Category: Ethics

  • Craig Young on “Bare Backing”

    Craig Young is shocked by statistics about “bare backing” being prevalent in the Gay community. Bare backing in case you don’t know is the name Craig gives to un-protected anal sex. Young is shocked because it suggests there exists a “parallel world where Paul Cameron tells the truth.”

    To understand this you need to understand something of Craig’s methods. Many critics of homosexual conduct have been for some time citing studies and evidence which suggests that homosexual conduct, as typically engaged, in is dangerous. Craig Young’s standard response has been ad hominem; he notes that one source sometimes cited in support of these claims is Paul Cameron and, according to Craig, Cameron was kicked out of the American Psychological Association for falsifying one of his studies. Craig fails to see that this is not an adequate rebuttal. First, even if Cameron’s work lacks credibility he is often only one of many sources these authors use. Contrary to what Craig seems to think you do not refute numerous studies by showing that one of them is false. Second, the fact that Cameron was kicked out of an organization for falsifying his research in a particular a study does not mean that every study he wrote or authored was shonky or bad.

    Despite his initial shock at discovering that merely attacking the character of one scholar does not establish the falsity of a thesis. Craig attempts a predictable save. The prevalence of unsafe sex amongst homosexual men is actually the fault of evangelical Christians not of the bare backers who actually do it.

    [T]he US Christian Right has had some dark successes in curtailing LGBT rights and mainstream HIV/AIDS prevention programmes. This has meant that the US LGBT communities are far more ghettoised than most other international LGBT communities, so it tolerates distorted antisocial behaviours that are one response to segregation from the rest of one’s society. What else could one call the cowboy bareback DVD producers that prey on young gay men barely past the age of consent that appear to be the backbone of barebacking?

    Craig here argues as follows: dangerous sexual practices are a response to segregation from society and segregation from society is the result of moral condemnation from Christians in that society. Ergo these Christians are responsible for the dangerous practices. Now something like this argument is common, like many common liberal arguments I reject it. Here is why:

    This argument suggests that people (in this case certain Christians) are responsible not just for the foreseeable causal consequences of their actions. But also for other peoples free responses to these actions (or at least such responses which one can be expected to predict) Young suggests that because it’s foreseeable some people choose to respond to Christian condemnation of homosexual conduct by forming a segregated culture, and its foreseeable that this culture will respond to segregation by condoning and engaging in “anti social behaviour”. It follows Christians are responsible for the behaviour.

    I think this understanding of scope of moral culpability is false. Consider the following example from Augustine. Suppose a man approaches a woman and tells her that he will kill himself if she refuses to have sex with him. Does that mean that she is a murderer if she refuses?[1] Her refusal would not constitute homicide even though his death is a foreseeable result of her choice. Although she foresaw his or her death, she did not cause it. It was caused by the free decision of the tempter to commit suicide.

    In an excellent article, Alan Donagan notes that historically Christian and Jewish casuistry agrees with Augustine on this point. Christian ethicists typically…

    limit an action’s effects, and a fortiori what its agent intends to bring about in doing it, to those that follow from it in course of nature and the ordinary operation of social institutions, and not from the free reactions of others to it.
    (Thus actions in the ordinary course of business, for example, those of postal officers in delivering a letter that has been mailed, are not counted as free reactions.) The principle on which they do is that a free reaction to an action, is a ‘new action’ (‘novus actus’), the effects of which are their effects, and not those of the action to which they are reactions.[2]

    If we apply this point to Craig’s analysis his argument falls down. Christians who condemn homosexual conduct do not cause people to engage in bare backing. In fact by condemning homosexual conduct they are explicitly telling them not to engage in it. If a person does it anyway, then they doing so in defiance of their will and hence without their consent consequently any negative consequences that follow are the responsibility of the “bare backer” not the person opposed to bare backing.

    I think the same line of argument addresses Craig’s second argument,

    And how could the blanket censorship of targeted adolescent gay HIV/AIDS prevention education not have resulted in a situation where there are young men who see nothing wrong in having unsafe sex- possibly because they’ve been isolated from metropolitan gay communities where they would have gotten that message?

    Putting to one side Young’s mistaken definition of censorship, here the same problem arises. The Christian expresses a volition that people not engage in homosexual behavior they believe that such behavior is wrong. Because they believe this they also refuse to help people engage in such conduct, that would make them complict in wrongdoing. A group of adolescents refuse to listen and do it anyway as a result they die. Craig suggests that this means that Christians are responsible for these deaths. This follows only if people are responsible for and culpable for the foreseeable actions of other people even when these other people are acting contrary to their expressed desire and as I argued above this is false.

