Category: Ethics

  • Cultural Confusion and Ethical Relativism III

    Arguments against Relativism
    In my previous post I argued that the common arguments for relativism fail. In this post I want to go one step further and suggest there are good reasons for rejecting relativism. Many reasons could be mustered here; I will limit myself to three.

    Counter Examples
    Both cultural and individual ethical relativism are subject to several, straight-forward, counter examples.

    Take cultural ethical relativism first. Consider a culture where it is accepted that that a husband has the right to beat his wife. Would an advocate of cultural relativism contend that in such a society criticism by a Christian minority of this practice and the advocacy of norms forbidding spousal abuse is an unacceptable imposition of a narrow, religious perspective? Would it be true that in such a society public policy could not be based on the ethical principle that it is wrong for a man to beat his wife?

    Consider an Islamic society where the majority believe that conversion to a rival, mono-theistic religion is immoral and should be a capital offence. To not execute converts to Judaism or Christianity in such a society would, according to cultural relativism, be wrong.

    In a society where a racial majority believes a racial minority is sub-human and this belief is widely accepted throughout the culture, it would be unjust to grant equal human rights according to cultural relativism.

    The same line of argument applies against individual ethical relativism. Suppose an individual believes that it is permissible to rape, torture and kill women. If individual relativism is true it follows that this person is right to do these things and anyone who utters condemnation because they believe rape, torture and murder are wrong are mistaken.

    You may think this is a hypothetical example but it’s not. In his discussion of relativism, Pojman recounts an interview with serial killer Ted Bundy,

    Then I learned that all moral judgments are “value judgments,” that all value judgments are subjective, and that none can be proved to be either ‘right’ or ‘wrong.’ I even read somewhere that the Chief Justice of the United States had written that the American Constitution expressed nothing more than collective value judgments. Believe it or not, I figured it out for myself – what apparently the Chief Justice couldn’t figure out for himself – that if the rationality of one value judgment was zero, multiplying it by millions would not make it one whit more rational. Nor is there any ‘reason’ to obey the law for anyone, like myself, who has the boldness and daring – the strength of character – to throw off its shackles…. I discovered that to become truly free, truly unfettered, I had to become truly uninhibited. And I quickly discovered that the greatest obstacle to my freedom, the greatest block and limitation to it, consists in the insupportable ‘value judgment’ that I was bound to respect the rights of others. I asked myself, who were these ‘others’? Other human beings, with human rights? Why is it more wrong to kill a human animal than any other animal, a pig or a sheep or a steer? Is your life more to you than a high’s life to a hog? Why should I be willing to sacrifice my pleasure more for the one than for the other? Surely you would not, in this age of scientific enlightenment, declare that God or nature has marked some pleasures as ‘moral’ or ‘good’ and others as ‘immoral’ or ‘bad’? In any case, let me assure you, my dear young lady, that there is absolutely no comparison between the pleasure I might take in eating ham and the pleasure I anticipate in raping and murdering you. That is the honest conclusion to which my education has led me – after the most conscientious examination of my spontaneous and uninhibited self.[1]


    Moral Reform and Moral Progress
    A second reason for rejecting relativism is that it implies that social reform is mistaken and those who engage in it are always wrong. Consider two historical examples; the first is Martin Luther King Jnr. Dr King campaigned against the racism and racial segregation that was practiced in the southern states of the US.

    Now if cultural relativism is correct, Dr King was wrong to do this; segregation was accepted by the society he was in at the time, hence, it was permissible for members of that society. Moreover Dr King’s own practices, which involved civil disobedience, were contrary to the laws of his day. In fact contemporaries of Dr King criticised his actions on this point. In his letter from Birmingham Jail, Dr King answered his critics by stating that above the laws and mores of one’s society was the law of God and that any law which contradicted this was unjust.

    Now if we accept relativism, we have to conclude that Dr King was mistaken here. Dr King, in fact, was an intolerant bigot who imposed his private religious beliefs about racism onto others. The society he lived in accepted racism, hence racism is right for members of that society. But surely this analysis is completely lopsided? Dr King was right and his society was wrong; he was the opponent of bigotry and his society was perpetuating it.

    Similarly, William Wilberforce’s campaign to end slavery would have to be considered unjust and mistaken if we take seriously the cultural relativist’s position. Slavery was, after all, accepted in the British Empire at the time. Wilberforce’s efforts were defeated by a majority of parliament on many occasions. Hence, if relativism is true, slavery was actually right and Wilberforce was wrong to oppose it.

    Similar things can be said for the idea of moral progress. Normally we think that certain reforms such as women’s suffrage, the abolition of cruel and unusual punishment, ending child labour, etc are marks of progress, historical points where a society improves and gets better. However, if relativism is correct this is not the case.

    Reform or progress is impossible; whatever a society believes is right, is right for members of that society. If something is right if a culture thinks its right, then it is impossible for a society’s mores to ever be wrong. Societal mores are in essence infallible.

    But then it seems there is nothing to improve upon and hence, progress cannot occur. All that can happen is that societies can change one perfectly valid system for another and those who advocate the change are always mistaken when they do.

    Further, a minority would never be justified in proposing its ideas until it was no longer a minority view. However, it cannot cease to be a minority view unless it is proposed in the first place. Consequently, this requires all societies to be frozen in whatever popular prejudices currently exist. The reforming minority that critiques contemporary culture would be effectively silenced.

    This problem does not only apply to cultural relativism. An analogous argument can be applied to individual relativism. Reform does not just happen within societies; individuals can reform and make moral progress.

    Consider a member of the Ku Klux Klan who thinks that lynching African Americans is justified or a Nazi who fervently believes in the extermination of Jews. If these people came to see the error of their ways and reformed their characters so that they came to view other races as people with equal dignity, made in the image of God, then it is plausible to say they have undergone moral reform and have progressed. However, individual relativism entails this is not the case.

