Category: Ethics

  • What About the Poor? Sustenance Rights Examined

    When I began university I had strong socialist leanings. The reason was that I believed, as a Christian, we had a duty to help the poor. Studying at Waikato University, however, brought me face to face with socialist academics and left-wing activists and I discovered a hostile and dangerous social agenda that I could not in good conscience embrace.

    That, however, left me with a burning question. What about the poor? If the classical liberal or conservative view is correct. What about the poor?

    In the next two posts I want to discuss my thoughts on this a bit. I will do so by examining Nicholas Wolterstorff’s defence of welfare or sustenance rights. I will argue that, as initially stated, Wolterstorff’s position is subject to three problems. In my second post, What About the Poor? More on Sustenance Rights, I will suggest that while Wolterstorff’s position can escape these problems, it does so only by qualifying itself in such a way that there is no necessary link between accepting the poor’s right to sustenance and the kind of statist re-distributionary policies favoured by the left

    In, When Justice and Peace Embrace, Nicholas Wolterstorff suggests that “If a rich man knows of someone who is starving and has the power to help that person, and chooses not to, then he violates that person’s rights as surely and reprehensively as if he had physically assaulted the sufferer.” Wolterstorff suggests further that this conclusion is orthodox Christian teaching. He provides citations from Basil, Ambrose, John Chrysostom and Aquinas to substantiate this claim.

    One immediate problem with this line of analysis is it ignores something of the context in which these theologians wrote. They were addressing the situation of alms-giving. A wealthy person living in a small town or village in the Roman Empire would come across destitute people in his community whom would ask for assistance in most cases a wealthy lord would be able to do so. In the age of the mass media, however, things are quite different. It is not just about the poor person down the road; I am regularly bombarded with stories of poverty and suffering of thousands of people all across the globe when I turn on the new or surf the web.

    In this context, to suggest that failure to alleviate any poverty I know about violates the person I fail to help and is analogous to assaulting them is problematic for a couple of reasons.

    First, take my duty (and corresponding right on the part of others) to not assault people. This duty applies 24-7, it is not like I can refrain from assault on Fridays but smash peoples heads in on Sunday. There are 6 billion people in the world, as I have a duty to not assault anyone I owe that duty to all these 6 billion people. Moreover, each one of them holds a right to not be assaulted against me. This is not problematic, because discharging my duty to all 6 billion is not hard, I can do so by refraining from assault.

    Discharging such a duty and its corresponding right, is unproblematic because the duty to not assault is a duty to not do something

    A claim right; a right requiring me to do or give assistance, however, is different. Clearly I cannot give assistance to all 6 billion people in the world at all times. I simply do not have the resources or the ability to do that. Hence, each individual poor person cannot hold a right to assistance against me. At best, I have a duty to help some people, some of the time, with some of my resources.

    A related problem is that unless I live just above the sustenance level and force my family to do the same, and donate every cent I earn above that level to the poor then I will be failing to discharge my duty. Hence, accepting Wolterstorff’s claim would quite literally imply that everyone has a duty to live just above the poverty line. Wealth of any sort is a sin, a conclusion at odds with scripture which commends many wealthy people (like Job and Abraham) as Godly people and not as mass murderers.

    A second problem is the quite oppressive political implications of Wolterstorff’s claim. Given what I have outlined above, if failure to give to a poor person when we can is analogous to assaulting them then every person who does not live just above sustenance level and does not donate everything they own and earn to charity is in fact a serious criminal. A just government would then be required to lock all these people up, their children would end up in foster care and all their property confiscated and given to the poor as restitution. The implications of accepting a right of the sort Wolterstorff affirms is totalitarianism; a system where everyone is poor and anyone else is arrested and detained. The state would be obligated to take almost everything.

    A third problem, which follows on from the first and second, is that if everyone must be self-frozen in their income to just above sustenance level and any falling below it grants one a right to receive what’s needed to get above the sustenance line wouldn’t this destroy all incentives to work or be productive in any shape or form?

    The problems with the idea of ‘sustenance right’ were not lost on Aquinas, whom Wolterstorff interestingly cites. In the Summa Theologica Aquinas addresses the question of whether a destitute person who steals food to avoid starvation has committed theft. Aquinas’s answer is no and he cites with approval the claim of Ambrose of Milan that the poor have a right to sustenance and any property given to those unable to maintain themselves is money they are owed.

    However, Aquinas goes on to offer some important qualifications. First, in the articles prior to this section of the Summa, Aquinas defends the concept of private property and argues that those who claim the private property of others are in sin, further, those who claim we are required to renounce property to be Christians are expounding a heretical doctrine. Second, Aquinas states that;

    Since, however, there are many who are in need, while it is impossible for all
    to be succored by means of the same thing, each one is entrusted with the
    stewardship of his own things, so that out of them he may come to the aid of
    those who are in need. Nevertheless, if the need be so manifest and urgent, that
    it is evident that the present need must be remedied by whatever means be at
    hand (for instance when a person is in some imminent danger, and there is no
    other possible remedy), then it is lawful for a man to succor his own need by
    means of another’s property, by taking it either openly or secretly: nor is this
    properly speaking theft or robbery.

    Aquinas observations are worth noting. Because there are so many in need and I cannot give to all I am not required to give to every needy person I know of. Instead I have a duty to give some of my money to some needy people and it is my choice to decide who. It follows from this observation that giving to the poor is an imperfect duty. Unlike the duty to refrain from assault it is not a duty to be discharged to all people at all times, but rather it is a duty to give some money to some poor people. But it is at the discretion of the property owner to decide who.

    While there is a duty to give to the poor there is not a duty to give to any specific poor individual and hence no individual poor person has a right to my property (although I will be in serious dereliction of duty if I give to no-one).

    Aquinas does provide an exception; what has been called the case of extreme necessity. As Donagan puts it, if a person “encounter[s] another who then and there needs help, which only he can give without disproportionate inconvenience” then such a person has a duty to give it and the other has a right to such help.

    The medieval position Aquinas expounded is well summed up by Donagan in The Theory of Morality. Donagan suggests that all people have a duty of beneficence, “it is impermissible not to promote the well-being of others by actions in and of themselves permissible, in as much as one can do so without proportionate inconvenience.” By promoting the well-being of others, Donagan means things such as [paraphrasing Donagan] promoting the well being and up-bringing of those who are not adults, especially orphans; helping those who have duties, which owing to bereavement, injury, illness or desertion, they can’t perform without help; restoring to a condition of independence those who have been incapacitated with illness, accident, or injury and caring for those who are crippled, deaf, blind, are chronically ill, or senile.

    However, the principle of beneficence is an imperfect duty. No individual poor person has a right to my assistance except in cases of extreme necessity. Donagan draws the appropriate conclusion; apart from cases of extreme necessity,

    Duties of beneficence, seeing they are not owed to specific individuals generate
    no enforceable rights; and apart from duties of beneficence, no innocent
    person has any obligation to contribute to the wellbeing of others, except as he
    may freely undertake.

    Donagan suggests that the duty to benefit the poor is an imperfect duty to pursue a particular end and not based on a right that another may have. While one has a duty to pursue this end, it is at a person’s discretion as to how exactly they would pursue it.

    It would seem then that social polices based on alleged welfare rights of the poor and the authority of the state to coercively uphold such rights are unjust. While we have a duty to aid the well-being of the poor as an end, no poor individual, outside of cases of extreme necessity, has a right to such assistance and hence one cannot justly be forced or required to give any individual such assistance.

