Category: Bloggers

  • Showing Christianity is True at Apologetics 315

    Brian Auten of Apologetics 315 has run an essay series through the month of April on the topic “Why is Christianity True?” Brian has accepted 23 submissions from various apologetics bloggers from around the world and has each day posted 1 essay in the series along with a podcast of each. At the end of the series a PDF ebook version of all the essays will be made available.

    Matt’s essay “Showing Christianity is True” was selected to be the concluding essay and it too has been made into a podcast. To hear the podcast and join in the global discussion pop on over to Apologetics 315 (or you can read it below).

    Showing Christianity is True

    “Can you show that Christianity is true?” To help us focus our thinking as to how one should answer this question I will pose some other questions as follows. Can you show that other people exist or that there exists a world that endures independent of our senses, which continues to exist when we no longer perceive it? Can my belief that it is wrong to inflict pain on another person for no reason at all be shown as true? What about my belief that Russell’s sceptical hypothesis that the whole Universe came into existence six seconds ago, including all apparent memories and signs of age – is this false or true?

    I hope that the point of these examples is clear. Unless we want to fall into a global scepticism that defies all common sense we have to acknowledge that there are some beliefs which we hold rationally and know are true that, nevertheless, cannot be shown or proven to be true from premises that all intelligent people are required to accept. In fact, somewhat ironically, the claim that one is only rational in believing something unless it can be shown to be true from premises all sane people are required to accept, is self-refuting; after all, many sane people reject it and it has yet to be shown to be true from premises that all sane people accept.

    However, one is rational in accepting some beliefs independent of any argument showing the truth of those beliefs; philosophers term such beliefs ‘properly basic beliefs.’ These beliefs typically function as foundational beliefs, a person reasons from them as premises to the truth of other propositions one holds. Similarly, they function as the background data against which one assesses hypotheses proposed for one’s acceptance. They arise because ongoing appeals to premises to prove premises to prove premises have to end somewhere. Properly basic beliefs constitute those beliefs where it is rational for the appeal for proof to end.

    It needs to be noted that properly basic beliefs are not groundless. While one does not believe a basic belief based on an inference, basic beliefs are often based on some form of experience. Alvin Plantinga discerns two types of experience, “sensory evidence”, such things as appearing to see, hear or feel a given object and “doxastic evidence”, which he refers to as “the belief feels right, acceptable, natural.”1  Doxastic beliefs appear to be self-evident. An example of such a belief is the corresponding conditional of modus ponens. When one entertains the conditional of modus ponens it just seems to be correct. Modus ponens seems self-evident in a way that an overtly-fallacious inference does not. It is this kind of experience that grounds basic beliefs.

    Many philosophers and theologians such as Calvin, Pascal, Alston and Plantinga hold that certain theological beliefs are properly basic. Belief in the existence of God is, from the believer’s perspective, properly basic and grounded directly in some form of religious experience; hence it is justified and rational to believe these doctrines independently of any argument in favour of them. Although I cannot elaborate it in a small article, I am in fundamental agreement with this position. The request then that Christians show or demonstrate that Christianity is true often relies on an assumption that I think is mistaken; this assumption is that rational Christian belief requires that arguments or proofs be provided for Christianity and failure to provide them renders the believer irrational.

    There is another more moderate question which lurks in the neighbourhood. If one grants that the believer is rational in accepting Christian belief in a properly basic way then what reasons can the believer give to those who do not hold to the same properly basic beliefs for accepting Christian belief? Perhaps some people, on the basis of some kind of religious experience, have immediate properly basic beliefs but many people do not have this kind of experience – what reason can be given to them for accepting the Christian faith? This problem is exasperated by the fact that it is extremely difficult to demonstrate the truth of foundational beliefs precisely because they are foundational beliefs. To prove something one needs to appeal to premises and the whole question in this instance is over what ultimate premises to accept. How then would one show to these people that Christianity is true?

    I think several strategies are available but due to space I can only briefly sketch them here.

    First, in many instances, one can show Christianity is true by rebutting objections to Christian beliefs. Properly basic beliefs are beliefs that one is rational in believing independently of any argument for them in the absence of any good reasons for them. It does not follow, however, that these beliefs cannot be defeated by reasons offered against them.  If I see John screwing his face up and grasping his leg, I might form the belief that John is in pain. However, if later John tells me that he was not in pain but rather rehearsing his death scene in a play he is acting in I might change my belief to believing that he was not in pain. The initial belief that he was in pain was properly-basic; however, because of what I later discovered, its rational status was defeated.

