Category: Political Philosophy

  • Against Liberal Morality

    In debates over abortion, homosexual conduct, euthanasia, prostitution, drugs. Those who call themselves liberals often mount the same basic argument. A socially or morally permissive stance is necessitated towards such practices because people have a right to choose do what ever they like with their bodies. As Mill put it,

    The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. [1] [Emphasis added]

    Mill here draws a distinction between other-regarding actions, actions that harm other people and self-regarding actions, those that harm oneself. He argues that society, either by law or by social pressure, cannot justly regulate any action a person performs unless it is other-regarding; that is, it harms people other than the agent him/herself. As Mill’s position is typically interpreted harm is understood to be governed by the principle “volenti non fit injuria” (where there is consent there is no injury) and hence refers to things done to other people without their consent. On this interpretation, self-regarding actions are those that people consent to and that harm no non-consenting, third party. As Mill himself notes, a self-regarding action is that “which affects only himself, or affects others with their free and voluntary, and undeceived consent”.[2]

    Perhaps one of the more important counter-examples to this criterion is that of Gladiatorial Matches. Irving Kristol famously proposed this counter-example,

    [T]he plain fact is that none of us is a complete civil libertarian. We all believe that there is some point at which the public authorities ought to step in to limit the “self-expression” of an individual or group even where this might be seriously intended as a form of artistic expression, and even where the artistic transaction is between consenting adults. A playwright or theatrical director might, in this crazy world of ours, find someone willing to commit suicide on stage, as called for by the script. We would not allow that-any more than we would permit scenes of real physical torture on the stage, even if the victim were a willing masochist. And I know of no one, no matter how free in spirit, who argues that we ought to permit gladiatorial contests in Yankee stadium, similar to those once performed in the Coliseum of Rome-even if only consenting adults were involved.[3]

    Kristol notes several cases of unjust homicide, homicide that any person of common sense would condemn but where the victims all consent to be killed.

    In Harmless Wrongdoing Feinberg considers this as the most important and potentially-devastating counter-example and he spends considerable energy attempting to circumvent it. He offers three responses. Here I will argue that these responses fail.

    (a) Consent
    The first response is to question whether, in fact, such cases are really cases of consensual homicide. Feinberg suggests that Kristol is too complacent about “the problem of determining genuine ‘willingness’ and voluntary ‘consent’”.[4] He offers two lines of argument for this. Firstly, he notes that Kristol refers to such things happening in this “crazy world”. Feinberg states, “an agreement is hardly consensual if one of the parties is “crazy”. To exploit a crazy person in the way he describes is not distinguishable from murder”.[5]

    Feinberg is, of course, correct; people who are crazy in the sense of insane are not competent moral agents. However, it is doubtful that Kristol is, in fact, speaking of people who are crazy in the literal sense of the word. His reference is a colloquial comment on the kinds of depravity people will engage in if given the freedom to do so.[6]

    The second reason Feinberg offers is that if gladiatorial matches existed today one would need various mechanisms to ensure consent was actual; such licensing procedures would render the contests unobjectionable. Under the conditions necessary to discern consent, Feinberg suggests that both the contestants and the audience would agree to a set of rules that held that the contest must stop once one fighter has clearly gained his or her dominance.

    This response is inadequate. It is unclear why contestants would agree to these provisions. Why, for example, could they not agree to a free for all or a fight to the death? Arneson notes, “Feinberg has projected a bit of his own nice character onto the world at large” and correctly adds “Feinberg’s liberal principles non-tendentiously applied would hold that we ought to let the free market decide how horrific or bloody the contests should become”.[7]

    Moreover, Arneson adds that even if the contestants and audience did agree to such rules, it is hard to see why the practice would then become unobjectionable.

    Feinberg’s response contains the disturbing suggestion that a state-regulated version of Kristol’s gory spectacles would be acceptable to the liberal … so long as some analogue of the Marquis of Queensberry rules is enforced (no bludgeoning your opponent when he is down; no slashing below the belt; no disembowelling your opponent once he surrenders), commercial combat with lethal weapons should in principle be tolerated by a liberal society. Many would consider this a reductio of the liberal position.[8]

    At one point in the discussion, Feinberg appears aware that it is a stretch to suggest that such matches could not be consensual.