    The Klan member and the Nazi were right to engage in bigoted behaviour, because neither believed there was anything wrong with it. Moreover, the basis of this change, seeing ‘the error of their ways,’ is, in fact, hugely mistaken. According to individual relativism, there was no ‘error of ways’ at all and anyone suggesting there was is an intolerant bigot.

    Equality of Cultural and Individual Practices
    My final argument against relativism is to note that if cultural relativism is true then no practiced widely accepted by a culture is better than a practice accepted by another culture. According to individual relativism, no practice sincerely believed in by one person is better than another’s.

    For individual relativism, if Ted Bundy believes it is permissible to rape women and kill them, then that is right for him and there is nothing wrong with him doing it. Similarly, if Mother Teresa believes helping the poor is permissible then she is permitted morally to do this. However, any suggestion that Bundy’s practices are worse than Mother Teresa’s and he should change and be more like her is mistaken. To do so is to suggest that the views of one person (Teresa) can be legitimately applied to another (Bundy) who does not believe in them.

    Similarly, with cultural relativism; if a culture institutionalises and accepts the persecution of ethnic minorities then its members are justified in engaging in such persecution. If another culture grants equal dignity to all races on the basis of its beliefs then it too is justified in this. However, it is mistaken to think that one is correct and the other wrong. Both are correct and neither is wrong as there is no trans-cultural standard that one can appeal to, to claim one is better than the other.

    Conclusion
    I submit then that relativism has little going for it. When one unpacks the contemporary slogans one finds a position supported by bad and often incoherent arguments. A position that if correct, entails horrific and bigoted practices are as justified as any other practice and any attempts to change or reform people from engaging in such practices is wrong. Relativism essentially renders morality and ethics into pointless concepts.

    [1] Louis P. Pojman The Moral Life: An Introductory Reader in Ethics and Literature (Oxford University Press: 2003).

    RELATED POSTS:
    Cultural Confusion and Ethical Relativism I
    Cultural Confusion and Ethical Relativism II
    Video of Matthew Flannagan Speaking on Moral Relativism
    With God Anything can be Permitted: Another Bad Argument against Theistic Morality
    On a Common Equivocation
    Sunday Study: The Virtue of Judging – Jesus was not a Relativist

  • Cultural Confusion and Ethical Relativism II

    In my previous post, I set out the differences between relativist and objectivist views of ethics. I noted that objectivist views were widely disparaged in our culture in favour of relativist ones. I now want to raise what, I think, is an obvious question, why should we accept the relativism assumed in much cultural ethical discourse? The fact it is popular shows it is fashionable but what reasons are there for thinking it is true?

    Arguments for Ethical Relativism
    There appear to be two main arguments for relativism. The first appeals to the existence of diverse mores and traditions amongst cultures on particular issues. The second is a cluster of ethical concerns about such things as tolerance, avoiding bigotry, open mindedness, etc. I will examine both below.

    Argument from Diversity
    One argument for relativism, going back to the time of Herodotus, is based on the fact that different cultures and groups often appear to have radically different ethical norms and values. In some cultures, for example, homosexual conduct is permitted even mandated, in others it is condemned.[1] Some cultures practice polygamy, others monogamy. Many cultures have practiced infanticide allowing the parents a choice whether to kill a child after birth,[2] other cultures strongly disapprove of this. I could go on.

    Further, within the same societies ethical judgments can appear to change over time. Fifty years ago abortion was illegal in New Zealand, now it is paraded as a woman’s choice. Four hundred years ago people were executed for witchcraft in Europe, now we watch “Sensing Murder” and “The Ghost Whisperer” for entertainment.

    It is not uncommon to find some cross-cultural anthropological studies making claims such as the following,

    [1] Ethical principles differ from culture to culture and from age to age.

    Given that [1] is essentially the thesis of ethical relativism, it is suggested that cross-cultural studies demonstrate relativism. [This is clearly an argument for cultural ethical relativism. However it is clear that an analogous argument could be constructed for individual ethical relativism; it would not be hard to show that individuals often differ radically on moral issues, particularly in highly pluralistic societies.]

    Two things can be noted in response. First, while it is true that different cultures come to different ethical conclusions, in and of itself, this does not mean they disagree over ethical principles. Sometimes this outcome is due to factual or non-ethical disagreements.

    Consider witchcraft. Rodney Stark notes that one reason the execution of witches occurred was because of certain non-ethical beliefs that were prevalent at the time. In the 14th century, many educated people believed in the existence of witches. It was believed witches met together secretly and sacrificed children to the devil and then ate these sacrifices in a ritual feast. After this feast these people bound themselves by oath to the devil to use supernatural powers to inflict harm and kill innocent people.[3]

    Now given these beliefs, it is quite understandable why some in that society felt this way. If, in our culture, people randomly killed and ate babies and then conspired to arbitrary kill, harm and maim innocent people, many would support their actions being subject to the death penalty. The point is that it is factual, not ethical claims, which are the major source of disagreement between cultures.[4]

    The second and more important point, is that the argument is invalid. Frances Howard-Snyder notes[5] that [1] is ambiguous it can mean,

    [1a] Beliefs about what is right and wrong differ from culture to culture and age to age.

    Or it could mean,

    [1b] What really is right and wrong differs from culture to culture and age to age.

    To provide grounds for affirming relativism, anthropological studies would need to establish [1b] but they do not. At most, they establish [1a]. To get [1b] from [1a] one would need to assume that what a society believed was right was really right for that society. This, however, would be to assume relativism was correct. The argument would then be circular; one would assume relativism as a premise in order to establish it as a conclusion.

