Category: Philosophy of Science

  • Contemporary Philosophy of Religion and NCEA Religious Studies: Part one

    This is a talk I gave to the New Zealand Association of Philosophy Teachers annual conference at St Cutherberts College in September this year. Several people have asked me to make this talk available.

    I have broken my talk up into four parts. Part One introduces what philosophy of religion. In part two I will outline two movements within analytic philosophy during the early to mid-century which I think resulted in religious beliefs not being taken very seriously within philosophy and philosophy of religion taking a fairly minor role. Part three will look at some responses to these movements offered in the late 20th century and how they changed the philosophical landscape. Part four will look at the question of “how to do philosophy of religion” comparing the methods used by two different atheist’s J L Mackie and Graham Oppy, and how this relates the National Certificate of Educational Achievement Standards. This post will contain part one.

    First, I want to thank the association for asking me to speak, seeing I have been teaching in the secondary sector full time for only a  couple of years so I am not sure I have a lot to share with you and feel very much like I have more to learn from you.

    I have been asked to talk about the contemporary philosophy of religion.  In my talk this morning I will focus on three things. First, I will talk about what philosophy of religion is. Second, I will talk a little bit about its history but focus on recent developments in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. Finally, I will link some of these things with the current National Certificate of Educational Achievement (NCEA) Standards in Religious Studies. I hope what I say is helpful to you.

    What is Philosophy of Religion
    What is the philosophy of religion? Charles Taliaferro at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines it as “thephilosophy-of-religion philosophical examination of the central themes and concepts involved in religious traditions.” He adds “Philosophy of religion also includes an investigation into the religious significance of historical events (e.g., the Holocaust) and general features of the cosmos (e.g., laws of nature, the emergence of conscious life, widespread testimony of religious significance, and so on)”[1] Chad Meister at The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines it as “ the philosophical study of the meaning and nature of religion. It includes the analyses of religious concepts, beliefs, terms, arguments, and practices of religious adherents.”[2]

    The History of Philosophy of Religion

    Now, Philosophy of religion has a very long history, going back to the Pre-Socratics. And it was an integral part of medieval philosophy, Augustine, Aquinas, Anselm, Abelard, Scotus, Ockham and so forth worked in the tradition of “faith seeking understanding”. They used philosophy as a conceptual tool to reflect upon, analyse, refine, the religious faith that they held and develop philosophically informed models of core religious doctrines, they also used it to respond to objections and critique rival views and develop arguments for the own for theological models they supported. Some of these reflections proved very fruitful.  The Islamic-Christian dialogue over Aristotle’s understanding of causation and how it related to miracles, and Gods causal activity in the world, for example, is profoundly influential on latter accounts of causation by people like David Hume and the concepts of laws of nature used by early modern scientists.

    Perhaps lesser appreciated is the role of philosophy of religion during the enlightenment.  There is an unfortunate tendency in the history of philosophy not to appreciate the religious context in which important key thinkers of the enlightenment operated. Descartes cogito ergo sum (I think therefore I am), for example, comes from Augustine’s response to sceptics about religious knowledge in the city of God Book 11: 26. Descartes immediately follows this up of course with an appeal to his own version of the ontological argument, proposed famously by Anselm of Canterbury.

    Or consider John Locke, according to Locke’s associate James Tyrell, the impetus for Locke’s “Essay on human understanding” was a conversation  he, Locke and four others had on the topic of “the principles of morality and revealed religion.” Locke’s attempt to develop a comprehensive empiricist understanding of knowledge was an attempt to answer the question of faith and reason, a topic he explicitly addresses in the last section of the book. (Incidentally, it’s a section often skipped in contemporary courses on Locke.)

    Or consider what a widely used textbook refers to as the “revolution in ethics” which occurred in the 18-19th centuries. Which the author, James Rachels, contends is due to Hume, Bentham and Mill. Rachel’s refers to as “A new conception of ethics”… “Morality, he [Bentham] urged is not a matter of pleasing God,  nor is it about following abstract rules, Rather, morality is nothing more than the attempt to bring about as much happiness as possible into the world”.[3]

    Rachel’s is, of course, talking about utilitarianism. However, his characterisation of the history is quite selective. In 1715, some 74 years before Bentham, George Berkley had defended a rule utilitarian conception of ethics[4]Berkeley was a divine command theorist hat moral rightness, and wrongness consists in agreement and disagreement, respectively, with the will of God.  Because  God’s purposes were benevolent a God’s aim was to maximize the happiness of his creatures, so one could assume that whatever rules maximized happiness were those enjoined by God. Berkley used this theoretical account of God and morality to attempt to reconcile his Irish Anglican commitment to passive obedience with loyalty to the Glorious revolution during Jacobite uprisings in Ireland. Berkley’s “theological utilitarianism” was adopted by people like John Gay, Abraham Tucker and compiled by William Paley. Paley’s textbook defending this way of looking at ethics was the standard text at Cambridge and widely influential several years before Bentham published his defence of utilitarianism.

