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  • “Remove the wicked man from among yourselves” THE TORAH AS A NORMATIVE AUTHORITY IN 1ST CORINTHIANS 5 (part two)

    Paul’s polemic against Judaizers in the Galatian correspondence, as well as his insistence in Romans that justification comes by faith (pistis) and not by works of the Torah, has led many interpreters to see Pauline ethics as thoroughly anti-nomian. In a previous post I  challenged this thesis by documenting Paul’s appeal to both the Torah and common rabbinic Halakha in the fifth chapter of Paul’s First Epistle to the Corinthians

    In that post, I examined  1 Corinthians Chapter 5. I  argued that Paul, (a) frames the problem in terms of obedience to the Torah’s commands regarding prohibited sexual relations, (b) responds by invoking the standard Halakha punishment of extirpation, and (c) justifies this by appealing to the Torah’s command to punish such offences. paul

    To many, this conclusion seems odd. In the Galatian correspondence Paul engages in a passionate polemic against those who would demand that Gentiles get circumcised and obey the Torah, yet in 1 Corinthians he rebukes a Gentile congregation for violating a commandment in the Torah and appeals to the Torah’s normative authority. How can he do both of these things?

    1. Why does Paul Invoke the Torah?

    I think the answer is ascertained by recognising a distinction in Jewish halakha. As early as the book of Jubilees, which was probably written around 200 BC, Jewish interpreters had come to recognise that while the Torah as a whole was given only to Israel, certain commands in the Torah applied to both Jews and Gentiles alike. Jewish exegesis distinguishes between what the Rabbis called the Noahide law and the Mosaic Law. The former are the commands God addresses to all humankind, both Jew and Gentile alike. Jewish tradition teaches that these laws were given first, during the time of Adam, to all Adam’s descendants and then again to Noah. The Mosaic Law, on the other hand, is a covenant between Jews and God. As the Jews are a subset of all people, many of the Noahide laws are repeated in the Mosaic Law. However, Israel is given a body of other laws which are binding on them in virtue of their special relationship to God.

    There is evidence that early Christianity recognised this distinction.[1] The book of Acts records the Apostles gathering to discuss whether it was necessary to circumcise Gentile believers and “direct them to observe the Law of Moses.” (15) The decision is recorded as follows in Acts 15:28-29:

    “For it seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us to lay upon you no greater burden than these essentials:  that you abstain from things sacrificed to idols and from blood and from things strangled and from fornication; if you keep yourselves free from such things, you will do well.”

    The Apostles decreed that Gentiles do not have to follow the Mosaic law, however, they are required to abstain from certain commandments in the Torah such as, sexual immorality, idolatry, “bloodshed” and consuming the “meat of strangled animals”. Western manuscripts omit the reference to “meat of strangled animals” and add the “golden rule” to the list. However, both agree that, sexual immorality (porneia), idolatry, and bloodshed were included. These are standard items in lists of the laws of Noah in Jewish halakah.[2]

    What’s important is that both Jewish Halakah and the Apostolic decree recognised the commandments prohibiting porneia as part of the Noahide law. Tomson explains:

    “The prohibition of certain types of sexual relationships both for Jews and Gentiles is considered fundamental in the various domains of ancient Jewish literature. Pharisaic-Rabbinic tradition includes [porneia] among the three commandments which Jews may never violate, even under threat of death. … According to a tradition as least as ancient as the book of Jubilees (7:20) it was a universal commandment conveyed by Noah to his children. In Rabbinic literature it is associated with the Genesis narrative. Stressing the universal implication of the word ‘man’ the Rabbis explain: ‘How do we know that Noahides are admonished for prohibited sexual relations like Israelites?’ “(Therefore a man leaves his father and mother and) cleaves to his wife” (Gen 2:24) — and not to another’s wife, a male, or a beast.”[3]

    It is interesting that Gen 2:24 is the same passage Paul himself uses in 1 Corinthians 6 to ground a prohibition of prohibit “porneia”.  His argument, therefore, reflects this halakhaic tradition.

    Consequently, in both early Christianity and in second temple Judaism, the claim that a Gentile was not required to be circumcised and not required to keep the law of Moses, did not entail, and would not have been understood to have entailed, that Gentiles did not have to obey that Halakah relating to commandments in the Torah, which were part of the Noahide law. And it certainly would not have been understood to have meant that Gentiles were not bound by Halakah relating to prohibited sexual relations. The fallacy here is the fallacy of division where one argues that because something is true of the whole its true of all of the parts. This would occur, for example, if someone reasoned that because the All Blacks score multiple tries in a game, it follows that every member of the All Blacks scores multiple tries in a game; or that because a particular wall is fragile and breakable, every single brick that makes up the wall is fragile and breakable. In this instance, the argument is that because the Mosaic law is not binding on Gentiles every single command in the law is not binding on Gentiles.Once the halakhic background distinction is appreciated, Paul’s stance in Corinthians is not inconsistent with that in Galatians.

    Conclusion

    Paul in 1 Corinthians 5 cites commandments in the Torah as authoritative for the Gentile congregation in Corinth. The problem is that they have disobeyed the Torah’s prohibition of porneia; his solution and justification both involve an appeal to the Torah and standard halakha.

