Category: Philosophy of Religion

  • The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory: Another Response to Erik Wielenberg (part one)

    Recently, Erik Wielenberg has developed a novel objection to divine command meta-ethics (DCM). DCM “has the implausible implication that psychopaths have no moral obligations and hence their evil acts, no matter how evil, are morally permissible” (Wielenberg (2008), 1). Wielenberg develops this argument in response to some criticisms of his earlier work. One of the critics he addresses is me. In some forthcoming posts, I will respond to Wielenberg’s arguments. In this post, I will set the scene by explaining the argument and the context in which it occurs. Subsequent posts will offer criticism of the argument

    1. Wielenberg’s New Argument from Psychopathy.

    Wielenberg calls his new argument the Psychopathy objection. The Psychopathy objection is the latest move in the contemporary debate between Wielenberg and his critics over the defensibility of divine command meta-ethics. By divine command theory, Wielenberg has in mind the divine command meta-ethics (DCM) defended by Robert Adams (1999) (1979), William Lane Craig (2009), William Alston (1990), Peter Forrest (1989) and C. Stephen Evans (2013). This version of DCM holds that the property of being morally required is identical with the property of being commanded by God.

    In previous writings, Wielenberg has pioneered the promulgation objection to divine command meta-ethics. (see Wielenberg (2005), 60–65; Morriston (2009); Wielenberg (2014), 75–80). According to this objection, a divine command theory is problematic because it cannot account for the moral obligations of reasonable unbelievers.

    In making this argument, Wielenberg takes for granted the existence of “reasonable non-believers” people whom “—have been brought up in nontheistic religious communities, and quite naturally operate in terms of the assumptions of their own traditions.” Similarly, “many western philosophers, have explicitly considered what is to be said in favor of God’s existence, but have not found it sufficiently persuasive.” Wielenberg assumes many people in these groups are “reasonable non-believers, at least in the sense that their lack of belief cannot be attributed to the violation of any epistemic duty on their part.” (Wielenberg (2018), 77)

    Wielenberg argues that if the property of being morally required is identical with the property of being commanded by God, then these people would have no moral obligations. Seeing reasonable non-believers clearly, do have moral obligations it follows that, DCM is false. 

    Why do reasonable non-believers lack moral obligations, given DCM? Wielenberg cites the following exposition of the problem from Wes Morriston:

    Even if he is aware of a “sign” that he somehow manages to interpret as a “command” not to steal, how can he [a reasonable non-believer] be subject to that command if he does not know who issued it, or that it was issued by a competent authority? To appreciate the force of this question, imagine that you have received a note saying, “Let me borrow your car. Leave it unlocked with the key in the ignition, and I will pick it up soon.” If you know that the note is from your spouse, or that it is from a friend to whom you owe a favor, you may perhaps have an obligation to obey this instruction. But if the note is unsigned, the handwriting is unfamiliar, and you have no idea who the author might be, then it is as clear as day that you have no such obligation.

    In the same way, it seems that even if our reasonable non-believer gets as far as to interpret one of Adams’ “signs” as conveying the message, “Do not steal”, he will be under no obligation to comply with this instruction unless and until he discovers the divine source of the message. (Morriston (2009), 5-6)

    I have responded to Wielenberg both in my book and in a recent article. I argued that Morriston’s argument contains a subtle equivocation. In the first line above, he expresses a disjunction. A person is not subject to a command if he does not know (a) who issued it, or (b) that it has an authoritative source. The example he cites, the case of an anonymous note to borrow one’s car, is a case where neither of these disjuncts holds. The owner of the car knows neither who the author is, nor whether its author has authority. We can illustrate this mistake, by reflecting on examples where, a person does not know who the author of the command is, but does recognize that it has an authoritative source.

    Consider two counter-examples I offered, first:

    Suppose I am walking down what I take to be a public right of way to Orewa Beach, New Zealand. I come across a locked gate with a sign that says: “private property, do not enter, trespassers will be prosecuted.” In such a situation, I recognize that the owner of the property has written the sign, though I have no idea who the owner is. Does it follow I am not subject to the command? That seems false. To be subject to the command, a person does not need to know who the author of the command is. All they need to know is that the command is authoritative over their conduct. (Flannagan (2017), 348)

    A second counter-example I provided was; 

    Suppose, for example, that an owner of one of the beachfront properties in Orewa puts up a sign that states “private property do not enter, trespassers will be prosecuted” and that John sees the sign and clearly understands what it says. He understands the sign as issuing an imperative to “not enter the property.” John recognizes this imperative is categorical and is telling him to not trespass; he also recognizes this imperative as having authority over his conduct, he also recognizes that he will be blameworthy if he does not comply with this imperative. However, because of a strange metaphysical theory, he does not believe any person issued this imperative and so it is not strictly speaking a command. He thinks it is just a brute fact that this imperative exists. Does this metaphysical idiosyncrasy mean that the command does not apply to him and that he has not heard or received the command the owner issued? That seems to be false. While John does not realize who the source of the command is, he knows enough to know that the imperative the command expresses applies authoritatively to him and that he is accountable to it. (Flannagan (2017), 351)

    In the first example, I am aware of the command but do not know who issued it. Despite my ignorance of the source of the command, I know it is authoritative over my conduct, and hence can be said to be subject to it. In the second example, John does not believe he is being commanded. However, he discerns the imperative expressed by the command and is aware both that it authoritatively applies to him and that he is accountable for performing it. A person who doesn’t believe in God can be subject to his commands if he discerns the imperative the command expresses and percieves its authority. 

    Craig, (2018) Evan’s (2013) and Adams (1999) have raised similar counter-examples. In a dialogue at the University of Purdue between with Wielenberg Craig responded by citing my second example and discussed is subsequently on his podcast. Evan’s gives a similar counter-example. He imagines a person walking on the border between Iraq and Iran, who perceives a sign warning him to stay on the path. Because he is on the border, he does not know whether the Iranian or the Iraqi governments posted the command, yet he knows some government has issued it. (Evans (2013), 113-114) Adam’s argues: “We can suppose it is enough for God’s commanding if God intends the addressee to recognize a requirement as extremely authoritative and as having imperative force. And that recognition can be present in non-theists as well as theists.” (Adams (1999), 268) These examples all suggest that reasonable believers can be “subject to God’s commands” without believing or knowing that God exists.

    In his most recent work, Wielenberg (2018) appears to concede the problem. He concludes that a reasonable unbeliever does not need to recognize moral obligations as God’s commands to be subject to them. However, he suggests this response to the promulgation objection raises a deeper worry. Wielenberg suggests that, behind the responses of Evan’s, Adam’s, Craig and myself is a “plausible principle” which he labels R.

    (R) God commands person S to do act A only if S is capable of recognizing the requirement to do A as being extremely authoritative and as having imperative force. 

