Category: Ethics

  • William Lane Craig, Raymond Bradley and the Problem of Hell. Part Two.

    In a previous post I mentioned Professor Raymond Bradley’s (Bradley) contention that,

    [3] The bible teaches that God will torture people endlessly for their beliefs.

    In his article he cites several scriptural passages in support of this contention. I think his exegesis is problematic; I cannot go into huge detail in a blog post but I will endeavour to address the main arguments he offers.

    In essence, Bradley cites from three sections of the New Testament: Matthew, Acts and the Epistles, and Revelation. I will examine each in turn.

    Matthew
    Bradley writes:

    In the Gospel of Matthew alone he characterizes it in terms which evangelists adore: “unquenchable fire,” “fiery hell” (twice), “torment,” “burned with fire,” “furnace of fire” (twice), “weeping and gnashing of teeth” (five times), “eternal fire,” and “eternal fire which has been prepared for the devil and his angels. [Emphasis Original]

    Bradley refers to references to “fire,” “torment” and “weeping and gnashing of teeth.” He assumes, without argument, that each of these phrases refer to torturing people. However, an examination of the relevant passages shows this to be false.

    Unquenchable Fire
    The phrase “unquenchable fire” occurs Matt 5:12 and does not refer to torture.

    His winnowing fork is in his hand, and he will clear his threshing floor, gathering his wheat into the barn and burning up the chaff with unquenchable fire. [Emphasis Added]

    The phrase originates in the Old Testament. There it refers not to a fire that tortures but one that consumes what it devours, because it is never put out. (see Isa 1:311, 34:10, 11; Jer 4:4, 7:20, 17:27, 21:12; Ezek 20:47, 48; Amos 5:6). The context bears this out; Matt 5:12 states “burning up the chaff with unquenchable fire” [emphasis added]. The metaphor here is a farmer burning chaff. Now when burned, chaff is consumed and destroyed by fire and not tortured (unless Bradley is asserting that Chaff has consciousness). The picture then is of separation and annihilation, not everlasting torture.

    It is worth noting that not only does this passage not support Bradley’s contention (a), it does not support (b) either. In v 10-11 the reason people might be subject to judgement is not because of what they believe, but because of unrepentant wrongdoing. Moreover, the earlier context alludes to “lack of fruit,” an Old Testament idiom for lack of virtuous conduct.

    Fiery Hell
    The references to “hell fire” do not bear Bradley’s point out either. The Greek word for hell is Ge-Hinnom. Ge-Hinnom was a valley outside of Jerusalem. In the time of Manasseh, this valley was used for human sacrifices to the Canaanite God Molech. For this reason the area became a euphemism for disgrace, shame and contempt. Later after the Assyrian invasion, it was a place where dead bodies were piled up and cremated. Isaiah used metaphors of mass cremation as a metaphor for future judgement. This imagery became a metaphor for final judgment in Jewish Apocalyptic writings.

    The term “fiery hell” does not necessitate a picture of everlasting torture; again the references to hell in Matthew bear this out. In 5:29-30 the contrast is drawn between cutting off your hand and throwing it into hell or throwing your whole body into hell. This again is not an allusion to torture (unless severed hands have consciousness?). In Matt 10:28, the contrast is between a person who kills a body and God who kills body and soul in hell. The picture is, again, not of torture but of being discarded and destroyed. Moreover, in all these references things are thrown into hell not because of what they believe but because of what they do.

    Burned with Fire
    Again when one looks at the actual passages in context, one sees they do not say what Bradley alleges. The repeated picture is of a tree being cut down and burned due to its lack of fruit (Matt 3:11 and Matt 7:19). The imagery is again of throwing something away and destroying it and not of torture (trees are not conscious). Moreover, fruitlessness is standard apocalyptic imagery for unjust conduct, not for mistaken belief.

    Furnace of Fire
    The references to a “furnace of fire” in Matt 13 do not convey endless torture. In 13:40 the explicit metaphor is of weeds which are pulled out and burned. Moreover in v 47, the furnace stands in a Semitic parallel to fish that are already dead but are thrown away as rubbish. Moreover, in both passages it is clear that judgement is inflicted upon people because they “do evil” or are “wicked”; it is again actions not beliefs.

    Gnashing of Teeth
    Similarly Bradley appears to interpret the phrase “weeping and gnashing of teeth” as referring to the agony of torture. This again is unlikely. The phrase occurs many times in the Old Testament (Job 16:9; Ps 35:16, 36:16, 37:12; Lam. 2:16) and in the New Testament, and in almost every instance signifies hatred or rage at God or the righteous. Not the agony of pain and torture.

    Eternal Fire
    It is equally doubtful that the phrase “eternal fire” means eternal torture. Jude v7, for example, uses the term “eternal fire” to describe the judgment that befell Sodom and Gomorrah, towns that were reduced to rubble and not tortured forever.

