Category: Conferences

  • Thinking Matters Talk: Does Morality Need God? Part Three:


    This year the New Zealand apologetics organization Thinking Matters ran a “Confident Christianity Conference” in Auckland. I was asked to speak at this conference on the topic. Does Morality Need God? Below is a slightly streamlined version of the talk I gave.

    This brings me to my second contention: If God exists, a divine command theory would provide a coherent account of our fundamental assumptions about moral requirements.

    I outlined four assumptions about the kind of requirements morality imposes upon us. These were

    1. Inescapability: moral requirements apply to us irrespective of whether following them contributes to any ends or aims we currently desire.
    2. Impartiality: moral requirements are justified from an impartial perspective.
    3. Authority: agents always have conclusive reasons to do what is morally required and never have sufficiently good reasons for doing what is morally wrong.
    4. Accountability: if something is morally required, we are guilty and liable to blame if we fail to do it and lack an adequate excuse.  

    I will make three points.

    First, If God exists, the assumption that wrongness is identical to the property of being contrary to God’s command would coherently account for all these assumptions. Consider the fact that moral requirements are “inescapable.” If God commands someone to do something, this command is addressed to them, regardless of whether it contributes to any ends or aims they currently desire. So, the imperative in question is inescapable.  Similarly, consider the impartiality of moral requirements. God is an all-powerful, all-knowing, essentially benevolent, and impartial agent. So what God commands is co-extensive with prescriptions that a benevolent, impartial person who was fully informed and reasoning correctly would endorse.  A command is also a paradigmatic example of a prescription that involves a demand for which we hold people accountable through standard practices such as blaming. That is how a command differs from other prescriptions, such as a piece of advice or a suggestion. So, if the property of being morally required is identical to the property of being commanded by God,  we would expect it to be true that we are accountable to moral requirements.

    Second, if God exists, the thesis that wrongness is identical to the property of being contrary to God’s command would vindicate the assumption that it is always in our long-term self-interest to follow impartial demands. A divine command theory entails that moral requirements are what we are accountable to God for doing. Unlike human beings, God’s commands are co-extensive with what is demanded from an impartial point of view, and people can never violate these norms secretly without being detected.  

    Third,  all attempts to refute a divine command theory have failed. It’s widely claimed that divine command theories were refuted by an argument called “The Euthyphro Objection.” This objection is named after a dialogue written by the ancient Greek philosopher Plato in the 4th century BC. Plato’s original argument is somewhat obscure and applied only to polytheistic religions (those religions that believe in many gods). However, the version used by philosophers today is an adaptation of Plato’s argument for use against monotheistic faiths. Critics of divine command theories appeal to three arguments loosely associated with Plato’s dialogue. These are (1) the anything goes objection, (2) the arbitrariness objection, and (3) the vacuity objection. I will address each of these briefly in turn.

    The Anything Goes Objection

    One objection is that a divine command theory makes morality arbitrary because anything at all could be right or wrong. King and Garcia explain the alleged problem in this way:

    [Divine command theory] implies that it is possible for any kind of action, such as rape, not to be wrong. But it seems intuitively impossible for rape not to be wrong. So [Divine command theory] is at odds with our common-sense intuitions about rape.[1]

    This objection assumes it is possible for God to command rape. Divine command theorists contest this assumption. They do not contend that moral requirements depend on the commands of just anyone. They base moral obligations on the commands of God conceived in a particular way. God is an all-powerful, all-knowing, essentially loving, just, immaterial person who created the universe on their conception. Given this, the claim that God could command people to perform a horrendous act like rape holds only if it’s possible for an all-knowing, loving, and impartial person to command rape. This is unlikely. The reason critics use examples like rape is that they view them as actions that no virtuous person could ever knowingly entertain. However, suppose, for the sake of argument, it is possible for a just and loving, omniscient person to command rape. Rape would only be commanded in situations where a just and loving person, aware of all the relevant facts, could endorse it– and under these circumstances, it’s hard to see how one could take for granted it was morally wrong.

     Arbitrariness

    A pervasive objection is that divine command theories make morality arbitrary because that nothing is right or wrong prior to God’s command; God can have no reasons for issuing one set of commands instead of another. Oppy explains the objection.

    Could it have been, for example, that murder, rape, lying, stealing, and cheating were good because God proclaimed them so? Surely not! But what could explain God’s inability to bring it about that murder, rape, lying, stealing and cheating are good by proclaiming them so, other than its being the case that murder, rape, lying, stealing, and cheating are wrong quite apart from any proclamations that God might make?[2]

    However, this is implausible. Suppose God has character traits such as being essentially loving and impartial. In that case, God can and would have reasons for prohibiting actions like rape, murder, or cheating, quite apart from whether these actions are antecedently wrong. Antecedent to any command on God’s part, these actions won’t have the property of being morally prohibited. But they could still have other properties such as being cruel or harmful or unjust or detrimental to human happiness— or being expressions of hatred, for example. And a loving and impartial God could prohibit these actions because these actions have these non-moral properties.

