Category: Ethics

  • Statism and Wealth Re-Distribution

    A post by Glenn caught my eye the other day and I have not been able to stop thinking about it as despite knowing that Glenn knows what he is talking about in this field, I just am struggling to believe his numbers. It really is proof-positive of the socialist extent of Labour’s policies in practice and should serve as a warning to anyone tempted to vote Labour because they think the criticims levelled at Labour’s attempts to turn as many working people into beneficiaries dependant on the state as possible are exaggerated.

    I have reproduced some of it below as it warrants further exposure.

    Extract from New Zealand: Land of greed, envy and political stupidity (the election blog, part 1)

    Wealth re-distribution is at an almost unbelievable level at present. Take a family with one income earner. At current taxation levels, with an annual income of $40,000, that income earner will pay $7770.00 in PAYE (“pay as you earn”). This includes income tax plus 1.4% ACC (socialised accident compensation insurance). On the whole, that’s about 19.43%. If the earner works more hours or gets a more skilled job that pays more and the income is $70,000, the total PAYE is $18,090. That’s about 25.84%. It gets worse if you earn more than that.

    But it does not end there. Let’s add this to the mix: This family has four children below the age of 12. This means that this family will qualify for state welfare for those children. Use the calculators at www.workingforfamilies.govt.nz to check the figures for yourselves. Let’s imagine that there are two families with one earner in each, one earning 40K and the other earning 70K. I’ll be taking into account the payments received from the “working for families” welfare scheme as well as the accommodation supplement each of these families will qualify for. I’ve arbitrarily hypothesised that these two different families live in the same city that I live in, and pay the same amount of rent that my family pays. Taking all of the above into account, here is the weekly combined income from all sources – after tax – for these two families.

    Family 1, earning $40,000:
    Total after tax weekly income (including welfare payments) of $1018.27
    This family will pay $7770 in PAYE and receive $19,916 in state welfare. No, that is not a typo. Nineteen thousand, nine hundred and sixteen dollars of untaxed welfare payments.

    Family 2, earning $70,000:
    Total after tax income of $1208.27
    This family will pay $18,090 in PAYE and receive $10,920 in state welfare.


    Take a few moments to take this in: Family 2 earns $576.92 more than family 1 each week. For their extra effort or skill, they end up just $190 better off each week.

    The level of wealth re-distribution to minimise the difference in income between these two families is staggering. And yet, each of these families is a recipient of a sizable chunk of the re-distributed wealth of others. The first family effectively pays no tax at all and then receives a further cash bonus of $12,146. But even the higher earning family still receives well over half of the earner’s PAYE payments back.

    Who are the benefactors here? The benefactors are those without children who are trying to get by on $30,000 per year and not receiving a penny from working for families (but still qualifying for an accommodation supplement of about $60 per week). The other benefactors are those who receive none of these taxpayer funded handouts but who fund a huge proportion of them: those who contribute more tax because they earn more.

    Essentially, the financial landscape this creates is one where a family on a low to medium income with several children has little incentive to increase their salary/wages beyond around $36,000 (the level at which state handouts start to decrease). Even if they had a salary of $70,000, the difference in financial positions would not reflect this increase in earnings.

    That’s what I’m talking about when I talk about statism and wealth redistribution. It’s not just rhetoric without substance. It’s a real system that demonstrably penalises the high achievers, and for everyone else it serves as the great equaliser, making it seem like nobody’s earning more than anyone else. When everyone gets ahead – nobody gets ahead, nor is there any incentive to do so.

  • Is Abortion Liberal? Part 2

    In my previous post, Is Abortion Liberal? Part 1, I argued that liberals who support the non-initiation of force principle can support abortion only on two grounds;

    (a) the fetus is a person but its existence inside the mother without her consent constitutes a form aggression, and hence, the mother’s action of killing it is defensive; or,
    (b) a fetus is not a person.

    I will now address each of these in turn.

    Is the Fetus an Aggressor?
    Consider first (a), the contention that a fetus can be considered an aggressor because it is intruding upon a woman’s body without her consent; an intrusion grave enough to justify the use of lethal force. In this respect then, being subject to an unplanned pregnancy would be on par with being the recipient of a serious assault such as being raped or severely beaten.

    Frank Beckwith and Steve Thomas in Consent, Sex and the Pre-Natal Rapist, have demonstrated several problems with this claim. It leads to the conclusion that, in certain circumstances abortion is justified without the consent of the woman.