    The passages in Matthew referred to are firstly symbolic, and secondly, do not support Bradley’s contention that they teach that God will torture people forever because of their beliefs. Its also worth noting Bradley’s citations from Matthew are selective. He cites the “fire” metaphor but ignores the metaphors for judgement of being incarcerated or of being expelled from a party which also occur in Matthew, etc and in each case it is the person’s deeds and not their beliefs, which are the basis for judgment.

    Epistles and Acts
    Bradley’s citations from Acts and the Epistles similarly do not back up his point. He notes,

    According to Luke, the reputed author of The Acts, there is salvation in no one else; for there is no other name under heaven that has been given among men, by which we must be saved.” (Acts 4:12). And St. Paul makes it clearer still when he tells us that “the Lord Jesus Christ shall be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels in flaming fire, dealing out retribution to those who do not know God [my emphasis]and to those who do not obey the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ. And these will pay the penalty of eternal destruction” (II Thess. 1:7-9). [Emphasis Original]

    The problem is that neither passage affirms that people are tortured for ever because of what they believe. The passage in Acts asserts that people are saved in Jesus’ name and does not state that people will be tortured because of their beliefs. Similarly, Paul does not state that people will be tortured but that they will be destroyed and the basis is not that they do not have certain beliefs but that they “do not know God” and “do not obey the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ.”

    Revelation
    At the Auckland Craig v Cooke debate Bradley cited a further passage from the Book of Revelation,

    If anyone worships the beast and his image and receives his mark on the forehead or on the hand, 10 he, too, will drink of the wine of God’s fury, which has been poured full strength into the cup of his wrath. He will be tormented with burning sulfur in the presence of the holy angels and of the Lamb. 11 And the smoke of their torment rises for ever and ever. There is no rest day or night for those who worship the beast and his image, or for anyone who receives the mark of his name.” 12 This calls for patient endurance on the part of the saints who obey God’s commandments and remain faithful to Jesus.

    There are several metaphors in this passage, a reference to the “wine of God’s fury” the picture of torment in burning sulphur and the picture of rising smoke. Bradley appears to have attached on to the latter two and interpreted them rather literally. The problem here is that the genre of Revelation is Apocalyptic literature. Such literature is highly metaphorical and uses stock symbols (common symbols repeatedly used in this type of literature). Careful note should be taken when reading Revelation of the metaphors in it and also the Old Testament background of these metaphors. The position is far more nuanced than Bradley appears to think.

    The picture of fire and sulphur followed by rising smoke is drawn from the account of Sodom and Gomorrah’s destruction by “burning sulphur.” Gen 19 adds,

    27 Early the next morning Abraham got up and returned to the place where he had stood before the LORD. 28 He looked down toward Sodom and Gomorrah, toward all the land of the plain, and he saw dense smoke rising from the land,

    This imagery of sulphur being poured upon people and smoke rising was later used in the Old Testament to symbolise the destruction of various nations. (Deut 29:23; Job 18:15-17; Ps 11:6; Isa 30:33). Perhaps one of the clearest uses of this imagery is seen in Isaiah 34

    9 Edom’s streams will be turned into pitch, her dust into burning sulfur; her land will become blazing pitch! 10 It will not be quenched night and day; its smoke will rise forever. From generation to generation it will lie desolate; no one will ever pass through it again.

    Now Edom did not literally burn forever in sulphur. In fact, taken literally, the differing metaphors in Isa 34 for Edom’s destruction would contradict each other. But Apocalyptic literature is not supposed to be taken this literally (just as many of the phrases we use today are not meant to be taken literally). What Apocalyptic literature does in this instance is use various differing, dramatic, visual images to describe total the destruction of Edom. Similar imagery to this passage is used thought the book of Revelation. In fact, in Rev 18 when the destruction of a city, named Babylon but probably a reference to Rome or Jerusalem, the city is said to be tormented by fire and onlookers watch the rising smoke. The message is that Babylon has been judged and destroyed.

    ***

    In essence, then, [3] is mistaken. It is based on an excessively literalistic reading of Apocalyptic literature. Bradley’s argument is not an argument for atheism. It can only succeed as an argument for atheism if one accepts both the infallibility of scripture and an excessively literalistic reading of the text, one that fails to take into account the genre of Jewish Apocalyptic writings. The correct response to this objection is not to become an atheist but to reject poor hermeneutics.

    RELATED POSTS:
    William Lane Craig, Raymond Bradley and the Problem of Hell Part Two
    The Battle of the Bill’s: A Review of the Craig – Cooke Debate

  • William Lane Craig, Raymond Bradley and the Problem of Hell Part One

    During the Q & A at the recent Auckland Cooke – Craig debate, Professor Raymond Bradley (Bradley), Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at Auckland University, offered an argument, which he has laid out in more detail in his article A Moral Argument for Atheism, as follows:

    Christians accept that:

    [1] Any act that God commits, causes, commands or condones is morally permissible;
    [2] It is morally wrong to torture people endlessly for their beliefs;
    [3] The bible teaches that God will torture people endlessly for their beliefs;

    From this he inferred that:

    [4] God does not exist.