    There is something even worse about this line of argument however: if it were true it would mean that any person can require me to assist them in any behavior they wish merely by threatening to do something worse if I do not. Such a principle essentially sanctions black mail and creates an obligation to collaborate in any wrong no matter how grave in response to a threat to a third party. Even worse, if the blackmailers carry out the threat they make us responsible what happens and not them. I can help but think this is a terrible distortion of ethical analysis

    I think it’s clear then that Craig’s analysis is mistaken. I will add a final note: Barebacking is an activity that occurs between consenting adults. Both parties agree to engage in causal unprotected anal sex. Now people like Craig have been arguing for some time that homosexual sex is permissible, precisely because it’s engaged in by consenting adults. Denials of this principle have been denounced by Craig’s news group Gaynz as bigoted, oppressive etc. Hence it’s hard to see how they can consistently oppose barebacking. Of course they may believe that barebackers need to be informed of the dangers of the practice. Such things as the fact that their partner is likely to have had hundreds of previous ones, that there are dangers associated with anal sex etc. The problem is that Craig and Gaynz have decried claims like this as false, as scaremongering etc. So I guess the question we need to put to Craig is this. If people who engage in same sex behavior are typically not promiscuous but enjoy relationships as stable as their heterosexual counterparts. If homosexual sex is not dangerous and there is nothing wrong with any sexual activity between consenting adults. What’s wrong with bare backing?

    Craig should stop being bigoted and be celebrating the sexual diversity that exists within his own community. The fact he is not celebrating shows that he cannot consistently live with the ideology he expounds.

    [1] Augustine, On Lying, 9.
    [2] Alan Donagan, “Moral Absolutism and the Double-Effect Exception: Reflections on Who Is Entitled to Double-Effect?” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 16 (1991): 498.

  • The Question of Islam

    An interesting discussion of Islam has been occurring at Kiwiblog. Up until now I have merely chipped in to correct inaccurate claims about Christian beliefs and practices. However, for what its worth I’ll add my two cents worth here.

    Here is what I think the issues are.

    We are familiar with Christian teachings on the morality of violence. The just war theory of Augustine, Aquinas, Gratian, Vitoria, Calvin, Luther and Grotius have been pretty much codified into international law and things like the Geneva accords. They are now at least held up as the correct rules ( even if they are not always followed in practice) by liberal democratic societies. We are also familiar with various other ideas which come from Christianity the idea that individuals have inalienable rights which the state cannot transgress. Those non believers should be tolerated. That Government should be limited. That Church and state are separate institutions with degrees of autonomy from each other. That the state should be concerned with the temporal welfare of its citizens and not their welfare in the life to come. While it’s fashionable for people to attribute to these things to the enlightenment, in reality, much of this in is found in Medieval Theology and even in earlier writers like the Church fathers. The basic premises of course come from the scriptures.

    Now when we confront Islam we confront (a) a religion we know less about (b) a religion which historically has threatened parts of Europe with invasion and hence has been feared and (c) whose high profile practitioners seem to have very different understandings of these things. Some of them appear to believe direct killing of non combatants is permissible and they seem to not respect the Geneva accords. They appear to have more absolute governments. Have clerics exercising vetoing legislation and they seem to threaten people with death if they don’t convert etc.

    I guess the question is this: does this historically feared tradition have the same moral teachings about these things Christianity does? And if it does not what does that mean for religious tolerance? How far can a religion disagree with our current consensus on these types of questions before tolerance is no longer acceptable? And finally, if we tolerate it and large numbers of the population embrace this religion how will that change the cultural values and assumptions which our liberal institutions are based on?

    I do not know the answers to these questions. but I think they need to be asked and debated. Not dismissed as Islamiphobia. I also think that the debate should be informed not a banding about of stereotypes and caricatures about either religion.

    This latter point requires emphasis. If we see the discussion as it occurs today one side dregs up stereotypes of Muslims and attempts to quote the Koran out of context without examining the tradition, critical commentaries that responsible study of this document requires. Another side dregs up stereotypes of Christians and argues they are the *real* problem and predictably do the same thing. They argue that the scriptures support rape, torturing heretics we are told. Any debate on the question of religious tolerance which relies on slander, ignorance and prejudice towards religious minorities scares me. The alternative to tolerance is supression; which involves violence. If it comes to that then lets make sure we have been informed enough to make the right decision.

    I would also add that these questions are not new. Medieval Theologians like Aquinas supported religious tolerance for Jews and Muslims but and not for Heretics. This is because he perceived heretics to threaten the institutions of society whereas other monotheistic minorities did not. Latter, John Locke suggested that religious dissenters (what Aquinas would have called Christian heretics) should be tolerated provided they did not challenge the moral values essential to a free and just society. Locke advocated suppressing Christian groups that taught contracts could not be kept with heretics because that would undermine the co-operation needed to maintain a free and just society. He also supported the suppression of atheists because he felt belief in a moral law giver was a necessary foundation for such a society. Some contemporary Gay rights advocates seem to believe we should not tolerate evangelical Christianity because opposing homosexual conduct inevitably incites violence. Or is opposed to certain understandings of equality which they think justice requires. Libertarians draw the line at aggression, because they believe freedom needs to be based on everyone refraining from the initiation of force.

