Category: Uncategorized

  • Abortion Hard Cases and Self Defence: Presentation

    This is the paper I presented to the Bioethics section of the  Evangelical Theological Society, annual meeting. In November last year.

    Abstract:Op ponents of abortion often agonise over two difficult cases. (a) Cases where the pregnancy originates in rape and (b) cases the pregnancy or threatens the life of the mother. This paper will explore one attempt to deal with such cases; that proposed by Alan Donagan. According to Donagan, abortion is usually the unlawful killing of an innocent human being. However, when the pregnancy is either the result of rape or threatens the mother’s life, the fetus is a material aggressor and can be lawfully killed in self-defence.

    My argument will proceed in three stages. Part I explains and defends Donagan’s critique of Judith Jarvis Thomson’s famous ‘violinist argument’ for abortion rights. Part II looks at an implication of Donagan’s critique: when pregnancy threatens the mother’s life or originates in rape, abortion is justified as a form of self-defence. I defend this implication against three objections. (i) The innocence of the fetus (ii) the passivity of the fetus (iii) the problem of proportionality. In part III, I argue that Donagan’s approach has advantages over rival approaches to these questions such as the “lesser evils” approach  suggested by Beckwith and appeals to the doctrine of double effect. 

  • The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory: Presentation

    Last year, I presented a talk entitled “The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory: Another Reply to Erik Wielenberg” to the New Zealand Association of Philosophers conference in Auckland. This was a follow up to interaction I have had with the work of Erik Wielenberg.

    In 2017 I wrote a critical response to Wielenberg’s book Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism. Some, of my criticisms, were discussed in the dialogue between William Lane Craig and Erik Wielenberg at  North Carolina State University in 2018 which was subsequently published by Routledge . Wielenberg has since responded to these criticisms. The talk at the NZAP was my thoughts on his latest paper.

    Over 2020, I have revised the substance of this talk substantially, and a version of the paper will be published in The European Journal for Philosophy of Religion next year. In November has the opportunity to present the revised paper at the annual meeting of the Evangelical Philosophical Society, which was held online in November. Below is a video of that paper.

    Abstract: Recently, Erik Wielenberg has developed a novel objection to divine command metaethics (DCM). The objection is that DCM “has the implausible implication that psychopaths have no moral obligations and hence their evil acts, no matter how evil, are morally permissible”. This article criticizes Wielenberg’s argument. Section 1 expounds Wielenberg’s new “psychopath argument” in the context of the recent debate over the Reasonable Nonbelievers Objection. Section 2 discusses two ambiguities in the argument: in particular, Wielenberg’s formulation is ambiguous as to whether Wielenberg uses the word “obligation” in an objective or subjective sense. Section 3 argues that this ambiguity undercuts the argument. If Wielenberg is using the word obligation in a subjective sense, his arguments do not show that psychopaths “have no moral obligations”. By contrast, if Wielenberg is using the word obligation in an objective sense, his arguments do not show that divine command theorists are committed to denying that psychopaths have obligations.

  • Divine Command Theory: answering classic and contemporary objections

    Last week Jordan Hampton from Crash Course Apologetics interviewed me about chapters 12-13 of my book Did God Really Command Genocide. In this is the section of the book, I discuss divine command metaethics and critique some of the most important objections raised against divine command theories. The interview is nearly two and a half hours long. We go over every objection I respond to in the book. Enjoy


  • The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory: Another Response to Erik Wielenberg (Part two)

    In my last post, I expounded the Psychopath objection to divine command meta-ethics (DCM) that has recently been defended by Erik Wielenberg. To recap. Wielenberg suggests that my response to his earlier “reasonable unbeliever’s objection” relies on the following principle:

    R) God commands person S to do act A only if S is capable of recognising the requirement to do A as being extremely authoritative and as having imperative force.

    Wielenberg’ summarises his argument as follows:

    The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory

    [1] There are some psychopaths who are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands. (empirical premise) 

    [2] So, there are some psychopaths to whom God has issued no divine commands. (from 1 and R) .

