Tag: Russ Shafer Landau

  • Can a Divine command theory account for the objectivity of moral requirements? Elizabeth Tropman, Russ Shafer-Landau, and “Stance Independence”.

    In my last post, I criticised David Brink’s argument that a divine command theory cannot vindicate the objectivity of morality. A different version of the objection comes from Elizabeth Tropman. Tropman begins by giving several reasons for thinking that moral realism is an attractive moral theory. She then argues that a divine command theory fails to vindicate this realist kind of objectivity. 

    [I]t is not even clear that divine command theory is compatible with a realist view of ethics after all. Divine command theory was supposed to secure the objectivity of moral demands by making morality independent of us. Yet, for many moral realists, morality’s obtaining independently of us is not enough for it to be objective. Objective moral requirements are supposed to be independent of any subject’s moral attitudes, not just ours. As leading moral realist Russ Shafer‐Landau puts it (2003), objective morality is stance‐independent “in the sense that the moral standards that fix the moral facts are not made true by virtue of their ratification from within any given actual or hypothetical perspective” (p. 15, emphasis in original). On Shafer‐Landau’s view, objective moral standards are valid independently of anyone’s perspective on them. This perspective could be one of an actual or hypothetical agent, human or divine. The moral requirement to help those in need would be objective just in case it does not have to be ratified, preferred, or willed by any agent to be valid. Divine command theory does not count as a form of realism on this approach since moral rules are wholly determined by God’s will.[1]

    We can summarise this as follows:

    [1] Moral standards are objective                                                                                               

    [2] moral standards are objective only if: the moral standards that fix the moral facts are not made true by virtue of their ratification from within any given actual or hypothetical perspective.”

    [3] If a divine command theory is true, then the moral standards that fix the moral facts are made true in virtue of their ratification from within a given actual perspective. 

    The conclusion is that a divine command theory has implausible implications. 

    I think the argument fails for reasons similar to the reason’s Brink’s does.

    First, as Tropman formulates her argument, [3] is false. Tropman relies on Russ Schafer-Landau’s idea of stance independence: the moral standards that fix the moral facts are not made true by virtue of their ratification from within any given actual or hypothetical perspective” this definition comes from p 15 of Shafer-Landau’s book “Moral Realism: A Defence” in this chapter, Shafer-Landau clarified the difference between moral realism and constructivism. As Shafer-Landau understands it, constructivism accepts the reality “of the moral domain” but sees it as “constructed” out of the attitudes of various agents. By contrast, realism affirms that moral reality is “stance independent” in the way specified. Tropman fails to notice a clarificatory footnote Shafer-Landau annexed to the very next paragraph:

    How should we classify views that make the determination of moral truth dependent on God’s ratification of the relevant standards? Such views seem most naturally grouped with realism, even though on these accounts, there is a constructive function that explains the correctness of the proper moral standards. For my purposes it doesn’t matter how we serve this taxonomic problem. All divine command theories incorporate a constructive function, to be sure, but it is also the case that the relevant standard-setting attitudes are not those of any human being-the attitudes (no matter how refined) of us mere mortals do not do the relevant work. Place these theories as you like; I don’t think anything that follows will be importantly affected by assigning such views to one camp rather than the other.[2]

    In this note, Shafer-Landau says divine command theories are “most naturally” classified as realist theories. Although, divine command theories entail those moral standards are “constructed” out of the attitudes of an agent. They are not ratified from the standpoint of actual or refined (idealised) human beings. This suggests that when Shafer-Landau referred to stance independence, he meant independence from the perspective of actual or idealised human agents. 

     This suspicion is confirmed by a later essay Shafer-Landau’s published

     Moral realism is the view that …moral judgments are made true in some way other than by virtue of the attitudes taken towards their content by any actual or idealised human agent.

    If torturing a child is wrong, it is not because of anyone’s disapproval of such an action. It is not because the action falls afoul of standards that I endorse, or rules that any society accepts. Even the disapproval of an ideal observer – say, someone who knows all nonmoral facts, and is fully rational –is not what makes an action wrong. For moral realists, the ultimate standard(s) of morality are as much a part of reality as the ultimate laws of logic, or the basic principles of physics. Perhaps God (if there is a God) made them up, but human beings certainly didn’t. (emphasis added)[3]

    Here Shafer-Landau defines moral realism as the view that moral judgements are not true in virtue of the attitudes that actual or idealised human agents take towards their content. Moral realism contends that moral facts are objectively true in the same sense that the laws of physics are real objective facts. It may be that God has created these laws. However, their truth does not depend on whether any actual or hypothetical idealised human agent ratifies them.