    Argument from Tolerance
    The second major argument proposed in favour of relativism appeals to virtues such as tolerance, absence of bigotry, open mindedness, etc. The idea is that if you apply your ethical standards to other people or other cultures, you are arrogantly assuming that they are wrong and you are right. In claiming that other people are mistaken or wrong you are failing to show them tolerance and are rather, imposing your morality upon them. This is, arguably, the major driver behind the appeal of relativism in culture today. This argument has the following structure.

    [1] It is intolerant to claim that other people’s opinions are mistaken or wrong.

    [2] People should not be intolerant.

    From which it follows,

    [3] People should not claim that other people’s opinions are mistaken or wrong.

    Let me examine each of these claims.

    Is it intolerant to claim that other people’s opinions are mistaken or wrong?
    Contrary to [1], it is not intolerant to claim others are mistaken or wrong. Two line of argument show this.

    First the person who proposes this claim seems to misunderstand the meaning of the word tolerance. Suppose you asked me what I thought about my wife’s cooking and I responded that I “tolerated it.” This would entail that my wife is not a good cook (and would probably make her mad). If she were a good cook, I would not say I tolerate her cooking, I would say she is a great cook. In the same way I can only tolerate other people’s behaviour and or opinions if I think there is something wrong or bad about them. If I do not think this, I would not tolerate their behaviour or opinions, I would endorse them.

    Second, [1] is itself refuting. Note that the person who makes this claim is criticising the behaviour of objectivist. The claimant is asserting that the objectivist in “telling other people that they are wrong or incorrect” is doing something wrong or incorrect. Can you see the problem?

    If [1] is true then the person who utters this argument is themselves intolerant by their own definition. It would also entail that any position based upon or committed to this view is also intolerant. However, [2] entails that the relativist should not utter this argument and if uttered, we should reject any view based upon this argument and any position committed to castigating others as intolerant.

    Do people have a duty to be tolerant?
    Turning to the second premise [2], despite often being expounded in contemporary society as a self-evident truth, [2] is clearly false.

    First, in many contexts, intolerance is appropriate and is a virtue. Imagine a society that tolerated rape, child molestation, infant sacrifice or spouse beating. Such a society would be “tolerating other people,” after all, rapists, paedophiles, child killers and wife beaters are people… However, this society would be wrong to do this. Hence, tolerance is not always a duty, sometimes it is a vice. Secondly, if unqualified, the assertion that people have a duty to be tolerant entails that one should tolerate intolerance, something deeply paradoxical.

    Third, in the context of an argument for relativism, [2] seems to put the proponent of this argument into a contradiction. Remember that according to relativism there are no objective ethical principles. On cultural ethical relativism, an action is wrong for a person only if that person’s culture condemns that action. On individual ethical relativism, an action is wrong for a person only if he or she believes the action is wrong. However, it follows that, if relativism is true, there is no objective duty to be tolerant. Any culture that accepts and practices intolerant and bigoted practices is permitted to do so. Any individual who believes that certain intolerant practices are permissible is justified in being intolerant. The relativist, then, cannot consistently ask the objectivist to give up the intolerant position that they believe on the basis that doing so is wrong. If relativism is true then the fact that objectivists believe in an intolerant position means tolerance is not wrong for them but in fact permissible.

    Many of the arguments behind relativism are thoroughly confused. In my next post I will argue that there are good reasons against accepting it.

    [1] David Greenberg The Construction of Homosexuality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
    [2] Lalia Williamson “Infanticide: An Anthropological Analysis” in Infanticide and the Value of Life ed. M. Kohl (New York: Prometheus Books, 1978) 61-73.
    [3] Rodney Stark, For the Glory of God: How Monotheism Led to Reformations, Science, Witch-Hunts, and the End of Slavery (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004) 201.
    [4] The witchcraft example comes from C S Lewis’ discussion of relativism in Mere Christianity.
    [5] Frances Howard-Snyder “Christianity and Ethics” in Reason for the Hope Within ed Michael J Murray (Grand Rapids MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co, 1999) 378; see also James Rachels Elements of Moral Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1986) 19.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Cultural Confusion and Ethical Relativism I
    Cultural Confusion and Ethical Relativism III
    Video of Matthew Flannagan Speaking on Moral Relativism
    With God Anything can be Permitted: Another Bad Argument against Theistic Morality
    On a Common Equivocation
    Sunday Study: The Virtue of Judging – Jesus was not a Relativist

  • Cultural Confusion and Ethical Relativism I

    Suppose you asked me what today’s date was and I answered that the Maori Electorate seats in Parliament should be scrapped. You would quite rightly wonder what I was on. The question of what the date is is a completely different question as to whether a particular social policy is just.

    Oddly enough, however, when it comes to many questions on social policy or on ethics in general, people offer the date as a justification for their stance. I often hear people justify some ‘progressive’ policy by informing me that is the 21st century or that we no longer live in the dark ages.

    Recently in there has been controversy over whether women should be allowed to ride motorbikes down our main street topless to promote a pornography erotica festival. There were predominantly two responses articulated by supporters in the media reports on the controversy: “it’s the 21st century” and “we live in a liberal society.”

    Let’s unpack both slogans. The first claims that being topless in public is acceptable because in the 21st century the fashions trends are for acceptance of such activities. In the past people opposed such actions but they shouldn’t anymore because society’s attitudes have changed. Note the implicit assumption here, that right and wrong is determined by what society currently accepts. The same assumption is even more evident in the second slogan. The assertion here is that New Zealand is a liberal society, that is, kiwis today have liberal attitudes towards pornography and public nudity. Suppose this is true; this entails that pornography and public nudity are permissible only if right and wrong are determined by societal attitudes.

