is verified by the fact “Christianity has endorsed slavery and war and mass torture and murder”

    An initial question that could be raised in this context is whether it is a fact that  Christianity has “endorsed slavery and war and mass torture”. Part of the problem with saying this, is that in many cases it’s not easy to answer the question of whether a historical person endorses war slavery and torture.

    Take for example the issue of war. Many theologians, (in fact most) such as Augustine, Aquinas, Vitoria. Suarez, Calvin, Luther, held to what is called the just war theory, this theory holds that war is justified in certain narrow situations such as when a king is defending his realm from aggressive invasion. But it’s not justified for the purpose of empire building or conquest, does this make them in favour of war or against it?

    Or take several 18-19th-century theologians who addressed the issue of slavery.  They argued that, while there are circumstances under which the institution of slavery in and of itself was justified, such as when a person sells their labour to pay a debt or as a punishment for a crime, the way it was concretely practised in their culture was unjust and immoral. For this reason, they advocated slavery’s abolition.  Were they defenders of slavery or opponents of it?

    Or consider medieval jurists who held (following secular law) that gaining information by torture was normally prohibited, it could be used in rare circumstances where there was compelling circumstantial evidence the accused was guilty and more information was needed to gain a conviction, were they in favor of torture or opposed to it?

    Let’s, however, put this initial question to the side and assume it’s true that there is a clear, unambiguous sense in which it is true that Christianity “endorsed slavery and war and mass torture”. Does  this support the conclusion that DCT in practise his “abrogates moral reasoning, and all too often becomes an excuse not to engage in it” whereas “ethical naturalism works far more consistently.”

    The answer is “No”, Carrier’s reasoning here seems to me to be rather weak. I will highlight three problems with it.

    The first problem is that the conclusion and premises refer to different groups of people. The premise here is that Christians have endorsed slavery and war torture. The conclusion is that divine command theorists have a tendency to engage in immature patterns of reasoning.

    But obviously divine command theorists and Christians are different groups. There are divine command theorists who are not Christians, such as Jewish and Islamic divine command theorists[4] and there are Christians who are not divine command theorists. It’s true that some Christians thinkers have endorsed divine command theory of meta-ethics, but it’s also true that many have not. Given the prominence of natural law reasoning in Christian theology many Christian thinkers have in fact been ethical naturalists.

    So the first problem is that there is a gap between conclusion and premise here. The premise attributes a tendency to one group, and the conclusion attributes a tendency to a different group. Such an inference doesn’t follow.

    The second problem is that Carrier’s conclusion asserts a  claim about the comparative merits of divine command theory and meta-ethical naturalism. claim. His claim is that the in practise DCT leads to immature reasoning whereas “ethical naturalism works far more consistently”. The premise, however, tells us only what Christians have done.

    It’s pertinent, in this context,  to remember that the actions Carrier mentions are war, slavery and torture.  After all, the vast majority of on-Christian cultures have also endorsed war and slavery, Ancient Rome, for example, practised both before Christianity came on the scene.  As did ancient Greece, Assyria, Egypt, Persia and so on. Modern secular philosophers today defend various military actions including the killing of non-combatants and terrorism. Consider such things as nuclear deterrence or the bombing of Hiroshima. Slavery was given a spirited defence by Aristotle, an ethical naturalist over 300 years before the birth of Christ, and so on.

    What is needed  is evidence, not just that Christians have supported these things, but that Christians have been more prone to doing this than non-Christians have.  We would need some evidence for example that Pacifism has been less commonly justified by Christians than other groups. That Slavery has been abolished more frequently in non-Christian cultures than others. That Christians have been less likely to defend absolute prohibitions on killing non-combatants than secular utilitarian’s who appeal to impartial benevolence. That torture was more frequently justified and used in ecclesiastical justice than was common in secular courts and so on.  Carrier of course hasn’t provided any evidence for these sorts of claims.

