Category: Philosophers

  • Sinnott-Armstrong on God, Secularism and “reasons” to be moral. Part two: Do unselfish reasons answer the question, “Why be moral?”

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    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong discusses the following objection:

    “Harming others is sometimes in some people’s best interest, even considering probable costs. In those cases, some theists say that only a divine threat of Hell provides a reason to be moral. Since atheists and agnostics do not believe in God, they do not believe in divine retribution for sins, so they have to admit that sometimes some people could get away with immorality and then they have no self-interested reason to be moral. Does that mean that these people have no reason at all to be moral?”[1]

    He responds to this argument as follows:

    No. That conclusion would follow only if every reason had to be self-interested, selfish, or egoistic. There is no basis for that assumption. Many reasons are not based on self-interest. That should be common ground between theists and atheists… The fact that an act prevents harm to another person can be a reason for me to do that act. The fact that an act causes harm to another person can be a reason for me not to do that act. These facts are reasons, even if the other people are strangers. Crucially, these reasons are not self-interested. They are facts about the interests of other people, not me. These unselfish reasons can answer the question, “Why be moral?”[2]

    Here, Sinnott-Armstrong makes three points. First, the argument in question assumes that “all reasons are selfish.” Second, this assumption is false—“it should be common ground between theists” that there are also “unselfish reasons,” based on the fact that certain acts harm others. Third, these “unselfish reasons” can answer the question: why be moral?

    Do non-selfish reasons answer the question: “Why be moral?”

    I discussed the first point in a previous post. In this post, I will discuss the third: do the non-selfish reasons he appeals to answer the question “Why be moral?”

    In my previous post, I noted that the question “Why be moral?” can be understood in two ways. Armstrong’s interlocutor could be asking:

    (a) whether, in the given circumstances, we have a pro tanto reason to refrain from harm; or
    (b) whether, in those circumstances, we have decisive reasons not to harm.

    I also pointed out that interpreting the question in terms of (a) is idiosyncratic. The way the question is commonly used—and the most plausible understanding of it—is in terms of (b).

    Whether an appeal to unselfish reasons answers the question “Why be moral?” depends on how you interpret the question. If we interpret it in terms of (a), then the fact that an action harms another person would answer the question. Sinnott-Armstrong’s hypothesis is that the property of being morally wrong is constituted by the property of harming another person. Suppose the fact that an action harms another person provides a pro tanto reason not to do that action—in that case, we have a pro tanto reason not to do what is wrong.

    The problem is that this is an extremely weak and idiosyncratic rendition of the skeptical challenge. As Mark Murphy points out:

    It would be helpful if Sinnott-Armstrong had named an opponent here who thought that this was the real challenge for the nontheistic ethicist. The worry is not characteristically expressed by theistic ethicists in terms of whether there is any reason to do what is morally right in the absence of God; the worry is characteristically expressed in terms of whether there could be overriding, or decisive, reason to do what is all-things-considered morally required.[3]

    In my last post, I pointed out that in his writings on moral skepticism, Sinnott-Armstrong himself has noted that the “Why be moral?” question is not normally understood in terms of whether there is “sometimes some kind of reason to be moral.” Instead:

    “A more plausible and common version of practical moral skepticism denies, instead, that there is always an adequate (or non-overridden) reason to do what is morally required.”[4]

    If we interpret the question in terms of (b), Sinnott-Armstrong’s appeal to the fact that an action “harms” another person does not answer the question “Why be moral?” His interlocutor argues that if a secular meta-ethical theory is true, then certain kinds of practical dilemmas will occur. What is prudentially required will be an act that harms others. We will therefore have self-interested or prudential reasons to do the act, and unselfish reasons not to do it. If such dilemmas occur, we face a question: What reason is there to act unselfishly rather than in one’s self-interest? What reason do we have for always giving precedence to impartial demands in such cases?

    Murphy explains:

    “The worry is that there are different kinds of reason that can pull in different directions, and it is not obvious that there is any practical error in choosing against a more impartial point of view by going with the more partial point of view.”[5]

    If I face a dilemma between two options—doing an act that harms others or doing an act that is contrary to my own interest—pointing out that one option involves harming others doesn’t solve the dilemma. What we need is some reason for always treating the impartially based demands as having precedence. Sinnott-Armstrong provides no such reason. In fact, later in the chapter, he is candid that he cannot give any such reason. He writes:

    The fact that an act causes harm to others is a reason not to do that act, and the fact that an act prevents harm to others is a reason to do that act. There is, then, always a reason to be moral on this secular account. And often these reasons are adequate, because they are strong enough to make it rational (or not irrational) to be moral….
    Nonetheless, some people still wish for a reason that is strong enough to motivate everyone to be moral and also to make it always irrational to be immoral. I doubt that secular moral theories can establish that strong kind of reason to be moral. For people who really do not care about others, the solution is found in retraining or restraining rather than in theory. (emphasis mine)[6]

    Note what is being said here: Armstrong is saying that if the best secular accounts of morality are true, agents do not always have all-things-considered reasons to do what is morally right. Sometimes they will, and sometimes they will not. In these latter cases, people will have adequate—and possibly even conclusive—all-things-considered reasons to violate moral norms. The solution to this is an appeal to naked force. What we need to do is force these people to act in ways that they have sufficient or decisive reasons not to act.