    If my interpretation of Shafer-Landau is correct, Tropman’s argument has a false premise. If we accept Shafer-Landau’s definition of stance independence, The argument would be

    [1] Moral standards are objective. 

    [2] moral standards are objective only if: the moral standards that fix the moral facts are not made true by virtue of their ratification from within any given actual or idealised human perspective.

    [3] If a divine command theory is true, then the moral standards that fix the moral facts are made true in virtue of their ratification from within a given actual human or ideal perspective. 

    [3] is false. Divine command theories do not entail that moral standards are ratified from any actual or idealised human perspective. A divine command theory maintains that God ratifies moral standards. God is neither an actual human being or a hypothetical human being appraising under ideal methods or conditions.

    However, there is a better way to read Tropman’s argument here. Instead of seeing her as adopting Shafer-Landau’s definition of stance independence. We could read her as advocating her own stronger understanding of stance independence. Whereby moral standards are objective only if they are valid independently of absolutely anyone’s perspective on them. Let’s refer to this account of stance independence as “unrestricted stance independence” in contrast to Shafer-Landau’s, which I will call “restricted stance independence”. Taken this way, Tropman is arguing the following:

    [1] Moral standards are objective. 

    [2] moral standards are objective only if: the moral standards that fix the moral facts are not made true by virtue of their ratification from within any given actual or idealised perspective, human or divine

    [3] If a divine command theory is true, then the moral standards that fix the moral facts are made true in virtue of their ratification from within a given divine perspective. 

    On this construal [3] is true. The problem, however, is now with premise [1]. For this argument to be valid, the word “objective must have the same meaning in premises [1] and [2]. Consequently, we should read premise [1] as claiming that it is plausible that moral standards presuppose unrestricted stance independence. But there appears to be no non-question-begging reason for thinking this is true. Consider the arguments Tropman gives for [1]

    Those who think that morality is objective believe that moral requirements are not up to us; moral obligations would be as they are irrespective of our thoughts or feelings on the matter. For objectivists, lying, cheating, and stealing would still be wrong even if we thought otherwise or approved of these actions.… Moral realism is often seen as the default meta‐ethical position (see Brink 1989). It is natural to suppose that some actions are morally right or wrong, and that an action’s morality is something we discover, not create. Moral realism is appealing because it makes sense of moral error, moral progress, and the authority of moral demands. Since morality is not up to us, it is possible for us to make moral mistakes and genuinely disagree about what is morally right or wrong.[4]

    None of these considerations gives us any reason for thinking that moral standards display unrestricted stance independence. The thesis of restricted stance independence can account for each of them. Suppose that the property of being morally required just is the property of being commanded by God. It will still be the case that moral requirements are “not up to us”. Lying, cheating, and stealing will still be wrong even if we thought otherwise or approved of these actions. Moral obligations will be as they are “irrespective of our thoughts and feelings on the matter”. Morality will still be something we “discover”, not “create”. People can make mistakes and genuinely disagree about what God has commanded. People can make progress in their fidelity to God’s commands. Individuals and societies can undergo religious reforms, where mistaken but socially accepted understandings of Gods will are repudiated. Moral facts will still be objective facts in the same sense that the laws of physics are objective facts. It will still be true that moral facts are not constructed from our desires via some idealised method or procedure. None of this is at all surprising; the only difference between restricted and unrestricted interpretations of stance independence is that the latter contends morality is independent of God. For all non-divine agents, the implication of each interpretation is the same. 

    In, Formulating Moral Objectivity, Tropman does give some reasons for formulating moral objectivity in terms of unrestricted stance independence. In this article, Tropman examines and criticises several attempts to define what it means for moral obligations to be objective. Early on, she discusses one definition which restricts stance independence to human agents. Tropman refers to this account as M2. She gives the following reason for rejecting it:

    “The trouble with (M 2) is that it cannot treat other classes of anti-realist anti-objectivists as such. Divine Command Theorists maintain that an action is right just in case God says that it is. On this theory, moral facts would indeed be independent of any of our moral beliefs. To respect this intuition about objectivity, we can revise (M 2) to refer, not only to human moral beliefs, but to those of any agent, actual or hypothetical, human or otherwise.”[5] 

    Here, Tropman states that any definition of moral objectivity, which restricts stance independence is to human agents, is problematic. Why? Because, if you restrict it this way, a divine command theory would satisfy the definition and hence entail that morality is objective. Tropman is taking it as a desideratum of any account of moral objectivity that a divine command theory does not satisfy it. She uses this desideratum to determine which theories of objectivity and stance independence are acceptable theories.

