Category: Philosophers

  • Is Naturalism simpler than Theism? Some reflections on Graham Oppy’s “Best argument against God”

    In Best Argument Against God (BAAG) Graham Oppy sketches a sophisticated argument for atheism. Oppy’s conclusion is the result of applying a particular method to the question of God’s existence. He contends that question of Gods existence should not be determined by examining the arguments for and against the existence of God. Instead philosophy of religion :“is concerned with the clash between theistic and atheistic worldviews (or theories),” The correct way to proceed is: “(1) to develop the best theistic and atheistic theories; (2) to assess the liability of these best theories to internal defeat; and (3) to make an assessment of the comparative theoretical virtues of these best theories, paying attention to simplicity, fit with data, explanatory scope, predictive accuracy, and the like.”[1] The putative data being such things as that “there is something rather than nothing; there being a universe; there being natural laws; there being cosmic fine-tuning; there being rational, conscious agents; there being moral laws; there being dictates of conscience; and so forth.”[2]

    Oppy argues that when this method is followed, there is a good reason to reject the existence of God. He contrasts Theism with naturalism:     the view that “that causal reality is natural reality” and “no supernatural causes exist”.  Looking at how each worldview accounts for such things as the existence of the universe, fine-tuning, morality and various other “putative data”.

     While Oppy thinks both theism and naturalism can provide defensible, coherent theories and that fit the data; naturalism is a preferable worldview because it is simpler. One theoretical virtue we use to asses’ theories is simplicity: “If everything else is equal, we should prefer the more simple theory to the less simple theory.”[3] Oppy argues that  “prior to the introduction of data, naturalism trumps theism on the grounds of simplicity and that none of the data that we consider favours theism over naturalism.”[4]

    I think Oppy claim that “prior to the data naturalism is simpler than theism” is mistaken. It is this claim that I will discuss in this post.

     Oppy’s argument for the simplicity of naturalism 

    Let’s begin by asking why Oppy thinks naturalism is simpler than Theism? Oppy’s argument is succinct:

    Naturalism is simpler than Theism: it postulates fewer kinds of entities, fewer kinds of primitive properties and fewer kinds of primitive principles. According to Theism, there are two kinds of entities – natural and supernatural – whereas according to Naturalism, there is only one kind. According to Theism, there are two kinds of causation – natural causation and supernatural causation – whereas according to Naturalism, there is only one kind.[5]

    There are three ideas here: First,  Oppy claims that [1] According to naturalism there is only one kind of entity and one kind of causation. Natural entities and natural causes.   By contrast [2] theism postulates two kinds of entities and causes, natural and supernatural. Third, Oppy thinks [3] the fact theism postulates more kinds of entities and causes than naturalism means naturalism is simpler. I think each of Oppy’s premises is questionable.

    Criticism of Oppy’s argument

    Does Naturalism postulate only one kind of entity?
    Let us begin with [1] the claim that according to naturalism there is only one kind of entity and one kind of causation. There are two potential problems here.

    First, this conclusion is incompatible with Oppy’s own definition of naturalism. Oppy defines naturalism as follows: “Naturalism says that causal reality is natural reality: the domain of causes is nothing more nor less than the natural world.”[6]  However, according to this definition, naturalism is simply the denial of supernatural causation. It says nothing whatsoever about whether non-natural entices or properties exist, such entities and properties are perfectly possible, provided they don’t enter into causal relationships.

    This brings me to the second problem, let’s suppose for the sake of argument naturalism did contend that only natural properties and entities exist.  This wouldn’t mean that only one kind of entity or property existed. Oppy states:

    Any suitably elaborated naturalism will hold that some features of the natural world are primitive – not susceptible of further explanation – whereas other features of the natural world are fully explained in terms of those primitive features. Thus, for example, some naturalists suppose that all of the primitive features of the natural world are physical features – i.e. features that lie in the proper domain of the discipline of physics. Other naturalists suppose that there are features of the natural world – for example, the psychological states of human beings – that cannot be fully explained in terms of the fundamental physical properties. The key point to note is that all naturalists suppose that there are no supernatural causal properties[7]

    Here Oppy here suggests that when he refers to natural features, properties and he isn’t using this word to refer to one kind of thing, such as material or physical things. Rather the natural world consists of multiple different primitive properties.

    Does theism postulate two kinds of entities and two kinds of causes?

    This brings us to [2] Oppy’s claim that theism postulates two kinds of entities and causes, natural and supernatural. I think this is false. theism is the claim that God exists, hence according to theism a supernatural being with supernatural causal powers exists. But theism by itself, prior to the data, entails nothing about the existence of natural entities or natural causes.

    Nor is this a picky pedantic point because there are prominent forms of theism which affirm neither the existence of natural entities or natural causes. Let’s look first at the question of “natural entities” Some theists notably George Berkeley and Jonathan Edwards have been idealists. According to idealism, the only things that exist are immaterial minds or souls.  Physical objects are purely phenomenal: a physical object is a collection of sensations a mind has such as a perception of shape, colour, a feeling of texture, a smell, and a there is no underlying material substratum to such objects which exist only as sensations in immaterial human or divine minds.    Of course, Idealism has always been a minority view. Most theists today realists: they believe that physical objects do have an underlying substratum, distinct from mental sensations, which exists in space and time and God creates and sustains material objects in being.

    The point, however, is that theism is part of and compatible with both idealism and realism. Whether a Theist postulates the existence of distinct natural entities or not depends on how he accounts for some of the purported data particularly the data that: “there is something rather than nothing; there being a universe; there being rational, conscious agent’s”. Prior to the data, theism affirms only that a supernatural being exists.

    The same point can be made regarding “natural causation”.  Whether there exists natural causes distinct from God’s supernatural causation has been, and is, a matter of dispute amongst Theists. Many theists have advocated concurrentism. Concurrentism is the view that God created the material world with certain natural causal powers and He sustains it in existence, moment by moment, and concurs with the causal transactions that take place in it.  According to concurrentism, while distinct natural properties have natural causal powers exist, they do so by God͛’s creating and sustaining activity, and they require God ͛ s concurring causal activity to operate.