    This appeal to the Torah’s normative authority is not inconsistent with Paul’s position; it is affirmed elsewhere in the Pauline corpus that Gentile believers do not have to be circumcised and are free from the law of Moses.  Paul believed that a person did not have to convert to Judaism to become a member of the covenant community, he did, however, believe people had to follow the commandments of God.


    [1] See for example, Tomson “Paul and the Jewish Law” also Marcus Bockmuehl Jewish Law in Gentile Churches: Halakhah and the Beginning of Christian Public Ethics (Baker Academic, 2000).

    [2] The list reflects Gen 9:1-5: “And God blessed Noah and his sons and said to them, “Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth. The fear of you and the terror of you will be on every beast of the earth and on every bird of the sky; with everything that creeps on the ground, and all the fish of the sea, into your hand they are given. Every moving thing that is alive shall be food for you; I give all to you, as I gave the green plant. Only you shall not eat flesh with its life, that is, its blood. Surely I will require your lifeblood; from every beast I will require it. And from every man, from every man’s brother I will require the life of man.”
    Here God addresses Noah and his sons (i.e. the whole human race) he permits them to eat any kind of food, showing that. the kosher food laws are not binding on Gentiles antecedent to the Noahic covenant. However, the shedding of human blood (bloodshed), the eating of an animal with “lifeblood still in” (strangled animals) and the duty to be fruitful and multiply”, and hence to procreate (relating to sexual morality), does hold prior to the giving of the Torah.

    [3] Thomson “Paul and the Jewish Law” 99.

     

  • “Remove the wicked man from among yourselves” THE TORAH AS A NORMATIVE AUTHORITY IN 1ST CORINTHIANS 5 (Part One)

    This post is based on an essay I wrote for an undergraduate course on the history of religion I did a couple of years ago. I plan to expand upon it and publish it in the future. Feel free to add comments and thoughts on my admittedly controversial ideas.

    Paul’s polemic against Judaizers in the Galatian correspondence, as well as his insistence in Romans that justification comes by faith (pistis) and not by works of the Torah, has led many interpreters to see Pauline ethics as thoroughly anti-nomian. In this and in future posts I  will challenge this thesis by documenting Paul’s appeal to both the Torah and common rabbinic Halakha in the fifth chapter of Paul’s First Epistle to the Corinthians.[1]

    In my first post, part 1, I will look at 1 Corinthians Chapter 5. I will argue that Paul, (a) frames the problem in terms of obedience to the Torah’s commands regarding prohibited sexual relations, (b) responds by invoking the standard Halakha punishment of extirpation, and (c) justifies this by appealing to the Torah’s command to punish such offences. Part 2 will offer a brief response to the objection that this is inconsistent with Paul’s position in Galatia.paul

    1. Paul’s Appeal to the Torah in 1st Corinthians 5

    Paul’s appeal to the Torah’s normative authority over the Corinthian community is evidenced in at least three ways.

    1. Paul’s Problem: Disobedience to the Torah’s Commands regarding Porneia.

    First, Paul addresses the problem of disobedience to some of the commandments in the Torah in 1 Corinthians 5:1-2.

    “It is actually reported that there is immorality [porneia] among you, and immorality [porneia] of such a kind as does not exist even among the Gentiles, that someone has his father’s wife. You have become arrogant and have not mourned instead, so that the one who had done this deed would be removed from your midst.”[2]

    The NASB uses the word “immorality” to translate the Greek word “porneia”. Ciampa and Rosner explain, “Porneia is a flexible term meaning prohibited sexual relationships”.[3] Paul uses the same term elsewhere in the Epistle to refer to sex with a prostitute (6:16-18) and extra marital sex (7:2). Matthew uses porneia to refer to adultery when narrating Jesus’ Halakha on divorce.[4] Jude uses the term to refer to homosexual rape of the messengers at Sodom.[5] Tomson argues that porneia is equivalent to the rabbinic term “uncovering the nakedness of”, a term used in the Torah to designate sexual relationships prohibited by the law.[6] For Paul in the passage at hand, failure to refrain from sexual relationships prohibited in the Torah appears to be the problem.

    This is further reinforced by Paul’s description of the particular type of porneia being engaged in; Paul writes, “someone has his father’s wife.” [Hōste gynaika tina tou patros echein]

    The language here is strongly reminiscent of the Septuagint (“LXX”) translation of the Torah, “A man shall not take his father’s wife” [Ou lempsetai anthropos ten gynaika tou patros autou (Deut 23:1 LXX)]. The book of Deuteronomy pronounced a curse on anyone who “sleeps with his father’s wife”.[7] “[S]leeping with one’s father’s wife” is listed as a capital offence in the book of Leviticus.[8]

    The fact that porneia of this sort is both subjected to a curse and is a capital crime in the Torah is significant because, as we shall see, Paul both pronounces a curse on the man sleeping with his father’s wife (5:5) and appeals to the command to execute people who engage in certain forms of porneia (5:13). What is pertinent to note here is Paul’s concern is that someone in a Gentile congregation has disobeyed a commandment in the Torah prohibiting certain forms of sexual relationships.

    The problem is not just that this has been done but, as Paul states, the church have not “mourned” over the fact someone has done this and have not expelled the person from their fellowship. (5:2) Paul sees these commands as authoritative over the conduct of the Corinthians.

    Paul’s Verdict: Rabbinic Punishment for Consensual Incest.

