Category: Atheists

  • Erik Wielenberg and the Autonomy Thesis: Part Two Standard Objections to the Autonomy Thesis, Reasons to be Moral Without God

    defaul1The autonomy thesis contends that there can be moral requirements to φ regardless of whether God commands, desires, or wills that people φ. In his monograph, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism,[1] Erik Wielenberg offers arguably one of the most sophisticated defences of the autonomy thesis to date.

    Wielenberg argues three things. First, I the most plausible alternative to the autonomy thesis, the divine command theory, is problematic because it cannot account for the moral obligations of reasonable unbelievers. Second, II  robust realism, the thesis that moral requirements are sui generis non-natural properties which supervene upon natural properties, can be formulated in a way that avoids the standard objections to the autonomy thesis. Third, III robust realism provides a better account of intrinsic value than any meta-ethical theory that identifies moral goodness with states of God.

    In a previous post I discussed I, I argued Wielenberg’s critique of divine command meta-ethics fails. This post will begin looking at his second major claim II. As an alternative to DCM, Wielenberg proposes a position he labels Robust Realism, the thesis that moral requirements are sui generis non-natural properties which supervene upon natural properties. By itself, robust realism is compatible with both theism and atheism. Wielenberg refers to the conjunction of robust realism and atheism as Godless Robust Normative Realism (GRNR) Wielenberg contends that his formulation of GRNR avoids the standard objections to the autonomy thesis.  Here I’ll look at one such objection.

    Reasons for being Moral without God.

    One objection Wielenberg discusses is the perennial concern that, in the absence of God, people lack compelling reasons to comply with morality’s demands. Wielenberg takes the following comments by Craig as representative of this objection.

    Even if there were objective moral values and duties under naturalism, they are irrelevant because there is no moral accountability. If life ends at the grave, it makes no difference whether one lives as a Stalin or as a saint…Why should you sacrifice your self-interest and especially your life for the sake of someone else? There can be no good reason for adopting such a self-negating course of action on the naturalistic worldview… Life is too short to jeopardize it by acting out of anything but pure self-interest. [2]

     Wielenberg initially suggests that Craig is arguing that “if people had moral obligations, but God did not exist, then people would have no normative reasons to carry out their obligations”.[3] He re-joins, plausibly, that people often do have normative reasons to refrain from wrongdoing. “the fact rape harms its victims is a compelling reason for me not to rape, regardless of whether refraining from rape benefits me” (emphasis mine).[4]

    Wielenberg then suggests that Craig might be offering a different argument. He might be contending that “if God does not exist then people lack self-interested normative reasons to perform their obligations” Wielenberg suggests taken this way, there are two problems with the argument. First, even if it were true, it wouldn’t follow that people lack any normative reasons to perform their obligations.  Second, this claim isn’t true “people often do in fact do have powerful self-interested reason’s for caring about fulfilling their obligations”[5] Wielenberg cites various empirical studies which show that immorality tends to disrupt, and damage people’s social relationships and harm meaningful connections.[6]

    However, it seems implausible to me that Craig is maintaining either of these positions. Elsewhere.  Craig clarifies his position as follows:

    [I]f God does not exist, then prudential reason and moral reason can and often do come into conflict, in which case there is no reason to act morally rather than in one’s self-interest. That’s consistent with saying that in other cases it is, indeed, prudent to act morally.[7]

    Here Craig affirms that if atheism is true, people often can have both moral and prudential normative reasons to carry out their moral obligations. So he doesn’t affirm, either of the positions, Wielenberg attributes to him.  He isn’t saying that no one ever has reasons to refrain from wrongdoing, nor is he claiming that no one ever has prudential reasons to refrain from wrongdoing.  Craig’s objection is rather that, if atheism is true, moral and prudential reasons can and do come into conflict. When they do people lack any reason to comply with what morality demands. “One has moral value pulling in one direction and prudential value tugging in the opposite, and no way to decide rationally which choice to make”[8].

    Latter Wielenberg suggests a different way of formulating the argument:

    [1] If GRNR is true then morality and self-interest sometimes diverge in the long run.

    [2] But, morality and self-interest never diverge in the long run.