    This seems an inadequate answer. Consider the following analogy: critics of monotheistic religions like Christianity, Judaism, or Islam often ask, “What reason do I have to adopt your religion?” This is not a question of belief but of action. Adopting a religion involves living a certain way. Skeptics ask: What reasons do I have to commit to faithfully following what you take to be God’s commands, especially when doing so often goes against my aims or interests?

    Imagine a theist responded to this as follows: “You don’t have compelling reasons to do this. In fact, you have good reason not to do this. The balance of reasons does not support such a commitment and may in fact be against it. However, if you don’t convert, I will persecute you.” Would any religious skeptic think their concerns had been answered?

    In the same way, I suggest that no one who was not already committed to secular morality would find Sinnott-Armstrong’s response here adequate.

    Later, Armstrong offers a different answer:

    Is this limitation a problem for secular accounts of morality? I doubt that, too. If we demand this extreme kind of reason to be moral, then we are bound to be disappointed. The solution to our disappointment is to give up this demand, not to imagine a higher power that we want to fulfill an illegitimate demand. Besides, this limit on secular theories would be a problem only if the alternative religious account could provide a better reason to be moral. It can’t. That is what I will show in the next section.[7]

    Here, Sinnott-Armstrong’s position appears to be twofold:

    First, the fact that a secular theory cannot answer the question “Why be moral?” is only a problem if religious theories can answer that question adequately. If they cannot, then this is a problem for all theories—and hence not a reason to favour one over another.

    Second, he claims that a religious theory cannot answer this question either. In fact, he seems to think no theory can. The appropriate response, he suggests, is to give up the demand.

    In a future post, I will examine Sinnott-Armstrong’s reasons for these two claims. I will argue that they fail.


    [1] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 114

    [2] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God 117

    [3] Mark Murphy’s, Morality Without God, available at https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/morality-s-without-god-s/ accessed 28 August 2025

    [4] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Practical Moral Skepticism, available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral/supplement.html accessed 28 August 2025

    [5] Mark Murphy’s, Morality Without God, available at https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/morality-s-without-god-s/ accessed 28 August 2025

    [6] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God 117-118

    [7] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God 118

     

  • Michael Huemer on Wokeness

    Political Philosopher Michael Huemer weighs in on the question: what is wokeness?

    I have been known to describe the essence of wokism as “reverse bigotry”. In the past, various forms of bigotry were common: prejudice against blacks, against women, against gays, against transgender people, and more. Wokism proposes, rather than to eliminate bigotry, to reverse the direction of traditional bigotry: replace anti-black racism with anti-white (or pro-black) racism; replace anti-female sexism with anti-male sexism; etc.

    Now you might think this an unfair description of the views listed in section 1. For instance, just because someone thinks that America is systemically racist against blacks, doesn’t mean that they support racism against whites, does it?

    Two things to note:

    One, the people who say that are basically blaming white people for the problems suffered by blacks as a group. They are saying that racism (which is, on their view, one of the greatest evils of the world) on the part of white people is responsible for black disadvantage. Sometimes they say the racism is “systemic”, which means that there need not be any actual racists, but many of them say that the racism is ongoing in the hearts of white people today. Anyway, even the systemic racism was caused by evil white people in the past.

    For a thought experiment, ask yourself what you would think about a person who explained most of the evils of the modern world as the product of wrongful behavior or evil character on the part of the Jews, either now or in the past. There are actually people like this. We call them “anti-Semites”, and they are obviously racists. If you replace “Jews” with “whites”, then you just have a different form of racism.

    The full article is available here at Huemer’s blog Fake Nous.

  • Evil, limited, and Indifferent deities: The Horrendous Deeds Objection Redivivus?

    Last week, I was scheduled to present the above paper at the Annual Meeting of the Evangelical Philosophical Society at Fort Worth, Texas. Unfortunately, Auckland’s lockdown prevented this, and the paper had to be cancelled due to the logistics involved. I did, however, pre-record the talk, so it is available below:

    Abstract: A common objection to divine command meta-ethics (‘DCM’) is the horrendous deeds objection. Critics object that if DCM is true, anything at all could be right, no matter how abhorrent or horrendous. Defenders of DCM have responded by contending that God is essentially good: God has certain character traits essentially, such as being loving and just. A person with these character traits cannot command just anything. 

    Recently, Jason Thibodeau[1] has offered a new version of the horrendous deed’s objection. Thibodeau, asks us to imagine the existence of Yod, a being just like God, who lacks omnibenevolence. Thibodeau argues that if God’s commands can ground morality so can Yod’s and Yod can command horrendous deeds. In this paper I examine and refute Thibodeau’s argument. I look at three interpretations of Thibodeau’s of objection (a) the objection from God’s moral grounding power, (b) the objection from evil and indifferent deities, and (c) the objection from lesser deities. I will maintain all of them fail.

    Appeals to moral-grounding power, malevolent, indifferent, or lesser benevolent deities, do not salvage the horrendous deeds objection.

     



    [1] Thibodeau, J. (2019). God’s love is irrelevant to the Euthyphro problem. Sophia, 58(3), 437–453.