    I think many people stand in an analogous position to various Christian beliefs; they reject them not because they do not see them to be true but because they accept various objections to these beliefs. Consider Richard Dawkins’ “All appearances to the contrary, the only watchmaker in nature is the blind forces of physics, albeit deployed in a very special way… it is the blind watchmaker.” What is interesting here is the phrase, “all appearances to the contrary,” Dawkins admits that, prima facie, the world appears and looks like it was designed and in the absence of any reasons for denying design then the natural observation is to say that it is. Dawkins suggests, however, that appearances are deceiving because science has allegedly provided defeaters for this belief. Showing Dawkins’ arguments are unsound in such a context enables people to accept appearances.

    The second line of argument is to show that various alternatives to Christianity are false. Often people fail to see the truth of Christianity because they accept mistaken views of the world and mistaken epistemic standards such as those associated with naturalism. They may experience God’s presence in nature but believe this is an illusion because they are convinced that nothing beyond nature exists. They might think that only things which can be empirically demonstrated can be rationally believed and these experiences are an illusion fostered by evolution to ensure social co-operation. Showing that these pictures of reality are false helps them to re-consider the veridical nature of these experiences. Refuting alternatives to Christianity provides another impetus for seeing the truth of Christianity.

    People have to live by some vision of the world. In terms of practice, one cannot remain agnostic on many existential questions. If all the viable alternatives to Christianity can be shown to be implausible then Christianity has to be taken seriously by people who cannot, in practice, live a life which suspends judgment on ultimate questions.

    Third, even if a person does not accept a given proposition they can still reason about such beliefs. One can reason “conditionally”,2  if one accepts certain premises or propositions as properly basic beliefs. Then certain other positions, hypotheses and theories are likely, and people from all sides of the dispute can assess and debate whether the reasoning is cogent. Plantinga notes,

    The conclusions of theistic science may not be accepted by non-theists, but the method – trying to see how best to explain the relevant phenomena from a theistic perspective – is indeed open to all.3

    One can show that when one does reason from a theistic perspective then certain existential and theoretical questions can be given coherent answers. One can explain such things as the origin of the universe, the existence of contingent beings, the existence and nature of moral obligation, the existence of laws of nature, existential questions about guilt and forgiveness and so on. Plantinga notes that the existence of God imports a “great deal of unity into the philosophic endeavor, and the idea of God helps with an astonishingly wide variety of cases: epistemological, ontological, ethical, having to do with meaning, and the like of that.”4 Showing that if one accepts theism, then plausible, defensible, comprehensive and unified answers are available to what would otherwise be intractable questions, provides one way of showing others why they should accept belief in God as a properly basic belief.

    The fourth and final way is to put a person in a position where that person is likely to have the requisite experience that grounds properly basic theological beliefs. Suppose I see a tree in the park and my wife asks me to show her that this tree exists. The obvious way to do so is not to construct a proof of the existence of a tree but to take her to a park and show her it. Similarly, many people fail to grasp self-evident axioms of logic because they fail to understand them, but when these are explained to them they become self-evident. The same is true with Christian belief. One way to show agnostics the truth of Christianity is to put them into circumstances where, if they are attentive, they are likely to start seeing the truth.

    One can explain the scriptures to them, encourage them to seek God in prayer – this is analogous to the way a person lost in the bush might call out to a rescuer even if he or she were unsure anyone was searching for him or her. One can encourage them to engage in the study of the scriptures whilst taking seriously the possibility that they are the word of God. The person could get involved in a community of believers where God dwells and works, where the person could be encouraged to live in accord with the moral law and honestly confess their failings and seek forgiveness for their moral errors. Pascal made this point in his famous wager; while an agnostic cannot simply choose to believe something he does not believe, he or she can choose to look, to seek and to understand. When the agnostic sincerely does so, it is likely that he or she will come to experience God. Just as a person who attempts to understand logic will see why its axioms are self-evident or a person who actually looks in the park will see that there is a tree there.

    In conclusion the basic doctrines of Christianity, if true, constitute properly basic foundational beliefs. One does not believe them on the basis of argument or proof as they are grounded directly in experience. Typically it is very difficult to prove with argument that a foundational belief is true; however their truth can be shown in other indirect ways. One can argue that the arguments against such beliefs are false, one can argue that the alternatives to accepting them are false or problematic, and one can show that if one accepts Christianity then these beliefs make coherent sense out of the world, they provide comprehensive answers to many theoretical and existential questions. Finally, in the context of all of the above, one can assist the sceptic to adopt the stance of a sincere seeker; to get him to put him or herself into the kind of position where he or she can come to have the requisite encounter with God so as to see that Christianity is true. This is ultimately how one shows that Christianity is true.

