Category: Public Policy

  • Jim Evans Decisively Smacks John Roughan

    On Saturday the NZ Herald’s John Roughan demonstrated why journalists should not engage in legal interpretation in his widely criticised piece on the smacking referendum, “Sinister undertones to referendum instigator.”


    At the time I struggled to ascertain whether Roughan was being deliberately deceptive or he just didn’t get it. He essentially quoted the non-controversial, much more straight-forward, parts of the anti-smacking law, the new s59 (1),(2) and (3) of the Crimes Act, to attempt to prove that the law was not confusing and claims to the contrary were a smoke screen put up by those who desire “the right to flog children.” Aside from his slander, his article was widely criticised because he omitted to mention the most controversial and confusing clause in the new section: s59 (4).

    More than one person asked me to write a critique of this piece but was unable to due to my injuries flaring up badly this week and massive transport headaches. I also worried that my status as a law student meant anything I wrote would not carry the necessary weight (funny how that does not apply to journalists with significantly less law papers to their name than I). Not to worry, because today the Herald features a most excellent response by Jim Evans, Emeritus Professor of Law at the University of Auckland no less; see “Jim Evans: New section 59 is clearly a mess.”

    Professor Evans clearly and simply explains not only the confusion caused by the controversial sub-section (4) but also the less widely noted but equally concerning problems that sub-section (2) creates. He concludes with what we have consistently maintained,

    “This is not clear legislation. In creating this law, Parliament abandoned its constitutional responsibility to say with clarity just which conduct is criminal.


    The section results from a political fudge. Whatever other views one takes about the topic of smacking, that much at least ought to be kept clear.”

    I encourage you to read both articles, especially if you have not voted yet and you are confused by all the contradictory claims being made by both sides. I have included the piece of legislation under scrutiny as a term of reference below.


    Crimes (Substituted Section 59) Amendment Act 2007 No 18, Public Act

    New section 59 substituted
    Section 59 is repealed and the following section substituted:


    “59 Parental control
    “(1) Every parent of a child and every person in the place of a parent of the child is justified in using force if the force used is reasonable in the circumstances and is for the purpose of—

    “(a) preventing or minimising harm to the child or another person; or
    “(b) preventing the child from engaging or continuing to engage in conduct that amounts to a criminal offence; or
    “(c) preventing the child from engaging or continuing to engage in offensive or disruptive behaviour; or
    “(d) performing the normal daily tasks that are incidental to good care and parenting.


    “(2) Nothing in subsection (1) or in any rule of common law justifies the use of force for the purpose of correction.
    “(3) Subsection (2) prevails over subsection (1).
    “(4) To avoid doubt, it is affirmed that the Police have the discretion not to prosecute complaints against a parent of a child or person in the place of a parent of a child in relation to an offence involving the use of force against a child, where the offence is considered to be so inconsequential that there is no public interest in proceeding with a prosecution.”

  • Key and Goff on Family Matters at the 2009 Forum on the Family

    The 2009 Forum on the Family is nearly upon us. This year John Key and Phil Goff are slated to face-off, Lord of the NZ Blogosphere, David Farrar, will be making an appearance, details of the rest of this years lineup are on the poster (click on the image if you cannot read it). You can register here and if you do it now you’ll get the early-bird rate.

    Matt and I have been to the last two Forums on the Family and can thoroughly recommend them as interesting, informative and a great place to network and meet people; at this stage we plan to attend this one.

    family

  • (dis)Honest to God: How Not to Argue about the Smacking Referendum

    Given that yesterday we advertised Dr Glenn Peoples’ upcoming public lectures and because the smacking referendum begins on Saturday, I thought we’d share this article critiquing bad anti-smacking reasoning by Glenn.



    (dis)Honest to God: How Not to Argue about the Smacking Referendum


    smackingIan Harris tells us (“Honest to God,” Dominion Post, [Dominion Post. Saturday July 11, 2009. Page B5], reproduced at the YesVote website) that we should reject the “harsh views” on child rearing found in the Bible.

    Mr Harris, unfortunately, joins many of those who promote the criminalisation of good parents by muddying the waters. He notes, for example, that someone who defends the right to use physical discipline also believes that children (like adults) are sinners. He then announces that since “progressive” Christians (by which he seems to mean those who no longer accept Christian theology) realise that this is based on an antiquated view, we should likewise reject the right to use physical discipline and we should criminalise those who do.

    It is difficult to interact charitably with those who support the ban on smacking if this is the contorted way they are going to reason about the subject. Whether or not one thinks the theology held by some supporters of the right to use physical discipline is correct is quite a different matter from whether or not one thinks they ought to be made into criminals, surely!

    Unfortunately again, Mr Harris attempts to use his platform as a mouthpiece of liberal (what he calls “progressive) Christianity to give credence to scientific claims that are obviously subject to great dispute. He makes the sweeping claim that this nebulous thing called “modern research” (while he cites no actual studies) shows that although corporal punishment does help bring about short-term compliance, it does not help a child to “internalise positive values for the longer term.”

    I am constantly bemused by the way in which conservative religious spokespeople are ridiculed even when they do cite research, but obvious nonsense like this can be peddled by the liberal voices without so much as a single scholarly citation, and nobody is expected to bat an eyelid.