    Whatever one thinks of this method of theory selection. Tropman cannot use it in the present context. Tropman is arguing against divine command theory on the grounds that it contradicts a plausible definition of moral objectivity. If the definition is considered plausible because of this implication, the argument is contrived and viciously circular. Critics of divine command theory cannot stipulate that a plausible account of moral objectivity must be incompatible with divine command theories and then use these accounts to argue that divine command theories are not objective. To do this is just to rig the game.

    Tropman, like Brink, fails to establish that divine command theories cannot vindicate the objectivity of morality. In both cases, I think the reason is similar. It isn’t enough to say that divine commands are not objective in some stipulated sense or other.  If you define objective standards as standards valid independently of anyone, including God’s perspective, it will be trivially obvious that Gods commands are not objective standards. The question is whether divine command theories vindicate the kind of objectivity presupposed by our moral commitments. The type of objectivity it is plausible to attribute to moral standards.


    [1] Elizabeth Tropman “Meta-ethics” Companion to Atheism and Philosophy ed Graham Oppy (Wiley-Blackwell, 2019) 345

    [2] Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 16

    [3] Russ Shafer Landau, “Ethics as Philosophy A Defense of Ethical Nonnaturalism” in Ethical Theory an Anthology, Second Edition. ed Russ Schafer-Landau (Malden MA: Wiley and Sons, 2013).This article is reprinted from Metaethics After Moore Eds Terry Hogan and Mark Timmons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) which was published three years after Moral Realism: A Defence.

    [4] Margret Tropman “Meta-ethics” 344

    [5] Elizabeth Tropman “Formulating Moral Objectivity” Philosophia 6:2 (2018) 1028

  • Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma: Part III

    This is a talk I gave to the Philosophy Club at Glendale Community College in Phoenix, Arizona, this weekend. The talk was followed by a long discussion with some faculty, students at the college, and others who zoomed in.

    In this talk, I introduced and defended a divine command theory of ethics. I divided the talk into three parts. In section I, I set out what modern divine command theories of ethics typically contend. I distinguished this from some common misunderstandings in section II. In Section III, I discussed the Euthyphro dilemma. I will suggest this objection is not the conclusive rebuttal it is often assumed to be. In my first post, I reproduced sections I and II. My second post began my discussion of the Euthyphro objection in section III. This post continues that discussion. 

    In my last post, I argued that a divine command theory does not entail the content of morality is arbitrary, in the sense that anything at all could be right or wrong. It entails that an action can only be permissible, only in situations where it is possible for a fully informed, rational, loving and just person to command it knowingly. Far from being absurd, this implication is entirely plausible. 

    Some have objected that divine command theory makes morality arbitrary in a different sense. It means there is no reason why one action is right or wrong rather than another. Russ Shafer-Landau presses the following dilemma: “Either there are, or there are not, excellent reasons that support God’s prohibitions. If there are no such reasons, then God’s choice is arbitrary, i.e. insufficiently well supported by reason and argument.” [1] Alternatively:

    If God is, in fact, issuing commands based on excellent reasons, then it is those excellent reasons and not the fact of God’s having commanded various actions, that make those actions right. The excellent reasons that support the requirements of charity and kindness are what make it right to be charitable and kind.[2]

    We can summarise this argument as follows, take a paradigmatically immoral action such as rape.

    (P1) Either (a) God has a reason for prohibiting rape, or (b) God has no reason for prohibiting rape. 

    (P2) If God has no reason for prohibiting rape, then God’s commands are arbitrary. 

    (P3) If God has a reason for prohibiting rape, then that reason is what makes rape morally wrong. 

    (P4) If something distinct from God’s commands is what makes rape morally wrong, then the divine command theory is false.  

    (C1) Either morality is arbitrary, or the divine command theory is false 

    This argument is based on a subtle equivocation. (P3) and (P4) refer to what “makes” something morally right. But the word “makes” is ambiguous. 

    In this context, Stephen Sullivan has argued that the word “make” can be used in two different senses.[3] The first sense refers to what Sullivan calls a constitutive explanation: On a hot February day, I pour a glass of water to drink it and quench my thirst. There is a legitimate sense in which I can say that what makes me pour a glass of water is the fact that I am pouring a glass of H20. When I speak like this, I use the word “makes” to refer to a relationship of identity. I am explaining one thing (the pouring of the water) but citing the existence of another thing that I take to be identical with it.

    The second sense involves what Sullivan calls a motivational explanation, such as when I state that what makes me pour a glass of water is the fact that I am thirsty. Motivational explanations do not explain an action by referring to something taken to be identical with it. Instead, they attempt to tell us why an agent acted the way they did by giving us the reasons and motivations the agent acted upon. 

    Let’s assume that Landau is using the word “makes” in the “motivational” sense. The inference is:

    (P1) Either (a) God has reasons for prohibiting rape, or (b) God doesn’t have reasons for prohibiting rape. 