    The irony of this, of course, is that many of defenders of one position view the others as being opposed to tolerance. As though tolerance did not come in degrees. Everyone is for tolerance of some religions and no one to my knowledge tolerates all religions. Because we have conducted the debate in this manner few people have been able to ask the real question : How far should tolerance extend?

    Aquinas’s question is still with us. When does error in Theology become serious enough for the state to step in?

  • Texan Justice and Liberal fiction

    Texas is about to perform it’s 400th execution since capital punishment was reinstated in 1982. Stuff has an interesting article on this entitled “Religion, Culture Behind, Texas Execution Tally”

    The article suggests that outsiders find it puzzling that evangelical Christians support capital punishment. This surprise, I suggest, reflects the theological and historical ignorance of these outsiders. Historically most Christian Theologians supported capital punishment as does mainstream historical Christian tradition. I suspect the reported puzzlement often comes from facile “if you oppose abortion you must oppose capital punishment” arguments which I have critiqued previously.

    Like many media accounts of religion and morality the article resorts to caricature

    Like his predecessor, Governor Perry is a devout Christian, highlighting one key factor in Texas’ enthusiasm for the death penalty that many outsiders find puzzling – the support it gets from conservative evangelical churches.
    This is in line with their emphasis on individuals taking responsibility for their own salvation, and they also find justification in scripture.
    “A lot of evangelical Protestants not only believe that capital punishment is permissible but that it is demanded by God. And they see sanction for that in the Old Testament especially,” said Matthew Wilson, a political scientist at Southern Methodist University in Dallas

    A lot could be said here. First there is a subtle reductio ad bushium hinted at in the first line. Second, note that when the journalist wants to gain an understanding of the scriptural and theological justification evangelicals rely on to defend capital punishment he turns not to an evangelical ethicist who supports the death penalty but to a political scientist.

    Third, what is said is questionable at best. In North America many evangelicals are dispensationalists and hence do not consider Old Testament moral norms to be binding on believers and so would not appeal to the Old Testament. Their scriptural justification is drawn from the New Testament particularly Romans 13.

    Third, contrary to what the article confidently asserts evangelicals do not believe people are responsible for their own salvation. Whether they are Arminians or a Calvinists evangelicals believe that salvation is given by grace. One cannot earn it through works and hence one is not responsible for it God is. What some Christian writers ( Kant and CS Lewis) have argued is that respect for human dignity requires that punishment be retributive as opposed to therapeutic or deterrent One is justified in depriving a criminal of his right to life or liberty by punishment only if he deserves it, he has by his own voluntary actions and done something he as a rational agent knows is wrong. To subject people to treatment without their consent or to punish one person for the future crimes of others is degrading. This argument may be mistaken. But the first step to refuting it is to actually understand it, not to attribute to evangelicals views they in fact reject.

    Not content with stereotyping and caricature. The article goes on to repeats the objection that that capital punishment is applied in a racist manner the article states.

    blacks more likely than whites to be condemned … Over 41 per cent of the inmates currently on death row in Texas are black, but they account for only about 12 per cent of the state’s population.

    Now there are several problems here:

    First, the while its true that blacks make up only 12 of the states population its also true that in the United states around 52% of all homicides are committed by Blacks. Hence the statistic provided is misleading at best and outright deceptive at worst. To asses whether capital punishment is applied in a discriminatory manner or not the issue is not the percentage of blacks executed relative to the number of blacks in society the issue is the percentage of blacks executed relative to the number who commit homicide.

    Second, this whole argument has been exploded by Ernest Van Der Haag in the Harvard Law Review Association ( 1983)

    Maldistribution of any punishment among those who deserves it is irrelevant to its justice or morality. Even if poor or black convicts guilty of capital offenses suffer capital punishment, and other convicts equally guilty of the same crimes do not, a more equal distribution, however desirable, would merely be more equal. It would not be more just to the convicts under sentence of death.

    Van Der Haag’s point is this: If capital punishment is just and those executed deserve to be executed then the fact that a disproportionate number of blacks are executed can not change this. To say otherwise is essentially to argue that because some people escape justice every one should.

    On the other hand if capital punishment is unjust and those executed do not deserve to die then applying capital punishment equally would not be an improvement. This is like arguing that all people should be treated unfairly because some are. The appeal to unequal distribution then is a red herring; the question is whether capital punishment is just.

    Of course none of this is surprising, to expect the media to accurately report the views of religious conservatives or actually give a competent treatment of a moral or ethical issue is asking to much. That might require getting people to actually hear reasoned theological dissent to the current liberal left orthodoxy.

