Category: Ethics

  • New publication Online: “Can a Divine Command Theory Vindicate the Objectivity of Morality?”

    My paper, “Can a Divine Command Theory Vindicate the Objectivity of Morality?” was published in Philosophia Christi, vol 21. No 1 2025. A copy is now available  online at my academia.edu page. The abstract is below.

    Abstract:
    Defenders of divine command metaethics (DCM) often argue that one of its key advantages is its ability to vindicate the objectivity of moral judgments. Critics, however, contend that DCM is a subjectivist theory and therefore inherits the difficulties such theories face in accounting for the apparently objectivist features of moral thought. In this paper, I examine and critique three prominent versions of this objection: David Brink’s appeal to appraiser independence, Elizabeth Tropman’s appeal to stance independence, and Michael Huemer’s concept of observer independence. I argue that none of these criticisms succeeds.

  • The Beatitudes: Part One

    Here is a talk I gave on the Beatitudes a few weeks ago. 

  • Some subversive thoughts about immigration part two: replies to objections

    Recently, I shared some reflections on the issue of immigration. Drawing on Deuteronomy 23:15–16 and the way this passage was interpreted and applied by 18th-century abolitionists, I argued that our present situation is analogous to that of illegal overstayers fleeing certain forms of degradation in their home countries. Below are some of the responses I received to this argument, followed by my replies.

    Is this a Noahide Command?

    One response points out that the passage I cited is in the Torah. But the Torah is a covenant between God and ancient Israel; there are lots of commands in the Torah — the command to circumcise male children, to refrain from eating pork, not to wear mixed cloth — which contemporary Gentile Christians are not required to follow.

    In reply: while not all commandments in the Torah apply to Gentiles, some do. As early as the Book of Jubilees, Jewish commentators argued that interpreters had come to recognise that, while the Torah as a whole was given only to Israel, certain commands in the Torah applied to both Jews and Gentiles alike. These were commandments that express moral requirements binding on all people — Jew and Gentile — antecedent to the Sinai covenant. Historically these were called the Noahide commandments[1]. Is the command in Exodus 23 (or Deuteronomy 23:15–16) a Noahide command?

    It is plausible to say it is. The reason is that on at least one occasion God is described as expecting Gentile nations, who were not parties to the Sinai covenant, to follow this law and to be held accountable for not doing so. When Jerusalem fell to Babylon in 587 BCE, refugees fled toward the border of Edom. The Edomites slaughtered some, rounded up others, and handed the fugitives over to the Babylonians. The prophet Obadiah condemns Edom for this action:

    Do not stand at the crossroads
    To eliminate their survivors;
    And do not hand over their refugees
    On the day of their distress. (Obadiah 14)

    Obadiah’s message is that God will hold Edom accountable for this action. Consequently, Deuteronomy 23:15–16 can be read as expressing a Noahide command — a moral requirement binding on Jew and Gentile alike.

    A second reply turns the reader back to case 1: do you believe the abolitionists did the right thing in breaking the Fugitive Slave Act? Would it have been right to hand runaway slaves over to the authorities? If you answer yes to the first question and no to the second, then you are implicitly endorsing the abolitionists’ interpretation of Deuteronomy 23:15–16 as a command applicable to Gentile Christians living in later ages.

    Limited Application
    A further response is that my argument has limited application: it applies only to asylum seekers and not to other forms of immigrants. In reply, Deuteronomy 23:15–16 applies to a person fleeing slavery; by analogy it applies to a person who has fled their country to escape any condition analogous to slavery. This is significant. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as a person who, “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”

     That definition is narrower than what Deuteronomy 23:15–16 seems to command. A person can be in severe bondage or servitude to another without fitting that 1951 Convention definition — for example in forms of debt bondage or extreme economic servitude, or cases where the person is persecuted or mistreated for reasons other than the ones specified.

    What about illegal or undocumented aliens?

    A third response distinguishes between legal and illegal aliens. The claim is that we should not aid and abet the deportation of someone who has gone through the correct channels and applied for refugee status, but someone who has illegally entered the country is in a different situation: they have “jumped the queue” and failed to respect the law.

    In reply, I deny their situation is different in any morally relevant way. The slave in 1850 the would have clearly crossed a border into a free state illegally, and the Jewish overstayer in the 1930s example may well have been an overstayer despite attempts to apply for asylum. These are people who are illegally in the country, and yet deporting them can still be wrong. Let us reflect on why.

