Category: Religion in Public Life

  • Recyling: Rawls on Religion and Public Life

    A common theme appeared in the comments section of my Investigate Magazine article, Contra Mundum: What’s Wrong with Imposing your Beliefs onto Others? Commenters suggested I had not addressed the standard liberal conception of the role of religion and public life, the view that no law should be based on premises that not all reasonable people accept. Mention was made of Rawls’ particular version of this argument so I thought it would be timely to recycle a series I wrote on this topic that many current regular readers might not have seen.

    Thanks to the wonders of WordPress’ more tag it is complete in this post.

    Rawls on Religion and Public Life

    One common line of argument for excluding theological premises from public debate is that not everyone accepts the truth of such premises. Any policy decisions based on such a purported divine law would be binding upon these people in spite of the fact they do not accept such theological doctrines.

    One obvious problem with this line of argument is that exactly the same thing can be said about many secular, non-theological, beliefs. Phillip Quinn articulates this point,

    … if the fact that religious reasons can not be shared by all in a religiously pluralistic society suffices to warrant any exclusion of religious reasons for advocating or supporting restrictive laws or policies, then much else ought in fairness also be excluded on the same grounds.[1]

    Quinn notes correctly that secular moral theories such as Utilitarianism or Kantianism, Intuitionism, Socialism, Libertarianism, can all be reasonably rejected in a philosophically-pluralistic society.

    Indeed, it would seem that the appeal to any comprehensive ethical theory, including all known secular ethical theories, should be disallowed on the grounds that every such theory can be reasonably rejected by some citizens in a pluralistic democracy. And if justification of restrictive laws or policies can be conducted only in terms of moral considerations no citizen of a pluralistic democracy can reasonably reject, then in a pluralistic democracy such as ours very few restrictive laws or policies would be morally justified, a conclusion that would, I suspect, be welcome only to anarchists.[2]

    One influential attempt to avoid these problems is proposed by John Rawls in Political Liberalism.[3] Rawls defends the thesis that it is wrong to appeal to religious or theological beliefs in debates pertaining to “constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice”.[4] Rawls does this on the same grounds that Quinn refers to above; such beliefs can be “reasonably rejected by some citizens in a pluralistic democracy”.[5] Rawls states,

    Our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.[6]

    (more…)

  • Dr Glenn Peoples on Abortion, Morality and Law

    Canterbury student group Prolife UC have organised for Dr Glenn Peoples to deliver some free public lectures at the University of Canterbury in Christchurch on Abortion, Morality and Law.

    Thursday 30th July 7.30 pm
    “Chasing the Justificatory Goalpost: Public Justification and Religious Beliefs”

    There is a broad political tradition that we are a part of that we could call “the liberal democracy.” Some modern thinkers allege that in a liberal democratic society like ours, we should not advocate policies or ideas in the public square that are justified by our religious beliefs (e.g. policies on abortion, marriage, education etc). This is because these people advocate a principle of justification, whereby all policies must be justifiable to our fellow citizen in a certain way, and (as everyone knows, of course!) all policies that are justified by our religious beliefs cannot be justified to our fellow citizens in this way. Dr Peoples will look at exactly what this principle of justification is, whether it is any good (he will argue that it needs improvement), and most importantly, will ask whether or not it is really true that policies that have a religious basis really do fail to be justified in this way.

    Friday 31st July 7.30pm
    “Abortion, Morality and Law”

    Is abortion immoral, and should it be legal? The abortion controversy is a persistent one in New Zealand that has seen revived interest lately. Dr Glenn Peoples will provide reasons for deeming abortion immoral and for its legal restriction. He will also consider some arguments for abortion rights and explains how to address these, demonstrating that they overlook the fundamental moral issues involved.

    Where: A3 lecture theatre, University of Canterbury, Christchurch (map and more info here)

    Cost: free but donation appreciated

    Dr Peoples completed his doctoral research on Religion in Public life through the University of Otago and runs New Zealand’s most popular podcast on philosophy, theology and politics.
  • Religion and Science: A Response to Ken Perrott’s “Other Ways of Knowing”

    Ken Perrott, at Open Parachute, took issue with some comments I made in my recent defence of Plantinga’s stance on Evolution being taught in state schools. To gain focus let’s look at one thing I said to Ken in the comments section on that post,

    If the relevant evidence points towards a theory it does not follow that all the evidence points towards it. That’s because there might be evidence which science does not consider, such as theological claims, that are relevant.”

    I went on to say

    …on many issues the relevant scientific evidence is the only evidence, but on questions of origins that is not the case. The question of our origins is both a scientific and theological question so a correct examination of the issue will take into account both the theological and scientific evidence that is relevant to the question. To teach evolution is the true theory of origins one would have to show it is probable on all relevant evidence, and seeing science excludes relevant theological evidence from the discussion it cannot claim to have shown it’s true on all relevant evidence.