    This is not an isolated incident. When I was studying the abortion issue for my PhD research I often found people who stated they were personally opposed to abortion but would not condemn others who did it. This, of course, suggests that one can accept a principle opposing abortion, apply it to oneself and yet think it inappropriate to apply it to others.

    Similarly, we often hear slogans such as “who are you to judge,” “don’t force your morality onto me,” Both suggest that one person cannot make moral judgments about another and that their moral scruples only apply to those who also hold them.

    It is not uncommon to hear people say things like, “if you don’t like abortion don’t have one” or “if you don’t agree with what’s on TV turn it off.” Both responses assume that a person should not apply their moral standards to other people’s actions. They should follow these standards themselves if that is their belief but other people who disagree with them are not required to.

    Behind these responses is a position known as ethical relativism. In a series of three posts I want to explore what relativism is, the common arguments for it and provide some reasons for rejecting it.

    [This series was developed from my talk on the topic for Thinking Matters]

    What is Ethical Relativism?
    Frances Howard-Snyder[1] suggests that relativism comes in two forms, cultural ethical relativism and individual ethical relativism. These views can be formulated as follows:

    Cultural Ethical Relativism: An action is wrong for a person, if and only if, that person’s society or cultural group condemns that action.

    Individual Ethical Relativism: An action is wrong for a person, if and only if, that person believes that the action is wrong.[2]

    Two things follow from this view of ethics; first, humans create right and wrong, either by societal consensus of some sort or by an individual choosing to adopt and/or believe in, certain principles of action. Second, moral principles only apply to people or cultures who accept them. A few of examples will illustrate this.

    Consider first cultural ethical relativism. Suppose two cultures have differing positions on the morality of pre-marital sex. In one culture it is seen as a serious sin, in the other it’s a normal courting ritual. Cultural ethical relativism entails that pre-marital sex is wrong for members of the first culture but not wrong for the second. Consequently, if a person in the second culture mocks a member of the first culture for holding repressed ideas about sex or conversely if a person in the first culture criticises someone in the second culture for engaging in pre-marital sex each is making a serious mistake. Premarital sex is only wrong for people in the first culture and denying your sexual urges is only wrong for people in the second.

    A similar result follows from adopting individual ethical relativism. If a person believes that pre-marital sex is wrong then it is wrong for him and he should refrain from engaging in it and can be condemned if he does not. However, he cannot apply his own standard of sexual conduct to the behaviour of others who do not accept his views. If a person does not accept his view then pre-marital sex is not wrong for them.

    This suggests a corollary that hypocrisy will be seen as the worst kind of evil (indeed the only evil) and sincerity will be highly praised. The hypocrite violates his own views and the sincere person embraces them. (Of course the problem is that an individual or culture might believe there is nothing wrong with hypocrisy and despise sincerity, this would lead to the conclusion that hypocrisy is ok and sincerity is evil.)

    A final implication is that as cultures and individuals often disagree on moral questions there is no set of moral precepts which bind all people, regardless of their culture, at all times. Given this, it is not surprising that people commonly respond to ethical and social policy questions by providing the date.

    Before looking at the arguments for relativism I want to contrast it with objectivism. In this context objectivism is not a form of Libertarianism expounded by Ayn Rand, it is the view that actions are right or wrong independent of whether anyone believes them to be so.

    Robert Adams defends the thesis that ethical wrongness is (i.e. is identical with) the property of being contrary to the commands of a loving God.”[3] [Emphasis original] I have defended divine command theories in various places on this blog, in this post, however, I want to simply note that a divine command theory, like other meta-ethical theories, grounds right and wrong in in facts that hold independently of human volition or cognition.

    If God exists, he existed before I came into existence and will continue to exist after I die. He does not depend on me in any way for his existence rather I depend upon him for my existence. The same is true for the commands he issues; if right and wrong are constituted by divine commands then, it follows, right and wrong are objective properties of actions and do not depend upon us for their instantiation.

    Two implications of objectivism are noteworthy. First, ethical rules are not created by human beings but rather discovered by them. Second, whether an action is right or wrong is a factual question in much the same way as the question is the earth round? The shape of the earth is something human beings have discovered. If some people, such as the 4th century Theologian Lactantius or some culture, such as the ancient Babylonians, believe the world is flat then they are mistaken. Despite what they think Lactantius and the Babylonians lived on a spherical globe; no matter how sincerely they believed otherwise, there was no change to the shape of the earth. Objectivism sees moral properties such as right and wrong as being on par with factual claims about the shape of the earth this is respect.

    As the slogans above suggest, objectivist views of ethics are widely disparaged in popular culture in favour of relativism. Of course, the fact that a position is widely disparaged does not mean it is mistaken. To determine this we need to ask whether the arguments in favour of relativism are compelling. It is to this task I will turn in my next post.

    [1] Frances Howard-Snyder, “Christianity and Ethics” in Reason for the Hope Within, ed Michael J. Murray (Grand Rapids MI: Eerdmans Publishing co, 1999) 376-377.
    [2] The same basic distinction is found in Pojman who distinguishes between what he calls conventionalism and subjectivism
    [3] Robert Adams, “Divine Command Meta-Ethics Modified Again,” Journal of Religious Ethics 7:1 (1979) 76.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Cultural Confusion and Ethical Relativism II
    Cultural Confusion and Ethical Relativism III
    Video of Matthew Flannagan Speaking on Moral Relativism
    With God Anything can be Permitted: Another Bad Argument against Theistic Morality
    On a Common Equivocation
    Sunday Study: The Virtue of Judging – Jesus was not a Relativist

  • Abortion and Child Abuse

    Bloggers WhaleOil and David Farrar are in disagreement over some comments made by Garth George in the New Zealand Herald regarding abortion and child abuse.