    Second, the course of action Paul takes is the course of action which, at least according to common Halakha of the time, the law commands to be taken. Paul responds in 1 Corinthians 5:3-5,

    “For I, on my part, though absent in body but present in spirit, have already judged him who has so committed this, as though I were present.  In the name of our Lord Jesus, when you are assembled, and I with you in spirit, with the power of our Lord Jesus, I have decided to deliver such a one to Satan for the destruction of his flesh, so that his spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus.”

    Paul, here, appears to be pronouncing a formal sentence in the name of the Lord Jesus when the assembly is present. The sentence is to “deliver” the person committing incest “over to satan” for “the destruction of the flesh”. The context suggests that this involves expulsion from congregation.

    Previously Paul’s complaint (5:2) was that the congregation had not “removed the one who had done this deed” from their “midst” and he specified the penalty in terms of “not associating” with the person and “not eating with them”. (5:10-13) While many translations render this latter phrase as to “not even to eat with such a one” (5:13), Schwiebert points out, “the two commands are coordinate, that not eating with someone is parallel to, comparable to, and conceptually linked with not associating with someone”.[9] He explains that this is “ likely in view of the social significance of meals in the ancient world”. This is because,

    “In first-century Mediterranean cultures, as in many non-Western cultures today, eating with someone is a form of social approval. For such cultures, the act of “eating with” (συνεσθίειν) does not so much symbolize as embody or enact common cause, kinship, acceptance, among other things. Refusing to eat with a certain person would embody the opposite: rejection or exclusion.”[10]

    The “delivery over to satan”, therefore, in context refers to some form of expulsion and exclusion from the community. This seems odd given the language of “destruction of the flesh”. Tomson suggests this oddity is explained in terms of the Jewish practice of extirpation:

    “It is interesting to compare Paul’s solemn judgement of with the category of punishment in ancient Jewish law called ‘death at the hands of Heaven’. In theory, as in biblical law, the principle cases of prohibited sexual relations were ultimatly punishable by execution. But in practice Jewish courts mostly delivered those convicted to ‘extirpation’  כָּרֵת; karet, explained as heavenly punishment in the form of an untimely death.”[11]

    The karet or extirpation was a kind of punishment, often used in substitute for capital punishment.[12] The Torah required two or three witness to a crime before a death sentence could be handed down,[13] and the Rabbinic and Pharisaic requirements placed upon witnesses, such as requiring that the witnesses made repeated warnings to the offender and the offender persisted in the offence, meant capital punishment was difficult to administer in many cases. Further, both Jewish and Christian sources inform us that around 40 years before the destruction of the temple, the Roman authorities had monopolised the power to try capital cases.[14] In light of this, extirpation was, in practice, the normal punishment for capital offences.

    Mario Philip notes that Paul’s language in 1 Corinthians 5 has some parallels with ancient extirpation formulae; these often involved a formal curse, “curses where persons were devoted to the gods of the lower world. … These rites can be found in both Jewish and pagan texts, the only difference being that in Jewish setting Satan replaced the gods of the underworld”.[15] Philip cites a magical papyrus from the 4th century: “I say to demons of the dead, ‘this you are, if I will deliver to you him, how not he will do the deeds whether he receives.”[16]

    Particularly striking are several texts that form part of the Dead sea scrolls:

    “And the levites shall curse all the men of the lot of Behai. They shall begin to speak and shall say: ‘Accursed are you for all your wicked, blameworthy deeds. May God hand you over to terror by the hand of all those carrying out acts of vengeance. May he bring upon you destruction by the hand of all those who accomplish retributions. .. may he be cut off from the midst of all the sons of light because of his straying from following God on account of his idols and obstacle of his iniquity.”[17]

    Similarly,

    “All who enter the council of holiness of those walking in perfect behaviour as he commanded, anyone of them who breaks a word of the law of Moses impertinently or through carelessness will be banished from the Community council and shall not return again; none of the men of holiness should associate with his goods or his advice on any matter.”[18]

    These examples illustrate a practice of issuing a “judgement under heaven”, where a person is formally cursed, handed over to God or Satan for punishment, and expelled from the community; the members refuse to associate with the offender any longer. The Mishna outlines “Thirty-six transgressions subject to extirpation are in the Torah”; tellingly, the second on the list is “He who has sexual relations with…his father’s wife”.[19]

    Tomson concludes, “Paul is not arguing for capital punishment but for something like the lesser punishment of ‘extirpation’, and his verdict evidently relates to Pharisaic-Rabbinic criminal law”.[20] What Paul means is the man is expelled and that “heaven leaves the execution of extirpation to Satan”.[21]

    Paul, therefore, cites disobedience to the Torah’s laws about prohibited sexual practices as being the problem and himself pronounces the sentence, which Jewish law required for such offences, in response to the problem.