    Central to this argument is a distinction between all the relevant scientific evidence and all the relevant total evidence. The argument assumes that science, while a reliable method of gaining truth in many areas, is not the only source of reliable information we have about the world, that on certain topics we can also discover truths about the world through faith and revelation; hence, on these topics an accurate view of the world must utilise both sources of information.

    Ken was clearly displeased with this statement and labeled it the “other ways of knowing argument.” On his own site he asked me to respond to his criticisms; I will do so below.

    1. Much of Ken’s response to this appears to be based on a failure to grasp what I actually said. In the above citation I did not say that evolution was not true nor did I say evolution was not probable on all the relevant evidence. Everything I have said is entirely compatible with theistic evolution, where a person comes to a position based both on the scientific evidence and the theological reflection. I did not say, as Ken repeatedly attributes to me, that “theology trumps science” or that theological reflection is more reliable than science. What I said was that a theory which is probable on all the evidence, that is all the theological and all the scientific evidence, taken together, should be believed over a theory which is only probable on the scientific evidence alone. I also maintain the opposite is true; a theory which is probable on all relevant evidence, drawn from both theology and science should be believed over a theory which is supported by theological considerations alone.

    The issue then, is not that one discipline “trumps another,” it is that a theory is not worthy of consent unless it takes into account all the relevant information from both disciplines. I think that theological and scientific reflections are both reliable methods and our interpretation of both the theological and empirical data can be fallible.

    These clarifications address an awful lot of Ken’s argument such as his statement, “To assert today that we should revert to a pre-scientific era, that theology or philosophy should trump scientific knowledge, is to claim that mythology/logic/reason is more reliable than evidence.” Given that I never said that theology should trump science, this statement is irrelevant.

    Similarly, Ken’s claim that my position “is consistent with the Wedge strategy” is misleading. While it is true that my position is consistent with creationism, as I note above, it is also consistent with evolutionary theory. Contrary to what Ken thinks, the mere fact that two views are consistent provides no basis for linking the views together in a kind of guilt by association argument. Creationism is, after all, consistent with the view that Wellington is the capital of New Zealand; however, this does not mean that everyone who claims that Wellington is the capital believes that the world was created in six 24-hour days. Consider a less palatable example; Hitler’s belief in the superiority of the Aryan race is consistent with the claim that there is a city called Cairo this does not mean that anyone who remembers visiting Cairo is a Nazi.

    2. Ken’s response also appears marred by a failure to adequately understand the meaning of some philosophical terms I use. In the above citation I use the word “true,” Ken says, in response to my use of it, that “the word [truth] means different things to theologians, scientists and people on the street.” In fact, in the above citation I am using the standard Aristotelian concept of truth which is common to both disciplines. Aristotle stated, “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true.” By this definition the claim that the earth is round is true if the earth is, in fact, actually round, and it is false if the earth is, in fact, not round. Similarly in theology, the claim that God created the world ex nihilo is true if there is, in fact, a God and he did, in fact, create the physical universe out of nothing a finite period of time ago.

    Ken seems similarly confused about the meaning of the word “logic” and goes to great lengths to assert that “logic must follow evidence.” However, this simply shows he does not understand logic; logic is the study of rules of inference, that is, logic tells one how to deduce conclusions from evidence. Once this is realised, the claim that logic should follow evidence makes no sense. One cannot deduce or infer anything from evidence without logic in the first place.

    Similarly Ken’s suggestion that science is more reliable than logic is questionable. Science utilises logic to infer its conclusions from the empirical data; logic, therefore, is a presupposition of science that science needs if science is to conclude anything. Moreover, some axioms of logic clearly are more certain and reliable than many empirical claims, the claim, for example, that Both A and Not A cannot both be true, in the same sense, at the same time is more certain that speculations about how first life arose. Similarly with the rule modus tollens, something of which we can be relatively certain, which states: if A, then B, not B, therefore, not A.

    3. Putting aside these misinterpretations and philosophical mistakes, Ken’s main objection is,

    Implicit in the “different ways of knowing” argument, and hinted at by Matt in his comments, is the desire to change the science process to include theological “evidence” and claims that are not based on, or tested by, evidence. To give theology a “free pass.”

    Elsewhere he claims,

    It’s claiming a logic or justification for the theist belief without allowing the normal checking that should go with knowledge claims.”

    Here Ken raises a fairly standard argument:

    [1] that scientific claims differ from theological claims in that the former are empirically testable and the latter are not; [2] lack of testability disqualifies theological claims from being taken into account in theorising about the world.