    Garth George says:

    I have said it before and I say it again: The number one cause of abuse against women and children is abortion.

    David Farrar says:

    I disagree. I think there would be less child abuse if there were more abortions. The world would be a better place if those who are not suited to be parents did not become parents.

    Whale Oil says:

    I think they both are missing the point.

    We have become a society that tolerates and indeed allows violence against children it is just a matter of where you draw the line that is the argument.

    Garth George draws the line at conceptiona and David Farrar draws the line at birth. (I think, perhaps he would like to clarify when it is ok to kill babies and when it is
    not.)

    My view is that we are indeed a sick society at whatever point we kill and excuse it away with weasel words like foetus, procedure, first trimester etc.

    Likewise my view about most of the recent cases of horrific child abuse is that they are no more and no less anything but late term abortions. The simple fact is that the parents of the children had no more respect for the life of the child than someon having a “procedure”.

    You see if we accept that you can kill children at up to 21 weeks from conception then why not at birth or why not at 5 years old, or even 18 just before they can vote. For me there is no difference. The Nia Glassie’s and Kahui twins are simply late term abortions by parents who no longer respected the life of their child. As long as we fail to respect human life then we will continue to get these case and no one should be at all shocked by it all.

    Whaleoil has a point, something Adolf agrees with me on, though David Farrar’s argument is not new; in, “Abortion a Feminist Perspective”, Susan Sherwin mentions that feticide may be justified in order to prevent child abuse.

    [F]eminists recognize that women have abortions for a wide variety of compelling reasons. … knowing the fathers to be brutal and violent, may be unwilling to subject a child to the beatings or incestuous attacks they anticipate; some may have no other realistic way to remove the child (or themselves) from the relationship.[i]

    In addition to outright abuse, she also suggests child neglect.

    Women who suffer from chronic disease, who believe themselves too young or too old to have children, or who are unable to maintain lasting relationships may recognize that they will not be able to care properly for a child when they face the decision.[ii]

    The argument is a two-premise syllogism. The first premise asserts that permitting feticide prevents child abuse or future child neglect. This is because it destroys organisms that will probably be abused in the future. The second premise claims that it is permissible to kill an organism if we know that it will probably be abused or neglected in the future.

    The second premise is false. Consider a new-born child born into a context whereby one knows that it is likely that it will be abused either physically or sexually in the future. If the major premise were true, then killing that infant to protect it from abuse would be permissible. In fact, according to this principle, it is acceptable to kill any person, child, teenager or adult whom we know is likely to be abused in the future.

    In order to be plausible, Sherwin and Farrar must limit the kinds of entities that the principle is referring to. It must be restricted to exclude entities that are infants or other human beings such as toddlers, adolescents and adults. However, the proponent of this argument must assume that fetuses are not human beings in the same sense that infants are. The argument is sound only if feticide is not homicide.

    Engaging in feticide to prevent child abuse is only justifiable if feticide is somehow the morally-better option. If the two are both homicide then one will be engaging in the very action one is trying to prevent. Sherwin and Farrar’s argument relies on the assumption that feticide is not homicide. Farrar has, of course, argued for this assumption, he maintains that a fetus is not a human being until it acquires an ECG which Farrar places at 20 weeks. As I argue in, Abortion and Brain Death: A Response to Farrar, this argument is unsuccessful as are the other attempts to place it at viability, sentience or personhood.

    [i] Susan Sherwin “Abortion a Feminist Perspective.” In Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine, 5th ed., ed. Bonnie Steinbock & John D. Arras, (Mountain View CA: Mayfield Publishing Co) 1999, 361.
    [ii] Ibid.

  • Why am I a Bigot?

    I am a Theologian with a strong background in Philosophy; apart from Philosophical Theology, my particular area of interest is Ethics. Given this, I often post my thoughts and reflections on moral issues of various persuasions on this blog. I have discussed the morality of warfare, whether it is sometimes permissible to lie, the morality of torture, capital punishment, the nature of our obligations to the poor.

    On occasions, I discuss issues related to abortion and homosexual conduct something which, I think, is unavoidable if one is a theologian writing from a relatively conservative evangelical perspective. I believe that homosexual conduct is contrary to divine law and I believe that feticide is homicide. The latter claim is not just a casual opinion; I spent some years writing a PhD thesis on the topic and over the last couple of years I have had articles published in this area.

    Now a pervasive response to my position on these issues is that appeals to divine law to condemn practises like feticide or homosexual conduct are really an expression of bigotry. One would think that it would be fairly obvious to people that you don’t refute a position by calling the person who holds it a bigot and it is tempting to dismiss this response as simply a confused ad hominem; the problem is that people do not appear to find this obvious. In my experience, many people even educated people, recoil from considering any argument against feticide or homosexual conduct or listening to theological concerns on these matters because they perceive such positions to be bigoted.

    It’s worth fisking this objection a bit. A good place to start is to ask what does this charge amount to? When someone claims that another is a bigot, what is meant by this? The Pocket Oxford English Dictionary defines a bigot as someone who is obstinate in his or her beliefs and is intolerant of others. Presumably, the objector claims that one who appeals to the law of God to condemn feticide or homosexual conduct (or some other practise celebrated by contemporary liberal secularists) displays or expresses these features – they are both obstinate and intolerant. The accusation clarified, an obvious question arises, why hold this claim?

    Obstinance
    Turning to the issue of obstinance, why must a person who holds these beliefs do so in an obstinate manner? Could they not have come to these beliefs as a result of careful reflection? Alternatively, could they hold to them because they are not convinced the counter arguments are sound? What is needed here is some argument to preclude such options and none is forthcoming.