  • Against Liberal Morality

    In debates over abortion, homosexual conduct, euthanasia, prostitution, drugs. Those who call themselves liberals often mount the same basic argument. A socially or morally permissive stance is necessitated towards such practices because people have a right to choose do what ever they like with their bodies. As Mill put it,

    The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. [1] [Emphasis added]

    Mill here draws a distinction between other-regarding actions, actions that harm other people and self-regarding actions, those that harm oneself. He argues that society, either by law or by social pressure, cannot justly regulate any action a person performs unless it is other-regarding; that is, it harms people other than the agent him/herself. As Mill’s position is typically interpreted harm is understood to be governed by the principle “volenti non fit injuria” (where there is consent there is no injury) and hence refers to things done to other people without their consent. On this interpretation, self-regarding actions are those that people consent to and that harm no non-consenting, third party. As Mill himself notes, a self-regarding action is that “which affects only himself, or affects others with their free and voluntary, and undeceived consent”.[2]

    Perhaps one of the more important counter-examples to this criterion is that of Gladiatorial Matches. Irving Kristol famously proposed this counter-example,

    [T]he plain fact is that none of us is a complete civil libertarian. We all believe that there is some point at which the public authorities ought to step in to limit the “self-expression” of an individual or group even where this might be seriously intended as a form of artistic expression, and even where the artistic transaction is between consenting adults. A playwright or theatrical director might, in this crazy world of ours, find someone willing to commit suicide on stage, as called for by the script. We would not allow that-any more than we would permit scenes of real physical torture on the stage, even if the victim were a willing masochist. And I know of no one, no matter how free in spirit, who argues that we ought to permit gladiatorial contests in Yankee stadium, similar to those once performed in the Coliseum of Rome-even if only consenting adults were involved.[3]

    Kristol notes several cases of unjust homicide, homicide that any person of common sense would condemn but where the victims all consent to be killed.

    In Harmless Wrongdoing Feinberg considers this as the most important and potentially-devastating counter-example and he spends considerable energy attempting to circumvent it. He offers three responses. Here I will argue that these responses fail.

    (a) Consent
    The first response is to question whether, in fact, such cases are really cases of consensual homicide. Feinberg suggests that Kristol is too complacent about “the problem of determining genuine ‘willingness’ and voluntary ‘consent’”.[4] He offers two lines of argument for this. Firstly, he notes that Kristol refers to such things happening in this “crazy world”. Feinberg states, “an agreement is hardly consensual if one of the parties is “crazy”. To exploit a crazy person in the way he describes is not distinguishable from murder”.[5]

    Feinberg is, of course, correct; people who are crazy in the sense of insane are not competent moral agents. However, it is doubtful that Kristol is, in fact, speaking of people who are crazy in the literal sense of the word. His reference is a colloquial comment on the kinds of depravity people will engage in if given the freedom to do so.[6]

    The second reason Feinberg offers is that if gladiatorial matches existed today one would need various mechanisms to ensure consent was actual; such licensing procedures would render the contests unobjectionable. Under the conditions necessary to discern consent, Feinberg suggests that both the contestants and the audience would agree to a set of rules that held that the contest must stop once one fighter has clearly gained his or her dominance.

    This response is inadequate. It is unclear why contestants would agree to these provisions. Why, for example, could they not agree to a free for all or a fight to the death? Arneson notes, “Feinberg has projected a bit of his own nice character onto the world at large” and correctly adds “Feinberg’s liberal principles non-tendentiously applied would hold that we ought to let the free market decide how horrific or bloody the contests should become”.[7]

    Moreover, Arneson adds that even if the contestants and audience did agree to such rules, it is hard to see why the practice would then become unobjectionable.

    Feinberg’s response contains the disturbing suggestion that a state-regulated version of Kristol’s gory spectacles would be acceptable to the liberal … so long as some analogue of the Marquis of Queensberry rules is enforced (no bludgeoning your opponent when he is down; no slashing below the belt; no disembowelling your opponent once he surrenders), commercial combat with lethal weapons should in principle be tolerated by a liberal society. Many would consider this a reductio of the liberal position.[8]

    At one point in the discussion, Feinberg appears aware that it is a stretch to suggest that such matches could not be consensual.

    There could be a presumption that such a person doesn’t fully understand what he is doing, or is not fully free of neurotic influences on his choice, but these hypotheses are rebuttable in principle, and in some cases that we can easily imagine, only with minor difficulty and expense rebuttable in fact. The liberals second and third responses then are the more pertinent ones.[9]

    It is to these I now turn.