    [3] Therefore, GRNR is false[9]

    Wielenberg grants the truth of [1], the empirical studies he earlier cited show only that people “often” have powerful prudential reasons to do what is right, not that they always or necessarily do. Wielenberg states that “an important different between a theistic universe and a godless universe” is that “without God, there is always the possibility that we will face a deep conflict between what is in our self-interest and what morality requires of us”. On the other hand, if God exists “there is a perfect correlation between morality and self-interest”[10]

    Wielenberg’s rebuttal, therefore, focuses on denying [2], his treatment of [2] consists of a single paragraph:

    It is hard to imagine a convincing non-question begging rationale for (2) that wouldn’t at the same time tell against (1). One might appeal to the existence of God to support (2) but this obviously begs the question. Alternatively, one might find a secular ground for (2)-but to the extent that such a ground is convincing it undermines the first premise…Craig often proceeds as if (2) were a datum for which any plausible moral theory must account. But such an approach has nothing to commend it. It is no more plausible than the falsity of (2) as a datum and arguing against Craig’s view. Such arguments get us nowhere.[11]

    Wielenberg provides two reasons for rejecting [2]. These are (a) that there is no non-question-begging reason for affirming [2] which does not undermine [1], and (b) that [2] is not a datum to be explained by a moral theory.  Neither is compelling.

    Regarding first (a), the problem is that several people, including Craig, have offered reasons for affirming [2] which neither assume theism or tell against [1].

    Robert Adam’s, for example, has appealed to the intuition that moral judgments “have an action- and preference-guiding force that they could not have unless everyone had reason to follow them in his actions and preferences.”[12]  Adam’s argues that “if happiness will, in the long run, be strictly proportioned to moral goodness, that explains how virtually everyone does have an important reason to want to be good.”[13] However, if this is not the case, it’s hard to justify the conclusion that “everyone does have reason always to be moral.”[14]

    Adam’s here focuses on the idea that everyone has a reason to be moral.  That if an action φ is morally wrong for a person P to perform, then P has a reason to not φ. Stephen Layman has offered a similar line of argument, focusing instead on the idea that people always have decisive reasons to do what morality demands.  Layman refers to what he calls the “The Reasons Thesis: The strongest reasons always favor doing what is morally required.” The idea that if something is obligatory, we not only have a reason to do it but that this reason is always decisive. Other reasons we may have for not complying such as reasons of self-interest or economics do not override it. Layman provides several examples which suggest that “If there is no God and no life after death, then there are cases in which morality requires that one make a great sacrifice that confers relatively modest benefits (or prevents relatively modest harms).” Layman argues that if such cases obtain,  reasons of prudence will override moral reasons we have doing the action in question.[15]

    Neither of these arguments begs the question by assuming God exists. They appeal not to God’s existence, but theses about the authority of moral requirements, that they provide virtually everyone with decisive reasons for acting.  Nor do these arguments give us reason for questioning [1]. Both, of them, in fact, concede and incorporate [1] in their thinking. So, Wielenberg’s claim, that it’s hard to imagine a non-questioning begging rationale for [2] that doesn’t undermine [1], is false. Several such rationales have been offered in the literature which he does not even mention let alone address.

    Moreover, Craig himself provided a similar rationale.   Craig claimed that:“[I]f God does not exist, then prudential reason and moral reason can and often do come into conflict, in which case there is no reason to act morally rather than in one’s self-interest”[16]. Elsewhere, Craig has stated:

    “I agree with Layman that on atheism, what he calls the overriding thesis ( namely that moral value always trumps prudential value) is not true, for one can have extremely strong prudential reasons for not acting morally, and there seems to be no common scale in which to weigh moral against prudential considerations”[17]

    This brings us to  (b), Wielenberg’s objection that [2] is not a datum to be explained by a moral theory. While he is correct that [2] itself is not a datum of moral theory, the claim that moral demands are authoritative so that everyone always as a decisive reason to be moral is something that, at least prima facie, a meta-ethical theory should explain.[18]  Wielenberg himself seems to accept this. He states “as I suggested in Chapter 1, to have an obligation just is to have decisive reasons to perform a certain action.” Therefore, according to Wielenberg, it is a necessary truth that we always have decisive reasons to do what we are moral required to do, and it is impossible, for people to not have such reasons or them to be overridden by other reasons such as self-interest”. Adam’s, Layman and Craig, therefore, appeal to something that is, on his view, a datum a meta-ethical theory should explain.