    I suspect that what lingers behind this accusation is the belief that theologically-based opposition to abortion is obviously mistaken and the case against it so compelling that no rational, informed person could think otherwise. If so, then this is not so much an argument against such appeals but an assumption that those who make them are mistaken on other grounds. The objector should come clean about what these other grounds are and put forward the compelling, unassailable arguments that everyone else should apparently already know about.

    Let me add further that as a person who studies ethics and aspires to be a professional theological-ethicist, nothing is more frustrating than being told by a journalist or a tax lawyer that it’s an obvious fact that a certain theological ethical stance is mistaken. Further, if I think otherwise I must be misinformed and ignorant of the subject, a subject they often have done little or no study on. Perhaps this is one area where a little humility is needed.

    Intolerance
    Turning to the issue of intolerance, let me here just say that, the concern about intolerance implicit in this objection is mistaken. Even if the proponents of more conservative positions were intolerant, this would only constitute an objection to their behaviour if it were first assumed that people have a duty to refrain from intolerance and this assumption is problematic.

    In many contexts intolerance is appropriate and contrary to popular slogans, a virtue. Imagine a society that tolerated rape, child molestation or infant sacrifice? Moreover if unqualified, the assertion that people have a duty to be tolerant entails that one should tolerate intolerance, is deeply paradoxical.

    For this charge to have any substance, the objector needs to specify what sorts of action he or she thinks one should tolerate and which ones are such that intolerance is inappropriate. He or she needs to justify this distinction and then provide reasons for thinking that appeals to divine law in a subject like feticide fall into the latter category yet no argument of this sort has been forthcoming.

    Here us the rub; if feticide is an action on a par with infanticide then intolerance towards it is justified. In asserting that it is not, the objector implicitly assumes that feticide is not homicide without offering argument. Similarly if homosexual conduct is a serious form of sexual immorality, such as incest, bestiality, polygamy or adultery, then intolerance against it is not necessarily wrong. Our society, for example, has laws against incest and bestiality and few contend for their repeal (though the chipping away has begun). Once again, the objector here, in making their charge, assumes that homosexual conduct is not seriously immoral.

    Now it is possible that these assumptions are correct but it is also possible they are not.
    Anyone who appeals to divine law to condemn practises like feticide or homosexual conduct is denying these assumptions. You don’t provide a cogent objection to a position by assuming it is false at the outset and then using this assumption to prove that it is. What is needed is an actual argument for the assumption in the first place. Until some actual argument is forthcoming that demonstrates the falsity of what has been defended, objections based on the notion of tolerance merely beg the question and have no impact on the thesis being advanced.

    I think there is a kind of irony here; often when someone accuses Theologians of bigotry they themselves are simply obstinately assuming that their position is true and their assumption leads them to castigate and refuse to tolerate the opinions or person who expresses dissent to the secular liberal orthodoxy. Here, as elsewhere, the accusation of bigotry is a form of Orwellian double-speak.

  • What About the Poor? More on Sustenance Rights

    In my last post, What About the Poor? Sustenance Rights Examined, I noted the position of Nicholas Wolterstorff that, “If a rich man knows of someone who is starving and has the power to help that person, and chooses not to, then he violates that person’s rights as surely and reprehensively as if he had physically assaulted the sufferer.” I argued that as stated, this position is subject to three problems; first, that it leads to absurd consequences, entailing that I have a duty to give to every poor person I know about. Second, that it has totalitarian implications and third, that acceptance and practise of this principle would destroy any incentive people have to work.

    In a more recent article “Christianity and Social Justice,” Wolterstorff attempts to defend his thesis against the three criticisms I mention above.

    Turning to the first problem, Wolterstorff’s response is to note that “acknowledging a person’s right to some good does not imply laying on everyone else a duty to extend to that person that good.” This seems odd, if a right to sustenance on the part of the poor does not mean we are obligated to give them the means to sustenance, what bite does it have?

    Wolterstorff puts forward an interesting suggestion. Turning to the paradigm of a right to not be assaulted, Wolterstorff suggests that while we have a duty to not assault people we do not have a duty to protect every person against assault. However, he goes on to note that in addition to having a right to not be assaulted, people have a right against their society “to have practises” and “social structures” that protect them from assault. In particular, such things as a police force, courts and an army. Clearly, if the right does not just mean that members of society refrain from attacking people, it also means that these members have a duty support the police force. Further, if the police force is ineffective, people have a duty to try and improve it (through such things as voting and lobbying).

    Moreover, Wolterstorff suggests if “I see you about to get mugged when no policeman is in view – then I may be obliged to offer you my protection in a direct way.” Wolterstorff’s argument is that sustenance rights are analogous to the right to not be assaulted in this way. People have a duty to support whatever institutions or charities exist that alleviate poverty. If they are ineffective, they have a duty to reform them. Further, if one encounters a person in extreme necessity one is required to assist them in a direct way.

    Turning to the second criticism, Wolterstorff makes three points to get around the totalitarian implications sketched previously. First, he states that,

    the general idea behind having such a right to some good is that individual actions and social practices ought to be such that one enjoys that good. But the role of the government in practices which secure that right may be nil or negligible. Not all rights are enshrined by law. Sometimes in the early church the care for the poor of society was principally in the hands of the bishop.

    He goes on to note, correctly I think, that,

    Far from acknowledging that there is such a right, nothing directly follows as to what, if anything, governments should do by way of securing that right. In particular, it does not follow that the poor should be put on a dole supported by public taxation. In principle there is a wide variety of other practices which would undo the violation of this right, some of which the government would have little or no role.

    Accepting sustenance rights then, does not entail accepting massive public ownership or redistribution.