    By contrast, occasionalists have denied the existence of distinct natural causes. All causation is reducible to the supernatural causation of God.    If objects, like fire, appear to cause another object, like cotton, to burst into flame, this is because God has decreed that when a fire is placed next to cotton, cotton will burn.  Natural causation does not involve powers inherent in nature; it occurs because there is a pre-existing law of nature that dictates that when certain events happen, other events will follow.  These laws of nature just are divine decrees.  The result is that all so-called natural causation is really divine causation.  God is the only and sole cause in nature. [8]

    Theism itself a part of and compatible with both concurrentism and occasionalism. Whether a theist postulates the existence of distinct natural causes or not depends on how he accounts for some of the purported data particularly the data that “there are laws of nature”.  Prior to the data, theism affirms only that a supernatural being exists.

    1. If theism postulates more kinds of entities and causes than naturalism, does it follow that naturalism is simpler?

    This brings us to Oppy’s third claim: that if theism postulates more kinds of entities and causes than naturalism does, then naturalism is a simpler worldview. This to contradict the criteria of simplicity which Oppy himself explicitly offers.  Oppy elaborates the criterion of simplicity as follows:

    (a) Simplicity: If everything else is equal, we should prefer the more simple theory to the less simple theory. If everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that postulates fewer (and less complex) primitive entities. If everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that invokes fewer (and less complex) primitive features. If everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that appeals to fewer (and less complex) primitive principles.[9]

    This doesn’t say that all else being equal we should prefer the theory that postulates fewer entities.  It states that “If everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that postulates fewer (and less complex) primitive entities.”Oppy thinks that on any view of the world there will be features which are ‘primitive’; features that are “not susceptible of further explanation” whereas other features of the world are “fully explained in terms of those primitive features” and it is the number, and complexity of primitive features not the number of features per se that is relevant to simplicity.

    Consequently, even if theism does postulate more kinds of entities and causes than naturalism does, it doesn’t follow naturalism is simpler.  This will only follow if Theists hold that these additional types of causes and entities are primitive. This, however, is not the case.  As Oppy himself states, according to theism “God is the cause of the existence of the natural world, and the source or ground or origin of most – if not all – of its significant features.”[10]  Consequentially, the natural causal order isn’t a primitive unexplained entity.


    [1]  Graham Oppy “What Derivations Cannot Do” Religious Studies (2015) 51, 328

    [2] Oppy, “What Derivations Cannot Do”, 51

    [3] Graham Oppy. The Best Argument against God (Palgrave Pivot) (p. 18). Palgrave Macmillan. Kindle Edition

    [4] Oppy, Graham. The Best Argument against God (Palgrave Pivot) (p. 18). Palgrave Macmillan. Kindle Edition.

    [5] Ibid 19

    [6] Ibid 19

    [7] Ibid, 13

    [8] Both within Islamic and Christian intellectual circles there was a rigorous metaphysical debate between concurrentism and occasionalism.  Various Islamic philosophers such as al-Ash͛ari (873-935) founder of the influential Asharite school of Islamic philosophy, and Al  Ghazali  (1055-1111),  all expounded occasionalism.  It was also embraced by Christian theologians, such as Nicholas of Autrecourt (1300-1350).  Pierre d’Ailly (1351-1420), and Gabriel Beil  (1420-1495). George Berkeley, (1685 – 1753) Nicholas Malebranche (1638 – 1715). More recently, it has been defended by John Foster and Alvin Plantinga.

    [9] Oppy, Best Argument against God, 14

    [10] Ibid, 12

  • Matthew Flannagan (MandM) and Jason Thibodeau (Secular Outpost) Debate God and Morality

    Yesterday, I had a long and enjoyable public discussion with Jason Thibodeau on the topic of The Euthyphro dilemma.

    Jason is a writer for the Secular Outpost and teaches philosophy at Cypress college in California. He also is the author of a recent article entitled “God’s Love is Irrelevant to the Euthyphro Problem” published in Sophia  The team at Real Atheology recently interviewed Jason about his paper a couple of weeks prompting  Cameron Bertuzzi from Capturing Christianity to have both of us discuss the matter further on his youtube channel.

    Those who follow MandM regularly will know, Jason and I have been engaging in written exchanges on this issue for several years and he has always been a thoughtful and intelligent dialogue partner. Jason has raised some challenging responses to my arguments and yesterday’s two-hour discussion/ debate was no different. It was one of the better dialogues I have had on religion and morality in a long time. Hopefully, the dialogue generates more light than heat.

    The whole dialogue is available on YouTube here:

     

  • Contemporary Philosophy of Religion and NCEA Religious Studies: Part Four

    This is a talk I gave to the New Zealand Association of Philosophy Teachers annual conference at St Cutherberts College in September this year. Several people have asked me to make this talk available.

    I have broken my talk up into four parts. Part One introduces what philosophy of religion. In part two I will outline two movements within analytic philosophy during the early to mid-century which I think resulted in religious beliefs not being taken very seriously within philosophy and philosophy of religion taking a fairly minor role. Part three will look at some responses to these movements offered in the late 20th century and how they changed the philosophical landscape. Part four will look at the question of “how to do philosophy of religion” comparing the methods used by two different atheist’s J L Mackie and Graham Oppy, and how this relates the National Certificate of Educational Achievement Standards. This post will contain part four.


    How to do Philosophy of Religion: A tale of Two Religious Skeptics

    I think the demise of verifications and the questioning of evidentialism then changed the landscape of philosophy of religion dramatically.  A good way of highlighting the change is to compare the work of two philosophers who probably have made the most rigorous cases for atheism in the last fifty years.