    But even if what Mr Harris says is correct, the implication is that corporal punishment in and of itself has short term benefits and no long term ill effects. Hardly something to be prosecuting people for! The reality is that the effects he cites are perfectly compatible with the good of corporal punishment. Such punishment usually is administered to children when they are not willing to reason or reflect on the long term consequences of their actions. It is for when children are being unruly and unwilling to listen. Circumstances in which they are willing to do so are the circumstances under which corporal punishment is less necessary (meaning that the older a child becomes, the less frequent a smack will become). None of this gives the careful reader any reason to think that the occasional smack is immoral, much less worthy of criminal prosecution.

    Bereft of compelling moral or scientifically grounded arguments, Mr Harris turns instead to arousing prejudice against the religious convictions of those who disagree with him about child discipline. Unable to find anything strong enough in what all Christians consider their holy book, he reaches into the book of Ecclesiasticus (part of the so-called “apocryphal” writings that did not make up part of the Hebrew canon) to find the claim that “he who loves his son will whip him often.”

    But not only has Mr Harris strayed into literature that the so-called “fundamentalists” (most of whom would identify as conservative Protestants) that he attacks do not even regard to be part of the Bible at all, he has clearly sought out the most extreme translation of the verse that he can find. He conjures up grizzly pictures of leering parents towering, horsewhip in hand, over the broken and bleeding bodies of little children with misleading language like this.

    But just a few minutes research would dispel this attempt. The New American translation reads, “He who loves his son chastises him often.” The Douay Rheims translation (the Catholic Bible, which does include this book as part of the canon) reads “He that loveth his son, frequently chastiseth him.” The old King James version, the one that “fundamentalists” are most likely to read if the read this book at all, reads “He that loveth his son causeth him oft to feel the rod.” Of course, because it’s a metaphor for physical discipline that’s probably still too much for Mr Harris, but needless to say, it robs him of his “whipping” bogeyman.

    After the rhetorical debris is stripped away, all that’s really left is a string of namecalling and fearful language. He calls the views of his opponents “repugnant.” He calls them “fundamentalists” with “antiquated” views that are opposed to “progressive” thought. But where’s the actual substance? Like much of the rhetorical fireworks that is being leveled at those who want the law changed to a common sense view that refuses to place thousands of good parents in the criminal category, Ian Harris offers more heat than light, and manifests just the sort of shallowness and bias that this debate could do without.

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  • Fisking Ian Hassall: The Arbitrary Ethical Reasoning on the Smacking Referendum

    Recently Dr Ian Hassall gave a presentation, on the upcoming referendum on section 59 of the Crimes Act 1961, entitled: How did we come to have a law that supported hitting children? This presentation defends the thesis that mild physical punishment (smacking) is wrong and should remain illegal in New Zealand. In this post I will critically evaluate Hassall’s arguments and demonstrate why they fail.

    Much of Hassall’s article discusses the evolutionary, legal and religious origins of corporal punishment and while I disagree with much of his analysis, and I am sure Paul Moon would have a few things to say about his historical claims regarding early Maori not engaging in violence against children, for the sake of space, I will forgo addressing this. I will also put to one side Hassall’s caricatured picture of ‘evangelical views’ on the doctrine of original sin which does not include a teaching on the necessity of inflicting pain repeatedly on children (I intend to do a Sunday Study on the biblical teachings surrounding this issue in the near future). Strictly speaking, the origins of the practice is irrelevant; the real issue is: now that it is here, is it wrong, is corporal punishment morally permissible and should it be illegal? These are questions of morality and ethics. My critique will focus on these aspects.

    Evidence Shows Smacking Does Not Harm
    Hassall begins his discussion of the ethical questions by conceding, contrary to the standard assertions from opponents of corporal punishment, that “a considerable body of research” shows “no detectable harm to children who have been mildly physically punished when compared with children who have had no such punishment.” This concession raises an immediate question; if mild corporal punishment is no more harmful than other forms of discipline, which are legal and considered morally unproblematic, why then is corporal punishment singled out for censure and prohibition? Hassall puts up several arguments, I will address the most significant ones.

    Equality before the Law
    Hassall argues against mild forms of corporal punishment by noting that the same acts would undoubtedly constitute a crime if done to an adult;

    The main argument against legally sanctioned assaults on children has never been a question of whether or not it does harm, as can be seen by applying the same argument to assaults on adults.

    The law that makes it a criminal offence to assault an adult does not rely for its justification on whether or not it does harm. If evidence was lacking for any ill effects from a certain level of assault by a man on his wife, for example, it would still not be acceptable. … The central issue is not whether or not harm is done but whether or not one person is entitled to assault another.

    The implicit assumption behind these appeals is that, if it is a crime to do something to an adult then it must also be a crime to do the same thing to a child. This kind of reasoning seems pervasive in the arguments of those who criticise corporal punishment. The problem is that the assumption is false.



    It is a criminal offence (theft) for a man to confiscate his wife’s property without her consent; similarly, it would be a criminal offence (false imprisonment) for a man to prevent his wife from leaving her room or her house. Yet no sensible person thinks that it ought to be a crime for parents to ground their child or confiscate property when their child is acting out.

    Corporal punishment does not seem different from other forms of parental discipline in this respect. Both corporal punishment, like smacking and non-corporal punishments, like groundings and confiscations, are such that if one adult did them to another they would be illegal.

