Author: Matt

  • Contra Mundum: Dawkins and Secular Hypocrisy

    Richard DawkinsWhen I was a non-Christian I was forever hearing about how Christians are hypocrites. When I converted to Christianity at 17, one thing that struck me is how often these charges were often a case of the pot calling the kettle black. While there is undoubtedly some hypocrisy within the church, it is also pervasive outside it. Secular culture often contains absurd ironies and hypocrisy which are conveniently ignored.

    A great example was the media fiasco over William Lane Craig’s visit to the United Kingdom last year. Craig is distinguished philosopher known professionally for his work in philosophy of time and philosophy of religion. Alongside his scholarly work, he has also developed a reputation as a prolific public speaker and debater, debating many of the world’s leading sceptics. His combination of scholarly ability and effective debating skills has earned him a reputation as one of the world’s foremost Christian apologists.

    “Apparently, having two PhD’s, authoring over 100 papers, and writing 30 books on a topic makes you unqualified to speak on it, but being the star of the 80’s TV series “Growing Pains” does.”

    Craig’s visit to the UK attracted media attention when Richard Dawkins, author of the best selling “God Delusion”, publically and resolutely refused to debate him. Dawkins publically stated earlier of his critics that “he did not care” who they were, he would “dialogue” with them and “win the argument”. He also had publically debated numerous critics significantly less qualified than Craig, notably Ted Haggard. These facts, alongside Dawkins implausible and inconsistent reasons lead to accusations of cowardice and hypocrisy from other academics such as Daniel Came a philosophy professor at St Hugh’s College Oxford.

    In the UK newspaper the Guardian Dawkin’s gave two reasons for his refusal. According to Dawkins, Craig “parades himself as a philosopher, but none of the professors of philosophy whom I consulted had heard his name”. Dawkins omitted to mention that this was not the first time he had publicly denigrated Craig’s scholarly credentials. On a previous occasion  Daniel Came,  had e-mailed him stating:

    “Professor Craig has a PhD in philosophy and a PhD in theology. He is Research Professor in Philosophy at Talbot University. He has published more than thirty books and over a hundred papers in reputable peer-reviewed journal. Given your passionate and unconditional commitment to truth, I can only think that you were not aware of Professor Craig’s credentials when you made the above reference.”

    So Dawkins claim that no philosopher he had consulted had ever heard of Craig was less than honest. A less charitable person might describe this as simply slander.

    Dawkins concern about Craig’s alleged lack of scholarly credentials also seems odd seeing that he (Dawkins) had earlier accepted an invitation to debate actor Kirk Cameron.  Apparently, having two PhD’s, authoring over 100 papers, and writing 30 books on a topic makes you unqualified to speak on it but being the star of the 80’s TV series “Growing Pains” does qualify you. It’s also ironic that Dawkins would accuse Craig of lacking scholarly credentials on the matter given that he (Dawkins) is a biologist and not a philosopher of religion.

    Dawkins next excuse was that Craig is “morally unfit” to debate him.  To substantiate this he cites not from any of Craig’s scholarly writings. But two blog posts Craig had written on with the conquest of Canaan. At face value  the early chapters of the book of Joshua portrays God as commanding the killing of every man women and child in Canaan. I say “appears”, here because latter sections of the book of Joshua and its sequel in judges proceed on the assumption this never occurred, and studies into ancient conquest accounts of this genre have noted the widespread use of literary hyperbole whereby victories are described in sweeping rhetoric of killing absolutely everyone when in reality they were (more…)

  • Blogging as a Supplement to Peer Review: My 2011 SBL & ASOR Paper

    At the 2011 annual meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature and the American Academy of Religion in San Francisco I gave a paper in the Blogger and Online Publication session entitled “Blogging as a Supplement to Peer Review“. It occurred to me today that I have never published it on MandM so here it is.

    This paper will not be a normal academic paper. Normally, when I present one of them, I have a specific thesis I try and offer an argument for it and rebut arguments against it. Today however I will present more of a narrative based on some reflections from my own experience as a blogger and scholar and someone who blends the two.

    Peer ReviewI began engaging in “biblical blogging” with great reluctance.  One of my biggest reservations was that blogs are not peer reviewed. Anyone can, and does, write anything at all and get it published on the internet – even, if it’s complete nonsense. One only has to surf the net for a few minutes to see the problem.