    (b) Harm to Third Parties
    Feinberg’s second attempt to circumvent Kristol’s counter-example is to argue that this case would inevitably involve harm to non-consenting, third parties. Reflecting upon the audience in a gladiatorial match Feinberg suggests,

    We cannot hold an image of these wretches in our minds without recoiling, for each of them alone will seem threatening or dangerous, and thousands or millions of them together will be downright terrifying. … When the bloody maiming and slaughtering of a human being is considered so thrilling and enjoyable that thousands will pay dearly to witness it, it would seem to follow that thousands are already so brutalized that there is a clear and present danger that some innocent parties (identities now unknown) will suffer at their hands.[10][Emphasis original]

    Like the former, this response is inadequate. First, the claim that such an activity will lead to the deaths of innocent, third parties is an empirical one. Feinberg simply asserts that it is correct but offers no evidence to prove this. In the absence of such evidence, the claim is speculative.

    A second problem reinforces this. The people killed in gladiatorial matches consent to the fight; the innocent third parties Feinberg mentions do not. In order for enthusiasm for death and killing in a gladiatorial match to spill over into the killing of innocents, fans of such matches must be unable to distinguish between consensual and non-consensual killing so that they are unable to limit their enthusiasm for one without endorsing the other.

    This assumption is implausible. For example, permitting people to engage in and enjoy consensual sodomy does not necessarily mean that those people will engage in sodomous rape. Allowing the consensual use of drugs will not mean that all drug users will then coerce others into drug use. Allowing people to watch pornography would not result in all people forcing others to have sex. Perhaps, even closer to the issue under discussion, allowing people to watch boxing matches does not appear to lead them to inevitably engage in assault. Why then should allowing people to watch consensual homicide lead them to engage in non-consensual homicide?

    (c) Bloated Mouse
    The final response Feinberg proposes is that these counter-examples are what he calls “a bloated mouse”.[11] He concedes that in cases like these we do have a case of unjust homicide that is consensual. However, he suggests cases like this are hypothetical, “[t]here seems little likelihood that they will ever occur, at least in the foreseeable future”.[12]

    It is worth noting that Feinberg again relies upon an unsubstantiated, empirical claim. He asserts, without any reason, that gladiator matches are unlikely to occur at all in the foreseeable future but why think this? Dueling to the death was practiced for centuries. People clearly have been willing to engage in such activities and did so for many years. Moreover, it is also plausible that people would choose to watch such spectacles, even ordinary people. Public executions were popular as late as the nineteenth century, suggesting that people are willing, if allowed, to watch real death and violence. The practice of the circuses in a civilised culture such as Rome shows the appeal of watching such spectacles. There appears no reason for thinking that such an activity is unlikely to occur at all given the history of the human race.

    Interestingly, Feinberg admits this elsewhere in his monograph. In a footnote he notes that the example of gladiatorial contests is no worse and in some respects better, than some forms of commercial brawling that exist in the U.S. He then cites disapprovingly the examples of “tough guy” contests where people fight bar-room brawls with no holds barred, no rules and often on racial lines. The sources he quotes note that such contests are popular, “the newest rage in spectator entertainment”.[13] It is hard to understand then why Feinberg thinks that such things are unlikely to occur in the future.

    ***

    It seems then the Feinberg fails to escape the counter example proposed by Kristol. Liberal Morality provides no basis for condemning blood sports and Gladiator matches and as such it is inadequate.

    [1] John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: Penguin Classics, 1985), 69.
    [2] Ibid. 71.
    [3] Irving Kristol “Pornography, Obscenity and the Case for Censorship” New York Times Magazine March 28 1971.
    [4] Feinberg Harmless Wrong Doing: Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. 4. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 127
    [5] Ibid. 130.
    [6] This highlights another feature of Feinberg’s discussion. Feinberg appears to find it difficult to accept that a sane person would ever choose to engage in the depraved activities outlined in various counter examples. However, if one believes that human beings are capable of evil then much of what he says is implausible.
    [7] Arneson “Liberalism, Freedom and Community” 373, 374.
    [8] Ibid. 374.
    [9] Feinberg Harmless Wrong Doing: 130.
    [10] Ibid. 131.
    [11] Ibid. 130.
    [12] Ibid.
    [13] Ibid. 353.

  • Abortion and Capital Punishment: No Contradiction

    This blog post has been published in Think: A Journal of the Royal Institute for Philosophy 6 (2008) 87-92, which is a journal of Cambridge University.

    One argument I frequently hear is that opposition to feticide, the killing of a human fetus, is inconsistent with support for capital punishment. Some times this argument is pushed even further. It’s alleged that this inconsistency shows that what really motivates opponents of feticide is not opposition to killing, but good old fashioned misogyny. An example of this argument is Beverly Wildung Harrison. Harrison notes that, that zeal “for capital punishment more often than not thrives amongst legislators most eager to prevent all abortion”.[1] She infers from this,

    Nothing makes clearer how little women count as full, valued persons or as competent moral agents than this dramatic ideological inconsistency on the part of so many anti-abortion advocates.[2]

    Harrison is referring to contemporary legislators in the United States, many of whom are motivated by traditional, theological objections to feticide. However, what she says would apply with equal force to the many notable Theologians, such as Aquinas, Augustine, Calvin who in addition to condemning feticide, permitted and supported capital punishment in many contexts.