    Dr William Lane Craig (Craig) responded that the conclusion does not follow from the premises unless one assumes that the Bible is infallible. [1] and [2] entail that God will not endlessly torture people for their beliefs. However, [3] entails the negation of this only if one adds the further premise, that whatever the bible teaches about God is true. If one does not grant this assumption, the fact that the bible records that God will do something does not entail that he actually will do this. Hence, even if Bradley’s argument is sound it is really an argument against theism conjoined with biblical infallibility, not against theism per se.

    In his article, Bradley argues that this option is unavailable to the Christian theist. He writes:

    this would be to be to abandon the chief foundation of religious and moral epistemology (ways of obtaining religious and moral knowledge) … the question arises as to how we are supposed to know of God’s existence let alone look to him for moral guidance. After all, it is a distinguishing feature of theism, as opposed to deism, to hold that God reveals himself to us and, from time to time, intervenes in human history. And the Bible, according to theists, is the principal record of his revelatory interventions. If the Bible, with its stories of Moses and Jesus, is not his revealed and presumptively true word, then how are we to know of him? If God doesn’t reveal himself through the Old Testament Moses and the New Testament Jesus, then through whom does he reveal himself? To be sure, a theist could well claim that God also reveals himself through other channels in addition to the Bible: reason, tradition, and religious experience all being cases in point. But to deny that the Bible is his main mode of communication would be to deny that the principal figures in Judaism and Christianity can really be known at all. Apart from the scriptural records, we would know little, if anything, of Moses or Jesus, it being doubtful that secular history has anything reliable to say about either. Apart from the scriptural records we would know nothing of the so-called Ten Commandments that God supposedly delivered to Moses, or of the ethical principles that Jesus supposedly delivered in his sermons and parables.

    Bradley is mistaken. He confuses the claim (i) that scripture is reliable, with the claim (ii) that scripture is infallible. In order for the Bible to give us reliable, trust-worthy information about God, (i) needs to be the case. However, (i) is compatible with admitting that on some issues scripture is mistaken.

    Therefore, Bradley’s argument does not have the bite he (and some members of the audience on Tuesday) thought it did. Nether-the-less as an evangelical, Craig is committed to some form of scriptural infallibility and I share this commitment with him. So it is best to see if another line of attack is available.

    Craig’s second point alluded to an ambiguity in [2]. [2] states it is wrong to endlessly torture people for their beliefs. However, this could be interpreted two possible ways, it could be interpreted as:

    [2a] It is wrong for human persons to endlessly torture people for their beliefs;
    [2b] It is wrong for any person including God to endlessly torture people for their beliefs.

    Now in order for Bradley’s argument to follow, [2b] needs to be the case. It needs to be the case that God is engaging in wrongdoing if he tortures people for their beliefs. However, in the article Bradley cites in support of this argument, he provides reasons only for [2a]. He argues that to deny principles such as do not torture people endlessly for their beliefs,

    … would be to ally oneself with moral monsters like Ghenghis Khan, Hitler, Stalin, and Pol Pot. It would be to abandon all pretense to a belief in objective moral values. Indeed, if it is permissible to violate the above principles, then it isn’t easy to see what sorts of acts would not be permissible. .. [It] would be tantamount to an embrace of moral nihilism. And no theist who believes in the Ten Commandments or the Sermon on the Mount could assent to that.

    What Bradley fails to appreciate is that these absurd consequences follow from the rejection of (2a) and not from the rejection of (2b). Moreover, as Craig noted there are good reasons for thinking that it is (2a) and not (2b) that is true. This is because (2b) assumes that God has duties. Both, Craig and I believe in a meta-ethical view known as the Divine Command Theory (DCT). According to this position, it is wrong for a person to perform an action, if and only if, God commands them to not perform this action. It follows from a DCT that God has duties only if he issues commands to himself. Given he does not issue commands to himself, it follows that God cannot have duties.

    God does issue commands to human beings. One command is to not torture people for their beliefs. It follows that (2a) is true and (2a) prevents us allying ourselves with moral monsters such as Pol Pot, Stalin, Hitler, etc.

    Craig’s response, then, is correct. I am inclined to think, however, that Bradley’s argument can be recast without presupposing that God has duties. It is essential to theism and to the defensibility of a divine command theory to maintain that:

    [1’] God is good (where good is referred to in terms of virtues as opposed to (duties).

    And a person, following Bradley’s lead, could argue that:

    [2’] A good person does not torture people for their beliefs.
    [3] The bible teaches that God will torture people endlessly for their beliefs.

    And [1’], [2’] and [3’], when conjoined to a commitment to biblical infallibility, entail a contradiction.

    The best response to Bradley is to attack [3]. Now note that [3] asserts at least two things; first: (a) scripture states that God will torture people forever; second, (b) God does so because of what such people believe. The crucial question then is what reasons Bradley offers for the truth of (a) and (b)? In my next post William Lane Craig, Raymond Bradley and the Problem of Hell Part Two I will examine some of these reasons and argue that they are mistaken.