    The Right to Physical Integrity
    A second argument Hassall raises is that children have a right to physical integrity, “the right of children to physical integrity is recognised by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Twenty-three countries have recognised this right in their law.” Now the argument that we should adopt a policy on something just because twenty-three other countries have done so is not compelling in and of itself.

    Now, I accept that children have a right to physical integrity. The obvious problem, however, is that not all forms of corporal punishment damage a person’s physical integrity. Some forms, like those that inflict injuries upon their victims, clearly do but the fact that some forms of corporal punishment violate a right does not entail that all do – anymore so than the fact that some forms of non-corporal punishment, such as locking a child up in a cage without food or water, mean that all forms of non-corporal punishment are unjust. Again there appears no reason for concluding that corporal punishment is wrong or unjust by this argument.

    Feeling Guilty
    Hassall notes that parents sometimes feel guilty when they engage in corporal punishment. “It feels wrong and when we reflect, we know in our hearts it is wrong. What ordinary parent can recall without remorse the look of fear on the child’s face when they raised their arm to strike?” The problem again is that this is not unique to corporal punishment. What parent does not feel upset, for example, when they see their child crying hysterically as a result of being sent to their room or not being allowed to watch a TV show or missing out on an event they were looking forward to due to their misbehaviour? Once again this argument gives us no reason for singling out mild corporal punishment as wrong but not other forms of non-corporal punishment. The argument applies equally to all forms of punishment that make parents feel bad when administering them.

    Normalisation of Hitting
    Hassall pulls out another common argument against corporal punishment, that it sends the message that “hitting people is normal.” He notes, “if as parents we have become inured to the fear and pain we cause by hitting our children, what have we become? And if our children over the years become used to us hitting them and regard it as normal, what have they become?”

    It is evident from this comment that Hassall’s conclusion is decided aprori and read into the evidence instead of being inferred from it. In the previous paragraph I noted his claim that if parents feel bad about corporal punishment then this shows it is bad, here he suggests if they do not feel this way then this also shows it is bad. In other words, no matter what the facts are, he draws the same conclusion. But more importantly, if Hassall’s argument is sound then an analogous argument shows that non-corporal punishments are unjustifiable.

    If smacking children teaches them that hitting others is normal then wouldn’t grounding them teach that restricting others liberty is normal? Wouldn’t confiscating their property teach that taking others property without their consent is normal? All punishment by its nature involves subjecting someone to something unpleasant, usually without their consent, which in normal circumstances it would be wrong to do; consider incarceration or periodic detention. Given that one of the functions of punishment is deterrence, all forms of punishment involves some degree of threatening others and scaring them away from wrongdoing. Not only is this an argument against smacking, it is also an argument against our justice system.

    Degradation and Indirect Harm
    Hassall offers two final arguments against the legality of mild corporal punishment. The first is that mild corporal punishment causes indirect harm to children and the second is that it is degrading.

    Turning to first of these arguments, Hassall notes,

    The old law propped up a sense of entitlement to strike children. This sense of entitlement, in an angry person with limited self control, can be the beginning of a beating. Surveys of adults found guilty of abuse of children have revealed that usually the episode of abuse began with the intention to punish and escalated.

    This is a very bad argument. Essentially Hassall is arguing that mild corporal punishment is wrong because if people with limited self-control engage in it then it will escalate into a beating. He also notes that often beatings come about as a result of such escalation. The problem here is that these facts are true of many legal and perfectly permissible activities. Spousal abuse often results following escalation of a marital argument. If a person with limited self-control argues with his or her spouse he or she may lose control and commit assault. However, it does not follow that it is wrong to argue with one’s spouse nor does it follow that such arguments should be illegal. Likewise, if people with limited self-control drink alcohol they may drink excessively, get in a car and kill someone. Many criminal offences result from an escalation of drinking; does it follow that any consumption of alcohol should be illegal?



    Hassall’s main and most important argument, however, is the claim that mild corporal punishment is “dehumanising” he notes that,

    Women, servants and soldiers, once subject to legally sanctioned corporal punishment are deemed in modern times to have the right to be free from assault and the threat of assault and from the oppression and dehumanisation that accompanies the entitlement of others to inflict pain upon them.

    Here Hassall singles out a feature that he contends mild corporal punishment possesses that other punishments do not. In modern times, adults can be subject to legally sanctioned punishments, like fines and incarceration but they cannot be subject to corporal punishment and this is because the latter (not the former) is “dehumanising” in a way that the others are not. This, he thinks, is the reason smacking should remain illegal.



    The problem with this argument is the central claim behind it, that mild corporal punishment is demeaning in a way that other forms are not. David Benatar makes the point well;

    Here it is noteworthy that there are other forms of punishment that lower people’s standing even more than corporal punishment, and yet are not subject to similar condemnation. Consider, for example, various indignities attendant upon imprisonment, including severe invasions of privacy (such as strip-searches and ablution facilities that require relieving oneself in full view of others) as well as imposed subservience to prison wardens, guards, and even to more powerful fellow inmates. My intuitions suggest that this lowering of people’s standing surpasses that implicit in corporal punishment per se, even though it is obviously the case that corporal punishment could be meted out in a manner in which it were aggravated…Therefore, if we think that current practices in prison life are not wrong on grounds of degradation, then we cannot consistently say that all corporal punishment is wrong on these grounds.