    Consider the following scenario. A young woman is involved in a car accident and is rendered unconscious by her injuries. She is brought to a hospital where, still comatose, she is examined by a doctor. While performing some tests, the doctor determines that the woman has been pregnant for several weeks. Furthermore, suppose that evidence comes to light to suggest that the woman is unaware of her pregnancy, perhaps her close friends know nothing of the pregnancy, her diary shows no knowledge of being pregnant, and so on.

    Adopting McDonagh’s understanding of pregnancy as morally equivalent to rape or assault, what is the doctor’s obligation to this unconscious patient? It would seem that, under these conditions, the doctor is morally required to perform an abortion to rid his patient of the ‘massive intrusion’ being imposed upon her by her unborn offspring. After regaining consciousness, the woman would have to be told that she’s undergone an abortion for a pregnancy of which she was not aware, for there was good evidence that no consent had been given and that she was under assault.[i]

    Beckwith’s point is that if the fetus is morally or legally on par with an aggressor who intrudes upon a woman’s body without her consent, such as a assailant or rapist then it would follow that in the case sketched above the doctor would be justified (and arguably would have an obligation) to abort despite the fact that no consent from the women had been obtained.

    Consider, that if one saw a person having sex with an unconscious woman and one knew the woman had not consented, it would be absurd to wait for the woman to wake up to see if she wanted to consent to sex. One would be obligated to intervene. “[T]he doctor in the midst of the situation, aware of the pregnancy in the absence of consent, must see it as the rape-in-progress of his unconscious patient. How could he do anything else but end the assault?”[ii]

    Now I assume that liberals would oppose the idea that any woman who both does not know she is pregnant and is unconscious should be subjected to an abortion without her consent. If this is the case then it is clear that they do not think that an unconsented to pregnancy constitutes an act of serious aggression.

    If the fetus is an unjust aggressor then liberals are committed to coercive abortions. If coercive abortions are not liberal then the fetus is not an unjust aggressor.

    Is the Fetus a Person?
    If the fetus is not an unjust aggressor then a liberal defense of abortion must be based upon (b), the idea that a fetus is not a person, a being that possesses the rights to life, liberty and property that liberals believe the state exists to protect.

    Now a fetus is clearly a human organism. After 14 days at least, it is an individual living being that is a member of the species homo sapiens. To justify abortion via (b), the liberal needs to tell us what property a human being possesses that grounds the right to not be subjected to the initiation of force, to not be killed. Further a liberal must also be able to plausibly maintain that a human organism does not acquire this property until after the fetal stage.

    Peter Cresswell takes the view,

    [T]he foetus is not yet a human being, but a part of a human being – the mother – who has rights over it. To be an actual, rather than merely potential, human being is, among other things, to be physically separate, which a foetus is not.

    This claim is erroneous. First the “parts of” relationship is transitive; if a brick is part of a wall and the wall part of a house then the brick is part of the house. If a fetus is part of a woman’s body it follows then that any organ that is part of the fetus will be part of the mother. A woman pregnant at eight weeks then possesses four arms, four legs and two brains. If the fetus is male, she will have both a vagina and a penis and be both male and female. Conclusions that are even more bizarre follow if the woman is pregnant with twins. She could have three faces, three brains, six arms, two penises and a vagina, three hearts, six kidneys and so on.[iv]

    Moreover, PC’s contention that “to be an actual human” one must be “physically separate” entails that conjoined twins are not human. Consider conjoined twins Bob and Scott. If Bob is a human being then since Scott cannot live independently of Bob, Scott must not be a human person (the converse is equally true).

    Yet it is difficult to see what property Bob has that Scott lacks which would justify considering one of them human and the other not simply because neither is dependant of the other. It appears then, that one would be forced to conclude that they both are and are not, human. Perhaps PC is simply giving a poorly worded defence of the viability criteria, which I have previously critiqued here.

    However, the usual liberal response is to ground the right to not be subjected to the initiation of force, to not be killed, in certain psychological capacities that human beings typically display; such things as sentience, rationality, self-awareness, autonomy, etc.