    RELATED POSTS:
    William Lane Craig, Raymond Bradley and the Problem of Hell Part Two
    The Battle of the Bill’s: A Review of the Craig – Cooke Debate

  • Praise from our Critics

    Despite holding to a somewhat contrary viewpoint and despite having had more than one clash of viewpoints it appears that our critics accord us some praise. I just now stumbled accross this thread on GayNZ.com’s forum discussing Christian blogs and websites and was pleasantly surprised by the comments on our blog.

    Kay writes: “The M & M blog is scarier because their posts almost make sense … over the top hatred like www.godhatesfags.com is so extreme that its hard to take it seriously. M&M sound plausible & reasonable …”

    Kaiwai agrees: “… some of the things I agree with … don’t dismiss everything he [Matt] says.”

    Kind Kit adds: “Yes, Matt and Mads are certainly cogent, and even logical after a fashion. Dr Flannagan wears his philosophical training rather well. They are not frothing lunatics by any means… ”

    Cale concludes: “I do know what you mean though about them being persuasive, they managed to gather enough people together to block the Otago campus support for the CUB bill and Madeleine spoke dangerously well.”

    We would like to clear up a couple of things though:

    1. The MandM blog is NOT “sponsored by the Elusive Brethren & Right Wing American Fundamentalists” but if either of the afore mentioned wish to sponsor us please use the PayPal widget in the side bar….

    2. Kaiwai wrote of us: “I don’t set out to impose my views by way of legislation – if I want to ‘change the world’, I’d sooner set an example by living the life I preach, then hope that it’ll rub off on others.”

    Holding to classical liberal and libertarian political views respectively and being evangelical Christians means we believe in less State and in changing the world in precisely the manner Kaiwai expressed. For example we don’t just oppose the Civil Unions Act but also the Marriage Act because both are outside the legitimate functions of the State.

    3. Depraved claimed: “The problem with Matt – they’re pro-life and yet, anti-sex education and anti-condom. They’re against the very things which would drastically reduce unwanted pregnancies. An example, someone is in an accident, they’re killed – the autopsy says that the individual could have survived had they worn a seat belt. Matt’s solution is ‘ban the car’ when the common sense approach would be to make safety belts compulsory and improve driver training.”

    We are not Catholic, we have no problem with condoms beyond the fact that using them is like having a shower wearing a raincoat (we use other forms of contraception). Our children’s knowledge of sex education is more than thorough and they could give a family planning sex educator a run for their money. But I suspect what Depraved is alluding to is our opposition to the State teaching sex education at all, and, in the amoral, relativistic manner they do.

    Further, I am not in favour of banning cars but I do believe that it should be illegal for people to use cars to kill other people with. Nothing strikes me as more absurd as a pro-choice social policy that says let’s legalise dangerous driving and allow people to freely and deliberately smash their cars into pedestrians on demand and when the body count for this practice (suprisingly) gets rather high, respond to this by increasing education on seatbelt use in schools.

    Matt

  • Patrick Nowell Smith on Divine Commands

    In a widely-anthologised essay Morality: Religious and Secular. Patrick Nowell Smith offers a influential criticism of “religious morality” It is clear from his definition of religious morality that it is Voluntarism ( or a Divine Command Theory of Ethics) he has in mind. Smith states that the religious moralist has “assumed that just as the legal propriety of an action is established by showing it to emanates from an authoritative source, so also the moral propriety of an action must be established in the same way; the legal rightness has the same form as moral rightness, and may therefore be used to shed light on it.” He goes on to state “ … Morality, on this view, is an affair of being commanded to behave in certain ways by some person who has a right to issue such commands; and once this premise is granted, it is said with some reason that only God has such a right” Smith’s critique then should be interpreted as a critique of Voluntarism.

    Readers of this blog will know I have considerable sympathy for Voluntarism. I have defended it against some common objections in previous posts. So it will not suprise anyone that, despite the popularity of Smith’s essay, I think his criticisms fail. Here I wish to comment on two lines of argument he proposes.

    1. One major contention Smith makes is that “religious morality is infantile” Smith’s thesis is that a Voluntarist possesses an ethical consciousness that is frozen or arrested at the pre-critical stage of a child. A mature adult whose cognitive faculties are functioning properly would have outgrown it.

    In arguing for this thesis, Smith draws upon the theories of moral development proposed by Piaget. According to Piaget, children start out with a view of morality that Smith labels deontological, heteronomous and realist. Children view morality as obedience to certain rules (deontology) which hold because an authority figure, usually the parent, has promulgated them (heteronomous) and wrongdoing is perceived as any external action that violates these rules (realism). This view of ethics is appropriate for small children; however, as they mature and become more rational their consciousness changes. They begin to see the point of certain rules and understand the reasons behind them and the function of such rules. This is the stage where ethics become in Smith’s words “autonomous”. Instead of just accepting a parent’s word for it the child learns to figure these things out for him/herself.

    Smith goes on to argue that these same features of heteronomy, realism and deontology are present in “religious morality” or, more specifically, Voluntarism. Consequently, Voluntarism reflects a childish way of viewing ethics, one not worthy of a grown-up, educated adult.