    R enables the divine command theorist to claim consistently that a reasonable non-believer has moral obligations. However, Wielenberg contends this comes at a cost; this is because when conjoined with DCM, R implies that Psychopath’s lack of moral obligations. 

    According to Wielenberg “the mainstream view of psychopaths in contemporary psychology and philosophy” which is that lack “conscience and are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands”. Wielenberg states, “According to principle (R) above, since psychopaths cannot grasp morality’s authority and force, God has not issued any commands to them, and so DCT implies that they have no moral obligations” (Wielenberg (2018), 8) 

    Wielenberg summarises his argument as follows:

    The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory

    [1] There are some psychopaths who are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands. (empirical premise) 

    [2] So, there are some psychopaths to whom God has issued no divine commands. (from 1 and R) .

    [3] So, if DCT is true, then there are some psychopaths who have no moral obligations. (from 2 and DCT). 

    [4] But there are no psychopaths who have no moral obligations. 

    [5.] Therefore, DCT is false. (from 3 and 4)

    In the next few posts, I will criticise this argument. In my next post, I will argue that the argument is crucially ambiguous in some of its key terms. In a subsequent post, I will argue that these ambiguities undermine the argument.


    Adams Robert Divine Command Metaethics Modified Again [Journal] // The Journal of Religious Ethics. – Spring 1979. – 1 : Vol. 7. – pp. 6-79,.

    Adams Robert Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics [Book]. – Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1999.

    Alston William Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists [Book Section] // Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy / ed. Beaty Michael. – Notre Dame  : Notre Dame University Press, 1990.

    Craig William Lane Debate: God & Morality: William Lane Craig vs Erik Wielenberg [Online] // Reasonablefaith.org. – February 23, 2018. – 8 10, 2019. – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6iVyVJAMiOY.

    Craig William Lane This most Gruesome of Guests [Book Section] // Is Goodness Without God Good Enough? A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics / ed. King Robert K Garcia and Nathan L. – Lanthan: : Rowan and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2009.

    Evans C Stephen God and Moral Obligation [Book]. – Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013.

    Flannagan Matthew Robust Ethics and the Autonomy Thesis [Journal] // Philosophia Christi. – 2017. – 2 : Vol. 17. – pp. 345-362.

    Forrest Peter An argument for the Divine Command Theory of Right Action [Journal] // Sophia. – 1989. – 1 : Vol. 28. – pp. 2–19.

    Morriston Wes The Moral Obligations of Reasonable Non-Believers: A special problem for divine command meta-ethics [Journal] // International Journal of Philosophy of Religion. – 2009 . – Vol. 65.

    Wielenberg Erik Divine command theory and psychopathy [Journal] // Religious Studies. – 2018. – pp. 1-16.

    Wielenberg Erik Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless [Book]. – New York : Oxford University Press, 2014.

    Wielenberg Erik  Virtue and Value in a Godless Universe [Book]. – Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2005

     

  • IS A FETUS A HUMAN BEING? Part one: Viability

    This is one of a series of posts based on a class I teach for level 3 NCEA Religious Studies.

    In the last few posts we saw that most of the Christian religious tradition sketched the following argument against feticide;

    Premise [1] Killing a human being without justification violates the law of God.

    Premise [2] A formed conceptus (i.e. a fetus) is a human being.

    Premise [3] In the case of feticide (at least in the majority of cases) insufficient or no justification is forthcoming.

    In this next series of posts, we will look at [2], the claim that a fetus, is a human being.

    Viability

    A very common position put forward today is that a foetus doesn’t become a human being until the point of viability. Viability refers to the point in pre-natal development where a foetus can live outside the mother’s womb. The idea is that fetus is not a human being until it is capable of surviving independently of another individual, before this period, it does not have an independent existence from its mother.

    Philosopher Susan Sherwin expresses this idea when she states that a fetus “is wholly dependent on her [the mother’s] unique contribution to its maintenance, while a newborn is physically separate, though still in need of a lot of care”[1]. Current medical technology means that viability occurs around 22-24 weeks after conception. At this point in time an infant that is born prematurely survive and be placed in an incubator.

    Objections to viability

    Obviously, the claim that a fetus is not a human being until viability is controversial. Several important objections have been raised to this position. We will look at the main ones below.

    A. The problem of differing technology

    The Philosopher Peter Singer contends that just because a fetus cannot survive independently of its mother that does not mean it is not a human being. This is because whether a fetus is viable or not depends more on the medical technology of a particular culture than any feature of the fetus itself. A fetus that is not viable in a more impoverished country like Chad is viable in a city like Los Angeles. If viability is necessary for something to be a human, then a woman pregnant with a viable fetus in Los Angeles who flies from Los Angeles to Chad carries a human being when she leaves, but this human being ceases to exist when she arrives in India and yet becomes human again when she returns.

    2. The problem of conjoined twins

    The Philosopher Michael Tooley offers a different criticism of people who claim that viability is the point where a human comes into existence. Tooley argues this claim has the strange implications that conjoined (Siamese) twins are not humans either[2]. Consider conjoined twins Bob and Scott. If Bob is a human being, then since Scott cannot live independently of Bob, Scott must not be a human person. However, it is difficult to see what property Bob has that Scott lacks which would justify considering one a human and the other not. It appears then that one would be forced to conclude that they both are, and are not, human. However, both Bob and Scott are humans and killing one or both of them would be homicide despite this entailing that they are both human beings even though one cannot live independently of the other.

     C. Does Dependence end at Birth

    Above we quoted the philosopher Susan Sherwin, Sherwin argued that the difference between a fetus and a newborn infant is that a fetus is dependent on the mothers care and cannot live independently of her. Some Philosophers have argued this is false, they claim that when you reflect on the facts carefully, it is clear that dependence doesn’t end at birth. Philosopher David Oderberg is an example:

    A born baby is also totally dependent on its mother, only instead of being fed and sheltered by the mother’s automatic internal processes, it is fed and sheltered by the mother’s consciously controlled external, behaviour. How can that make a difference to whether or not a foetus is a human being?[3]

    Peter Singer points out that a new-born is entirely dependent on its mother if it happens to be born in an isolated area where there are no other lactating women or the means of bottle-feeding. An elderly woman may be entirely dependent on her children looking after her. A hiker who breaks her leg a week’s walk from a road will die if her companions do not bring help. Yet in these situations. Yet the hiker, the elderly women or the baby are still t human beings.  He concludes it is not plausible to suggest that the dependence of the non-viable fetus upon its mother makes it non-human.


    [1] Susan Sherwin, “Abortion a Feminist Perspective,” in Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine, 5th ed., ed.

    Bonnie Steinbock & John D. Arras (Mountain View CA: Mayfield Publishing Co, 1999), 364.

    [2] Michael Tooley, “Abortion and Infanticide” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Autumn, 1972), 51

    [3] David Oderberg, Applied Ethics: A Non-Consequentialist Approach (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Co, 2000), 5.