    This argument is problematic and has been refuted numerous times in the literature; here I can be brief. Turning to [1] Larry Laudan notes “It is now widely acknowledged that many scientific claims are not testable in isolation, but only when embedded in part of a larger system of statements, some of whose consequences can be submitted to test.”[1] Take the claim that there is at least one electron in the universe. To test the truth of this claim we would need a theory about how electrons act under various conditions, what their predicted effects upon things would be and theories about how one could detect these effects if they occur and so on. Only with this kind of background information can we can use the relevant tools to test the predictions; however, in isolation, the claim that there is at least one electron is untestable.[2]

    Second, many theological claims are testable in precisely the same way. Take the claim made by Archbishop Usher that the world was created 6000 years ago. This claim is testable; we can muster empirical evidence to assess the age of the earth. The same is true for other theological claims; take the claim, for example, that the cosmos had a beginning in time, an implication of the theological views of St Augustine or that the universe is governed by laws that can only be discovered by empirical means, an implication of the voluntarist theology of the late middle ages or the claim made by 14th-15th century theologians that, contrary to some interpretations of Aristotlian physics, God did make the universe such that the earth orbited the sun or Augustine’s claim that God created the world with seed principles, via which, the whole creation of the universe could unfound over time or Bonaventure’s theologically based contention that the cosmology of his day was mistaken in claiming that the universe was infinitely old.

    Turning to [2] the suggestion that only testable claims can be utilised in answering a question about the world is also questionable. Ethical statements, such as, “it is wrong to cause pain just for entertainment” cannot be, by themselves, empirically tested yet in answering many questions about what we ought to do it is impossible to get an answer without appealing to them. Moreover, one cannot empirically test anything without presupposing some truths that themselves cannot be empirically established. Hume showed for example that it is impossible to non- circularly justify the reliability of inductive reasoning. William Alston has argued persuasively that one cannot empirically verify the reliability of one’s senses (the reason for this is quite obvious, to empirically demonstrate anything one needs to use one’s senses, and hence, one needs to presuppose the reliability of the source one is trying to prove the reliability of). It is hard to even conceive of a situation where basic axioms of logic, such as the law of non-contradiction, could be observably false. Yet science proceeds by presupposing the reliability of the senses, the reliability of inductive reasoning and the rules of logic.

    Ken’s central argument then is mistaken. His other arguments fair no better, such as his attempt to try to link my position with Stalinism;

    So what would the trumping of science by theology/philosophy be like? We have seen some disastrous examples. Such as Stalin’s promotion of Lysenko, trumping of science by Stalinist interpretations of Marxism-Leninism. This put Soviet genetic science back many years and led to the death and persecution of many scientists. In many ways the current theological/creationist/wedge attack on science is of a similar ilk to Stalinism.

    Apart from the fact that I did not espouse creationism or claim that theology trumps science, Ken here seems to think that telling state schools that they can teach a theory is true , as opposed to merely saying that it is the best scientific theory, is akin to arresting scientists, censoring their research, persecuting and executing them!

    Unfortunately, this logic can be turned on its head as the same logic would entail that refusal to teach Christian theology as the truth in state schools is akin to persecuting Christian theologians, censoring their research, persecuting them and executing them; hence, any atheist who objects to their children being taught religion at a state school is advocating some kind of quasi-Stalinist policy.

    Somewhat ironically, however, Ken makes some claims that if taken seriously suggest he is not adverse to religious persecution. Ken states that,

    He [Matt] argues that teaching evolution is actually teaching “fundamentalist children that their religious beliefs are false.” Well, of course that is a problem for fundamentalism, not science. We cannot ignore reality because some silly people are offended by it.

    Ken here implies that state schools should teach that a particular religious perspective is false if “that’s reality.” In other words, if a person’s religious beliefs really are false then it is not unjust for the state to teach this.

    Now as I stated in my original post and as I have repeated several times in correspondence with Ken, this argument is problematic. Both Ken and I agree that Islam is false, that Mohammad is not a prophet. If Ken’s claims were correct then, justice would require that the government run re-education programs for Muslim students telling them that Mohammad is not a prophet. After all, as Ken grants, “this is reality” and the religious sensibilities of other people cannot justify not teaching reality.

    Ken’s second argument is that to fail to tell children that evolution is true is “child abuse.” As I pointed out, however, if this were true then the many Muslim, Christian and Jewish parents who home school their kids with creationist texts or send their kids to private schools where creationism is taught should be arrested, charged with child abuse and punished at law on par with child abusers; further, their children should be placed in state care and sent to state re-education centres. The logical implication of both Ken’s arguments is religious persecution.

    Now I pointed both these points out to Ken when he raised them in previous discussions. Ken’s response was to apparently ignore the response and just repeat the argument. This, however, is not a rational response at all; simply repeating the same mantra over and over does not make it true.