    In my next post I will look at how Wolterstorff responds to criticisms of this sort and how he qualifies his position to do so.

  • The Myth of Left Wing Moral Superiority

    Irish Bill at The Standard writes:

    One of the things I like about being left wing is how often the best moral decision is also the best economic decision.

    Take economic stimulus for example. In a recession it’s the most vulnerable such as beneficiaries, low paid workers and youth that are hit worst because they are the ones least likely to have any financial backstop. The good thing is the best way to ameliorate the effects of a recession on society as a whole is to help these people out.

    Irish Bill here insinuates that only left-wingers support giving to the poor and right wingers do not. The problem is that this claim is false. As I pointed out here, evidence suggests that religious conservatives actually give significantly more money to assist poor people than secular liberals do.

    The difference between the left and right is not about whether or not financial assistance should be provided to the poor. Contrary to the false moral superiority (and slander) propagated by left wing activists, the difference is that the left primarily believe in taking other peoples money by threats of violence and giving it to the poor and in practice they give very little of their own money voluntarily. Conservatives, on the other hand, give generously of their own money and take others by force only when as a last resort.

    The Standard can con themselves into thinking that the former is the more moral stance, but I think that is fairly questionable.

  • A Voting Guide

    How to choose who to vote for tomorrow, from Glenn (once again – what can we say? he is brilliant and we ran out of time *ahem*)

    Extract from: So who AM I voting for? (the election blog, part 3)

    Basic Human rights/freedoms
    There are some bottom line human rights and liberties that should always be protected. They’re sometimes called “first generation” human rights. Whatever you call them, here are the big basic things that no government anywhere should neglect, and which no state has any right to diminish. These are the non-negotiables, the rejection of which means that you’re simply morally deficient and unfit to be in power.

    Right to life
    Christians believe that human life is sacred. Humanity is made in the image of God, and as such taking life is a serious matter. Prima facie, we have a duty to not kill. That is to say, if there are no other factors to consider, then killing human beings is always wrong. Some times, of course, there are other factors to consider. Sometimes people are attacked (or their families, friends etc), and in the course of defending themselves they kill the attacker. This is rare, since self defense usually does not require killing anyone, but sometimes it happens. Sometimes this happens not merely on a personal level, but a national one, where your country is attacked by another. Here too, most of us recognise that although we may not want to kill anyone, that may be an unavoidable outcome of defending our country.

    Even in the controversial case of abortion, many conservative Christians accept that – although it is a terrible thing to have to do – there are cases where the very existence of the unborn child poses a clear and imminent threat to the life of the woman carrying the child, and removing the child at an early stage of gestation involves ending the life of that child. It’s the doctrine of double effect – you save life and prevent both mother and child from dying, but a consequence of this is that one of them dies. A more controversial example still for some Christians is the issue of capital punishment. Here, while we have a prima facie duty not to kill people, a person is deemed to have done something so terrible that they give up their right to life itself, and they are put to death.

    None of these scenarios, of course, involves rejecting the right to life, since the right to life imposes only a prima facie duty. But it is still a duty, and the fact that there are a few rare cases where we can take life should not allow us to trivialise this right or duty. For that reason, abortion should be regarded as prima facie wrong (even if there could conceivably be isolated cases where it is permissible), and not merely wrong but such an abridgment of human rights that it ought not be permitted.

    Similarly, because of the value of human life, most forms of euthanasia are likewise not permissible. I say “most forms” because there are some forms of euthanasia that are arguably not killing, or which are sufficiently indirect that they are not morally on par with killing (such as withdrawal of extraordinary means, or death as a double effect resulting from pain relief). Firstly then, I think that any party that has a permissive policy on abortion or euthanasia has a big black mark against it when it comes to being a party worth voting for. I know of only two parties in the election race who pass this hurdle, namely the two Christian parties: The Kiwi party and the Family Party.

    [Support for Abortion is illiberal; any liberal who supports it is inconsistent. Don’t agree? Then read our series and post a reasoned rebuttal.]

    Free speech
    The right to freedom of speech means that if I want to say it, and if I am able to say it, then I must be free to say it and the state should not prevent me from doing so. As with the right to life, this is a prima facie right, and there are limits on what I can and cannot say. Sellers are not allowed to mislead people about products and services they sell, for example. I am not allowed to defame somebody: Say things that are not true or reasonable to believe and which damage another person (for example, I cannot spread rumours that a local retailer is a paedophile in order to get people to come to my store instead). But the right to free speech means that it is wrong for the state to censor or inhibit the propagation of any point of view in society.

    If I want to print and distribute fliers telling people who I think they should vote for, or if I want to rent billboard space to do the same thing – no strings attached, it is something I have a right to do. Of course, nobody has a duty to promote or protect my views, so another person can refuse to use her private property to promote my views (e.g. if I leave comments on her blog she may delete them, because it’s her blog), but that’s an issue of that person’s private property rights, and it doesn’t mean I no longer have a right to free speech. What’s more, free speech doesn’t come with extra conditions.

    For example, the state can’t say “sure, you can voice your political opinion and attack our policies, but if you do then you must wear this big bullseye so that people can identify you in public,” or “OK, so tell people that you’re opposed to our regime, but you’ll have to attach this big yellow star to the front door of your house so that our goons know where to look for you.” That’s not free speech because it’s not free. All it would do is discourage people from expressing themselves via intimidation or fear of reprisal.

    Generally speaking, free speech exists in New Zealand, and few parties pose any sort of threat to it. As far as I know, none of the parties listed in this blog entry would threaten free speech. I haven’t listed the Labour Party or the minor parties on the far left, as they tend to fail just about every single criterion I present here. Free speech is no exception for Labour, who are responsible for the “electoral finance act” that I discussed recently. The act in effect does the same thing as would a law that says you can have free speech as long as you paint a bulls-eye on the door of your family home. Check out my earlier blog entry to see why.

    Property rights
    People have certain rights over their own property. What they earn belongs to them, and it cannot be taken from them without due process and given to others. The government cannot commandeer land that you own for its own projects, and if it requires land you own, you must be compensated at market value. This has implications for taxation as well. Prima facie, the government cannot tax you at all. Only after good grounds have been given for obliging you to pay tax can the government take money from you, and it must be transparently accountable to you for what it does with that money, and continually justify the level of tax taken. Remember, “thou shalt not steal.”

    In addition to what we might think of as basic human rights and freedoms, there are a few other important principles of government that have in common the pursuit of justice and/or the reduction of corruption by state interference.

    Separation of powers / due process
    By “separation of powers” I mean that Parliament, while it has the authority to make laws, has absolutely no authority to enforce those laws, and no role whatsoever in the judicial process. It will respect the decision of the courts, it will not commandeer the police to do its bidding, and it will not influence the likelihood of a person facing (or not facing) charges, among other things. The Labour government and its ministers have blatantly violated each of these principles as I have noted elsewhere.