    Imagine I am being pursued by someone who wishes to do me harm — to enslave or kill me. I manage to escape to somewhere my pursuer cannot reach. You yell to my pursuer, “He is over there,” grab me, pull me out, and hand me over. Why would this be wrong? It is wrong because, in doing this, you are actively assisting my pursuers in enslaving or killing me. This is not merely a failure to help; it is active complicity in the attacker’s wrong.

    Notice that this is true whether or not I am a documented or undocumented alien. Suppose I have entered the country illegally — I “jumped the queue.” Suppose there was a legal path I could have followed and I did not. That fact does not change that I am being pursued; it does not change that exposing my whereabouts and handing me over will result in my death or enslavement; and it does not change that, by doing so, you are complicit in that killing or enslavement. The features of the action that make turning me over wrong hold regardless of whether I followed legal channels to enter.

    One way to see this is to ask the following question: was there a realistic possibility that, had the person followed the correct legal procedure, they would have been denied asylum? If the answer is yes, then this case doesn’t differ in any relevant respect from cases 1 and 2 above. The fugitive slave fleeing to a free state fled there illegally. He could have attempted to follow whatever legal procedures were available to leave his master and emigrate to a free state, but we know that under federal law in the US in 1850 this was prohibited. Making his existence known to the authorities would have resulted in his being returned to slavery.

    In the 1930s, thousands of Jewish asylum seekers who legally applied to emigrate to the US were turned down. In 1939, the St. Louis, a ship carrying 900 Jews fleeing Nazi Germany, sailed to the US. The US, along with various other nations, refused the Jews entry, and the ship was forced to return to Germany. In light of these facts, it is very plausible that a Jewish overstayer who revealed themselves to the authorities would have been deported.

    Suppose, then, that the person seeking asylum would have had it granted if they had followed the correct procedure. In this case, critics point out, the overstayer has “jumped the queue”; they have unfairly entered the US without following the procedures others have duly followed. Would we be justified in turning the undocumented alien in to the authorities, knowing they would be deported back to a country where they would likely be enslaved, killed, or persecuted?

    I think the answer is no. Let us grant that “jumping the queue” is wrong, that laws prohibiting it are in principle justified, and that some legal penalty is warranted. Even so, it seems implausible that you would be obliged to hand me over if the penalty inflicted by the authorities is disproportionate. Suppose I knew that stealing a loaf of bread carried a sentence of death. Or that using a false passport meant being handed over to a mafia gang to be tortured and killed. In such cases, I think it would be wrong to turn in someone I knew had stolen a loaf of bread or faked a passport. The fact that it is wrong to commit fraud and theft, and that laws against them are justified, does not mean I would be justified in handing you over under such circumstances.

    The case where the penalty for “jumping the queue” is deportation back to the country the asylum seeker fled from is also a case of disproportionate punishment. Remember, as we have stipulated, this is a case where asylum would have been granted had he not jumped the queue. The benefit he unfairly received, therefore, was not asylum itself—he would have gained that regardless—but merely one of convenience: less hassle, a shorter waiting period, and avoidance of some stressful processes. Do we really think that gaining this kind of advantage unfairly over another justifies execution, permanent enslavement, or permanent exile into destitution? Obviously not. Yet handing people over to authorities who will impose such disproportionate consequences makes you complicit in those outcomes.

    To make this vivid: suppose someone, fearing for their life, illegally fakes identification to stow away on a boat. The captain of the boat has the following policy: if someone tells him they are fleeing for safety, he will allow them on board. However, the captain has no tolerance for stowaways. Anyone discovered stowing away will—as punishment—be thrown into the Atlantic to drown. Or suppose a pilot discovers a passenger with a fake passport and, deciding the passenger is an illegal entrant, opens the plane door mid-flight and throws them out. Both acts would be monstrous. Arresting the person and issuing a proportionate punishment at their destination might be defensible; expelling them when such expulsion will result in death is not.

    Now suppose I know about the stowaway and also know that disclosure will lead to a disproportionate death sentence (being thrown from a plane or cast into the sea). Do I have a duty to disclose? I do not think so. I would be morally justified in concealing the person. I would not be obligated to hand them over.


    [1] Noahide command is the term used by Rabbi’s in the Talmudic literature, Christians have expressed a similar idea using the terms “moral law” or “natural law”. Consider for example Aquinas “The Old Law showed forth the precepts of the natural law, and added certain precepts of its own. Accordingly, as to those precepts of the natural law contained in the Old Law, all were bound to observe the Old Law; not because they belonged to the Old Law, but because they belonged to the natural law. But as to those precepts which were added by the Old Law, they were not binding on save the Jewish people alone” https://www.newadvent.org/summa/2098.htm#article5

  • Some subversive thoughts on immigration

    I’ve been thinking recently about the moral issues surrounding immigration. This is partly because it’s an issue I’ve never really studied in depth, and partly because it’s become a massive political football.