    Divine command theories do not entail that morality is arbitrary. If anything, the opposite is the case. A divine command theory entails that actions will be wrong in virtue of certain non-moral properties those actions have. Non-moral properties would provide an informed, loving, and impartial person with reasons to prohibit those actions.

     Vacuity Objection

    A third objection is that divine command theories entail that the doctrine of the goodness of God is rendered vacuous. Someone can only be morally perfect if he has duties and acts in accordance with them. But, seeing God does not issue commands to himself, a divine command theory entails that God has no obligations. Consequently, God cannot be God.

    This objection assumes that God’s goodness should be explicated in terms of God faithfully discharging his duties. But there is no reason why we must understand God’s goodness in this way. In Christian creeds like the Westminster Confession, God’s goodness is understood as possessing certain character traits, such as being loving, impartial gracious, merciful, long-suffering, truthful, forgiving, etc. If God’s commanding an action makes it required, God cannot have an obligation to do these things; that does not mean God does not do them. God does not have to have a duty to do something in order to do it.

    To recap: unless we assume that prudential and impartial commands never conflict, we cannot account for our fundamental intuitions about morality. Second, secular accounts of the kind of accountability we have to morality undermine this assumption. Fourth, a divine command theory would, if true, both vindicate this assumption and coherently account for our fundamental assumptions about morality.  Finally, standard objections against a divine command theory fail. The conclusion is this. If we assume God exists, a divine command theory can coherently and defensibly account for these fundamental assumptions in a way a secular theory cannot.


    [1] Nathan L King, “Introduction”, in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 11.

    [2]  Graham. Oppy, Best Argument against God (Hampshire: Palgrave Pivot, 2014), 44.

  • Evil, limited, and Indifferent deities: The Horrendous Deeds Objection Redivivus?

    Last week, I was scheduled to present the above paper at the Annual Meeting of the Evangelical Philosophical Society at Fort Worth, Texas. Unfortunately, Auckland’s lockdown prevented this, and the paper had to be cancelled due to the logistics involved. I did, however, pre-record the talk, so it is available below:

    Abstract: A common objection to divine command meta-ethics (‘DCM’) is the horrendous deeds objection. Critics object that if DCM is true, anything at all could be right, no matter how abhorrent or horrendous. Defenders of DCM have responded by contending that God is essentially good: God has certain character traits essentially, such as being loving and just. A person with these character traits cannot command just anything. 

    Recently, Jason Thibodeau[1] has offered a new version of the horrendous deed’s objection. Thibodeau, asks us to imagine the existence of Yod, a being just like God, who lacks omnibenevolence. Thibodeau argues that if God’s commands can ground morality so can Yod’s and Yod can command horrendous deeds. In this paper I examine and refute Thibodeau’s argument. I look at three interpretations of Thibodeau’s of objection (a) the objection from God’s moral grounding power, (b) the objection from evil and indifferent deities, and (c) the objection from lesser deities. I will maintain all of them fail.

    Appeals to moral-grounding power, malevolent, indifferent, or lesser benevolent deities, do not salvage the horrendous deeds objection.

     



    [1] Thibodeau, J. (2019). God’s love is irrelevant to the Euthyphro problem. Sophia, 58(3), 437–453.

  • Abortion Hard Cases and Self Defence: Presentation

    This is the paper I presented to the Bioethics section of the  Evangelical Theological Society, annual meeting. In November last year.

    Abstract:Op ponents of abortion often agonise over two difficult cases. (a) Cases where the pregnancy originates in rape and (b) cases the pregnancy or threatens the life of the mother. This paper will explore one attempt to deal with such cases; that proposed by Alan Donagan. According to Donagan, abortion is usually the unlawful killing of an innocent human being. However, when the pregnancy is either the result of rape or threatens the mother’s life, the fetus is a material aggressor and can be lawfully killed in self-defence.

    My argument will proceed in three stages. Part I explains and defends Donagan’s critique of Judith Jarvis Thomson’s famous ‘violinist argument’ for abortion rights. Part II looks at an implication of Donagan’s critique: when pregnancy threatens the mother’s life or originates in rape, abortion is justified as a form of self-defence. I defend this implication against three objections. (i) The innocence of the fetus (ii) the passivity of the fetus (iii) the problem of proportionality. In part III, I argue that Donagan’s approach has advantages over rival approaches to these questions such as the “lesser evils” approach  suggested by Beckwith and appeals to the doctrine of double effect. 

  • The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory: Presentation

    Last year, I presented a talk entitled “The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory: Another Reply to Erik Wielenberg” to the New Zealand Association of Philosophers conference in Auckland. This was a follow up to interaction I have had with the work of Erik Wielenberg.