    Despite the pervasive appeal of this approach, it faces serious problems. Boonin notes that those who attempt to ground humanity in the amount of brain development an organism has face a dilemma. “Any appeal to what a brain can do at various stages of development would seem to have to appeal to what the brain can already do. Or to what the brain has the potential to do in the future.”[v]

    Either option leads to problems for a defender of the permissibility of abortion who does not also want to endorse infanticide. This is because “by any plausible measure dogs, and cats, cows and pigs, chickens and ducks or more intellectually developed than a new born infant.”[vi] Suppose, then, one takes the first horn and appeals to what the brain can already do. However, unless one wishes to affirm that cats, dogs and chickens are human beings, “appeals to what the brain can already do” will “be unable to account for the presumed wrongness of killing toddlers or infants.”[vii] Suppose, then, one takes up the second horn of the dilemma and appeals to “what the brain has the potential to do in the future;”[viii] Boonin notes that this will entail that feticide is homicide. “If [such an account] allows appeals to what the brain has the potential to do in the future, then it will have to include fetuses as soon as their brains begin to emerge, during the first few weeks of gestation.”[ix]

    A couple of examples will illustrate this. Suppose the liberal appeals to sentience, the capacity for consciousness and the ability to perceive pleasure and pain. This criterion will mean abortion is permissible up to 24 weeks.[x] The problem is that this criterion also catches cats, dogs, cows, and chickens as well all. All of which are as sentient if not more sentient than new born infants and post-24 week fetuses.

    If the liberal draws the line at sentience, he/she will have to hold that farming, butchers shops, McDonald’s restaurants, Kentucky fried Chicken restaurants all engage in unjustified aggression against people because they kill sentient beings without their consent. Further, to remain consistent, the liberal will have to maintain a policy of outlawing all these industries and prosecuting those who engage in them for murder and cannibalism.

    Suppose the liberal appeals to more advanced psychological states such as self-awareness, rationality or autonomy. Such accounts of the grounding of rights will exclude the animals mentioned above and will exclude human fetuses. The problem is, according to this account, newborn infants are not persons either.

    In a definitive study of infanticide, Michael Tooley compiles an impressive array of neurological and physiological data that demonstrates that infants are not persons in this sense until some time after birth.[xi] The price of this line of inference is the reduction of newborn infants to the ethical level of cows. A newborn cow, and certainly a mature cow, is more person-like than an infant is. It is difficult to understand by this view why killing and eating infants is any more problematic than consuming a Big Mac.

    Of course the liberal can avoid this by claiming that it is the potential to acquire properties such as rationality, self-awareness, autonomy, not their actuality that matters. This will enable one to claim infants are protected by the non-initiation of force principle and will exclude animals. But the problem of course is that foetuses will also be protected by the non-initiation of force principle because fetuses also have the potential to possess these properties.

    In summation, liberal proponents of the non-initiation of force principle can only support abortion if they are willing to be inconsistent and arbitrary in their application of the principle or if they are willing to endorse not just infanticide but the eating of newborn infants or state mandated vegetarianism or coercive abortions. These policies are an anathema to most liberals; as such, abortion is not liberal.

    UPDATE: In response to comments below see Sentience Part 1 and Sentience Part 2.

    [i] Francis J. Beckwith & Stephen Thomas, “Consent, Sex, and the Prenatal Rapist; A Brief Reply to McDonagh’s Suggested Revision of Roe v Wade,” Journal of Libertarian Studies 17: 3 (2003): 4.
    [ii] Ibid, 6.
    [iii] Peter Creswell, “Not PC: Cue Card Libertarianism – Abortion”.
    [iv] Here I am influenced by Peter Kreeft, The Unaborted Socrates (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1983), 45-47 and Francis J Beckwith, Politically Correct Death, 124.
    [v] David Boonin, A Defense of Abortion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 125.
    [vi] Ibid, 121.
    [vii] Ibid.
    [viii] Ibid.
    [ix] Ibid.
    [x] It is generally accepted that sentience occurs around 24 week’s gestation. There is some dispute over this and some scientists date sentience in the first 10 weeks of gestation.
    [xi] Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) Ch. 11.5.

  • Is Abortion Liberal? Part 1

    Laws permitting abortion on demand are often deemed to be liberal. Further, political liberals are frequently ardent defenders of such laws. I think these conclusions are mistaken. In a series of two posts I will provide some reasons why.