    There could be a presumption that such a person doesn’t fully understand what he is doing, or is not fully free of neurotic influences on his choice, but these hypotheses are rebuttable in principle, and in some cases that we can easily imagine, only with minor difficulty and expense rebuttable in fact. The liberals second and third responses then are the more pertinent ones.[9]

    It is to these I now turn.

    (b) Harm to Third Parties
    Feinberg’s second attempt to circumvent Kristol’s counter-example is to argue that this case would inevitably involve harm to non-consenting, third parties. Reflecting upon the audience in a gladiatorial match Feinberg suggests,

    We cannot hold an image of these wretches in our minds without recoiling, for each of them alone will seem threatening or dangerous, and thousands or millions of them together will be downright terrifying. … When the bloody maiming and slaughtering of a human being is considered so thrilling and enjoyable that thousands will pay dearly to witness it, it would seem to follow that thousands are already so brutalized that there is a clear and present danger that some innocent parties (identities now unknown) will suffer at their hands.[10][Emphasis original]

    Like the former, this response is inadequate. First, the claim that such an activity will lead to the deaths of innocent, third parties is an empirical one. Feinberg simply asserts that it is correct but offers no evidence to prove this. In the absence of such evidence, the claim is speculative.

    A second problem reinforces this. The people killed in gladiatorial matches consent to the fight; the innocent third parties Feinberg mentions do not. In order for enthusiasm for death and killing in a gladiatorial match to spill over into the killing of innocents, fans of such matches must be unable to distinguish between consensual and non-consensual killing so that they are unable to limit their enthusiasm for one without endorsing the other.

    This assumption is implausible. For example, permitting people to engage in and enjoy consensual sodomy does not necessarily mean that those people will engage in sodomous rape. Allowing the consensual use of drugs will not mean that all drug users will then coerce others into drug use. Allowing people to watch pornography would not result in all people forcing others to have sex. Perhaps, even closer to the issue under discussion, allowing people to watch boxing matches does not appear to lead them to inevitably engage in assault. Why then should allowing people to watch consensual homicide lead them to engage in non-consensual homicide?

    (c) Bloated Mouse
    The final response Feinberg proposes is that these counter-examples are what he calls “a bloated mouse”.[11] He concedes that in cases like these we do have a case of unjust homicide that is consensual. However, he suggests cases like this are hypothetical, “[t]here seems little likelihood that they will ever occur, at least in the foreseeable future”.[12]

    It is worth noting that Feinberg again relies upon an unsubstantiated, empirical claim. He asserts, without any reason, that gladiator matches are unlikely to occur at all in the foreseeable future but why think this? Dueling to the death was practiced for centuries. People clearly have been willing to engage in such activities and did so for many years. Moreover, it is also plausible that people would choose to watch such spectacles, even ordinary people. Public executions were popular as late as the nineteenth century, suggesting that people are willing, if allowed, to watch real death and violence. The practice of the circuses in a civilised culture such as Rome shows the appeal of watching such spectacles. There appears no reason for thinking that such an activity is unlikely to occur at all given the history of the human race.

    Interestingly, Feinberg admits this elsewhere in his monograph. In a footnote he notes that the example of gladiatorial contests is no worse and in some respects better, than some forms of commercial brawling that exist in the U.S. He then cites disapprovingly the examples of “tough guy” contests where people fight bar-room brawls with no holds barred, no rules and often on racial lines. The sources he quotes note that such contests are popular, “the newest rage in spectator entertainment”.[13] It is hard to understand then why Feinberg thinks that such things are unlikely to occur in the future.

    ***

    It seems then the Feinberg fails to escape the counter example proposed by Kristol. Liberal Morality provides no basis for condemning blood sports and Gladiator matches and as such it is inadequate.