    [1] Larry Laudan “Science at the Bar — Causes for Concern” Science, Technology and Human Values 7: 16-19.
    [2] For example see, Alvin Plantinga “Religion and Science” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Evolution should not be taught in State Schools: A Defence of Plantinga Part I
    Evolution should not be taught in State Schools: A Defence of Plantinga Part II

  • Evolution should not be taught in State Schools: A Defence of Plantinga Part II

    In Evolution should not be taught in State Schools: A Defence of Plantinga Part I, I articulated and defended Alvin Plantinga’s proposal that evolution should not be taught as “the sober truth” in state schools. In this post I will address what should be taught in state schools and look at Robert Pennock’s objections to this argument.

    Part II. Plantinga’s Proposal: What should be taught in State Schools?
    After drawing the above conclusion, Plantinga asks what should be taught regarding origins in state schools? He suggests two answers; the first is to teach nothing on matters of origins,

    One answer is to say: in a pluralistic society like ours, there is no fair way to teach anything about origins; hence public schools ought not to teach anything on that subject. They should instead stick to subjects where there isn’t disagreement at the level of religious or comprehensive beliefs. This would be just a reflection of a more general difficulty in having public schools of our sort in a pluralistic society. Perhaps, when the citizens get together to found a system of education, what they discover is that there is too much diversity of opinion to make it feasible.[1]

    The second, and perhaps more interesting answer, is to teach both evolution and creationism “conditionally,” Plantinga labels this as his “modest proposal.”[2] To explain this idea of teaching conditionally Plantinga introduces the technical notion of an epistemic base, “for each person P there is an epistemic base, EBP, with respect to which the probability or acceptability of proposed beliefs is to be evaluated.”[3] A person’s epistemic base contains at least four things. First it contains their “current beliefs;”[4] second, as “some beliefs are held more strongly than others,” it includes, “an index of degree of belief.”[5] Third, an epistemic base will include, “prescriptions as to how to conduct inquiry,” how to learn about world, revise beliefs, etc.[6] Fourth, it will include their comprehensive beliefs.[7] Plantinga emphasises that a persons epistemic base is not set in stone but revisable in light of argument.

    Plantinga notes that science, as currently practiced, respects a procedure known as methodological naturalism, “the policy of avoiding hypotheses that mention or refer to God or special acts on the part of God, or other supernatural phenomena, or hypotheses whose only support is the Bible, or some other alleged divine revelation.”[8] While there is dispute over whether science should do this, as currently practised, science does involve commitment to methodological naturalism.[9] This means that science operates with a particular epistemic base; while the epistemic base of science will include things such as logic, mathematics, various common-sense beliefs, there will be certain beliefs that will not go into the epistemic base for science (EBS) at least as currently practised, “Among these would be the belief that there is such a person as God, that God has created the world, and that God has created certain forms of life specially–human beings, perhaps, or the original forms of life, or for that matter sparrows and horses.”[10]

    Plantinga’s claim that evolution be taught conditionally then amounts to this: Evolution can be taught as the most probable theory relative to the current scientific epistemic base. This, he thinks, is uncontroversial and not likely to contradict anyone’s comprehensive beliefs; even a creationist, for example, can grant that, if one brackets various theological claims and operates on methodological naturalism then evolution is likely. What schools cannot do is teach that any particular epistemic base is the correct one to start from or that what follows from a particular epistemic base is true. Plantinga thinks that creationism could be taught in a similar conditional way in state schools.

    Pennock’s Critique of Plantinga
    Robert Pennock offers a critique of Plantinga’s position. Pennock contends that a rational person would not grant parents do not have the sort of prima facie rights Plantinga attributes to them. Instead, a rational person would advocate that evolution be taught as true and creationism or any other theological view be excluded from being taught in state schools.[11] He offers two arguments for this conclusion; the first is that,

    we all know parents who are bigots or ideologues and others who are simply narrow-minded or ignorant. … A good education may be a child’s only window to a clear picture of the world and to an open future. To agree to a basic right would be to close that window. This would be a serious harm for the children of such parents.[12]

    This is a bad argument; it is true that some parents are narrow minded. It is also true that some parents do not feed their children or neglect to clothe them or give them poor medical care; however, it would be grossly unjust to infer from this that no parent has even a prima facie right to clothe and feed their child or make medical decisions for them. Moreover, a parallel line of argument would entail that teachers, schools and governments cannot make education choices either. We are all familiar with teachers and government officials who are bigoted, corrupt and abuse their power. Taken consistently, Pennock’s views would entail that no one could make educational choices for children.