    This brings me to the third problem in Carrier’s argument. His conclusion regards the kind of reasoning engaged in by divine command theorists. The premise, however, gives us information about some of the conclusions  Christian’s have come to, they have “endorsed slavery, war and mass torture as moral”.

    Such an inference, however again, doesn’t follow. People can and have supported war, slavery and torture out of a sense of “their own compassion” and have been motivated by care “about the people affected by our actions” Aristotle for example famously argued that slavery was necessary for the welfare of the slave. The Crusades were often defended on the grounds of love and humility, liberating Eastern Christians from the threat of Muslim invasion was seen as self-sacrifice for the good of one’s neighbour.[5].

    So we can’t conclude from the mere fact that a Christians endorsed slavery, or war or torture, that they were engaging in immature as opposed to adult reasoning. To determine that, we would need to know not just the conclusions they drew, but the reasoning they used to get to moral conclusions. We would need to know why various Christian thinkers endorsed these practises.  What were the reasons?  What kind of reasoning lead them to support war or torture or slavery?  Did they do so “begrudgingly to avoid punishment” reasoning that “we just do what God commands; we don’t think about whether that’s actually good or right” Or did they appeal to altruistic reasons such their own compassion and concern for the good of others to justify these things.

    For these reasons I think that Carrier has failed to establish in practise, DCT interferes with mature reasoning and encourages immaturity. Both naturalists and theists ground morality in the compassion of a hypothetical being who knows better, and Carrier’s inference from undefended claim that Christians have endorsed war and slavery, to the conclusion that divine command theorist have engaged in immature moral reason more than other groups involves multiple unjustified leaps in logic.


    [1] Richard Carrier “On the Facts as we Know them, Ethical Naturalism is all there is: A Reply to Matthew Flannagan” Philo 15, no. 2 (Fall-Winter 2012) 206.

    [2] Ibid. 205.

    [3] Ibid. 208.

     [5] See, for example, Douglas Earl, “Joshua and the Crusades,” in Holy War in the Bible: Christian Morality and

    an Old Testament Problem, ed. Heath A. Thomas, Jeremy Evans, and Paul Copan (Downers Grove,

    IL: IVP Academic, 2013), 19–43.

  • Erik Wielenberg and the Autonomy Thesis: part one Wielenberg’s criticism of Divine command meta-ethics

    The autonomy thesis contends that there can be moral requirements to φ regardless of whether God commands, desires, or wills that people φ. In his monograph, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism,[1] Erik Wielenberg offers arguably one of the most sophisticated defences of the autonomy thesis to date. Wielenberg argues that: I the most plausible alternative to the autonomy thesis, the divine command theory, is problematic because it cannot account for the moral obligations of reasonable unbelievers;  II robust realism, the thesis that moral requirements are sui generis non-natural properties which supervene upon natural properties, can be formulated in a way that avoids the standard objections to the autonomy thesis and,  III robust realism provides a better account of intrinsic value than any meta-ethical theory that identifies moral goodness with states of God.

    In this and future blog posts, I will argue Wielenberg’s defence of the autonomy thesis fails. This post will address I. Future posts will look at II and III

    defaul1Let’s look at the first claim, that the divine command theory, is problematic because it cannot account for the moral obligations of reasonable unbelievers.

    By divine command theory, Wielenberg has in mind the command meta-ethics (DCM) defended by Adam’s, Craig, Alston, Evans which holds the property of being morally required is identical with the property of being commanded by God

    Wielenberg takes for granted the existence of “reasonable non-believers”[2] people who “have been brought up in nontheistic religious communities, and quite naturally operate in terms of the assumptions of their own traditions.”[3] Or the “many western philosophers, have explicitly considered what is to be said in favour God’s existence, but have not found it sufficiently persuasive.” Wielenberg assumes that many of these people “reasonable non-believers, at least in the sense that their lack of belief cannot be attributed to the violation of any epistemic duty on their part.”[4]

    Wielenberg argues that If the property of being morally required is identical with the property of being commanded by God these people would have no moral obligations, they clearly do have moral obligations. Consequently, DCM is false.