    The first is J L Mackie’s work “The Miracle of Theism” published in 1982. Mackie’s work was for many years the definitive defence of atheism in Philosophy; I quoted Mackie above, let’s look again:

    If it is agreed that the central assertions of theism are literally meaningful, it must also be admitted thatJohn_Leslie_Mackie they are not directly verified or directly verifiable. It follows that any rational consideration of whether they are true or not will involve arguments . . . [i]t [whether or not God exists] must be examined either by deductive or inductive reasoning or if that yields no decision, by arguments to the best explanation; for in such a context nothing else can have any coherent bearing on the issue. (Mackie, Miracle of Theism, 4-6;)

    The second, atheist I want to look at is Graham Oppy; Oppy is a philosopher at Monash University, his book Arguing about God, is rightly hailed as the best contemporary attack on the theistic arguments and he is, in my view, the leading defender of philosophical atheism writing today.  Here is what Oppy says in an article “What Derivations can do” published in 2015.

    Philosophy of religion should not be about the standard array of ‘arguments for and against the existence of God’. Indeed, philosophy of God should not be about the standard array of ‘arguments for and against the existence of God’. In so far as philosophy of religion – or philosophy of God – is concerned with the clash between theistic and atheistic world-views, the proper way to proceed is: (1) to develop best theistic Oppyand atheistic theories; (2) to assess the liability of these best theories to internal defeat; and (3) to make an assessment of the comparative theoretical virtues of these best theories, paying attention to simplicity, fit with data, explanatory scope, predictive accuracy, and the like (  Oppy “What Derivations Cannot Do” Religious Studies (2015) 51, 328

    The contrast between these two writers is illustrative.

    Mackie focuses on the fact that the claim that God exists isn’t verifiable. He acknowledges the collapse of verificationism: despite not being directly verifiable the central assertions of theism are meaningful. However, he does think this lack of verifiability places a burden of proof on the Theist. The Theist is required to produce arguments for Gods existence. Deductive, abductive, inductive, arguments presumably from premises which ultimately are verifiable in this way.  Oppy, by contrast, doesn’t focus on whether the claim “God exists” is verifiable. His focus is on this belief, embedded in broader philosophical theories, verification, when it occurs, is applied to theories.

    An even clearer contrast is over evidentialism.  Mackie affirms evidentialism. He contends that “any rational consideration” of the question of God’s existence depends on the Theist providing “deductive, abductive, inductive arguments for Gods existence. “Nothing else can have any coherent bearing on the issue. Oppy however explicitly repudiates this he states Philosophy of religion should not be about the standard array of ‘arguments for and against the existence of God.”

    Instead, Oppy suggests that the important question is what happens when people utilise theological assumptions in philosophy. Theists and atheists will reason from their prospective presuppositions and construct theories which attempt to answer important philosophical questions. Questions such as “why is there something rather than nothing?” “why are there and what are laws of nature”? “what are moral obligations” and so forth? Philosophy of religion is about how defensible these theories are. Can they be defended against objections, do they provide coherent answers to these questions, and how do the answers they give compare with each other.

    Contemporary Philosophy of Religion and NCEA Achievement Standards.
    You’ll probably guess my sympathies lie with Oppy, and it’s at this point that I think it’s interesting to look at the NCEA standards for Religious Studies

    One barrier to doing Philosophy in secondary schools is the fact there are no nationally recognised qualifications for the subject. There is an absence of any standards for philosophy under NCEA. Many people in this organisation have been lobbying for the government to introduce philosophy as a NCEA subject and I support this cause.

    However, I want to suggest that if one looks at the standards which already exist for NCEA religious studies. There is already in the curricula plenty of scope for doing contemporary Philosophy of religion. In fact, if you move away from an excessive focus on the arguments for and against Gods existence and ask about religious and secular theories, NCEA asks and requires students to engage in contemporary philosophy of religion. The most obvious is the final achievement standard for level 3 NCEA:

    Analyse the key beliefs of a religious tradition and a secular worldview in relation to ultimate questions

    This sounds very much like the method Oppy refers too. Here students are asked to look at secular and religious worldviews and the theories they offer in response to critical philosophical questions. They are told to analyse these views: to discern their key premises and assumptions. When one looks, however, at the Merit and Excellence criteria for this standard it asks students to do work out the implications of these different answers, and to evaluate them, that sounds very much like Contemporary Philosophy of Religion.

    Similarly, in level Three, NCEA asks students to analyse a religious tradition(s) in Aotearoa New Zealand.  And analyse the response of a religious tradition to an ethical issue. Here, again, students are asked to analyse, to work out the assumptions and presumptions, assess the implications significance and evaluate the case for and against particular theories about right and wrong this is all contemporary philosophy of religion.

    Of course, there are challenges to doing philosophy of religion under NCEA. NCEA classifies Religious Studies as a subset of the social sciences, and some moderators tend to interpret the words analyse or implications in more sociological senses. But, if we understand what it actually is to analysis a religious tradition or its response to an ethical issue or how it answers an ultimate question, then we are doing philosophy.

    And I think this applies not just to level three religious studies where the standards require analysis. Consider the level two standard.  “Explain the key beliefs within two religious traditions in relation to a significant religious question.” This uses the word “explain” however the standard defines a significant religious question. As questions regarding ” life after death, the nature of God, the existence of suffering, good and evil, the nature of the human being.” To get an achieved they have to compare how traditions answer these questions. But For merit and excellence, they are asked to ask questions about the significance and what are the implications of these views. This is asking students to engage in philosophical reflection: its asking, if these answers were true what follows, what difference would it make why is it important and so on.

    Even the more descriptive level 1 standards have this, level 1, for example, asks students to “Describe key beliefs of a religious tradition” this sounds purely descriptive however to gain a merit and excellence students are asked to think through the significance of these beliefs, to look at links between the beliefs and to ask questions about their implications. Done well, this has the potential to foster a lot of philosophical reflection on the beliefs in question.

    Conclusion

    So in conclusion, Philosophy of religion involves “the philosophical examination of the central themes and concepts involved in religious traditions”. This has been done by assuming a default position of religious scepticism and examining the arguments for and against religious beliefs or asking if religious beliefs are verifiable and meaningful and the temptation is for this to be the modus operandi in philosophy courses in secondary school.

    I am suggesting a different approach. Today Philosophy of religion is much broader; it involves looking at the answers religions have offered to some of the most profound philosophical answers, developing these as charitably and defensibly as possible and seeing if they can stand against objections. Finally, it involves asking whether religious views of the world answer these questions in a better and more plausible way than secular views do. Interestingly, as worded, this is the sort of questions  NCEA  Religious Studies achievement standards ask of students.