    Small government / non intervention
    This is really the broad principle underlying many of the rights and principles I’ve outlined here. In a pluralistic society, we all have our own agendas. Some will get married, others will not, some are happy with one type of school or educational method, some prefer others, some people might like one insurance company, some prefer others, some people take fewer risks, and so end up having fewer accidents and less accident related expense, some people make foolish choices and end up disadvantaging themselves and so forth. You get the idea. Small government means that the government does not intrude into private life, and it lets people make their own choices and bear responsibility for the consequences of those choices. People will save money or waste money depending on the options they choose, they will have more or fewer accidents, they will spend more or less on education, and so forth. Likewise, the government might not like the values that parents instill in their children, but it is not the job of government to raise children, that is the role of parents. Likewise again, the government might not like the fact that a court reaches a certain decision, but it is not the job of the government to settle cases, that is the role of the courts.

    In the political tradition that I am partial to, namely the Christian classical liberal tradition, the role of the state is limited by the law of nature. It should only do what the basic precepts of the law of nature (that is, minimal standards of justice and upright living) require of it, and beyond this, it usurps the role of the private sector.

    Safety net for the poor
    Why am I listing this last? Doesn’t the Bible say more about caring for the poor than it does about free trade or property rights? Yes it does. It also says more about worshipping God in song than it does about free speech, but that doesn’t mean we should only vote for a party that promises to create taxpayer funded hymn singing squads. The fact that something is encouraged in the Bible does not automatically mean that we are justified in saying that the Bible advocates it as a duty of the government. Just about every time the Bible says anything at all about caring for the poor, it is clearly speaking about the duty that we as people have, rather than describing government spending programmes. I’m also listing it last to deliberately contrast myself from some Christians who (as far as I can tell) seriously believe that social justice just is wealth redistribution to the poor. Those who think this are somewhat selective in their reading of the Bible. For some reason none of them ever seem to quote 2 Thessalonians 3:10-12:

    For even when we were with you, we would give you this command: If anyone is not willing to work, let him not eat. For we hear that some among you walk in idleness, not busy at work, but busybodies. Now such persons we command and encourage in the Lord Jesus Christ to do their work quietly and to earn their own living.

    That being said, there does need to be a safety net for those who fall into genuine hardship. People who are genuinely unable to earn a living (or who are demonstrably doing all that they can to obtain work) and who have no other means of support should be assisted for as long as is necessary. Although by no means a desirable state of affairs, it’s like the Proverb says, “people do not despise a thief if he steals to satisfy his appetite when he is hungry.”

    Far from being some sort of socialism, this has always been a part of a conservative or classical liberal outlook. John Locke gives his rationale for limited welfare in his treatise on government, book 1, paragraph 42:

    But we know God hath not left one man so to the mercy of another, that he may starve him if he please: God, the Lord and Father of all, has given no one of his children such a property in his peculiar portion of the things of this world, but that he has given his needy brother a right to the surplusage of his goods; so that it cannot justly be denied him, when his pressing wants call for it: and therefore no man could ever have a just power over the life of another by right of property in land or possessions; since it would always be a sin, in any man of estate, to let his brother perish for want of affording him relief out of his plenty. As justice gives every man a title to the product of his honest industry, and the fair acquisitions of his ancestors descended to him; so charity gives every man a title to so much out of another’s plenty as will keep him from extreme want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise.

    Likewise in biblical law, allowance was made for those in genuine need to receive something from the surplus of those with plenty. See Leviticus 19:9-10 – “When you reap the harvest of your land, you shall not reap your field right up to its edge, neither shall you gather the gleanings after your harvest. And you shall not strip your vineyard bare, neither shall you gather the fallen grapes of your vineyard. You shall leave them for the poor and for the sojourner: I am the Lord your God.”

    This has particular relevance here because it is not simply moral instruction but law, and therefore enforceable by the authorities.

    What should be pretty obvious in all this is that having basic safety nets for those in genuine need has little (if anything) to do with enormous wealth redistribution programmes to equalise all middle class families and give them advantages over people with no children. One other reason for listing this criteria last is that it really serves no value as a means of distinguishing between political parties in this election. There is no party that stands any chance of being in Parliament that does not meet this criterion in some way. Most parties go well beyond a safety net, and end up pursuing admirable ends by immoral means.

    So how do these parties measure up?

    National
    I won’t say much about National, other than to say that they have painted themselves into a political corner. In order to attract Labour voters, they have become as much like Labour as its own supporters will let it, which is quite a lot unfortunately. Think enormous government, duplicating Labour’s massive welfare programmes, shaving tiny amounts off tax for most people, and calling it a change. There’s no principled stance on matters of human life that I can see, and little to redeem the party apart from the fact that they could be worse (e.g. they could be Labour). It does, however, have two redeeming features (I said there’s little to redeem them, not nothing). One, they aren’t Labour, and two, Stephen Franks (one of the finest politicians in this country, and a former ACT MP).

    United Future
    Ditto for United Future, but add to the mix a leader (Peter Dunne) who will literally support any other party no matter how bad, as long as it gets him leverage as a minister and coalition power broker. This is the man who was happy to prop up the minority Labour Government in exchange for a ministerial portfolio.

    The Kiwi Party
    The Kiwi party presents a strong Christian image, opposing abortion and the legal manufacturing of same sex marriage, but they are a bit of a political Frankenstein – sometimes appearing to favour a socialist state (when it comes to, for example, spending taxpayer funds on pre-marriage counselling), sometimes appearing to favour a more limited state (opposing the so-called “anti-smacking bill” as a government intrusion into the home).

    There’s a statist approach to employment (and effectively job cuts), advocating raising the minimum wage to $15 an hour, which is a big nod to leftist voters, and then they’re back in the lower tax camp by advocating income splitting for couples. On the whole they certainly seem to advocate more of a limited government/personal responsibility stance than the current government (additional policies like tax rebates for private health insurance bear this out). So while I like them when it comes to a few specific issues, on the whole I just don’t see them as having a particular political vision or unifying set of principles, and they fail quite badly in some cases when it comes to the scope and power of the government. An improvement? Sure. Will I vote for them? No.

    ACT
    On the whole, the ACT party score very well in regard to the principles that I look for in government, as outlined here. It’s such a shame that they do so abysmally poor when it comes to issues of human life. As a party perceived as being fairly extreme (only because most New Zealand parties contain so many socialistic elements that any party that lacks them appears very different and therefore extreme), it attracts extreme supporters, and like Labour it has managed to capture the affections of some young voters very hostile to Christianity. There’s great potential in what the party quite self-consciously stands for; individual rights and responsibilities, personal liberty, strong policies on justice and other things, but the fly in the ointment – terrible policies that lack regard for the sanctity of life and a support base that contains some crazies – is pretty distracting.

    The Family Party
    Lastly there’s the youngest of the parties that have my interest, the Family Party. OK, least important things first: I hate their party name. It gives the unfortunate and misleading impression that they want to benefit families and forget everyone else. There are people who wouldn’t vote for a party with a name like that. Their policy statements reveal that their concern is much broader than this, so they should have a different name. But that aside, I like what I see.

    They’re the second explicitly Christian party. They have what I think are some great policies on taxation. They advocate removing sales tax on necessities like food and gasoline. Freedom of choice in education is a priority, a welfare policy designed to get people away from welfare, a clearly pro-life stance on abortion, and policies across the board that as far as I can tell line up very well with the values that I outlined at the start of this post. So what’s the drawback? Why am I not coming out in full force telling everyone that this is who I will vote for? The answer lies in a fairly embarrassing pragmatism. In order for a party to get into parliament at all in New Zealand’s electoral system, they must either have one candidate who wins an electorate seat, or they must win at least 5% of the party vote, and I’m not sure that the Family party will do this. If I knew that the party I vote for would definitely get into parliament, I would vote for them in a second. As it is, I still might do so, but my mind hasn’t been made up.