    [1] Erik Wielenberg, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014)

    [2] Erik Wielenberg, Robust Ethics, 56-57, the citation is from William Lane Craig “The Indispensability of Meta-Ethical Theological Foundations for Morality” available at http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/meta-eth.html

    [3] Ibid, 57

    [4] Ibid

    [5] Ibid

    [6] Wielenberg’s examples all deal with Hume’s idea of the sensible knave, the individual who has a reputation for morality but engages in undetected wrongdoing when it’s in his self-interest. They don’t, however, address Kai Neilsen’s example of a “classist amoralist” who forms deep and genuine relationships with others within his class but ruthlessly exploits members of other classes to his advantage. See Kai Nielsen Why be Moral (Buffalo, N.Y: Prometheus Books, 1989) 295-296

    [7] William Lane Craig  “Q&A 230 Is Life Absurd without God?” available at http://www.reasonablefaith.org/is-life-absurd-without-god. Accessed 6/2/2017

    [8] William Lane Craig “This Most Gruesome of Guests” Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 182-183

    [9] Wielenberg, Robust Ethics 59

    [10] Ibid, 59

    [11] Ibid, 59

    [12] Robert Adams “Moral Argument for Theistic Belief” in The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). 158

    [13] Ibid

    [14] Ibid.

    [15] See C Stephen Layman “God and the moral order”, Faith and Philosophy, 19: 3 (2002) 304-16.

    [16] William Lane Craig “Q&A 230 Is Life Absurd without God?” available at http://www.reasonablefaith.org/is-life-absurd-without-god. Accessed 6/2/2017

    [17] William Lane Craig “This Most Gruesome of Guests” 183

    [18] Terence Cuneo makes this point, see  Terence Cuneo “Erik J Wielenberg Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2015.03.24 available at http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/56511-robust-ethics-the-metaphysics-and-epistemology-of-godless-normative-realism/ accessed 7/2/17

  • Carrier on infantile moral reasoning: one more time

    In a previous post, I discussed Carrier’s defence of “The infantile Objection” to divine a command theory (DCT) of meta-ethics. Some comments he makes in the same paper, suggest a slightly different version of the argument. Seeing I have found this version of the objection relatively common in oral discussions. It is worth having a second look.

    As we saw, Carrier distinguished between “mature” or “adult” moral reasoning which is “based on actually caring about the people affected by our actions” and immature reasoning “which involves “actually not wanting to do good but begrudgingly doing it anyway to avoid punishment (or get paid).”

    At one-point Carrier argues as follows:

    CarrierDCT in practice (regardless of what claims are made of it in theory) interferes with the development of this mature form of moral reasoning, by not basing moral motivation on the compassion of the agent (and their own reasoning and observation), but on the commands of a third-party (God) who supposedly knows better. DCT thus abrogates moral reasoning, and all too often becomes an excuse not to engage in it (we just do what God commands; we don’t think about whether that’s actually good or right). It also replaces an agent’s own compassion with the hypothetical compassion of a hypothetical being constructed in the imaginations of certain supposed religious authorities. Though one can theoretically avoid these defective forms of moral reasoning on DCT, in practice DCT is not very successful at it. That Christianity has endorsed slavery and war and mass torture and murder as moral only verifies the point. When it comes to actual adult decision-making, ethical naturalism works far more consistently, because it requires the agent to engage their own moral reasoning and to motivate their behavior on their own compassion for others (and not someone else’s). [1]

    What carrier here claims is that, whatever may or may not be true of in theory in practise, DCT interferes with mature reasoning, as he defines, it and encourages immaturity. On the other hand, Naturalism more consistently leads to mature reasoning.

    He provides two reasons for this conclusion. The first (a) is that DCT, identifies moral requirements with on “the “hypothetical compassion” of “a hypothetical being” “who knows better” whereas ethical naturalism which requires the agent to engage there “own” reasoning, and their own compassion not someone else’s. The second is that (b) “Christianity has endorsed slavery and war and mass torture and murder as moral”. Neither argument is compelling,

    Actual Compassion Vs Compassion of a Hypothetical Being who knows better

    let’s turn to (a). Only a few paragraphs earlier, Carrier spells out his own version of ethical naturalism. He states: “I have demonstrated elsewhere that the ground for morality must be motivational (the consequences of moral behavior must actually be what the moral agent would most want, if he or she knew better)”[2] Carrier here is explicit, on the view he defends, which he takes to have demonstrated, is that morality is based on what a person would most want, if he or she knew better. Hence, Carrier grounds moral requirements in the claims of a hypothetical being who knows better.