    Paul’s Justification of the Verdict: An Appeal to the Torah

    Paul justifies the sentence by explicit appeal to the Torah. In 1 Corinthians 5:10-13 he writes:

    “I wrote you in my letter not to associate with immoral people; I did not at all mean with the immoral people of this world, or with the covetous and swindlers, or with idolaters, for then you would have to go out of the world. But actually, I wrote to you not to associate with any so-called brother if he is an immoral person, or covetous, or an idolater, or a reviler, or a drunkard, or a swindler—not even to eat with such a one. For what have I to do with judging outsiders? Do you not judge those who are within I But those who are outside, God judges. Remove the wicked man from among yourselves.” [Emphasis original]

    Paul is using the word “judge” (krinein) here in the sense of passing a sentence or rendering a verdict. The passage continues on from Paul’s announcement only a few verses earlier, he had pronounced a formal sentence (kekrika) in the name of the Lord. And in the very next verse (6:1) Paul uses the word “judge” (krinien) in the context of a law suit before a Roman or ecclesiastical tribunal. Consequently, in v 12-13 Paul’s argument is about jurisdiction; he has a right to judge those within the church community but not those outside. To substantiate this he cites the phrase “Remove the wicked man from among yourselves.”

    The phrase, “Remove the wicked man from among yourselves”, comes from the LXX translation of Deuteronomy. In the LXX version the phrase occurs eight times in Deuteronomy in verses: 13:5, 17:7, 19:19, 21:20, 22:21, 21:22, 21:23 and 24:7. In each instance its use specifies the court’s right or duty to hand down a capital sentence for a particular crime; its use is often contextually linked with judicial procedure. Paul, in v 13, gives an almost verbatim citation of this phrase. Ciampa and Rosner note “the texts are identical, apart from the verb, changing from a singular future indicative to a plural aorist imperative presumably to suit the epistolary context”.[22]  That Paul cites this passage, having just handed down a sentence of “death at the hands of heaven”, to defend his right to judge those inside the church, and does so just before he proceeds to instruct the Corinthians to try their own disputes rather than go to Roman tribunals, can hardly be coincidental.

    Equally hard to dismiss as coincidental is the influence of these same passages from the LXX upon Paul’s vice list in v 10-11. Paul mentions several classes of offenders that the church are: not to associate with or not eat with, offenders to whom the punishment of extirpation can be applied, those who are “immoral” (porneia), “covetous and swindlers”, “idolaters”  or who are “a reviler”, a “drunkard”. These are the same offenses that are condemned in Deuteronomy verses: 13:5, 17:7, 19:19, 21:20, 22:21, 21:22, 21:23 and 24:7 for which Moses’ command to Israel to “remove the wicked man from among yourselves” occurs. The table below illustrates:

    1 Corinthians 5

    “do not associate with”, “do not eat”

    Deuteronomy (LXX): “remove the wicked man from among yourselves”
    Prohibited sexual relations (Porneia) (11) Promiscuity, adultery (22:21-22,30)
    Revilers (slanderer) (11) Malicious, false testimony (19:16-19)
    Drunkards (11) Rebellious drunken son (21:18-21)
    Idolaters (11) Idolatry (13:1-5, 17:2-7)
    Covetous, swindlers (11) Kidnapping and selling into slavery (24:7)

    The parallel between the first four offences in the table above is relatively obvious. Less obvious is the parallel between the last ones. Paul’s reference to “covetous and swindlers” does not appear to be a reference to “kidnapping and selling into slavery”. However, this lack of apparent match is deceptive. The categories of “covetous” and “swindler” are linked as a single category in v 11[23] but here  Paul  conjoins two words, “pleonektēs” (rendered “greedy” in the NASB) and “harpax” (rendered “swindler” in the NASB). The word “pleonektēs” refers to the attempt to seek unlawful gain, and the word “harpax”, carries the connotation of taking by force.[24] Now, obviously, kidnapping someone and selling them into slavery would be an extreme, though paradigmatic, example of taking something forcibly that did not belong to the taker; in fact, the language of the LXX bears this out. The LXX condemns kidnapping and enslaving as forms of theft; it literally refers to the enslaver as a “thief” who “steals a soul”. So, in fact, the categories of “covetous” and “swindler” does parallel the LXX category of a person who kidnaps and enslaves.[25]

    The offences Paul lists in 1 Corinthians 5 match those warranting a capital sentence in Deuteronomy. This, again, is unlikely to be coincidental. Peter Zaas states there is usually very little overlap between any two vice lists in the Pauline corpus, nor is there any between Paul’s vice lists and any extant piece of ancient literature.[26] Yet in this case we have an overlap of every category; moreover, a very similar vice list is repeated again by Paul in 6:9-10.[27]

    Paul justifies his right to judge those in the church who engage in incest (porneia), and the duty of the congregation to not associate with people from within the church who do so by appeal to the Torah. The Torah authorised Israel to set up courts and pass sentences of death upon members of their community for certain offences. In practice, particularly after Rome monopolised the right to administer capital crimes, this was substituted with the punishment of karet and extirpation, where the offender was expelled and “execution at the hands of heaven was” invoked. Paul was invoking this practice in Corinth; the porneia engaged in was of a type that carried a capital sentence; hence, the congregation of God’s people had the right to impose this penalty upon the transgressor.


    [1] By “Pauls First Epistle to the Corinthians” I mean the Epistle designated 1 Corinthians in the New Testament Canon. Paul had written an earlier letter to the Corinthian church which is lost to history. Paul explicitly mentions this letter in 1 Corinthians 5:9.

    [2] Unless otherwise stated, all scripture citations are from the New American Standard Version (NASB).

    [3] Roy E Ciampa and Brian S Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians (The Pillar New Testament Commentary) (Grand Rapids MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, 2010) 199.