    Here’s a thought that came to me. As I understand it, the right of a refugee to seek asylum in international law has Christian roots, which in turn draw on certain passages in the Torah, such as this one:

    You shall not hand over to his master a slave who has escaped from his master to you. He shall live with you in your midst, in the place that he chooses in one of your towns where it pleases him; you shall not mistreat him.(Deut 23:15-16)

    This law contrasts with common legal practice in the ancient Near East, where people were legally required to return any runaway slaves. Consider, for example, the Laws of Hammurabi (c. 1750 BCE):

    LH §16: If a man should harbor a fugitive slave or slave woman of either the palace or of a commoner in his house and not bring him out at the herald’s public proclamation, that householder shall be killed.

    Or a fifteenth-century BCE treaty between two Syrian kings:

    If a fugitive slave, male or female, of my land flees to your land, you must seize and return him to me; (or), if someone else seizes him and takes him to you, [you must keep him] in your prison, and whenever his owner comes forward, you must hand him over to [him].[1]

    Jefferey Tigay explains:

    The only thing remotely close to this biblical law in the ancient world is the practice at certain temples of granting asylum to slaves fleeing harsh treatment by their masters. Generally, such asylum was not permanent; it protected the slave until he could come to terms with his master or, as a last resort, was sold to another master. By contrast, the biblical law is absolute and treats the whole land of Israel as a sanctuary offering permanent asylum.[2]

    Notice what the Torah passage states: it forbids Israel from deporting someone who has escaped into their nation to escape slavery, and it prohibits restricting their freedom of movement within Israel or limiting their choice of where to live. (Here the “you” is a collective reference to Israel, not simply “your” towns.)

    I was familiar with this passage, but I was struck by its possible application to modern immigration.

    Let’s begin with some historical examples.

    Example 1 (1850). The Fugitive Slave Act required citizens of states where slavery had been criminalized to assist in the capture and return of escaped slaves who had made their way into those states. Abolitionists at the time quoted Deuteronomy 23:15–16 to justify refusing to comply with this law.

    So: you live in a free state in 1850. You discover the whereabouts of a runaway slave who is fleeing an abusive master. Do you (a) comply with the Fugitive Slave Act and hand him over to the authorities, or (b) conceal his whereabouts to prevent his capture? I think most of us would agree that (b) is the right thing to do.

    Example 2 (1930s). The Nazis persecute Jewish people across Europe. Thousands of Jews flee and seek to emigrate, but protectionist U.S. immigration policies mean many are refused entry. You discover a German Jewish overstayer. Do you (a) inform the authorities so he is deported back to Germany, or (b) help conceal his whereabouts? Intuitively, (b) again seems the morally right course; (a) would be immoral.

    Example 3 (contemporary). It is 2025. The Taliban rule Afghanistan. You discover an Afghan overstayer who fled the Taliban; if reported, he will be deported. Do you (a) report him, or (b) conceal him? Or you discover an undocumented Mexican restaurant owner in California who fled cartels, or a Nigerian Christian overstayer who fled persecution? Do you disclose their legal status or do you conceal it? From what I read, many American evangelicals appeal to Romans 13—“obey the government”—to argue that Christians must support the deportation of illegal aliens because the law has been broken in these cases.

    So here is my question: how do these 2025 cases differ in principle from examples 1 and 2? In all cases, the person is illegally in the country while fleeing life-threatening danger—slavery, genocide, Taliban rule, cartels. Is there a principled difference between returning a slave to his master and sending someone back to the Taliban or cartels? If those who defied the Fugitive Slave Act were doing the right thing, why must we follow the law here?


    [1] Jeffrey H. Tigay, Deuteronomy, JPS Torah Commentary (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1996), 387.

    [2] Tigay, Deuteronomy, 215

  • Sinnott-Armstrong on God, Secularism and “reasons” to be moral. Part Three: Can Religious theories answer the question, “Why be moral?”