    Smith’s analogy between Voluntarism and childish morality ignores a fundamental dis-analogy between the case Piaget describes and that of the divine/human relationship. As Richard Mouw has pointed out, Piaget views the transition from heteronomy to autonomy as corresponding to the time when a child begins to be on an increasingly-equal footing with his or her parents. The infantile stage of morality is appropriate while the child is in infancy because of its limited rationality and knowledge. In this state the child is unable to make decisions as competently as the adult, hence it relies on and defers to the judgement of adults. However, as the child grows equal to the parent in these respects he or she ceases to rely on parental judgement. He or she is now just as competent to answer these questions as his or her parent is and so his or her thinking becomes autonomous.

    Consequently, Piaget’s model of development applies to situations where the subordinate is temporarily in a stage of inferiority to the authority but is undergoing a process of growth towards equality. It is when this equality is reached that the authority relationship is no longer appropriate. However, the relationship between adult humans and God is fundamentally different. Adults are not growing into divinity so that when mature they will equal God in rationality and knowledge. Rather, they are permanently in a state where they are inferior to God in these respects. In this context the failure to reach a moral consciousness that is equal to God’s is not a sign of arrested development and the infantile charge loses its sting. It is inappropriate for adults to behave like children but not inappropriate for them to fail to think like God.

    2.Another argument Smith utilises appeals to the epistemic priority of moral principles over theological ones. Smith offers an argument that is “familiar to philosophers but of which the force is not always appreciated”. The argument essentially points out,

    [W]e must be persuaded independently of his goodness before we admit his right to command. We must judge for ourselves whether the Bible is the inspired word of a kind and benevolent God or a curious amalgam of profound wisdom and gross superstition. To judge this is to make a moral decision, so that in the end, so far from morality being based upon religion, religion is based upon morality.

    In Philosophical Problems and Arguments. James Cornman and Keith Lehrer express the same argument.

    Consider what we would do if we read that Moses had returned with such commandments as ‘make love to thy neighbor’s wife,’ ‘steal thy neighbor’s goods,’ and ‘take advantage of thy parents.’ We would decide that what-ever was revealed to Moses, it was not the will of God, because these are immoral commandments. We do not justify that something is moral by showing it is God’s will, because the only available way to evaluate conflicting claims about what God wills is by finding which one is in accordance with what is moral.

    This objection notes that in order to know whether a given action is, in fact, the type of thing God has commanded, one first needs to know whether the act is wrong. Therefore, ethics is prior to, and independent of, theology.

    This objection again confuses the question of epistemological priority with the question of metaphysical independence. What these examples show is that we can know certain ethical truths prior to and independently of our knowledge of theological truths. However, it does not follow from this that deontic principles are metaphysically independent of, or non-identical to, theological ones. Consider the following analogy. In order to know that a clear liquid in front of me is water I need to examine its atomic structure to see if it is H20. It would not follow from this that water is not H20. Similarly, the fact that in certain contexts one needs to examine the moral appropriateness of commands to ascertain whether they are from God or not does not make it follow that wrongness is not the property of being contrary to God’s commands.

  • Abortion and Brain Death: A Response to Farrar

    David Farrar of Kiwiblog weighs in on the abortion debate. I have met David a couple of times and worked with him on several issues and I have a lot of time for him but on this issue we disagree. Given how widely read Farrar’s blog is, and seeing the ethics of killing a fetus was my PhD thesis topic, I will endeavour to spell out why I think he is mistaken.

    David Farrar writes:

    Now my personal position on abortion is it should be legal, safe and preferably rare. As cessation of brain activity is what effectively marks death, I tend to regard life as the start of such brain activity (as measured by ECG, not just electrical activity) which is at around 20 weeks.

    Farrar’s argument here appears to consist of two premises (some which are more implicit than explicit). They are [1] If the loss of a property results in something going out of existence then the acquiring of the same property results in it coming into existence [2] the loss of a functioning brain (measured by an EEG) results in living human being to go out of existence and [3] A fetus acquires functioning human brain (measured by a EEG) at 20 weeks. Now [1] and [2] entails that a living human being comes into existence when it receives a functioning brain measured by EEG, and this conjoined with [3] entails that a living human being comes into existence at 20 weeks

    I think Farrar’s argument is unsound because [1] is clearly false. Consider a functioning car. A functioning car ceases to exist as a functioning car when it looses a motor. Does it follow that then that all a car needs to become a functioning car is a motor? No, More than just a motor is needed to get a car to function, one needs petrol, a driver, wheels etc. The loss of a motor will stop it functioning but the presence of a motor is not enough to make it function. The point is that often there can be a series of properties each of which is necessary for something to exist but none by themselves enough to make the object exist. Something can be necessary for X but not in and of itself sufficient for X. Farrar’s argument confuses these separate things, it assumes that if something is necessary for X ( its absence causes X to not exist) then its sufficient for X (its presence causes it to exist) and this is simply an error.