     

  • The Naturalness of Belief: New Essays in Theism’s Rationality.

    The book The Naturalness of Belief: New Essays on Theism’s Rationality recently arrived from the publishers and is available on Amazon. Matt contributed a chapter to this book entitled “Divine Commands and the Euthyphro Dilemma: Some Naturalistic Misperceptions” The Naturalness of Belief is edited by Paul Copan (Palm Beach Atlantic) and Charles Taliaferro (St Olaf College) and published by Lexington Books.

    The table of contents is as follows:

    Introduction
    Part I: The Unnaturalness of Naturalism?
    1. Naturalism and Naturalness: A Naturalist’s Perspective
    —Graham Oppy
    Part II: Foundational Considerations
    2. Is Naturalism Natural?
    —Charles Taliaferro
    3. The Contraction and Expansion of Naturalism and the Theistic Challenge
    —Charles Taliaferro
    4. Taking Philosophical Naturalism Seriously
    —R. Scott Smith
    Part III: Theistic Belief, Science, and Naturalism
    5. In What Sense Might Religion Be Natural?
    —Justin Barrett and Aku Visala
    6. Science, Methodological Naturalism, and Question-Begging
    —Robert Larmer
    Part IV: Axiology and Naturalism
    7. Alienating Humanity: How Evolutionary Ethics Undermines Human Rights
    —Angus Menuge
    8. Divine Commands, Duties, and Euthyphro: Theism and Naturalist Misunderstandings
    —Matthew Flannagan
    9. Beauty: A Troubling Reality for the Scientific Naturalist
    —R. Douglas Geivett and James Spiegel
    Part V: Naturalism and Existential Considerations
    10. Existential Arguments for Theistic Belief
    —Clifford Williams
    11. Psychological Factors Contributing to Atheism: Bad Father Relationships and Just Bad Relationships as in Autistic Spectrum Disorders
    —Paul C. Vitz
    12. The Cultural Implications of Theism versus Naturalism
    —Paul Copan and Jeremiah J. Johnston
    Part VI: Naturalism, Freedom, and Immortality
    13. Theism, Robust Naturalism, and Robust Libertarian Free Will
    —J.P. Moreland
    14. Naturalism, Theism, and Afterlife Beliefs
    —Jonathan Loose

    The blurb from Amazon is as follows.

    Despite its name, “naturalism” as a world-view turns out to be rather unnatural in its strict and more consistent form of materialism and determinism. This is why a number of naturalists opt for a broadened version that includes objective moral values, intrinsic human dignity, consciousness, beauty, personal agency, and the like. But in doing so, broad naturalism begins to look more like theism. As many strict naturalists recognize, broad naturalism must borrow from the metaphysical resources of a theistic world-view, in which such features are very natural, commonsensical, and quite “at home” in a theistic framework.

    The Naturalness of Belief begins with a naturalistic philosopher’s own perspective of naturalism and naturalness. The remaining chapters take a multifaceted approach in showing theism’s naturalness and greater explanatory power. They examine not only rational reasons for theism’s ability to account for consciousness, intentionality, beauty, human dignity, free will, rationality, and knowledge; they also look at commonsensical, existential, psychological, and cultural reasons—in addition to the insights of the cognitive science of religion.

    Get your copy now, read it, and let us know what you think both here and on Amazon.

  • FETICIDE IN CHRISTIAN MORAL THOUGHT PART ONE: Alexandrian Judaism

    Some readers of MandM will know that for the last three years I have taught Theology and Philosophy at a Catholic high-school. I teach five to six classes a day, year 9 to year 13 subjects such introduction to scripture, church history, NCEA religious studies, Cambridge world religions and Divinity. My goal has always been to teach at Tertiary level, but the flooded market has meant I have, so far, found employment easier to come by in the secondary sector, hence my current employment.

    One topic I teach is NCEA Religious Studies, in year 13, one standard is to Analyse the response of a religious tradition to a contemporary ethical issue. Officially students have to describe the response a religious tradition has made to a moral issue. Our school like a lot of schools looks at Christian responses to abortion. Because I did my PhD thesis on this very subject in the last year I have been going through my dissertation and simplifying, summarising and rewriting it into short sections I can use with my classes. Because there is some interest in this, I have decided to post some of these on MandM. I welcome any feedback or comments.

    When we are analysing the response of a religious tradition to a moral or ethical question one of the first questions we need to ask is “what does the religious tradition in question actually teach”? We need to look at what the teachers and theologians the religion have said and what their arguments were.  This will enable us to avoid misrepresenting someone’s opinions and help us accurately identify the premises and conclusions that we want to evaluate.

    Answering this question will be the focus of Part Three of this standard We are going to look at several representative strands of Christian thought or reflection on the question of abortion. When we do, we can find a common a common three-premise argument against feticide that is common to these different strands. The rest of the standard will analyse and critically evaluate each of these premises.

    In part one we looked at how to analyse arguments.  Here we will put what we learnt to work.  Historically Christianity has approached the question of killing a fetus by formulating a simple three-premise argument:

    Premise [1]: God has commanded people not to kill human beings without adequate justification.

    Premise [2]: a foetus, is a human being;

    Premise [3]: in almost all cases where a fetus is killed the reasons offered are not strong enough to justify killing a human being.

     Of course, it isn’t enough to just say this. For any sensible analysis, we must provide evidence that we are accurately presenting what Christians have taught. To do this, we will trace the existence of this argument in several representative Christian traditions. We will look at the position adopted by the Church fathers, the church in the middle ages and the Protestant Reformers. Before doing that, however, we will look at the origins or source of Christian moral teaching on this question in Alexandrian Judaism.

    Feticide in Alexandrian Judaism

    The origins or beginning of Christian responses to abortion begins in a movement known to historians today as Alexandrian Judaism.   During the first century, most of the Roman world was dominated by Greek language and culture. Greek Philosophy also dominated the intellectual world of schools and Universities. This culture is called Hellenism. Alexandrian Jews were Jews who lived outside the land of Israel in this Greek Culture These Jews spoke Greek-speaking and combined a commitment to Judaism with the ideas of Greek Philosophy.

    A very important document for Alexandrian Jews was the Septuagint. You learnt about the Septuagint in year 9.  The Old Testament was originally written in Hebrew, however several hundred years before the time of Christ. The old testament was translated into Greek. This Greek translation is called the Septuagint. The purpose of the Septuagint was to provide a book which could explain to Alexandrian Jews what the commandments and teachings of Judaism were and how to apply and follow these teachings in their community. For this reason, the Septuagint didn’t always provide a word for word rendition of the Hebrew text but offered commentary on what it meant and how it was to be followed and applied.