    Ask me who I’m not going to vote for, however, and I’m as clear as day (they aren’t listed here).

  • Fisking Grant Robertson

    Supporters of Labour Candidate for Wellington Central, Grant Robertson, have published this video to provide evidence that Stephen Franks, the National Candidate for the same electorate, is “homophobic.” I remain unconvinced; in fact, I suggest that a careful analysis of the contents show that, if anything, Robertson is the bigoted ideologue. Unlike Robertson’s supporters, I will endeavour to argue for my position.

    The video opens citing Franks’ comments that he was tired of having to deal with “grumpy Christians and whiny gays;” the caption is put above the head of John Key and attributed to the National Party as a whole. This is clearly dishonest. Franks’ comments were made in a particular context; while he was on the select committee for the Civil Unions Act, he commented that he was sick of grumpy Christians and whiny gays appearing before the committee. To suggest from this that he is sick of gays and Christians in general is simply engage in inaccurate spin.

    Moreover, to suggest that because Franks’ on one occasion, several years ago, was sick of them in a particular context means that it follows that the entire National party is sick of them in every context is a whopping non-sequitur. It is hard to take this kind of inference seriously except for the fact that many people actually appear to!

    Turning to the video; Grant Robertson starts by responding to the arguments Stephen Franks gave against the Civil Unions Bill in parliament. After admitting that he has read the speech, Robertson does not provide any arguments against Franks’ reasons or offer any critique, he instead suggests that Franks’ arguments are “convenient” given the comments he made which “did not put the gay community in a positive light.”

    Note what’s going on here, Robertson is suggesting that if a person utters comments that do not put the Gay community in a positive light, if such comments do not advance the PR agenda of homosexuals, then their argument can be written off. It apparently does not matter whether their arguments are well reasoned, sound or that the facts they cite may be true. The crucial consideration is whether everything they have stated is in the interests of the gay community.

    If it is not then everything they say should be ignored and dismissed by members of parliament considering legislation. Apparently, the state should only listen to and consider the reasoning offered by those who advance the PR of the gay community.

    This is not open minded tolerance, its close mindedness of the worst kind.

    The other point about this opening comment on Robertson’s part is that it is clearly irrational. Robertson is responding to Franks’ arguments, not by showing there is anything mistaken about them but by insinuating he is really motivated by homophobia.

    In other words, his response to a critique of government policy is to impugn the motives of the critic and attack his character. Grant suggests that Franks’ is homophobic but then immediately declines to mention or provide evidence of the charge despite the fact that he has put it out there. Moreover even if what Robertson claims of Franks were true, it actually does not address any of Franks’ arguments.

    Even if people are motivated by hatred or fear in adopting a position, it does not follow that the position itself is mistaken or that the reasons they offered for its adoption were bad. If I, for example, were motivated by an irrational fear and hatred towards fundamentalists to publish books defending evolutionary theory that would not mean that evolutionary theory is based on an irrational fear of fundamentalism and that I had offered no reasons for this theory. The theory stands or falls on the evidence not the motives of its proponents. Hitler thought the world was round. Was he wrong because he was a monster?

    Turning to the allegedly homophobic comments; Robertson cites Franks’ statement “I love my dog that does not mean I can marry him.” Some of Robertson’s supporters have claimed on the basis of this that Franks “compares civil unions to marrying your dog.” This way of interpreting Franks’ comments is of course easily turned into something homophobic, if Franks had actually suggested that a same-sex civil union is on par with marrying a dog, one could then suggest that he thinks that gays are like animals, and hence less than human with no civil rights.

    The problem is that this is not what Franks’ said. He did not say that “civil unions are like marrying your dog” he said the fact that you love your dog does not mean you can marry it. In other words, he is stating that the mere presence of love is not enough to justify the state issuing a marriage licence.

    As Franks himself clarified, he was not attacking civil unions per se, but the premise of one particular argument for civil unions; the premise that the state should recognise all loving relationships.

    Now contrary to what Robertson and his supporters contend, there is in fact a world of difference between noting that one premise of one argument in favour of civil unions entails that one can marry one’s dog and the claim that all gays are dogs.

    The reasoning of Robertson’s supporters seems to be this:

    P. If one premise of one argument for P entails Q then P is analogous to Q.

    But this is clearly false: the North American Man Boy Love Association has offered arguments for Gay rights which utilise premises that entail that paedophilia is a loving relationship between adult and child. Many gay people are aware of these arguments and reject them precisely because they have this implication. Does it follow that these gay people believe that all homosexuals are paedophiles? Of course not! They simply reject these particular arguments and ensure that those who defend ‘gay rights’ use other arguments that do not entail support for paedophilia. To suggest that anyone who rejected NAMBLA’s argument because of its absurd implications then believes that all gays are paedophiles is ridiculous.

    Take another example, Grant Robertson supports abortion. Grant is also aware, I am sure, that one argument for abortion rights, proposed by Peter Singer, entails that infanticide is permissible. Does Grant admitting this problem exists with Singer’s argument mean that he thinks abortion is on par with infanticide and that he is ok with this? Clearly not. He simply concludes that this particular argument is flawed.

    So contrary to Robertson’s supporters, Franks did not suggest either directly or by implication that “civil unions is like marrying your dog”.

    Its interesting that when Franks’ points out that Robertson has confused a claim about a premise with a claim about a conclusion and has cited him out of context that the response is not an apology and retraction; instead Robertson’s supporters, boo, hiss, shout “shame on you” and continue to affirm the false claim Robertson makes against his opponent. No attempt is made to suggest the original allegation was inaccurate or apologise. These people apparently think that it is ok to accuse people of malicious intent without evidence or to back their claims up and that when the claims are refuted they simply maintain them anyway. Who is the bigot here? Not Franks.

    Its worth noting that even if Franks’ had claimed that having “a civil union is like marrying your dog” it does not necessarily follow that this is offensive or “does not portray the gay community in a positive light.” It depends upon what respects Franks’ said they were alike. It is true, for example, that heterosexual relationships are like marrying ones dog in some respects as both, for example, occur on earth; both involve at least one human, both can take place in the 21st century, both can happen in the middle of the day etc. Of course in other respects they are quite different. Marrying a dog, for example, (if one consummated the union) violates the law of God whereas a heterosexual marriage does not. But the point is that whether saying they are alike is offensive depends on the way in which they are said to be alike.

    Interestingly, even if one misrepresents Franks’ comments, it is clear that he only stated they were alike in that both were loving. Is this what Grant finds offensive? Apparently to say gay relationships are loving “does not portray the gay community in a positive light.” Would Robertson prefer that people said gay lovers hate each other?

    Finally let me say some comments about Franks’ argument. While Franks refers to a person loving one’s dog, elsewhere he pointed out that a common premise utilised by defenders of the Civil Unions Act entailed that incestuous unions should be recognised by the State. In this he is absolutely correct; many people who defended the Bill did so on the grounds that:

    (1) the government should not discriminate against any loving committed relationships;

    The problem is that it is a fact that:

    (2) incestuous and unions with multiple partners can be loving and committed;

    However, [1] and [2] entail that:

    [3] incestuous and multiple partner relationships should be recognised by the state.