    This means there is plenty of scope for doing Philosophy of religion as part of Religious Studies programs. It is my hope that those of us who want to see philosophy taken seriously in the secondary sector can, where appropriate, use the current NCEA   standards to develop religious studies programs, which ask students to take these questions seriously. To get them to understand clearly various religious perspectives on various issues, to wrestle with them, significance and implications, to compare them to alternative religious or secular theories, and to critically consider the answers given.

    I think this is an important part of a general education. Today’s students grow up in a philosophically pluralistic society, moreover, at a certain point in anyone’s life they will be confronted with different answers to very pressing existential questions, questions which are unavoidable, people will want to know who they are and how they should live. Avoiding these questions or allowing people to be uninformed and ignorant of how others answer them isn’t education. To allow people to be informed about different question’s and to think through carefully and honestly what these answers are, there significance and implications, and to critically evaluate them is in my view what Philosophy at the secondary level should be all about. So, I suggest that Philosophy programs at secondary school start to take seriously religious studies and religious studies take seriously philosophy of religion.

     

     

  • Contemporary Philosophy of Religion and NCEA Religious Studies: Part three

    This is a talk I gave to the New Zealand Association of Philosophy Teachers annual conference at St Cutherberts College in September this year. Several people have asked me to make this talk available.

    I have broken my talk up into four parts. Part One introduces what philosophy of religion. In part two I will outline two movements within analytic philosophy during the early to mid-century which I think resulted in religious beliefs not being taken very seriously within philosophy and philosophy of religion taking a fairly minor role. Part three will look at some responses to these movements offered in the late 20th century and how they changed the philosophical landscape. Part four will look at the question of “how to do philosophy of religion” comparing the methods used by two different atheist’s J L Mackie and Graham Oppy, and how this relates the National Certificate of Educational Achievement Standards. This post will contain part three.

    The late 20th century

    The late twentieth century however late 20th century saw fairly substantial intellectual shifts in analytic philosophy of religion. Here I will focus on two important developments:

    The Demise of Verificationism

    The first was the demise of verificationism. Around the 1960’s various problems began to emerge with the verificationist principle. Take the claim “a statement is only meaningful if it can in principle be either empiricallyphilosophy-of-religion verified or falsified or is analytic” This claim doesn’t seem to be one capable of empirical verification, so is it meaningful? The standard response was that it’s analytic, but the problem here is it seems to become close to a stipulative definition, of course, a person can choose to define the word “meaning” in a particular way. But it’s a lot harder to see verificationism as an account of the way people actually do use various terms or discussions. Some reason is needed as to why a believer should take this account of his own theological discourse seriously.

    Second, various counterexamples and problems began to emerge with verificationism. One area it obviously had application to was ethics. Claims like it’s wrong to rape or kill arent in principle verifiable. So the implication was that ethical statements like this are meaningless. This seems prima facie implausible and attempts by people like Ayer and Hare to develop accounts of moral discourse where moral language didn’t assert anything had trouble explaining how moral argument and disagreement could exist.

    But even in the sciences certain claims which verificationists wanted to consider meaningful became difficult not to rule out. If you defined the definition narrowly then, scientific claims were not meaningful. However, if you broaden what counts as verificationism, it ceases to rule out metaphysical claims or religious ones.

    Take the claim: “there are electrons”. This claim, by itself, is neither verifiable or falsifiable. It’s only when it’s held in conjunction with other claims about what electrons are like, how they operate, and how they are expected to influence the world and our equipment and senses, that we can test them empirically.  But then scientific claims aren’t falsifiable in isolation; rather they are testable only when embedded in broader scientific theories. The same however is true of religious claims, the claim God exists is by itself unfalsifiable. But when part of a broader theory they often are. Consider, claims about God creating the world in six 24 days or a global flood, or that God created a world which contains no suffering and evil are all testable claims.

    The point is the verificationism soon became seen to be problematic at worst, or highly controversial at best. It couldn’t be taken for granted as a kind of intellectual Desiderata for religious claims.

     2. The rejection of Evidentialism.

    Following on from the demise of verificationism, a second important development was some serious works challenging evidentialism as the correct methodology for approaching religious claims. This most notable being those of Alvin Plantinga, though other philosophers such as William Alston, and Nicholas Wolterstorff also contributed.

    Plantinga’s earlier work can be seen as raising a question; why accept evidentialism with regards to belief in God?

     It is important to note that not everything one believes needs to be proven to be rational for at least two reasons. First, the claim that everything must be proven to be rationally believed leads to a regress problem. Roy Clouser notes;

    If everything needs to be proven, then the premises of every proof would need to be proven. But if you need a proof for every proof, you need a proof for your proof, and proof for your proof of a proof and so on-forever. Thus it makes no sense to demand that everything be proven because an infinite regress of proofs is impossible.[1]

    Second, there are many things that we believe quite rationally which cannot be proved. Such things as there is a chair in front of me or that other people have thoughts and feelings. The history of philosophy has shown that when we try to prove the existence of other people or the existence of an external world, it’s notoriously difficult to do so.  Nevertheless, my belief in the existence of other people and the existence of various objects are obviously rational.

    So if not everything needs to be proven, why does Theism need to be proven to be rational?

    This question was put to a conference Alvin Plantinga; the answer he received from a leading sceptic Kai Neilsen is interesting;

    All of us can agree, at least for a large range of cases, whether somebody is in pain, whether he’s thinking, feeling anxious or the like. We do in general agree about these things. Only a madman would claim that no one is ever in pain or that no one ever knows that another person is in pain. The same is true for thinking, feeling anxious or sad and the like… Now the situation is very different in religion[2].

