Category: Ethics

  • “Thank God for the New Zealand Anti Terrorist Squad” Published

    At last years the conference of the American Academy of Religion I participated in a panel discussion on the topic “Just War as Deterrence Against Terrorism”.

    The papers from this symposium have now been published in issue 18: 21 of Philosophia Christi

    The abstract to my article “Thank God for the New Zealand Anti-Terrorist Squad” is as follows:

    On November 14 1990 David Gray’s 22 hour shooting spree ended when the New Zealand Anti-terrorist squad (ATS) shot Gray dead. In this paper I argue that Christians should support the existence of state agencies like the ATS who are authorized to use lethal force. Alongside the duty we as Christians have to love our neighbors, live at peace with others and to not repay evil for evil, God has authorized the government to use force when necessary to uphold a just peace within the geographical area over which it has jurisdiction.

    This panel involved contributions from  Paul Copan, Myles Werntz, Gregory Boyd, Keith Pavlischek, and J. Daryl Charles and consquently contained an interesting mix of pacifists and just war theorists.

  • Video: The Smith-Flannagan Debate “Morality Does Not Need God”

    On Wednesday 21st May at the University of Waikato retired Philosophy and Political science lecturer Dr Ron Smith and Dr Matthew Flannagan (of this blog) debated the resolution “Morality Does not need God”. Here is the video of that debate.

     

  • Richard Carrier and the “Infantile” objection to God’s command’s

    In his article, “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality”, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argued that a “Divine command theory makes morality childish.”[1]

    In my response to Armstrong, “Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism?”[2] I made two points. First, I addressed a tangential point: that Armstrong’s argument caricatures divine command theory (“DCT”) by tacitly assuming that divine command theorists believe actions are wrong because God will punish us for doing them. Second, I called into question the analogy Armstrong draws between a child following one’s parents and humans following God.Carrier

    Richard Carrier, in his reply to my article, “On the Facts as we Know them, Ethical Naturalism is all there is”,[3] objects to both these responses.

    The motivation of punishment
    Carrier dismisses my first point as “disingenuous” stating,

    (a) that he is “not aware of any DCT advocate who is actually a universalist”; and

    (b) “Every time a DCT advocate has ever threatened or warned anyone of hell (or even just the loss of heaven) in reference to their behaviour, they expose what they really think the ground of Morality is: the fear of consequences.”[4]

    Neither argument is cogent. Let us look at (a) first. The philosopher most responsible for developing and defending DCT in the last fifty years, Robert Merrithew Adams, is a universalist. Given that Adams’ discussion is definitive, and most of the literature in the last thirty years discusses his arguments, Carrier’s claim that he is “not aware of any DCT advocate who is actually a universalist” speaks only to his lack of reading and knowledge of the subject.

    Premise (b) expresses a non-sequitur. Even if, as is true, many divine command theorists are not universalists and even if some have warned people about divine punishment, then it does not follow that those people believe that fear of punishment is the ground of morality. At most it shows that those people believe in divine judgement and they see it as one reason to avoid wrongdoing.

    An analogy might illustrate the mistaken logic here. All people I know believe that prisons exist and I have known some of them warn others that if they commit a crime they will go to jail. It does not follow from this that that these people believe that jail is the only reason one should not commit crimes.

    Straw manning Armstrong and missing the real target
    Carrier’s response to my second point fares little better. He makes two objections:

    (i): “[Armstrong’s] point about infantilization is not the point Flannagan is responding to. Flannagan thinks he means something to do with children obeying parents (and therefore we can build a comparable analogy to adults obeying God that does not infantilize).”

    (ii) that Armstrong’s real point, that “Adult moral reasoning is based on actually caring about the people affected by our actions and thus wanting to do good, as opposed to actually not wanting to do good but begrudgingly doing it anyway to avoid punishment” remains untouched.[5]

    Once again, both objections fail. In respect of (i), contrary to Carrier’s protestation, Armstrong does speak of children obeying parents and does draw an analogy between adults obeying God and children obeying their parents. Here is what Armstrong says:

    “A second objection is that the divine command theory makes morality childish Compare a small boy who thinks that what makes it Morally wrong for him to hit his little sister is only that his parents told him not to hit her and will punish him if he does. As a result, this little boy thinks that if his parents leave home or die then there is nothing wrong with hitting his little sister. Perhaps some little boys think this way but surely we adults do not think that Morality is anything like this.”[6]

    This section of Armstrong’s work was directly quoted in my article.