    Hence if one affirms [1], one is rationally committed to supporting incestuous marriages. Now despite howls and boos from Robertson’s supporters, it is difficult to see what is wrong with this inference. The argument form is clearly valid, it follows the form: all A’s are B, x is an A; therefore x is a B. To deny this form is to affirm that all things of a particular sort can have a property and also some can not, which is a contradiction. Robertson’s supporters may be suggesting that it is homophobic to not contradict oneself but I doubt they are that stupid.

    Seeing the argument is valid, the objector needs to reject [1] or [2] as false. The whole point of the argument, however, is to show that [1] is false by showing the absurd conclusions it entails. Moreover, Robertson’s supporters in the You Tube clip clearly support [1] one of them asserts very loudly that something like [1] is true. So presumably their claim is that incestuous couples or polygamous couples never love each other, but that is clearly false. The only sensible thing then is to suppose they support [3], but then if that is the case, then why is it offensive to suggest that homosexual unions are like incestuous ones? They apparently see nothing wrong with incest.

    The honest thing to do then would be to simply admit that this argument is a bad one and offer another one. But of course they do not. When an argument for civil unions is refuted, they resort to quoting out of context, character assassination and dogmatic assertions of the falsehood even when its mendacity had been shown.

    It is then unwarrantedly claimed that Franks’ comment in one context applies to all times and places and are held in this absurd way by everyone in the National Party. Moreover, any other argument against their position is irrationally dismissed and ignored on the grounds that it does not further their political agenda to consider it. Apparently this is the type of activity that some Labour supporters consider open minded tolerance.

    Matt (posted by Madeleine)

  • State of the Nation: Some Voting Considerations

    With each of us feeling pulled, guilt tripped, bribed, confused over not only who to vote for and how to decide Glenn does it again; read his analysis of the state of our country and where exactly we have gone wrong in our thinking.

    Extract from New Zealand: Land of greed, envy and political stupidity (the election blog, part 2):

    The New Zealand political environment is one of very strong statism and government intervention, wealth redistribution and disincentives for many people to work hard and try to get ahead. “Share the wealth” might sound like a nice idea, only in this case it’s not a case of someone saying “why don’t you share your wealth,” but rather a case of the state saying “I am going to share your wealth – with everybody else.”

    There’s more to it than just this. The involvement of the state with our finances is part of the intervention into private lives, but it’s not the only form of such intervention. Marriage in New Zealand is now essentially a legal construct, and as such those who make the laws inevitable end up telling people what does and does not count as marriage. We’ve recently been told (by lawmakers) that we must – regardless of our own views on the matter) treat same sex couples as having a relationship that is the same as a married relationship, if they have a civil union. Now, you might personally think that’s fine. The point here is that it wouldn’t be an issue if the state didn’t own marriage. If marriage was a private affair, perhaps accompanied by a private contract, there would be no “same sex marriage” controversy. Let churches marry who they are prepared to marry, and let anyone have a public gathering to celebrate what they will. But as soon as the state gets involved and starts bestowing its blessing, they have started forcing other people to endorse forms of relationships.

    Take another example: The notorious (at least in new Zealand) “anti-smacking” law. Assault is a crime in New Zealand, however there have always been exceptions – scenarios where you are permitted to use force against other people (within reason). You can use reasonable force in self defense, the captain of a ship can use reasonable force to subdue and contain a passenger who poses a risk to other passengers, and up until recently, a parent could use reasonable force in the course of disciplining a child. The has always said that the force must be reasonable, so you couldn’t injure your child, for example. But you could use force – for example – to place your child in confinement (which would normally be illegal – I can’t confine another person under normal circumstances), or to smack your child (again, with the proviso that the force is reasonable and not harmful), or any other kind of force along those lines. However, section 59 of the Crimes Act, which allowed for this exception in the case of disciplining children, has now been repealed. The state can use force against you if you need correction, but you cannot use force against a child if that child needs correction. As has frequently been noted, this as the unambiguous consequence that any person who uses any amount of force on a child for any reason is a criminal. If you place your child in “time out” when he doesn’t want to be there – you’ve commit a crime, and a crime for which there is literally no legal defense. If you did this and the police laid charges, you’d be guilty, no matter what the circumstances, because the law has been changed so that absolutely no amount or type of force can be considered reasonable. When challenged with this fact, the member of parliament who proposed this law change, Sue Bradford, explained that yes, it’s true that nearly all parents would technically become criminals, but we should trust the police to use discretion. It’s sometimes hard to convict people who physically abuse children, she explained, so this way everyone is prosecutable, meaning that the genuine abusers can be successfully prosecuted without hindrance like pesky defences of “reasonable force.” Think I’m exaggerating? Not even close. I was physically present (and almost physically sick) at Bradford’s public meeting here in Dunedin when she happily explained this.

    Another example is the Electoral Finance Act, which I discussed recently here. This is, in effect, an attack on the free speech of political spokespeople who do not wish their personal address to be provided to the new Zealand public.

    Another example is Labour’s re-write of the Immigration Act. The new version gives immigration personnel (not even police officers) powers to invade private property, seize belongings and detain people, without the need of a warrant. Oh, and the detainees do not have to be given the specifics of why they are being detained, either.

    Then of course there was the notorious Seabed and foreshore Act. The government, one side of a dispute over ownership and governance of parts of New Zealand coastline, decided by legislation that the dispute could never be taken to court, and it declared by fiat that the state owned all of the disputed pieces of land. Case closed. No compensation required (oh, and no due process either).

    And then there’s the general all-powerful thuggish behaviour of Labour’s members of parliament over their last few terms of government, including the Prime minister herself, to whom ordinary laws and principles of conduct simply don’t apply – whether it’s the leaked fabrications she used to end the career of the Police Commissioner, the artwork she falsely signed for an auction, the speeding that she apparently required of her driver to get to a rugby game on time – and then let him take the fall for it, as well as the more general reputation she has earned for being a controlling bully who allows no dissent (or free thought). Then there are the cabinet ministers (note: not just members of parliament but cabinet ministers) who, the police agreed, had prima facie cases to answer for assault, but against whom the police, for some reason, chose not to press charges. And then there was the cabinet minister who abused police power by literally calling them up to go and advise a citizen of a request to pay damages (i.e. a civil matter, and even before a civil suit had been filed). The Prime Minister did literally nothing about any of this. There was also the case where an application to build a marina in Whangamata was approved by the environment court, after much effort and expense by the applicants. But then cabinet minister Chris Carter overturned the decision. Again, no due process, no separation between the legislature and the courts, just heavy handed intervention to overthrow the normal process because a government minister didn’t like the outcome of the court.

    There’s little doubt that Clark has had a clear vision for the type of society she wishes to engineer. The society towards which the policies of Clark’s Labour government are geared is a society that eschews traditional morality, sees solo parenting as normal and provides financial support to make it no more difficult than two parent parenting, a society where “sexual norms” is a judgemental term and same-sex unions are absolutely no different from traditional marriage between a man and woman, where authority and to some extent, responsibility, are transferred out of the family home into into the hands of the state (it is the state’s role to discipline, educate, or use force to punish, etc), a society where it is fundamentally the role of the state to see that your family is provided for, a society where healthcare and educational choices are made by the state and funded by the taxpayer whether they use those options or not, a society where the type of free expression that finds acceptance is that which upholds all these norms, and expression that call into question the moral acceptability of these things is frowned on, a society where the idea of promiscuity as something abnormal or unhealthy is itself seen as something abnormal, unhealthy and oppressive, a society where the defence of all these values is described as tolerance, and the defence of different values is presented as intolerance. Of great importance, amidst all this, is that the wise, benevolent state faces no opposition to its decisions, and if there is ever public opposition to its intentions (as was the case with the Civil Unions Bill and the Anti Smacking Bill), these complications are simply ignored.