  • Can a Divine Command Theory Vindicate the Objectivity of Morality: Huemer on Observer Independence, part two

    In my last post, I discussed Michael Huemer’s argument that a divine command theory cannot vindicate the objectivity of moral requirements. As I interpret him, the  argument is:

    [1] Our commitment to morality presupposes that moral requirements are objective.

    [2] Moral requirements are objective just in case there obtain facts about what is right and wrong that do not constitutionally depend upon the attitude of observers towards the objects of evaluation.

    [3] If divine command metaethics is true, facts about right and wrong constitutively depend upon the attitudes of an observer towards the objects of evaluation.

    I think [3] and [1] are questionable.

    Let us begin with [3]. For [3] to be accurate, a divine command theory must entail that facts about right and wrong constitutively depend upon the attitudes of an observer. It is not enough that these facts depend upon God’s attitudes in some way or other. These attitudes must constitute moral facts in part or whole.

    Why think that [3] is true? Presumably, the inference goes like this:  If a divine command theory is true, then facts about right and wrong are identical with facts about what actions have been commanded by God. However, facts about what actions have been commanded and prohibited by God are constituted by facts about God’s attitudes. So, a divine command theory entails that facts about observers attitudes constitute deontic facts.

    However, it is not evident that facts about what actions have been commanded and prohibited by God are constituted by facts about God’s attitudes. In the literature, it is common to distinguish divine command theories from divine will or attitude theories.[1] Divine will theories contend that God’s attitudes towards certain actions constitute deontological facts. By contrast, a divine command theory contends deontological facts are identical with facts about what actions have been commanded by God.  Attitudes and commands are not the same things. Robert Adam’s stresses that “moral obligation is understood in terms of what God requires of us”. But, “requiring is something we do in relationship to each other it essentially involves communicative acts”. It is not logically equivalent to having a positive or negative attitude towards that action.

    The difference between commanding and merely willing is significant. Divine command theorists like Adam’s defend a divine command theory because they believe “the will of a legislature imposes no obligations without being commanded”. To illustrate this, Adam’s provides some examples, where what a person desires or wills and what the command comes apart.

     “Religiously, obedience to God is in large part a matter of respect for God; and interhuman examples suggest that respect would follow commands in preference to unexpressed desires. The wait staff in a restaurant show me benevolence, perhaps, but scant respect, if they bring me what they think I want instead of what I actually ordered.” [2]

    So, when a divine command theorist claims deontological facts are identical with facts about what actions God commanded, it doesnt follow that God’s attitudes constitute these facts. To get that conclusion, we need to assume that commands are constituted by attitudes. Seeing someone can command X without a pro attitude towards it, and someone can have a pro attitude towards x without commanding this is not obvious.

    This brings us to [1], Suppose divine command theories do entail moral facts constitutively depend upon an observer’s (i.e. God’s) attitudes. This is only problematic if our commitment to morality presupposes that moral facts are objective in this sense of the word.  If we define an objective fact as a fact that does not constitutively, as opposed to causally, depend on an observer’s attitudes. It does not seem to me that [1] is true.

    Objectivist metaethical theories’ plausibility consists of their accounting for and vindicating certain presuppositions of our moral thought and practice.  Our moral thought and practice assume that beings like you and I can make mistaken judgements. We have limited information, are prone to biases, and make errors of fact and reason. We reason about morality to discern which evaluations our human compatriots are correct and which are not. We use reasons to support and verify some judgments and criticize others showing they are mistaken.  We defend some of the evaluations of our society against criticisms.[3] We reject others as oppressive, immoral and in need of reform. We think our society made moral progress by rejecting slavery and racial segregation. We believe the Nazi’s evaluation of racism was mistaken, and Martin Luther King Juniors was closer to the truth.  We think some moral reformers who criticized widely endorse policies were correct. They have given us a better understanding of what is right and wrong. We believe certain actions, like the rape and murder of a small child, are wrong even if I or my society endorsed them.

    In Ethical Intuitionism, Huemer himself emphasises several of these assumptions. He notes (i) the judgements of Neo Nazi’s and Nazi society were mistaken.  (ii) That we engage in real disagreement with our compatriots, but individually and collectively contradicting what they say and offering reasons for and against their judgements. (iii) That individuals and societies are not infallible moral judges and (iv) that human judgements can be based on arbitrary reasons.[4]

    These assumptions presuppose moral facts obtain independently of the evaluation of human appraisers: appraisers like you and I who are subject to these cognitive deficiencies. Who are fallible, make mistakes, can be prejudiced and arbitrary, and ignorant of relevant facts.  They do not presuppose that this independence is only constitutive. They do not assume this independence applies to all possible appraisers. Even an infallible omniscient, impartial appraiser upon whose will everything else depends for its existence.

    Two examples will illustrate this.  Take a crude relativist theory: where actions are morally required if and only if, and because, my social group approves of them. This theory is a paradigmatic example of a subjectivist theory. All most everyone rejects it because it contradicts the objectivist presuppositions of moral thought.  Yet, according to Huemer’s view, whether this theory vindicates the objectivity of morality depends solely on whether societies approval causes or constitutes moral facts.