    Wielenberg cites the following exposition of the problem from Wes Morriston:[5]

    Even if he is aware of a “sign” that he somehow manages to interpret as a “command” not to steal, how can he [ a reasonable non-believer] be subject to that command if he doesn’t know who issued it, or that it was issued by a competent authority? To appreciate the force of this question, imagine that you have received a note saying, “Let me borrow your car. Leave it unlocked with the key in the ignition, and I will pick it up soon.” If you know that the note is from your spouse, or that it is from a friend to whom you owe a favor, you may perhaps have an obligation to obey this instruction. But if the note is unsigned, the handwriting is unfamiliar, and you have no idea who the author might be, then it’s as clear as day that you have no such obligation. In the same way, it seems that even if our reasonable non-believer gets as far as to interpret one of Adams’ “signs” as conveying the message, “Do not steal”, he be under no obligation to comply with this instruction unless and until he discovers the divine source of the message[6]

    Morriston’s argument contains a subtle equivocation, in the first line he expresses a disjunction: a person is not subject to a command if he doesn’t know (a) who issued it, or (b) that it has an authoritative source. The example he cites, the case of an anonymous note to borrow one’s car, is a case neither of these disjuncts holds. The owner of the car knows neither who the author of the note is, nor whether its source is authoritative.

    However, the conclusion Morriston apparently draws is that failure to know who the author is, by itself, is sufficient to exempt someone from being subject to the command. This clearly doesn’t follow.[7]

    The mistake can be illustrated, by reflecting on examples where, a person doesn’t know who the author of a command is, but does recognise that it has an authoritative source. Suppose I am walking down what I take to be a public right of way to Orewa beach I come across a locked gate with a sign that says: “private property, do not enter, trespassers will be prosecuted”. In such a situation, I recognise that the owner of the property has written the sign, though I have no idea who the owner is. Does it follow I am not subject to the command? That seems clearly false. To be subject to the command a person does not need to know who the author of the command is. All they need to know is that the command is authoritative over their conduct.

    In fact, being subject to a command is compatible with having mistaken beliefs about who the author of the command is. Suppose I believe that the beach property I am in front of is owned by Holly Holmes, having read about her purchase in the New Zealand Herald, in fact, the Herald, has gotten details wrong and the house was sold to Kim Schmidt. In this situation, it is still the case that, when I read the sign, “private property trespassers will be prosecuted”, I am subject to the command. The fact I have all sorts of mistaken beliefs about who the author of the command does not seem to make any difference.[8]

    Wielenberg concedes the problem, and concludes that a reasonable unbeliever does not need to recognise moral obligations as God’s commands to be subject to them, all that’s needed is that they recognise these commands as coming from “some authority or other” However, he thinks this rejoinder “doesn’t address the central worry” Morriston raises. Taking Robert Adam’s version of DCM as paradigmatic, Wielenberg notes:

    An important part of Adam’s strategy for accounting for the moral obligations as of non-theist’s is the idea that some divine commands are issued by ways of “moral impulses and sensibilities common to practically all human beings since some (not too recent) point in the evolution of our species[9]

    The problem is that “reasonable non-theists lack of belief prevents them from recognizing any divine signs they receive-including their own “moral impulses and sensibilities”- as commands issued by someone who has authority over them”[10] while they will recognise certain actions as obligatory, “some reasonable non-believers do not construe the deliverance of their consciences as commands at all”[11]

    There are two problems with Wielenberg’s objection.

    First, he misconstrues Adam’s position. Consider Adam’s reference to “moral impulses and sensibilities common to practically all human beings” the full quotation is as follows:

    [P]rinciples of moral obligation constituted by divine commands are not timeless truths because the commands are given by signs that appear in time. People of who are not in the region of space-time in which a sign can be known are not subject to the command given by it. Of course, if the signs by which divine commands are given are moral impulses and sensibilities common to practically all human beings since some (not too recent) point in human evolution, all of us can be fairly counted as subject to those commands. But the conception of a divine command allows for divine commands with historically restricted audiences. (emphasis added)[12]

    Adam’s the words “if” and “but” here suggest Adam’s isn’t claiming that divine commands are “given through, moral impulses and sensibilities common to practically all human beings”. Adam’s is alluding to a hypothetical possibility to which he thinks there are alternatives.