    [1] John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: Penguin Classics, 1985), 69.
    [2] Ibid. 71.
    [3] Irving Kristol “Pornography, Obscenity and the Case for Censorship” New York Times Magazine March 28 1971.
    [4] Feinberg Harmless Wrong Doing: Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. 4. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 127
    [5] Ibid. 130.
    [6] This highlights another feature of Feinberg’s discussion. Feinberg appears to find it difficult to accept that a sane person would ever choose to engage in the depraved activities outlined in various counter examples. However, if one believes that human beings are capable of evil then much of what he says is implausible.
    [7] Arneson “Liberalism, Freedom and Community” 373, 374.
    [8] Ibid. 374.
    [9] Feinberg Harmless Wrong Doing: 130.
    [10] Ibid. 131.
    [11] Ibid. 130.
    [12] Ibid.
    [13] Ibid. 353.

  • Kiwisaver or why I am not a centrist

    A little while ago a friend and I were discussing New Zealand politics with an American associate. My friend spoke of how he was an economic centrist and I informed him I was not. The topic got to kiwisaver, a policy with which he agreed. I thought his comments were interesting. Basically he cited anecdotal evidence to support the contention that many New Zealanders do not save money. He then noted that kiwisaver will mean that they do, seeing this was a good result one should support kiwisaver. The conversation was prematurely ended. But I thought my friend had revealed something important about how social policies are often justified in New Zealand.

    Now let’s assume for the sake of argument that the conclusion he supported with anecdotal evidence is also supported with empirical evidence and is also true. The argument then is something like this:

    [1] Kiwisaver results in more people saving

    [2] A policy that results in more people saving is justified

    Therefore

    [3] Kiwisaver is justified

    Now this argument is formally, valid and I have granted that [1] is true. However, [2] is clearly flawed. To see why imagine the following; suppose that one discovered that you could convince people to save by threatening to kill them if they did not. A state policy of issuing such threats would therefore bring about more people saving, and hence by [2] be justified. But such a policy is not justified, why? Because it achieves this good result by unlawful means; by threatening violence against innocent people consequently, the fact a policy results in my people saving by it’s self is insufficient to justify it.

    It seems then that [2] needs amending, what is needed is something like

    [2’] A policy that results in more people saving, and achieves this by lawful means is justified

    But now [1] and [2] do not entail [3], to entail [3], [1] needs to be amended to [1’]

    [1’] kiwi saver results in more people saving and achieves this by lawful means

    However, the problem now is that affirming [1’] is not justified by the evidence I granted for the sake of argument above. There I assumed that the evidence suggested that Kiwisaver resulted in more people saving. This does not show us that it does this by lawful means, this latter claim is a moral or normative claim not an empirical or sociological one.

    Moreover not only is [1’] not supported by the evidence, I am inclined to think that [1’] is false. We need to remember that kiwisaver is taxpayer funded. What does this mean? It means that kiwisaver works this way. Person P signs a contract with another person Q where Q agrees to pay P in exchange for labour. The state however, steps in and threatens P, telling him that if he does not give the government some of the money he has worked for and is entitled to by contract the government will separate him from his wife and kids and lock him up (violate his liberty). In other words Kiwisaver achieves its goals by threatening violence against others. Threatening to violate there liberty rights if they do not comply.

    Don’t get me wrong here, I am not an anarchist; I am not saying that the state is never justified in threatening people or taking their life liberty or property. What I do think however is that one needs justification for this. If we are to avoid tyranny, then it cannot be the case that the state can just do this whenever some good consequence or cause would be furthered by doing so. Policies like kiwisaver appear to be premised on the denial of this principle they suggest that merely helping others save is sufficient justification for threatening others with violence.

    This is why I am not a centrist, and why I am not a leftwinger. While the left claim to be opposed to violence they really are not. They in fact have a very low threshold of opposition to opposing violence and are willing to use it for almost any reason at all. The left tend to oppose violence when its being used against criminals, such is in cases of capital punishment or in just wars where aggressive or tyrannical regimes are being resisted by force. However, when it comes to innocent people, people who have committed no crimes the left will justify violence for almost any reason. If a policy has a good consequence, such as helping people save, or helping a person educate there children, or helping people artists paint a picture, or whatever, they will allow the state to threaten innocent people to do so.

    I find this morally perverse, justice requires distinguishing between the innocent and the guilty, those who are threatening others and those who are not. A just state concentrates threats of violence and if necessary uses violence against the latter and not the former. The state can collect taxes for this purpose but it cannot threaten people for any reason it likes no matter how socially useful such violence may be. Yet the political left have distorted our culture that people now, apparently in large numbers, will justify threatening their law abiding neighbour to help them save money.