    The basic idea, then, is that religious belief are private beliefs that not all people (at least all sane people educated people) believe; whereas the belief that other people have thoughts and feelings are public beliefs that all people accept and no sane person would doubt. Once we see this, then, I think we can make sense of some of the assumptions at play in evidentialism. Evidentialism affirmed that:

    [1] A belief is  philosophically acceptable if it is either:
    (a) acknowledged to be true by all sane people; or,
    (b) can be proven from premises that are acknowledged to be true by all sane people;

    [2] Religious beliefs are not acknowledged by all sane people nor can they be proven to be true from beliefs acknowledged by all sane people.

    Problems with Evidentialism

    In Plantinga’s earlier work one can find two basic objections against evidentialism.

    The first is to note that if it is true, then almost every philosophical position of any significance is irrational.  As Marilyn Adams points out”[D]efense of any well-formulated philosophical position will eventually involve premises that are fundamentally controversial and so unable to command the assent of all reasonable people.[3]Philip Quinn makes a similar point, “it would seem that the appeal to any comprehensive ethical theory, including all known secular ethical theories, should be disallowed on the grounds that every such theory can be reasonably rejected by some.”[4]. The point is no philosophical position starts from assumptions which are uncontroversial accepted by all controverted by no one. So there is something arbitrary about demanding religious beliefs do.

    The second, more pertinent, response to this objection is to note that [1] is self-refuting. Take the claim explicitly articulated in [1] that if something is not acknowledged to be true by all sane people, then it needs to be proven to be true. Now the truth of this claim itself is not acknowledged by all sane, educated people. Many theologians, philosophers and lay people don’t accept [1] so by [1] we are irrational in believing it unless someone offers a proof for its truth. However, to the best of my knowledge no one has done this; therefore, if [1] is true then the rational response is to reject [1].

    (Note also that any proof the proponent of this argument attempts to offer can only appeal to premises that are accepted by all sane people. If the proponent does not, we will be required to disbelieve the premises and hence the proof.)

    This, then, is the problem with this kind of evidentialist dismissal of theism; the sceptic rejects God’s existence out of allegiance to certain assumptions about what constitutes a rational belief. The problem is that these assumptions are in the same boat as theism is alleged to be; a person who rejects theism because he or she believes these assumptions is acting inconsistently.

    What Plantinga went on to suggest that there was no reason why people with religious beliefs couldn’t start with the assumptions and presuppositions of their own traditions when doing serious philosophical work. They weren’t under some burden of proof to prove them to all dissenters first. Any more than anyone else who advocated a controversial secular position was. They could start philosophical theorising from those presuppositions, work out implications and answers to philosophical problems that assumed those assumptions, construct models and theories which incorporated them. Of course, they would have to defend those views against objections and critics. And they would have to criticise rival alternative theories and models. But that’s not the same as proving their position from premises every party to the conversation accepts.[5]

    [1] Roy Clouser Knowing With the Heart 69.

    [2] Kai Nielsen “The Skeptics Reply” in Faith and the Philosophers, ed. John Hick (London: Macmillan, 1964) 274.

    [3] Marilyn McCord Adams Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999) 180.

    [4] Phillip Quinn, “Political Liberalism and their Exclusion of the Religious,” in Religion and Contemporary Liberalism, ed. Paul Weithman (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 144.

    [5] See for example Alvin Plantinga “Advice to Christian Philosophers” Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers vol. 1:3, 253-271 available online http://www.faithandphilosophy.com/article_advice.php

     

  • Erik Wielenberg and the Autonomy thesis: part four Intrinsic goodness

    In my last two posts, I argued that  Erik Wielenberg fails to show that Godless Normative Robust Realism (GRNR) avoids some of the standard objections to the autonomy thesis. This brings me to Wielenberg’s third claim III, Wielenberg suggests that GRNR is prima facie preferable to various theistic accounts of axiological properties. Several authors have defended accounts of the nature of moral goodness which identify goodness with certain types of relationships to God. Robert Adam’s has defended a platonic conception of goodness, where God is the paradigmatic good, and all finite things are good or bad depending on how they resemble Gods nature. Mark Murphy has defended an Aristotelian position whereby goodness consists in “being like God in ways that belong to the kind to be like God”[1]. Linda Zagzebski, by contrast, has appealed to Gods motives[2] and, and Thomas Carson has defended an account of Goodness whereby goodness is what God prefers[3]. defaul1

    Wielenberg refers to all these positions under the umbrella term “theological stateism” (TS). Wielenberg argues that prima facie GRNR is preferable to TS because, unlike TS, GRNR is consistent with the intuition that certain things have intrinsic value:

    “I suggest that among our common-sense moral beliefs are the belief that some things distinct from God are intrinsically good: for example, the pleasure of an innocent back rub, or the love between parent and child,” …“[B]ecause non-theistic robust normative realism allows for the intrinsic goodness of things distinct from God, that theory fares better in this respect than its theistic alternatives.”[4]

    By “the intrinsic value of a given thing” Wielenberg means the “value it has, if any, in virtue of its intrinsic properties.” Something’s extrinsic value by contrast “is the value it has in virtue of how it is related to things apart from itself.”[5]

    Can Theological Stateism accommodate Intrinsic Value?

    Wielenberg’s argument relies, crucially, on the claim that TS entails that nothing distinct from God is intrinsically good. His argument for this claim is as follows:

    A second noteworthy aspect of Adams’s view is its implication that no finite thing is intrinsically good (or evil) since the goodness (and badness of things) of all finite things is dependent upon their relationship to God. Craig follows Adam’s in holding that finite goodness=resemblance to the necessarily existing divine nature. (emphasis mine)[6]

    Later he cites Mark Murphy’s view as an example;

    Back in section 2.2, I noted that Adam’s theory implies no finite thing is intrinsically good (or evil) since, on Adam’s view, the goodness (and badness) of all finite things is partly determined by how they are related to God. Consequently, Adam’s view holds that nothing distinct from God is intrinsically good. Murphy holds also holds that the goodness of things distinct from God consists in their standing in certain relationships to God: their goodness is extrinsic rather than intrinsic because it is explained not merely by intrinsic properties but also by certain properties of God.[7]

    According to Wielenberg then reason TS  entails that “the value of all finite things is dependent upon their relationship to God” (emphasis mine)[8].  However, if a finite thing has intrinsic value, it is valuable “in virtue of its intrinsic properties” and not “in virtue of how it is related to things apart from itself.” Consequently, TS entails that that “nothing distinct from God is intrinsically good.”