    What is important for the topic we are studying is how the Septuagint translated a particular passage in the book of Exodus. In Exodus 21: there is a body of Jewish law which deals with where a pregnant woman is struck in such a manner that a miscarriage occurs. The Hebrew translations which we have today translate the passages this way:

    [I]f men struggle and strike a pregnant woman and she miscarries, and there is no harm, he shall pay a fine according as the woman’s husband lays upon him, according to an assessment. And if there is harm you will prescribe life for life, eye for an eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise.[1]

    The Septuagint, however, interprets the passage this way:

    If two men fight and strike a pregnant woman, and her unformed embryo departs, he shall be fined; according as the woman’s husband lays upon (him) he shall give according to what is thought fit. But if it be formed, he shall give a life for a life.[2]

    The Septuagint draws a distinction between a formed and unformed embryo. This corresponds to our modern distinction between an embryo and a fetus we looked at in part two. A person who kills a fetus must pay “life for a life”. The phrase life for life wasn’t taken literally by Jewish thinkers, it was understood to mean something like “pay the value of life for the value of a life”. But the critical issue is that the Septuagint views the life of a fetus as having the value of human life.

    By contrast, the Hebrew text states that if someone kills an embryo or a fetus they must pay a fine based upon an assessment and is silent on exactly how this assessment is carried out. Some scholars, however, have argued that what we know about the legal practices in the cultures surrounding Israel suggests the assessment must have been based on the age of the fetus.

    Why do these translations differ? The Hebrew texts we have today were compiled much later than the Septuagint, and so it might be tempting to suggest the Septuagint has the earlier understanding. However, it is pretty clear that the Septuagint is influenced by Greek Philosophy. The distinction it draws between a formed and unformed embryo was a common distinction in Greek philosophy.  Some examples:

    • Galen (129 AD- 200) wrote that the Hippocratic philosophers of his day held “That what is in the womb is already a living being when it is formed in all its members”.
    • Laertius said that the Pythagorean view was “this first creation [the conceptus] is formed in forty days, and then, in accordance with the law of harmony, the baby is perfected and born after seven, or nine, or maximum ten months.[3]
    • Empedocles argued that the formation of an embryo started on the 39th day and was completed on the 49th.[4]
    • Asclepiades referred to the formed/unformed distinction and suggested that for males formation occurred between the 26th and 50th days and females were formed around 60 days.13
    • The author of a Philosophical book titled On Seven Months Child, states a male conceptus is formed at 40 days while a female is formed after this.15
    • Aristotle argued that the embryo became fully human when it achieved form, which occurred 40 days after conception for a boy or 90 for a girl.16

    Consequently, there was an established distinction in the writings of many ancient Greek philosophers between an unformed and formed embryo. It is unlikely that the similarities between the Septuagint’s and Greek Philosophy are a coincidence. The best explanation appears to be that Alexandrian Jews utilised Greek Philosophy in an effort to apply the Jewish law to the question of killing a fetus. The law told them that if a person killed a fetus they had to be punished based on an assessment of the maturity of the fetus. Several schools of Philosophy schools taught that an embryo was human by the time when it acquired human form around 40 days after conception. They probably put these two ideas together concluded that if a person killed a formed embryo, this was homicide and violated Gods laws against homicide. Specifically, the fifth commandment “you shall not kill.”

    Philo of Alexandria

    The Septuagint translation of Exodus 21:22-24 receives one of its clearest expositions by Philo of Alexandria. Philo was a Jewish Philosopher, Theologian and leading intellectual in Alexandrian Judaism. He lived from 20BC-50AD and so lived at the same time as both Jesus and Paul. For this reason, he is a good source of information on what Jewish theologians taught at the time of Christ.  In his commentary on the Ten commandments Philo writes:

    But if anyone has a contest with a woman who is pregnant, and strike her a blow on her belly, and she miscarry, if the child which was conceived within her is still unfashioned and unformed, he shall be punished by a fine, both for the assault which he committed and also because he has prevented nature, who was fashioning and preparing that most excellent of all creatures, a human being, from bringing him into existence. But if the child which was conceived had assumed a distinct shape … in all its parts, having received all its proper connective and distinctive qualities, he shall die; … for such a creature as that is a man, whom he has slain while still in the workshop of nature, who had not thought it as yet a proper time to produce him to the light, but had kept him like a statue lying in a sculptor’s workshop, requiring nothing more than to be released and sent out into the world.[5]

    In this passage, Philo is explaining to his audience what the fifth of the ten commandments requires of them. (The fifth commandment is the commandment: do not kill). He appeals to the Septuagint and argues that the law considered the killing of a formed embryo to be a homicide and so feticide is a violation of the fifth commandment. With this conclusion established, Philo uses it to argue against infanticide. Infanticide is the practice of killing new-born infants after birth and was a widespread practice in the Roman and Greek world. Philo argued that If killing a fetus before birth was homicide, then killing children after birth must be as well. Therefore, the law ten commandments condemned both abortion and infanticide.

    Conclusions

    The Septuagint and Philo contain a specific argument against feticide. This argument can be initially summed up in two premises. Firstly,  a fetus is a human being and secondly, that the law of God prohibits killing a human being. This argument entails that feticide is unlawful and contrary to the law of God.

    I say “initially,” because a careful examination shows that the second of these claims need to be qualified.  We know Jewish rabbis permitted abortion in rare cases where continuing the pregnancy would kill the mother, arguing these abortions were a case of self-defence. Hence, the sixth commandment is best construed as being that the law of God forbids killing a human being without justification, where justification is interpreted as an excuse or permission granted somewhere else by God’s law. In the absence of any other command or permission to the contrary, one should refrain from homicide. With this clarification in place, we can summarise the argument used by Alexandrian Jew’s as follows:

    Premise [1]: Killing a human being without justification violates the law of God.

    Premise [2]: A formed embryo (i.e. a fetus) is a human being.

    Since Alexandrian Jews, and, as we will see, Christian theologians after them, believed feticide to be unlawful in most, if not all, circumstances, they also held to the following enthymeme:

     Premise [3]: in the case of feticide (at least in the majority of cases) insufficient or no justification is forthcoming. 

    From these three premises, it follows that killing a fetus (at least in the majority of cases) is unlawful, i.e. contrary to the law of God.


    [1] Exodus 21:22-25 MT.

    [2] Exodus 21:22-25 LXX. This translation of the  Septuagint comes from Stanley Isser, “Two Traditions: The Law of Exodus 21:22-23 Revisited,” The Catholic Biblical Quarterly 52:1 (1990): 30.

    [3] Kapparis, Abortion in the Ancient World, 39.

    [4] Ibid., 45.

    [5] Judaeus Philo, “The Special Laws III,” in The Contemporary of Josephus, Translated from the Greek, trans. by Charles Duke Yonge (1993) (108)(109).