    This opposition to violence, and wanting it limited by principle is central to me; My faith in fact teaches that God opposes such violence and we have a sacred duty to avoid it. This is why I oppose killing unborn children who are not threatening the lives of their mothers. It’s why I do not oppose executing criminals or fighting in just wars, and it’s why I oppose economic policies that justify threatening people with violence and utilise coercion to bring about monetary or economic gain. Violence must be used to punish the guilty and protect the innocent from attack. Not turned against the innocent for social gain.

    And that is why I am not a centrist. If opposing arbitrary violence against the innocent makes me a “rightwing extremist” so be it.

  • Sanctions and Siege Warfare

    Helen Clark has announced that the New Zealand government will not be sending troops to Fiji. We will, however, impose economic sanctions, including a reduction of aid.

    I agree with Clark about militarily intervention. I believe that a state has the right to wage war only to defend those living with in its boarders from attack. A state’s authority to use coercion to uphold justice is limited to its borders.

    Just as a state has no right to prosecute a person for committing a crime committed outside NZ or to make laws regulating peoples behaviour beyond its shores, it has no duty to defend people in other countries.

    However, it seems to me that replacing military action with sanctions is questionable. First, sanctions are in fact a type of warfare, a form of siege warfare. Where a person instead of fighting the enemy directly attempts to force a surrender by cutting off supplies and starving the populace into submission. (Not suggesting that Helen intends to see the people of Fiji starve – making a general point about what siege warfare entails.)

    Secondly, siege warfare of this type is unjust. In a just war one targets enemy combatants – a military intervention would do this. The NZ army would go in and kill the military who are carrying out the coup and would not deliberately target innocent civilians. Sanctions do not do this. The entire population is deprived of aid and support including women, children, the poor, etc. Sanctions work in the same way terrorism does, one attempts to force a government to change by causing innocent civilians to suffer and essentially blackmailing them into submission.

    Also sanctions infringe the rights of New Zealand citizens to freely dispose of their own lawfully acquired property. New Zealanders will be told that they cannot sell to another person because of his race (in this case Fijian race) and because some other person of the same race has behaved unjustly. This is the mentality of the KKK.

    Moreover, for a government to tell private sports clubs who they can and cannot play cricket and rugby with is stepping well outside the bounds of its lawful authority.

    If one wants to harm and hurt people then hurt those who are guilty, send in the troops. If one cannot justify this then one cannot justify harming innocent third parties by depriving them of aid and support and preventing others freely giving it to them.

  • Democracy and Legitimacy

    The founding statement of liberal political theory, John Locke’s Two Treaties of Civil Government, opens with the following statement:

    Reader, thou hast here the beginning and end of a discourse concerning government; what fate has otherwise disposed of the papers that should have filled up the middle, and were more than all the rest, it is not worth while to tell thee. These, which remain, I hope are sufficient to establish the throne of our great restorer, our present King William; to make good his title, in the consent of the people, which being the only one of all lawful governments, he has more fully and clearly, than any prince in Christendom; and to justify to the world the people of England, whose love of their just and natural rights, with their resolution to preserve them, saved the nation when it was on the very brink of slavery and ruin.

    Locke states his purpose in writing is to defend a military coup. Locke goes on to argue that a government derives its powers from the consent of the government for the purpose of protecting the rights of its citizens. Specifically a citizen’s right to life, liberty and property. He argues that if a government turns against these rights the people can justly overthrow it.

    The US declaration of independence reiterates this claim.

    We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from
    the consent of the governed. That whenever any form of government becomes destructive to these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.

    Two of the founding documents for liberal democracy maintain that a government can be legitimately overthrown if it uses its powers to infringe, as opposed to protect, the rights of its citizens. In some instances, the military have a duty to do this; often the military have sworn duty to defend the rights of its citizens with force. If the government begins to threaten these rights then this duty means the military have a duty to resist the government with force. This is not some crackpot, novel idea, it is part of our liberal heritage, it is also incidentally part of our Christian heritage. Aquinas argued in a similar vein, as did numerous Puritan writers such as Mornay, Rutherford, Milton, Buchanan.