    I could go on; my point is that Philosophy of religion has a long and prestigious history, even during the enlightenment and an important part of educating students about our history and the history of concepts that undergird much of the modern world involves acknowledging these connections rather than ignoring them.

    [1] Charles Taliaferro “Philosophy of Religion”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/philosophy-religion/

    [2] Chad Meister, “Philosophy of Religion” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://www.iep.utm.edu/religion/

    [3] James Rachels The Elements of Moral Philosophy, (Random House: New York, 1993) 80

    [4] For explication see Stephen Darwall, “Berkeley’s Moral and Political Philosophy” Kenneth Winkler (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley. Cambridge University Press. (2005) see also C. D. Broad, “Berkeley’s Theory of Morals” Revue Internationale de Philosophie, vol. 23-24 (1953):  72-86.

     

  • Comparing the Old & New Teleological Arguments

    Robin Collins

    The “New Teleological Argument” is a theistic argument which attempts to show that theism is more probable than the postulate of an “atheistic single universe”[i]. There are number of reasons why this argument is termed the “New” teleological argument. Chief among these reasons is that its explanandum i.e. the incredible fine tuning of the laws and constants of physics have only been discovered in the past 20-30 years[ii] [iii]. By contrast, the explanandum of “Old Teleological Arguments” has long since been available to theologians and philosophers of religion. Of course the relatively recent origin of the “New” Teleological argument is not the only feature which distinguishes it from its historical counterpart. Whereas historical versions of design arguments (such as Paley’s famous watchmaker argument) rest on an argument from analogy, contemporary versions of the argument rest on what the philosopher of biology Elliot Sober calls the “Likelihood Principle”[iv] [v]. In other words, rather than relying on an analogy between the explanandum and some obviously contrived entity such as (in Paley’s case) a watch, contemporary versions of the teleological argument argue that the explanandum (the fine tuning of the laws and constants of physics) is more probable given the hypothesis of theism as opposed to the postulate of an atheistic single universe[vi].

    The Conditions of Success
    Throughout the rest of this post, I hope to argue that, on purely philosophical grounds, there is little which will allow us to say which version of the argument (be it contemporary or historical) is more or less plausible. In this respect, it seems only fair that we should assess the strength of David Hume’s critiques, since they are popularly regarded as decisive refutations of teleological arguments.[vii] [viii] It’s important to note also, that while the failure of the Humean critiques would not guarantee the conclusion that the design arguments are equally plausible, it is suggestive thereof. After all, if the joint failure of natural theological and atheological arguments should suggest that it’s impossible to arbitrate (on the evidence) between theism and atheism, then similarly, the failure of stock arguments against either of the design arguments should lead us to think that it’s impossible to arbitrate between them.  In spite of the fact that both contemporary and historical versions of the design argument are equally plausible, I will argue that the contemporary version of the argument has a number of key dialectic advantages which may warrant us in thinking that it is “dialectically speaking”, more successful than its historical counterpart. More precisely, I am saying that the relative success of the new teleological argument is a function of the fact that it does not turn on premises that are as deeply controversial as the commitments required by the historical version.

    The Contemporary Version of the Argument
    The most prolific contemporary defender of the design argument is Robin Collins who, rather than arguing from facts about biology, argues from recent discoveries in physics[ix]. As we noted earlier, this is one of the main reasons why it is termed the “New” teleological argument. Collins frames his rendition of the argument as follows:

    (1)     The existence of fine tuning is not improbable under theism[x]

    (2)     The existence of fine tuning is very improbable under the atheistic single-universe hypothesis[xi]

    Therefore, given the prime principle of confirmation[1] [xii],

    (3)     The existence of fine tuning is evidence for theism over the atheistic single-universe hypothesis[xiii]

    By “fine tuning”, I mean the very precise arrangement of the fundamental laws and constants of physics that must be met in order for our Universe to fall into the very narrow life permitting range.[xiv] [xv] According to contemporary physics, these conditions seem to be arranged in such a way that, were they to vary by even the tiniest amount, life (or more precisely, sentient life) would not be a physical possibility. For example, as P.C.W. Davies points out, a change in “the weak force”[2] by only 1 part in 100100 would make the Universe uninhabitable.[xvi] Similarly, if the cosmological constant[3] were just a fraction faster, matter would spread apart so quickly that even relatively small clumps of matter would have insufficient time to form[xvii].