    Harrison makes two points regarding this stance. Firstly, that support for capital punishment is inconsistent with opposition to abortion. Secondly, the fact that a person expresses such inconsistency is clear evidence that he or she believes that women do not “count as full, valued persons or as competent moral agents”; essentially, such people are really motivated by misogyny. I will examine each of these in turn.

    Harrison contends that affirming that (a) judicial execution of a murderer is lawful and that (b) feticide is unlawful is inconsistent. To hold both (a) and (b) is to affirm a contradiction. However, this is simply incorrect. A contradiction occurs when two propositions are affirmed and one of them is the negation of the other. This is not the case with the two propositions mentioned above. The negation of (a) is the claim that it is not the case that judicial execution is just; (b) does not affirm this. It affirms quite a different proposition about the lawfulness of feticide. Similarly, the negation of (b) is the claim that it is not the case that feticide is unlawful. However, (a) does not affirm that feticide is unlawful. It makes no comment about feticide whatsoever. The affirmation of (a) and (b) is not a contradiction.

    Perhaps what Harrison has in mind is that these propositions are either formally or implicitly contradictory.[3] The former occurs when two propositions are affirmed, though, in and of themselves, they are inconsistent, such that a contradiction can be deduced from them using only the rules of first order logic. The latter occurs when a contradiction can be deduced from the propositions when they are conjoined with another proposition that asserts a necessary truth.

    If this is, in fact, what Harrison has in mind, then we need an argument to this effect. Take the claim that (a) and (b) are a formal contradiction. If this is to be more than just an unwarranted assertion then those who, like Harrison, make this claim must demonstrate that the derivation can be done. Yet nowhere in her book is such a deduction even attempted.
    The idea that (a) and (b) are an implicit contradiction can be dealt with in the same way. If this claim is warranted then we require an argument that spells out what the necessarily true proposition in question is and how this proposition conjoined with (a) and (b) entails a contradiction.

    What would such a proposition be? Harrison provides us with none. Perhaps what Harrison has in mind is something like the following. Christian theologians who oppose feticide do so because they believe it is unlawful to kill a person and capital punishment clearly violates this.[4]

    Now I agree that if this were the basis on which a given theologian opposed feticide then support for capital punishment would be inconsistent with it. However, most theologians who historically did not oppose feticide on this ground feticide was judged wrong not merely because it is homicide. As the casuistry makes clear, many theologians held that killing was justified if done as defence or as a just retribution. Hence, they understood the law of God to forbid as homicide, killing that is aggressive where the victim is innocent. It is perfectly consistent to oppose feticide and not capital punishment as capital punishment kills people who are not innocent whereas feticide does not.

    Of course, someone could argue that these theologians were mistaken in their understanding of the law of God and that it, in reality, prohibits all forms of homicide. This would require detailed argument addressing the hermeneutical and ethical arguments involved and Harrison has not even begun to attempt this. Moreover, even if she had provided compelling arguments for this claim it would not show these theologians to be inconsistent, rather it would show that one of a series of consistent propositions they hold is false.

    There is a further point worth mentioning here. If a theologian opposed feticide because he or she believed it was unlawful to kill a person, then what would be problematic is not their opposition to feticide but their support of capital punishment. The correct conclusion would be to argue that both abortion and capital punishment are wrong. The inconsistency is not in their stance towards women who have abortions, but in their stance towards states that execute criminals.

    ***

    Harrison’s contention, then, that those who oppose feticide and support capital punishment are inconsistent is unwarranted. However, even if this were the case, which it is not, it does not follow that the person who held such a view hates women. All it shows is that one of the two propositions is false. Harrison here appears to assume that anyone who holds to an inconsistent set of propositions denies that women “count as full, valued persons or as competent moral agents”. This is hard to take seriously. As will be seen below, Harrison herself affirms inconsistent propositions. Are we to conclude that she hates women?

    In fact, not only would a successful charge of inconsistency not entail that opponents of feticide were misogynist, it would not even entail that they were mistaken in opposing feticide. All it would demonstrate was that one of the propositions held, either the one affirming the permissibility of capital punishment or the one denying the lawfulness of feticide, is false. It does not provide any grounds for asserting which of these propositions is mistaken. All the charge does is show opponents of feticide that they need to make modifications to their belief structure. It does not entail that they must give up their position on feticide.

    It also should be noted that even if Harrison were correct, that inconsistency meant that one had a misogynist view of women, it still would not follow that feticide is permissible. All it would show was that the opponent of feticide hates women. A person can love women and have false beliefs and a person can hate women and have true beliefs. Here, as elsewhere, Harrison confuses attacking the characters of those who disagree with her with actually rebutting their positions.