    Further, the readership of blogs is not restricted to scholars. Many blogs feature a person writing on a subject with little or no understanding of it who have a following of devoted readers who are equally ignorant, but nevertheless read and comment on the same topic as if they were knowledgeable. My impression was that blogs on theological topics were no less immune to this problem than blogs on other topics.

    So my first reservation was that a blog post really carried no stature; I felt it would be embarrassing to be known as a blogger – I was seeking to be a scholar.

    My second reservation based on my experience with online communication. There are subtle social constraints on face to face communication. If I have to stand up and speak in front of an audience at a conference I will be nervous.  If I say something stupid publically others will laugh at me and I will be embarrassed. If I get really nasty and cross a line someone might get physically threatening and even hit me if I provoke them. There are social consequences to what I say. Online, however, many of these social constraints are muted, one can be completely anonymous or communicate from a fictional personae. People can say things they would never say saying in public without facing the normal social consequences of such comments. This means that online discussions can be counter-productive. Most bloggers will be familiar with the phenomena of “trolls” people who enter into online discussions simply to insult, attack and distract the discussion. I could not see the attraction much less the benefit of engaging in a medium like that.

    I think both these reservations have some merit. However I now believe that, despite them, blogging can serve as a supplement to peer review. It is hard to not believe that given what blogging has done for me but before I get into that, note that I said supplement, my suggestion is that it can supplement not replace peer review.

    Some Challenges of Traditional Peer Review
    In 2006 I graduated with a PhD in Theology. The prospects in the job market were bad in New Zealand – my part of the world – particularly for an unknown fresh graduate. An immediate goal of mine was to establish myself as a credible theological scholar which, of course, meant getting my work known. I resolved that I needed to be published. If I developed a series of publications, others in my field will read my work, and as a result my work will become known. I began by following the usual route of submitting articles to journals for publication and I found it hard going.

    Let me note two challenges I found with this:

    First, almost no one reads your article until it gets published, and this can affect you (more…)

  • My Faith Journey

    Like Jacob in the book of Genesis, my spiritual journey has been one of wrestling with God. Not physical wrestling, like that engaged in by Jacob, but wrestling intellectually with the questions and implications that have arisen from my realisation that God exists and Jesus Christ actually, in reality, rose from the grave.

    Faith JourneyI was not raised a Christian; in my early years my family attended an Anglican Church. This was part of the residual Anglicanism which is part of New Zealand’s heritage as a British colony.  We ceased attending in the early 80’s when I was around 6.  I was raised in a very secular environment where what are commonly referred to as ‘liberal ideals and values’ were taken for granted.

    Something kept drawing me to the reality of God. New Zealand has an amazingly beautiful country-side, which I spent a lot of my youth hiking and exploring in; I kept being aware of a spiritual presence, a glory, an amazingly awesome being reflected in the world around me and I felt it was providentially guiding me. I engaged in theological debates at intermediate and high school as I explored this sense.

    Then at 16 I began to ask serious questions about morality and my life. My parents had divorced, my friends were promiscuous, doing drugs and breaking the law. I had attended a very conservative upper-class boarding school and I had also attended a very permissive public school by then. I began to ask questions about how I should live, were the beliefs I had correct, what sort of person did I want to be? Who was correct, the Christians from the past or the moderns of today? And how do we tell – how can I know?

    These questions lead me to attend a Church in 1991, which was enthralled by the teachings of Bishop Spong. Spong was teaching that the bible was not authoritative, Christ did not rise from the dead, Christians needed to revise their views on sexuality, and so on. I was puzzled as to why a Church would teach things like this. The elders recommended I read some “modern critical scholarship”. This led me to encounter the debate over many of these issues for the first time. I discovered Josh McDowell, Alistair McGrath, Francis Schaeffer and serious evangelical scholarship for the first time.

    At a youth camp ran by the Methodist church in 1991 I ran into a small group of evangelicals who began sharing with me the Christian faith. I came before God in prayer and committed by life to following him. This was the most dramatic life changing experience I have ever had.

    I started University the next year. Waikato University was the most secular university in New Zealand, and my new beliefs came under concerted intellectual attack. For time-tabling reasons I was forced to do a philosophy degree and from day one everything I had committed to was assaulted intellectually in my classes. My wrestling with God continued. As my interlocutors raised questions I went to the library to find literature that was not on the reading lists, which helped me address these questions.