    For this argument to be valid, the kind of dependence that  TS postulates to hold between God and the goodness of finite things must be the same kind of dependence that Wielenberg’s definition of intrinsic value rules out. Consequently, the phrase “in virtue” in Wielenberg’s definition, must refer to the same kind of dependence relationship which TS entails exists between God and the value of finite things. However, a careful examination of Wielenberg’s definition, however, shows this is not the case.

    Earlier in Robust Ethics  Wielenberg spends some time elaborating what he means when he defines intrinsic value something has in virtue of its intrinsic properties. On pages 9-15 he distinguishes between two[9] different types of supervenience relationship which can hold between finite things and their evaluative properties. The first is what Wielenberg calls “reductive supervenience” (or R supervenience) this is where a moral property M supervenes upon a base property B because the moral property is identical with the base property. The second is what Wielenberg refers to as “De-Paul supervenience” (D- supervenience). If a moral property M D supervenes upon a base property B then “M is not identical with, reducible to or entirely constituted by B” instead “B’s instantiation makes M be instantiated”.

    D supervenience and R supervenience are distinct types of relationship.  M can R supervene upon B without D supervening upon B and  M can D supervene upon B without R supervening upon it.  GRNR is itself an example of this distinction. According to GRNR moral properties are sui generis irreducible non-natural properties that  D supervene upon natural properties. Consequently, GRNR presupposes that moral properties can D supervene upon natural properties without R supervening upon them.

    Not only do are D and R supervenience distinct relationships. It appears they are mutually exclusive.  If B is reducible to or identical to M, it B cannot be a distinct property from M, which M causes to exist. That would involve self-causation. Similarly, if B is distinct from M and B makes M be instantiated, B is not reducible to or identical with M.

    When Wielenberg defines a finite thing’s intrinsic value as the value, it has in virtue of its intrinsic properties,  he uses the phrase “in virtue” to refer to a relationship of D supervenience.

    If there are entities distinct from God that possess intrinsic value, then Craig is mistaken. I think there are such entities. As I suggested in chapter 1, some finite things pass the isolation and annihilation tests which, which suggests such things are intrinsically valuable. The intrinsic value of such entities D supervenes upon some set of their intrinsic properties and not on how they are related to other things.[10]

    Earlier he writes:

    In my view, the most plausible way of understanding the “in virtue” relationship which I earlier claimed holds between the intrinsic properties of certain things and their intrinsic value is making. To claim that a given thing is intrinsically valuable is to claim that some of that thing’s intrinsic properties make it valuable… More generally, I think that moral properties indeed all moral properties D supervene upon non-moral properties.(emphasis mine)[11]

    The problem is that proponents of TS are not committed to denying that moral properties D supervene on the intrinsic properties of finite objects.  When people like Mark Murphy or Robert Adam’s or William Lane Craig contend that the goodness of all finite things is dependent upon their relationship to God, they are not claiming that goodness D supervenes upon this relationship. They are claiming it R supervenes upon this relationship. Consider how Wielenberg himself describes Adams’s position.

     A noteworthy feature of Adams’s view is its implication that no finite thing is intrinsically good (or evil) since the goodness (and badness of things) of all finite things is dependent upon their relationship to God. Craig follows Adam’s in holding that finite goodness=resemblance to the necessarily existing divine nature...  Murphy holds also holds that the goodness of things distinct from God consists in their standing in certain relationships to God: their goodness is extrinsic rather than intrinsic because it is explained not merely by intrinsic properties but also by certain properties of God. (emphasis mine)[12]

    It is true that according to Adams the goodness of finite things is “dependent” upon their relationship to God. However, but in the highlighted sentence, Wielenberg spells out the kind of dependence Adam’s has in mind. The dependence Adams refers to is one where “finite goodness=resemblance to the necessarily existing divine nature”.  Adam’s is, therefore, saying that the goodness of finite objects R supervenes upon the divine nature. Wielenberg notes this when a few paragraphs earlier he describes Adam’s (and Craig) as holding that:

    [S]ince the Good just is God, the existence of God cannot explain or ground the existence of the good. In the context of Adams’s view, the claim God serves as the foundation of the Good is no more sensible than the claim that H20 serves as the foundation of water. Indeed, once we see that on Adams’s view the good = God, we see that Adams’s  theory entails that the Good has no external foundation, since God has no external foundation.[13]

    Similarly, when Wielenberg discusses Murphy he notes that according to Murphy the goodness of things distinct from God “is explained”, not merely by intrinsic properties, but also by certain properties of God. However, he clarifies that, by this, Murphy means the goodness of finite things “consist in” their relationship to God So again, Murphy is talking about R Supervenience, not D Supervenience.

    So, contrary to Wielenberg TS does not entail that things distinct from God cannot have value in virtue of, their intrinsic properties. TS entails that the value of something distinct from God  R supervenes upon its relationship with God. However, that does not entail its value D supervenes upon this relationship. So TS is not incompatible with the common sense intuition that finite objects can have intrinsic value.

    On the other hand, If the objection is that TS  entails that the value of finite things cannot R supervene upon their intrinsic properties, then GRNR fares no better. According to Wielenberg, the proponent of GRNR holds that moral properties are “real and sui generis; they are non-natural and not reducible to any other sort of property” (emphasis mine). If moral properties are not reducible to other properties, then they do not R supervene on the intrinsic properties of finite things. In fact, on GRNR and the goodness of every distinct and finite thing will R supervene, not upon its intrinsic properties but on its relationship to distinct irreducible non-natural properties and so finite things will have only extrinsic value. This objection, therefore, is a non-starter.


    [1] Mark Murphy God and The Moral Law: A Theistic Explanation of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 155

    [2] Linda Zagzebski Divine Motivation Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)

    [3] Thomas Carson Value and the Good Life (Notre Dame Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000)

    [4] Erik Wielenberg Robust Ethics 84

    [5] Ibid. 2

    [6] Ibid. 44

    [7] Ibid.