    The Plausibility of the Premises
    Premise (1) amounts to the claim that if God exists, then it is entirely within His creative capability to create the universe finely tuned as it is. Hence the observation that there is a universe which exhibits teleo-functional properties is not surprising given the postulate of theism. Considering that the traditional conception of God holds that He is an omnipotent being, this is a fairly straightforward premise that we should accept.

    Premise (2) amounts to the claim that if God does not exist and if the single universe hypothesis is true, then the apparent fine tuning of the universe is a very surprising fact. After all, the fundamental laws and constants of physics seem to be arranged in such a way that their placement seems guided. But if God doesn’t exist, it doesn’t seem likely that there would be any intelligent, guiding mind such that it could plausibly account for this apparent fine tuning. Hence premise (2) seems (more…)

  • Hear all of John Lennox’s New Zealand Talks

    John Lennox recently toured New Zealand and most of his hosts recorded his talks. Here are all the MP3s of Lennox’s New Zealand talks handily in one post.

    John Lennox

    Hat Tip: Thinking Matters

  • Induction: Assuming the Uniformity of Nature

    Most people engage in what philosophers call “inductive” reasoning. People make accurate predictions about the future on the basis of conjunctions they have observed in the past. For example, I assume the sun will rise tomorrow because in the past I have observed it rise. Scientists, in particular, rely on extrapolations of this sort in the construction of their theories and in the detection of the laws of nature.

    Implicit in such reasoning is the assumption that nature is uniform or regular, one can legitimately contend that events in the past will resemble events that will occur in the future. One interesting problem consists of how one knows that the future will resemble the past in this way. What is the basis for this view? In this post Machine Philosophy discusses some of these issues.

    Conjunction and Inductive Argument

    Uniformity of Nature?Even those who accept the regularity view are compelled, sometimes in the statement of that view itself, to assume that that regularity view itself is false.

    Events have causes in the sense of regular and special antecedents.

    Do you intend to apply that to the future as well?

    Yes.

    But you have not experienced the future.

    No.

    Then you must be using an argument. You’re saying that b will continued to follow a in the future because b has followed a in the past.

    But unless a is connected with b by something more than mere proximity of place or time, there’s no ground for that argument.

    Without some other connection, there is no reason for saying that past uniform sequence must be followed by future uniform sequence.

    When we’ve argued from past uniformities to their continuation in the future, our expectations have been verified.

    But the uniform sequence of verification of your expectation is just another sequence. It has no special privileges when we’re asking why one should argue from any past sequence to future ones.

    It’s a matter of probability. Two or more events frequently occuring together is more likely to be maintained than broken.

    You’re either repeating the old assumption whose basis is in question, that the past is a guide to the future, or else it’s is false.

    If a and b are unconnected, there’s no more reason to expect them to continue together than there is to expect an unloaded penny to continue turning up heads because it has just done so ten times in a row.

    We ‘postulate’ the  (more…)

  • John Lennox on the “Religion v Science” Myth

    John Lennox will arrive in Auckland in less than two weeks for his New Zealand tour.

    If you are not familiar with Lennox watch this video “The “Religion v Science” Myth.” In it Lennox examines the historically ignorant myth that religion is and always has been at odds with science.

    Details of Lennox’s upcoming New Zealand tour are here: Hear John Lennox in New Zealand.

    Hat tip: Glenn Peoples

  • Hear John Lennox in New Zealand UPDATED

    John LennoxProfessor John Lennox of the University of Oxford will arrive in New Zealand in a fortnight for a brief public speaking tour in the centres of Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch.

    His New Zealand speaking itinerary of public events is below; all public events are free.

    Auckland

    Sunday 27 February

    9:30 – 11:00am Preaching at Howick Baptist Church on the corner of Picton and Wellington Streets, Howick, Auckland. Facebook Event Page.