    Similarly, on p 208 he states:

    “S morally ought to do A” means “If S’s desires were rationally deduced from as many facts as S can reasonably obtain at that time (about S’s preferences and the outcomes of S’s available alternatives in S’s circumstances), then S would prefer A over all the available alternative courses of action (at that time and in those circumstances).”[3]

    Notice the word “if” in the first line here, Carrier does not base moral requirements in the actual compassion of the agent, but rather in the compassion the agent would have under hypothetical circumstances where they knew better. So, it’s difficult to understand why, when he wants to accuse DCT of being immature, he claims that DCT relies on a hypothetical being who knows better, whereas naturalism relies on a person’s actual compassion. Because this is false.  Both views attempt to identify moral requirements with the demands of a compassionate person who knows better.

    Slavery, War, and Torture

    I turn then to (b) Carrier’s second reason for thinking that, in practise DCT encourages “immature reasoning” while naturalism more consistently leads to mature reasoning. This is verified by the fact “Christianity has endorsed slavery and war and mass torture and murder”

    An initial question that could be raised in this context is whether it is a fact that  Christianity has “endorsed slavery and war and mass torture”. Part of the problem with saying this, is that in many cases it’s not easy to answer the question of whether a historical person endorses war slavery and torture.

    Take for example the issue of war. Many theologians, (in fact most) such as Augustine, Aquinas, Vitoria. Suarez, Calvin, Luther, held to what is called the just war theory, this theory holds that war is justified in certain narrow situations such as when a king is defending his realm from aggressive invasion. But it’s not justified for the purpose of empire building or conquest, does this make them in favour of war or against it?

    Or take several 18-19th-century theologians who addressed the issue of slavery.  They argued that, while there are circumstances under which the institution of slavery in and of itself was justified, such as when a person sells their labour to pay a debt or as a punishment for a crime, the way it was concretely practised in their culture was unjust and immoral. For this reason, they advocated slavery’s abolition.  Were they defenders of slavery or opponents of it?

    Or consider medieval jurists who held (following secular law) that gaining information by torture was normally prohibited, it could be used in rare circumstances where there was compelling circumstantial evidence the accused was guilty and more information was needed to gain a conviction, were they in favor of torture or opposed to it?

    Let’s, however, put this initial question to the side and assume it’s true that there is a clear, unambiguous sense in which it is true that Christianity “endorsed slavery and war and mass torture”. Does  this support the conclusion that DCT in practise his “abrogates moral reasoning, and all too often becomes an excuse not to engage in it” whereas “ethical naturalism works far more consistently.”

    The answer is “No”, Carrier’s reasoning here seems to me to be rather weak. I will highlight three problems with it.

    The first problem is that the conclusion and premises refer to different groups of people. The premise here is that Christians have endorsed slavery and war torture. The conclusion is that divine command theorists have a tendency to engage in immature patterns of reasoning.

    But obviously divine command theorists and Christians are different groups. There are divine command theorists who are not Christians, such as Jewish and Islamic divine command theorists[4] and there are Christians who are not divine command theorists. It’s true that some Christians thinkers have endorsed divine command theory of meta-ethics, but it’s also true that many have not. Given the prominence of natural law reasoning in Christian theology many Christian thinkers have in fact been ethical naturalists.

    So the first problem is that there is a gap between conclusion and premise here. The premise attributes a tendency to one group, and the conclusion attributes a tendency to a different group. Such an inference doesn’t follow.

    The second problem is that Carrier’s conclusion asserts a  claim about the comparative merits of divine command theory and meta-ethical naturalism. claim. His claim is that the in practise DCT leads to immature reasoning whereas “ethical naturalism works far more consistently”. The premise, however, tells us only what Christians have done.

    It’s pertinent, in this context,  to remember that the actions Carrier mentions are war, slavery and torture.  After all, the vast majority of on-Christian cultures have also endorsed war and slavery, Ancient Rome, for example, practised both before Christianity came on the scene.  As did ancient Greece, Assyria, Egypt, Persia and so on. Modern secular philosophers today defend various military actions including the killing of non-combatants and terrorism. Consider such things as nuclear deterrence or the bombing of Hiroshima. Slavery was given a spirited defence by Aristotle, an ethical naturalist over 300 years before the birth of Christ, and so on.