    There is however an analogue of Farrar’s argument which has more promise and it has been proposed by ethicists such as Goldenring, Hans Martin Sass and Baruch Brody. This argument suggests that we already have criteria which we use after birth to determine whether a human body on a life support system is a living human being or merely human tissue (a corpse). This is the famous “Brain Death criteria”. According to this criteria if a human body posses a functioning human brain then it is a living human being and killing it (by harvesting its organs for example) constitutes homicide. On the other hand if it does not have a functioning human brain then it is dead, it is not a living human being and one does not commit homicide if one slices it up.

    These ethicists suggest that we apply this criteria to pre born situations. Early in the pregnancy a rudimentary human body emerges. The uterine environment is moreover analogous to a life support system. We want to know whether this body constitutes a living human being or a mere tissue. They suggest we apply the Brain death criteria. If the fetus posses a functioning human brain then it is a living human being and killing it is homicide. If it does not then abortion only destroys human tissue.

    So, suppose I be charitable and reconstruct Farrar’s arguments along these lines. Do we have an argument that a fetus is not human until 20 weeks gestation?

    No, the reason is that Farrar appears to not understand the brain death criteria. According to this criteria a human body is dead (as opposed to alive) if it posses a brain that has irreversibly ceased to function. It’s not enough that there be no brain function it must also be the case that such function will not come into being in the future. For reasons like this, many ethicists like Goldenring, Sass and Brody who appeal to the Brain death criteria conclude that a fetus is a human being from very early in the pregnancy around 6-8 weeks gestation. The reason is simple, around this time a fetus has developed a rudimentary brain, it posses some function and full function will come about in the future through natural brain development. Hence the fetus cannot be said to have irreversible lack of brain function.

    The application of brain death criteria then in fact brings about precisely the opposite result to what Farrar contends. It leads to the conclusion that at the time most abortions occur a fetus is a living human being and abortion is homicide.

  • Permissible Lies

    In wake of the return of the stolen victoria crosses and the Police claiming they are “honour bound” to pay the thieves the promised reward not PC argues that it is permissible to lie to an agressor. The standard example in the literature (which PC utilises) goes something like this: You are hiding someone fleeing for their life (modern examples use Jews in Nazi occupied territory). A murderer (modern examples usually use the Gestapo) come knocking on your door. They ask you if you know the whereabouts of their prey. Do you tell the truth?

    I agree with not PC that the correct answer to this question is no. I agree that the rule to not lie is restricted in scope, prohibiting lying to competent adults who are not violating our rights or threatening such a violation.

    Interestingly, not PC seems to think I am committed to rejecting this conclusion. He insinuates that Kantian and Divine Command approaches to ethics entail that one can never lie under any circumstances. He writes for example “that moral principles are neither “divine commandments” nor “categorical imperatives” — they are guides to action applying within a certain framework of conditions;”and latter he is more explict

    Unlike the ethics of religionists, Objectivism derives its moral principles not from stone tablets or burning bushes or caliphate commandments — not on what’s needed to live in heaven or paradise in some supernatural realm — but from from the needs of man’s survival and flourishing right here on this earth. The contrast with religious morality could not be greater: for the Objectivist, moral principles are guides to action intended to enhance and sustain one’s life. For the religionist however, moral principles are divine commandments that act like a ball and chain — a dogmatic straitjacket commanding one’s obedience, even if when talking to a Gestapo officer it could lead to your own death or that of a loved one. For the Objectivist, the answer to a Gestapo chief is outside the bounds of morality altogether: morality ends when the Gestapo chief’s gun begins. But for the religionist, telling the truth is an absolute necessity even if it entails the sacrifice of your life and that of your loved ones.

    Here PC is just plain wrong. While it is correct that many Catholic moral theologians support an unqualified prohibition on lying PC misunderstands the rationale they propose for this verdict. Catholic teaching on natural law as (expounded by people like Thomas Aquinas) is precisely that the moral law is derived from what conduces to human flourishing. Lying is prohibited because it is believed to be conducive to human flourishing. It is not prohibited because such a rule makes one fit for heaven or because its set down in tablets of stone promulgated by burning bush (apart from slander lying is not mentioned in the ten commandments) nor is it held to be correct because a priest or caliphate says so. Catholic theologians argue for this thesis from Aristotelian understandings of human flourishing. I think they are incorrect, but thats not an excuse for misrepresenting their position.

    Similar things can be said about Divine Command Theories (and contrary to PC not all “religionists” are divine command theorists) . Divine command theories (DCT) as propounded by Locke, Berkley, Paley, Suarez etc typically affirm that right and wrong are determined by God’s prescriptive will. However these thinkers go on to stress that God is a rational being who wills the flourishing of human beings and hence what God’s will is rational and God commands what promotes or leads or respects human flourishing in some way.

    But to the more substantive point.

