Category: Ethics

  • The Meta-Ethical Argument for Christian Theism: A Response to Richard Chappell

    According to one version of the Moral Argument for Theism, God provides the best explanation for the existence of moral obligations. The most sophisticated version of this argument is arguably that provided by Robert Adams in “Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief” (published in The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays). Richard Chappell thinks those who follow Adams in this argument have a “daft’ position. Because, Chappell states, any aspect of morality God can explain can also be explained by appealing to what God would have done in counterfactual situations a. Chappell writes,

    Ideal standards can be grounded in counterfactuals, e.g. facts about what an ideal spectator would recommend.”Suppose we want to ground goodness in God’s nature. This does not require God to exist. We could just as well appeal to counterfactual natures, and what God would have wanted (had he existed).

    Now the best defenders of the meta-ethical argument do not attempt to ground morality in God’s nature. Robert Adams holds not that “Gods nature” grounds moral goodness. But that that the most plausible account of what “right and wrongness of an act consists in” is the theory that moral rightness and wrongness consist in agreement and disagreement, respectively, with the will or commands of a loving God.” Strictly speaking then Chappell attacks a straw man. Nether the less I assume Chappell thinks his argument applies with equal force to Divine Command Theories such as those proposed by Adams. He argues,

    Consider: you may think (1) that God exists, and (2) that God frowns upon genocide. Now entertain the hypothesis (3) that God does not actually exist after all. You should still hold a modified form of your second belief, namely: (4) God would have frowned upon genocide.

    I’m suggesting that claim #4 can do everything that claim #2 can. It is just as objective, and can “ground” all the same facts. Any doubts you have about #4 (e.g. “but how can we know it for sure? We could be mistaken in ascribing these judgments to God…”) will apply in equal measure to #2. There is simply no relevant difference between them.

    Chappell asks us to consider two claims. The first which I will call [a] is the claim that God exists in the actual world and commands C1-C2 in The second which I will label [b] God does not exist in the actual world, however there is a possible world just like the actual world in all respects except that God does exist in this world and does issue commands Cn-Cn+2. Chappell thinks that [a] and be [b] that God will issue the same commands in both worlds C1-C2 will be identical to C1-C2. Hence every aspect of morality which it’s explained by Gods actual commands in [a] will be explained by the counter factual commands in [b].

    What I find puzzling about Chappell’s appeal to this argument is that Adams in fact discussed it and responded to it in the above mentioned essay. Which is one of the definitive essays on the topic. After spelling out his argument Adams notes,

    It may be objected that the advantages of the divine command theory can be obtained without an entailment of God’s existence. For the rightness of an action might be said to consist in the fact that the action would agree with the commands of a loving God if one existed, or does so agree if a loving God
    exists. This modification transforms the divine command theory into a nonnaturalistic form of the ideal observer theory of the nature of right and wrong. It has the advantage of identifying rightness and wrongness with properties that actions could have even if God does not exist And of course it takes away the basis of my metaethical argument for theism.

    This is almost an exact analogue of Chappell’s argument. Adams response is to deny that God will necessarily issue the same commands in [a] as he does in [b],

    The flaw in this theory is that it is difficult to see what is supposed to be the force of the counterfactual conditional that is centrally involved in it. If there is no loving God, what makes it the case if there were one, he would command this rather than that? Without an answer to this question, the crucial counterfactual lacks a clear sense (cf. chapter 6 in this volume). I can see only two possible answers: either that what any possible loving God would command is logically determined by the concept of a loving God, or that it is determined by a causal law. Neither answer seems likely to work without depriving the theory of some part of the advantages of divine command metaethics.

    No doubt some conclusions about what he would not command follow logically or analytically from the concept of a loving God. He would not command us to practice cruelty for its own sake, for example. But in some cases, at least, in which we believe the act is wrong, it seems only contingent that a loving God
    does or would frown on increasing the happiness of other people by the painless and undetected killing of a person who wants to live but will almost certainly not live happily. Very diverse preferences about what things are to be treated as personal rights seem compatible with love and certainly with deity.

    Adams point is as follows much of what God commands in the actual world is a contingent matter. God is not required by the facts of the world or by his own nature to issue the exact commands he does. Of course there are some things a loving God will not command, such as cruelty for it own sake. But once these options are eliminated, there is still no one set of commands which a loving being in a world like ours must command. Hence it simply does not follow that God will issue the same commands in counterfactual situations that he does in the actual world. There are possible worlds like ours where he issues one set of commands and there are other possible worlds like ours in all other respects in which he issues other commands. Hence, there is no determinate answer to the question, what would God command if he existed in a world like ours.