    The second and more substantial argument is that accepting parental rights would “gut the curriculum of state schools.”[13]Pennock notes,

    … there are thousands of special interests groups that would use such a right to prohibit the teaching of specific facts or even whole subjects they objected to. One does not have to look far to find parents who would object to teaching about racial equality, the facts of reproductive health, or that even that the earth is round. Only the utterly trivial could have a chance of escaping the gag of basic rights. No rational person would agree to such a policy.[14]

    Pennock here suggests Plantinga’s position would prevent anything being taught at state schools and he takes this as a reductio ad absurdum of the claim that parents have the kind of rights Plantinga contends they do. Three points can be made in response to this.[15]

    First, Pennock misconstrues Plantinga’s position. Plantinga’s view is that, “it is improper, unfair, to teach either creationism or evolution in the schools–that is so, at any rate for areas where a substantial proportion of the parents hold religious or comprehensive beliefs incompatible with either.” [Emphasis added][16] Consequently, it applies locally not globally. In a Native Indian reserve, for example, it would be unjust for state teaching of things that were contrary to the comprehensive beliefs of Native Indians.[17] It would not follow, however, that one could not teach these things in a school in New York, for example, where there are hardly any Native Indians who continue to believe these cultural practices.[18] Hence, the fact that almost everything is incompatible with someone’s comprehensive beliefs is irrelevant. Schools do not have to accommodate the views of everyone; they only need to accommodate the views in their area.

    Second, Plantinga stresses that parental rights are prima facie rights not absolute rights; they can be overridden in certain circumstances. Interestingly Plantinga alludes to one such circumstance in the very paper Pennock critiques,

    Of course a basic right is a prima facie right… The majority might also insist on teaching the denial of certain comprehensive views, Nazism, for example, in which case the fair thing to do would be to exclude the Nazis from the contract (and also exclude them from the tax liability).[19]

    Here Plantinga considers the very examples Pennock raised; situations where a minority has bizarre or repugnant views which the majority feel compelled to warn their own children about and it is clear that in such situations one does not need to adopt a gag rule for all state schools. One simply establishes a state school based on the views of the majority in the area in question and grants the minority freedom to opt out of these schools and an exemption from education taxation.

    Third, suppose that Pennock is correct and there is too much disagreement over comprehensive views to have a state school system and also respect the rights Plantinga attributes to parents, does it follow that we should not respect parental rights? Not at all, an alternative is to not have state schools; Plantinga notes, “Perhaps, when the citizens get together to found a system of education, what they discover is that there is too much diversity of opinion to make it feasible.”[20] An alternative could be to establish a network of private schools where parents could choose which school meets the needs of their children, basing their decisions in part on their comprehensive beliefs.[21] Some private schools could teach evolution and others could choose not to and parents could choose which ones to send their children to.

    In other words, if it is true that it is impossible to have a centralised state education system and accord parents prima facie rights of the sort Plantinga suggests, then that is an argument against having a centralised state education system. It is not, as Pennock suggests, a compelling argument against parental rights.

    Conclusion
    I conclude then that Plantinga’s position is defensible. Regardless of whether evolution is true or empirically founded it is unjust to teach the children of parents who have theological objections to evolution that it is true. State schools which have a sizeable clientele who hold such views should teach it only conditionally or not at all. Alternatively, the government should allow these people to opt out of state education and grant them a tax rebate.

    [1] Alvin Plantinga “Creation and Evolution: A Modest Proposal” in Robert Pennock Ed Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics: Philosophical, Theological and Scientific Perspectives (Cambridge, The MIT Press – Bradford Books, 2001) 787.
    [2] Ibid 789.
    [3] Ibid 787.
    [4] Ibid.
    [5] Ibid.
    [6] Ibid.
    [7] Ibid.
    [8] Ibid, 788.
    [9] Alvin Plantinga “Methodological Naturalism?” Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith49 (1997) 143-154; M Ruse “Methodological Naturalism Under Fire” South African Journal of Philosophy 24(1)(2005) 44-60.
    [10] Plantinga “Creation and Evolution: A Modest Proposal” 788.
    [11] Robert Pennock “Should Creationism Be Taught in Public Schools?” Science & Education 11(2) (2002) 111-133.
    [12] Ibid 129.
    [13] Ibid 128.
    [14] Ibid 127.
    [15] I am grateful to Alvin Plantinga for his helpful comments here.
    [16] Plantinga “Creation and Evolution: A Modest Proposal” 786.
    [17] Ibid 782.
    [18] Alvin Plantinga suggested this example in correspondence
    [19] Plantinga “Creation and Evolution: A Modest Proposal” 782.
    [20] Ibid 787.
    [21] Here again I am grateful to Alvin Plantinga for confirming this suggestion.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Evolution should not be taught in State Schools: A Defence of Plantinga Part I

  • Evolution should not be taught in State Schools: A Defence of Plantinga Part I

    In this two-part series I will sketch and defend Alvin Plantinga’s proposal that evolution should not be taught as “the sober truth” in state schools. In Part I, I will sketch Plantinga’s position and the arguments he provides for it; in Part II, I will look at what should be taught and then I’ll defend this position against the most significant critique offered of it by Robert Pennock. I have developed this position partly out of reading and reflecting on the published debate between these two men but also through correspondence with Alvin Plantinga over the issue.