    In 2017 I wrote a critical response to Wielenberg’s book Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism. Some, of my criticisms, were discussed in the dialogue between William Lane Craig and Erik Wielenberg at  North Carolina State University in 2018 which was subsequently published by Routledge . Wielenberg has since responded to these criticisms. The talk at the NZAP was my thoughts on his latest paper.

    Over 2020, I have revised the substance of this talk substantially, and a version of the paper will be published in The European Journal for Philosophy of Religion next year. In November has the opportunity to present the revised paper at the annual meeting of the Evangelical Philosophical Society, which was held online in November. Below is a video of that paper.

    Abstract: Recently, Erik Wielenberg has developed a novel objection to divine command metaethics (DCM). The objection is that DCM “has the implausible implication that psychopaths have no moral obligations and hence their evil acts, no matter how evil, are morally permissible”. This article criticizes Wielenberg’s argument. Section 1 expounds Wielenberg’s new “psychopath argument” in the context of the recent debate over the Reasonable Nonbelievers Objection. Section 2 discusses two ambiguities in the argument: in particular, Wielenberg’s formulation is ambiguous as to whether Wielenberg uses the word “obligation” in an objective or subjective sense. Section 3 argues that this ambiguity undercuts the argument. If Wielenberg is using the word obligation in a subjective sense, his arguments do not show that psychopaths “have no moral obligations”. By contrast, if Wielenberg is using the word obligation in an objective sense, his arguments do not show that divine command theorists are committed to denying that psychopaths have obligations.

  • Religious Studies Scholarships and the NZAPT

    Those who follow me on Facebook will know that two years ago I began teaching Philosophy and Theology full time at St Peters College one of New Zealand’s largest Catholic high schools.

    Only a handful of schools teach Philosophy in New Zealand and while it has official subject recognition one cannot gain any credits for Philosophy under the National Certificate of Educational Achievement (NCEA).  NCEA does allow credits for Religious Studies which in the secondary sector involves a mix of religious history, ethics, theology/philosophy of religion, and hermeneutics. However, Religious studies have not been treated as a very rigorous subject in the secondary sector, and so far it is mostly Catholic schools which have taken it up as a subject.

    It has been a very challenging couple of years as I have been getting my head around how Philosophy and Theology are taught or can be taught, in the secondary sector. Trying to balance my own very high standards for Theological and Philosophical scholarship with the practicalities on the ground in the education sector. The challenges in doing this are unique and require quite a bit of wisdom and creativity to pull off well. I can’t say I have always been successful in doing so.

    It’s been an encouraging week for me in this regard.  I spent two days in Wellington this week. I was holed up in the Ministry of Education buildings a stone throw away from the beehive and parliament attending the New Zealand Association of Philosophy Teachers. (NZAPT)  annual conference.  At the NZAPT several other philosophy teachers and I spent several hours dialoguing with policymakers in Wellington about the importance of teaching philosophy in the secondary sector. We had presentations from people in the ministry and even some Members of parliament come and discuss the subject with us. Whether anything will come of this remains unclear, but with the new Government initiating a review into NCEA and the assessment system being up in the air at the moment it certainly is starting to get on the radar.

    Of course, there are still lots of questions; it was unclear from the meeting over precisely what teaching philosophy involved. Is it just a pedagogy involving Socratic questioning and inquiry learning or should the subject be taught more formally, do you introduce it as a kind of foundational sub-discipline for other subjects, i.e. philosophy of science for science? Philosophy of law for legal studies, classical philosophy in classics. Alternatively, introduce a new subject on the already proliferating curriculum, and some real questions came out of the conference around the teaching of political philosophy and the danger of it becoming activism.  These were all things we discussed and debated amongst ourselves at the conference

    To cap this all off on Thursday the New Zealand Qualifications Authority (NZQA) announced that Religious Studies would be included as a scholarship subject in 2020.  Scholarship exams are the highest level of academic assessment in New Zealand secondary schools. Only 3% of all students gain a scholarship and its only available in subjects which are considered to meet a high level of rigour specifically the criteria is:

    • significant numbers of candidates have shown the ability to perform with excellence at level 3
    • there are writers and markers available of sufficient calibre and experience in this subject to produce a quality assessment for students at the appropriate level
    • there is an appropriate tertiary path for Scholarship students in this subject
    • the subject has the capacity to permit students to exhibit the high-level cognitive abilities for the credibility of the Scholarship examination

    The New Zealand Association of Religious Studies Teachers, an association of which I am a member has been pressing for the Ministry of education to consider allowing Religious Studies to be made a Scholarship subject, a move that will require increasing the rigour of teaching and assessment in this subject substantially.  My name was one of several put forward as evidence that there is now in the secondary sector “writers and markers available of sufficient calibre and experience in this subject to produce a quality assessment for students at the appropriate level”. On Thursday NZQA announced on Thursday they now consider Religious Studies to have matured enough at the high school level to meet this criterion. Religious Studies is now on the radar and a serious academic subject available in New Zealand schools, hopefully, Philosophy is not too far around the corner.