    This creates a problem for counter factual appeals to God. The problem, noted by Thomas Carson , is that if we ask what God would have commanded in counterfactual situations we will get contradictory answers. In one possible world exactly like ours in all relevant respects God would have commanded us to A. But in another possible world exactly like ours in the same respects, he would have commanded to not A. C1.

    Now I think Adams (and Carson) are correct about this, even if I am wrong however, what this shows is that Richard’s argument is mistaken. Richard attempts to criticise a meta-ethical argument for theism. He however ignores the actual versions the argument that occur in the literature and sketches a straw man, he then simply asserts a claim that God will issue the same commands in counter factual situations, which the actual proponents of the moral argument have already noted and argued against. He then concludes from this assertion their position is daft. If people are to rebut Christian philosophers, they need to actually engage with their arguments and that means Richard needs to provide some argument to the effect that God would issue the same commands in a counterfactual situations as he does in the actual world. Divine Command Theorists such as Duns Scotus and more recently Hare and Quinn have denied this claim, and argued against it. They may be mistaken, but simply saying so and ignoring what they have argued is not a rebuttal.

  • What’s Wrong with Whaling?

    With governments refusing to help ships that engage in it and ‘peace’ activists apparently willing to ram ships to prevent it, one assumes that whaling is a grave moral evil. It is, apparently, obviously so. Unfortunately, I fail to see why.

    How is killing a whale any different from fishing for marlin or shark or tuna?

    Of course, whales are more intelligent than sharks. But as Peter Singer infamously pointed out pigs are more intelligent than newborn infants yet we should not consider killing infants and newborns as on par with pig farming.

    True some whales are endangered but so are some other forms of sea animals. Some species of shark are endangered and some species of whale are not endangered. Of course, whales are beautiful, wondrous creatures, but I happen to think this is true of numerous animals and landscapes. Sharks are incredibly slick and beautiful.

    Harpooning is arguably cruel causing a long and painful death but that is not an issue of whaling. It is an issue of the method. So find a quicker method of killing them. Moreover, many methods of spear fishing and fishing with a hook are arguably cruel as well.

    As I see it, provided one kills animals in a humane manner and one does not hunt them to extinction, then there is nothing wrong with whaling. Not just for ‘research,’ but for commercial purposes.

    Further, I fail to see why one would ram boats over this issue. After all our government kills over 16,000 unborn humans in state hospitals every year. Now if a person were to damage equipment and ram heavy machinery into clinics over this. What would we call such a person? A fanatic? A terrorist? After all it is not like it is a blue whale it is only a human.

  • Saddam Dead

    At 4pm Saddam Hussein, the Butcher of Baghdad, was executed.

    Saddam deserved to die. I do not think anybody believes he was innocent of serious crimes. This dictator murdered and tortured thousands of innocent people including women and children. I have had the misfortune of reading some of the accounts of Saddam’s atrocities from firsthand witnesses. Few things have disgusted and sickened me more.

    No doubt some groups like Amnesty International will denounce his hanging as unjust. They would prefer a world where innocent unborn children are slaughtered for any reason but where bloody brutal murderers and dictators do not get their just desserts. I do not share their sentiments.

    It is true that there are questions about the process of Saddam’s trial and legitimate criticisms may be raised. However, Saddam was not an innocent man framed for crimes he did not commit or some innocent third party in the wrong place at the wrong time victimised by a corrupt system. Saddam did commit these crimes and many more and he deserved to die.

  • Misrepresenting Catholic Theology

    The Herald has run a story with the no-brainer title “Patient dies after machine unplugged“.

    According to the article an italian doctor turned off a patient’s life support system (did the title of the article give you a clue?) at his request. The article went on to suggest that this might be illegal euthanasia, outlined the penalty for such an offence and states that the Vatican is opposed to euthanasia.

    This is deceptive reporting. As the Vatican defines euthanasia, this case is clearly not euthanasia.

    The Catholic Church distinguishes between failing to save a patient and actively killing a patient. It holds that there is an absolute duty to not kill an innocent human being. However, it does not hold that one must keep a patient alive at all costs and it certainly does not hold that a patient should be subjected to invasive treatment against his or her consent.

    Any manual on Catholic moral theology would have spelt this out to the reporter had he or she bothered to read it. Under Catholic teaching one cannot subject a competent patient to life saving medical treatment against his or her consent. Further, any patient can lawfully choose to forgo treatment if it is excessively burdensome and unlikely to have proportionate benefit.