    Part I. The Argument against Teaching Evolution in State Schools
    Arguably the most sophisticated argument against teaching evolution in state schools has been made by Alvin Plantinga. Plantinga begins by offering a couple of qualifications; first, Plantinga’s inquiry is limited to whether evolution should be taught in the state schools of countries that display significant pluralism and diversity of opinion.[1] This would include, not just Plantinga’s own country, the United States of America but also New Zealand. Second, Plantinga limits his inquiry to whether “evolution should be taught as the sober truth of the matter” [Emphasis mine][2] as opposed to “the best current scientific hypothesis, or what accords best or is most probable (epistemically probable) with respect to the appropriate scientific evidence base.”[3] Plantinga’s conclusion is that it is unjust to teach evolution in this way. His argument proceeds in three stages.

    First Plantinga notes that American (and the same is true of New Zealand) society is “radically pluralistic; and here I am thinking in particular of the plurality of religious and quasi-religious views.”[4] Following John Rawls, he calls these religious and quasi-religious views “’comprehensive’ beliefs… deep ways of understanding ourselves and our world, other deep ways of interpreting ourselves and our world to ourselves.”[5]

    Second, Plantinga suggests that with state schools, “It is as if we are all party to a sort of implicit contract: we recognize the need to train and educate our children, but don’t have the time or competence to do it individually. We therefore get together to hire teachers to help instruct and educate our children, and together we pay for this service by way of tax money.”[6] However, given that “[for] most citizens, these comprehensive beliefs are of enormous importance… some even thinking that one’s eternal welfare is tied up with accepting them, parents will typically want their children to be educated into what they take to be the true and correct comprehensive beliefs;”[7] This, however, raises an immediate question of fairness,

    It would clearly be unfair, unjust, for the school, which we all support, to teach one set of religious beliefs as opposed to another–to teach that evangelical Christianity, for example, is the truth. This would be unfair to those citizens who are party to the contract and whose comprehensive beliefs–Judaism, naturalism, Islam, whatever–are incompatible with evangelical Christianity.[8]

    From these points Plantinga argues that parents possess what he calls a basic right that, “each of the citizen’s party to the contract has the right to not have comprehensive beliefs taught to their children that contradict their own comprehensive beliefs.”[9] A basic right expresses a prima facie right not an absolute right; that is, it is a right which can be overridden by other considerations. Teaching evolution clearly violates a basic right; a significant proportion of people hold comprehensive religious views, views that contradict evolution. Hence, their rights are being violated if evolution is taught as true in state schools. It follows then, that in the absence of other considerations, teaching evolution in state schools is unjust.

    The final step in Plantinga’s argument is to contend that, in the case of evolution, there are no other considerations that override this prima facie right. Commenting on a defence of the teaching of evolution made by Robert Pennock, Plantinga identifies two considerations made in favour of teaching evolution. The first is that evolutionary theory is true; the second is that it is an empirically supported theory, the best supported theory of origins in the biological sciences.

    In response to the first consideration Plantinga notes that even if evolution is true, it does not follow that it is just to teach it as true in a pluralistic society.

    Suppose Christianity is in fact true, as indeed I believe it is, would that mean that it is fair to teach it in public schools where most of the citizens, citizens who support those schools, are not Christians and reject Christian comprehensive beliefs? I should think not; that would clearly be unfair, and the fact that the system of beliefs in question is true would not override the unfairness.[10]

    Plantinga’s response to the second consideration is more nuanced. Plantinga has not claimed that evolution cannot be taught as “the best current scientific hypothesis, or what accords best or is most probable (epistemically probable) with respect to the appropriate scientific evidence base,”[11] his claim is that it should not be taught as true. The fact that evolution is the best scientific theory does not, by itself, entail that it is true. To get the conclusion that evolution is true one needs to conjoin the claim that evolution is the best scientific theory of origins with an epistemological claim that Plantinga labels PC,

    (PC) The right way to answer questions of empirical fact–for example questions about the origin of life, the age of the earth, whether human beings have evolved from earlier forms of life–is by way of science, or scientific method.[12]

    Plantinga notes that PC is not an empirical or scientific claim; it is rather a claim of philosophy or epistemology. Second, PC is a claim that contradicts the comprehensive beliefs of many parents. Hence, to justify teaching evolution as true, as opposed to just the best scientific hypothesis, educators would have to go beyond the mere scientific empirical evidence and teach substantive philosophical views that contradict the comprehensive views of parents.[13]

    Plantinga concludes that the considerations put forward to override the prima facie rights of parents do not override these rights, hence, “is that it is improper, unfair, to teach either creationism or evolution in the schools–that is so, at any rate for areas where a substantial proportion of the parents hold religious or comprehensive beliefs incompatible with either.”[14]

    In my next post, Evolution should not be taught in State Schools: A Defence of Plantinga Part II, I will look at what should be taught in state schools and I’ll address Robert Pennock’s criticisms of the position.