    I discovered the writings of Alvin Plantinga, Richard Swinburne, William Lane Craig and J P Moreland. I began to ask questions about how my faith related to politics or history or to the theoretical disciplines I was studying. There was no real place I knew of where evangelicals could get these questions answered so I went to the library and began to skim through the books on the shelf and read. I began using what I discovered to respond to my sceptical interlocutors. I soon found they were quite unprepared for the answers I gave. It seemed to me Christianity had lost the cultural battle by default with skeptics raising age-old questions that Christian writers had already addressed and taking the silent response as acquiescence.

    I also began to discover the great classics from Christian history. After disagreeing sharply with the very skeptical lecturer of my religious studies class I began checking primary sources. This led me to begin reading Athanasius, Augustine’s City of God, Calvin’s Institutes, sections of Aquinas and so on. I began to discover there was a wealth of history that I had not been made aware of and which my culture had caricatured.

    My wrestling with these questions transformed me radically. I went on to do a Masters degree in philosophy on the relationship between faith, reason and scholarship and a PhD thesis on ethics. I found myself estranged from the very anti-intellectual, pietistic evangelical traditions that dominate in New Zealand. I also felt estrangement from the mainstream academic community due to my commitment to a fairly conservative Christian faith.

    Despite this, I have felt in doing this I have been faithful to the call I perceived on my life at a young age. It ignited in me a passion to assist other Christians to wrestle with these questions and to come up with credible answers with which to engage the secular culture credibly.  It has led me to having a very Socratic pedagogy and a demand for a high level of logical rigour, cultural awareness, and faithful theological commitment to my endeavours. This is why I blog at MandM.

  • Madeleine on “The Panel” on Pat Brittenden Mornings – with Craig Heilmann

    Radio RhemaIf you tuned in to Radio Rhema at 11:45am (NZ time) on 21 June 2012 you would have heard this blog’s Madeleine Flannagan and Craig Heilmann discuss topical issues such as the first car to be crushed under the new laws and whether it is a deterrent or not, whether Matariki should be a public holiday, and their thoughts on the creationism debate, among other issues, on “The Panel” on Pat Brittenden morning.

    You can listen online here.

  • Mark Murphy Reviews Walter Sinnott-Armstrong.

    Those who have followed my recent discussions of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s writings on God and Morality. Might be interested in this review of Armstrong’s book “Morality without God”  by Mark Murphy in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. Mark  is a lecturer in moral philosophy at Georgetown University. He is is one of the leading critics of divine command ethics writing today.

    Interestingly, there is some overlap in his comments and mine, particularly the issues regarding “social obligations” and how moral obligations constitute reasons for action.

    Enjoy

  • Is Ethical Naturalism More Plausible than Supernaturalism? A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Part II

    This is the second part of the paper I presented to the Naturalisms in Ethics Conference at Auckland University last year.

    In my previous post, I noted that Robert Adams has argued that if God exists, then divine commands “best fill the role assigned to wrongness by the concept”.[1] He argues that if moral obligations are divine commands this explains the fact, that (i) “wrongness is an objective property of actions,”[2], (ii) it accounts “for the wrongness of a major portion of the types of action that we have believed to be wrong,”[3]   (iii) it “plays a causal role … in their coming to be regarded as wrong”,[4]  (iv) it explains how moral obligations constitute a “supremely weighty reason” for acting or refraining from an action,   and (v) he contends that DCT explains the intuition that moral duties comprise “a law or standard that has a sanctity greater than that of any merely human will or institution”.[5]

    Moreover, in my last post, I also argued that, for Armstrong to conclude his arguments call into question any theistic account of ethics, he must argue that his harm account of moral obligation provides a better explanation of all these features. Failing that, if his account doesn’t preserve these features of moral obligation, then he must provide us with a reason to suppose that they are not part of the concept of moral obligation. Or he must provide reasons for revising our concepts.

    In his monograph “Morality without God” he attempted to do this. It’s my contention that he has failed in this task.

    1. Social Requirements

    Let’s begin with (v), In “Morality without God”, Armstrong purports to address this line of argument, he claims that “the best line of argument-because it is the only argument is that moral laws require a lawgiver”[6]. He attributes to popular writer Dinesh D’Souza. He then proceeds to make short work of D’Souza’s argument.