     

    [4] Matthew 19:9. Here I assume that Jesus is defending the divorce Halakah of the Shammite school against no fault divorce proposals of the Hillelite school. For a defence of this claim see David Instone Brewer Divorce and Re-Marriage in the Bible: The Social and Literary Context (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002).

    [5] Jude 7.

    [6] Peter J Tomson Paul and the Jewish Law (Jewish Traditions in Early Christian Literature) (Minneapolis: Brill Academic Pub, 1991).

    [7] “‘Cursed is he who lies with his mother-in-law.’ And all the people shall say, ‘Amen’.” (Deuteronomy 27:23) The NASB renders “mother in law” where the LXX has the more literal “father’s wife”.

    [8] Leviticus 18:8 “You shall not uncover the nakedness of your father’s wife; it is your father’s nakedness.” Leviticus 20:11” If there is a man who lies with his father’s wife, he has uncovered his father’s nakedness; both of them shall surely be put to death, their bloodguiltiness is upon them.”

    [9] Jonathan Schwiebert “Table fellowship and the Translation of 1 Corinthians 5:11″ Journal of Biblical Literature 127:1 (2008) 162.

    [10] Ibid. 162-163.

    [11] Tomson Paul and the Jewish Law 101-102.

    [12] Numerous scholars have argued, cogently in my opinion, that the capital sentences in the Torah specify the maximum sentence. Further that textual indications within the law itself, and also evidence from Cuneiform law of the same genre, suggests that in practice capital punishment was frequently substituted for a lesser punishment in lieu of execution. See Raymond Westbrook, “The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law,” in A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law, Vol. 1, ed. Raymond Westbrook (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003), 71-78. Finkelstein, “The Ox that Gored,” 35. Joe M Sprinkle, “The Interpretation of Exodus 21:22-25 Lex Talionis and Abortion,” Westminster Theological Journal 55.2 (1993) 233-53. Walter Kaiser, “God’s Promise Plan and his Gracious Law,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 35:3 (1992): 293. I summarise some of this evidence in my article, Matthew Flannagan “Feticide, the Masoretic Text and the Septuagint” Westminster Theological Journal 74:1 (2012) 59-85.

    [13] Deuteronomy 17:6.

    [14] Tomson documents a Jewish tradition that “40 years before the temple the power to judge capital cases was taken from Israel”. Peter J Tomson Paul and the Jewish Law 102. The Gospels also mention this; after the Sanhedrin find Jesus guilty of blasphemy instead of carrying out any punishment themselves they take him to Pilate to have him executed, this is because the Jewish authorities lacked the power to put anyone to death. See, for example, John 18: 29-31.

    [15] Mario Philip “Delivery into the Hands of Satan—A Church in Apostasy and not Knowing it: An Exegetical Analysis of 1 Corinthians 5:5” Evangelical Review of Theology 39:1 (2015) 54.

    [16] Idem.

    [17] Ibid. 54-55.

    [18] Ibid. 55.

    [19] Idem.

    [20] Tomson, 103.

    [21] Idem.

    [22] Ciampa and Rosner “The First Letter to the Corinthians” 220.

    [23] Note the use of the conjunctive between the various vices and the conjunction of “covetous” and “swindler” into the same category; Paul writes, “I did not at all mean with the immoral people of this world, or with the covetous and swindlers, or with idolaters.”

    [24]  Daniel Berchie “The Meaning of Harpax in 1 Cor 5:10” Ilorin Journal of Religious Studies 2: 2 (2012) 1-14.

    [25] This also makes sense out of the differences between the otherwise very similar lists in 1 Corinthians 5 and 6. Chapter 5 lists: “sexually immoral person, or covetous, or an idolater, or a reviler, or a drunkard, or a swindler”, Chapter 6 lists: “neither fornicators (porneia), idolaters, nor adulterers, nor[effeminate, nor homosexuals, (arsenkoites, literally, men who go to bed with men) nor thieves, nor the covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor swindlers, will inherit the kingdom of God.” The difference is that chapter six adds effeminate and arsenkoites, which appears to be an allusion to the LXX condemnation of same sex behaviour in Leviticus 18 and 20, both of which are categories of prohibited sexual relationships, and hence, a form of porneia. Similarly, chapter 6 adds the category of “thieves”, which as we have seen is synonymous with a person who is “covetous” or a “swindler” in chapter 5. The vice lists, therefore, become essentially the same; both cite a list of offences designated as potentially capital offences in the LXX.

    [26] Peter S Zaas “Catalogues and Context: 1 Corinthians 5 and 6” New Testament Studies 34 (1988) 623.

    [27] 1 Cor 6:9-10 “Or do you not know that the unrighteous will not inherit the kingdom of God? Do not be deceived; neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor effeminate, nor homosexuals, nor thieves, nor the covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor swindlers, will inherit the kingdom of God.”

  • Contemporary Philosophy of Religion and NCEA Religious Studies: Part two

    This is a talk I gave to the New Zealand Association of Philosophy Teachers annual conference at St Cutherberts College in September this year. Several people have asked me to make this talk available.

    I have broken my talk up into four parts. Part One introduces what philosophy of religion. In part two I will outline two movements within analytic philosophy during the early to mid-century which I think resulted in religious beliefs not being taken very seriously within philosophy and philosophy of religion taking a fairly minor role. Part three will look at some responses to these movements offered in the late 20th century and how they changed the philosophical landscape. Part four will look at the question of “how to do philosophy of religion” comparing the methods used by two different atheist’s J L Mackie and Graham Oppy, and how this relates the National Certificate of Educational Achievement Standards. This post will contain part two.