    Benatar’s point is that one cannot claim that corporal punishment is less dehumanising than current legal punishments which “in modern times” are legally sanctioned against adults. Once this is realised, the central premise behind Hassall’s objection collapses; he has not singled out a property that is unique to corporal punishment that does not equally apply to any other form of punishment.



    I began this post noting that Hassall concedes that mild corporal punishment causes no more harm than many punishments which are both permissible and legal. I conclude, by noting that mild corporal punishment does not differ in any of the other features Hassall mentions either. All punishments done to children would be crimes if done by one private adult to another. If any punishment sends the message that one can mistreat another then all do. There are numerous perfectly acceptable practices which, when engaged in by people who lack self control, escalate into crime. Having to inflict any punishment is something loving parents find unpleasant and corporal punishment is no more dehumanising than many other punishments.

    Far, from showing that mild corporal punishment, such as smacking, should be singled out for prohibition, Hassall’s argument suggests that it is no more problematic than many other forms of discipline, which good parents can and do permissibly utilise. Hassall’s moral case against mild corporal punishment then is arbitrary and appears to have little rational basis.

    David Benatar “Corporal Punishment” Social Theory & Practice, Summer 1998, Vol 24, Issue 2, accessed July 3 2009.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Fisking Margaret Mayman: The Flawed Moral Theology on the Smacking Referendum
    We’re Confused about the Anti-Smacking Referendum Question
    No Defences Permitted for the Accused

    (This post was authored by Matt and was accidentally posted under Madeleine’s account.)


  • Fisking Margaret Mayman: The Flawed Moral Theology on the Smacking Referendum

    In “A Christian Perspective on the Child Discipline Referendum,” Rev Dr Margaret Mayman presents a theological justification for retaining the amended section 59 of the Crimes Act 1961, which has criminalised force used against a child for the purposes of parental correction.

    Mayman began by offering three standard arguments for repealing the old section 59, the defence of reasonable force for the purposes of parental correction. The first is that, “Prior to the law change, there had been terrible cases of child abuse that had not resulted in an assault conviction because of the use of this defence.” The second is that, “New Zealand has appalling rates of lethal and non-lethal child abuse and there is strong evidence that abuse often occurs as an escalation of physical punishment.” The third is that, “The law needed to be changed to ensure that the children received equal protection.” Despite their popularity and repetition in the media, these arguments are seriously flawed.

    Some Accuseds Get Off
    Turning to the first, it may be true that the existence of the defence of reasonable force meant that some child abusers escaped conviction. What Mayman fails to note is that this is true of any defence in Criminal Law. Section 48 of the Crimes Act allows a person to use reasonable force in defence of oneself or another from assault. Undoubtedly some serious assaults have not resulted in criminal prosecution as a result of the existence of this defence. Similarly, the law allows those accused of rape to mount a defence that the victim consented; this defence undoubtedly has lead to serious rapes not resulting in conviction. In fact, the very existence of a requirement for the prosecution to prove an assault has occurred, beyond reasonable doubt, has resulted in untold number of serious criminal actions not resulting in criminal convictions. Hence, if the mere fact that the former s59 occasionally resulted in criminals not being convicted entails that it should remain abolished then all defences should be abolished; clearly this is an absurd conclusion.

    Criminalisation Because of Escalation
    The second argument fares no better. Mayman asserts that, “abuse often occurs as an escalation of physical punishment.” This may be true. It is also true that spousal abuse often occurs as an escalation from a verbal argument between spouses. Does it follow that we should criminalise verbal arguments with one’s spouse.

    Equal Protection
    Mayman’s third argument, that children must receive “equal protection” under the law, is also problematic. It is true that the law does not allow a parent to smack an adult. However, it is also true that the law does not allow an adult to prevent another adult from leaving the house; to do this would be to commit false imprisonment. The law also does not allow an adult to confiscate the property of another adult; this is the crime commonly known as theft. Nor does the law allow an adult to subject another adult to medical treatment without their consent; this would be both a form of assault and a violation of the Bill of Rights’ protection of life and security of the person.

    If we were to truly give children equal protection under the law then it should be illegal for parents to send their children to their room, to ground them, to confiscate their property or keep their immunisations up to date. Clearly no sensible person advocates this because no sensible person really believes that children should receive equal protection under the law.

    After presenting these ill-thought out arguments, Mayman offers a theological case for her position. Mayman cited Jesus, “Let the little children come to me, and do not stop them; for it is to such as these that the kingdom of heaven belongs. And he laid his hands upon them and went on his way” (Matthew 19: 13-15). She also cited, “Take care that you do not despise one of these little ones; for, I tell you, in heaven their angels continually see the face of my Father in heaven. … So it is not the will of your Father in heaven that one of these little ones should be lost.” (Matthew 18:10, 14). Mayman then drew two conclusions from these passages. First, these passages call us to a “radical respect for the personhood, and therefore the bodily integrity of children.” Second, that Mayman finds, “no justification for physical punishment, let alone any directive for it.”