    A DC theorist is committed to claiming that it is never wrong to lie in any circumstance, only if believes God has commanded this. Such a claim is often attributed to the Hebrew and Christian scriptures, but this is debatable to say the least. The Hebrew scriptures contain several passages where God approves of lying in certain contexts. One obvious example is the case of the Hebrew midwives in the book of Exodus. In the narrative Pharaoh orders that all Hebrew male children are to be killed at birth. The midwives respond by lying to Pharaoh about the births in order to protect them and are commended by God for their actions. There has been a huge amount of discussion of these passages and their application to moral theology on lying within Christian casuistry. So it is surprising people so often attribute naïve absolutism to moral theologians who take scripture seriously.

    Nor does a person sympathetic (as I am) to Kantian understandings of morality have to embrace the conclusion that’s its never wrong to lie. According to some Kantian’s (such as Alan Donagan) ethical principles have a logic such that one person cannot appeal to a principle for protection as a shield for breaking that principle or another equally as grave. Self defence is perhaps the clearest paradigm: a person cannot rationally appeal to an absolute right to not be killed if he uses that right as a shield to cover his killing of someone else. Such a position involves a contradiction of the will. And it rejects the universalizability of moral principles; the idea that what rules one lays down for others must, if they are moral principles, also apply to oneself.

    I am inclined to think that without something like this condition ethical principles would become incoherent. If one cannot justifiably use force to repel an attacker when the only way the attacker can be repelled is by force then the attacker has a freedom right to attack his victim. But surely if the claim it’s wrong to kill entails anything it entails that people do not have a freedom right to do kill others. Now, if one can use force against a person to protect ourselves and others from their attacks it seems hard to see why we can’t lie or deceive them to do so.

    What does this mean in the present context? It means that not PC is correct that the police are not bound by a promise to pay the reward to those who stole the Victoria Crosses. The Police would be acting licitly if they refused to pay. And nothing about being a divine command theorist or Kantian precludes one drawing this conclusion

    Let me add a final point in defence of PC’s conclusion. The standard argument against lying in this context takes a rule consquentialist line. It’s contended that accepting a rule that permits the police to renege on paying such rewards has bad consequences. Criminals in future cases may not divulge information necessary to solve crimes and hence peoples property will not be returned. The problem here, as with many appeals to consquentialism, is that there are other consequences of accepting this rule which point the other way. A rule where criminals get paid for returning what they steal makes stealing and ransoming pay and hence encourage stealing, kidnapping, ransoming etc.

    Consequently, if one is to appeal to positive consequences in a plausible way one needs to examine the total consequences of accepting the rule. One need’s to examine both how many crimes will be solved by accepting this rule and how much crime will be encouraged if we don’t and it needs to be shown that former good results outweigh the latter. To the best of my knowledge no one has ever done this calculation. Until they have the claim that consequences justify honouring agreements to thieves is unsubstantiated.

  • Greens, Tasers and Torture

    Watching the news the other night, I heard how some UN body had declared that the use of tasers constituted torture. (At least that is how it was reported). Predictably the Green party cited this as  a for rejecting the use of Tasers.The implicit argument here seems to go something like this. [1] The use of Tasers constitutes torture [2] Torture is always unjust, therefore [3] the use of Tasers is unjust. Formally this argument is valid. If [1] and [2] are true [3] follows. Most people I suspect will take issue with [1] and I think there could well be problems with this claim. I think however a more interesting issue arises here. Is [2] actually true, is torture always unjust or are there circumstances in which it is justified and, assuming Tasers are torture devices, are they an instance of such a circumstance.

    Is torture always unjust? A common argument for justifiable torture goes something like this: A terrorist cell has planted several bombs in malls around the countries; they will be detonated some time in the next 24 hours. One member of the cell who knows where these bombs are has been captured. Would it be acceptable to torture the terrorist to gain this information, or should one instead let thousands die? Cases like this are sometimes called “ticking time bomb” cases. Many people find, that their moral sense or intuitions lead to conclude that torture is justified in ticking time bomb cases. The popularity of shows like 24 attest to this.

    Act Utilitarianism provides a prima facie rationale for this judgment. According to Act Utilitarianism, an action is right if and only if the consequences of performing it result in more net happiness than any alternative. In this instance, torturing the terrorist will make him suffer. However, failure to torture him will result in thousands of deaths and thus will lead to even greater suffering. Hence, the former action; that of torturing the terrorist is justified.

    Until fairly recently I did not find this analysis convincing, while I see the force of the ticking time bomb case. The act utilitarian assessment seems to me to be wrong. This is because one can construct equally plausible cases where one should not engage in violence against another person, even if doing so results in an increase in net happiness. Consider the following two cases, taken from the literature. Judith Jarvis Thomson [i]. Thomson points out that if a doctor painlessly kills a group of healthy patients and harvests their organs, an even greater number of people can be saved via organ donation. It is in fact conceivable that forcing people to under go various medical procedures such as kidney and or bone marrow transplants would result in numerous people being saved from fatal illnesses. Despite these facts, however, neither killing people nor enforcing compulsory transplants are permissible practices. Although such procedures may promote the happiness of others and in some cases be life saving, they do so by unjust means, killing and assaulting innocent human beings.