    However, this is neither the best, nor the only argument offered in favour of a DCT. In subsequent articles and a monograph, Adam’s has developed (v) in some detail.[7] Adam’s proposes a “social requirement theory” of obligation whereby “being obligated to do something consists in being required (in a certain way under certain situations) by another person or groups of persons not to do it”[8]. Obligations are a kind of social relationship where one person makes a demand on another, failure to comply results ruptures in the relationship expressed in terms of blame, censure, punishment and alienation, which can be expiated by forgiveness. Adam’s offers a sustained argument that the role of guilt, censure, punishment, social inculcation, moral motivation, moral knowledge and forgiveness plays in our concept of obligation, make a social requirement theory plausible.[9] Nowhere in Armstrong “Morality without God” does Armstrong even (more…)

  • Jerry Coyne on God and Morality Revisited

    Late last year I, wrote a criticism of Jerry Coyne’s piece in USA today. Entitled, As  atheists know, you can be good without God.  My critique attracted some attention. Getting commentary from Mary Ann Spikes, Jason Thibodeau,  Jeffery Lay Lowder, and Brian Zamulinski.  Since the USA today article Coyne has written a follow up article where he purports to address the kinds of criticisms I made in this post. This article is entitled Maybe my Philosophy isn’t so Unsophisticated After All.  However, far from exonerating his poor reasoning, Coyne’s response simply further demonstrates my point.

    In this article Coyne focuses almost exclusively on criticisms I and others have made to his use of the arbitrariness objection. This is significant, for this criticism was just one of several criticisms of Coyne’s article that I raised .  Consequently, even if Coyne’s rejoinder is sound it addresses only one of my objections.  The rest remain untouched.

    As it is, his response is poor.  He begins by noting the response to the arbitrariness objection proposed by William Lane Craig. According to Coyne, Craig’s response is “whatever God orders is good and morally obligatory simply by virtue of the fact that He is God.” He cites this as a quotation but fails to provide a source. His response to this is to refer to alleged atrocities taught in the Old Testament and claim Craig’s response is “too stupid to address”

    Three things are evident, First, this is not Craig’s response to the arbitrariness objection; in his book Philosophical Foundations of  a Christian Worldview, Craig argues that Our moral duties are constituted by the commands of a just and loving God” (emphasis original)   and that

     this fact also supplies the key to the arbitrariness objection.  For our duties are determined by the commands, not merely of a supreme potentate, but of a just and loving God.  God is essentially compassionate, fair, kind, impartial, and so forth, and His commandments are reflections of His own character.  Thus, they are not arbitrary, and we need not trouble ourselves about counterfactuals with impossible antecedents like “If God were to command child abuse . . . .[1]

    So, Craig, in fact, maintains it’s impossible for God to command actions which are cruel, unjust and so on.   He does not, claim such actions can become good merely by God commanding them and Coyne appears to insinuate.

    Second, I actually addressed the Old Testament atrocity argument in my original article . However, Coyne simply repeats his argument.

    Third, calling someone “stupid” is not a rational rebuttal of their position; it commits a fallacy that logicians call the ad hominem fallacy, where one attacks the arguer instead of rebutting his argument. The distinction between attacking a person and refuting their argument is an elementary one in logic; it’s hard to believe Coyne is unaware of it.

    If Coyne thinks misrepresenting people, insulting them and then repeating an argument which has been addressed counts as competent philosophical or theological analysis he is gravely mistaken.

    After setting this tone, Coyne turns specifically to my criticisms. After suggesting that responding to on MandM is “a mugs game” he directs the reader to an article by Jason Thibodeau who Coyne calls a “real” philosopher” and cites two paragraphs which he claims “decisively” refute me.

    Now it doesn’t need saying that simply finding an article that agrees with you and maintaining the author of that article is a “real scholar” is not really a response to anything. Neither is simply asserting that someone has offered a refutation itself a refutation.

    But what’s interesting is Coyne’s selective citation. After noting my point, that a loving and just person would not command the kinds of actions he mentions, Thibodeau states

    There are a few problems with this response. The most important (and the one that I think that Coyne had in mind) is that if we are to understand the reply to mean that a moral God would not issue immoral commands… the response implies that there is a standard of morality that is independent of God against which he and his commands can be judged. But if morality is independent of God, then the DCT [divine command theory] is false.

    Coyne suggests this response “shows pretty definitively that” my argument fails and it “sets the record straight” for all thinking Christian’s

    In fact this response is mistaken. The fact that a loving and just being does not command certain actions does not entail that there is a moral standard independent of that being requiring them to not command those things. This is because it is possible for a person to be loving and just with being obligated to be loving and just. Suppose, for the sake of argument, morality was an illusion and in reality no one really was required to love their children.  Would it follow that all parents would cease to love them, or that they could not exercise love?  Not at all, I can be loving without being under an obligation to be loving. So this objection fails.