    And in fact, Adam’s, elsewhere explains he thinks that “divine commands are revealed” largely “through human social requirements”.[13] That is through requirements and demands other people make on our conduct and blame us for not complying with. He states “a divine command against murder” has “been made known very widely to the human race” and “dissemination of such prohibitions has surely taken place largely through human systems of social requirement”.[14] He elaborates:

    On this view, divine ethical requirements will not form an entirely separate system, parallel and superior to systems of social requirement. Rather human moral will be imperfect expressions of divine commands, and the question of their relation to God’s commanding will be whether and how far they are authorized or backed by God’s authority, not whether they agree with an eternal divine command laid up in the heaven[15]

    This takes the sting out of Wielenberg’s criticism, because even though reasonable non-theists don’t construe “own moral impulses and sensibilities”- as commands issued by someone who has authority over them” they will inhabit social relationships where other people other people, parents, teachers, spouses, children, employees, courts, governments, make demands upon them which they recognise as authoritative, and demands will clearly be understood as real commands.

    Second, it’s not clear that Wielenberg is correct, that “reasonable believers” don’t perceive the deliverances of their conscience as authoritative commands.

    Consider, John Hare’s recent analysis of a divine command[16]. Hare, starts by noting that commands are a type of speech act, and in particular they are prescriptive speech acts which involve imperatives. However, commands differ from other imperatives such as exhortations, advice, warnings, requests, advice “instructions for cooking omelettes”[17] in certain important respects. Commands differ from advice or exhortations, in that commands presuppose authority on the part of the commander, additionally “in command there is standardly some expectation of condemnation if the command is not carried out.”[18] And one is not permitted or given consent by the commander to not follow the command. Similarly, commands, unlike say cooking instructions aren’t “conditional, or, in Kant’s term, ‘hypothetical.”[19]

    Commands then are categorical prescriptions “with which the person commanded is not permitted not to comply, and a prescription in which there is an internal reference, by the meaning of this kind of speech act, to the authority of the speaker, and to some kind of condemnation if the command is not carried out.”[20]

    It is striking how these features of a command are also features of moral obligations. Moral requirements are prescriptive, telling us what to do, and purport to be not just advice but authoritative, telling us what we must do and are not permitted to not do. Similarly, moral requirements are categorical in that their applicability is not contingent on some goal or end those subject to them have. Similarly, moral requirements condemn our behavior, failure to comply without an adequate excuse render us guilty and blameworthy, and others can justifiably censure us, rebuke you and even punish you, and even punish you.

    So, while, reasonable non-believers won’t construe the deliverances of conscience as literally a speech act by a person, it’s not implausible that, their pre-theoretical concept of a moral requirement is something very much like a command in all other respects.

    This, I think, undermines Wielenberg’s objection. Because, it’s plausible to suggest that a person who is aware of all aspects of a command while not recognising it as a speech act from a person, is still subject to the command.

    Suppose for example that an owner of one of the beach front properties in Orewa puts up a sign that states “private property do not enter, trespassers will be prosecuted”. John sees the sign and understands clearly what it says. He understands the sign as issuing an imperative to “not enter the property”. John recognises this imperative is categorical and is telling him to not trespass, he also recognises this imperative as having authority over his conduct, he also recognises that he will be blameworthy if they don’t comply with this imperative. However, because of a strange metaphysical theory, he doesn’t believe any person issued this imperative and so isn’t strictly speaking a command.  He thinks it’s just a brute fact that this imperative exists. Does this metaphysical idiosyncrasy mean that the command does not apply him and he has not heard or received the command the owner issued? That seems to me to be false. While John does not realise who the source of the command is, he knows enough to know that the imperative the command expresses applies authoritatively to him and that he is accountable to it.