    Second, he tries to mitigate the objection by appealing again to the analogy with assault; “in our fallen world… we do not suppose that, in the face of all the aggressive impulses of human beings purely voluntary arrangements would suffice to secure our freedom from assault.” He goes on to note, “why should we suppose that, in the face of acquisitive impulses of human beings, purely voluntary arrangements would suffice to secure our right to sustenance?” Finally he notes, “it is true, indeed that there are dangers lurking when governments try to ensure that the rights of the poor are respected. But who would be so foolish as to argue that the armies and police forces that we assemble propose no threat?”

    Wolterstorff makes some pertinent points here. However, it is worth noting that if one takes the assault analogy seriously, several things are evident. First, the police and armed forces actually do not play as big a role in protecting us from assault as it may appear.

    The Police do not patrol everyone’s houses at night, nor does it have 24/7 video surveillance cameras set up on every home, nor do we have publicly funded burglar alarms. If people want any of these things, they hire private security guards, install privately owned cameras and buy their own alarms. The police are called when these systems fail and there is immediate danger.

    It is also worth noting that the ability of the Police to catch and prosecute assailants is limited by such things as the presumption of innocence, the need for warrants, probable cause, etc. In societies with lower crime rates, police typically have more sweeping powers, powers our society rightly rejects precisely to avoid the danger of excess state intrusion and its subsequent abuses. As such, if the state is to secure our rights to sustenance similar limits should apply.

    Turning to the third criticism, Wolterstorff states that while people do not earn their basic human rights by merit, such as the right to be free from assault or the right to liberty, the same is true of the right to sustenance. Wolterstorff notes correctly that a person can forfeit these rights by misdeeds; if a person attacks another his right to be free from assault is forfeited and I can strike him if necessary to defend myself. Similarly, if a person commits a crime they forfeit their right to liberty and can be imprisoned.

    In the same way, Wolterstorff suggests that the right to sustenance can be forfeited if a person is capable of providing for themselves but refuses to do so; just as a needy person has a right against society to sustenance, society has a right against those it supports that they will take responsibility for themselves when they can and not pass of their responsibilities onto someone else.

    As far as I can tell, Wolterstorff’s responses enable him to accept sustenance rights without falling into the problems mentioned in my previous post. It is worth noting, however, his response makes the claim that the poor have sustenance rights significantly qualified.

    What it means is that individuals in a society have a duty to support various institutions that aid and assist those who are unable to provide for their own needs. These institutions may or may not be run by the state but if they are, the state plays a last resort role and is subject to careful checks on its power. This picture may differ from that some proposed by certain types of Libertarian, particularly those who believe we have no obligations to support the poor at all, but it is hardly the charter for statism or massive public ownership

  • Homosexuality and the Right-Wing Socialists

    Lately I have been thinking I must write a post about the sacred cow of homosexuality and how it can turn the most ardent liberal into a lefty. I am not the only person to have noticed this phenomena.

    As Matt once commented, “Christians should be very concerned with people who will sell out their commitment to liberty before they would side with a Christian [or a moral viewpoint typically ascribed to a Christian]. Such people cannot be relied upon to defend my rights at all.”

    Matt was alluding to the so called principled liberals whose principles dissipate the minute they encounter someone who shares most of their views but whose moral code differs from the narrow point of view they define their liberality by.

    If you ask them to defend their views and offer a critique they cannot. I doubt they know why they hold their views they just know they are supposed to so they just repeat their mantra.

    Their blind adherence to the “correct” moral views are not based on principle or reason, if you point out a flaw in an argument for one of their sacred cows they intolerantly froth and deem you to not be a member of the club. They will jump on the “correct” side regardless of whether the arguments used are sound.

    This bigoted intolerance from the right is not completely reserved for Christians; anyone secular daring to voice a flaw in an argument advanced by the sacred cows of the-state-must-endorse-gays-movement is also slammed as illiberal.

    Look at all the fuss and bother over David Garrett’s comments on paedophilia [note the comments were NOT on homosexuality, learn the difference between an analogy and an identity claim]. In Real Bigotry Versus Mere Opinion Blair Mulholland notes:

    Today’s Herald has two separate stories dealing, in a roundabout way, with the issue of homosexuality.

    In one, we have an elected official actively condoning violence because some of his constituents regard having their town labeled a “gay capital” as an insult.

    In the other, we have a barrister, who was not an elected official at the time, pointing out that, in his view, both homosexuality and paedophilia are unchangeable psychological phenomena.

    Guess which elected official has had their head called for?

    Seriously, this is bullsh*t. The blogosphere, and I am looking at you too David Farrar, needs to get their priorities straight… so to speak. A small town Mayor says it’s allright to give Jeremy Wells the bash for a comedy piece he did ten years ago and we shrug our shoulders. A new MP makes a crude observation about human behaviour and the crowd demands crucifixion.

    It’s not acceptable.

    Consider Lucyna’s argument in Finding Socialists in the Darndest Places, she cites Lindsay Mitchell‘s argument that one spots a socialist by their walk, not their talk or the ribbons they wave.

    Want proof of how support for homosexuality turns liberals into lefties?

    Compare Blair Mulholland, who says he is “more attuned with the Libertarianz” than ACT’s, endorsement for Wellington Central with Cactus Kate’s, one of the last, self-proclaimed, bastions of complete right-wing bias, hero worshipper of ACT’s Rodney Hide.

    Blair’s endorsement:

    Stephen Franks was worth about ten regular National MPs when he was last in parliament, so if you put him in their caucus he will kick some arse. My wholehearted endorsement for the National candidate here.

    Cactus Kate’s are here, here and here:

    Grant, You are the only Labour candidate I am endorsing at this election

    and:

    With great humour I see all the National Party candidates are now MP’s and yet none of the Labour candidates made it through. Oh dear. Crying a river. With
    such a vicious swing Nationwide to National that result was a fait accompli.