    Ironically, Harrison’s own position is inconsistent. Harrison herself rejects both propositions mentioned. She believes that feticide is permissible and opposes capital punishment. This creates a serious problem with her objection. Two propositions are contradictory only if one entails the negation (or rejection) of the other. It follows from this that they will have opposite truth-values; one will be true and the other false. If Harrison believes that capital punishment is unjust and believes that believing the contrary is inconsistent with opposition to feticide then it follows that feticide is wrong.

    Further, a little reflection suggests that this inconsistency would afflict Harrison even if she did support capital punishment. Her argument is that because opposition to feticide is inconsistent with the stance many opponents of feticide take toward capital punishment, opposition to feticide is problematic. However, if these stances are inconsistent (which is what the objector must believe) then the position of many supporters of feticide is equally inconsistent with their stance against capital punishment. The same reasoning that suggests that opponents of feticide should drop such opposition suggests that supporters should drop their support.

    Harrison’s argument is defective in numerous ways. It postulates contradiction where there is none and infers via a non sequitur an irrelevant conclusion that does not negate the proposition she is attacking. Moreover, her argument is incoherent and entails, if it were sound, that she should abandon her own position.

    [1] Beverly Wildung Harrison, Our Right to Choose: Toward a New Ethic of Abortion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), 35.
    [2] Harrison, Our Right to Choose, 35.
    [3] In this discussion of formal and implicit contradictions I am influenced by Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co, 1974) 14-16.
    [4] This argument was suggested to me in private correspondence.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Is Abortion Liberal? Part 1
    Is Abortion Liberal? Part 2
    Sentience Part 1
    Sentience Part 2
    Viability
    Abortion and Child Abuse
    Abortion and Brain Death: A Response to Farrar
    During, Sherwin & Hutchison on Backstreet Abortion
    Imposing Your Beliefs onto Others: A Defence
    Boonin’s Defense of the Sentience Criterion: A Critique Part I
    Boonin’s Defense of the Sentience Criterion: A Critique Part II

  • Some Questions for Dr. Michael Cullen

    I saw Dr. Michael Cullen speaking in on TV3 last night. What he said was interesting because it highlights a tension I have often noted in liberal views of sexual morality . The issue was as follows: A school had hired a teacher. This teacher however had advertised on an internet adult site for a woman to have sex with him. He requested the women be 17 or adding that the younger the student was the better. His partner apparently consented to him doing this and offered to join in, apparently one of them “liked to watch”.

    Now Cullen stated that he wanted to tighten up regulations so Schools could dismiss teachers like this. He stated it was unacceptable that a person like this should be teaching teenage girls. He seemed to take this latter claim as obvious and there was no apparent disagreement from anyone in the clip.

    Let’s be clear what Cullen is saying here. He is suggesting that it should be permissible to refuse to employ someone on the basis of private sexual behaviour they engage in with other consenting adults (under NZ’s laws a 17 year old is not considered a minor when it comes to sex and hence is a consenting adult). Moreover, he is also suggesting that a person’s private consensual sexual behaviour can be grounds for considering them unfit to teach at public schools. Moreover Cullen appeared to think this was obvious and certainly no one appeared to disagree in this instance.

    If this is so the question I have for Cullen and the Labour party is this. If you believe this, why have you repeatedly stated the opposite in the past? This is the party whose activists have repeatedly stated that it’s wrong to discriminate against people on the basis of their private consensual behaviour.

    I also have another question. Suppose this teacher had instead of advertising for a member of the opposite sex on a website he had been cruising for causal sex with another man in a local gay bar. Would Cullen say this person was unfit to teach teenage children? Suppose he had advertised for causal in Express magazine? Would that be grounds to discriminate against him and to claim he is unfit to teach at public schools?

    I suspect I know the answer to this question. If a person were to make this argument about a homosexual teacher Cullen and his supporters would denounce the person as a bigot and an intolerant homophobe. No doubt the person would be compared to the Nazis and to the Taliban (as though somehow saying that a person is unfit to teach at a school is the same as engaging in mass murder and genocide).

    But this raises an obvious question; If it’s obvious that a heterosexual male is unfit to teach because he advertises for sex on the net. Why is a homosexual male who advertises for causal sex in a Gay bar or on the pages of express not also unfit? In both cases the sex is consensual in private. The only difference is the gender of his partner. I thought Labour believed it was wrong to treat same sex relationships differently to heterosexual ones?

    If we are to believe what Labours activists have told us then either one of two things is true either (a) Cullen is a pro Taliban Nazi bigot or (b) much of what Labour has told us about consenting sex in private is false and much of the character assassination it has dished out to Conservatives is unjustified. Which is it?

    A rational person should not prescribe a principle unless he is willing to also prescribe the logical implications of that principle. If you prescribe a rule but are unable to accept its implications because you find them intuitively absurd then you have good grounds for rejecting the rule. No amount of denouncing others as bigots can change this fact.