    [1] Erik Wielenberg, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014)

    [2] Erik Wielenberg, Robust Ethics, 77

    [3] Ibid

    [4] Ibid.

    [5] Interestingly, Morriston states “This example is adapted from Wielenberg.” So Wielenberg is citing an example from Morriston, which Morriston cites as an example from Wielenberg. See, Wes Morriston “The Moral Obligations of Reasonable Non-Believers: A special problem for divine command metaethics,” International Journal of Philosophy of Religion 65 (2009), 5

    [6] Wes Morriston “The moral obligations of reasonable non-believers” 5-6

    [7] The inference here would be If P then (Q or R), not R, therefore not P.

    [8] Stephen C Evans gives a similar counter example, see God and Moral Obligation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 113-114 as do Paul Copan and I in Did God Really Command Genocide: Coming to Terms with the Justice of God (Grand Rapids MI: Baker Publishing House, 2014) 157

    [9] Wielenberg Robust Ethics 76

    [10] Ibid 79

    [11] Ibid.

    [12] Robert Adam’s Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 270

    [13] Ibid 264.

    [14] Ibid 264-265

    [15] Ibid

    [16] John E Hare Gods Command (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 32-44

    [17] John E Hare Gods Command, 37

    [18] Ibid 44

    [19] John E Hare “What is a Divine Command?” Wilde lectures, Oxford University, Wednesday 08 February 2012, 26

    [20] John Hare Divine Command 49

     

  • Video: The Smith-Flannagan Debate “Morality Does Not Need God”

    On Wednesday 21st May at the University of Waikato retired Philosophy and Political science lecturer Dr Ron Smith and Dr Matthew Flannagan (of this blog) debated the resolution “Morality Does not need God”. Here is the video of that debate.

     

  • Richard Carrier and the “Infantile” objection to God’s command’s

    In his article, “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality”, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argued that a “Divine command theory makes morality childish.”[1]

    In my response to Armstrong, “Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism?”[2] I made two points. First, I addressed a tangential point: that Armstrong’s argument caricatures divine command theory (“DCT”) by tacitly assuming that divine command theorists believe actions are wrong because God will punish us for doing them. Second, I called into question the analogy Armstrong draws between a child following one’s parents and humans following God.Carrier

    Richard Carrier, in his reply to my article, “On the Facts as we Know them, Ethical Naturalism is all there is”,[3] objects to both these responses.

    The motivation of punishment
    Carrier dismisses my first point as “disingenuous” stating,

    (a) that he is “not aware of any DCT advocate who is actually a universalist”; and

    (b) “Every time a DCT advocate has ever threatened or warned anyone of hell (or even just the loss of heaven) in reference to their behaviour, they expose what they really think the ground of Morality is: the fear of consequences.”[4]

    Neither argument is cogent. Let us look at (a) first. The philosopher most responsible for developing and defending DCT in the last fifty years, Robert Merrithew Adams, is a universalist. Given that Adams’ discussion is definitive, and most of the literature in the last thirty years discusses his arguments, Carrier’s claim that he is “not aware of any DCT advocate who is actually a universalist” speaks only to his lack of reading and knowledge of the subject.

    Premise (b) expresses a non-sequitur. Even if, as is true, many divine command theorists are not universalists and even if some have warned people about divine punishment, then it does not follow that those people believe that fear of punishment is the ground of morality. At most it shows that those people believe in divine judgement and they see it as one reason to avoid wrongdoing.

    An analogy might illustrate the mistaken logic here. All people I know believe that prisons exist and I have known some of them warn others that if they commit a crime they will go to jail. It does not follow from this that that these people believe that jail is the only reason one should not commit crimes.

    Straw manning Armstrong and missing the real target
    Carrier’s response to my second point fares little better. He makes two objections:

    (i): “[Armstrong’s] point about infantilization is not the point Flannagan is responding to. Flannagan thinks he means something to do with children obeying parents (and therefore we can build a comparable analogy to adults obeying God that does not infantilize).”