    The purpose of my talk this morning, however, isn’t to discuss the philosophy of religion in the early modern period. I have been asked to talk about contemporary philosophy of religion.  As I said in my introduction, I will focus on the analytic tradition because it is the tradition I was trained in and hence the one I am most familiar with.

    Philosophy of Religion in the Earlier 20th century
    The reason this is necessary is that in the early 20th-century  analytic philosophy of religion was not taken terribly seriously.  I will briefly mention a couple of reasons as to why I think this was the case:

    1 Evidentialism

    The first was that the early 20th century, within analytical Philosophy.  A particular methodological stance was adopted towards religious or theological beliefs which has been dubbed by religious epistemologists of today “Evidentialism”. The basic idea can be seen in an article written by William Clifford called the entitled The Ethics of Belief.[1] Clifford writes, “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence.”[2] The same thesis can be seen in the writings of prominent atheists such as Michael Scriven,[3] Bertrand Russell,[4] A  lucid example of the same approach is seen in the writings of Antony Flew:philosophy-of-religion

    [T]he debate about the existence of God should properly begin from the presumption of atheism, that the onus of proof must lie upon the theist…What the protagonist of my presumption of atheism wants to show is that the debate about the existence of God ought to be conducted in a particular way, and that the issue should be seen in a certain perspective. His thesis about the onus of proof involves that it is up to the theist: first to introduce and to defend his proposed concept of God; and second, to provide sufficient reason for believing that this concept of his does, in fact, have an application.[5]

    A similar position is seen John Mackie’s  work the Miracle of Theism:

    If it is agreed that the central assertions of theism are literally meaningful, it must also be admitted that they are not directly verified or directly verifiable. It follows that any rational consideration of whether they are true or not will involve arguments . . .[I]t [whether or not God exists] must be examined either by deductive or inductive reasoning or if that yields no decision, by arguments to the best explanation; for in such a context nothing else can have any coherent bearing on the issue.[6]

    Central to these writers is an important contention. Theism is philosophically acceptable only if there is good evidence for it. The word evidence can be used in all sorts of nuanced ways in epistemology. However, in this context,  the word evidence is being used synonymously with the idea of an argument or proof. Mackie states, “[whether or not God exists] must be examined either by deductive or inductive reasoning or, if that yields no decision, by arguments to the best explanation;” Flew talks of a “burden of proof” their contention is that if theism cannot be proven in the manner laid down, it is irrational.

    Evidentialism then meant that atheism or disbelief was the default position in philosophy until a successful argument for Gods existence had been proposed. Until such arguments were forthcoming, discussions within philosophy would assume a secular stance and assume God did not exist until someone offered proof they did.  Religious beliefs or assumptions, therefore, were prima facie out of place in serious philosophical discourse and theory construction.

    2. Verificationism:

    A second reason Philosophy of religion wasn’t taken terribly seriously in the earlier 20th century was the influence of a movement known as verificationism this was a movement in philosophy of language that gained a lot of traction in the late 30’s up to the 1960s. According to verificationists, a sentence is only meaningful if it is either analytic, that is true in virtue of the meaning of terms or if it can be in principle be empirically verified or falsified.  Thinkers such as the Viena Circle, A J Ayer, Carnap and others proposed different formulations of this position. But the basic idea was that any statement which could not in principle be verified or falsified empirically was meaningless.

    Note the thesis here: it’s not that the sentence it’s not scientific, or that its false or that it’s not rationally justified or warranted, it’s that the sentence is meaningless it doesn’t express any proposition at all.

    The influence of verificationism on Philosophy of religion can be seen in the famous “University Discussion” that took place in the text  New Essays in Philosophical Theology in 1955. The focus of this discussion was whether religious language actually had any meaning. When a person claims God created the earth, the question was less whether this claim is true or false, warranted or unwarranted, but “was he making a meaningful claim at all?” Was religious language really what John Hare called a “blik” an expression of an attitude as opposed to an assertion about the world?  If this position is adopted then much of what occurs in the historic philosophy of religion is either meaningless or radically misguided, it treats expressions of attitude as assertions about the world and tries to analysis, the implications, relationships, between, truth and falsity of such assertions. The problem is they aren’t assertions.

    So there were twin engines in the early to mid-twentieth century meant that philosophy of religion played a fairly marginal place in analytic philosophy. It was doubtful religious statements could even be taken seriously as meaningful statements, and if there was a presumption against their truth, they carried a burden of proof to be demonstrated or philosophically proven before anyone would take them seriously.

    [1] William Kingdon Clifford “The Ethics of Belief” in Lecture and Essays ed. William Kingdon Clifford (London: Macmillan, 1879) 339-63.

    [2]  Ibid, 186

    [3] Michael Scriven Primary Philosophy (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966) 87.

    [4] Bertrand Russell “Why I am not a Christian,” in Why I am not a Christian, ed. Bertrand Russell (London: Routledge Publishing, 2004) 3.