    Most contemporary liberals advocate a form of the harm principle, famously articulated by Mill in On Liberty,

    The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.[i] [Emphasis added]

    Mill here draws a distinction between other-regarding actions, actions that harm other people, and self-regarding actions, those that harm oneself. He argues that society, either by law or by social pressure, cannot justly regulate any action a person performs unless it is other-regarding; that is, it harms people other than the agent him/herself. As Mill’s position is typically interpreted harm is understood to be governed by the principle volenti non fit injuria (where there is consent, there is no injury) and hence refers to things done to other people without their consent. On this interpretation, self-regarding actions are those that people consent to and that harm no non-consenting, third party. As Mill himself notes, a self-regarding action is that “which affects only himself, or affects others with their free and voluntary, and undeceived consent”.[ii]

    The most common version of the harm principle is known as the non-initiation of force principle; Rothbard sums it up well,

    The libertarian creed rests upon one central axiom: that no man or group of men may aggress against the person or property of anyone else. This may be called the “nonaggression axiom.” “Aggression” is defined as the initiation of the use or threat of physical violence against the person or property of anyone else. Aggression is therefore synonymous with invasion.[iii]

    I do not subscribe to the harm principle or the non-initiation of force interpretation of it (I give some reasons why here). However, in this series of posts I will adopt it for the sake of argument so as to examine what follows for abortion. Abortion involves killing a fetus, usually by dismembering it. Moreover, the fetus does not consent to it. Hence if a Liberal is to support abortion he/she must do so for only one of two reasons. Either,

    (a) the fetus is a person but its existence inside the mother without her consent constitutes a form aggression, and hence, the mother’s action of killing it is defensive; or,
    (b) a fetus is not a person.

    Only if one of these two options is adopted, can a liberal support the non-initiation of force principle and permissive abortion legislation and remain consistent.

    Failed Avoidance Tactics
    At this juncture it is worth noting that two very common tactics of avoiding this conclusion fail. The first is to defend abortion, as Rodney Hide tried to at the recent Family First Forum, on the basis of the perceived positive social consequences of ‘liberal’ abortion laws. In popular political discourse, and in some feminist writings, abortion is defended on consequentialist grounds; it is argued that abortion prevents unwanted children, children who are likely to be poor, abused, neglected or engage in crime. It is hailed as a solution to over-population and the existence of handicapped people. It prevents adult and teenage women from falling into economic hardship and stress and enables them to complete their education, pursue their careers and so on.

    The problem with this line of argument is that this is only cogent for liberals if they assume that abortion does not violate the non-initiation of force principle. If abortion does violate this principle then allowing abortion on these grounds would be tantamount to saying that people can engage in aggression (as Rothbard defines it) they can initiate lethal force against others provided doing so brings about positive consequences, like lower crime rates, less child abuse, lower population rates, access to education and employment, etc. This conclusion contradicts the non-initiation of force principle which states that one cannot justly pursue social utility by violating an individual’s right to life, liberty or property; the very basis of their opposition to socialism.

    The second avoidance tactic is to appeal to slogans such as “you can’t force your morality onto others, you can’t legislate morality”. The problem with these claims is that the non-initiation of force principle is itself a moral principle and liberals believe the state should enforce this principle and should defend people against others who would violate it. This forces a dilemma upon liberals who cite this slogan; either the claim “you can’t force your morality onto others” applies to the non-initiation of force principle or it does not. If it does, then abortion involves an unjust imposition of morality onto another only if you assume it is not the initiation of force. If it does not, then liberalism as a doctrine collapses as the state has no duty to protect the life, liberty and property of its citizens from aggression. In fact, it entails the conclusion that acts of aggression such as rape and murder should be decriminalised alongside abortion.

    It follows then that the liberal cannot rationally avoid the question. If one is to both support ‘liberal’ abortion laws and hold to the non-initiation of force principle, one must do so either on (a) or (b) above. I think neither is terribly defensible. I will address (a) the fetus is a person but its existence inside the mother without her consent constitutes a form aggression, and hence, the mother’s action of killing it is defensive; and, (b) a fetus is not a person, in my next post, Is Abortion Liberal? Part 2.

    [i] John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: Penguin Classics, 1985), 69.
    [ii] Ibid. 71.
    [iii] Murray N Rothbard, For A New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto (New York: Collier Books, 2002) 23.

  • More Reasons to not Vote Green: Population Control gets a Global Warming Twist

    The blogosphere is abuzz with the Greens new Family Policy which

    “proposes setting a level of population New Zealand could sustain and leaving room within that for climate change refugees from Pacific Islands.