    Don Marquis suggests a second case. The infamous the Willowbrook experiments which involved experimenting upon mentally retarded children in order to ascertain information for fighting diseases such as Hepatitis or the Nazi experimenting upon concentration camp inmates to learn how to combat hypothermia. Regarding these experiments Don Marquis notes that

    The Tuskegee, Willowbrook and Nazi studies were wrong, not because they were bad and useless science, but because the human subjects in them were treated inhumanely…There is now a consensus, both in society and in academic bioethics that this is wrong even when the research will clearly benefit the common good. In short conformity with a respect for human subjects principle is a necessary condition of morally permissible research whatever its benefits.[ii]

    I contend that Marquis is correct in these sentiments. What made such experiments wrong was not that they failed to bring about the significant results they aimed at, but rather that the means they did so were unjust, and involved disrespecting and degrading human beings. Hence even if important advancements in fighting hypothermia or hepatitis have been achieved, the experiments should still be condemned.

    A few years ago however, I came across a different analysis of the ticking time bomb case that makes sense of its initial plausibility without leading to the conclusion that violence is justified whenever more, or a large number, of people are made happy by its commission.

    In his monograph The Theory of Morality Alan Donagan responds to ticking time bomb cases, by noting, correctly, that violence is not unjust if used against an unjust aggressor. Suppose a person is attacking an innocent third party and is threatening to kill them or do them irreparable injury, suppose further that the only way to stop him is by use of violence, either by physically hitting him and inflicting probable pain and injury upon him. In such a situation, both civil and divine law recognise that the use of violence is justified. It’s this moral insight that is behind the legal right to kill or use force in self defence.

    Donagan goes on to note that the case I sketched above seems to fit this paradigm of justified use of violence. The terrorist, is complicit in the planting of bombs which are about to go off, hence he is in the process of committing a heinous act of violent aggression against hundreds of innocent people, hence if the only way to prevent this attack from killing these people is to use violence against him, it is justified. This however, seems to leave open a case for justified torture. If one has reasonable grounds for thinking that the terrorist is complicit in such an attack and if one knows that the only way to gain the information necessary to thwart this attack is to torture the terrorist, then one is justified in using violence proportionate to the gravity of the attack, against the terrorist, to extract this information.

    Interestingly Donagan steps back from concluding that torture should be permitted in such cases. He notes, perhaps plausibly, that in real life situations its dubious one will really know that a given person is in fact a terrorist. Nor is it likely in most situations that one will know that torture is the only way to prevent an attack hence he concludes. A rule allowing torture in such cases would probably cause much mischief. He concludes “In the last century and a half, torture has come to be prohibited in all civilised countries: and rightly, because it has been found practically impossible , while allowing it at all, to confine it to those very few cases where it would be morally permissible”

    This may be a compelling reason for banning torture as an interrogation technique. But it seems clear to me that the context in which the use of Tasers are being proposed is quite different. No one is suggesting Tasers be used as an interrogation device to extract information from suspects. Instead, Tasers are used by the proposed as a defensive weapon, to defend either the police man himself or a member of the public from imminent attack. And it seems false to suggest that the law cannot make distinctions between violence used in justifiable defence of the innocent and that which is not. For centuries both common law and statute law have been drawing just this distinction and applying it in the courts. Section 48 of the crimes act for example allows this defense to assault. “Every one is justified in using, in the defence of himself or another, such force as, in the circumstances as he believes them to be, it is reasonable to use.” So it seems then that (i) one can justifiably inflict pain injury and even death on a person in defense of ones self or others and (ii) the law can make this distinction. Hence it’s hard to see why, torture, which is wrong presumably because it inflicts pain and injury on people, can always be unjustified in the context being proposed. Hence even if one grants that the Tasers are a form of torture it does not follow its always wrong to use them.

    There is of course a way around this conclusion, an apologist for the greens could argue that (i) and (ii) are false and we should abolish section 48 of the crimes act. I think this is absurd, but stranger things have come from the Green party. Consider, Sue Bradfords tireless campaign to abolish section 59 of the crimes act which allowed parents to use “reasonable force” to correct bad behavior of children. I distinctly remember Sue arguing that this defense should be abolished because. (a) its unacceptable to draw distinctions between reasonable and unreasonable violence (b) all forms of violence are wrong. (c) All people have a right to be protected from violence and (d) what’s reasonable to one person is not reasonable to another (e) under section 59 some people who were guilty of assault were acquitted because they persuaded a jury that their force was reasonable. Now, as I pointed out Bradford herself, don’t each of these arguments apply with equal force to section 48 of the crimes act? In a sense then the Greens have already made the argument that people should not be allowed to defend themselves by implication which, perhaps, puts this whole Taser debate in an interesting context.

    [i] Judith Jarvis Thomson “Killing Letting Die and the Trolley Problem” The Monist Vol. 59, p 205.
    [ii] Don Marquis “Stem Cell Research: The Failure of the New Bioethics” Free Inquiry, Winter 2002 Vol. 23 # v1.