My book review of John Loftus’s The Christian Delusion: Why Faith Fails prompted several responses from Hector Avalos, one of the book’s contributors. Avalos has offered critiques of not just my arguments but also those of my good friend Paul Copan. This Guest Post, written by Paul Copan, responds to some of Avalos’s charges. Paul Copan writes:
Recently Hector Avalos has responded to a particular argument in my book Is God a Moral Monster? (Baker). In it, I follow biblical scholar Jerome Walsh’s interpretation of Deuteronomy 25:11-12:[1] If two men, a man and his countryman, are struggling together, and the wife of one comes near to deliver her husband from the hand of the one who is striking him, and puts out her hand[yad] and seizes his genitals, then you shall cut off her hand [kaph]; you shall not show pity.
I first came across Walsh’s perspective by way of Richard Davidson’s book on sexuality in the Old Testament, Flame of Yahweh (Hendrickson)—a book I highly recommend. I follow both Walsh and Davidson on the view that this text is not referring to amputating the hand, but rather depilation. This was a punishment of humiliation involving shaving a woman’s pubic hair in thekaph—the curved region below the waist. I won’t elaborate on what my book says, but I’ll simply address Deuteronomy 25:11-12 in the bulk of this blog posting. In the post, I’ll address the question of lex talionis (“an eye for an eye”) and the work of Raymond Westbrook.
1. Preliminary remarks: I have been in communication with Jerome Walsh, who prefers to stay out of the discussion. Walsh has read Avalos’s post, though, and noted too that he did not see anything new in Avalos’s arguments that he hasn’t encountered before. He simply saw nothing linguistically to persuade him to alter his views.
Avalos’s repeated identification of kaph = “hand” as the “literal” meaning is misleading. While it may be the commonest meaning, the term has less-common usages too (the bowl of a spoon, the frond of a palm tree). It’s unproductive to start from the assumption that commonest meaning is the only one allowable unless one can prove otherwise. The point in the article is that yad tends to refer to the hand without connotation or nuance, or when the hand is envisaged, as an instrument of pointing, hitting, doing. Kaph, so far as he can see, connotes the hand as an instrument of grasping and holding, thus the curvature and the focus on the palm.
In Walsh’s estimation, Avalos seems to be operating from the position of a methodological absolutism: “X” is the common opinion, and unless one can definitively prove not-X, then one must espouse X. He doesn’t appear to leave much room for “more likely” or “less likely” as the possible evaluation of a hypothesis.
Avalos cites Marc Cortez for support: “The Law on Violent Intervention: Deuteronomy 25.11-12 Revisited,” Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 30:3 (2006), 431-47. As I note in my book, though, it is unfortunate that Cortez fails to interact with Walsh’s essay, which had been published two years earlier.
In correspondence with Walsh (May 2010), he commented on an online version of Cortez’s article. He pointed out that while Cortez dismisses Eslinger’s attempt to identify kaph with gynecological exactitude (and he can agree with Cortez on that point), Cortez does not deal with the fact that kaph is used not just for the palm of the hand, but for several other curved, arched objects, both corporeal (sole of foot) and not (bowl of a spoon, frond of a palm tree). Walsh’s argument simply treats kaph as the curve of the groin, a very likely meaning in Song of Solomon, and (pace Cortez) in Genesis as well.
Cortez wants to retain without discussion the understanding of kaph as “hand.” But Walsh notes that Cortez’s explanation of why a “talionic” law would equate “hand” as an instrument of offense with “palm of the hand” as the object of “cutting-off” is, basically, “why not?” That begs the question. Further, he ignores completely that there is no reason whatsoever for treating the qal of qatsats as if it were the piel. In the piel, it clearly means “to cut off.” In the few other instances of its appearance in the qal, it means “to cut (hair).” Why, in this unique case, should the qal be translated as if it were a piel?
Now, Walsh readily acknowledges that his article is not the standard reading of the passage, and that Cortez’s evaluation of others’ interpretations of Deut 25:11-12 is judicious, careful, and sober. He would agree with Cortez completely that the peculiarities of this unique law in the Israelite corpus have led scholars to some truly egregious attempts to make sense of its oddity. And Cortez is very good indeed at identifying the unpersuasive lengths to which some scholars have gone. But he, like all of those scholars, has not looked at the words. This is the contribution that Walsh’s article proposes to make. Instead of accepting unquestioningly that “you shall cut off her hand” is what the Hebrew words mean, he has argued that that is a misreading of the Hebrew terms. To put the disagreement in a nutshell, let me quote a line from Cortez’s article. Cortez says: “The first and most important question that must be addressed with respect to the woman’s punishment is (more…)