    This brings us to (ii), even if Armstrong was making the point Carrier attributed to him in this section of his paper, it is mistaken to conclude that I never addressed this (more…)

  • John Corvino on Liberals and Being Judgemental

    0199856311bRecently I have been reading John Corvino’s book, “What’s wrong with Homosexuality?” Corvino describes himself as a religious sceptic and is one of the leading defenders of the moral permissibly of homosexual conduct, and also an articulate defender of what is commonly called “gay rights”. In terms of the conclusions we each have, Corvino and I are on very different pages. Yet despite our significant differences, I was pleasantly surprised at how much of his book I agreed with, particularly, his attempt to bring a degree of clear thought to the issue as opposed to the emotionalistic sloganising and rhetorical bullying that so often accompanies this issue.

    I want to share with my readers this gem, which comes from the first chapter:

    “Some people claim that morality is a “private matter” and that, in any case, people’s rights shouldn’t hinge on others’ moral opinions. I think this view is badly mistaken. Morality is about how we treat one another, and thus it is quintessentially a matter for public concern. It’s about the ideals we hold up for ourselves and others. It’s about the kind of society we want to be: what we will embrace, what we will tolerate, and what we will forbid. And while it’s true that a free society grants a good deal of personal latitude here, avoiding legal force except where transgressions infringe upon others’ liberty, it doesn’t follow that morality is irrelevant to the law. People’s moral views strongly influence how they vote, and thus, ultimately, what laws get passed. There’s a philosophical connection as well. Laws depend on moral foundations, broadly speaking, for their legitimacy, and the commitment to “liberty and justice for all” is a moral commitment. So it irks me when my fellow liberals insist that “we ought not judge one another.” I understand where they’re coming from: Moralistic finger-wagging is tiresome, not to mention counterproductive, and nobody likes a know-it-all. One might also point to Biblical support for the directive, though presumably in that context it means that humans have no business making “Final Judgments,” not that we can’t make judgments at all. But as a general rule, the claim that we ought not judge one another is misguided—logically, rhetorically, and morally.  It’s misguided logically because it’s self-refuting. (If we ought not judge one another, then why are you telling me what to do?) It’s misguided rhetorically because it makes liberals seem as if they have conceded “moral values” to the other side, leaving them in the  untenable position of being “opposed” to moral values. And it’s misguided morally, because people have a moral responsibility not only to behave well themselves but also to promote standards of right conduct. The moral tone of society is everyone’s responsibility, liberals included.  This is not to say that we ought to become moral busybodies. Humility is a moral virtue, as is kindness, and those who wield morality as a weapon are at least as confused as those who insist that it’s a “private matter.” But we shouldn’t confuse the rejection of bad moralizing with the rejection of moralizing altogether. Morality is too important for that.”

    Excluding the phrase “my fellow liberals”, I could not agree more with  Corvino’s sentiments.

  • Did God Really Command Genocide? Summarised at Moral Apologetics

    Over at Moral Apologetics,  David Baggett and Mark Foreman, are undertaking the task of writing chapter summaries of Paul Copan’s and my book, “Did God Really Command Genocide?” The chapter summaries are available here.

    Moral Apologetics

  • Randal Rauser’s Interview: “Matthew Flannagan on God and Genocide”

    Randal Rauser interviewing Matthew FlannaganWhen Matt was in San Diego for the Evangelical Theological Society (ETS) and Evangelical Philosophical Society (EPS) meetings in November 2014, Randal Rauser interviewed him for his Podcast, The Tentative Apologist.

    The interview was for episode 58 and is entitled “Matthew Flannagan on God and Genocide“; you can listen to it by following the link. (It is basically an interview about Matt and Paul Copan’s book, Did God Really Command Genocide? Coming to Terms with the Justice of God.)

    Rauser later reviewed Did God Really Command Genonide? here.

  • A very belated report on my trip to San Diego

    With trips to the US, Christmas, New Years, the summer break, Madeleine’s work, my preaching and juggling the family and the launch of my book, it has been a while since I blogged. Since the last post was about me going to the US I figured I should start by giving a very belated update on the trip before I get down to more run of the mill blog posts.

    Last time Madeleine blogged it was Wednesday 19 November 2014, the day after I had flown out of Auckland. I arrived in Los Angeles at 10 am on Tuesday 18 November 2014 (love the international date line!) and I finally arrived in San Diego that afternoon where I had an enjoyable dinner with Moore College President Mark Thompson.

    The Evangelical Theological Society (ETS) and Evangelical Philosophical Society (EPS)  meetings began the next day. The first session I attended was a very good paper by Richard Davis and Paul Franks critiquing Wes Morriston’s criticisms of divine command meta-ethics (DCM). This paper was technical so I’ll try to summarise: Morriston objects that if moral requirements are identical with God’s commands, and even if it’s impossible for a perfectly good God to command the random sacrifice of 3 years olds, DCM still entails that if this impossibility were actualised and God were to command the random slaughter of 3 year olds, then such slaughter is wrong.