    [3] So, if DCT is true, then there are some psychopaths who have no moral obligations. (from 2 and DCT). 

    [4] But there are no psychopaths who have no moral obligations. 

    [5.] Therefore, DCT is false. (from 3 and 4)

    I think this argument is unsound. However, before I can elaborate as to why I believe this, a couple of ambiguities in the argument need to be addressed.

    Let’s look first at R.

    R) God commands a person S to do act A only if S is capable of recognising the requirement to do A as being extremely authoritative and as having imperative force.

    As this is worded R lays condition, under which commands can exist. It entails that if someone does not recognise God’s commandments as authoritative or having imperative force, then God has not issued a command. It is unclear, however, that the counterexamples I offered suggest something this strong.  Consider, in particular, the context of my replies. Morrison’s had stated: “Even if he is aware of a “sign” that he somehow manages to interpret as a “command” not to steal, how can he [a reasonable non-believer] be subject to that command if he doesn’t know who issued it, or that it was issued by a competent authority?” (Morriston (2009), 5)

     The situation Morriston envisaged is one where someone is aware of the existence of the command but is unaware of its source.  What is being contested is not the existence of the command but whether unbelievers are “subject to it”. Morriston elaborates what he means by “subject to it” it later in the same paragraph. “[I[f the note is unsigned, the handwriting is unfamiliar, and you have no idea who the author might be, then it is as clear as day that you have no such obligation.” He adds “even if our reasonable non-believer gets as far as to interpret one of Adams’s “signs” as conveying the message, “Do not steal,” he will be under no obligation to comply with this instruction unless and until he discovers the divine source of the message.”

    Consequently, Morriston is not envisaging a situation where no one issues the command. He is instead suggesting that a command has been issued but that it fails to impose an obligation upon the hearer. It was in response to this argument that I offered my counterexamples. Consequently, these replies were not trying to provide situations under which a command exists. They were suggesting conditions under which an existing command can generate an obligation.

    Something similar is true of the other counterexamples consider Evan’s example of the person hiking on the Iran/Iraq Border. Before offering this example, Evan’s describes the argument he is responding to as follows;

    Wielenberg admits that if God exists he would be authorised to impose obligations on human beings… However, the problem is that for this to happen, the recipients of the command must know that the commands come from God, otherwise no obligation is generated.

    Evan’s takes himself to be addressing the situation under which God’s commands impose obligations. Not circumstances under which commands exist.

    Consequently, as R is worded, it is far too strong.   Wielenberg appears to be aware of this point. Early in the discussion, he states:

    Is shall henceforth use command to mean obligation-bestowing command. On this usage, no divine command is issued unless it imposes some moral obligation on those to whom it is issued. It is important to see that this usage may differ somewhat from the ordinary sense of command (Wielenberg (2018), 2)

    If this is correct, then R should be understood as follows:

    R1) If God commands a person S to do act A, this command imposes an obligation on S to do A, only if S is capable of recognising the requirement to do A as being extremely authoritative and as having imperative force.

    To avoid potential unclarity, I will use R1 instead of R throughout the rest of the discussion.

    This brings us to a second and more crucial ambiguity. R1 refers to an “obligation-bestowing” command. However,  the word “obligation” admits of different senses. Historically medieval theologians distinguished between a material and formal sense of obligation. More recent literature has used the words “objective” and “subjective” instead to describe this distinction.  Smith explains: “Objective obligatoriness (or rightness or wrongness) is the deontic status that an action has in virtue of its actual circumstances and consequences” By contrast, “Subjective obligatoriness (or rightness or wrongness) is the deontic status an action has in virtue of the agent’s beliefs about its morally relevant circumstances and consequences” (Smith (2010), 4)