    Personhood and Bodily Integrity
    Turning to the first, I agree that we should respect the personhood and bodily integrity of children. I also think (as I am sure Mayman does) that we should also respect the personhood of adults. Mayman assumes, without argument, that the use of force for correction is always incompatible with respecting someone’s personhood or their bodily integrity. This claim is clearly false. Certain forms of physical punishment that cause injury or harm can damage a person’s personhood or bodily integrity but not all forms do. Moreover, if correction by force always contradicts our duty to respect personhood or bodily integrity then Mayman would have to conclude that criminal punishment of child abusers themselves is unjustified. Such criminals often do not voluntarily go to jail; they have to be forced to. The fact that Mayman supports laws against child abuse shows that she does not believe her own argument; she accepts that sometimes physical force for correction is justified (for adults anyway).

    No Directive for Physical Punishment
    Her second argument is equally problematic. Mayman states she finds, “no justification for physical punishment, let alone any directive for it.” Here she is correct; nothing in the passages she cited provides any justification for physical punishment or any directive for it. Nor, for that matter, do these particular passages provide any justification for refraining from rape, kidnapping, adultery or theft. That is because these particular passages do not address these issues; they have nothing to say about them at all. Whether such things are justified or not depends on other passages or arguments that are actually about those things. Hence, appealing to them in this context is irrelevant.

    Interestingly, immediately after citing these passages, Mayman notes that another passage in scripture does seem to imply the permissibility of corporal punishment. She provides four responses to this, none of which hold any weight.

    First she notes that people have historically appealed to the book of Proverbs, “Those who spare the rod hate their children, but those who love them are diligent to discipline them”, to justify “physical violence and assaults.” This may be true but only in the same way that historically people have appealed to notions of equality to murder millions of people in Gulags. Does it follow that all appeals to equality are wrong (and should be criminalised)? Incorrect use or application of an idea tells us nothing about whether the idea itself is true.

    Second Mayman states this passage needs to interpreted in light of the “knowledge about child development and of the damage caused by physical punishment” that we have acquired since “the scriptures were written.” I agree that one should take into account relevant empirical facts when interpreting scripture. The problem is that Mayman simply assumes that it is an empirical fact that “physical punishment” causes damage; the problem is that this is far from obvious. In “Corporal Punishment,” Professor David Benatar surveys several studies and notes,

    Although there is evidence that excessive corporal punishment can significantly increase the chances of such psychological harm, most of the psychological data are woefully inadequate to the task of demonstrating that mild and infrequent corporal punishment has such consequences.

    Moreover, he goes on to note that, “even the data suggesting that very rare instances of mild corporal punishment do have some negative effects also suggest that the effects are not substantial.” In fact, the empirical data is nowhere near as conclusive as Mayman suggests; several studies found little or no adverse effects of physical correction once the difference between severe and abusive types of physical punishment was distinguished from other, milder forms. Theologians should take into account empirical data; they should not, however, uncritically accept unsubstantiated empirical claims about what science allegedly shows.

    Literal Interpretation
    Mayman also attacks the idea that one should take the Bible literally. She backs this up by citing Deuteronomy 21: 18-21. Mayman claims that this verse teaches that parents are required, “to put to death the persistently disobedient youth.” In fact, Mayman’s interpretation of this verse is flawed. As Christopher Wright notes, in the Ancient Near East it was common for fathers to have rights of life and death over their adult children. Deuteronomy 21, in this context, actually subverts this by taking these decisions out of the hands of fathers. The passage probably refers to adult sons, not children as it describes the sons and gluttonous drunks. Moreover, many scholars have provided evidence that penal sanctions, like those recorded in this passage, serve a rhetorical function of denouncing the action and are not intended to be taken literally.

    Even if one ignores these problems, Mayman’s position remains erroneous. Mayman assumes that if one should not take Deuteronomy 21 literally it follows that one should not take any other part of Scripture literally. This is mistaken. Such a conclusion would follow, only if, one assumed that either every statement in Scripture is to be taken literally or none is. Almost any piece of writing will contain a mixture of metaphor, figures of speech, hyperbole and so on, alongside literal comments. In any event, Mayman seems to want it both ways, in several places in her article she takes the teachings of Jesus literally in an attempt to substantiate her view on corporal punishment!

    Similar contradictions inflict the rest of Mayman’s exegesis. She dismisses the Epistle to the Hebrews on the grounds that “Nowhere does the author invoke the teaching of Jesus to confirm his beliefs.” She then immediately cites Paul’s commands to “provoke your children, or they may lose heart,” despite the fact that Paul does not, in this verse, “invoke the teaching of Jesus” to confirm this instruction. Even if Mayman’s exegesis were coherent (which it is not) the claim to not provoke one’s children is not the same as the claim to never physically correct them.

    Slavery
    Mayman finally asserts “that Paul accepted the institution of slavery” but that “Nineteenth century Christians realised that to take seriously the teaching of Jesus about the dignity of all people, required that slavery be ended.” Even if Mayman’s exegesis of Paul and her historical claims about abolitionists were correct (which scholar’s dispute) it again proves nothing at all. Even if Paul was mistaken on one issue, it does not mean he was mistaken on all issues nor does it mean he is mistaken on this issue (Mayman authoritatively quotes Paul elsewhere herself). To show Paul is mistaken on this matter requires an actual argument.

    Slogans About Violence
    After the above dubious moral theology Mayman turns to a series of slogans. She suggests that physical punishment constitutes violence, she insinuates that violence is always wrong and that violence begets violence. In fact, none of these claims are true.