    [8] Ibid.

    [9] Wielenberg actually spells out three relationships, but mentioning the third would only complicate this discussion unnecessarily. The proceeding argument applies equally well when the third type of supervenience is taken into account.

    [10] Ibid. 44

    [11] Ibid. 13

    [12] Ibid. 44

    [13] Ibid. 43

  • Erik Wielenberg and the Autonomy Thesis: part one Wielenberg’s criticism of Divine command meta-ethics

    The autonomy thesis contends that there can be moral requirements to φ regardless of whether God commands, desires, or wills that people φ. In his monograph, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism,[1] Erik Wielenberg offers arguably one of the most sophisticated defences of the autonomy thesis to date. Wielenberg argues that: I the most plausible alternative to the autonomy thesis, the divine command theory, is problematic because it cannot account for the moral obligations of reasonable unbelievers;  II robust realism, the thesis that moral requirements are sui generis non-natural properties which supervene upon natural properties, can be formulated in a way that avoids the standard objections to the autonomy thesis and,  III robust realism provides a better account of intrinsic value than any meta-ethical theory that identifies moral goodness with states of God.

    In this and future blog posts, I will argue Wielenberg’s defence of the autonomy thesis fails. This post will address I. Future posts will look at II and III

    defaul1Let’s look at the first claim, that the divine command theory, is problematic because it cannot account for the moral obligations of reasonable unbelievers.

    By divine command theory, Wielenberg has in mind the command meta-ethics (DCM) defended by Adam’s, Craig, Alston, Evans which holds the property of being morally required is identical with the property of being commanded by God

    Wielenberg takes for granted the existence of “reasonable non-believers”[2] people who “have been brought up in nontheistic religious communities, and quite naturally operate in terms of the assumptions of their own traditions.”[3] Or the “many western philosophers, have explicitly considered what is to be said in favour God’s existence, but have not found it sufficiently persuasive.” Wielenberg assumes that many of these people “reasonable non-believers, at least in the sense that their lack of belief cannot be attributed to the violation of any epistemic duty on their part.”[4]

    Wielenberg argues that If the property of being morally required is identical with the property of being commanded by God these people would have no moral obligations, they clearly do have moral obligations. Consequently, DCM is false.

    Wielenberg cites the following exposition of the problem from Wes Morriston:[5]

    Even if he is aware of a “sign” that he somehow manages to interpret as a “command” not to steal, how can he [ a reasonable non-believer] be subject to that command if he doesn’t know who issued it, or that it was issued by a competent authority? To appreciate the force of this question, imagine that you have received a note saying, “Let me borrow your car. Leave it unlocked with the key in the ignition, and I will pick it up soon.” If you know that the note is from your spouse, or that it is from a friend to whom you owe a favor, you may perhaps have an obligation to obey this instruction. But if the note is unsigned, the handwriting is unfamiliar, and you have no idea who the author might be, then it’s as clear as day that you have no such obligation. In the same way, it seems that even if our reasonable non-believer gets as far as to interpret one of Adams’ “signs” as conveying the message, “Do not steal”, he be under no obligation to comply with this instruction unless and until he discovers the divine source of the message[6]

    Morriston’s argument contains a subtle equivocation, in the first line he expresses a disjunction: a person is not subject to a command if he doesn’t know (a) who issued it, or (b) that it has an authoritative source. The example he cites, the case of an anonymous note to borrow one’s car, is a case neither of these disjuncts holds. The owner of the car knows neither who the author of the note is, nor whether its source is authoritative.

    However, the conclusion Morriston apparently draws is that failure to know who the author is, by itself, is sufficient to exempt someone from being subject to the command. This clearly doesn’t follow.[7]

    The mistake can be illustrated, by reflecting on examples where, a person doesn’t know who the author of a command is, but does recognise that it has an authoritative source. Suppose I am walking down what I take to be a public right of way to Orewa beach I come across a locked gate with a sign that says: “private property, do not enter, trespassers will be prosecuted”. In such a situation, I recognise that the owner of the property has written the sign, though I have no idea who the owner is. Does it follow I am not subject to the command? That seems clearly false. To be subject to the command a person does not need to know who the author of the command is. All they need to know is that the command is authoritative over their conduct.

    In fact, being subject to a command is compatible with having mistaken beliefs about who the author of the command is. Suppose I believe that the beach property I am in front of is owned by Holly Holmes, having read about her purchase in the New Zealand Herald, in fact, the Herald, has gotten details wrong and the house was sold to Kim Schmidt. In this situation, it is still the case that, when I read the sign, “private property trespassers will be prosecuted”, I am subject to the command. The fact I have all sorts of mistaken beliefs about who the author of the command does not seem to make any difference.[8]

    Wielenberg concedes the problem, and concludes that a reasonable unbeliever does not need to recognise moral obligations as God’s commands to be subject to them, all that’s needed is that they recognise these commands as coming from “some authority or other” However, he thinks this rejoinder “doesn’t address the central worry” Morriston raises. Taking Robert Adam’s version of DCM as paradigmatic, Wielenberg notes:

    An important part of Adam’s strategy for accounting for the moral obligations as of non-theist’s is the idea that some divine commands are issued by ways of “moral impulses and sensibilities common to practically all human beings since some (not too recent) point in the evolution of our species[9]

    The problem is that “reasonable non-theists lack of belief prevents them from recognizing any divine signs they receive-including their own “moral impulses and sensibilities”- as commands issued by someone who has authority over them”[10] while they will recognise certain actions as obligatory, “some reasonable non-believers do not construe the deliverance of their consciences as commands at all”[11]

    There are two problems with Wielenberg’s objection.