    What is needed  is evidence, not just that Christians have supported these things, but that Christians have been more prone to doing this than non-Christians have.  We would need some evidence for example that Pacifism has been less commonly justified by Christians than other groups. That Slavery has been abolished more frequently in non-Christian cultures than others. That Christians have been less likely to defend absolute prohibitions on killing non-combatants than secular utilitarian’s who appeal to impartial benevolence. That torture was more frequently justified and used in ecclesiastical justice than was common in secular courts and so on.  Carrier of course hasn’t provided any evidence for these sorts of claims.

    This brings me to the third problem in Carrier’s argument. His conclusion regards the kind of reasoning engaged in by divine command theorists. The premise, however, gives us information about some of the conclusions  Christian’s have come to, they have “endorsed slavery, war and mass torture as moral”.

    Such an inference, however again, doesn’t follow. People can and have supported war, slavery and torture out of a sense of “their own compassion” and have been motivated by care “about the people affected by our actions” Aristotle for example famously argued that slavery was necessary for the welfare of the slave. The Crusades were often defended on the grounds of love and humility, liberating Eastern Christians from the threat of Muslim invasion was seen as self-sacrifice for the good of one’s neighbour.[5].

    So we can’t conclude from the mere fact that a Christians endorsed slavery, or war or torture, that they were engaging in immature as opposed to adult reasoning. To determine that, we would need to know not just the conclusions they drew, but the reasoning they used to get to moral conclusions. We would need to know why various Christian thinkers endorsed these practises.  What were the reasons?  What kind of reasoning lead them to support war or torture or slavery?  Did they do so “begrudgingly to avoid punishment” reasoning that “we just do what God commands; we don’t think about whether that’s actually good or right” Or did they appeal to altruistic reasons such their own compassion and concern for the good of others to justify these things.

    For these reasons I think that Carrier has failed to establish in practise, DCT interferes with mature reasoning and encourages immaturity. Both naturalists and theists ground morality in the compassion of a hypothetical being who knows better, and Carrier’s inference from undefended claim that Christians have endorsed war and slavery, to the conclusion that divine command theorist have engaged in immature moral reason more than other groups involves multiple unjustified leaps in logic.


    [1] Richard Carrier “On the Facts as we Know them, Ethical Naturalism is all there is: A Reply to Matthew Flannagan” Philo 15, no. 2 (Fall-Winter 2012) 206.

    [2] Ibid. 205.

    [3] Ibid. 208.

     [5] See, for example, Douglas Earl, “Joshua and the Crusades,” in Holy War in the Bible: Christian Morality and

    an Old Testament Problem, ed. Heath A. Thomas, Jeremy Evans, and Paul Copan (Downers Grove,

    IL: IVP Academic, 2013), 19–43.

  • Is it Immoral to Believe in God? Matt responds to Michael Ruse

    The Christian Research Journal have published an online copy of an article I wrote for their journal last year:

    downloadIn a recent op-ed piece in the New York Times, the distinguished philosopher of science Michael Ruse raises the question, Is it morally wrong to believe in God? Some skeptics maintain there is something irrational about theism. But is it immoral?

    Behind the question is the rhetoric of the New Atheism represented in the writings of people such as Christopher Hitchens, Richard Dawkins, and Sam Harris. Ruse historically has been fairly critical of New Atheism and maintains that, although New Atheists are “self-confident to a degree that seems designed to irritate,” they display “an ignorance of anything beyond their fields to an extent remarkable even in modern academia.”

    However, behind their remarkable uninformed hubris is a “moral passion unknown outside the pages of the Old Testament.” Ruse notes that “atheists of Dawkins’ stripe don’t just say that believing in God is an intellectual mistake. They also claim that it’s morally wrong to believe in the existence of God or gods.” Ruse appears to have some sympathy with this motif of their thought and attempts to defend it.