    They also want parents educated about the impacts of population growth when they are planning their family size and how far apart to have children.”

    The myraid of problems that scream from those two sentences is so large I am not sure where to begin.

    National, ACT and the Maori Party are declaring it a step in the direction of China’s one child policy.

    Rodney Hide, making a carbon credits joke, said “that perhaps if parents planted a field of trees, they might be able to have twins.”

    David Farrar makes the point that New Zealand already has a declining population rate and has done for some time anyway which makes one wonder why issue the policy?

    Zen Tiger quotes from Frog Blog “Do we as humans have a ‘right to breed’?” this reminded me of other crazy lefty ideas like Jim Flynn’s Thoughts on Contraception.

    Keith Locke, at a loss to understand why most New Zealanders would react negatively to the policy, claims they have been misinterpreted:

    “There is no way the Green Party would ever dictate to any parent how many children they should have, … Every child is a loved and wanted child. It would also be racist to try to dictate family size, given that the various ethnic groups in our society have different birthrates.”

    There are two problems in the above quote that are not being criticised about the blogosphere that I will highlight here.

    The every child is a loved and wanted slogan is ambiguous. It could mean that every child that comes into existence, no matter how it comes into existence, is loved and wanted, or, it could mean that every child that is unwanted should be taken out of existence. Both these situations would lead to every child being wanted.

    The statement is a eugenicist slogan promoted primarily by family planning movement which advocate the latter interpretation and promote the latter interpretation via abortion, contraception and sterilisation, campaigning against unplanned pregnancy. Now, I am not opposed to contraception or sterilisation or people knowing how to prevent unplanned pregnancy. My problem is that this organisation is opposed to all and every unplanned pregnancy, even those within stable, married, well-positioned-to-provide families. Dig a little on Family Planning and you find they are a sinister organisation whose roots are in eugenics, we have posted previously on the odiousness of family planning here.

    So when Keith Locke used this statement which interpretation did he mean? Given the context of the policy, I think we can safely assume the latter.

    The second issue is the Green’s definition of racism the reasons they cite for why if they were in fact dictating how many kids families should have it would be wrong. Lets have a closer look at Keith Locke’s statement:

    “It would also be racist to try to dictate family size, given that the various
    ethnic groups in our society have different birthrates.”

    His argument essentially is that ethnic groups have different birth-rates so to impose one birth-rate, to disagree or be at odds with another ethnicity’s viewpoint on this subject, is racist. Racism according to the Greens is defined as disagreeing with the cultural values of another. I don’t agree with the cannibalism practices of some ethnicities – guess I am a racist.

    Further, the only reason he offers as to why “the Green Party would ever dictate to any parent how many children they should have” is that to do so would be racist. The fact that such a dictum would be nanny-statist, eugenicist and is so far out of the realm of the proper role of the state that it is just plain, outright, wrong seems to be lost on him; but why am I not surprised?

  • On the Meta-Euthyphro Objection

    According to proponents of the Euthyphro Objection, defenders of a Divine Command Theory of Ethics face a dilemma, actions are morally-required either because:

    (i) God commands them;

    or,

    (ii) God commands them because they are morally-required.

    The latter (ii) entails that actions are right and wrong independently of God’s commands and as such, a Divine Command Theory of Ethics is false. The former (i), however, is said to be problematic for two reasons: [a] if things are morally-required because God prohibits them, then God’s commands are arbitrary; if God commanded gratuitous torture then gratuitous torture would be morally-required. Moreover [b], the claim that God is good is emptied of any substantive content; to say God is good is simply to say God does what He wills.

    I am unimpressed with this argument. In previous posts I have argued why. Despite the popularity of this line of argument (seen by its repetition in almost every first year ethics text book I have read) I think these two arguments are not powerful at all. On a Judeo-Christian concept of God, God is understood to have a certain type of character and to possess certain virtues. As the Westminister Confession states, God is:

    [M]ost loving, gracious, merciful, long-suffering, abundant in goodness and truth, forgiving iniquity, transgression, and sin; the rewarder of them that diligently seek Him; and withal, most just, and terrible in His judgments, hating all sin, and who will by no means clear the guilty.