    Why, exactly, would a Christian vote for a government like this? I’ve asked a few, and I think that, unfortunately, the reason some Christians might vote for a party like this is that “if they become the next government, they will give me X.” What about their impact on laws relating to marriage, or prostitution, or their immoral solutions to land disputes, or their threat to free speech, or their thuggish and unaccountable influence over civil servants, or their disregard for human rights, whether in its treatment of immigrants or in other cases (such as their rejection of the freedom of association for students)? Don’t any of these give my fellow Christians pause before voting them back into power? “They’ve going to give me X.” Whether that X is a cash payout via some sort of state welfare, or a bonus for people working in the state sector, or something else, how in the world could anyone be so short sighted as to snap at a cash carrot and to ignore the wider picture of what is happening?

    One answer has to do with the basic human condition: I’m greedy and envious. If the government gives me money, then regardless of whether I deserve it, my first inclination is to take it and enjoy it. Other people make much more money than I do, so why shouldn’t I be able to get my snout to the trough as well, right? And if the way to get this present is to vote for a particular party, then that party will get my vote.

    There are less cynical ways of looking at welfare payouts, of course. Perhaps the Christian voter might think that the state is being kind to the poor by having these programmes (which should, hopefully, make them wonder why they payouts are made to families that earn salaries over $60,000). Maybe they believe that “social justice” just means distributing wealth so that nobody ends up at the bottom of the heap. I’ll say more about this in my next post, but my experience tells me that the main reason some Christians have for voting for Labour is that Labour will give them something, and they don’t want to lose it.

    Here’s a question I put to any who think this way: Aside from the fact that you like getting free money, what would be wrong with you not getting that free money? Now I know – when you write conversations yourself you get to determine the outcome, but look at it this way:

    Jerry: Hey Perry, who are you voting for?

    Perry: I’m voting for Labour.

    Jerry: Really? Wow. I wouldn’t have seen that coming. You’re a Christian, right?

    Perry: Yes – what does that have to do with anything?

    Jerry: Everything, I would have thought. I mean Labour is totally pro-abortion rights, they created same-sex marriage in this country, they made parents into criminals, they forced people to publish their address when they make political comment, they ride roughshod over human rights, they take incredible amounts of tax, they-

    Perry: Woah, woah, slow down!

    Jerry: Well, you do realise that Labour did all those things, right?

    Perry: Well, maybe. I’m not sure. But still… won’t that other party take away the money Labour is giving us? And I work in the state sector, I mean, my future there is more secure with Labour, right?

    Jerry: You’ve got to be kidding me.

    Perry: What?

    Jerry: Do you really think that your personal finances and security in a government job is more important than matters of right and wrong?

    Perry: No, no of course not. It’s not just about me. What about all those other families out there? They get family assistance from the government too!

    Jerry: And you point is?

    Perry: Well isn’t it obvious? Getting money from the government makes it easier for them to get by, so of course I want to vote for a party that will keep giving them that money.

    Jerry: Well firstly, pretty much every party is going to give them that money. It would be political suicide not to now that they’re already getting it. But there’s a much more important question here.

    Perry: And what’s that?

    Jerry: Should the government take my money and give it to you?

    Perry: Oh come on, let’s not make it personal….

    Jerry: OK fine – should the government take my cousin Bob’s money and give it to you?

    Perry: Well it helps the families who get it, right?

    Jerry: Oh, so if it helps families then the government can do it?

    Perry: Well, I guess. The government is here to help us.

    Jerry: Let’s see where that takes us. How would you feel if you worked hard to save up and buy a car, and then some agents from the government burst into your garage tonight and stole it, and gave it to my cousin Bob.

    Perry: Come on, that’s ridiculous. Nobody is saying that the government should be allowed to do that.

    Jerry: Well Perry, the thing is, Bob can’t afford a car, and having a car would really help his family. He could take them on holiday, and his wife could take them to soccer practice. Do you have any idea how handy a car is in today’s world for a family, Perry?

    Perry: But the fact that they would find it helpful doesn’t give someone the right to just take it from me and give it to them! I worked to buy that car. I earned it!

    Jerry: So what? Remember, it helps families. I thought you said a second ago that the government can do something if it helps families. In fact while we’re at it, some families struggle to pay for good healthy food. I hope you don’t mind if your local MP comes and raids your fridge for some food for them.

    Perry: This is getting silly. OK, the government can’t do just anything because it helps families.

    Jerry: Why not?

    Perry: Because that stuff is mine! That wouldn’t be just!

    Jerry: Just?

    Perry: Right. Taking my car or my food would be unjust!

    Jerry: That’s interesting Perry. Last time I heard, you were all in favour of this thing you call “social justice.” Am I right?

    Perry: You bet! As a Christian, issues of social justice are so crucial to me.

    Jerry: I see. So what are some of the fundamental issues of social justice?

    Perry: Well probably the biggest one is our attitude to the poor. We should share the vast wealth of society with them, redistribute those resources to see that nobody misses out.

    Jerry: OK, so why can’ the government redistribute your car and your food?

    Perry: Like I said, that’s unj- [the penny drops]

    Jerry: Unjust?

    Perry:… yeah. Unjust.

    Jerry: I think we need to take a big step back here. I’m all in favour of me sharing my wealth or you sharing your wealth. But what do we normally call someone who takes it upon himself to share other people’s wealth?

    Perry: Yeah, yeah, a thief, I know. But look, you can’t say that just because it would be wrong for an individual person, it would also be wrong for the government. Governments can do all sorts of things that an individual can’t do. They can make laws, they can change taxes, heck they can even declare war!

    Jerry: OK, now we’re really getting to the heart of it. What can the government do, and what can’t it do? What’s it’s job in the first place? There’s no way we can even begin to ask if it’s all right for the government to take my money and give it to you if we don’t even know what the role of the state is in the first place. Is it the government’s job to redistribute wealth at all? Exactly what rights do I have to the money I earn and the property I possess? How much authority does the government rightly have?

    Perry: There you go, getting all academic. Why doesn’t anyone just think of the children….

    Perry is a moron. Not in every way, of course, but when it comes to voting and politics, he’s pretty dim. That’s not measured by who he wants to vote for, don’t get me wrong. There are politically smart people who will vote for Labour. They are politically smart because they realise what they are doing: They are giving their support to a particular vision of the role of the government in society. When they debate politics, they realise that they are not debating individual policies, they are really involved in a clash of ideologies: Different political philosophies altogether. Two people might both support the same policy, but on the basis of very different political outlooks. Take the civil unions act that created a kind of same-sex marriage here in New Zealand. One person might support it because they firmly believe that it is the role of state to create by law all the formal types of relationships that adults enter into because they support a big government statist ideology, and if all relationships are covered by law, they can be regulated. Another person might support it in the (mistaken, I think) belief that this law generates more liberty and gets the government out of the lives of consenting adults.