    [5] Antony Flew The Presumption of Atheism (London: Pemberton Publishing, 1976). 14-15

    [6] John Mackie The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) 4-6

     

  • Contemporary Philosophy of Religion and NCEA Religious Studies: Part one

    This is a talk I gave to the New Zealand Association of Philosophy Teachers annual conference at St Cutherberts College in September this year. Several people have asked me to make this talk available.

    I have broken my talk up into four parts. Part One introduces what philosophy of religion. In part two I will outline two movements within analytic philosophy during the early to mid-century which I think resulted in religious beliefs not being taken very seriously within philosophy and philosophy of religion taking a fairly minor role. Part three will look at some responses to these movements offered in the late 20th century and how they changed the philosophical landscape. Part four will look at the question of “how to do philosophy of religion” comparing the methods used by two different atheist’s J L Mackie and Graham Oppy, and how this relates the National Certificate of Educational Achievement Standards. This post will contain part one.

    First, I want to thank the association for asking me to speak, seeing I have been teaching in the secondary sector full time for only a  couple of years so I am not sure I have a lot to share with you and feel very much like I have more to learn from you.

    I have been asked to talk about the contemporary philosophy of religion.  In my talk this morning I will focus on three things. First, I will talk about what philosophy of religion is. Second, I will talk a little bit about its history but focus on recent developments in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. Finally, I will link some of these things with the current National Certificate of Educational Achievement (NCEA) Standards in Religious Studies. I hope what I say is helpful to you.

    What is Philosophy of Religion
    What is the philosophy of religion? Charles Taliaferro at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines it as “thephilosophy-of-religion philosophical examination of the central themes and concepts involved in religious traditions.” He adds “Philosophy of religion also includes an investigation into the religious significance of historical events (e.g., the Holocaust) and general features of the cosmos (e.g., laws of nature, the emergence of conscious life, widespread testimony of religious significance, and so on)”[1] Chad Meister at The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines it as “ the philosophical study of the meaning and nature of religion. It includes the analyses of religious concepts, beliefs, terms, arguments, and practices of religious adherents.”[2]

    The History of Philosophy of Religion

    Now, Philosophy of religion has a very long history, going back to the Pre-Socratics. And it was an integral part of medieval philosophy, Augustine, Aquinas, Anselm, Abelard, Scotus, Ockham and so forth worked in the tradition of “faith seeking understanding”. They used philosophy as a conceptual tool to reflect upon, analyse, refine, the religious faith that they held and develop philosophically informed models of core religious doctrines, they also used it to respond to objections and critique rival views and develop arguments for the own for theological models they supported. Some of these reflections proved very fruitful.  The Islamic-Christian dialogue over Aristotle’s understanding of causation and how it related to miracles, and Gods causal activity in the world, for example, is profoundly influential on latter accounts of causation by people like David Hume and the concepts of laws of nature used by early modern scientists.

    Perhaps lesser appreciated is the role of philosophy of religion during the enlightenment.  There is an unfortunate tendency in the history of philosophy not to appreciate the religious context in which important key thinkers of the enlightenment operated. Descartes cogito ergo sum (I think therefore I am), for example, comes from Augustine’s response to sceptics about religious knowledge in the city of God Book 11: 26. Descartes immediately follows this up of course with an appeal to his own version of the ontological argument, proposed famously by Anselm of Canterbury.

    Or consider John Locke, according to Locke’s associate James Tyrell, the impetus for Locke’s “Essay on human understanding” was a conversation  he, Locke and four others had on the topic of “the principles of morality and revealed religion.” Locke’s attempt to develop a comprehensive empiricist understanding of knowledge was an attempt to answer the question of faith and reason, a topic he explicitly addresses in the last section of the book. (Incidentally, it’s a section often skipped in contemporary courses on Locke.)

    Or consider what a widely used textbook refers to as the “revolution in ethics” which occurred in the 18-19th centuries. Which the author, James Rachels, contends is due to Hume, Bentham and Mill. Rachel’s refers to as “A new conception of ethics”… “Morality, he [Bentham] urged is not a matter of pleasing God,  nor is it about following abstract rules, Rather, morality is nothing more than the attempt to bring about as much happiness as possible into the world”.[3]

    Rachel’s is, of course, talking about utilitarianism. However, his characterisation of the history is quite selective. In 1715, some 74 years before Bentham, George Berkley had defended a rule utilitarian conception of ethics[4]Berkeley was a divine command theorist hat moral rightness, and wrongness consists in agreement and disagreement, respectively, with the will of God.  Because  God’s purposes were benevolent a God’s aim was to maximize the happiness of his creatures, so one could assume that whatever rules maximized happiness were those enjoined by God. Berkley used this theoretical account of God and morality to attempt to reconcile his Irish Anglican commitment to passive obedience with loyalty to the Glorious revolution during Jacobite uprisings in Ireland. Berkley’s “theological utilitarianism” was adopted by people like John Gay, Abraham Tucker and compiled by William Paley. Paley’s textbook defending this way of looking at ethics was the standard text at Cambridge and widely influential several years before Bentham published his defence of utilitarianism.

    I could go on; my point is that Philosophy of religion has a long and prestigious history, even during the enlightenment and an important part of educating students about our history and the history of concepts that undergird much of the modern world involves acknowledging these connections rather than ignoring them.