    Suppose there are two versions of this theory. (a) One claims the property of being morally required is identical to the property of being socially approved.  (b), Another claims my society can directly and immediately bring it about that I am required to do something by approving of it. Neither of these theories will vindicate the objectivists presuppositions of our moral thought. Both will entail that correct evaluation are co-extensive with the attitudes of my society. So, both will have implications that contradict the relevant presuppositions mentioned above. Nevertheless, in Huemer’s view, (b) entails that moral facts are objective and (a) does not.  Consequently,  a theory can vindicate the objectivity of morality, in Huemer’s sense of the word, yet fail to vindicate any objectivist presuppositions of our moral thought and practice.

    A second example, consider a form of naturalistic moral realism whereby moral facts are facts about the causal properties of certain actions. Rightness just is the property an action has when it tends to increase or enhance our happiness. Wrongness just is the property an action has when it tends to diminish our happiness. This is a paradigmatic objectivist theory. It makes wrongness depend on facts about causal physical properties of actions. It vindicates the objectivist presuppositions of our moral thought and practice. The judgements human appraisers make about causal properties can fail to correspond to causal reality.   Yet on Huemer’s view, whether this theory vindicates the objectivity of morality depends solely on what its advocates believe about the ontology of laws of nature.

    Suppose John and Mary jointly develop and defend a theory of this sort. Although they agree on the ontology of moral facts, John and Mary have different views on the ontology of laws of nature. Mary is an atheist who accepts David Armstrong’s thesis that laws of nature are a form of natural necessity[5]. By contrast, John is a Theist who accepts the view of early modern scientists that laws of nature are just the laws by which God governs the natural world. He accepts Alvin Plantinga’s[6] and John Foster’s[7] defence of the thesis that Laws of nature are divine decrees. 

    John and Mary advocate the same meta-ethical theory. But, Huemer’s definition entails that Mary’s theory vindicates the objectivity of morality and John’s theory does not. Their thesis is that certain causal properties of actions constitute the wrongness of actions. John believes that causal laws are constituted by God’s willing certain regularities occur. So, John is committed to claiming that wrongness constitutively depends on God’s will.  Mary has no such commitments.

    However, this difference between Mary and John makes no difference whatsoever for how well their joint theory vindicates the objectivist assumptions of our moral discourse. Consequently, a theory can fail to vindicate the objectivity of morality in Huemer’s sense and yet vindicate all the objectivist features of our moral discourse.

    If I am correct about this, the kind of objectivity presupposed by our moral commitments has nothing to do with whether moral facts are “constitutional” independent of any observer or appraiser.


    [1] Examples of divine will theories include those of; Matthew Carey Jordan (2012),“Divine Attitudes, Divine Commands, and the Modal Status of Moral Truths,” Religious Studies 48: 45–60; Mark Murphy (1998), “Divine Command, Divine Will, and Moral Obligation,” Faith and Philosophy 15: 3–27; Christian Miller (2009), “Divine Desire Theory and Obligation,” in Yujin Nagasawa and Erik Wielenberg (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Religion (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan); and Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (2004), Divine Motivation Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

    [2] Robert Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 260

    [3] Think of the perennial moral debate between conservatives and progressives, which is over what social norms to preserve and defend and what to reform.

    [4] Michael Huemer, Ethical Intuitionism, (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) 49-53.

    [5] David Armstrong, What is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987)

    [6] Alvin Plantinga, “Law, Cause, and Occasionalism” Reason and Faith: Themes from Richard Swinburne, (Eds.) Michael Bergmann and Jeffrey E. Brower (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) 126-143.

    [7] John Foster, The Divine Lawmaker: Lectures on Induction, Laws of Nature, and the Existence of God, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 

  • Can a Divine Command Theory Ground the Objectivity of Morality? Michael Huemer on Observer Independence: Part One

    In a previous post  I criticized David Brink’s argument that a divine command theory cannot vindicate the objectivity of morality. Brink argued:

    [1] Our commitment to morality presupposes that moral requirements are objective

    [2] Moral requirements are objective just in case facts about what is right or wrong obtain independently of the moral beliefs or attitudes of appraisers.

    [3] If divine command metaethics is true, facts about right and wrong depend on the attitude of an appraiser.

    In response, I noted two possible interpretations of appraiser independence: (a) a weaker sense, where moral facts obtain independently of the attitudes of any actual human appraisers.  Alternatively, (b) a stronger sense, where moral facts obtain independently of the attitudes of any appraiser whatsoever. I pressed a dilemma:  If we adopt the weaker understanding of appraiser independence, premise [3] is clearly false. By contrast, if we adopt the stronger interpretation, premise [3] is true, but. [1] is unmotivated. The presuppositions of moral do not commit us to this stronger conception of appraisal independence. We can account for the presuppositions of our moral practice equally well on the weaker interpretation. In a later post, I offered similar criticisms of an analogous argument by Elizabeth Tropman.