    The Oxford Shorter Dictionary defines violence as “the use of physical force so as to inflict injury on others or cause damage to property.” However, not all force inflicts injury or damages property. Further, violence does not always beget violence; sometimes violence stops violence. The existence of the police force, army, armed offenders squad, courts and prisons show that even civilised societies recognise that violence and force can be justly used against others and are necessary to stop and deter further violence. Therefore, while it is correct to suggest that force and violence are often unjustified, sometimes they are not, and a sensible and just social policy will recognise the difference.

    David Benatar “Corporal Punishment” in Social Theory & Practice (Summer 1998) Vol 24, Issue 2, 237.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Fisking Ian Hassall: The Arbitrary Ethical Reasoning on the Smacking Referendum
    We’re Confused about the Anti-Smacking Referendum Question
    No Defences Permitted for the Accused

  • Evolution should not be taught in State Schools: A Defence of Plantinga Part II

    In Evolution should not be taught in State Schools: A Defence of Plantinga Part I, I articulated and defended Alvin Plantinga’s proposal that evolution should not be taught as “the sober truth” in state schools. In this post I will address what should be taught in state schools and look at Robert Pennock’s objections to this argument.

    Part II. Plantinga’s Proposal: What should be taught in State Schools?
    After drawing the above conclusion, Plantinga asks what should be taught regarding origins in state schools? He suggests two answers; the first is to teach nothing on matters of origins,

    One answer is to say: in a pluralistic society like ours, there is no fair way to teach anything about origins; hence public schools ought not to teach anything on that subject. They should instead stick to subjects where there isn’t disagreement at the level of religious or comprehensive beliefs. This would be just a reflection of a more general difficulty in having public schools of our sort in a pluralistic society. Perhaps, when the citizens get together to found a system of education, what they discover is that there is too much diversity of opinion to make it feasible.[1]

    The second, and perhaps more interesting answer, is to teach both evolution and creationism “conditionally,” Plantinga labels this as his “modest proposal.”[2] To explain this idea of teaching conditionally Plantinga introduces the technical notion of an epistemic base, “for each person P there is an epistemic base, EBP, with respect to which the probability or acceptability of proposed beliefs is to be evaluated.”[3] A person’s epistemic base contains at least four things. First it contains their “current beliefs;”[4] second, as “some beliefs are held more strongly than others,” it includes, “an index of degree of belief.”[5] Third, an epistemic base will include, “prescriptions as to how to conduct inquiry,” how to learn about world, revise beliefs, etc.[6] Fourth, it will include their comprehensive beliefs.[7] Plantinga emphasises that a persons epistemic base is not set in stone but revisable in light of argument.

    Plantinga notes that science, as currently practiced, respects a procedure known as methodological naturalism, “the policy of avoiding hypotheses that mention or refer to God or special acts on the part of God, or other supernatural phenomena, or hypotheses whose only support is the Bible, or some other alleged divine revelation.”[8] While there is dispute over whether science should do this, as currently practised, science does involve commitment to methodological naturalism.[9] This means that science operates with a particular epistemic base; while the epistemic base of science will include things such as logic, mathematics, various common-sense beliefs, there will be certain beliefs that will not go into the epistemic base for science (EBS) at least as currently practised, “Among these would be the belief that there is such a person as God, that God has created the world, and that God has created certain forms of life specially–human beings, perhaps, or the original forms of life, or for that matter sparrows and horses.”[10]

    Plantinga’s claim that evolution be taught conditionally then amounts to this: Evolution can be taught as the most probable theory relative to the current scientific epistemic base. This, he thinks, is uncontroversial and not likely to contradict anyone’s comprehensive beliefs; even a creationist, for example, can grant that, if one brackets various theological claims and operates on methodological naturalism then evolution is likely. What schools cannot do is teach that any particular epistemic base is the correct one to start from or that what follows from a particular epistemic base is true. Plantinga thinks that creationism could be taught in a similar conditional way in state schools.

    Pennock’s Critique of Plantinga
    Robert Pennock offers a critique of Plantinga’s position. Pennock contends that a rational person would not grant parents do not have the sort of prima facie rights Plantinga attributes to them. Instead, a rational person would advocate that evolution be taught as true and creationism or any other theological view be excluded from being taught in state schools.[11] He offers two arguments for this conclusion; the first is that,

    we all know parents who are bigots or ideologues and others who are simply narrow-minded or ignorant. … A good education may be a child’s only window to a clear picture of the world and to an open future. To agree to a basic right would be to close that window. This would be a serious harm for the children of such parents.[12]

    This is a bad argument; it is true that some parents are narrow minded. It is also true that some parents do not feed their children or neglect to clothe them or give them poor medical care; however, it would be grossly unjust to infer from this that no parent has even a prima facie right to clothe and feed their child or make medical decisions for them. Moreover, a parallel line of argument would entail that teachers, schools and governments cannot make education choices either. We are all familiar with teachers and government officials who are bigoted, corrupt and abuse their power. Taken consistently, Pennock’s views would entail that no one could make educational choices for children.