    1 Alvin Plantinga Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) 110-111.
    2 See Alvin Plantinga “Creation and Evolution: A Modest Proposal” in Darwinism Design and Public Education ed John Angus Campbell & Stephen C Meyer (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2004) 521-232; “Reason and Scripture Scholarship” in Behind the Text: History and Biblical Interpretation ed C Bartholomew, C Stephen. Evans, Mary Healy & Murray Rae (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2003) 98-100.
    3 Alvin Plantinga “On Rejecting The Theory of Common Ancestry: A Reply to Hasker” Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 44 (December 1992): 258-263.
    4 Alvin Plantinga “Two Dozen or so Theistic Arguments” accessed 7 March 2010.

  • Guest Post: Does Tax Exemption for Churches Directly Cost Taxpayers?

    Bethyada of True Paradigm offers us this guest post. I find it interesting because I wrote some thoughts about the New Zealand Association of Rationalist Humanist’s position on the issue of religious trusts having tax exemption in Equality or Hegemony: NZARH and Religious Trusts back in 2008. There I pointed out that humanist trusts that engage in the equivalent of evangelism for humanism are also tax exempt and promoted by the very same organisation. Anyway, Bethyada writes:

    Ken Perrott wrote about several objections he had to religious charities, specifically churches, being tax exempt. This was in response to my thoughts on proposed tax law changes. Initially he made the unlikely (or perhaps hyperbolic) proposal of how to significantly reduce the tax burden,

    Remove the classification of religion as a charity. That is allow charitable tax exemption only for genuine charity. Not for teaching of supernatural dogma.

    Given that most churches make little surplus money, and taxes are on the profits of a company, this revenue stream is going to be very small. Charities are not able to make large amounts of money and spend it as they wish, they must put the money back into the charity’s cause.

    Ken did also raise a related issue about the cost of charities being born by others. Philosophically I have sympathies with the potential issue he identifies; I object to both covering costs for other people that they should cover, and funding groups that promote ideology I disagree with. I can appreciate that an atheist would object to his money being used for Christian evangelism, much in the way that I object to my money being used to promote humanism. However I am not certain that churches are that costly.

    Now tax exemption is not a direct cost, it is a refusal to tax. When Ken was asked what was the cost to him, his initial reply was twofold: religious charities were using publicly financed resources and they have a responsibility to share society’s financial burden. Interestingly Ken was happy to subsidise genuine charities. Interesting in that I am not certain I support the use of government money in supporting any charities, religious or non-religious.

    Ken’s more detailed response can be read here. He covers several areas. His complaint is

    1. Religious organisations can get charity status and tax exemption but science, reason, or atheist organisations cannot register as charities;
    2. Churches do not pay rates, thus these services are covered by other people;
    3. Individuals can manipulate the system to their benefit;
    4. Charities offer fringe benefits;
    5. Charities have an unfair commercial advantage;
    6. Some religious people are morally corrupt; and
    7. Forced tithing has been important to the survival of the church.

    I think the main issue is around item 2, but I will briefly address the others.

    Item 1 is untrue. About 15% of the more than 25,000 charities in New Zealand are religious in nature. The criteria for charities are

    • the relief of poverty
    • the advancement of education
    • the advancement of religion
    • any other matters that are beneficial to the community.

    There are plenty of charities in New Zealand that are involved in scientific research. Schools can be charities. Neither is tax exemption restricted to charities: some sports groups have tax exemption and some of them can also request charity status.

    Item 3 is not unique to charities. Trusts can be misused, and some companies shift profit around the world to minimise tax. Simplifying tax law and minimising tax take are more likely to counter this problem.

    Item 4 is irrelevant. Companies do this too. Individuals can allow people to stay with them and not charge board, though other people may have to. This is an issue of envy, not justice.

    Item 5 could be a problem if true. It would need to be confirmed. Claims by business of unfair advantage may be an attempt to gain their own advantage, not necessarily because there is a legitimate unfair advantage. Offering my free services to any company, charity or not, is not an unfair commercial advantage, I am allowed to do what I want with my time.

    Item 6 is true, but completely irrelevant.

    Item 7 is irrelevant to New Zealand. It is more an issue in Europe. And I agree, forced tithing with money compulsory collected by the government and forwarded to the relevant church should not be compulsory based on your stated religion/ denomination. Preferably it should not be collected by the state at all. Some church organisations may struggle if this occurred, but that is not necessarily a bad thing.