    Michael Huemer anticipates this line of criticism. “[The divine command theorist] might say that morality is objective as long as it does not depend upon human observers; it can still depend upon non-human observers.” He responds:

    I try not to spend too much time on semantic debates, so I will just say I think this would be an artificial way of drawing boundaries. Physical facts-the paradigm of objectivity- are not constitutively dependent on any observers whatsoever, they can exist by themselves. If one says that physical facts need some special observer, then one is conceding they are not objective facts in the robust sense that other observers are.[1]

    Huemer refers to paradigmatic cases of objective and subjective facts.  Physical facts are paradigms of objective facts: “If there is a cat on the table, then that is true regardless of whether anyone believes it, or wants it to be true, and so on. The cat can be there with no one at all being aware of it.”[2]. By contrast, “funniness” is a paradigm of a subjective fact. “Whether a joke is funny depends on whether it would tend to amuse. People. Facts about, our reaction to the joke constitute its funniness”.[3] Huemer thinks his unrestricted sense of appraiser independence[4] uses the word “objective” in the same sense as it is used in paradigmatic cases. The restricted sense does not.

    Prima facie, this is mistaken. If there is a cat on the table, that will be true whether or not any actual or hypothetical human being “believes it, or wants it to be true”. But that is not true if the observer in question is God.  After all, God creates and sustains all physical objects in being moment by moment according to his will. If God did not will the cat and table exist, neither would be there. Consequently, physical objects are not objective according to an unrestricted understanding of appraiser independence.

    William Lane Craig raises this point in his response to Huemer.

    [O]n theism physical facts are no more dependent on God’s attitudes than are moral facts-indeed being contingent, they are less so-for they depend upon God’s will to create the physical objects and preserve them in being. Observer-dependence, then, ought not to have reference to God, lest the distinction between “objective” and “subjective” collapse. Subjectivism is Huemer’s Pickwickian sense is no longer objectionable.[5]

    Craig mentions a problem for any attempt to define objective facts as facts that obtain independently of all appraisers whatsoever. Because God is the creator and sustained of every contingent being in existence, This definition threatens to collapse the distinction between objective and subjective facts. Facts about anything distinct from God will be subjective facts. By this definition, moral facts will be subjective. However, so will the fundamental laws of physics, the fact that the world is round and numerous paradigmatic examples of objective facts. The word “subjective” will be used in an idiosyncratic way.

    However, I think Huemer  may be able to avoid this implication. At one point, he defines objective morality in a way similar to Brink:” “there is “objective morality” provided that there are truths about what is good or bad, right or wrong, which obtain, independently of the attitude of observers toward the objects of evaluation”. When he argues that a divine command theory entails subjectivism, he is more precise:

    “It [divine command meta-ethics] …is not an objectivist theory. If true it makes morality subjective, not objective. That is because [It] holds that morality constitutively depends on the attitudes of an observer. The observer in this case is a very interesting one-God- but an observer none the less”.[6]

    Here Huemer, says an objective fact is a fact that fact does not constitutively” depend on the attitude of observers towards it. Huemer distinguishes between causal and constitutive independence. The funniness of a joke is a subjective fact, not because the joke causes us to be amused. Instead, our reacting with amusement constitutes its funniness. Funniness just is the tendency to amuse. Consequently, objective facts can depend on the attitude of observers, provided the dependence is causal and not constitutive.[7]

    By emphasising constitutive instead of causal independence, Huemer may be able define objectivity as strong appraiser independence without collapsing the distinction between subjective and objective facts. Suppose the cat is on the table. This fact causally depends upon God’s attitudes, God’s willing that the cat exists it to exist. However, the cat is not reducible or constituted by God’s willing. The cat remains a distinct thing.  Hence it can be objective, despite its existence depending on God’s attitudes.


    I said “may be”. This response may work with physical objects like cats and tables. It is less clear with another paradigmatic example of an objective fact—the fundamental laws of physics.  According to Peter Harrison, the idea of laws of nature was a theological concept developed by early modern scientists such as Descartes, Boyle, Newton, and various others.[1] Whereas Aristotle had explained regularities in nature in terms of intrinsic dispositional properties of natural objects, their nature or substantial form, these early modern thinkers understood regularities as imposed upon nature by God.  Laws of nature were laws God laid down which govern the physical world. Some contemporary philosophers, notably Alvin Plantinga[2] and John Foster[3], have defended this account of laws.

    The details of their position do not concern us here. The issue is this. Imagine Descartes and others were correct, and laws of nature are just laws God laid down that govern nature. It would follow from Heumer’s definition that the laws of physics were “subjective facts” because they are constituted by the will of an observer: God. However, it is hard to see anything of substance that follows from this. This conclusion does not suggest that “we” made up the laws of physics. It does not suggest “they are not real”, or they are “social constructs”, or are useful “fictions”. It does not mean that they depend on us for their existence, so that if we ceased to exist, so would they. It does not follow they are not true really true, or that we cannot be mistaken about them, and so on. Everything that leads us to see the laws as hard objective facts would be untouched. By contrast, if we held that laws of physics were laws “we” made up and based on our decisions, that would radically undermine scientific realism.

    I will return to this point later; for now, let us assume Huemer can avoid collapsing the distinction between objective and subjective in this way. His argument would be as follows:

    [1] Our commitment to morality presupposes that moral requirements are objective. 

    [2] Moral requirements are objective just in case there obtain facts about what is right and wrong that do not constitutionally depend upon the attitude of observers towards the objects of evaluation.