    In a previous post, I observed that Walter Sinnott-Armstrong concedes that secular accounts of moral obligation cannot vindicate the thesis that agents always have decisive (all-things-considered) reasons to avoid wrongdoing. To mitigate this problem, he argues:

    Is this limitation a problem for secular accounts of morality? I doubt that, too. If we demand this extreme kind of reason to be moral, then we are bound to be disappointed. The solution to our disappointment is to give up this demand, not to imagine a higher power that we want to fulfill an illegitimate demand. Besides, this limit on secular theories would be a problem only if the alternative religious account could provide a better reason to be moral. It can’t. That is what I will show in the next section.[1]

    There are three ideas here. First is the claim that the failure to vindicate this assumption is a problem for secular theories only if religious theories can adequately vindicate it. Second is the claim that religious theories cannot vindicate this assumption. Third, he claims that the assumption itself cannot be adequately vindicated.

    I want to focus on the last two of these claims.

    Can religious theories adequately vindicate this assumption?

    Sinnott-Armstrong argues that religious theories cannot adequately vindicate the thesis that agents always have decisive reasons to avoid wrongdoing. His argument involves two steps.

    First, he argues that any adequate theory of moral requirements must not only vindicate the assumption that agents have reasons to do what is right, but that those reasons must be of the right kind—they cannot be arbitrary. He illustrates this point with two examples.

    Imagine that “the King of Curls threatens to kill all of his subjects who do not shave their heads on May 21, though there is nothing special about that date.”[2] Do we have a reason to shave our heads? Yes—the threat of death gives us a reason to comply. However, this reason is arbitrary; it is based on naked force and bears no relation to the content of the command.

    Similarly, a mother is trying to teach her son to stop hitting his sister. She can do this in two ways: she can convince him that harming his sister is wrong, or she can simply threaten him with punishment if he doesn’t comply. The second approach gives the son a reason not to hit his sister, but it is the wrong kind of reason—it is arbitrary, based on force, and doesn’t teach him to care about his sister.[3]

    His second step is to argue that religious theories fail to provide the right kind of reasons for refraining from wrongdoing. They are arbitrary in the same way. His reasoning is as follows:

    Divine threats of Hell or promises of Heaven operate in the same way. If our only reason to be moral is to avoid Hell or get to Heaven, then our motivation is far from ideal. Even a total psychopath, who cares about nobody else but believes in Hell, would have this reason to be moral. But this reason would not give the psychopath any reason for the content of the moral restrictions themselves. The psychopath would still see moral restrictions as just as arbitrary as a law requiring him to shave his head on May 21.[4]

    The key premise here is that if God exists, the only reason we could have for following His commands would be to either get to Heaven or avoid Hell.

    But why think this? Sinnott-Armstrong doesn’t say.

    Earlier in the same chapter, he had rejected the idea that all interests are self-interested. He wrote: “Many reasons are not based on self-interest. That should be common ground between theists and [atheists].”[5] Later, he states:

    The fact that an act prevents harm to another person can be a reason for me to do that act. The fact that an act causes harm to another person can be a reason for me not to do that act. These facts are reasons, even if the other people are strangers. Crucially, these reasons are not self-interesting. They are facts about the interests of other people, not me.[6]

    So, Sinnott-Armstrong accepts that—even if theism is true—there can be non-selfish reasons for acting. But if that’s correct, why assume that the only reason an agent could have for obeying God is a selfish one? Why couldn’t agents also have non-selfish reasons to obey God?

    Remember the theist whom Sinnott-Armstrong is criticising. This theist understands God to have certain attributes: God is all-powerful, all-knowing, essentially benevolent, and impartial. So what God commands is co-extensive with prescriptions that a benevolent, impartial person would endorse—if that person were fully informed and reasoning correctly. It is quite plausible that agents would have unselfish reasons to follow such prescriptions. In fact, it is hard to see how Armstrong can say that we have unselfish reasons to do acts that benefit others, but no unselfish reasons to obey prescriptions that are justified from a perspective that aims to benefit others.

    Here we need to recall the challenge to secular ethics and how theism is purported to solve it. The challenge is this: Suppose we are not accountable to God. In that case, certain kinds of practical dilemmas will occur. Requirements that are justified from an impartial point of view—ones that promote the interests of others—will sometimes conflict with an agent’s long-term self-interest. Unselfish reasons will point one way, prudential reasons the other. If such dilemmas occur, we face a question: What reason is there to act unselfishly rather than in one’s self-interest? What reason do we have for always giving precedence to impartial demands in such cases?

    It is the inability of secular ethics to address this question that is the alleged problem.

    If we are accountable to God, this problem is avoided because such dilemmas never occur. Rewards and punishments change the balance of reasons for and against the act. However, they do so not by changing or negating the strength of the unselfish reasons against the act—they change the balance of prudential reasons in favour of the act. Because God is impartial and benevolent, we will still have the same kind of unselfish reasons—of the sort Sinnott-Armstrong refers to—to obey God’s commands. However, these reasons will never be matched or overridden by prudential demands to the contrary. Instead, prudential reasons will support and reinforce them.