    Once this is realised, one can take (i) and avoid the problems [a] and [b] that are supposed to afflict the affirmation of this horn of the dilemma that the Euthyphro Objection raises. One can avoid [a] because it is not coherent to claim that a being with certain virtues would command actions like gratuitous torture. Likewise, one can avoid [b] because claiming God possesses certain character traits does not commit one to the claim that his goodness consists merely in doing as he wills, and these traits provide substantive content to the claim that God is good.

    In the discussion here Mark V posted an astute response:

    “You say that God is good because he posseses certain character traits that we regard as good. But why do we regard them as good? Is it because God possesses these traits or because they conform to some external standard of goodness?”

    If I understand Mark’s objection here, he is suggesting that even if my solution to the Euthyphro Objection is successful, the same problem arises again on another level, now we are faced with the same dilemma all over again with regard to the goodness of God’s character traits. Either they are good because God possesses them or God possesses them because they are good.

    Although Mark doesn’t say so, I think he means to suggest that the same problems with each option of the Euthyphro Objection also apply to this new issue. If a person claims that God possesses these traits because they are good then goodness exists independently of, and prior to God, which appears to compromise the doctrine of divine aseity. However, if a person claims that God’s traits are good because he possesses them then analogues to the arbitrariness [a] and emptiness [b] objections apply. Let’s call this line of argument the Meta-Euthyphro Objection.

    I want to suggest that neither option Mark suggests is quite right. It is not the case that God’s character traits are good because he possesses them, neither is it the case that they are possessed by God because they are good. Instead I want to suggest that these traits are good because God prefers himself to have them.

    An obvious rejoinder to this claim is that it really avoids the issue. Whether God’s character is good because he prefers himself to have it instead of it being good because he possesses it does not make an iota of difference. I am still faced with analogues of [a] the arbitrariness and [b] the emptiness objections aren’t I?

    Actually I think the answer to this is no. To see why, note that when Mark asks:

    “You say that God is good because he posseses certain character traits that we
    regard as good. But why do we regard them as good?”

    He grants there is nothing problematic about God having these traits but rather that the question is what makes Him having them a good thing? But this fact disarms both the arbitrariness [a] and emptiness [b] objections.

    Turning to [a], the arbitrariness objection, when this objection is applied to the claim that God’s character traits are good because God prefers to have them, the [a] contends that God’s preference of the traits in question is arbitrary; after all, he could just as well have preferred to be vicious and cruel, and if he did, it would be good to be vicious and cruel.

    The problem is that this is based on a false assumption. If God has the character traits in question then it is not true that he could have preferred just any traits; a person who has the following traits will not desire to be a vicious or cruel person “loving, gracious, merciful, long-suffering, abundant in … truth, forgiving…” Holding these traits means that there are certain things that one does not desire or want to see happen. That is part of what having such traits means.

    Similar things apply to the emptiness charge [b]. Just as before, one could say that when we say that God is good, we mean that he possesses certain character traits which are normally recognised as paradigmatic examples of goodness. Now the suggestion that a trait is good because a being who displays paradigmatically good character traits prefers it does not seem trivial at all.

    I conclude then that the Meta-Euthyphro Objection does not fair any better than its predecessor; one can meaningfully attribute goodness to God and say that God’s duties constitute our obligations, and we can do so without making goodness independent of God. I maintain then that the standard textbook objections remain unsound.

  • John Key on Religion and Public Life

    A few weeks ago someone gave me a copy of this interview with John Key. Now the first thing to note is that the article was published by Gaynz.com. Gaynz.com are not a terribly reliable media outlet, and Madeleine would say that they are beneath the term “media outlet”. Hence, much of what is written may be highly inaccurate. Despite this, if John Key did say these things, how should one respond to them? I will endeavour to do this in this post.f

    Key states he voted against civil unions because the majority in his electorate were opposed it. This is clearly an inadequate stance, suppose that same-sex sex is wrong, contrary to the laws of God. If this is the case, Key is suggesting that he would follow the beliefs and will of the majority over the beliefs of an omniscient, all knowing, perfectly-good God. This is irrational to say the least. The mistaken views that are popular are more authoritative than the decree of God.

    On the other hand, suppose there is nothing wrong with same-sex sex. Suppose that discriminating against such unions is on par with discriminating against inter-racial unions. Then Key is suggesting he would follow the racial prejudices of the majority even though he abhors this prejudice himself.