    The second and more substantial argument is that accepting parental rights would “gut the curriculum of state schools.”[13]Pennock notes,

    … there are thousands of special interests groups that would use such a right to prohibit the teaching of specific facts or even whole subjects they objected to. One does not have to look far to find parents who would object to teaching about racial equality, the facts of reproductive health, or that even that the earth is round. Only the utterly trivial could have a chance of escaping the gag of basic rights. No rational person would agree to such a policy.[14]

    Pennock here suggests Plantinga’s position would prevent anything being taught at state schools and he takes this as a reductio ad absurdum of the claim that parents have the kind of rights Plantinga contends they do. Three points can be made in response to this.[15]

    First, Pennock misconstrues Plantinga’s position. Plantinga’s view is that, “it is improper, unfair, to teach either creationism or evolution in the schools–that is so, at any rate for areas where a substantial proportion of the parents hold religious or comprehensive beliefs incompatible with either.” [Emphasis added][16] Consequently, it applies locally not globally. In a Native Indian reserve, for example, it would be unjust for state teaching of things that were contrary to the comprehensive beliefs of Native Indians.[17] It would not follow, however, that one could not teach these things in a school in New York, for example, where there are hardly any Native Indians who continue to believe these cultural practices.[18] Hence, the fact that almost everything is incompatible with someone’s comprehensive beliefs is irrelevant. Schools do not have to accommodate the views of everyone; they only need to accommodate the views in their area.

    Second, Plantinga stresses that parental rights are prima facie rights not absolute rights; they can be overridden in certain circumstances. Interestingly Plantinga alludes to one such circumstance in the very paper Pennock critiques,

    Of course a basic right is a prima facie right… The majority might also insist on teaching the denial of certain comprehensive views, Nazism, for example, in which case the fair thing to do would be to exclude the Nazis from the contract (and also exclude them from the tax liability).[19]

    Here Plantinga considers the very examples Pennock raised; situations where a minority has bizarre or repugnant views which the majority feel compelled to warn their own children about and it is clear that in such situations one does not need to adopt a gag rule for all state schools. One simply establishes a state school based on the views of the majority in the area in question and grants the minority freedom to opt out of these schools and an exemption from education taxation.

    Third, suppose that Pennock is correct and there is too much disagreement over comprehensive views to have a state school system and also respect the rights Plantinga attributes to parents, does it follow that we should not respect parental rights? Not at all, an alternative is to not have state schools; Plantinga notes, “Perhaps, when the citizens get together to found a system of education, what they discover is that there is too much diversity of opinion to make it feasible.”[20] An alternative could be to establish a network of private schools where parents could choose which school meets the needs of their children, basing their decisions in part on their comprehensive beliefs.[21] Some private schools could teach evolution and others could choose not to and parents could choose which ones to send their children to.

    In other words, if it is true that it is impossible to have a centralised state education system and accord parents prima facie rights of the sort Plantinga suggests, then that is an argument against having a centralised state education system. It is not, as Pennock suggests, a compelling argument against parental rights.

    Conclusion
    I conclude then that Plantinga’s position is defensible. Regardless of whether evolution is true or empirically founded it is unjust to teach the children of parents who have theological objections to evolution that it is true. State schools which have a sizeable clientele who hold such views should teach it only conditionally or not at all. Alternatively, the government should allow these people to opt out of state education and grant them a tax rebate.

    [1] Alvin Plantinga “Creation and Evolution: A Modest Proposal” in Robert Pennock Ed Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics: Philosophical, Theological and Scientific Perspectives (Cambridge, The MIT Press – Bradford Books, 2001) 787.
    [2] Ibid 789.
    [3] Ibid 787.
    [4] Ibid.
    [5] Ibid.
    [6] Ibid.
    [7] Ibid.
    [8] Ibid, 788.
    [9] Alvin Plantinga “Methodological Naturalism?” Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith49 (1997) 143-154; M Ruse “Methodological Naturalism Under Fire” South African Journal of Philosophy 24(1)(2005) 44-60.
    [10] Plantinga “Creation and Evolution: A Modest Proposal” 788.
    [11] Robert Pennock “Should Creationism Be Taught in Public Schools?” Science & Education 11(2) (2002) 111-133.
    [12] Ibid 129.
    [13] Ibid 128.
    [14] Ibid 127.
    [15] I am grateful to Alvin Plantinga for his helpful comments here.
    [16] Plantinga “Creation and Evolution: A Modest Proposal” 786.
    [17] Ibid 782.
    [18] Alvin Plantinga suggested this example in correspondence
    [19] Plantinga “Creation and Evolution: A Modest Proposal” 782.
    [20] Ibid 787.
    [21] Here again I am grateful to Alvin Plantinga for confirming this suggestion.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Evolution should not be taught in State Schools: A Defence of Plantinga Part I

  • Evolution should not be taught in State Schools: A Defence of Plantinga Part I

    In this two-part series I will sketch and defend Alvin Plantinga’s proposal that evolution should not be taught as “the sober truth” in state schools. In Part I, I will sketch Plantinga’s position and the arguments he provides for it; in Part II, I will look at what should be taught and then I’ll defend this position against the most significant critique offered of it by Robert Pennock. I have developed this position partly out of reading and reflecting on the published debate between these two men but also through correspondence with Alvin Plantinga over the issue.