    What grates me horribly, however, is the fact that so many Christians (like so many people in general) don’t even ask the big questions. Questions of principle like “should the government be taking and redistributing people’s earned money in this way – is that its job?” are replaced with much more selfish questions like “how much will I get,” or “how will this benefit my profession,” or even more benevolent sounding questions like “what will they give to families,” and people who dissent are not challenged intellectually on whether or not their political philosophy make sense, rather they are targeted with guilt trips like “but you’d be taking [taxpayers’] money away from ________ [insert some group here].” Never mind asking if the government should be giving them other peoples’ money at all, or if the government should be doing anything to benefit those in your profession. What about those not in your profession, or those from whom the money would be taken to give to you?

    Let me put some flesh on the bones: I know a person (nobody who would be reading this blog) who is a Catholic believer, who would vote for a pro-abortion rights pro same-sex-marriage party on the grounds that his taxpayer funded job would be less likely to get funding if another party came to power. I have known Christians – high profile ones at that – who have stood up in public and said “when you cast your vote, just ask one thing: What are they going to do for _______,” and he then named the Christian institution that employed him. In short, Christians get tangled up in some pretty ugly political messes, supporting parties – some of them self consciously Christian parties – that are struggling to impress people by how much they are going to give people or do for them, and they are not once engaging in high-level discussion about why anyone should care that those parties are going to do those things. “He says he’ll get the government to promote heterosexual marriage in law! I’ll vote for him!” Or “they want to give cash payouts to married couples who stay together! He gets my vote!” Not “he consistently advances policies on the basis of a good understanding of private property rights,” or “He really understands the role of the state and the limits of its authority.”

  • Sentience Part 2

    Following on from Sentience Part 1, I will now address the conclusion of Bonnie Steinbock’s argument.

    Steinbock’s Conclusion
    Similar ambiguities affect Steinbock’s conclusion. Steinbock asserts that for killing an individual to be unlawful homicide, the individual must be sentient. However, this is ambiguous; as Don Marquis points out, this could mean that the individual will be sentient at some point in its life or it could mean that it is sentient now or it could mean that it was sentient at some time in the past.[i]

    Steinbock must embrace the last of these options. If she adopts the first option, then the fetus does not lack sentience, as it will become sentient at some point in its life, hence feticide is homicide. The second option is also problematic, if the requirement is that the being is sentient now then it entails that a surgeon who actively kills a patient while he is under general anaesthetic has not committed homicide. Consequently, it is the last sense that Steinbock needs to embrace, it was sentient at some point in the past. However, this raises immediate questions. Why is sentience in the past necessary for possessing interests? On the face of it this appears simply an ad hoc manoeuvre.

    At one point, Steinbock attempts to answer this question.

    [N]ote an important difference between a temporarily unconscious person and a fetus. The difference is that the person who is now unconscious has had experiences, plans, beliefs, desires, etc. in the past. These past experiences are relevant because they form the basis for saying that the comatose person wants not to be killed while unconscious. “He valued his life” we might say or “of course he would want to not be killed” … We have all sorts of desires of which we are not at any particular time consciously aware, and it would be absurd to limit our desires to what we are actually thinking about. Nor do our desires, plans, goals, or the interests composing them, vanish when we fall into a dreamless sleep.[ii]

    Steinbock asserts that past sentience is important because without it an individual cannot be said to have a present desire to go on living. However, this argument returns us to the problems stated above. As Tooley and Singer have pointed out, an infant cannot have a present desire to go on living either, because infants lack the mental capacity necessary to conceive of continued existence. Consequently, the very property that Steinbock claims makes killing fetuses not a form of homicide is a property possessed by infants. The distinction she draws between feticide and infanticide then is ad hoc.

    Towards the end of her paper, Steinbock appears to see some of these problems and offers a third reason in addition to the Golden-Rule and interests arguments already mentioned as to why sentience marks a critical difference. Steinbock appeals to, what she suggests, is a plausible account of personal identity, the psychological continuity account.

    According to the psychological continuity account of personal identity, having a certain set of past experiences is what makes me the person I am, and the experiences I have, my experiences. What makes experiences at two different times experiences of the same person is that they are appropriately related by a chain of memories, desires, intentions and the like. So people’s past experiences are precisely what makes their futures theirs.

    Steinbock is arguing that a fetus and the infant it becomes are not the same individual; they are, rather, different individuals. In order for an individual in the past to be the same individual as me there must be a psychological link between this earlier individual and myself. I must have desires, intentions etc that it once had or, most importantly, I must remember conscious episodes that it had. In order for an earlier individual to have these psychological links with me, it must have been sentient. Consequently, there is an important difference between a fetus and an infant because an infant is sentient. It is possible for me to have been that infant. It was the same individual that I am but at an immature stage. However, this is not true of a pre-sentient fetus. On the psychological continuity account of individual identity, it is impossible for a pre-sentient fetus to have been me. I never was a fetus, some other individual was.

    Again, this argument seems to entail that infanticide is not homicide. By applying the standard psychological continuity account, it is very difficult to find the requisite psychological link between the infant that developed into me and me today. Defenders of infanticide, such as Tooley and Singer, appeal precisely to this account to argue that we are not the same individual as the infant that developed into us. Tooley, in his monograph Abortion and Infanticide, cites numerous empirical data to show that according to the Psychological identity account, a person is not identical to the infant that developed into him or her.

    Steinbock’s response to this problem is surprisingly weak; she simply states that “it may be that a more sophisticated account [of identity]” can be worked out. Merely claiming there “may be” a solution is not an adequate response. If the opponent of feticide were to respond to Steinbock’s objections by saying, “maybe my position can be modified to avoid those objections”, I doubt she would consider herself answered. Until such possibilities become defensible actualities, sentience does not give us any reason for discriminating between infanticide and feticide.

    This discussion has repeatedly led to the conclusion that accounts based on sentience do not provide a basis for concluding that feticide and infanticide are any different. Not only are the arguments mustered in favour of feticide problematic, the very features of feticide that are alleged to render killing fetuses permissible are features also present in infanticide.

    [i] Don Marquis, “Why Most Abortions are Immoral,” in Advances in Bioethics: Bioethics for Medical Education, Vol. 5, ed. Rem B. Edwards & E. Edwards Bittar (Stamford, CT: JAI Press, 1999), 239-240.
    [ii] Bonnie Steinbock, “Why Most Abortions are Not Wrong,” in Advances in Bioethics: Bioethics for Medical Education, Vol. 5, ed. Rem B. Edwards & E. Edwards Bittar (Stanford, CT: JAI Press, 1999), 252.
    Ibid., 252-54.
    Ibid., 253.
    Ibid., 254.

  • Sentience Part 1

    Following on from my series on the illiberality of Abortion, discussion in the comments section turned to the issue of sentience. Commenters asked whether perhaps sentience is the property that a newborn possesses and a fetus does not that warrants such unequal application of the non-initiation of force principle by liberals. Is sentience the property that enables the liberal to be consistent in otherwise violating the non-initiation of force principle when it comes to abortion, by permitting feticide, and yet not when it comes to liberal opposition of infanticide?

    Some commentators claim that feticide is not homicide until the fetus is sentient. Bonnie Steinbock made perhaps the most sophisticated defence of this position. In an article summarising her position Steinbock states, “my thesis is that killing fetuses is morally different from killing babies because fetuses are not, and babies are, sentient”.[i] She states that she finds the notion that feticide is on a par with infanticide and hence homicide, “completely implausible” because:

    A newborn can feel, react, and perceive. It cries when it is hungry or stuck with needles. Very soon after birth it cries from boredom or loneliness as well and can be soothed by being rocked and held. By contrast, the first-semester fetus cannot, think, feel, or perceive anything.[ii]

    I propose two responses. Firstly, I will analyse Steinbock’s argument in favour of this thesis, then I will criticise her conclusion in Sentience Part 2. In both cases, I will argue that Steinbock does not provide a reason for thinking that feticide is different from infanticide. On the contrary, her arguments in favour of feticide are also arguments in favour of infanticide.