    [1] Alvin Plantinga “Creation and Evolution: A Modest Proposal” in Robert Pennock Ed Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics: Philosophical, Theological and Scientific Perspectives (Cambridge, The MIT Press – Bradford Books, 2001) 779.
    [2] Ibid.
    [3] Ibid.
    [4] Ibid 780.
    [5] Ibid; John Rawls Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993)
    [6] Ibid, 781.
    [7] Ibid.
    [8] Ibid.
    [9] Ibid, 780.
    [10] Ibid, 784.
    [11] Ibid, 779.
    [12] Ibid, 786.
    [13] Ibid.
    [14] Ibid.

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  • Rest In Peace Richard Neuhaus

    It is with sadness that I have just read that Richard John Neuhaus died on Thursday the 8th of January at age 72. There are various obituaries here

    For those New Zealand readers who won’t know. Neuhaus was a Lutheran turned Catholic priest who wrote and commented extensively on issues of religion and public life. His book The Naked Public Square was an important work challenging the modern liberal notion that religion should be privatised and not be utilised in public debate. Neuhaus was was a long time civil rights activist who marched in the civil rights movement, against Vietnam, and became a leading intellectual in the Neo Conservative movement. The journal he edited First Things brought together Jewish, Catholic and Protestant scholars with a conservative bent and produced some of the some of the most thoughtful and insightful commentary on issues related to religion and public life that I have read.

    Neuhaus and his excellent and often sarcastically witty columns will be missed.

  • Some More Thoughts on Religion and Public Life: Robert Audi’s Critique of Wolterstorff

    In two earlier posts, I discussed John Rawls’ defence of the contention that theological premises should be bracketed or excluded from public discourse. In particular, I appropriated the criticisms of Rawls’s position made by Nicholas Wolterstorff.

    In “Wolterstorff on Religion, Politics, and the Liberal State” in Religious Beliefs in the Public Square, Robert Audi argues that Wolterstorff’s conclusion is mistaken. He argues that Rawls’ position is more qualified than Wolterstorff appears to think. Audi points out that Rawls is only, “speaking above all about coercive state power in relation to matters of basic justice, not about every political issue. … Moreover, the emphasis is not on actual agreement, … but on its realistic possibility given rationality.”[1] [Emphasis original] Audi suggests that concerning issues of constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice there are “some very basic moral intuitions that are common to mature rational adults who are conscientiously devoted to living together in harmony”.[2]

    However, Wolterstorff has not just argued that public reason is problematic because it will not deliver actual agreement. His argument was that such agreement was not a realistic possibility. He said, “It would be utterly unreasonable” for a person using Rawls’ method to “expect anything else than disagreement”. Wolterstorff claims that agreement is not a realistic possibility because while some will agree, some will not. “[T]he reasonable thing … to expect is not that all reasonable people who use their common reason will agree with … [the] results, but that not all reasonable people will agree.”

    Audi’s other points seem to be that Rawls limits his position to “basic issues of justice” and “constitutional essentials” and that on these matters agreement is a realistic possibility. However, I noted above that on many substantive matters there is not a realistic possibility of agreement. The question then needs to be asked, are these matters of basic justice or constitutional essentials? If they are, then Audi’s position appears false. On these types of matters, it is simply not true that there are sufficient common sets of intuitions for a reasonable hope of agreement to occur.

    On the other hand, if these are not matters of basic justice or constitutional essentials then Rawls’ position lacks any bite. If, for example, the question of feticide is not a question of basic justice or constitutional essentials then Rawls’s position entails no objection to appeals to divine law on this topic. It is only on constitutional essentials and basic justice that such appeals are wrong and this is not such an issue.

    Note that if Audi is correct here, much of the sting is taken out of Rawls’ position. One cannot appeal to comprehensive doctrines in contexts where there is widespread agreement on basic issues; one can only appeal to such doctrines where there is widespread disagreement. Therefore, on deeply contentious issues like abortion, euthanasia, homosexual rights, etc appeals to divine law are perfectly appropriate. Appeals to divine law are only wrong when there is widespread consensus amongst rational people.