    Can the assumption be adequately vindicated?

    Let’s turn to Sinnott-Armstrong’s second claim: that the thesis that agents always have decisive (all-things-considered) reasons to avoid wrongdoing cannot be adequately vindicated. He proposes the following dilemma:

    Different audiences react to this point in different ways. Some people really want a reason to be moral that will motivate psychopaths, even if it is not connected to any reason why certain acts are immoral. They are rightly scared of psychopaths, so they want a reason that will convince psychopaths to be moral. Other people want a reason to be moral that does not leave morality arbitrary, because the reason to be moral shows why those moral acts are moral. They want a moral reason rather than a selfish reason. I share the latter goal, but I can appreciate the former wish. Unfortunately, I doubt that the former wish can be fulfilled. No reason will succeed in convincing everyone to be moral. This is another obvious but hard fact of life that we need to learn to live with.[7]

    The proposed dilemma appears to be this: no meta-ethical theory can both vindicate the assumption that agents always have decisive reasons to refrain from wrongdoing and identify reasons of the correct type. If a meta-ethical theory entails that agents always have decisive reasons to be moral, the reasons it cites will be arbitrary or of the wrong kind. If we are to identify a fact that provides reasons for all people—including egoists and amoral individuals—it will need to appeal to something like self-interest; and self-interested reasons are the wrong kind of reason. By contrast, if a theory provides reasons of the right kind, it will fail to provide a reason strong enough or universal enough to ensure agents always have decisive reasons to be moral. The right kind of reasons are unselfish reasons, but these will not provide everyone—including egoists and psychopaths—with reasons to be moral, nor will they always be strong enough to override prudential or instrumental reasons to the contrary.

    Here, I think Sinnott-Armstrong relies on a false dichotomy. He assumes a meta-ethical theory must either appeal to selfish reasons to be moral or to unselfish reasons. However, his interlocutor’s point is that this is a false choice. If a divine command theory is correct, then what is in our long-term interest and what is justified from an impartial point of view coincide. So we have both types of reason at the same time. They are never in conflict.

    It is always in our interest to obey God and never in our interest to disobey—things such as eternal life are at stake. For this reason, there are strong self-interested reasons to be moral that are never overridden. These reasons provide even an egoist or a psychopath with reasons to comply.

    Because God is impartial and benevolent, we also have very strong unselfish reasons to be moral. What God commands us to do is what a fully informed, rational, impartial, benevolent person would command. The commands He gives are prescriptions justified from a perspective that equally considers the interests of all. These are reasons of the right kind.


    [1] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God 118

    [2] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God 95 (ebook)

    [3] Ibid, 96

    [4] Ibid

    [5] Ibid, 93

    [6] Ibid, 94

    [7] Ibid, 96

  • Sinnott-Armstrong on God, Secularism and “reasons” to be moral. Part two: Do unselfish reasons answer the question, “Why be moral?”

    ***

    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong discusses the following objection:

    “Harming others is sometimes in some people’s best interest, even considering probable costs. In those cases, some theists say that only a divine threat of Hell provides a reason to be moral. Since atheists and agnostics do not believe in God, they do not believe in divine retribution for sins, so they have to admit that sometimes some people could get away with immorality and then they have no self-interested reason to be moral. Does that mean that these people have no reason at all to be moral?”[1]

    He responds to this argument as follows:

    No. That conclusion would follow only if every reason had to be self-interested, selfish, or egoistic. There is no basis for that assumption. Many reasons are not based on self-interest. That should be common ground between theists and atheists… The fact that an act prevents harm to another person can be a reason for me to do that act. The fact that an act causes harm to another person can be a reason for me not to do that act. These facts are reasons, even if the other people are strangers. Crucially, these reasons are not self-interested. They are facts about the interests of other people, not me. These unselfish reasons can answer the question, “Why be moral?”[2]

    Here, Sinnott-Armstrong makes three points. First, the argument in question assumes that “all reasons are selfish.” Second, this assumption is false—“it should be common ground between theists” that there are also “unselfish reasons,” based on the fact that certain acts harm others. Third, these “unselfish reasons” can answer the question: why be moral?

    Do non-selfish reasons answer the question: “Why be moral?”

    I discussed the first point in a previous post. In this post, I will discuss the third: do the non-selfish reasons he appeals to answer the question “Why be moral?”