    This objection involves what is called a counter-possible, which is a hypothetical statement with an impossible antecedent. In this case the antecedent is that a perfectly good person could command the random sacrifice of children. According to the standard semantics for counter in modal logic all counter-possibles are  trivially true. Morriston argues this approach to standard semantics is mistaken; it is plausible that some counter possibles are false and that this counter-possible is one such example.

    Davis and Franks, give an interesting and thoughtful reply to Morriston in their forthcoming article “Counterpossibles and the ‘Terrible’ Divine Command Deity“. They argue: (a) Morristons’ own criteria  for distinguishing true from false counter-possibles entails that the counter-possible, If God commanded random sacrifice then random sacrifice is morally required, is, in fact, true and not false. Second, (b) they argue that DCM does not entail this counter-possible.

    To put their point in a nutshell: they argue that a world where God commands evil is a world where God ceases to be good; and since goodness is an essential property of God this entails that in such a world God would cease to exist. However, given God is the creator and sustainer of all that is distinct from him, a world where God does not exist is a world where nothing exists. Hence, it is false that if God commands evil, evil would be morally required. This was an excellent paper and I enjoyed some stimulating discussion with both of the authors during the Q&A and also at lunch.

    Next up was a paper by Frank Beckwith discussing Judith Jarvis Thomson’s famous article “A defence of abortion”. Thomson famously concedes for the sake of argument that a fetus is a human being and then argues, from analogy, that even if that is the case abortion is still permissible. Beckwith argued that, in fact, Thomson does not grant the personhood of the fetus in the way opponents of abortion understand it, but instead assumes a radically individualistic understanding of persons whereby people are not bound by any obligations to others which they do not willingly consent to, a picture which appears to rule out such things as parental duties to children or children’s duties to parents.

    This was followed by Micheal Rea’s interesting paper on whether God is gendered and the use of masculine and feminine language and imagery in describing God. His argument was that God is not gendered and the fact that most imagery used in scripture to describe God is masculine does not justify conceptualising God is exclusively masculine terms.

    In the break I had some very good fellowship and discussion over pizza with members of the Facebook group, Christian Apologetics Alliance.

    In the afternoon I took part in the ethics session of the ETS. The session kicked off with an interesting paper on how capital punishment is practiced in the US. The author, Ken Magnuson, made several disturbing observations about the fact that wealthy people almost always escape capital murder charges whereas the poor do not. This paper was unclear on what the nature of the core problem was: was it that innocent poor people were executed, or that the guilty escaped justice? While the fact that large numbers of innocent are executed might be a reason for opposing the death penalty, the fact that some guilty people get off does not seem to be. If the problem is that some escape capital punishment who deserve it, then ensuring everyone escapes capital punishment will increase the injustice. What was clear was that there needs to be some reforms to ensure less inequitable outcomes.

    Next was a paper by Evan Lenow where he argued that the philosophical doctrine of self-ownership, as articulated in its progenitor John Locke, does not support abortion rights. In this I thought he was right; Locke’s writing in the first treatise makes Lenow’s case even stronger.

    That afternoon I gave my paper, “Abortion as Self-Defence”. I offered a critique of Elieen Mcdonagh’s contention that even if a fetus is a human being, its presence inside a women who does not wish to be pregnant constitutes an act of unjustified aggression and so a women’s right to self-defence entitles her to kill it. My criticism was based on the fact that, in non rape cases, the fetus’ existence inside the woman is due to voluntary sexual intercourse for which her and her partner are responsible and this action confers parental obligations upon both of them. Given that parents have an obligation to provide the basic necessities of life to their children, the fetus’ appropriation of such necessities cannot be unjust aggression. This paper was well received and there was some excellent discussion about rape cases and therapeutic abortion in the Q&A. (Audio of my talk is available here.)

    Thursday was equally intense. I began the morning hearing a paper by David Wood on Paul Draper’s version of the problem of evil. This was followed by a panel discussion on Scott Smith’s recent book, In Search of Moral Knowledge. The panel consisted of Francis Beckwith, David Baggett and James Dew, all offering critique and commentary on the book and Smith offering a response.

    Matthew Flannagan and Paul CopanOver lunch I met with Paul Copan and a representative from Baker Academic to discuss the launch of Copan’s and my book, Did God Really Command Genocide?: Coming to Terms with the Justice of God, the promotional events we would each be participating in, and also the prospect of further publications in the future. I was then interviewed on camera for US television about the book. (more…)