    Returning to the main issue, item 2: churches getting services that are paid for by others. This includes services that local and national government supply, the first via rates, the latter via taxes. Ken argues,

    Churches, religious organisations, trusts, etc., are not paying their fare share of social costs – streets, rubbish, defense, health, emergency services, fire service, etc. Everything our taxes/rates are used for. The fair share my secular science and reasons organisation would have to pay.

    Now I think that many of these things should be funded by the people using them. Rubbish does not need to be run by council, nor does water supply, or sewage. However the system is that these things are provided by council currently. So I agree that it is reasonable for the charities to pay towards these things, but let’s review specifics.

    The costs should only be those that relate directly to the organisation and its property, not the people in it. This is because the individuals who are paid by the charity pay their own tax at the normal rates. So health costs for a person who works for a charity are contributed to from his personal tax. The organisation does not have any health costs. Conversely, if a church calls the police about vandalism to their property, then they are using this service as an organisation. So fire, police, water, sewage, rubbish are real costs incurred by the charity which if not paid by the charity are then covered by others. Health, defence, social welfare, retirement, education, are not costs that a church incurs and are covered by the individual tax of its workers. I have left off roading as it is mixed, though on balance is a minimal cost, and almost certainly covered by fuel taxes.

    Charities do pay rates. Yes it is reduced to a nominal amount and may not cover the full cost of amenities, but they contribute toward it.

    Charities can claim sales tax, but if they hold an event that they charge for they have to pay sales tax.

    So the legitimate costs of charities associated with their tax exempt status are small. These categories (such as water) are not significant costs to government.

    But how much do religious charities save government? The amount of food, counselling, shelter given to people in- and outside the church is enormous. It would easily dwarf any savings they make from not having to pay their contribution to say policing, and probably decreases policing costs indirectly.

    Not that I think churches shouldn’t pay for water and rubbish. Ideally these would not be managed by the council anyway, and then everyone including the church would have to pay private providers who could choose whether or not they wished to discount charities. And everyone would pay the true cost, and likely pay much less. But the situation is that the direct costs of religious charities to the state is minor, and completely offset by the savings they provide.

    RELATED POST:
    Equality or Hegemony: NZARH and Religious Trusts

  • Oxford Calling… Can you Help Glenn Peoples?

    The 18th Conference of the European Society of the Philosophy of Religion at the University of Oxford is on “Religion in the Public Square” and will feature my favourite philosopher (next to Matt of course) Professor Nicholas Wolterstorff and New Zealand’s own Glenn Peoples who blogs and produces brilliant podcasts at Say Hello to my Little Friend. Back in February Glenn blogged of his interest in giving a paper to this conference and of his intention, if accepted, to find a way there.

    The first hurdle was to get his paper accepted, which is no small feat but one that Glenn has pulled off – well done Glenn!

    The second hurdle is to raise the funds to get there, which is a work in progress…

    Glenn’s situation is much like Matt’s. Glenn holds a PhD in Philosophy and a Masters in Theology (the opposite way around to Matt). He is a very good Christian philosopher; I referenced him in my own philosophy of law paper on the subject, Matt has cited from him also  in several works (see our Glenn Peoples tag) and we both view Glenn’s blog to be MandM’s toughest competition in the NZ blog rankings for our niche .  Like Matt,  since graduating, Glenn has struggled to find work in his field. He currently works for the IRD and earns a very modest wage. Glenn is trying to find a position using his skills, if not in New Zealand, anywhere in the world so this conference is not only an opportunity for him to meet one of the world’s best living philosophers in Glenn’s field, it is not just an opportunity to have New Zealand Christian philosophy showcased at Oxford but it is a chance to help someone with a gift take another step towards using that gift to provide for his family and to support the broader church. Donations are currently being gathered and more information is available here if you would like to help and/or follow his progress.

  • Auckland Bloggers Drinks – This Thursday

    On the first Thursday of every month (except for this month because the first Thursday fell on the eve of Good Friday and people tend to go away for Easter weekend) Auckland bloggers gather for the B3 (Bloggers Bar Bash).

    What: Auckland Bloggers Drinks
    When:
    Thursday 8 April from 6.30pm
    Where:
    Galbraiths, 2 Mt Eden Road, Mt Eden, Auckland

    The B3, as it is coined by regulars, is open to anyone who happens to be in Auckland who writes for, comments on or reads blogs.

    Past blogging celebrities in attendance include bloggers and bloupies (blog groupies) from Annie Fox, Barnsley Bill, Beretta, Cactus Kate, Garfield Herrington, Interest.co.nz, Kiwiblog, Lolly Scramble, MandM, Night City Trader, No Minister, Not PC, Roar Prawn, SOLO, State Highway One, Stephen Franks, The Fairfacts Media Show, Whale Oil and WHOAR.