    Such a position is bizarre. For my part I expect legislators to be people of integrity and have the courage of their convictions to stand against evil and injustice even when it is unpopular to do so.

    Key dismisses the argument that “civil unions undermine marriage” in a far too cavalier manner. Though I myself do not endorse this argument, I believe a critique of it should be based on an accurate and fair interpretation which must also be a valid argument. Key’s is neither. Key responds by saying, “I have been married for 22 years and the fact that a gay couple may choose to have a Civil Union would have absolutely no impact on my marriage to my wife”. But that is not the issue. Opponents of civil unions claimed it would undermine the institution of marriage not that it would under mine one particular person’s marriage.

    Of course Key is not alone in dismissing the arguments of others simply by a cavalier caricature, but this fact does not alter the spuriousness of doing so.

    Key states “I don’t care what people’s sexual preferences are” and states that a persons sexual preference “is their business and their business alone.” Several things can be said here; first whether Key cares about an issue is irrelevant. The issue is whether certain actions are right or wrong and this is not determined by Key’s personal feelings.

    Second, if a person’s “sexual preferences” are “their business alone” why does he have no problem with the State solemnising and legally recognising a person’s sexual union. If it is no one else’s business then why is it the states business?

    Thirdly, contrary to what Key says, a person’s “sexual preference” is relevant. Some people prefer little children; by definition this is a sexual preference. If Keys’ trite sounding slogan were correct, this is their business alone and no one else’s.

    Similarly Key notes that “We have friends who are gay and lesbian, just as we have dozens of friends who are heterosexual.” This may be true but it is beside the point. The fact that you know people who do something does not mean the State should endorse their activity through recognising and solemnising it. I have had friends who sleep around and regularly get intoxicated. Does that mean that the government should set up state funded clinics for those who want casual sex or provide tax payer funded alcohol?

    In discussing the origins of same-sex attraction Key states “I believe it is innate. I am not an expert in these areas but I have had all these religious groups in my electoral office trying to argue that this is learned behaviour, personally I believe that is crap.” It is not just religious people who make that claim (and not all religious people do anyway). Socially liberal New York University Sociologist, Dr David Greenberg, in his book “The Construction of Homosexuality” concluded that homosexual conduct is socially learned. He based this on a huge survey of cross-cultural studies. This work may be mistaken, but I think Key is reaching if he thinks his credentials warrant writing off such research as “crap” because of what his consciousness tells him.

    Key goes on to note: “I think we largely live in a secular society, I think there are many religions operating in NZ and it is in the best interests of the state to make decisions that are on a secular basis so they don’t discriminate. I’m no supporter of these hard right religions. [For instance,] I was never offered, I would never have accepted any financial support from the Exclusive Brethren. I met them as a constituency MP, as I would meet anyone as a constituency MP on constituency issues as I believe it’s wrong to discriminate.”

    There is so much here it is hard to know where to begin.

    Key states “we live in a secular society”. This mantra is trotted out by politicians of the left and right continually, but it is spurious. The fact that society currently displays a trait does not mean it ought to display that trait, we currently live in a Labour led society, does Key think that means Labour ought to continue to lead?

    Key goes on to state he does not believe in discrimination. However, he then immediately notes that he does not “support hard right religions.” His position is contradictory; unless Key does not support any groups at all (which is clearly false he supports National) he is discriminating against these groups as he is supporting some but not others.

    Moreover, legislation by its nature discriminates. A law regulates human conduct, it states that people who engage in certain actions will be censured (incarcerated or fined) while people who do not engage in those actions will not. This is discrimination. Contrary to what Key states discrimination in and of itself is a morally neutral concept. Some types of discrimination are wrong i.e. depriving people of their life on the basis of their race, and others are not, depriving people of liberty because they have committed murder. The fact that such an elementary and obvious point is lost on someone who seeks to lead the country speaks volumes for the intellectual and moral acumen of today’s politicians.

    However, Key’s core argument is “I think there are many religions operating in NZ and it is in the best interests of the state to make decisions that are on a secular basis so they don’t discriminate.” The argument here seems to be that because there are many differing religious groups in NZ, it would be discriminatory to base the laws on moral principles taught by only some of these groups. Hence legislation should be based on secular (i.e non-religious) values and ideals.

    The problem is that if this argument is not sound. If it were, there is an equally sound argument for the claim that we should not base laws on secular values and ideals.