    (ii) that Armstrong’s real point, that “Adult moral reasoning is based on actually caring about the people affected by our actions and thus wanting to do good, as opposed to actually not wanting to do good but begrudgingly doing it anyway to avoid punishment” remains untouched.[5]

    Once again, both objections fail. In respect of (i), contrary to Carrier’s protestation, Armstrong does speak of children obeying parents and does draw an analogy between adults obeying God and children obeying their parents. Here is what Armstrong says:

    “A second objection is that the divine command theory makes morality childish Compare a small boy who thinks that what makes it Morally wrong for him to hit his little sister is only that his parents told him not to hit her and will punish him if he does. As a result, this little boy thinks that if his parents leave home or die then there is nothing wrong with hitting his little sister. Perhaps some little boys think this way but surely we adults do not think that Morality is anything like this.”[6]

    This section of Armstrong’s work was directly quoted in my article.

    This brings us to (ii), even if Armstrong was making the point Carrier attributed to him in this section of his paper, it is mistaken to conclude that I never addressed this (more…)

  • Did God Really Command Genocide? Summarised at Moral Apologetics

    Over at Moral Apologetics,  David Baggett and Mark Foreman, are undertaking the task of writing chapter summaries of Paul Copan’s and my book, “Did God Really Command Genocide?” The chapter summaries are available here.

    Moral Apologetics

  • The Arbitrariness Objection (once more): A brief reply to Jason Thibodeau

    Jason ThibodeauJason Thibodeau over at The Secular Outpost has written a thoughtful discussion and response to the critique I made of Walter Sinnott Armstrong’s arbitrariness objection in my article, “Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism: A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong.”

    Jason suggests that when you disambiguate the premises of Armstrong’s argument, it is formulated as follows:

    (1) Either: (i) there is a reason, r, why God prohibits rape; or, (ii) there is no reason, r, why God prohibits rape.

    (2) If there is no reason, r, why God prohibits rape, then God’s commands are arbitrary.

    (3’’) If there is a reason, r, why God prohibits rape then r is what constitutes the wrongness of rape.

    (4’’) If r is what constitutes the wrongness of rape then God’s commands are explanatorily superfluous.

    The word “constitute” in premises (3”) and (4”) is a technical term for a  particular  kind of explanatory relationship. Mark Murphy explains, “The sense of explanation at stake is that of informative identification, as we explain the nature of water by identifying it with H2O or explain the nature of heat by identifying it with molecular motion.”[1]

    In my paper, “Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism“, I argued that  (4’’) was false; (4’’) relies on a particular principle:

    PI: If A is constituted by B, and someone has reasons, r, for bringing about B, then A is constituted by r.

    However, PI is false. Consider a counter-example drawn from Stephen Sullivan. Consider Giorgio who is bachelor. Giorgio is unmarried because he prefers to live alone. Given that the property of being a bachelor is constituted by the property of being an unmarried man, and Giorgio’s love of living alone provides a reason for him to be an unmarried man, PI entails that the property of being an unmarried man is constituted by the property of preferring to live alone, but this is clearly false. Giorgio’s preference for living alone provides him with a reason for being a bachelor, in the sense that it is what motivates him to continue to be one, but his preferences do not constitute him being a bachelor.[2] There are, after all, many people who are bachelors who would prefer not to live alone.

    Thibodeau  agrees that this counter example refutes PI, he  suggests a repair: (more…)

  • Out Now: Did God Really Command Genocide? Coming to Terms with the Justice of God by Paul Copan and Matthew Flannagan

    Did God Really Command Genocide?Well done Matt and Paul. 🙂

    Out now!

    Get your copy today of Did God Really Command Genocide? Coming to Terms with the Justice of God, by Paul Copan and Matthew Flannagan, published by Baker Books.

    More here.

    Buy from Baker Books
    Buy on Amazon in paperback
    Buy for your Kindle
    Buy from Book Depository

    (The New Zealand store launch is not until 31 January 2015 but Book Depository do free international posting.)