    See the rest of my article here

  • Richard Carrier and the “Infantile” objection to God’s command’s

    In his article, “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality”, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argued that a “Divine command theory makes morality childish.”[1]

    In my response to Armstrong, “Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism?”[2] I made two points. First, I addressed a tangential point: that Armstrong’s argument caricatures divine command theory (“DCT”) by tacitly assuming that divine command theorists believe actions are wrong because God will punish us for doing them. Second, I called into question the analogy Armstrong draws between a child following one’s parents and humans following God.Carrier

    Richard Carrier, in his reply to my article, “On the Facts as we Know them, Ethical Naturalism is all there is”,[3] objects to both these responses.

    The motivation of punishment
    Carrier dismisses my first point as “disingenuous” stating,

    (a) that he is “not aware of any DCT advocate who is actually a universalist”; and

    (b) “Every time a DCT advocate has ever threatened or warned anyone of hell (or even just the loss of heaven) in reference to their behaviour, they expose what they really think the ground of Morality is: the fear of consequences.”[4]

    Neither argument is cogent. Let us look at (a) first. The philosopher most responsible for developing and defending DCT in the last fifty years, Robert Merrithew Adams, is a universalist. Given that Adams’ discussion is definitive, and most of the literature in the last thirty years discusses his arguments, Carrier’s claim that he is “not aware of any DCT advocate who is actually a universalist” speaks only to his lack of reading and knowledge of the subject.

    Premise (b) expresses a non-sequitur. Even if, as is true, many divine command theorists are not universalists and even if some have warned people about divine punishment, then it does not follow that those people believe that fear of punishment is the ground of morality. At most it shows that those people believe in divine judgement and they see it as one reason to avoid wrongdoing.

    An analogy might illustrate the mistaken logic here. All people I know believe that prisons exist and I have known some of them warn others that if they commit a crime they will go to jail. It does not follow from this that that these people believe that jail is the only reason one should not commit crimes.

    Straw manning Armstrong and missing the real target
    Carrier’s response to my second point fares little better. He makes two objections:

    (i): “[Armstrong’s] point about infantilization is not the point Flannagan is responding to. Flannagan thinks he means something to do with children obeying parents (and therefore we can build a comparable analogy to adults obeying God that does not infantilize).”

    (ii) that Armstrong’s real point, that “Adult moral reasoning is based on actually caring about the people affected by our actions and thus wanting to do good, as opposed to actually not wanting to do good but begrudgingly doing it anyway to avoid punishment” remains untouched.[5]

    Once again, both objections fail. In respect of (i), contrary to Carrier’s protestation, Armstrong does speak of children obeying parents and does draw an analogy between adults obeying God and children obeying their parents. Here is what Armstrong says:

    “A second objection is that the divine command theory makes morality childish Compare a small boy who thinks that what makes it Morally wrong for him to hit his little sister is only that his parents told him not to hit her and will punish him if he does. As a result, this little boy thinks that if his parents leave home or die then there is nothing wrong with hitting his little sister. Perhaps some little boys think this way but surely we adults do not think that Morality is anything like this.”[6]

    This section of Armstrong’s work was directly quoted in my article.

    This brings us to (ii), even if Armstrong was making the point Carrier attributed to him in this section of his paper, it is mistaken to conclude that I never addressed this (more…)

  • Is belief in God essential for Morality? Why Crime Statistics don’t answer this question

    Readers of this blog will note that, of late, I have been focusing a lot in my thinking, writing and research on questions of the relationship between religion and morality. One particular frustration I encounter in this topic is the, unfortunately common, tendency for writers and researchers to conflate separate questions and subsequently give answers to the wrong questions thinking they have answered the right ones.

    A good example is article which was sent to me via e-mail recently entitled “The destructive myth about religion that Americans disproportionately believe.” The article comments on a recent survey which found that the majority of people in certain parts of the world, including the United States of America, believe that belief in God is essential for morality. The author considers this a “destructive myth”. His rebuttal involves two premises: (a) he interprets the survey’s results to mean that the majority of people believe you cannot live a morally good life unless you believe in God; (b) he aims to refute this by appealing to some unsourced crime statistics that suggest atheists do not commit disproportionately more crimes than theists.

    o-PRISONER-READING-facebookI think his reasoning on both points is mistaken, before getting into why, I note that this article proposes to be about whether belief in God is essential to morality; it is not about the related, though separate, question of whether the existence of morality depends on the existence of God.