    The claim that its wrong to discriminate against people on the basis of their private consensual sexual activities has counter intuitive implications. Hence in the absence of compelling arguments for this claim it should be rejected.

  • Jim Flynn’s suggestion: Contraception and Religious Freedom

    When I was teaching the history of early modern philosophy at Otago last year, one of my students told me I reminded them of Dr Jim Flynn. This was supposed to be a compliment. Flynn was highly regarded at Otago even those who considered themselves conservatives had good things to say about Flynn. I knew him by reputation only, having never had the privilege of meeting him. I did however learn one thing about Flynn during my stint at Otago: he is a left wing activist who is militantly secular.

    Recently Flynn has attracted negative attention for these comments.

    “I do have faith in science, and science may give us something that renders conception impossible unless you take an antidote,”

    “You could of course have a chemical in the water supply and have to take an antidote. If you had contraception made easier by progress, then every child is a wanted child.”

    Flynn here seems to view a situation where contraception was placed in the water supply an example of progress. Many have interpreted this to mean that Dr Flynn believes that the government should put contraceptive in the water supply? Flynn has claimed this is a misrepresentation of his comments.

    Dr Flynn told the Otago Daily Times he was merely trying to illustrate a point,
    not seriously suggesting contraception in the water supply. Considering the opposition to fluoride in the water, such a scheme would never go ahead, he said.
    But to have a contraception device that meant women had to take action to get pregnant instead of having to take a pill not to get pregnant, “would be wonderful”. “It doesn’t seem to me too controversial at all.”

    What really bothers me in this quote is that Flynn only states that such a policy is politically unfeasible. He does not appear to think it is unjust or violates people’s rights. I think this fact illustrates something important about the political culture in which we live.

    First let me state why I believe a policy of putting contraceptives in the water supply is unjust. It violates a persons freedom of religion. Let me explain: As a Christian Theist I believe that every person has a sacred responsibility to carefully consider ones conscience and act in accord with what one considers to be Gods will. The existence of this responsibility entails a freedom or right to carry it out. Now according to Roman Catholic teaching artificial contraception is a mortal sin which violates natural law. While this teaching is popularly associated with Catholicism Catholics are not alone in believing it, many of the Protestant Reformers also held this view, and many Protestants still do. Now I happen to disagree with them. I do not think contraception violates the law of God. However, I do acknowledge that these people believe sincerely that God commands this and because of this they have a right to refrain from using contraception if they choose. They have right not just to opt out of contraceptive practises but to not opt in in the first place.

    Now, there is an obvious objection to this argument: freedom of religion is a only prima facie right. Consider Sati a Hindu practise whereby a wife is burnt alive at her husband’s cremation. This practise was justly suppressed by the British in India. This however shows that freedom of religion is only a prima facie right and it can be overridden by other more weighty principles such as “do not kill innocent human beings”.

    But this is precisely where I see the battle lines being drawn in contemporary culture. While there is a broad consensus that there exists a prima facie right to freedom of religion. There is no consensus on when is it appropriate to override this prima facie right? Are you permitted to do so only when the religion advocates engaging in a seriously immoral action like homicide? Or is the promotion of social utility sufficient to override it? To make things specific: If it is good that every child be a wanted child is this good of sufficient weight to override the prima facie right to freedom of religion?

    This brings me to a crucial point: How one answer’s this question in fact depends on the theological perspective one adopts.

    Suppose one believes that belief in God is irrational on par with belief in Santa Claus or the tooth fairy and those traditional views about sexuality and procreation are simply homophobic misogynist bigotry. Suppose one is also a secular utilitarian and believes our duties consist not of following commands but of doing whatever maximises net utility. Then one is not going to grant the freedom to follow what one believes God commands a huge amount of weight in ones reasoning. Suppose a person stated that he was opposed to a utility maximising policy because he thought Santa Claus had informed him that Aryans’ were the superior race and this policy prevented him and his community living in accord with that belief. How many people would cease to support the policy? Most I think would be unmoved.

    On the other hand suppose one believes that God exists, that he issues commands to human beings that constitute our moral duties and that God holds people accountable for how well they discharge these duties. Then one will grant the freedom to act in accord with what believes to be Gods will much higher weight. Moreover, seeing one sees morality as “a set of rules or precepts of conduct, constituting a divine law”[1] one will not find utilitarian justifications of social policy plausible.

    Returning to the policy of putting contraception in the water supply from the perspective of some secular leftists there is nothing unjust about this policy. True the policy violates freedom of religion if that freedom is understood in Christian context. However, if we remove this right from this context and replace it with a secular context freedom of religion can be re-contextualised. Re-contextualised in a manner where Roman Catholicism does not fall under it. And where the freedom to be an evangelical protestant is viewed the same way current society views a Nazis freedom to be a Nazi something begrudging deferred to when the matter is not to serious, but easily overridden by important social policy.

    [1] Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 6.