    As an illustration, consider the case of David Cerven, an unarmed man who was shot dead by the New Zealand police in March of 2015. After committing several of armed robberies, Cerven had arranged with the police to meet at a public park where he would turn himself in. When the police arrived, he informed them he was armed and reached into his jacket pulling out what looked like a gun. CCTV footage showed Cerven “putting his right hand into his right-hand pocket, taking his hand out of the pocket and then appearing to clasp both hands together as if to make it look like he had a firearm in his hands”.  Cerven was shot and killed. Subsequent investigation revealed Cerven was unarmed.  (New Zealand Herald, 2018)

    In Smith’s terminology, the shooting of Cerven was objectively wrong. If we look at the actual circumstances and consequences, the police were shooting dead an unarmed man, who was not threatening either them or the public. To kill an unarmed man is morally wrong, and police officers have an obligation not to shoot unarmed people. At the same time, the shooting of Cerven was subjectively permissible. Given what the police knew; that Cerven had stated he was armed, was reaching for what looked like a gun, and the speed in which they had to make a decision, their decision to fire was permissible.

    Donagan (1977) points out that objective and subjective obligations play different roles in moral thinking. “When an agent and his moral counsellors are considering the moral permissibility of a proposed action, the first question to arise is, Is it materially (objectively) permissible?”. The agent is to attempt to discern his objective duties as accurately possible and to perform them.  By contrast, subjective obligations are utilised when a person has acted on what they believe to be their objective obligations, and we are raising questions about culpability and blameworthiness. If the agent act with non-culpable ignorance, even if the act is objectively wrong, he is excused and not subject to blame for performing it. Whereas he does wrong knowingly and intentionally, he is blameworthy. (Donagan (1977), 137)

    There are important connections between objective and subjective senses of the word obligations and significant discussion and debate about how to formulate them and their relationship to each other. These details do not concern us here.  What is pertinent is that the distinction between objective and subjective obligations provides us with two  possible interpretations of R :

    (R1. Subjective) If God’s commands a person S to do act A, this command imposes a subjective obligation on S to do A, only if S is capable of recognising the requirement to do A as being extremely authoritative and as having imperative force.

    (R1. Objective) If God’s commands a person S to do act A, this command imposes an objective obligation on S to do A, only if S is capable of recognising the requirement to do A as being extremely authoritative and as having imperative force.

    The same ambiguity effects premise [4] as well. [4] could mean either:

    [4S] But there are no psychopaths who have no subjective moral obligations. 

    Or

    [4O] But there are no psychopaths who have no objective moral obligations.

    Having clarified some ambiguities in the Psychopathy argument. We can no turn to offering a response. I is my contention that the common distinction between objective and subjective obligation makes trouble for the Psychopath Objection.  In my next post, I will explain why this ambiguity makes Wielenberg’s objection unsound.



    Morriston Wes The Moral Obligations of Reasonable Non-Believers: A special problem for divine command meta-ethics [Journal] // International Journal of Philosophy of Religion. – 2009 . – Vol. 65

    Donagan Alan The Theory of Morality [Book]. – Chicago : Chicago University Press, 1977.

    Evans C Stephen God and Moral Obligation [Book]. – Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013.

    New Zealand Herald Big Read: The life and death of David Cerven [Online] // nzherald.co.nz. – July 24, 2018. – 8 10, 2019. – https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=12094183.

    Smith Holly The Moral Clout of Reasonable Beliefs [Book Section] // Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics / book auth. Timmons Mark. – Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2010. – Vol. 1.

    Wielenberg Erik Divine command theory and psychopathy [Journal] // Religious Studies. – 2018. – pp. 1-16.

  • FETICIDE IN CHRISTIAN MORAL THOUGHT PART ONE: Alexandrian Judaism

    Some readers of MandM will know that for the last three years I have taught Theology and Philosophy at a Catholic high-school. I teach five to six classes a day, year 9 to year 13 subjects such introduction to scripture, church history, NCEA religious studies, Cambridge world religions and Divinity. My goal has always been to teach at Tertiary level, but the flooded market has meant I have, so far, found employment easier to come by in the secondary sector, hence my current employment.