    Consider, there are many secular philosophies operating in NZ. They disagree on all sorts of matters. Compare the Socialist Workers Party with the Objectivist Society, or both with the New Zealand Association of Rationalists and Humanists. Hence, if we follow Key’s logic, to avoid discrimination we need to base laws on “non-secular aims”.

    In fact one can push this silly argument further, there are numerous different political parties in NZ, hence to avoid discrimination we should not base laws on the aims or values of any political party. Which means that if elected Prime Minister, Key will not support any National Party policies being implemented.

    Does any of the above mean that people should not vote for National? Not necessarily. While Key is clearly mistaken on these issues, it does not follow that he is mistaken on every other issues. Moreover, it could be (lets face it, it is probably the case…) that the alternative to National will contain people who are more mistaken on more issues. John Key has a lot of faults but he has one big tick in his favour, he is not Helen Clark.

  • Caller of the Week – Sexual Preference on Census Form

    When I was at work last week one of my colleagues said he thought he had heard me on the radio one Friday afternoon but he wasn’t sure if it was me. I had phoned into Newstalk ZB during the last week of the school holidays but it wasn’t a Friday, so we sort of laughed that someone else sounded like me and then he said that the person he had heard had won caller of the week – so then I knew it couldn’t have been me!

    Over the weekend my family was over and my brother in law was hassling me about my call to the radio. He and my sister are somewhat left of centre (as in, Labour are too right wing) so we often good naturedly disagree on things and sure enough he was not happy with aspects of my call. He went on to offer a critique and I offered a defence, we went back and forward and then he finished with “well anyway I was most peeved to have to listen to your call twice, the first time when you rang in was bad enough but when you won caller of the week and the announcer thought you were so onto it I got really mad because you were wrong!” He then asked where the wine from Landmark Estate was anyway and hassled me for serving substandard wine. It then dawned on me that perhaps I had been caller of the week after all.

    Despite having a blog and being rather into political debates I do not frequent talk back shows. We were driving home from Mt Albert pools and I heard the announcer say that the government were considering adding a question on sexual preference to the census form and listeners were invited to call in with their thoughts. On a whim I phoned the station, Matt was driving so what the hey!

    I commented on the methodological flaws of the government gathering this data, citing Kinsey’s report which utilised analogous methodology. The gist went basically that you are unlikely to obtain reliable results as the sort of people who volunteer to answer questions on their sexual preferences tend to be the sort of people whose sexual preferences are more ‘out there,’ those who are very private about their sexual preferences tend to be more conservative and are less likely to volunteer that sort of info. Kinsey’s study invited people to participate and as such he found there to be a much higher number of more ‘out there’ sexual practices than other studies using better methodology which led to random samples. I concluded by asking why the government felt they had a place in our bedrooms anyway? I speculated that the purpose behind the proposed move was so they could rubber stamp their social agenda and stated that they should stick to law, order and defence.

    My brother in law’s issue was that on the radio I stated that Kinsey invited people to call in and in actual fact Kinsey’s study was not a phone survey, the interviews were done face to face. My brother in law was quite right to pull me up on this factual error but he was wrong to suggest that my criticisms failed because of it. Kinsey interviewed a disproportionately high number of criminals, particularly sex offenders, Laumann writes in The Social Organisation of Sexuality: Sexual Practices in the United States (Chicago University Press, 1994):

    Kinsey roamed far and wide in selecting his subjects … Kinsey also purposefully recruited subjects for his research from homosexual friendship and acquaintance networks in big cities.

    Anyway, this led me to email Newstalk ZB and ask if indeed I was the caller of the week. I will update with their reply.

    UPDATE: Newstalk ZB have confirmed I was caller of the week. Still waiting to hear if I get the Landmark Estate wine prize given I did not call in when it was announced.

    UPDATE: A knock at the door yesterday saw the arrival of my prize along with this letter:

    Dear Madeleine,
    Congratulations
    Newstalk ZB – Caller of the Week
    2 Bottles of wine – just for you.

    One bottle of Chardonnay one bottle of Sauvignon Blanc from Landmark Estate Wines. Matt and I polished off the Chardonnay last night, very nice – not remotely vinegary like some chardonnays. The Sauv is on hold til Sunday night – I must see if the promised repairs to my cupboard doors eventuates – otherwise my brother in law just gets a toast!