    Well done Sam, Aaron, Simon and Nikki. I hope all your dreams come true. And Grant Robertson who managed despite this massive swing to Toryism, to upset
    Stephen Franks in Wellington Central. Brought a wee glow to the cheeks.

    For the benefit of our overseas readers, Grant Robertson was the Labour (left-wing) candidate and Stephen Franks was the National (right-wing) candidate in the Wellington Central electorate in the recent NZ election.

    Robertson is a unionist and state services flunky from way back; a hard-core left wing activist. As an example of what I mean, when he was National President of NZUSA he organised an activist training conference and invited and sponsored a speaker who advocated vigilante assaults on the private property of those they disagreed with.

    Franks is a former ACT Party MP (more right-wing than National), is a Classical Liberal, has years of experience as a lawyer working in NZ’s top law firms, is considered across the political spectrum as being one of the sharpest, most competent and most ethical MP’s in recent times. Franks is secular and, from conversations I have had with him, does not share my view that homosexual conduct is immoral or that abortion, far from being liberal, is homicide.

    So, I ask you, why would the uber-right wing Cactus Kate be pleased to see Robertson trump Franks? I asked her that and as yet she has not answered. As she moderates her comments, she has seen my questions, so I must assume the silence is deliberate.

    I speculate, with good reason, that the answer is Robertson is gay and that to the socialist-liberal being gay forgives every other flaw; especially when Franks, during the NZ debate to have the state endorse gay relationships through the passage of the Civil Unions Act, made some critical observations on some of the reasons advanced by the defenders of the Bill.

    This of course renders Franks a homophobic hate-filled conservative (liberals by definition are pro-everything gay, no matter how inconsistent it renders them and will turn and blacklist their own in heartbeat at the first sign of a betrayal) and elevates the statist Robertson to the position of the better candidate. [I am reminded here of Matt’s blog: Bigotry as Tolerance: Homophobia as Orwellian Double Speak.]

    Right-wing socialists loudly claim to be principled yet to avoid being associated with a perceived affront to their moral values they would sell their freedom on the basis of knee-jerk ignorance, straw-men and stereotypes.

    So now I turn to Glenn’s latest offering where he suggests that the state has no role to play in endorsing any relationships. Something liberals have always claimed on every other, non-homosexual, issue. This is a concept I endorse accross the board. Marriage existed for centuries without the help of the state. State endorsed marriage is a fairly recent phenomena.

    Extract from: Homosexuality and Socialism?

    It might seem like a very odd connection until you consider… well, actually no matter what you consider it still seems like an odd connection, but in the recent song and dance about Proposition 8 in California, that very odd connect has been reinforced yet again. I’m sure that there are plenty of homosexual people who don’t choose to identify as socialist, so don’t take me to be saying that they all do. But when it comes to the public scrap about marriage, for some of them the red comes to the surface quicker than you can drop a hat.

    As evidenced here, here, here, here and in many many other places, some outspoken homosexuals actually believe the following slogan:

    Marriage is a civil right.

    Now let me very clear what’s being said here. They’re not saying that they have the right to live together as a couple. They already have that right in California, and it was not under threat. They mean legal marriage, and I don’t mean a relationship that is legally permitted (again, they already have this, which is why Keith Olbermann is lying in the second link above when he says that all homosexuals in California who opposed proposition 8 want is the ability to be “a little less alone in the world” by having a relationship”), I mean a relationship that is created by law. What they are actually saying is this:

    I have a basic right for the government to create a type of legal relationship and to confer upon my relationship the status of being one of those relationships.

    Excuse me? There exists no such civil right, for anyone – homosexual, heterosexual…. or otherwise! What kind of nannyish rubbish is this? The government does currently create such a relationship and confer upon many heterosexual relationships the status of being one of those relationships (and it refuses to do so for others – e.g. close relatives, relationships with more than two people etc, which is why Representative Anthony D. Weiner is lying in the third link above when he says “We are not going to rest at night until every citizen in every state in this country can say, ‘This is the person I love,’ and take their hand in marriage”). It’s like thinking that the right to bear arms means that you have the right to arms, that is, the government has the duty to buy you a gun!

    If I stood up in public and said that my wife and I had a civil right to a free house from the government, what would you say? And how crazy do you think I would look if I went further and said that if the government did not provide one then it was somehow displaying hatred or contempt for me or for my relationship?

    I’m a conservative Christian, and I take very seriously the teaching of the Bible. So if you tell me that I have no choice and I must accept the fact that all marriages must be state-endorsed, then obviously I’m going to think in terms of my traditional understanding of marriage, since I don’t want the government creating and then endorsing things that are immoral. We’re going to clash and war over that. But here’s a radical thought: If you want to get married then get married, and let’s not let the government have a part of it at all!

    But what about incest, polygamy etc? Well firstly, people in the USA are already legally permitted to have sexual relations with multiple people and commit adultery. If you think that’s so horrific, then support a law banning it. And incest is already illegal, so the question of incestuous marriage isn’t an issue. The act is banned. Let’s just say that anyone can get married, as long as they don’t commit any acts that are themselves illegal (like incest or marrying a minor or any other illegal sexual practices). Enter into whatever property contracts you like, regardless of sexuality.

    Issues of sexual practices are determined on their own (e.g. the notorious “anti-sodomy law” issue in Texas). But the suggestion that you have a civil right for the government to come into your bedroom and give you a nice certificate and pat your relationship on the back (so to speak)…. Please don’t do that to my language. “Rights” are important things, and you’re dragging that word through the mud when you use it like that.

    (This is to say nothing of the misleading claim that currently, different individuals have different rights based on their sexuality. They don’t. No individual is excluded from getting married in California based on gender, race, or sexual orientation. That’s why emotive comparisons to interracial marriage being banned just have no substance.)