    One topic I teach is NCEA Religious Studies, in year 13, one standard is to Analyse the response of a religious tradition to a contemporary ethical issue. Officially students have to describe the response a religious tradition has made to a moral issue. Our school like a lot of schools looks at Christian responses to abortion. Because I did my PhD thesis on this very subject in the last year I have been going through my dissertation and simplifying, summarising and rewriting it into short sections I can use with my classes. Because there is some interest in this, I have decided to post some of these on MandM. I welcome any feedback or comments.

    When we are analysing the response of a religious tradition to a moral or ethical question one of the first questions we need to ask is “what does the religious tradition in question actually teach”? We need to look at what the teachers and theologians the religion have said and what their arguments were.  This will enable us to avoid misrepresenting someone’s opinions and help us accurately identify the premises and conclusions that we want to evaluate.

    Answering this question will be the focus of Part Three of this standard We are going to look at several representative strands of Christian thought or reflection on the question of abortion. When we do, we can find a common a common three-premise argument against feticide that is common to these different strands. The rest of the standard will analyse and critically evaluate each of these premises.

    In part one we looked at how to analyse arguments.  Here we will put what we learnt to work.  Historically Christianity has approached the question of killing a fetus by formulating a simple three-premise argument:

    Premise [1]: God has commanded people not to kill human beings without adequate justification.

    Premise [2]: a foetus, is a human being;

    Premise [3]: in almost all cases where a fetus is killed the reasons offered are not strong enough to justify killing a human being.

     Of course, it isn’t enough to just say this. For any sensible analysis, we must provide evidence that we are accurately presenting what Christians have taught. To do this, we will trace the existence of this argument in several representative Christian traditions. We will look at the position adopted by the Church fathers, the church in the middle ages and the Protestant Reformers. Before doing that, however, we will look at the origins or source of Christian moral teaching on this question in Alexandrian Judaism.

    Feticide in Alexandrian Judaism

    The origins or beginning of Christian responses to abortion begins in a movement known to historians today as Alexandrian Judaism.   During the first century, most of the Roman world was dominated by Greek language and culture. Greek Philosophy also dominated the intellectual world of schools and Universities. This culture is called Hellenism. Alexandrian Jews were Jews who lived outside the land of Israel in this Greek Culture These Jews spoke Greek-speaking and combined a commitment to Judaism with the ideas of Greek Philosophy.

    A very important document for Alexandrian Jews was the Septuagint. You learnt about the Septuagint in year 9.  The Old Testament was originally written in Hebrew, however several hundred years before the time of Christ. The old testament was translated into Greek. This Greek translation is called the Septuagint. The purpose of the Septuagint was to provide a book which could explain to Alexandrian Jews what the commandments and teachings of Judaism were and how to apply and follow these teachings in their community. For this reason, the Septuagint didn’t always provide a word for word rendition of the Hebrew text but offered commentary on what it meant and how it was to be followed and applied.

    What is important for the topic we are studying is how the Septuagint translated a particular passage in the book of Exodus. In Exodus 21: there is a body of Jewish law which deals with where a pregnant woman is struck in such a manner that a miscarriage occurs. The Hebrew translations which we have today translate the passages this way:

    [I]f men struggle and strike a pregnant woman and she miscarries, and there is no harm, he shall pay a fine according as the woman’s husband lays upon him, according to an assessment. And if there is harm you will prescribe life for life, eye for an eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise.[1]

    The Septuagint, however, interprets the passage this way:

    If two men fight and strike a pregnant woman, and her unformed embryo departs, he shall be fined; according as the woman’s husband lays upon (him) he shall give according to what is thought fit. But if it be formed, he shall give a life for a life.[2]

    The Septuagint draws a distinction between a formed and unformed embryo. This corresponds to our modern distinction between an embryo and a fetus we looked at in part two. A person who kills a fetus must pay “life for a life”. The phrase life for life wasn’t taken literally by Jewish thinkers, it was understood to mean something like “pay the value of life for the value of a life”. But the critical issue is that the Septuagint views the life of a fetus as having the value of human life.