    RSVP on Facebook or just turn up… we’ll be there.

  • Inerrancy and The Originals: A Response to John FH

    John FH of Ancient Hebrew Poetry has written a thoughtful hazing of some of my posts on inerrancy, Inerrancy and Biblical Authority and Two Forms of Inerrancy. The points he raised are issues worth taking up.

    John’s first concern is that the two conceptions of inerrancy I set out, those of Verbal Plenary Inspiration (VPI) and Didactic Plenary Inspiration (DPI) constitute a false dichotomy. He notes that some people, such as himself, accept both VPI and DPI. This, of course, is correct. In fact I suggested as much in my follow-up post, Two Forms of Inerrancy, there I quoted Alan Rhoda,

    A weaker, and I think more defensible view, may be called didactic plenary inspiration (DPI). This is the view that whatever the Biblical originals were intended to teach is inerrant. It is not necessary that the particular words of the Bible be chosen by God so long as the particular message that God wants to convey gets across. (VPI entails DPI, but not vice-versa.) [Emphasis added]

    Rhoda explicitly suggested that VPI entails DPI; hence a person can accept both. What is interesting, however, is that one can also accept DPI and not accept VPI. One can accept that what scripture teaches is true and yet also hold that scriptures contain errors but that these errors are not part of what scripture teachers.

    So John is correct that one can affirm both VPI and DPI; however, one can also affirm DPI and not affirm VPI and it was this possibility that was my major point. An implication of this point is that certain sceptical attacks on inerrancy fail because they attack VPI and leave DPI unaffected.

    John’s second point is more interesting,

    I also hold that God superintended the transmission (SPI) of the text such that it was, over time, faithfully edited and translated, and is, for all intensive purposes, just as inerrant in the Septuagint as it is in the MT; in the Textus Receptus as in Nestle-Aland; in the NIV as in the KJV.

    He goes on to argue,

    Since Matt likes to refer to the “originals” which we do not have, and applies the language of inerrancy to them alone, I am left to assume, which is absurd, that he considers the NIV or KJV Bible (or whatever) read and preached on in church on a given Sunday to be an errant text.

    John here raises several questions regarding the reference to “the originals” in my initial post. In response let me say two things. First, I made reference to the “originals” because that is the position defenders of inerrancy typically take. Consider the statement of the Evangelical Philosophical Society, which I cited in my post, Two Forms of Inerrancy, “The Bible alone, and the Bible in its entirety, is the Word of God written and therefore inerrant in the originals.” The distinction between VPI and DPI made by Alan Rhoda, which I cited in my post, was an attempt to show two different ways this particular statement could be understood. Now given that this statement clearly applies inerrancy to the originals, whatever understanding one adopts of it, one must also apply inerrancy to the originals. The EPS are not being unusual here; defenders of inerrancy normally limit inerrancy to the originals. For example, Article VII of the Chicago statement on inerrancy states, “We affirm that the whole of Scripture and all its parts, down to the very words of the original, were given by divine inspiration.” Similarly Article X states,

    We affirm that inspiration, strictly speaking, applies only to the autographic text of Scripture, which in the providence of God can be ascertained from available manuscripts with great accuracy. We further affirm that copies and translations of Scripture are the Word of God to the extent that they faithfully represent the original.

    Second, it seems that the issue John raises actually illustrates another difference between VPI and DPI in that VPI has to limit inerrancy to the original documents whereas DPI does not have to. John attributes inerrancy to not just the originals but to contemporary English translations such as the NIV and KJV. He also suggests that ancient manuscripts such as the Septuagint, Masoretic Text, the Textus Receptus and the Nestle-Aland are all inerrant. The obvious problem here is that these texts do not agree on the precise words used to convey the message of scripture. A couple of examples will suffice. Take the following passage in the NIV version of 1 Corinthians 13:5, “If I give all I possess to the poor and surrender my body to the flames, but have not love, I gain nothing,” a footnote states, “some ancient manuscripts have body that I may boast.” Here we see that differing manuscripts disagree over the exact wording used in this text. They both cannot be correct, word for word, translations of this verse as they differ. Similarly, the Masoretic Text (MT) translates Exodus 21:22 as follows,

    When people who are fighting injure a pregnant woman so that there is a miscarriage, and yet no further harm follows, the one responsible shall be fined what the woman’s husband demands, paying as much as the judges determine. If any harm follows, then you shall give life for life.

    The Septuagint (LXX) renders the passage as follows,

    If two men fight and strike a pregnant woman, and her unformed embryo departs, he shall be fined; according as the woman’s husband lays upon (him) he shall give according to what is thought fit. But if it be formed, he shall give a life for a life.