    In my previous post, I noted that the question “Why be moral?” can be understood in two ways. Armstrong’s interlocutor could be asking:

    (a) whether, in the given circumstances, we have a pro tanto reason to refrain from harm; or
    (b) whether, in those circumstances, we have decisive reasons not to harm.

    I also pointed out that interpreting the question in terms of (a) is idiosyncratic. The way the question is commonly used—and the most plausible understanding of it—is in terms of (b).

    Whether an appeal to unselfish reasons answers the question “Why be moral?” depends on how you interpret the question. If we interpret it in terms of (a), then the fact that an action harms another person would answer the question. Sinnott-Armstrong’s hypothesis is that the property of being morally wrong is constituted by the property of harming another person. Suppose the fact that an action harms another person provides a pro tanto reason not to do that action—in that case, we have a pro tanto reason not to do what is wrong.

    The problem is that this is an extremely weak and idiosyncratic rendition of the skeptical challenge. As Mark Murphy points out:

    It would be helpful if Sinnott-Armstrong had named an opponent here who thought that this was the real challenge for the nontheistic ethicist. The worry is not characteristically expressed by theistic ethicists in terms of whether there is any reason to do what is morally right in the absence of God; the worry is characteristically expressed in terms of whether there could be overriding, or decisive, reason to do what is all-things-considered morally required.[3]

    In my last post, I pointed out that in his writings on moral skepticism, Sinnott-Armstrong himself has noted that the “Why be moral?” question is not normally understood in terms of whether there is “sometimes some kind of reason to be moral.” Instead:

    “A more plausible and common version of practical moral skepticism denies, instead, that there is always an adequate (or non-overridden) reason to do what is morally required.”[4]

    If we interpret the question in terms of (b), Sinnott-Armstrong’s appeal to the fact that an action “harms” another person does not answer the question “Why be moral?” His interlocutor argues that if a secular meta-ethical theory is true, then certain kinds of practical dilemmas will occur. What is prudentially required will be an act that harms others. We will therefore have self-interested or prudential reasons to do the act, and unselfish reasons not to do it. If such dilemmas occur, we face a question: What reason is there to act unselfishly rather than in one’s self-interest? What reason do we have for always giving precedence to impartial demands in such cases?

    Murphy explains:

    “The worry is that there are different kinds of reason that can pull in different directions, and it is not obvious that there is any practical error in choosing against a more impartial point of view by going with the more partial point of view.”[5]

    If I face a dilemma between two options—doing an act that harms others or doing an act that is contrary to my own interest—pointing out that one option involves harming others doesn’t solve the dilemma. What we need is some reason for always treating the impartially based demands as having precedence. Sinnott-Armstrong provides no such reason. In fact, later in the chapter, he is candid that he cannot give any such reason. He writes:

    The fact that an act causes harm to others is a reason not to do that act, and the fact that an act prevents harm to others is a reason to do that act. There is, then, always a reason to be moral on this secular account. And often these reasons are adequate, because they are strong enough to make it rational (or not irrational) to be moral….
    Nonetheless, some people still wish for a reason that is strong enough to motivate everyone to be moral and also to make it always irrational to be immoral. I doubt that secular moral theories can establish that strong kind of reason to be moral. For people who really do not care about others, the solution is found in retraining or restraining rather than in theory. (emphasis mine)[6]

    Note what is being said here: Armstrong is saying that if the best secular accounts of morality are true, agents do not always have all-things-considered reasons to do what is morally right. Sometimes they will, and sometimes they will not. In these latter cases, people will have adequate—and possibly even conclusive—all-things-considered reasons to violate moral norms. The solution to this is an appeal to naked force. What we need to do is force these people to act in ways that they have sufficient or decisive reasons not to act.

    This seems an inadequate answer. Consider the following analogy: critics of monotheistic religions like Christianity, Judaism, or Islam often ask, “What reason do I have to adopt your religion?” This is not a question of belief but of action. Adopting a religion involves living a certain way. Skeptics ask: What reasons do I have to commit to faithfully following what you take to be God’s commands, especially when doing so often goes against my aims or interests?

    Imagine a theist responded to this as follows: “You don’t have compelling reasons to do this. In fact, you have good reason not to do this. The balance of reasons does not support such a commitment and may in fact be against it. However, if you don’t convert, I will persecute you.” Would any religious skeptic think their concerns had been answered?

    In the same way, I suggest that no one who was not already committed to secular morality would find Sinnott-Armstrong’s response here adequate.