    Steinbock’s Argument
    Steinbock argues that being sentient is essential for possession of interests.

    [S]entience is important because nonsentient beings, whether mere things (e.g., cars and rocks and works of art) or living things without nervous systems (e.g., plants), lack interests of their own. Therefore, nonsentient beings are not among those beings whose interests we are required to consider.

    Why is sentience necessary for possession of interests? Steinbock says “[I]t is only sentient beings to whom anything matters… since non-sentient beings cannot be hurt or made to suffer it does not matter to them what is done to them”.[Emphasis original] Elsewhere Steinbock states that what is necessary for a being to have interests in something is that it desires or wants the thing in question.

    Steinbock’s argument then rests on these claims. Firstly, that killing an individual is homicide only if continued life is in the interests of that individual. Secondly, an individual cannot have an interest in living unless it cares about living. Thirdly, that sentience is necessary to be able to care about anything.

    This argument equivocates on two separate senses of the word ‘interests’. Interests can refer to things a person is interested in, what a person likes or cares about; in this sense, tramping is one of my interests. On the other hand, to talk of someone’s interests can mean to talk about what is best for him or her, what enhances and promotes his or her welfare.

    When we examine the second premise of this argument it is clear that it is true only if interests are defined in the first of these senses. In order for something to be in someone’s interests in the first sense, then it must matter to him or her. He or she must care about the thing in question. It is not necessary for a person to have interests in the second sense. A thing can be in someone’s best interests even if he or she is not interested in it. Matters in the best interests of children such as nutritious food, clothing, shelter and education are often things they have never taken an interest in. People who suffer from mental illness can fail to take care of their interests correctly. Consequently, the second premise of the argument is true only if the word ‘interest’ is used in the first sense.

    However, if the first premise is to have any plausibility at all then interests must be understood in the second sense. If one has a duty to refrain from taking something from an individual only if the individual cares about the thing in question, then depriving the insane or children of what is in their best interests will not be wrong as long as they are not interested in it. Infants lack the mental ability to conceive, and hence, care about their future existence so infanticide would not be homicide by this line of reasoning. The argument is unsound.

    This problem with Steinbock’s position leads naturally to a second one. From the quotes above Steinbock seems to think that sentience is not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition. She concedes that it would be wrong to kill unwanted infants but adds that this is different from killing a fetus “because fetuses are not, and babies are, sentient”.

    The problem is that her above argument does not justify this conclusion at all. What the argument says is that sentience is necessary for possessing interests. Moreover, it explicitly states that in order to have an interest in continued existence, an individual’s existence must matter to it; it must care about it in some way. While sentience is clearly necessary for caring about one’s continued existence various other factors are also necessary.

    Michael Tooley has argued one must also be able to conceptualise one’s continued existence and this requires awareness of one’s self as a subject of future experiences. An infant does not acquire the neurological capacity for this until some time after birth. In fact, an infant’s awareness of itself and future-orientated preferences to live are less developed than those of a mature cow. Consequently, if the premise of the argument offered is correct then infants do not have an interest in continued existence and consequently infanticide is not homicide.

    Steinbock offers a second argument in favour of sentience as a significant threshold.

    “[G]olden rule”- type reasons do not apply to nonsentient beings. That is, no one would explain opposition to burning the flag of the United States of America by saying, “How would you like it if you were a flag and someone burned you?

    Here, Steinbock appeals to a version of the Golden Rule. This rule prescribes consistency in one’s ethical judgments so that if one holds that it is permissible for you to do a particular action X to another person in certain circumstances then one must also hold that it is permissible for someone to do X to you in the same circumstances. Steinbock’s point is that such consistency is impossible with non-sentient beings. It does not make sense for one to object to destroying a flag because if one were a flag I one would not object to being burned. Flags after all cannot object to anything.

    Again, Steinbock’s argument relies on concealed ambiguities. Harry Gensler has distinguished two different interpretations of the Golden Rule. In one, the rule asks for our reaction to a hypothetical case involving ourselves. On the other it asks how we would react if faced with the actual case itself.

    Two examples demonstrate the difference between these two interpretations; a temporarily-unconscious individual and a case of infanticide. Taking the unconscious individual first, the first interpretation of the Golden Rule asks, would I object to the idea of someone killing me if I ever fell into a temporary coma? The second interpretation asks, would I object to being killed if I were, in fact, already in a coma? The answer to the first question is yes, I do object to the idea of someone killing me in the event I fell temporarily unconscious. I do not think it permissible for a surgeon to kill me while I was under general anaesthetic, for example. However, the answer to the second question must be no. If I were already unconscious, I could not object to being killed. While unconscious, I would not be capable of objecting to anything at all.

    The infanticide example demonstrates these differences further. Applying the first interpretation I would ask, would I object to the idea of being killed when I was an infant? The second interpretation asks, would I object to being killed if I was an infant? Again, I would answer yes to the first question but no to the second. I do object to the idea of being killed when I was an infant. However, I clearly could not object if I were an infant because infants lack the cognitive development to be able to object or even understand what it means to object to being killed.

    Returning now to Steinbock, it is evident from her discussion that she is interpreting the Golden-Rule in the second way. Her question, “how would you like it if you were a flag and someone burned you?” asks us how we would react if we were a flag. Such a question is absurd because as a flag we could not have any cognitive reactions at all. However, interpreted this way it is equally absurd to apply the Golden Rule to infants or the temporarily unconscious. Consequently, if feticide is not homicide because the Golden Rule questions interpreted in this manner do not apply to fetuses, then killing infants and killing the temporarily unconscious are also not homicide.

    On the other hand, if the golden rule is interpreted the first way a different result emerges. It remains absurd to ask whether I would object to the idea of being killed in the event that I became a flag. It is dubious that I could ever be a flag, that a human adult and a flag could ever be the same individual. However, it does make sense to ask whether I object to the idea of being killed when I was an infant or when I was a fetus. This is because rational agents like myself once were fetuses and infants. The fact that a being is a potential rational agent makes it possible for rational agents to ask Golden Rule questions about them.

    Steinbock’s arguments for the sentience threshold are unsound. Further, when conjoined with certain facts of neurology they entail that infanticide is not homicide. The claim that feticide is not homicide while infanticide is appears ad hoc and arbitrary.

    I will address Steinbock’s conclusion in my next post, Sentience Part 2.

    [i] Bonnie Steinbock, “Why Most Abortions are Not Wrong,” in Advances in Bioethics: Bioethics for Medical Education, Vol. 5, ed. Rem B. Edwards & E. Edwards Bittar (Stanford, CT: JAI Press, 1999), 248.
    [ii] Ibid.
    Ibid.
    Ibid.
    Ibid.
    Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) 47.
    Steinbock “Why Most Abortions are Not Wrong,” 248-49.
    Harry Gensler, “Abortion and the Golden Rule,” in The Abortion Controversy 25 Years after Roe v Wade: A Reader, ed. Francis Beckwith & Louis Pojman (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1998), 323.