    When it comes to the exact wording of this law the MT and LXX clearly use different words, as such both texts cannot both be verbally inerrant. Similar differences in wording can be found amongst the English translations.

    Defenders of VPI acknowledge these facts. Norman Geisler’s response is fairly typical, “Actually, the variant readings which significantly reflect the sense of a passage are less than ten percent of the New Testament, and none of them affect any basic doctrine of the Christian faith.”[1] Similarly the Chicago statement in Article X states,

    We further affirm that copies and translations of Scripture are the Word of God to the extent that they faithfully represent the original.

    We deny that any essential element of the Christian faith is affected by the absence of the autographs. We further deny that this absence renders the assertion of Biblical inerrancy invalid or irrelevant.

    The argument here is two-fold; first, both Geisler and the Chicago Statement affirm that textual criticism shows various manuscripts and English translations are reliable and reflect the original wording to a high degree of accuracy. Second, both go on to note where there is dispute over the exact wording of the text, this does not affect any doctrine or teaching of the Christian faith.

    I am not going to contest the accuracy of either of these points. I am inclined to agree that many of the variant readings in different manuscripts do not really affect much of substance. Take the Corinthians passage mentioned above, whether Paul stated “If I give all I possess to the poor and surrender my body to the flames, but have not love, I gain nothing,” or whether he stated, “If I give all I possess to the poor and surrender my body so I may boast, but have not love, I gain nothing,” his point is surely the same – that a person who engages in massive sacrifices but does not actually love other people really misses the boat. Similarly, as I have argued in my Alexandrian Argument series, while the LXX and MT disagree on the exact wording in Ex 21:22-25 what they teach is essentially the same and the LXX appears to be an accurate interpretation and application of the law even if it is not an accurate word for word translation.

    What I will say however is that the response of Geisler and the Chicago Statement shows that when it comes to any existent manuscripts, inerrancy can only be applied to them if one adopts a DPI view. This is evident from their responses; take the claim that various manuscripts and translations reflect the original to a high degree of accuracy. To say something is highly accurate is not the same as saying it is completely accurate or inerrant. Both Geisler and the Chicago Statement admit that when it comes to actually existing manuscripts, we do not have a verbally inerrant text. The second claim, essentially affirms that this verbal errancy does not really matter or carry much significance because what the originals taught is not affected by this difference in wording.  In other words, while we do not have VPI we do have DPI and apparently when we are talking about anything but the originals this is sufficient.

    Geisler’s comments illustrate the point that DPI enables one to avoid the very criticism John raised whereas VPI does not. The fact that we do not have the exact wording of the originals and the fact that different English translations such as the NIV, KJV, RSV, etc differ in the precise English words they use to translate variant manuscripts threatens the inerrancy of these particular manuscripts and translations only if inerrancy requires VPI. If inerrancy is predicated of the teaching of the texts and not the exact words then the problem does not arise.


    [1] Normal Geisler and William Nix The Bible an Introduction (Chicago: Moody Press, 1986) 489.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Sunday Study: Inerrancy and Biblical Authority

    Sunday Study: Two Forms of Inerrancy

  • Can State Expropriation of Minerals be Justified? Part II

    In Can State Expropriation of Minerals be Justified? Part I, I set out a common law property rights argument drawing from the writings of jurists Blackstone and Locke as well as contemporary philosopher Ed Feser. I looked at what circumstances, if any, might justify the state taking of real property, looking specifically at minerals from the sub-soil of privately held property. In this post I identify and critique some of the purported justifications for the historic and current expropriation of property in New Zealand, using the examples of petroleum, gold and silver.

    II.        Purported Justifications
    One of the earliest attempts to justify an inroad into property rights in sub-soil was made in The Case of Mines. Three arguments offered by counsel for the queen are recorded which I have labelled excellence, necessity and currency:

    Excellence: “because gold and silver were the most excellent products of the soil, they should, ipso facto, go to the Queen, who was the most excellent person in the realm.”[29]

    Necessity: “That the King as head of the realm needed the money to keep up the army and enforce the laws.”[30]

    Currency: “That gold was necessary or coin or commerce, and the Crown ought to have it to mint,”[31]

    Whilst “none of the reasoning of the judges is given, just the bare decision”,[32] I will assume that the reasons offered by counsel were the reasons accepted by the court and address the merits of each in turn.