    Later, Armstrong offers a different answer:

    Is this limitation a problem for secular accounts of morality? I doubt that, too. If we demand this extreme kind of reason to be moral, then we are bound to be disappointed. The solution to our disappointment is to give up this demand, not to imagine a higher power that we want to fulfill an illegitimate demand. Besides, this limit on secular theories would be a problem only if the alternative religious account could provide a better reason to be moral. It can’t. That is what I will show in the next section.[7]

    Here, Sinnott-Armstrong’s position appears to be twofold:

    First, the fact that a secular theory cannot answer the question “Why be moral?” is only a problem if religious theories can answer that question adequately. If they cannot, then this is a problem for all theories—and hence not a reason to favour one over another.

    Second, he claims that a religious theory cannot answer this question either. In fact, he seems to think no theory can. The appropriate response, he suggests, is to give up the demand.

    In a future post, I will examine Sinnott-Armstrong’s reasons for these two claims. I will argue that they fail.


    [1] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 114

    [2] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God 117

    [3] Mark Murphy’s, Morality Without God, available at https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/morality-s-without-god-s/ accessed 28 August 2025

    [4] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Practical Moral Skepticism, available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral/supplement.html accessed 28 August 2025

    [5] Mark Murphy’s, Morality Without God, available at https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/morality-s-without-god-s/ accessed 28 August 2025

    [6] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God 117-118

    [7] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God 118

     

  • Sinnott-Armstrong on God, Secularism and “reasons” to be moral. Part One:

    In his book Morality Without God, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that a secular account of the nature of moral properties—namely, that wrongness is constituted by the property of harming others—is preferable to a theistic account, in which wrongness is identified with the property of being contrary to God’s commands

    Chapter 6 is entitled “Why be moral?”
    In this chapter, Sinnott-Armstrong attempts to rebut the idea that secular meta-ethical theories—such as the one he proposes—cannot provide an adequate answer to this question.

    Sinnott-Armstrong begins his discussion by citing an argument that purports to show that secular accounts of morality cannot answer the question: why be moral? He summarises the argument as follows:

    “Harming others is sometimes in some people’s best interest, even considering probable costs. In those cases, some theists say that only a divine threat of Hell provides a reason to be moral. Since atheists and agnostics do not believe in God, they do not believe in divine retribution for sins, so they have to admit that sometimes some people could get away with immorality and then they have no self-interested reason to be moral. Does that mean that these people have no reason at all to be moral?”[1]

    He responds to this argument as follows:

    No. That conclusion would follow only if every reason had to be self-interested, selfish, or egoistic. There is no basis for that assumption. Many reasons are not based on self-interest. That should be common ground between theists and atheists… The fact that an act prevents harm to another person can be a reason for me to do that act. The fact that an act causes harm to another person can be a reason for me not to do that act. These facts are reasons, even if the other people are strangers. Crucially, these reasons are not self-interesting. They are facts about the interests of other people, not me. These unselfish reasons can answer the question, “Why be moral?”[2]

    There are some infelicities in the way this argument is described and set up. Sinnott-Armstrong’s version of the argument relies solely on the appeal to fear of Hell and divine retribution. He doesn’t, for example, couch the argument in terms of hope of eternal life. Moreover, in the paragraphs leading up to this one, he gives a sarcastic, literalistic reading of the Book of Revelation on the topic of Hell. These all rhetorically prime negative reactions in the reader; they also border on crude caricature.

    However, in this post and in future ones, I will focus on what I take to be the main thrust of Sinnott-Armstrong’s response to this argument. Sinnott-Armstrong makes three points. First, he argues that this argument is only sound if one assumes that “every reason” is “self-interested.” Second, he argues that this assumption is false. It should be granted by both theists and non-theists that there are “unselfish reasons” based on the fact that an action will “harm” (or benefit) other people. Third, he contends these unselfish reasons can answer the question of why they are moral.

    Does the argument assume that all reasons are selfish?

    Let’s look at the first point: does this argument assume that all reasons are selfish? That depends on how one interprets the phrase “reasons to be moral” and the rhetorical question “Why be moral?”