    [3] If divine command metaethics is true, facts about right and wrong constitutively depend upon the attitudes of an observer towards the objects of evaluation.

    I think there are two difficulties with this argument. If limit the kind of appraiser independence moral facts must display to “constitutional independence”. Then [3] and [1] are questionable. In my next post, I will spell out why I think this is the case in more detail.


    [1] Michael Huemer “Groundless Morals”, A Debate on A Debate on God and Morality What is the Best Account of Objective Moral Values and Duties? Eds. Erik Wielenberg, William Land Craig and Adam Johnson (New York: Routledge, 2021) 150-151. Kindle

    [2] Huemer, “Groundless Morals” 149

    [3] Ibid, 150

    [4] Huemer uses the word “observer independence” instead of “appraiser independence”, his reference to an observer’s attitudes towards “the object of evaluation”; however, suggests he is thinking of an appraiser. I will use both appraiser independence and observer independence interchangeably to describe Huemer’s view.

    [5] William Lane Craig, “William Lane Craig’s Final Remarks”, A Debate on A Debate on God and Morality What is the Best Account of Objective Moral Values and Duties? Eds. Erik Wielenberg, William Land Craig and Adam Johnson (New York: Routledge, 2021) 196, Kindle

    [6] Huemer, “Groundless Morals”, 150

    [7] See chapter 1 of Michael Huemer, Ethical Intuitionism (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) for the elaboration of this point.

    [8] Peter Harrison “The Development of the Concept of a Law of Nature” Creation: Law and Probability ed Fraser Watts (Ashgate, 2008) 13-36

    [9] Alvin Plantinga, “Law, Cause, and Occasionalism” Reason and Faith: Themes from Richard Swinburne, (Eds.) Michael Bergmann and Jeffrey E. Brower (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) 126-143.

    [10] John Foster, The Divine Lawmaker: Lectures on Induction, Laws of Nature, and the Existence of God, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 



  • Does the Incommensurability of Prudential and Impartial rationality avoid the dualism of Practical Reason?

    I have been discussing the dualism of practical reason. As I understand it, this is an inference from three premises:

    [1] We always have most reason to do what is morally required

    [2] An act is morally required if and only if it is impartially demanded: demanded by rules justified from a perspective of impartial benevolence.

     [3] If there are cases where, what is impartially demanded of a person, is an action contrary to their long-term self-interest, then the strongest reasons do not always favour what is impartially demanded.

    The conclusion: unless we assume that requirements of self-interest never substantially conflict with impartial demands, we can only coherently affirm [1] and [2]. Seeing [1] is a plausible thesis about the authority of requirements, and [2] is a plausible thesis about their content.  Our fundamental moral intuitions about morality cannot be reconciled.

    One response to this argument is to deny [3]. This involves contending that impartial requirements are overriding: If impartial and prudential requirements clash, the former always take precedence. In my last post, I mentioned an argument made by Stephen Layman against this contention.   Layman asks us to consider the case of Ms Poore;

    Ms. Poore has lived many years in grinding poverty. She is not starving, but has only the bare necessities. She has tried very hard to get ahead by hard work, but nothing has come of her efforts. An opportunity to steal a large sum of money arises. If Ms. Poore steals the money and invests it wisely, she can obtain many desirable things her poverty has denied her: cure for a painful (but nonfatal) medical condition, a well-balanced diet, decent housing, adequate heat in the winter, health insurance, new career opportunities through education, etc. Moreover, if she steals the money, her chances of being caught are very low, and she knows this. She is also aware that the person who owns the money is very wealthy and will not be greatly harmed by the theft. Let us add that Ms. Poore rationally believes that if she fails to steal the money, she will likely live in poverty for the remainder of her life. In short, Ms. Poore faces the choice of stealing the money or living in grinding poverty the rest of her life. In such a case, I think it would be morally wrong for Ms. Poore to steal the money; and yet, assuming there is no God and no life after death, failing to steal the money will likely deny her a large measure of personal fulfillment, i.e., a large measure of what is in her long-term best interests[1].

    Layman takes this case to illustrate that impartial requirements are not overriding.  If there are cases where impartial demands require us to make a great sacrifice that confers relatively modest benefits on others, the strongest reasons do not support complying with impartial demands.[2] 

    Peter Bryne has criticised Layman’s example. He writes:

    Layman’s way of approaching his moral argument suggests the following picture: rational agents are aware of a variety of reasons for action. They see prudential reasons vying with moral reasons. They measure whether moral reasons for doing something outweigh prudential reasons for not doing it, and they follow that set of reasons which is stronger overall. Now it is time to ask the question “From what standpoint does Layman’s rational agent weigh or measure reasons for action?[3] 

    Bryne thinks this is question raises an important challenge:

    The unclarity in the language of weighing reasons for action, and of judging which reasons are stronger than others, lies in the fact that such language implies a common, neutral means of measuring the reasons. The very contrast, however, between morality and self-interest suggests that there can be no such means. The agent is faced with a choice between points of view and perspectives. From within a point of view or perspective, there can be weighing. What remains a mystery is how any agent could measure the relative strengths of the two kinds of consideration from neither the moral or prudential point of view but from a neutral standpoint.[4]

    Bryne’s criticism seems to be this. Layman example imagines an agent “weighing” impartial reasons against prudential reasons against each other and attempting to answer the question as to which reasons are stronger or take precedence. This implies there is some rational perspective, which is neutral between prudence and impartial demands, which can weigh and adjudicate them in a conflict. 