    By contrast, the Hebrew text states that if someone kills an embryo or a fetus they must pay a fine based upon an assessment and is silent on exactly how this assessment is carried out. Some scholars, however, have argued that what we know about the legal practices in the cultures surrounding Israel suggests the assessment must have been based on the age of the fetus.

    Why do these translations differ? The Hebrew texts we have today were compiled much later than the Septuagint, and so it might be tempting to suggest the Septuagint has the earlier understanding. However, it is pretty clear that the Septuagint is influenced by Greek Philosophy. The distinction it draws between a formed and unformed embryo was a common distinction in Greek philosophy.  Some examples:

    • Galen (129 AD- 200) wrote that the Hippocratic philosophers of his day held “That what is in the womb is already a living being when it is formed in all its members”.
    • Laertius said that the Pythagorean view was “this first creation [the conceptus] is formed in forty days, and then, in accordance with the law of harmony, the baby is perfected and born after seven, or nine, or maximum ten months.[3]
    • Empedocles argued that the formation of an embryo started on the 39th day and was completed on the 49th.[4]
    • Asclepiades referred to the formed/unformed distinction and suggested that for males formation occurred between the 26th and 50th days and females were formed around 60 days.13
    • The author of a Philosophical book titled On Seven Months Child, states a male conceptus is formed at 40 days while a female is formed after this.15
    • Aristotle argued that the embryo became fully human when it achieved form, which occurred 40 days after conception for a boy or 90 for a girl.16

    Consequently, there was an established distinction in the writings of many ancient Greek philosophers between an unformed and formed embryo. It is unlikely that the similarities between the Septuagint’s and Greek Philosophy are a coincidence. The best explanation appears to be that Alexandrian Jews utilised Greek Philosophy in an effort to apply the Jewish law to the question of killing a fetus. The law told them that if a person killed a fetus they had to be punished based on an assessment of the maturity of the fetus. Several schools of Philosophy schools taught that an embryo was human by the time when it acquired human form around 40 days after conception. They probably put these two ideas together concluded that if a person killed a formed embryo, this was homicide and violated Gods laws against homicide. Specifically, the fifth commandment “you shall not kill.”

    Philo of Alexandria

    The Septuagint translation of Exodus 21:22-24 receives one of its clearest expositions by Philo of Alexandria. Philo was a Jewish Philosopher, Theologian and leading intellectual in Alexandrian Judaism. He lived from 20BC-50AD and so lived at the same time as both Jesus and Paul. For this reason, he is a good source of information on what Jewish theologians taught at the time of Christ.  In his commentary on the Ten commandments Philo writes:

    But if anyone has a contest with a woman who is pregnant, and strike her a blow on her belly, and she miscarry, if the child which was conceived within her is still unfashioned and unformed, he shall be punished by a fine, both for the assault which he committed and also because he has prevented nature, who was fashioning and preparing that most excellent of all creatures, a human being, from bringing him into existence. But if the child which was conceived had assumed a distinct shape … in all its parts, having received all its proper connective and distinctive qualities, he shall die; … for such a creature as that is a man, whom he has slain while still in the workshop of nature, who had not thought it as yet a proper time to produce him to the light, but had kept him like a statue lying in a sculptor’s workshop, requiring nothing more than to be released and sent out into the world.[5]

    In this passage, Philo is explaining to his audience what the fifth of the ten commandments requires of them. (The fifth commandment is the commandment: do not kill). He appeals to the Septuagint and argues that the law considered the killing of a formed embryo to be a homicide and so feticide is a violation of the fifth commandment. With this conclusion established, Philo uses it to argue against infanticide. Infanticide is the practice of killing new-born infants after birth and was a widespread practice in the Roman and Greek world. Philo argued that If killing a fetus before birth was homicide, then killing children after birth must be as well. Therefore, the law ten commandments condemned both abortion and infanticide.