    1:00 – 3:00pm Science and Religion Q&A at the Salvation Army East City Corps, 37-45 Wellington Street, Howick Auckland. Facebook Event Page.

    7:00 – 9:00pm Preaching at Greenlane Christian Centre, 17 Marewa Rd, Greenlane, Auckland.

    Monday 28 February

    7:00 – 9:00pm “Christ Among the Philosophers” at St Paul’s Church, Symonds St, Auckland. Facebook Event Page.

    Organised by Compass, “Dr Lennox will address questions such as, is faith delusional? Is it reasonable? How can we live faithfully in the public square? How might one engage faithfully as a Christian in the academy?”

    Tuesday 1 March

    12:00 – 1:00pm (this talk will be repeated in the same room from 1:00-2:00pm) “Has Science Buried God?” Public lecture at Auckland University at the Cap and Gown Lounge (Bar), Level 3, Students Union, Auckland University Campus. Facebook Event Page.

    Organised by TSCF: “Science and reason seem to be claiming to have disposed of our need of God. But have they? Prof John Lennox, author of “God’s Undertaker”, engages with the issues in an accessible, thoroughgoing and scientifically sound way. As a world renowned academic mathematician and the only Christian academic that Richard Dawkins has been happy to engage in public debate, John brings illumination, humour and challenge (as well as a cool accent) into this tense and controversial area.”

    7:30 – 9:30pm “So you want to change the world?” Student Meeting TSCF Offices, 441 Queen Street.

    Wellington

    Wednesday 2 March

    7:00 – 9:00pm “Why God Loves Richard Dawkins?” or “God and Stephen Hawking” at St Michael’s, Upland Road, Kelburn, Wellington. Facebook Event Page.

    “Hawking’s book argues that invoking God is not necessary to explain the origins of the universe, and that the big bang is the consequence of the laws of physics alone. Hawking has said, “One can’t prove that God doesn’t exist, but science makes God unnecessary”. Professor Lennox will discuss the flaws in Stephen Hawking’s logic and demonstrate that, far from disproving a creator, Hawking’s argument make the existence of God far more probable.”

    Christchurch

    Sunday 6 March

    9:00 – 10.30am Speaking at Spreydon Baptist Church, Corner Lyttelton & Cobham StreetsSpreydon,Christchurch

    Biography

    God's Undertaker: Has Science Buried God?Dr John Lennox is a Professor of Mathematics at the University of Oxford, a Fellow in Mathematics and the Philosophy of Science and (more…)

  • False Alarm: Falsificationism and its Misapplication

    A fair number of people are fond of the claim that if one is to be able to take a claim seriously, it really ought to be falsifiable. One easy response is that it’s difficult to see how this particular claim, about how we are to go about accumulating knowledge and believing stuff, is itself falsifiable; but if that seems a bit too quick a dismissal, there are other fairly well documented reasons to be dubious of ‘falsificationism’ and its claims to epistemological kingship.

    Some ideas can be tested reasonably well e.g. with this early electron microscope. Others await the examination of evidence in different ways.

    The idea is commonly associated with the scientific method; a purportedly precise way of doing things that many (perhaps particularly scientists, surprisingly enough) are pretty sure everyone should be keen on. If you want to know something, use science – it works. Indeed, the requirement of falsifiability is sometimes seen as a shibboleth for rationality, or at least orthopraxy amongst ‘reasonable’ people. In the discipline of the philosophy of science itself however, it would appear to be considerably less popular than among certain popularisers of science; an intriguing sociological fact. Falsificationism is a dumbed-down version of the views of method which Karl Popper offered the scientific community. Yes, science involves testing claims against the evidence, but there is more to it than that. A requirement of falsifiability may be seen as a suitably sceptical approach; even (as I’ve seen) contrasted with the blind faith apparently invested by religious people in their beliefs. This is problematic for a number of reasons, some of which will become clear. Lying behind it is a conveniently selective scepticism which puts aside the complexities of science and assumes or pretends that the project of explicating the order in the universe is a natural fit with naturalism. If you want to know why science works, it’s not science and it may not be falsifiable theories which will give good answers.

    Perhaps the most pressing issue behind this post is widespread allegiance amongst many naïve people to some form of ‘scientism’. I and other Christians who decry this trend away from genuine rationality and accompany the hand-wringing with good arguments are often assured that it does not in fact exist (more…)