    <http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/yonge/book29.html>

     

  • Brad Hooker and Philip Quinn

    Most versions of Divine command meta-ethics  (DCM) contend that the property of being morally required is informatively identical with the property of being commanded by God.[1] A common objection to divine command meta-ethics is the horrendous deeds objection.  We can formalise this objection as follows:

    [P1] If DCM is true, then if God commands unjust actions unjust actions are morally required

    [P2] It is possible for God to command unjust actions

    [P3] It is not possible for unjust actions to be morally required.

    These three premises, entail a contradiction. [P1] conjoined with [P2] entails that it is possible for unjust actions to be morally required. However, this conclusion explicitly contradicts [P3]. Moreover, [P1] is clearly true. If I contend that  A and B are really the same property, then if any action that has A will also have B. So it follows that if an unjust action has the property of being commanded by God. It will also have the property of being morally required.

    Philip Quinn responds to the abhorrent commands objection, by rejecting [P2].[2] Quinn notes that on standard conceptions of God has certain character traits essentially. God is omniscient, omnipotent, but he is also loving and just. It is impossible however for a loving and just person to knowingly and deliberately command something incompatible with love and justice. If someone did this, they couldn’t coherently be called just or loving. The upshot is that [P2] is false. Affirming that a loving and just being commands injustice is to affirm something logically impossible.

    Hooker’s Critique

    Brad Hooker offers a response to Quinn.[3]  Hooker notes that DCM has the implication that “Before God made any commands, there were no moral requirements.”  However, Quinn suggests that God has the property of being just essentially, this means that requirements of justice must exist antecedent to any commands God issues.  But that means there are requirements of justice antecedent to requirements of morality.

    Hooker then offers the following argument:

    [P1]    If DCM is correct all moral requirements depend on Gods commands.

    [P2]:  If all moral requirements derive from God’s commands, then the require­ments cannot exist until the commands exist.

    [P3]: Even before God made any commands, there were requirements of justice constraining His commands.

    [C1]     Before God made any commands, there were no moral requirements (from premises 1 and 2)

    [C2] Requirements of justice were not moral requirements. (from P3 an C1)

    However, Hooker argues that [C2] is false.  He concludes:

    Since the logic of the above argument is valid, then if the argument’s conclusion is false, at least one of the argument’s premisses must be false. Premiss 2 cannot plausibly be denied. To reject Premiss 1 is to abandon the Divine Command Theory. So is Premiss 3 the one to reject? According to Quinn, even before God makes His first command, His inherent justice would keep Him from making unjust commands. To reject Premiss 3 is to abandon Quinn’s defence of the Divine Command Theory … [4]


    Response to Hooker

    I agree with Hooker that, if the conclusion of the argument is false, then at least one of its premises must be false. I also agree that a divine command theorist cannot abandon P1 or P2 and abandoning P3 commits him to abandoning Quinn’s defence of DCM.  The critical question is whether [C2] is false. Why is [C2] implausible? Hooker’s argument against [C2] is brief. He writes:

    However, requirements of justice are moral requirements. If they are moral requirements, then presumably they also were moral requirements (and will continue to be). Conclusion 2, therefore, seems false… the Divine Command Theory commits us to the implausible view that requirements of justice are not moral requirements.

    Noticing a subtle shift in this argument is important. In Hooker’s argument, C2 is the claim that “moral requirements of justice were not moral requirements. (emphasis mine). The “were” refers to the time before God issued any commands. P1 P2 and P3 do not entail that moral requirements are not moral requirements posterior to such commands. The divine command theorist could affirm, and I suspect probably will affirm, that antecedent to any commands by God, there were requirements of justice. But no one was under any moral requirement to act justly. Posterior to Gods commands, however, there is such a requirement. Hence while the requirements of justice are moral requirements now, they were not prior to God issuing any commands.

    A distinction made by John Mackie is illustrative here. Mackie famously argued for moral nihilism. According to Mackie, our moral discourse presupposes that objective moral requirements exist. He then argued that no such requirements do exist and so our moral discourse is systematically mistaken. Claims such as “Bill is morally required to act justly are false.

    Mackie’s thesis is jarring, to soften the blow he but that in denying moral requirements exist he points out he is “not denying that there can be objective evaluations relative to standards,” taking, as an example, the standard of justice:

    In one important sense of the word, it is a paradigm case of injustice if a court declares someone to be guilty of an offence of which it knows him to be innocent. More generally, a finding is unjust if it is at variance with what the relevant law and the facts together require, and particularly if it is known by the court to be so. More generally still, any award of marks, prizes, or the like is unjust if it is at variance with the agreed standards for the contest in question: if one diver’s performance, in fact, measures up better to the accepted standards for diving than another’s, it will be unjust if the latter is awarded higher marks or the prize …”[5]

    What follows from nihilism is instead that:

    The statement that a certain decision is thus just or unjust will not be objectively prescriptive: in so far as it can be simply true it leaves open the question whether there is any objective requirement to do what is just and to refrain from what is unjust, and equally leaves open the practical decision to act in either way.[6]

    On this Mackie is surely correct, a person who embraces nihilism and thinks nothing is really right or wrong can still understand the concept of what is loving and just. Such a person could know that this idea of justice entailed certain standards and paradigmatic examples and he or she could in many cases tell whether certain behaviour was loving or was in accord with the standards of justice. She or he also could choose to live in accord with these standards if he or she wanted to and she or he could choose not to live in accord with them. He or she could simply reject that there was any objective moral obligation to behave in accord with such standards.   The question of whether an action is just and loving and whether it is obligatory are, in principle, separate questions.

    This distinction is subtle but important, and it has application here. DCM entails that, prior to God’s commands, no action is morally wrong. This, however, does not mean that actions cannot be loving and just prior to God’s commands. Prior to God’s act of commanding, certain actions will be loving and just without it being the case that they are obligatory. Because God is loving and just he commands people to behave in loving and just ways so that actions which are just antecedent to his commands become morally required or obligatory posterior to such commands.

    It seems then that Hooker then is mistaken when he states “Divine Command Theory commits us to the implausible view that requirements of justice are not moral requirements.” Hooker here has moved from C1 which claims moral requirements were not moral requirements antecedent to God’s commands to the claim they are not moral requirements posterior to God’s commands.

    The only reason Hooker gives for this leap is to assert “If they [requirements of justice] are moral requirements, then presumably they also were moral requirements (and will continue to be).”  But apart from Hooker’s presumption, there is no reason to think that, and certainly no reason for a divine command theorist to believe this. As far as I can tell its coherent to claim that actions could be unjust but not obligatory prior to God’s commands.


    [1] I say most here, William Lane Craig, Robert Adams, C Stephen Evans, William Alston, and Peter Forrest all contend the property of being commanded by God and the property of being morally required are informatively identical. By contrast, Philip Quinn holds that Gods commands directly and immediately cause the existence of moral requirements. This difference though important will not affect the subsequent discussion of Philip Quinn.