    What this shows us is how the NZ media distort and caricature the theological positions of others to paint them in a negative light, a light easy to dismiss because it is a strawman.

  • Saddam to be Executed Soon

    Saddam will be executed 25 Jan 2007.

    While I will not celebrate his execution I am pleased that it is happening.

  • Dear Hell Pizza

    My kids get taught about sex when I decide to teach them about it. As their parents I get to decide what and how I tell them about it.

    No one else gets to infringe my right to educate my kids, not the state, not family planning and not the local pizza company.

    I used to buy your pizza’s but since you decided you could override my rights as a parent, you will never, ever, ever see any of my money, ever again.

    Further, I will encourage anyone who claims to be right wing to join me in my boycott of your business. Hell Pizza are right up there with the worst of the nanny state lefties and do not deserve to prosper.

    PS. Your pizza’s were never that great anyway and my kids always preferred Pizza Hut and Dominoes.

  • An Argument for Gay Marriage

    Here is a common argument for gay marriage that I have heard multiple times.

    [1] Justice requires that all people be treated equally by the state.
    [2] Homosexuals are people.
    [3] The marriage act does not treat homosexuals
    equally to heterosexuals unless it is amended to allow for Gay marriage,

    Therefore

    [4] Justice requires that the marriage act should be amended to allow for Gay
    marriage.

    This argument is formally valid. If its premises are true, the conclusion follows. However, with the exception of premise [2] every premise is false which means it is unsound.

    Re [1] It is not true that justice requires that the state treat all people equally. Consider a person guilty of a crime. A person guilty of a crime is a person yet clearly justice does not require that the state treat the guilty the same way it treats the innocent. Criminals are deprived of their liberty rights (they are incarcerated), their property rights (fined) or in some cases their life (capital punishment) those who do not engage in crimes are not deprived of these things.

    I am not trying to say that gay people are on par with criminals, I am making the point that the state does not in fact treat all people equally.

    Further, justice does not require that all people be treated equally. The classical definition of justice is to “render to each what is his due.” As Wolterstorff notes in God, Justice and Duty:

    [In some contexts] that which is due to them is some ‘evil’ in the other cases … that which is due them is some life-good. If it is a life-good that is due them, then what is
    due them is what they have a right to, what they are entitled to. If it is an “evil,” what is due them is their desert.

    To make the case, the defender of homosexual marriage needs to supplement [1] with two further arguments (i) that those who engage in homosexual relationships have not done anything wrong which would deserve them being treated differently; and, (ii) a state sanctioned marriage is a right. Simply, citing dubious claims about equality does neither.

    I don’t think either claim is plausible: regarding (i), it is seriously immoral to have sex with a member of the same sex, consequently a person who enters into a Gay marriage is in fact taking a vow expressing commitment to a life of immoral activity.

    Re (ii), the state’s function is to defend the innocent against aggression and to punish those who commit crimes. Performing marriage ceremonies constitutes neither.

    Re [3] the marriage act does not treat homosexual persons differently to heterosexual persons. Under the marriage act a heterosexual person can: (a) enter into a informal marriage (de facto) with any number of people of either sex providing it is consensual and the person is not a close relative, (b) have a private ceremony to recognise, celebrate or solemnise any such marriage, (c) have the state solemnise and recognise a formal marriage with one member of the opposition sex provided it is consensual and not with a close relative.

    Similarly a homosexual person can (a) enter into a informal marriage (de facto) with any number of people of either sex providing it is consensual and the person is not a close relative, (b) have a private ceremony to recognise, celebrate or solemnise any such marriage, (c) have the state solemnise and recognise a formal marriage with one member of the opposition sex provided it is consensual and not with a close relative.

    So the marriage act grants identical rights to homosexuals and heterosexual persons. What the act does is discriminate against certain sexual relationships. However, the principle expounded in [1] is that all people should be treated equally, not, that all sexual relationships should be treated equally.

    Again, it seems the defender of this argument needs to say more, he or she needs to maintain not only that justice requires that all people be treated equally but also that all sexual relationships should be treated equally. But this is clearly absurd, it entails that the state should treat the case of Miewes and Brandes the same as it treats a married couple who consummate their wedding.

    Finally, even if [3] were true and the marriage act does not treat homosexual persons equally to heterosexual persons it would not follow that it does so unless it is amended to allow for Gay marriage. An obvious way equality could be restored would be for the state to recognise no marriages. A proposal some libertarians have put forward and one we support too.

    So as far as I can tell this argument is worthless and certainly is unsound. Of course, this will not stop defenders of gay marriage trotting this argument out ad nauseum. Providing credible arguments for their position has never been a forte.