    The excellence argument is clearly problematic as it is not a given that the monarch will always be the most excellent person in the realm (especially when one pauses to consider the character and conduct of some of England’s monarchs). Further, even assuming that a monarch is the most excellent person in the realm, it would not follow that this attribute confers an automatic right to the most excellent form of every conceivable thing regardless of whether those things were owned by other people. Further, the assumption that gold is the most excellent of metals suggests that ‘excellent’ is being used in an economic sense to denote gold as the most economically valuable of metals. However, if this assumption is correct then the most excellent person must be the richest, which would entail that anyone wealthier than the queen was entitled to take her gold (an argument that I am fairly confident counsel for the queen did not intend).

    The other two arguments are more plausible. They both speak to the state’s need to be able to finance the discharge of its basic functions (i.e. defence, justice, minting the currency, etc) and, as such, are arguably extensions of the necessity justification. Given the then threat of Spanish invasion, the need to raise an army in times of war and the practical uses of gold and silver in the 16th century, these arguments may have had some merit. However, in contemporary New Zealand where the core functions of government are funded by taxation, where we keep a standing army and our currency is not minted from, or based on, gold and silver, the elements of necessity that ground the reasoning within The Case of Mines are not currently present.

    As current precedent The Case of Mines can justifiably affirm the principle that in situations of necessity, such as defence or natural disaster, where the state needs a particular mineral and cannot realistically obtain it from within its own lands or by trade then it might be justified in expropriating it from private citizens for the duration of the necessity. Something like this justification was arguably present in the passage of the Petroleum Act 1937. Oil had become a mineral of strategic importance to defence as the British Royal Navy fleet had converted to oil in 1914. This proved to be critical in their sea victories during WWI. In 1919 existing regulations governing the extraction of oil were extended to private land. Driven largely by the British Navy’s need for oil, a post-war search for oil in the British Colonies began.

    In 1927 a Petroleum Bill was drafted but abandoned. At the time, the petroleum industry was growing by itself; Shell and BP were both active in New Zealand, private agreements to extract petroleum were being struck and the national urgency in the wake of WWI was waning. However, as the 1930’s progressed, issues of national defence increasingly came back into focus;[33]

    The growing strategic threat from Japan and Germany caused the New Zealand government to focus on the need to increase investment by international oil companies in the discovery and extraction of New Zealand’s oil reserves – and on the ability of those companies to deal with a single owner (the government) as being ‘in the national interest’.

    The Petroleum Act 1937 nationalised all petroleum. The justifications cited were petroleum’s strategic importance in defence, the economy, transport and the preference of the oil companies to deal with a single party.[34] Whilst the appeal to national interests found broad support within society, the passage of the act was highly controversial.[35] It was disputed that the expropriation of private property was necessary to achieve the objectives and the lack of compensation was widely objected to, particularly so by Maori.

    The Waitangi Tribunal reports that “Maori shared in the wider endorsement, and their challenge was not to the intent to nationalise the resource but to the failure to pay landowners compensation for their loss of property rights under the common law and the Treaty.”[36] The 1937 Act did not grant royalties to the landowners despite the provision to do this initially being left open;[37]

    The approach of the government in 1937 and 1938 was based on the position that, where the ‘national interest’ justified action and where the owners of the confiscated rights could be presumed to share in the national benefits of the policy, no compensation for the loss of private property rights need be paid.

    The government of the day appeared to hold that property rights could be justifiably overridden without compensation on the grounds of “national interests.” Traditionally these were a mixture of strategic national security issues and economic benefits to the country as whole.

    A.        National Security Justifications
    Now earlier I suggested that the necessity justification may apply to such appeals; however, the strategic necessity arising from factors such as the threat posed by Germany, Japan, Spain or the British Navy’s need for oil is no longer present (the British navy is these days increasingly nuclear propelled and the New Zealand Navy barely has a fleet). Yet despite the change in the strategic situation, legislation asserting ownership of petroleum, gold, silver, and uranium to the state remain — in fact, post-WWII legislation has affirmed their position as state property “whether or not the land has been alienated” and has reserved additional minerals to the collection.[38] (In the case of the continued state reservation of uranium this seems rather odd given that it appears incapable of attaining the standard for military necessity given New Zealand’s nuclear free policies.)

    B.        Economic Justifications
    Peter Ackroyd suggests that taking property to acquire economic benefit was a driving justification for many of New Zealand’s past legislative acts. He cites from Hansard, “The Colony, however, could not afford to dispense with the mining industry, and every effort should be made by the Legislature to assist in maintaining its position.” [39]

    It is indisputable that a prosperous mining industry can contribute greatly to the progress of a society; however, whether the gain of this benefit, in and of itself, can justify the taking of another’s property seems rather dubious. Almost any taking of one person’s property by another will economically advantage the taker yet this does not typically justify taking (even if the taker invested the property in a way that ended up benefiting the takee). Every person has a right to retain their justly acquired property and to have the taking of it protected by law. Paternalistic justifications such as “it is economically good for you” are not normally grounds for overriding the rights of adults.