    [1] Charles Taliaferro “Philosophy of Religion”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/philosophy-religion/

    [2] Chad Meister, “Philosophy of Religion” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://www.iep.utm.edu/religion/

    [3] James Rachels The Elements of Moral Philosophy, (Random House: New York, 1993) 80

    [4] For explication see Stephen Darwall, “Berkeley’s Moral and Political Philosophy” Kenneth Winkler (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley. Cambridge University Press. (2005) see also C. D. Broad, “Berkeley’s Theory of Morals” Revue Internationale de Philosophie, vol. 23-24 (1953):  72-86.

     

  • Erik Wielenberg and the Autonomy Thesis: Part Three Standard Objections to the Autonomy Thesis, Human Rights and Dignity without God

    In my last post I looked at Erik Wielenberg’s response to the objection that, in the absence of God, people lack compelling reasons to comply with morality’s demands.  A second objection Wielenberg briefly addresses is that without certain theological doctrines, one cannot provide a plausible basis for human rights and dignity.  Wielenberg, here again, takes Craig as paradigmatic.

    defaul1If there is no God, then what’s so special about human beings? They’re just accidental by-products of nature that have evolved relatively recently on an infinitesimal speck of dust lost somewhere in a hostile and mindless universe and that are doomed to perish individually and collectively in a relatively short time[1]

    Craig’s rhetorical question alludes to a serious point, made in more detail by Peter Singer, Louis Pojman, and Nicholas Wolterstorff, this is that it is hard to plausibly accommodate the thesis that all human beings have equal dignity and rights outside a theistic framework. Wielenberg’s response is that human rights are grounded in “non-moral intrinsic properties of human beings” He notes: “Human beings can, reason, suffer, fall in love, set goals for themselves and so on. God or no God, human beings obviously differ when it comes to intrinsic properties than dogs or mere lumps of clay[2]”

    Wielenberg here appeals to certain higher cognitive capacities human beings possess that other animals lack.

    This brief response to Craig is central to his Wielenberg’s rebuttal of evolutionary debunking arguments against moral realism latter in the book. Sharon Street and others have raised epistemological challenges to moral realism by noting that many of our basic evaluative capacities, our disposition to judge certain types of behaviour as morally wrong, has been shaped by naturalistic evolution.  Naturalistic evolution, however, isn’t guided by considerations of truth, in selecting such dispositions, but by adaptability, these basic evaluative judgements exist, because making such judgements enabled our ancestors to reproduce effectively in the environment in which they lived. Street notes “the striking coincide between independent moral truths posited by the realist and the normative views evolution has pushed us towards” and “challenges the realist to explain this coincidence.”[3]

    Wielenberg proposes that “our cognitive capacities” explain the coincidence. Moral rights D supervene upon any creature that possesses certain cognitive capacities.  Seeing these are the same cognitive capacities which produce moral beliefs. It follows that any being which believes it has moral rights will necessarily have them.[4]

    Wielenberg specifies that the supervenience relationship here involves both modal covariation, and a form of “robust causation” analogous to the way theist understand God’s relationship to the created universe, just as Theists believe that God immediately sustains the universe in existence moment by moment simply by willing its existence. So, natural those properties which constitute our higher cognitive faculties, robustly cause the existence of moral rights, without any intermediatory agency or laws of nature.

    This answer both to the grounding of human rights and evolutionary debunking arguments has a cost.  As Wolterstorff [5] and Singer [6].  have both pointed out, while it is true that normal adult humans have the cognitive capacities in question, many important categories of human beings do not. Infants and small children cannot reason, or fall in love, set goals for themselves, nor do they have the developed moral cognition Wielenberg refers to. In fact, David Boonin has noted: “by any plausible measure dogs, and cats, cows, and pigs, chickens and ducks are more intellectually developed than a new born infant.”[7].

    So, Wielenberg’s answer gives us no reason for thinking a child or infant has a rights or dignity, over and above any other animal. In fact, seeing moral rights modally covary with possession of the relevant cognitive faculties, such capacities are necessary and sufficient for the possession of moral rights.  Consequently, His position seems to entail that infant’s small children, and mentally impaired human adults have no moral rights.


    [1] Wielenberg, Robust Ethics 51, the citation is from William Lane Craig and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong God: A Debate Between a Christian and an Atheist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 18

    [2] Ibid 51

    [3] Ibid 155

    [4] Ibid 134-175

    [5] Nicholas Wolterstorff Justice: Rights and Wrongs (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008) 325-341.

    [6] Peter Singer, Writings on an Ethical Life (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 2001) 186-187

    [7] David Boonin, A Defense of Abortion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 121, the neurological data is summarised in Michael Tooley’s Abortion and Infanticide (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) Ch. 11.5.

  • Thank God for the New Zealand Anti Terrorist Squad: Online


    Matt’s article is available at this link flannagan-pc-18-1

    Permission has been granted from the Editor of Philosophia Christi to upload this contribution. Learn more about the journal by going to www.epsociety.org/philchristi.

  • Matt’s Sermons at Takanini Community Church

    Those who read MandM may be aware that I work as a teaching elder part time at Takanini Community Church. This involves me preparing and giving a lesson for the Takanini Community Church congregation every two weeks.

    In case you’re interested, my sermons at Takanini can be found online here.  I have done a series on the book of Judges, Genesis, The book of Corinthians, The Psalms, and the book of Jonah, currently I am going through the gospel of Luke.