    However, Wolterstorff does address this issue in the article Audi refers to. In “The Role of Religion in Political Issues” Wolterstorff states, “if my using reasons that I know you do not endorse really does constitute my not treating you as equal, then it constitutes that whether or not the issue is constitutional essentials or matters of basic justice”.[3] On this, he seems correct. Consequently, if Rawls’ claims about why one should bracket comprehensive beliefs on such matters are cogent then we should bracket them on other matters as well. This would of course mean that on many questions of public debate, if not most, no answers would be forthcoming. Moreover, as Wolterstorff himself points out, it would mean one could not appeal to the values of political liberalism either. Liberalism presumably is a comprehensive doctrine so again Rawls position would be rendered incoherent.[4]

    On the other hand, if Rawls’s reasons for bracketing comprehensive beliefs are incorrect with regards to non-constitutional matters, if on these issues of coercive legislation one can appeal to theological beliefs that are rejected by rational people yet not disrespect them, then it is hard to see how they can become incorrect just because the topic has changed. Hence, it is doubtful that Rawls can limit his restriction in the way he wants to and given this, all the problems of applying public reason to non-constitutional issues apply with full force.

    These responses all assume Audi’s contention that on matters of basic justice and constitutional essentials, agreement between reasonable people can be reasonably expected. Audi bases this claim upon a rhetorical question.

    But is there not a strong consensus, at least among citizens of democratic societies, that justice requires not only equal protection of the laws but also laws that protect liberty, including political and religious liberty and freedom of speech, up to a certain level? There are of course disagreements on matters of detail…[5]

    The problem here is that each of these examples involves appeal to an ambiguous and vague notion. However, as soon as an attempt is made to fill out these concepts with substantive content the apparent consensus disappears.

    Consider the example of freedom of speech. Audi notes that most people agree that there should be freedom of speech, however, what does this mean? Free from what? From prior restraint? From the initiation of force? From no restraint upon content but not upon the manner of expression? Is this a negative freedom so that it forbids merely coercive attempts to prevent speaking? Is it a positive freedom so that the state has a duty to provide public funds to subsidise expression? Reasonable people can be expected to disagree on the answers to these questions. Moreover, these are not just matters of detail, they are disagreements over the very meaning of the term ‘freedom’ in the phrase ‘freedom of speech’. It may be true that people use the same terms but the substantive content and the meaning that they understand the terms to denote differs widely.

    Similar disagreement arises over what sort of speech is referred to in the term ‘freedom of speech’. Does it include a right to engage in hate speech? Does it include speech denying the Holocaust occurred? What about racist and sexist speech? Does it include speech that is blasphemous or defamatory? Again, reasonable people disagree; not only do they disagree over the meaning of the term “freedom” they also disagree over what types of speech one is free to engage in.[6]

    I think the same thing occurs concerning freedom of religion. In his book Foreordained Failure, Steven Smith demonstrates that there is no such thing as a right to freedom of religion. Instead there is a spectrum of views about religious tolerance that comes in degrees; no state tolerates all religious sects and very few states tolerate none. He notes that Aquinas, Cromwell, Locke and Mill all advocated and defended forms of religious tolerance. However, each disagreed as to which religions such tolerance should apply to and the proper limits upon those they disagreed with.[7]

    Smith argues further that these differing accounts of freedom of religion all depended upon comprehensive views and one cannot adjudicate between them without appeal to such views. Attempts to articulate a right to freedom of religion from a neutral or public stance are quite hopeless.[8] Similar things can be said about the idea of ‘equality’ within the term ‘equal protection of the laws’. Hence, it appears that even on these issues of basic justice and constitutional essentials public reason will not utilise principles that all reasonable people can be expected to endorse, nor will one be able to get very far without utilising comprehensive doctrines of some sort.

    I think the difficulties Rawls’ position faces are illustrative of a general problem with the dialectic over theological beliefs in the public square. If one attempts to exclude theological beliefs from public discourse, because reasonable people can reject them, then secular comprehensive beliefs must also be excluded as reasonable people can and do reject secular beliefs. If one does not exclude secular beliefs then special pleading is going on. If one does exclude both secular and religious beliefs then what is left will be insufficiently thick to address many public issues. One would have to appeal to some comprehensive belief to answer the questions that one faces but such restrictions upon comprehensive beliefs would render one’s position incoherent.

    [1] Robert Audi, “Wolterstorff on Religion, Politics, and the Liberal State,” in Religion in the Public Square; The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate, ed. Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 1997), 133-134.
    [2] Ibid., 134.
    [3] Wolterstorff, “The Role of Religion in Political Issues,” Religion in the Public Square; The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate, ed. Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 1997), 106.
    [4] Ibid.
    [5] Audi, “Wolterstorff on Religion, Politics, and the Liberal State,” 132.
    [6] Ibid. Audi argues that in these types of situations one means substantially the same thing by the term, agrees on the paradigms of its application and yet offer differing definitions. This is because “providing definitions is a demanding task” and “many different definitions can be applied to the same finite range of cases”. However, this misconstrues the situation. As noted it is not that these people use the term the same way but that they use it and understand it in a very different way. They disagree over the paradigms and hold to a different range of finite cases even if there is some overlap between them.
    [7] Steven Smith, Foreordained Failure: The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
    [8] Ibid.

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