    [2] Philip Quinn, “Divine Command Theory” In The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, ed. H. LaFollette, (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 2000) 70-71

    [3] Brad Hooker “Cudworth and Quinn” Analysis 61: 4 (2001); 333-335

    [4] Brad Hooker “Cudworth and Quinn” Analysis 61: 4 (2001); 335

    [5] John Mackie “The Subjectivity of Values” in Ethics: Essential Readings in Moral Theory ed George Sher (Routledge, 2012) 184.

    [6] Ibid.

  • Is Naturalism simpler than Theism? Some reflections on Graham Oppy’s “Best argument against God”

    In Best Argument Against God (BAAG) Graham Oppy sketches a sophisticated argument for atheism. Oppy’s conclusion is the result of applying a particular method to the question of God’s existence. He contends that question of Gods existence should not be determined by examining the arguments for and against the existence of God. Instead philosophy of religion :“is concerned with the clash between theistic and atheistic worldviews (or theories),” The correct way to proceed is: “(1) to develop the best theistic and atheistic theories; (2) to assess the liability of these best theories to internal defeat; and (3) to make an assessment of the comparative theoretical virtues of these best theories, paying attention to simplicity, fit with data, explanatory scope, predictive accuracy, and the like.”[1] The putative data being such things as that “there is something rather than nothing; there being a universe; there being natural laws; there being cosmic fine-tuning; there being rational, conscious agents; there being moral laws; there being dictates of conscience; and so forth.”[2]

    Oppy argues that when this method is followed, there is a good reason to reject the existence of God. He contrasts Theism with naturalism:     the view that “that causal reality is natural reality” and “no supernatural causes exist”.  Looking at how each worldview accounts for such things as the existence of the universe, fine-tuning, morality and various other “putative data”.

     While Oppy thinks both theism and naturalism can provide defensible, coherent theories and that fit the data; naturalism is a preferable worldview because it is simpler. One theoretical virtue we use to asses’ theories is simplicity: “If everything else is equal, we should prefer the more simple theory to the less simple theory.”[3] Oppy argues that  “prior to the introduction of data, naturalism trumps theism on the grounds of simplicity and that none of the data that we consider favours theism over naturalism.”[4]

    I think Oppy claim that “prior to the data naturalism is simpler than theism” is mistaken. It is this claim that I will discuss in this post.

     Oppy’s argument for the simplicity of naturalism 

    Let’s begin by asking why Oppy thinks naturalism is simpler than Theism? Oppy’s argument is succinct:

    Naturalism is simpler than Theism: it postulates fewer kinds of entities, fewer kinds of primitive properties and fewer kinds of primitive principles. According to Theism, there are two kinds of entities – natural and supernatural – whereas according to Naturalism, there is only one kind. According to Theism, there are two kinds of causation – natural causation and supernatural causation – whereas according to Naturalism, there is only one kind.[5]

    There are three ideas here: First,  Oppy claims that [1] According to naturalism there is only one kind of entity and one kind of causation. Natural entities and natural causes.   By contrast [2] theism postulates two kinds of entities and causes, natural and supernatural. Third, Oppy thinks [3] the fact theism postulates more kinds of entities and causes than naturalism means naturalism is simpler. I think each of Oppy’s premises is questionable.

    Criticism of Oppy’s argument

    Does Naturalism postulate only one kind of entity?
    Let us begin with [1] the claim that according to naturalism there is only one kind of entity and one kind of causation. There are two potential problems here.

    First, this conclusion is incompatible with Oppy’s own definition of naturalism. Oppy defines naturalism as follows: “Naturalism says that causal reality is natural reality: the domain of causes is nothing more nor less than the natural world.”[6]  However, according to this definition, naturalism is simply the denial of supernatural causation. It says nothing whatsoever about whether non-natural entices or properties exist, such entities and properties are perfectly possible, provided they don’t enter into causal relationships.

    This brings me to the second problem, let’s suppose for the sake of argument naturalism did contend that only natural properties and entities exist.  This wouldn’t mean that only one kind of entity or property existed. Oppy states:

    Any suitably elaborated naturalism will hold that some features of the natural world are primitive – not susceptible of further explanation – whereas other features of the natural world are fully explained in terms of those primitive features. Thus, for example, some naturalists suppose that all of the primitive features of the natural world are physical features – i.e. features that lie in the proper domain of the discipline of physics. Other naturalists suppose that there are features of the natural world – for example, the psychological states of human beings – that cannot be fully explained in terms of the fundamental physical properties. The key point to note is that all naturalists suppose that there are no supernatural causal properties[7]

    Here Oppy here suggests that when he refers to natural features, properties and he isn’t using this word to refer to one kind of thing, such as material or physical things. Rather the natural world consists of multiple different primitive properties.

    Does theism postulate two kinds of entities and two kinds of causes?

    This brings us to [2] Oppy’s claim that theism postulates two kinds of entities and causes, natural and supernatural. I think this is false. theism is the claim that God exists, hence according to theism a supernatural being with supernatural causal powers exists. But theism by itself, prior to the data, entails nothing about the existence of natural entities or natural causes.

    Nor is this a picky pedantic point because there are prominent forms of theism which affirm neither the existence of natural entities or natural causes. Let’s look first at the question of “natural entities” Some theists notably George Berkeley and Jonathan Edwards have been idealists. According to idealism, the only things that exist are immaterial minds or souls.  Physical objects are purely phenomenal: a physical object is a collection of sensations a mind has such as a perception of shape, colour, a feeling of texture, a smell, and a there is no underlying material substratum to such objects which exist only as sensations in immaterial human or divine minds.    Of course, Idealism has always been a minority view. Most theists today realists: they believe that physical objects do have an underlying substratum, distinct from mental sensations, which exists in space and time and God creates and sustains material objects in being.

    The point, however, is that theism is part of and compatible with both idealism and realism. Whether a Theist postulates the existence of distinct natural entities or not depends on how he accounts for some of the purported data particularly the data that: “there is something rather than nothing; there being a universe; there being rational, conscious agent’s”. Prior to the data, theism affirms only that a supernatural being exists.

    The same point can be made regarding “natural causation”.  Whether there exists natural causes distinct from God’s supernatural causation has been, and is, a matter of dispute amongst Theists. Many theists have advocated concurrentism. Concurrentism is the view that God created the material world with certain natural causal powers and He sustains it in existence, moment by moment, and concurs with the causal transactions that take place in it.  According to concurrentism, while distinct natural properties have natural causal powers exist, they do so by God͛’s creating and sustaining activity, and they require God ͛ s concurring causal activity to operate.