    In the event that someone does take from another, it is normal practice under the principles of restorative justice that the taker be required to compensate the takee. Likewise, when a state takes property in the name of national or economic interest it was recognised at common law that compensation must be paid. Further it is common to find this requirement in other jurisdictions. A recent survey of the constitutional legislation within 30 OECD countries showed that 28 expressly acknowledge property rights and 24 required expropriations of property rights to be adequately justified and to not occur without compensation.[40]

    In New Zealand the CMA provides compensation for the disturbance of the land caused by mining activities but not for the loss of the minerals. The situation is analogous to a judge ordering a burglar to fix the window broken during the burglary but permitting the burglar to keep the widescreen plasma TV he took from the house.

    As cited earlier, a justification commonly offered for the state’s failure to pay compensation is that “the owners of the confiscated rights could be presumed to share in the national benefits of the policy.” Lewis Evans, Neil Quigley and Kevin Counsell identify a problem with this line of reasoning;[41]

    This position will … only be justified if it can be shown that those affected by the confiscation of the private rights will receive benefits roughly equivalent in value to the share of the benefits that they would have otherwise received. In this case [the Petroleum Act], of course, no such analysis was done.

    Even if the state did undertake this analysis of costs and benefits, the justification fails to note that compensation does not actually introduce any additional cost. The following example will bear this out. A person owns a piece of property, P. P is worth a certain value, V. If the state expropriates P and fails to compensate the owner then the owner loses V. However, if the state does compensate the owner then the state loses the value of V. Either way, someone is going to pay the cost of V. The question is who should bear this cost – the private owner or the government? Both the loss and the cost remain the same regardless of who bears it.[42]

    Lewis, Evans & Quigley note that the absence of compensation increases the chance that the state will over-estimate the benefits of various takings and not accurately measure the costs.[43]

    Uncompensated confiscation is not justified by actions that are deemed by politicians to be ‘in the public interest’. It is too easy for interest groups who benefit from government actions but bear none of those costs to create the appearance of a public benefit when none in fact exists. If there is a public interest, its value must be quantified against the loss to the private property rights that would be destroyed by the action. In the absence of this accounting, government will overuse its power of eminent domain and will engage in actions that impose net costs on society as a whole.

    As shown above, compensating owners does not increase the cost to society but a policy permitting expropriation without compensation may.

    III.       Conclusion
    I have argued that there is a common law presumption in favour of property rights, which is based on a moral principle antecedent to state recognition. According to this principle, a state must justify any expropriation of property. While I granted that expropriation may be able to be justified on certain grounds, contemporary New Zealand does not currently meet such grounds. Expropriation on economic grounds is far more dubious and even if this ground could be justified, the absence of statutory provisions for compensation renders such takings unjust.


    [29] James Parcell “A Thesis on the Prerogative Right of the Crown to Royal Metals” (Government Printer, Wellington, 1960) 13.
    [30] Ibid 14.
    [31]
    Ibid.
    [32] Ibid 11. Parcell suggests that the report was a forgery or had been embellished.
    [33]
    Lewis Evans, Neil Quigley & Kevin Counsell “Protection of Private Property Rights and Just Compensation: An Economic Analysis of the Most Fundamental Human Right Not Provided in New Zealand” (2009) New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation (at 21 January 2010) 23.
    [34] Ibid 23-24.
    [35] Hansard and the national archives record fierce debate; breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi were alleged and the Petroleum Haka became part of New Zealand history.
    [36] Waitangi Tribunal The Petroleum Report – Wai 796 (2003) 29.
    [37]
    Lewis, Evans & Quigley, above n 33, 24.
    [38] Key examples: Atomic Energy Act 1945; Coal Act 1948, 1949; Iron and Steel Industry Act 1959; Mining Act 1971, which were all brought under the CMA.
    [39] Peter Ackroyd “Mining Legislation and the Reservation of Mineral Resources in New Zealand” [1988] NZLJ 41, 42.
    [40]
    Lewis, Evans & Quigley, above n 33, 43-48.
    [41] Lewis, Evans & Quigley, above n 33, 24.
    [42]
    I am grateful to Matthew Flannagan for the development of this argument.
    [43] Lewis, Evans & Quigley, above n 33, 41.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Can State Expropriation of Minerals be Justified? Part I
    Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part I
    Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part II