    I say this because at 7:30 PM tonight on Campbell live a military coup was announced in Fiji. The immediate reaction from every commentator I saw was one of disgust because a democratically elected government had been overthrown. Now I am not saying I agree with the coup, I am quite willing to concede that the Military are acting unjustly. However, the mere fact that the government of Fiji was democratically elected does not mean its wrong to over throw them with a coup. If the government uses its power to punish the guilty with proportionate and humane punishments and they defend the rights of the innocent against aggression then I agree it is unjust to over throw them. But if the government of Fiji has used its power to deprive innocent people of there rights and to acquit those guilty of crimes then in certain circumstances the military are within their rights in staging a coup. The fact that the government was lawfully elected is irrelevant.

    When commentators in the media claim that a coup is wrong because the government is elected. They are in essence promoting the tyranny of the majority. They are suggesting that we have a duty of unqualified obedience to any leader which 51% of our peers support on election day, regardless of what this government does or orders us to do. They are deifying the majority and placing a democratic government in the place of God.

    A state’s legitimacy depends on what it does, not on how many people support it or how popular it is the year of an election. If upholds the law of God and the rights this law confers upon us it is worthy of support. If it turns against these, it is not. God and God alone is the only person worthy of unqualified obedience.

  • Real Charity is Voluntary

    A friend recently e-mailed me a link to this article.

    It points out that religious conservatives give more money to charities that assist the poor than liberals do. If the data is correct, it highlights an issue I came to realise several years ago.

    Consider two situations (a) and (b). In (a) my neighbour is in need, I take out my chequebook and give him some money; in (b) my neighbour is in need I take out a gun put it at another’s neighbours head and say to him, give that guy your money or else.

    As a Christian, I advocate the former. Those on the political left, while claiming to support the former, frequently support the latter (the gun being the force of the state and the means taxation).

    These two are clearly not the same, the first is generous, voluntary giving the second is violence against others.

    However, so often in discussing this issue with other evangelicals (a) and (b) are conflated. I am told that because we have a duty to give charitably to the poor we have a duty to support socialist welfare programs. This is a non sequitur. Failure to be attuned to this distinction means that genuine desire to assist the needy is misguidedly thrown in behind acts of state-sanctioned violence and threats against innocent people.

    Surely, the real test of virtue is what you are willing to do with your own money in the absence of a gun being held to your head and not what you want the state to force others to do with theirs.

  • In Remembrance of the Religious Right

    British politics was divided between the Whigs (Liberals) and the Tories (Conservatives). The Tories were shocked at the violence and atrocities of foreign leftest regimes. Into this fray entered an ultra conservative religious sect who railed against the perceived immorality of British society. One member of this sect, a recent convert, was a member of parliament. Reflecting in his diary one day he decided that God had called him to reform the morals of English society and he set out on a legislative program to achieve this end. He highlighted numerous activities that he considered to be a sin against God. One of them, though opposed in principle by many people, was considered something that the State should tolerate. This convert would have none of this, his religious beliefs about the immorality of this practice must be imposed upon all British citizens, in fact, he advocated that through imperialism this belief should be imposed on the colonies. He knew that the indigenous members of such colonies practiced the sin in question, he knew also that it was only in Christian countries that this practice had been challenged. But nevertheless he was undeterred and repeatedly, doggedly brought Bills before the house advocating moral reform. The convert was met with oppositon, in one famous speech a Lord of the house denounced his program as “bringing religion to bear on public life” and hence, deemed it problematic. It should be noted also that the convert brought his children up in his strict right wing religious views. His son would later become famous for opposing evolutionary theory against Thomas Huxley and has widely been denounced in popular history as an ignorant bigot for doing so.

    England are about to celebrate this convert’s achievements. Two hundred years after the fact he will be considered one of the greatest reformers in British history. The man is William Wilberforce. The sect is the Clapham Sect, a group of evangelical Christians and his legislative program was the abolition of the slave trade. Many, many people gained their freedom because of the religious right and the determination of one man to impose his unpopular religious beliefs onto society through the state.