    By contrast, occasionalists have denied the existence of distinct natural causes. All causation is reducible to the supernatural causation of God.    If objects, like fire, appear to cause another object, like cotton, to burst into flame, this is because God has decreed that when a fire is placed next to cotton, cotton will burn.  Natural causation does not involve powers inherent in nature; it occurs because there is a pre-existing law of nature that dictates that when certain events happen, other events will follow.  These laws of nature just are divine decrees.  The result is that all so-called natural causation is really divine causation.  God is the only and sole cause in nature. [8]

    Theism itself a part of and compatible with both concurrentism and occasionalism. Whether a theist postulates the existence of distinct natural causes or not depends on how he accounts for some of the purported data particularly the data that “there are laws of nature”.  Prior to the data, theism affirms only that a supernatural being exists.

    1. If theism postulates more kinds of entities and causes than naturalism, does it follow that naturalism is simpler?

    This brings us to Oppy’s third claim: that if theism postulates more kinds of entities and causes than naturalism does, then naturalism is a simpler worldview. This to contradict the criteria of simplicity which Oppy himself explicitly offers.  Oppy elaborates the criterion of simplicity as follows:

    (a) Simplicity: If everything else is equal, we should prefer the more simple theory to the less simple theory. If everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that postulates fewer (and less complex) primitive entities. If everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that invokes fewer (and less complex) primitive features. If everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that appeals to fewer (and less complex) primitive principles.[9]

    This doesn’t say that all else being equal we should prefer the theory that postulates fewer entities.  It states that “If everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that postulates fewer (and less complex) primitive entities.”Oppy thinks that on any view of the world there will be features which are ‘primitive’; features that are “not susceptible of further explanation” whereas other features of the world are “fully explained in terms of those primitive features” and it is the number, and complexity of primitive features not the number of features per se that is relevant to simplicity.

    Consequently, even if theism does postulate more kinds of entities and causes than naturalism does, it doesn’t follow naturalism is simpler.  This will only follow if Theists hold that these additional types of causes and entities are primitive. This, however, is not the case.  As Oppy himself states, according to theism “God is the cause of the existence of the natural world, and the source or ground or origin of most – if not all – of its significant features.”[10]  Consequentially, the natural causal order isn’t a primitive unexplained entity.


    [1]  Graham Oppy “What Derivations Cannot Do” Religious Studies (2015) 51, 328

    [2] Oppy, “What Derivations Cannot Do”, 51

    [3] Graham Oppy. The Best Argument against God (Palgrave Pivot) (p. 18). Palgrave Macmillan. Kindle Edition

    [4] Oppy, Graham. The Best Argument against God (Palgrave Pivot) (p. 18). Palgrave Macmillan. Kindle Edition.

    [5] Ibid 19

    [6] Ibid 19

    [7] Ibid, 13

    [8] Both within Islamic and Christian intellectual circles there was a rigorous metaphysical debate between concurrentism and occasionalism.  Various Islamic philosophers such as al-Ash͛ari (873-935) founder of the influential Asharite school of Islamic philosophy, and Al  Ghazali  (1055-1111),  all expounded occasionalism.  It was also embraced by Christian theologians, such as Nicholas of Autrecourt (1300-1350).  Pierre d’Ailly (1351-1420), and Gabriel Beil  (1420-1495). George Berkeley, (1685 – 1753) Nicholas Malebranche (1638 – 1715). More recently, it has been defended by John Foster and Alvin Plantinga.

    [9] Oppy, Best Argument against God, 14

    [10] Ibid, 12

  • God and Moral Grounding Power

    A common objection to divine command theories of ethics (DCT) is that they make morality arbitrary. There are several ways this objection can be cashed out. The most common is what is called the ‘Horrendous deeds objection’. The Horrendous deeds objection can be formalised as follows:

    (1) If the DCT is true, then if God commanded us to rape people we would be required to rape people.

    (2) It is absurd that we could be required to rape people.

    (3) God could command us to rape.

     (4) Therefore, DCT is absurd.

    The key premise is (3), the assumption that it is possible that God could command horrendous actions like rape. Divine command theorists have responded by suggesting that (3) is dubious.  They assume a conception of God Whereby God is understood to be an immaterial person who is all powerful, all knowing, loving and just. So, as terms are defined, the claim that it is possible for God to command people to rape others would only hold if it is possible for an all-knowing, loving, and just person to command rape. This is unlikely. The very reason critics use the example of rape is that they view it as a paradigm action that no virtuous person could ever knowingly entertain.Jason Thibodeau

    Suppose, however, it is possible for a just and loving, omniscient person to command rape. Divine command theorists point out, this would mean rape would be commanded in situations where a just and loving person, aware of all the relevant facts, could endorse it– and under these hypothetical circumstances, it’ s hard to see how (2) could be maintained.

    1. Jason Thibodeau’s Argument

    In a recent article, published in Sophia, Jason Thibodeau updates the ‘Horrendous deeds objection’ to avoid this problem.[1] Jason starts by defining a concept which he refers to as moral grounding power. “Let us say that a being b has moral grounding power just in case the commands of b constitute moral obligations.” He continues “unless it is able to deny that other possible divine beings have this power, it implies that there are possible worlds in which horrendous acts are obligatory”.

    His argument for this conclusion is as follows:

    (P1) If DCT is true, then God has moral grounding power. (Premise)

    (P2) Any omnipotent being has the same powers that God has. (Premise)

    (P3) In some possible world, there exists a being that is like God except that he is not omnibenevolent [henceforth this being will be called Yod]. (Premise)

    (P4) If DCT is true, then Yod has moral grounding power. (From P1, P2, and P3)

    (P5) In some possible world, Yod commands the gratuitous torture of children. (Premise)

    (P6) If DCT is true, then there is a possible world in which the gratuitous torture of children is morally obligatory. (From P4 and P5)

    (P7) There is no possible world in which the gratuitous torture of children is obligatory. (Premise)

    (P8) DCT is false. (From P6 and P7) [2]

    Recently Jason and I discussed this argument on Capturing Christianity, here I want to lay out in writing my main objection to it. Let me stress that Jason and I are discussing this back and forth and my thoughts may alter as the discussion continues.

    A. Premise (P1): Does a Divine Command Theory entail that God has Moral Grounding Power?

    Let me begin with (P1) the claim that “ Given Jason’s definition of moral grounding power; this premise affirms that: “if God a divine command theory is true, then Gods commands constitute moral obligations”. Is this correct? The answer is it depends on the kind of divine command theory proposed. Divine command theorists contend actions are morally required if and only if and because those actions are commanded by God. However, the word “because” here can be used to describe different kinds of explanatory relationships.

    In an important article on this issue Stephen Sullivan[3] distinguishes between a causal explanation and an identity explanation. In a casual explanation, one explains the existence of A by citing some distinct thing B, which causes B to exist B. By contrast an identity explanation explains the existence of A by noting the existence of B and then saying that A just is (is identical with) B.

    There are important differences between saying B caused A and saying B is identical to A.  In a causal relationship, the explanandum (the thing being explained) and explanans (the explainer) are distinct things; the former is an effect the latter a cause. As a cause, the explanans exists prior to the explandum, and there is an asymmetric dependence relationship between them: If B causes A to exist then B does not cause A to exist.  The effect depends on the cause for its existence but not vice versa.