    Part I. The Argument against Teaching Evolution in State Schools
    Arguably the most sophisticated argument against teaching evolution in state schools has been made by Alvin Plantinga. Plantinga begins by offering a couple of qualifications; first, Plantinga’s inquiry is limited to whether evolution should be taught in the state schools of countries that display significant pluralism and diversity of opinion.[1] This would include, not just Plantinga’s own country, the United States of America but also New Zealand. Second, Plantinga limits his inquiry to whether “evolution should be taught as the sober truth of the matter” [Emphasis mine][2] as opposed to “the best current scientific hypothesis, or what accords best or is most probable (epistemically probable) with respect to the appropriate scientific evidence base.”[3] Plantinga’s conclusion is that it is unjust to teach evolution in this way. His argument proceeds in three stages.

    First Plantinga notes that American (and the same is true of New Zealand) society is “radically pluralistic; and here I am thinking in particular of the plurality of religious and quasi-religious views.”[4] Following John Rawls, he calls these religious and quasi-religious views “’comprehensive’ beliefs… deep ways of understanding ourselves and our world, other deep ways of interpreting ourselves and our world to ourselves.”[5]

    Second, Plantinga suggests that with state schools, “It is as if we are all party to a sort of implicit contract: we recognize the need to train and educate our children, but don’t have the time or competence to do it individually. We therefore get together to hire teachers to help instruct and educate our children, and together we pay for this service by way of tax money.”[6] However, given that “[for] most citizens, these comprehensive beliefs are of enormous importance… some even thinking that one’s eternal welfare is tied up with accepting them, parents will typically want their children to be educated into what they take to be the true and correct comprehensive beliefs;”[7] This, however, raises an immediate question of fairness,

    It would clearly be unfair, unjust, for the school, which we all support, to teach one set of religious beliefs as opposed to another–to teach that evangelical Christianity, for example, is the truth. This would be unfair to those citizens who are party to the contract and whose comprehensive beliefs–Judaism, naturalism, Islam, whatever–are incompatible with evangelical Christianity.[8]

    From these points Plantinga argues that parents possess what he calls a basic right that, “each of the citizen’s party to the contract has the right to not have comprehensive beliefs taught to their children that contradict their own comprehensive beliefs.”[9] A basic right expresses a prima facie right not an absolute right; that is, it is a right which can be overridden by other considerations. Teaching evolution clearly violates a basic right; a significant proportion of people hold comprehensive religious views, views that contradict evolution. Hence, their rights are being violated if evolution is taught as true in state schools. It follows then, that in the absence of other considerations, teaching evolution in state schools is unjust.

    The final step in Plantinga’s argument is to contend that, in the case of evolution, there are no other considerations that override this prima facie right. Commenting on a defence of the teaching of evolution made by Robert Pennock, Plantinga identifies two considerations made in favour of teaching evolution. The first is that evolutionary theory is true; the second is that it is an empirically supported theory, the best supported theory of origins in the biological sciences.

    In response to the first consideration Plantinga notes that even if evolution is true, it does not follow that it is just to teach it as true in a pluralistic society.

    Suppose Christianity is in fact true, as indeed I believe it is, would that mean that it is fair to teach it in public schools where most of the citizens, citizens who support those schools, are not Christians and reject Christian comprehensive beliefs? I should think not; that would clearly be unfair, and the fact that the system of beliefs in question is true would not override the unfairness.[10]

    Plantinga’s response to the second consideration is more nuanced. Plantinga has not claimed that evolution cannot be taught as “the best current scientific hypothesis, or what accords best or is most probable (epistemically probable) with respect to the appropriate scientific evidence base,”[11] his claim is that it should not be taught as true. The fact that evolution is the best scientific theory does not, by itself, entail that it is true. To get the conclusion that evolution is true one needs to conjoin the claim that evolution is the best scientific theory of origins with an epistemological claim that Plantinga labels PC,

    (PC) The right way to answer questions of empirical fact–for example questions about the origin of life, the age of the earth, whether human beings have evolved from earlier forms of life–is by way of science, or scientific method.[12]

    Plantinga notes that PC is not an empirical or scientific claim; it is rather a claim of philosophy or epistemology. Second, PC is a claim that contradicts the comprehensive beliefs of many parents. Hence, to justify teaching evolution as true, as opposed to just the best scientific hypothesis, educators would have to go beyond the mere scientific empirical evidence and teach substantive philosophical views that contradict the comprehensive views of parents.[13]

    Plantinga concludes that the considerations put forward to override the prima facie rights of parents do not override these rights, hence, “is that it is improper, unfair, to teach either creationism or evolution in the schools–that is so, at any rate for areas where a substantial proportion of the parents hold religious or comprehensive beliefs incompatible with either.”[14]

    In my next post, Evolution should not be taught in State Schools: A Defence of Plantinga Part II, I will look at what should be taught in state schools and I’ll address Robert Pennock’s criticisms of the position.

    [1] Alvin Plantinga “Creation and Evolution: A Modest Proposal” in Robert Pennock Ed Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics: Philosophical, Theological and Scientific Perspectives (Cambridge, The MIT Press – Bradford Books, 2001) 779.
    [2] Ibid.
    [3] Ibid.
    [4] Ibid 780.
    [5] Ibid; John Rawls Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993)
    [6] Ibid, 781.
    [7] Ibid.
    [8] Ibid.
    [9] Ibid, 780.
    [10] Ibid, 784.
    [11] Ibid, 779.
    [12] Ibid, 786.
    [13] Ibid.
    [14] Ibid.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Evolution should not be taught in State Schools: A Defence of Plantinga Part II