    Turning to the first premise (a), the article opens with:

    “Pew Research Center published the results of a survey conducted among 40,080 people in 40 countries between 2011 and 2013. The survey asked a simple question: Is belief in God essential to morality? While clear majorities say it is necessary, the U.S. continues to be an outlier. In 22 of the 40 countries surveyed, the majority says it is necessary to believe in God in order to be a moral person. “This position is highly prevalent, if not universal, in Africa and the Middle East,” says the report.”

    This is confused. The author states the question asked was: “Is belief in God essential to morality?” The author then interprets those answering in the affirmative as saying “it is necessary to believe in God in order to be a moral person.” This does not follow from the affirmative answer. The question asked was whether belief in God is essential to the institution of morality itself; such a question is asking whether the institution needs this belief. The question did not ask what attributes were necessary to be a moral person.

    Not only are these separate issues, they are logically distinct. (more…)

  • Jerry Coyne on Deception and the Omission of Facts

    In 2011 I wrote a criticism of Jerry Coyne’s USA Today article, “As  atheists know, you can be good without God.” My critique, “When Scientists make bad Ethicists,” attracted some attention motivating Coyne to write a response. I wrote a following up piece the next year, “Jerry Coyne on God and Morality Revisited,” my conclusions were not flattering. I wrote:

    “Nothing in Coyne’s follow up leads me to revisit my initial conclusion. Misrepresenting people’s views, calling people names, quoting from articles out of context, denigrating others’ scholarly qualifications and confidently asserting a position whilst reasoning in a circle, and ignoring objections, are not the same as actually addressing them.  I doubt such sophistry would pass muster in the scientific community when people write on scientific topics, and it does not pass muster when scientists comment on theology or philosophy.”

    Jerry CoyneRecently I discovered Coyne’s latest riposte on the issue of divine commands: “William Lane Craig answers a distressed reader: ‘If ISIS’s god were mine, should I do what he says?’”  which  has   subsequently  been posted on richarddawkins.net. Little, it seems, has changed. Coyne begins by sarcastically referring to William Lane Craig as a “sophisticated theologian” and commending him for addressing a question “not often taken up by theologians”. I am not sure which “sophisticated theologians” Coyne has read because, contrary to what he says, almost every major monograph on divine command theory (“DCT”) in the last thirty years has discussed the problem he refers to in his post, as do most articles on the subject. Undeterred by these facts, or perhaps unaware of them, Coyne suggests in closing that “sophisticated theologians” like Craig who defend DCT are like real estate salesman in Florida.

    Apart from sarcastic names and insinuations of dishonesty Coyne’s central argument purports to highlight an inconsistency in Craig’s divine command theory. The inconsistency relates to a distinction Craig (and others like Baggett and Walls) draw between a voluntaristic and a non voluntaristic DCT. According to Craig’s account of a voluntaristic DCT ,“God’s commands are based upon His free will alone”; God “arbitrarily chooses” what we are required to do.”[1] On a non-voluntaristic  account, “Our duties are determined by the commands, of a just and loving God. God is essentially compassionate, fair, kind, impartial, and so forth, and His commandments are reflections of His own character”;[2] because he has these character traits, essentially, “it is logically impossible for Him to issue certain sorts of commands”.[3]

    I think Craig’s use of the term “voluntarism” is somewhat inaccurate. Yet he is correct when he adds that most (if not all) divine command theorists are non-voluntarists, as he defines the term. Coyne thinks this “is bait and switch”. This is because “Craig himself seemed in at least one case to hold to the voluntarist view of the DCT.”  Coyne quotes from Craig:

    “But God has no such prohibition [the prohibition not to take an innocent life]. He can give and take life as He chooses.  We all recognize this when we accuse some authority who presumes to take life as “playing God.” Human authorities arrogate to themselves rights which belong only to God. God is under no obligation whatsoever to extend my life for another second.  If He wanted to strike me dead right now, that’s His prerogative …

    … On divine command theory, then, God has the right to command an act, which, in the absence of a divine command, would have been sin, but which is now morally obligatory in virtue of that command.”

    Coyne rejoins, “If that’s not voluntaristic DCT, I don’t know what is.” Coyne provides a link to the article in question, so presumably he expects his readers – good free thinkers who accept nothing blindly on authority – to check his quote and verify what he says. When one does, however, the (more…)