    In an identity relationship, the explandum (the thing explained) and explanans (explainer) are not distinct things at all; they are the same thing described in different terms. Because the explanans and explandum are identical, the explanans does not exist prior to the explandum, that would entail something existed prior to itself. Moreover, identity relationships are symmetrical: if A is identical to B then B is also identical to A. Sullivan subsumes identity relationships under a broader category of “constitutive” explanations which includes not just explanations in terms of identity relations but also relationships of non-reductive supervenience.

    Now if we turn to (P1), Jason states “If DCT is true, then God has moral grounding power” where “a being b has moral grounding power just in case the commands of b constitute moral obligations”. This assumes that divine command theorists are offering a constitutive explanation of moral requirements. But unless qualified,this assumption is dubious. It is true that some divine command theorists do this. Edward Wierenga (who Jason cites as an example) seems to have in mind a non-reductive supervenience relationship between moral requirements and Gods commands. Similarly, the divine command theories of Adam’s, Craig, Evans, Forrest, and Alston all contend that the property of being morally required is identical with the property of being commanded by God, and so they also offer a constitutive explanation of moral requirements in terms of Gods commands.

    However, other divine command theorists, do not offer a constitutive explanation of moral requirements. One important proponent of a divine command theory was Philip Quinn. Quinn explicitly offered a causal explanation of moral requirements in terms of Gods commands. Quinn argued that the property of being willed by God and the property of being morally required are not identical properties but distinct properties. God’s act of willing that a person performed an immediately caused it to be the case that a moral obligation to do this action existed.

    Strictly speaking then (P1) is false. Divine command theories per se do not entail that Gods commands constitute moral obligations. Some divine command theories do, and some do not. Of course, the most significant divine command theories defended today involve identity explanations, and so these theories do have the entailment Jason refers to. For this reasons one might think my qualifications are a tad pedantic. However, the difference between causal and constitutive divine command theories will become important when we examine further premises.

    B.Premise (P4): Is the Inference Valid?

    Before, examining premise (P2), let me first say something about the Jason makes in (P4).

     (P4) If DCT is true, then Yod has moral grounding power. (From P1, P2, and P3)

    Notice that (P4) draws an inference from (P1) (P2) and (P3). It takes the fact that a divine command theory entails that God has “moral grounding power” and, the fact that omnipotent beings have the same powers, and infers from this that any omnipotent being will have moral grounding power. If this inference is valid, the word “power” must have the same meaning in (P1) as it does in (P2). When Jason states in (P2) that Any omnipotent being has the same powers that God has, the word “powers” must include the kind of moral grounding power he refers to in (P1). If  this isnt the case the inference commits the fallacy of equivocation.

    C. What does the word “power” mean in (P1) and (P2)?

    It’s precisely on this last point however that I think Jason’s argument falls down.  Jason supports (P2)   by asking us to imagine a being like God, who is omnipotent but lacks the property of benevolence: He then asks whether such a being would “in virtue of his malevolence, lack the power to flood the earth, destroy a planet or create the universe? “. He concludes “If the being is omnipotent, this seems unlikely, it’s hard to see how the mere absence of benevolence would limit Gods power in this way. “

    I find this claim intuitively plausible, but note carefully the examples Jason uses here. He gives the examples of “lacking the power to flood the earth” “destroy a planet” “create a universe” these are all acts of causal power, where God by his actions causes something distinct from himself to come into existence or go out of existence.

    However, in his first premise (P1), Jason uses the word power in a different sense. He refers to “moral grounding power” which a being has  “just in case the commands of b constitute moral obligations”. Moral grounding power then isn’t the power God has to cause moral obligations to come into existence its rather the God’s ability or power to constitute moral requirements with his commands. We saw above that, in the context of divine command theories, constitutive explanations can involve the postulation a non-reductive supervenience relationship between Gods commands and moral requirements. However, in most cases, divine command theorists who offer a constitutive explanation of moral requirements are offering an “identity” explanation.  Divine command theorists like Craig, Evans, Adams, Forrest, all contend that the property of being morally required is identical with the property of being commanded by God.

    This means that the phrase “moral grounding power” is often just a technical way of saying that, the property of being commanded by God is identical with the property of being morally required.  The property of being obligatory isn’t something that is caused to come into existence by Gods commands; it just is the property of being commanded by God by a different name. Just as the morning star and evening star are the same thing under different descriptions. The property of being morally required and being commanded by God are the same property under different descriptions.

    The problem is that while (P2) is intuitively plausible if you are referring to causal powers. It is not so obvious when one is talking of something like a moral grounding power.  To say God has moral grounding power could just mean that God has the power to perform actions which are identical with God’s actions under a different description. However, it is impossible for any person who is not God to have this kind of power. This is because the relationship of identity can only hold between a thing and itself. It is impossible for any being, no matter how powerful, who is not God to perform actions which are identical with God’s actions. This is an incoherent idea.

    Let me illustrate this: By waving my hand I can make it the case that Matthew Flannagan Has waved his hand. However, it is not possible for anyone else, even an omnipotent being to do this. An omnipotent being has the causal power to make me wave my hand. If he becomes incarnate in human form, he could himself wave his hand. However, he could not make it the case that his standing up is identical with me standing up. That is because his actions are not identical to my actions.  Nor is it possible for him a distinct person from me to perform actions which are identical with actions I perform. If you want to refer to this ability as a power, then it is a power that it is metaphysically impossible for anyone but me to have. The only person who can perform actions numerically identical to my actions is me.

    Conclusions:

    Above I noted that the inference he draws in P4 is valid. Only if the word “power” is used the same way in both premises P1 and P2. The kind of power, God, is said to have when Jason states “Any omnipotent being has the same powers that God has” must include the kind of power he has in mind when he states “If DCT is true, then God has moral grounding power”.

    We have seen that this is not the case. In our discussion of P1, we noted that the claim “If the DCT is true, then if God commanded us to rape we would be required to rape” is true only of divine command theories which do not postulate a causal explanation of moral requirements. In other words (P1) is true only in cases where the word “power” excludes causal relationships. (P2) however is defensible only if the word power refers to causal powers. If it is understood more broadly to refer to constitutive explanations of Gods commands (P2) is false. It isn’t true that any omnipotent being can perform an action which is identical with the action of another being. The crucial premise (P4) then commits the fallacy of equivocation.


     

    [1] Jason Thibodeau, “God’s Love is Irrelevant to the Euthyphro Problem” Sophia:1-17 (forthcoming)

    [2] Jason Thibodeau, “God’s Love is Irrelevant to the Euthyphro Problem” 9,

    [3] Stephen Sullivan, “Arbitrariness, divine commands, and morality” International Journal of Philosophy of Religion 33 (1) (1993) 33-45