    First, he misconstrues Adam’s position. Consider Adam’s reference to “moral impulses and sensibilities common to practically all human beings” the full quotation is as follows:

    [P]rinciples of moral obligation constituted by divine commands are not timeless truths because the commands are given by signs that appear in time. People of who are not in the region of space-time in which a sign can be known are not subject to the command given by it. Of course, if the signs by which divine commands are given are moral impulses and sensibilities common to practically all human beings since some (not too recent) point in human evolution, all of us can be fairly counted as subject to those commands. But the conception of a divine command allows for divine commands with historically restricted audiences. (emphasis added)[12]

    Adam’s the words “if” and “but” here suggest Adam’s isn’t claiming that divine commands are “given through, moral impulses and sensibilities common to practically all human beings”. Adam’s is alluding to a hypothetical possibility to which he thinks there are alternatives.

    And in fact, Adam’s, elsewhere explains he thinks that “divine commands are revealed” largely “through human social requirements”.[13] That is through requirements and demands other people make on our conduct and blame us for not complying with. He states “a divine command against murder” has “been made known very widely to the human race” and “dissemination of such prohibitions has surely taken place largely through human systems of social requirement”.[14] He elaborates:

    On this view, divine ethical requirements will not form an entirely separate system, parallel and superior to systems of social requirement. Rather human moral will be imperfect expressions of divine commands, and the question of their relation to God’s commanding will be whether and how far they are authorized or backed by God’s authority, not whether they agree with an eternal divine command laid up in the heaven[15]

    This takes the sting out of Wielenberg’s criticism, because even though reasonable non-theists don’t construe “own moral impulses and sensibilities”- as commands issued by someone who has authority over them” they will inhabit social relationships where other people other people, parents, teachers, spouses, children, employees, courts, governments, make demands upon them which they recognise as authoritative, and demands will clearly be understood as real commands.

    Second, it’s not clear that Wielenberg is correct, that “reasonable believers” don’t perceive the deliverances of their conscience as authoritative commands.

    Consider, John Hare’s recent analysis of a divine command[16]. Hare, starts by noting that commands are a type of speech act, and in particular they are prescriptive speech acts which involve imperatives. However, commands differ from other imperatives such as exhortations, advice, warnings, requests, advice “instructions for cooking omelettes”[17] in certain important respects. Commands differ from advice or exhortations, in that commands presuppose authority on the part of the commander, additionally “in command there is standardly some expectation of condemnation if the command is not carried out.”[18] And one is not permitted or given consent by the commander to not follow the command. Similarly, commands, unlike say cooking instructions aren’t “conditional, or, in Kant’s term, ‘hypothetical.”[19]

    Commands then are categorical prescriptions “with which the person commanded is not permitted not to comply, and a prescription in which there is an internal reference, by the meaning of this kind of speech act, to the authority of the speaker, and to some kind of condemnation if the command is not carried out.”[20]

    It is striking how these features of a command are also features of moral obligations. Moral requirements are prescriptive, telling us what to do, and purport to be not just advice but authoritative, telling us what we must do and are not permitted to not do. Similarly, moral requirements are categorical in that their applicability is not contingent on some goal or end those subject to them have. Similarly, moral requirements condemn our behavior, failure to comply without an adequate excuse render us guilty and blameworthy, and others can justifiably censure us, rebuke you and even punish you, and even punish you.

    So, while, reasonable non-believers won’t construe the deliverances of conscience as literally a speech act by a person, it’s not implausible that, their pre-theoretical concept of a moral requirement is something very much like a command in all other respects.

    This, I think, undermines Wielenberg’s objection. Because, it’s plausible to suggest that a person who is aware of all aspects of a command while not recognising it as a speech act from a person, is still subject to the command.

    Suppose for example that an owner of one of the beach front properties in Orewa puts up a sign that states “private property do not enter, trespassers will be prosecuted”. John sees the sign and understands clearly what it says. He understands the sign as issuing an imperative to “not enter the property”. John recognises this imperative is categorical and is telling him to not trespass, he also recognises this imperative as having authority over his conduct, he also recognises that he will be blameworthy if they don’t comply with this imperative. However, because of a strange metaphysical theory, he doesn’t believe any person issued this imperative and so isn’t strictly speaking a command.  He thinks it’s just a brute fact that this imperative exists. Does this metaphysical idiosyncrasy mean that the command does not apply him and he has not heard or received the command the owner issued? That seems to me to be false. While John does not realise who the source of the command is, he knows enough to know that the imperative the command expresses applies authoritatively to him and that he is accountable to it.


    [1] Erik Wielenberg, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014)

    [2] Erik Wielenberg, Robust Ethics, 77

    [3] Ibid

    [4] Ibid.

    [5] Interestingly, Morriston states “This example is adapted from Wielenberg.” So Wielenberg is citing an example from Morriston, which Morriston cites as an example from Wielenberg. See, Wes Morriston “The Moral Obligations of Reasonable Non-Believers: A special problem for divine command metaethics,” International Journal of Philosophy of Religion 65 (2009), 5

    [6] Wes Morriston “The moral obligations of reasonable non-believers” 5-6

    [7] The inference here would be If P then (Q or R), not R, therefore not P.

    [8] Stephen C Evans gives a similar counter example, see God and Moral Obligation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 113-114 as do Paul Copan and I in Did God Really Command Genocide: Coming to Terms with the Justice of God (Grand Rapids MI: Baker Publishing House, 2014) 157

    [9] Wielenberg Robust Ethics 76

    [10] Ibid 79

    [11] Ibid.

    [12] Robert Adam’s Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 270

    [13] Ibid 264.

    [14] Ibid 264-265

    [15] Ibid

    [16] John E Hare Gods Command (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 32-44

    [17] John E Hare Gods Command, 37

    [18] Ibid 44

    [19] John E Hare “What is a Divine Command?” Wilde lectures, Oxford University, Wednesday 08 February 2012, 26

    [20] John Hare Divine Command 49

     

  • Matt Elected to the Executive Board of the Evangelical Philosophical Society

    Evangelical Philosophical SocietyCongratulations to this blog’s Matthew Flannagan who was just elected to the executive board of the Evangelical Philosophical Society. Congratulations also to Frank Beckwith, Paul Franks who were also just elected to the board.

    Matt, Frank and Paul will join the existing board, who can be seen at the above link. Their first meetings are in Atlanta next week. As far as I can tell, Matt seems to be the first kiwi scholar to hold the position.