    (P2) If God doesn’t have reasons for prohibiting rape, then God’s commands are arbitrary. 

    (P3)’ If God has reasons for prohibiting rape, then those reasons motivationally explain why rape is morally wrong.  

    (P4)’ If something distinct from God’s commands motivationally explain why rape is morally wrong, then a divine command theory is false.  

    (C1) Either morality is arbitrary, or the divine command theory is false. 

    On this interpretation of the argument (P3)’ is plausible. Suppose God has reasons for issuing the commands he does, and the property of being wrong is identical with the property of being contrary to God’s commands. In that case, these reasons do provide a motivational explanation as to why rape is wrong. However, (P4′) is false. The fact that God’s prohibition does not motivationally explain the wrongness of rape is wrong does not entail that the prohibition is not identical to the moral wrongness of rape. Divine command theories contend that wrongness is identical with the property of being contrary to God’s commands. So it only in the constitutive sense of the word “makes” that they deny anything other than God’s commands “make” actions wrong. 

    Consequently, For Shafer-Landau’s argument to have a bite, he must use the word “makes” to refer to a constitutional explanation. So interpreted, the argument is:

    (P1) Either: (a) God has reasons for prohibiting rape, or (b) God doesn’t have reasons for prohibiting rape. 

    (P2) If God doesn’t have reasons for prohibiting rape, then God’s commands are arbitrary. 

    (P3)” If God has reasons for prohibiting rape, then those reasons are identical with the property of moral wrongness.   

    (P4)” If something distinct from God’s commands is identical with the property of moral wrongness, then a divine command theory is false.  

    (C1) Either morality is arbitrary, or the divine command theory is false. 

    On this interpretation (P4)” is plausible, if something distinct from God’s prohibition is identical with wrongness. God’s prohibition cannot be identical with wrongness.

    However, now (P3)” turns out to be implausible. Why should the fact that God has reasons for issuing a command mean that those reasons are identical with the property of being morally wrong? The Landau seems to assume the following inference: If A is identical to B, and someone has reasons r for bringing about B, then A is identical with r.  However, this inference is invalid. An analogy will show this; A Batchelor is identical to an unmarried man, John has reasons for being unmarried, he dislikes women. Does it follow that the property of being a Bachelor is identical with the property of disliking women?[4]

    Landau’s argument, therefore, is unsound. Graham Oppy proposes a more direct argument for the conclusion that a divine command theory makes morality arbitrary:

    Could it have been, for example, that murder, rape, lying, stealing and cheating were good because God proclaimed them so? Surely not! But what could explain God’s inability to bring it about, that murder, rape, lying, stealing and cheating are good by proclaiming them so, other than its being the case that murder, rape, lying, stealing and cheating are wrong quite apart from any proclamations that God might make?[5]

    However, this is implausible. Suppose God has character traits such as being essentially loving and just. In that case, God can and would have reasons for prohibiting actions like rape, murder, or cheating, quite apart from whether these actions are antecedently wrong. Antecedent to any command on God’s part, these actions won’t have the property of being morally prohibited. But they could still have other properties such as being cruel or harmful or unjust or detrimental to human happiness— or being expressions of hatred, for example. And a loving and just God could prohibit these actions because these actions have these non-moral properties.

    Consequently, divine command theories do not entail that morality is arbitrary. If anything, the opposite is the case. A divine command theory entails that actions will be wrong in virtue of certain non-moral properties those actions have. Non-moral properties that would provide an informed, loving and just person with reasons for prohibiting those actions.


    [1] Russ Shafer-Landau, “Introduction to Part IV,” in Ethical Theory: An Anthology, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 237.

    [2]Ibid., 238.

    [3] Stephen Sullivan, “Arbitrariness, Divine Commands, and Morality,” International Journal of Philosophy of Religion 33:1 (1993): 33-45.

    [4] These points are made cogently by Stephen Sullivan, “Arbitrariness, Divine Commands, and Morality,” 37-39. See also Matthew Flannagan’s, “Is Ethical Naturalism More Plausible than Supernaturalism: A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong,” Philo 15:1 (2012): 19-37.

    [5]  Graham. Oppy, Best Argument against God (Hampshire: Palgrave Pivot, 2014), 44.

  • Divine Command Theory: answering classic and contemporary objections

    Last week Jordan Hampton from Crash Course Apologetics interviewed me about chapters 12-13 of my book Did God Really Command Genocide. In this is the section of the book, I discuss divine command metaethics and critique some of the most important objections raised against divine command theories. The interview is nearly two and a half hours long. We go over every objection I respond to in the book. Enjoy