    When we talk of “reasons” to act, we can mean one of two things. Sometimes the word “reason” functions as a mass noun, referring to what we have decisive reasons to do—what we have reasons to do all things considered, when we consider everything that counts in favour of an action and against it. Alternatively, the word “reason” can function as a count noun, referring to what we have a pro tanto reason to do—what we have reason to do all else being equal. Here we ask whether there is anything that by itself counts in favour of the action.[3]

    An illustrative example: It is a rainy day, and I have to walk fifteen minutes outside to the bus. The fact I will get wet if I don’t take an umbrella is a pro tanto reason to take an umbrella. The fact that carrying an umbrella is cumbersome is a pro tanto reason against it. When I consider all the relevant factors—the burden of carrying the umbrella and the prospect of getting wet—I conclude that I have decisive, all-things-considered reasons to carry it.[4]

    Sinnott-Armstrong’s interlocutor asks: if we are not accountable to God for our actions, and harming someone promotes our long-term self-interest, what reason do we have to refrain from doing harm? He could mean two things:
    (a) He could be asking whether, in the given circumstances, we have a pro tanto reason to refrain from harm; or
    (b) He could be asking whether, in those circumstances, we have decisive reasons not to harm.

    If he means (a), then Sinnott-Armstrong’s criticism seems on point. The interlocutor is assuming that all reasons are selfish. He is saying that if it is not in our self-interest to avoid harming others, then there is no consideration of any sort at all against harming them. This follows only if all reasons are selfish.

    I suspect that this is how Sinnott-Armstrong interprets the argument in question. The problem is that this is a very idiosyncratic understanding of the question “Why be moral?” Normally, in philosophical discussions, this is not what is meant by the question.[5]

    Consider what  Sinnott-Armstrong himself writes in his Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on moral skepticism. He writes about a form of skepticism known as “practical skepticism,” which asks the question:

    “Why be moral?” This question is used to raise many different issues. Almost everyone admits that there is sometimes some kind of reason to be moral. However, many philosophers deny various universal claims, including the claims that there is always some reason to be moral, that there is always a distinctively moral reason to be moral, and/or that there is always enough reason to make it irrational not to be moral or at least not irrational to be moral…
    Practical moral skeptics usually deny that there is always enough reason for moral action.[6]

    In a supplementary paper, he explains:

    What such practical moral skeptics deny is that I always have reason to do what is morally required… Practical moral skeptics do not deny that there is sometimes reason not to do what is morally wrong. After all, some wrongdoers are caught and punished. However, practical moral skeptics can still deny that there is always reason to do what is morally required or to avoid what is morally wrong.
    How much reason? Some practical moral skeptics claim that sometimes there is no reason at all to do what is morally required. If all reasons are self-interested, this means that sometimes doing what is morally required does not serve the agent’s interest in any way. That extreme position would be refuted if doing what is morally wrong always creates even a slight risk of some negative repercussion. A more plausible and common version of practical moral skepticism denies, instead, that there is always an adequate (or non-overridden) reason to do what is morally required. To establish this position, practical moral skeptics need only one case where there is overriding reason not to do what is morally required. (emphasis mine)[7]

    So, according to Sinnott-Armstrong himself, if we interpret the rhetorical question “Why be moral?” charitably—in a way that reflects how the question is commonly used—it is not a denial that agents lack any pro tanto reasons to do what they are required to do. Instead, the interlocutor is challenging the idea that agents always have decisive reasons to refrain from harm when doing so is contrary to their self-interest.

    Suppose we interpret Sinnott-Armstrong’s interlocutor in terms of (b). In that case, he is arguing as follows: if there are cases where harming another is in our self-interest, then we will not always have all-things-considered reasons to refrain from harm. This argument does not assume that all reasons are selfish. Even if there are unselfish reasons based on the fact an action harms others, these reasons will not always be stronger or weightier than the selfish reasons we have to the contrary. One can accept that we have a pro tanto reason to do an action and also admit that when one considers everything that is relevant—for and against—the total balance of reasons does not support it.

    We can conclude our discussion as follows: Sinnott-Armstrong’s claim—that his interlocutor’s argument rests on a false assumption, namely that all reasons are selfish—is true if one interprets the question “Why be moral?” in an idiosyncratic and uncharitable way, contrary to how the question is typically used. However, if the question is interpreted charitably, in line with its usual philosophical usage, then  Sinnott-Armstrong’s claim is false.


    [1] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Morality Without God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 114

    [2] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Morality Without God 117

    [3] See Stephen Darwall, “What Are Moral Reasons?” The Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 12 (2017): 2. Available at https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/What%20Are%20moral%20reasons.pdf accessed 28 August 2025

    [4] See Stephen Darwall, “What Are Moral Reasons?” 2-3

    [5] This point is made by Mark Murphy’s review, Morality Without God, available at https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/morality-s-without-god-s/ accessed 28 August 2025

    [6] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Moral Skepticism, available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral/index.html accessed 28 August 2025

    [7] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Practical Moral Skepticism, available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral/supplement.html accessed 28 August 2025