    Bryne thinks this is misleading. The clash between prudential and impartial reasons involves a clash between requirements justified by incommensurable points of “points of view” or “perspectives”. These points of view are perspectives on what interests to take into account and how much weight to give them. The impartial point of view is a perspective that takes into account everyone’s interests and forms a conclusion based on giving these interests equal weight and consideration. From this point of view, you always have decisive reasons to do what is impartially required. By contrast, the prudential point of view is a view that only gives takes into account the interest of the individual agent and gives equal weight to the future and past interests of this individual agent. From this perspective, you should always act in your long-term self-interest. 

    Because these are differing perspectives on what interests to take into account and how much weight to give conflicting interests, there can be no question-begging way of weighing the conclusions of each procedure against each other. You can weigh reasons for and against actions in accord with one or more of these perspectives. You can have allegiance to one or both perspectives, and weigh from that perspective. One can also give up allegiance to one perspective in favour of another. But, when they clash, you cannot accept both perspectives simultaneously and weigh them against each other. 

    I am inclined to think Byrne’s response here misses the point. Consider how Ms Poore’s case appears on Bryne’s analysis. Ms. Poore “faces the choice of stealing the money or living in grinding poverty the rest of her life”. However, you analyse this; she still has to choose what to do in this situation; she must act one way or the other. In Bryne’s terms, we can ask Which perspective should she use in making the decision and weighing the relevant factors. Which point of view should she give allegiance to? Which should she give up allegiance to? Bryne’s analysis seems to imply there is no reason one can give for or against either answer. There is no “rational” or “neutral point of view” by which she can make this choice. The implication is that Ms Poore does not have stronger or weightier reasons to do what is impartially required. This isn’t because prudential reasons sometimes outweigh or trump impartial reasons, but because one cannot coherently claim one is weightier than the other without begging the very question at issue. 

    Concerns about the dualism of practical reason are concerns about a specific sort of practical dilemma. Suppose it is not always in one’s long-term self-interest to act according to impartial demands. This will mean impartial demands sometimes come into conflict with prudential requirements. When they do, we face the question: What reason is there to act impartially, rather than in one’s self-interest. What reason do we have for assuming that impartial demands are always stronger or weightier than prudential requirements when the two clash? The concern is that no answer to this question is forthcoming. If impartial and prudential requirements cannot be weighed against each other, then its hard to see how the former can always be weightier or take precedence in a clash. If they are incommensurable, we cannot have reasons for preferring one to the other.

    Several commentators argue that this is precisely Sidgwick’s point when he agonised over the dualism of practical reason[5]. Note the argument Sidgwick gives for [3]

    [U]nless the egoist affirms, implicitly or explicitly, that his own greatest happiness is not merely •the rational ultimate end for himself but •a part of universal good; and he can avoid the ‘proof’ of utilitarianism by declining to affirm this. Common sense won’t let him deny that the distinction between himself and any other person is real and fundamental; so it puts him in a position to think: ‘I am concerned with the quality of my existence as an individual in a fundamentally important sense in which I am not concerned with the quality of the existence of anyone else’; and I don’t see how it can be proved that this distinction ought not to be taken as fundamental in fixing the ultimate goal of an individual’s rational action… If an egoist isn’t moved by what I have called proof, the only way of arguing him into aiming at everyone’s happiness is to show that this gives him his best chance of greatest happiness for himself. And even if he admits that the principle of rational benevolence is self-evident, he may still hold •that it is irrational for him to sacrifice his own happiness to any other end;[6] 

    Here, Sidgwick imagines an “egoist”: someone who has “given allegiance” to the prudential point of view and weighs reasons in accord with this perspective. This egoist discovers that an impartial point of view would prohibit some action. Does the egoist have any reason to heed this prohibition? Sidgwick argues that, unless it can be shown that doing so is in his interest, the answer is no. From the egoist’s “perspective” or “point of view,” the effects of the action on his long-term interests is the only factor that carries weight in the decision. Providing does not implicitly give allegiance to an impartial point of view, or he is willing to give up any allegiance he does have to it; he will have no reason to do what is impartially required. Nor does he have any question-begging reason why he should switch allegiance to this point of view. 

    On this interpretation: the dualism of practical reason is the problem that impartial and prudential requirements are requirements justified from incommensurable points of view. Because human beings recognise both prudential and impartial reasons for acting in their practical reasoning, they implicitly give allegiance to both. This is not a problem if their requirements are consistent. But if they contradict each other, we will be rationally committed both to both doing and not doing the same action. The incommensurability of these perspectives means there is no rational basis for resolving the contradiction in favour of impartiality. Sidgwick writes:

    [W]here we find a conflict between self-interest and duty, practical reason, being divided against itself, would cease to be a motive on either side. The conflict would have to be decided by which of two groups of non-rational impulses had more force. So we have this: •The harmony of duty and self-interest is a hypothesis that is required if we are to avoid a basic contradiction in one chief part of our thought.[7]

    We can put it this way: Either prudential and impartial reasons are commensurable, or they are incommensurable. If they are commensurable, then when these requirements clash, we will need some reason for thinking that impartial reasons are always weightier. The Ms Poore case suggests this is not the case. By contrast, suppose that prudential and impartial requirements are incommensurable perspectives, and we cannot weigh them against each other. If they clash, we will have to choose which perspective to follow, and we will have no reason to follow one or the other. It will simply be an arbitrary act of allegiance. Either way, we will lack decisive reasons always to do what is impartiality required.


