In Part I of my review of the debate between Sam Harris and William Lane Craig on the moot “Is the Foundation of Morality Natural or Supernatural? I discussed Craig’s defence of the contention that:
1. If God exists then we have a plausible account of (a) the nature of moral goodness and (b) the nature of moral obligation.
I noted that Harris’s attempt to refute this conditional failed miserably. However, he did not just offer a negative case; Harris contended that:
2. If atheism is true then we have a plausible account of (a) the nature of moral goodness and (b) the nature of moral obligation.
Harris defended 2(a) by contending that moral goodness could be identified with human well-being, which he “in turn” identified with physical states of the brain. Harris defended 2(b) by identifying our moral obligations with the property of promoting human well-being. Harris suggested that this means that moral questions are scientific questions that can be answered by science.
Harris’s Argument for Ethical Naturalism
Harris’s argument for 2(a) consisted of three claims. First, he proposed a thought experiment of a world without conscious beings. Intuitively, we judge that nothing is good or bad in this world because nothing matters to anyone in such a world, since there is no one for anything to matter to. Harris concluded that the existence of goodness is dependent on conscious beings.
Second, Harris asked us to imagine a world full of conscious creatures who live forever in excruciating pain. We intuitively judge this state of affairs to be bad and we intuitively assume a duty to avoid it.
Third, since states of consciousness are brain states, science can develop ways of promoting these states.
However, this argument fails to establish Harris’s conclusion. The first claim shows only that goodness depends on the existence of conscious beings. It does not show that goodness is a state of consciousness. Moreover, the second and third premises affirm that we have a duty to avoid maximising pain and that science can tell us how to fulfil this duty. It does not show that moral obligation is the property of promoting or enhancing human flourishing. Nor does the argument show that science can answer moral questions.
The argument, in fact, relies on people determining, by moral intuition, what things are good and what obligations we have prior to scientific investigation. After this is determined science is used to ascertain how to fulfil these duties. Nothing in Harris’s argument implies that science can discover what our duties are or what is good in the first place.
Moreover, as I noted in my previous post, this method involves accepting moral beliefs as properly basic. However, if it is the case that we can accept moral beliefs as properly basic then what is the problem with Alvin Plantinga’s contention that belief in God is properly basic? What exactly is it about religious beliefs that disqualifies them from being basic in the same way Harris contends moral beliefs are? (more…)