    Interestingly however, Thibodeau actually points this out in the very next line of the article which Coyne snips from his quotation. Thibodeau writes:

    In any event, as Flannagan indicated, the debate does not end here because the divine command theorist may concede the point but still insist that all he needs is that God is all-loving, and he will get the same consequence (or at least one that is close enough); namely that God will not issue commands that require us to cause horrible pain and suffering (or do anything that we all agree would be horrendous). If developed in the appropriate direction, this reply can lead to a fully developed response to the arbitrariness objection.

    So, the “real philosopher” Coyne cites actually says this argument is unsuccessful, for reasons I had already indicated in my criticisms.  Coyne’s response therefore appears to be as follows (a) find an article that agrees with his conclusions (b) assert the author (apparently unlike me) is a real philosopher (c)  quote an argument  the author actually says fails to address my point (d) Snip the context so your readers don’t know this (e) assert boldly that his comment refutes me.  Far from showing that my criticisms of Coyne are mistaken these kinds of tactics suggest I was on the mark.  Of course readers of Coyne’s work online or in USA today won’t have the original articles Coyne cites from and so will take his assertions on faith. This is effective propaganda but little else.

    After these dubious manoeuvres, Coyne then asserts that the rest of Thibodeau’s article makes devastating points against me but does not cite or summarise these arguments.

    In fact Thibodeau’s makes two arguments both of which fail.

    Thibodeau’s, first argument appeals to God’s omnipotence, which he defines as the ability to do whatever is logically possible.  If omnipotence is defined this way, then God could command the torture of children.

    Now whether omnipotence should be defined in this way is in fact a matter of dispute. However, suppose we grant Thibodeau’s definition; the argument still fails. Adams’ position is that that moral obligations are constituted by the commands of a loving and just God.  Even if God, being omnipotent could command the torture of children, he could not do so and continue to be loving and just. This is because it’s not logically possible for a loving and just being to command things like this. So this argument does nothing to show that a loving and just God could command torturing children and hence does not refute Adams’ position.

    Thibodeau’s second argument is similarly mistaken. Thibodeau argues that it’s possible that there exists an all-powerful creator that enjoys watching sentient beings suffer, he labels this being Azura. He then notes that Azura could command the torture of children.

    Now assuming that it is possible that Azura exists (which I doubt), this argument is beside the point. The fact that an evil being who is all powerful could command the torture of children, does not entail that a loving and just God could. So Adam’s contention that moral obligations are best accounted for by the commands of a loving and just God remains un-refuted.

    Both arguments fail because they misconstrue the position that Adams and those who follow him defend. These people contend that the nature of moral obligations is best explained by the commands of a loving and just God. Pointing out that they are not explained by a God who lacks these attributes does not address this contention. It ignores it.

    Interestingly,  in  some commentary on Coyne’s exchange with myself arguments philosopher and ethicist  Brian Zamulinski notes that he had pointed this out to Coyne months before he wrote the USA today article. Zamulinski  writes

    Robert Merrihew Adams contended that morality is constituted by the commands of an essentially loving God.  The Euthyphro dilemma collapses because an essentially loving God could not command just anything.  In his USA Today article, Coyne rehearses the Euthyphro dilemma but does not mention the Adams reformulation.  This is odd.  I had an e-mail correspondence with Coyne some months earlier in which I pointed out the Adams reformulation.  Coyne should have taken time to rebut the reformulation.  He did not.

    Coyne’s final riposte is to ask a question, how do you know a loving God exists? And this whole issue is “moot unless you can show that there’s a God to issue moral commands”. This however is to reason in a circle, in his USA today article Coyne was criticising the argument that morality was “strong evidence for [God’s] existence.” People like Adams argue it is because the best account of the nature of moral obligations is that moral obligations are commands issued by a loving and just God.  To contend Adams is wrong because no one has offered an argument for a loving God’s existence is to assume the very issue under dispute. One could just as easily argue Coyne’s argument is flawed on the grounds that his arguments are flawed.

    Nothing in Coyne’s follow up leads me to revisit my initial conclusion. Misrepresenting people’s views, calling people names, quoting from articles out of context, denigrating others’ scholarly qualifications and confidently asserting a position whilst reasoning in a circle, and ignoring objections, are not the same as actually addressing them.  I doubt such sophistry would pass muster in the scientific community when people write on scientific topics, and it does not pass muster when scientists comment on theology or philosophy.

    [1]William Lane Craig and J P Moreland Philosophical Foundations of a Christian WorldView (Downers Grove Il:Intervarsity Press academic), 531,