  • Reflections on Annihilationism, Traditionalism and the Problem of Hell

    Last year I gave a paper entitled “Reflections on Annihilationism, Traditionalism and the Problem of Hell’ at the Rethinking Hell conference in Auckland.  This talk is now available online.

  • The Challenge of Moral Relativism: Arguments for Relativism

    This post is based on a series of talks I have given on moral relativism. In my last post, I looked at what relativism and objectivism are. Here I examine some common reasons people accept or defend relativism I will offer critical commentary on these arguments.

    When examining any position in philosophy it is important to understand what motivates people to hold it, why do people find it plausible? Two reasons are commonly cited.

    1. The Argument from Cultural Diversity

    One common motivation for relativism, particularly cultural relativism, is the observation that different societies have different moral beliefs.  To use a well-known example: people in 14th century Europe believed witchcraft was seriously immoral and executed witches. People in 21st century New Zealand doesn’t believe this. Some societies endorse polygamy others endorse monogamy.   Facts like these are held to cast doubt on the idea there is a single true morality relativism-1independent of what society thinks.

     Response to the argument from cultural diversity.

    Objectivists make several responses to this argument.

     Distinguishing Separate idea’s.

    First, they argue that this argument conflates two separate ideas.  (a) the idea that beliefs about what is right and wrong differ from society to society. And  (b) that idea that what really is right, and wrong differs from society.  The fact different societies have different moral beliefs provides evidence for the first of these ideas. It establishes (a).  However, cultural relativism affirms something stronger than this. Relativists believe moral standards are correct or incorrect relative to society.  Cultural Relativists contend an action is wrong for a person because their society condemns that action.  Hence, they affirm (b).

    However, that the fact different societies have different moral beliefs doesn’t support (b) It’s possible that when different societies make different judgements about something that one of them is mistaken. When don’t normally assume that when societies disagree on something the correct answer is relative to society.  If different societies have different beliefs about the shape or age of the earth, we would not take this to demonstrate that the earth’s actual age and shape differ in various societies. So why do we do this when the disagreement involves moral judgements?  The mere fact societies make different judgements on a topic tells us nothing about whether those judgements are objectively true or false.

    Exaggerated disagreement

    Second, objectivists argue that appeals to cultural diversity often exaggerate the amount of cross-cultural disagreement over moral standards. Often when societies have different moral beliefs, this isn’t due to different moral standards but the result of disagreement over certain factual questions.  Consider the abovementioned case of witchcraft. In the 14th-century people believed in the existence of witches. They believed witches met together secretly and sacrificed children and ate these children in a ritual feast. They bound themselves by oath to the devil to use supernatural powers to harm, and kill innocent people. Hence the believed witchcraft involved the deliberate conspiracy to cause serious harm to innocent people.

    We don’t hold these beliefs today but if we did our opinion of witchcraft would be very different. Suppose we believed there was a group which conspired to randomly kill and maim innocent people and killed and ate children as part of its rituals.  We probably would legally suppress this group. And many people would support the death penalty for those who did these things, killing children is a horrendous form of murder after all. The difference between us and 14th-century Europeans is due, in a large part, to different factual beliefs not simply a disagreement over moral standards.

    1. Relativism Promotes Tolerance

    A second motivation behind relativism is the idea that moral relativism promotes tolerance and humility. When you realise that your own moral standards are correct only for you, you are less likely to fall into arrogance and pass judgements on the beliefs and practises of others. Nor are you likely to demand they change these practices and adopt yours. 

    Response:

    Objectivists respond that this concern reveals a subtle contradiction. The argument assumes that tolerance and humility are good things, it assumes people should be tolerant and humble and should not be arrogant and rush to judgement.  However, if relativism is correct, this isn’t the case. According to cultural relativism, it is wrong to be intolerant only if your society believes that it is.  Societies which are imperialistic and arrogant and believes its permissible to colonialize other nations don’t do any wrong if it imposes its moral judgements on to others.  Similarly, according to subjectivism humility and tolerance are wrong only if you think it is. If someone has bigoted or arrogant beliefs, then bigotry is morally required of them, and they shouldn’t act in a humble, tolerant way.

    Objectivists maintain that one can condemn individuals or societies who have arrogant and bigoted practices only if you hold these things are wrong despite the fact societies or individuals may endorse them. There is something incoherent about offering a moral criticism about the arrogant and intolerant moral judgements of societies or individuals and then concluding you can’t make judgements about societies and individuals