    [1] C. Stephen Layman “God and the Moral Order” Faith and Philosophy, 23 (2006): 307

    [2] Layman, “God and the Moral Order” 308

    [3] Peter Bryne “God and the Moral Order: A Reply to Layman” Faith and Philosophy, 23:2 (2006): 201

    [4] Bryne, “God and the Moral Order: A Reply to Layman” 206-207:

    [5] See for example, Derek Parfit On What Matters (Volume 1) (Oxford: Oxford University Press : 2011) 130-134. See also Francesco Orsi, “The Dualism of the Practical Reason: Some Interpretations and Responses” Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, 10:2 (2008): 25-26

    [6] Henry Sidgwick, The Method of Ethics, 242 available at https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/sidgwick1874.pdf accessed 20/3/21

    [7] Henry Sidgwick, The Method of Ethics, 284 available at https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/sidgwick1874.pdf accessed 20/3/21

     

     

  • Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma: Part IV

    This is a talk I gave to the Philosophy Club at Glendale Community College in Phoenix, Arizona, this weekend. The talk was followed by a long discussion with some faculty, students at the college, and others who zoomed in.

    In this talk, I introduced and defended a divine command theory of ethics. I divided the talk into three parts. In section I, I set out what modern divine command theories of ethics typically contend. I distinguished this from some common misunderstandings in section II. In Section III, I discussed the Euthyphro dilemma. I argued this objection is not the conclusive rebuttal it is often assumed to be. In my first post, I reproduced sections I and II. My second post began my discussion of the Euthyphro objection in section III. Focusing on the Anything Goes Objection. My third post examined the claim that a divine command theory would, if true, entail that morality is arbitrary. This post concludes this discussion. 

    In my last post, I argued that divine command theories do not entail that morality is arbitrary. If anything, the opposite is the case. A divine command theory entails that actions will be wrong in virtue of those actions’ non-moral properties, properties that would provide an informed, loving and just person with reasons for prohibiting those actions.

    The Vacuity Objection

    Finally, critics press what is known as the vacuity objection. A divine command theory entails that “the doctrine of the goodness of God is rendered meaningless”[1]  Oppy puts the objection forcefully: “It cannot be…that God’s commands or decisions determine what is morally good because God is morally good prior to the giving of those commands or the making of those decisions.”[2]  If God is essentially good, he must be good prior to the issue any commands. However, this means that goodness cannot depend upon the existence of these commands. If it did, goodness would exist prior to itself. 

    Like the previous objection, I think this one is based on an equivalent. In the first section of this talk, I pointed out that the word “good” is ambiguous”. I stated that a divine command theory is an account of moral requirements, not an account of goodness in general. This observation is essential here. When divine command theorists say God’s commands determine what is good, they mean only that the existence of moral obligations or moral requirements depends upon God. By contrast, when a divine command theorist says God is good, he means by this that God has certain character traits: God is loving, just, impartial, faithful, in all possible worlds.  

    But the question of whether someone has certain character traits is distinct from whether they have moral requirements to behave in a certain way. 

    Consider a nihilist who denies the existence of objective moral requirements. This nihilist could, if he wanted, choose to live in accord with the norms of justice and could decide to be a faithful, loving and impartial person. What he could not do is claim that there exists any moral obligation to live this way.[3] 

    This distinction removes the sting from Oppy’s objection. God’s commands determine the existence and content of moral requirements. This does not mean his commands determine whether people can have certain character traits. Consequently, God can have these character traits prior to giving any commands.

    Even if, antecedent to commanding, God has no moral duties, it does not follow that he can’t have certain character traits. Traits such as being truthful, benevolent, loving, gracious, merciful. Nor does it mean he is not opposed to actions such as murder, rape, torturing people for fun, and so on. If God has no duties, he is not under any obligation to love others or tell the truth, but that does not mean he cannot love others or be truthful. God does not have to have a duty to do something to do it.

     Conclusion

    The “anything goes,” “arbitrariness,” and “vacuity” objections, therefore, all fail. This is significant because these are the three reasons commonly given for rejecting Divine command theories. Almost everyone who dismisses the claim that morality is dependent upon God cites these three objections as decisive. Seeing that these objections all fail, in the absence of further argument, one cannot proclaim with any confidence that a divine command theory is a flawed theory.


    [1] James Rachels, Elements of Moral Philosophy (New York: Mcgraw-hill Education, 2003), 50.

    [2]Graham Oppy, “Morality Does Not Depend Upon God,” in Problems in Philosophy: An Introduction to the Major Debates on Knowledge, Reality, Values, and Government, ed. Steve Cowan (Bloomsbury Publishing House, Forthcoming 2018).

    [3] For this point, see John L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1981), 26-27.