    Conclusions

    The Septuagint and Philo contain a specific argument against feticide. This argument can be initially summed up in two premises. Firstly,  a fetus is a human being and secondly, that the law of God prohibits killing a human being. This argument entails that feticide is unlawful and contrary to the law of God.

    I say “initially,” because a careful examination shows that the second of these claims need to be qualified.  We know Jewish rabbis permitted abortion in rare cases where continuing the pregnancy would kill the mother, arguing these abortions were a case of self-defence. Hence, the sixth commandment is best construed as being that the law of God forbids killing a human being without justification, where justification is interpreted as an excuse or permission granted somewhere else by God’s law. In the absence of any other command or permission to the contrary, one should refrain from homicide. With this clarification in place, we can summarise the argument used by Alexandrian Jew’s as follows:

    Premise [1]: Killing a human being without justification violates the law of God.

    Premise [2]: A formed embryo (i.e. a fetus) is a human being.

    Since Alexandrian Jews, and, as we will see, Christian theologians after them, believed feticide to be unlawful in most, if not all, circumstances, they also held to the following enthymeme:

     Premise [3]: in the case of feticide (at least in the majority of cases) insufficient or no justification is forthcoming. 

    From these three premises, it follows that killing a fetus (at least in the majority of cases) is unlawful, i.e. contrary to the law of God.


    [1] Exodus 21:22-25 MT.

    [2] Exodus 21:22-25 LXX. This translation of the  Septuagint comes from Stanley Isser, “Two Traditions: The Law of Exodus 21:22-23 Revisited,” The Catholic Biblical Quarterly 52:1 (1990): 30.

    [3] Kapparis, Abortion in the Ancient World, 39.

    [4] Ibid., 45.

    [5] Judaeus Philo, “The Special Laws III,” in The Contemporary of Josephus, Translated from the Greek, trans. by Charles Duke Yonge (1993) (108)(109).

    <http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/yonge/book29.html>

     

  • Reflections on Annihilationism, Traditionalism and the Problem of Hell

    Last year I gave a paper entitled “Reflections on Annihilationism, Traditionalism and the Problem of Hell’ at the Rethinking Hell conference in Auckland.  This talk is now available online.

  • Divine Command Theory and Utilitarianism forgotten bedfellows? Paley’s Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (part two)

    In my last post, I explained the position of Theological Utilitarianism as expounded in William Paley’s The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy. I pointed out The Principles was first published in 1785, four years before Jeremy Bentham published An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. In this post, I want to look at the influence Theological Utilitarianism had in the 18th and 19th centuries. Was Paley expounding some novel idiosyncratic position? Or was he simply repeating a fairly mainstream position on the relationship between Gods law and happiness which had been around for decades?

    1. The influence of Theological Utilitarianism in the 18thand 19th centuries

    Theological Utilitarianism sounds novel to contemporary ears. But it wasn’t an innovative position in the late eighteenth century. Paley notes in the preface that he is a “compiler” of earlier writers of moral theory. Schneewind, states that the theory he proposed was in fact “an assemblage of ideas developed by others and is presented to be learned by students rather than debated by colleagues. “[1] Some trace theological utilitarianism back to the divine command theory of John Locke[2]  However, the earliest clear exponent of this position appears to be George Berkeley’s sermons in 1712.[3]

    It is worth looking at Berkeley in some detail.  According to Berkeley, things are “denominated good or evil” as “they are fitted to augment or impair our own Happiness” Good or Evil. On the other hand, “Moral Goodness” consists in a “Conformity to the Laws of God.” Berkley articulates the relationship between moral and non-moral goodness as follows:

    For Laws being Rules directive of our Actions to the end intended by the Legislator, in order to attain the paleyKnowledge of God’s Laws, we ought first to enquire what that end is, which he designs should be carried on by human Actions. God is a Being of Infinite Goodness. it is plain the end he proposes is Good. But God enjoying in himself all possible Perfection, it follows that it is not his own Good, but that of his Creatures. Again, the Moral Actions of Men are entirely terminated within themselves, so as to have no influence on the other orders of Intelligences or reasonable Creatures: The end therefore to be procured by them, can be no other than the good of Men. But as nothing in a natural State can entitle one Man more than another to the favour of God, except only Moral Goodness, which consisting in a Conformity to the Laws of God, doth presuppose the being of such Laws, and Law ever supposing an end, to which it guides our Actions, it follows that Antecedent to the end proposed by God, no distinction can be conceived between Men; that end therefore itself or general design of Providence is not determined or limited by any Respect of Persons: It is not therefore the private Good of this or that Man, Nation or Age, but the general well-being of all Men, of all Nations, of all Ages of the World, which God designs should be procured by the concurring Actions of each individual. Having thus discover’d the great end, to which all Moral Obligations are Subordinate; it remains, that we enquire what Methods are necessary for the obtaining that End.[4]

    When Berkeley says God is  infinitely good, he like Samuel Clarke seems to mean that God  has “an unalterable disposition to do and to communicate good or happiness.”[5] [6] God’s goal in issuing the commands he does is the happiness, impartially considered of all human beings.

    Berkeley proceeds to note two ways that God could promote this happiness. One would be “without the injunction of any certain universal Rules of Morality, to to oblige “every one upon each particular Occasion, to consult the publick Good, and always to do that, which to him shall seem in the present time and circumstances, most to conduce to it.”  The second is  “by enjoining the Observation of some determinate, established Laws, which, if Universally practised, have from the Nature of things an Essential fitness to procure the well-being of Mankind” Berkeley argues that “”there lie several strong Objections.” Berkeley then anticipates the “self-effacing” objection to act utilitarianism arguing that anyone committed to promoting the happiness of others wouldn’t promulgate act utilitarianism as a decision procedure. Public endorsement and acceptance of the rule “do whatever maximises utility” would probably not maximise utility. Consequently, Berkeley concludes that God has followed the second method.

    Stephen Darwall suggests that the best way to interpret Berkeley is to distinguish between his meta-ethical theory and normative theory. His meta-ethical theory attempts “to answer metaphysical questions of what goodness and rightness themselves, respectively, are.” On the other hand, his normative theory “concerns what actions or things are good and right.” Meta-ethically Berkeley is a divine command theorist “moral goodness consists” consists in a “Conformity to the Laws of God”. However, Berkeley’s normative theory was rule-utilitarian, God commands “Laws, which, if Universally practised, have from the Nature of things an Essential fitness to procure the well-being of Mankind”.[7]

    A position very similar to Berkeley is hinted at in Butler’s writings[8] but is expounded more clearly in the writings of, John Gay [9] John Brown, and Abraham Tucker.   It’s clear that Paley clearly draws upon this earlier tradition.  In the preface to The Principles Paley acknowledges that he is attempting to compile and articulate the positions of John Gay, and Abraham Tucker. Book II chapter 1 of The Principles proposes a line of argument that closely resembles the argument of John Gay “Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”.

    Similarly, Paley’s emphasis on rules is, as we saw, found in Berkeley’s Passive obedience and performs the same function. Berkeley’s initial advancement of this distinction and advocacy of rule utilitarianism was part of a broader argument to argue against violent resistance to the state during the Jacobite agitation in Ireland. He was concerned that people were advocating the violation of certain negative rules of the law of nature such as: “do not commit adultery”, “do not steal”, “don’t rebel against the government”, whenever they perceived doing so would further the public good. Paley uses the distinction for similar purposes, to respond to the objection that utilitarianism allows people to break with impunity moral rules against theft and murder whenever they perceive it will make people happy.

    In fact, the proximate source for Paley’s stress on rules appears to be Abraham Tucker. Tucker. Wrote

      As we cannot upon every occasion see to the end of our proceedings, he [the moralist] will establish certain rules to serve as landmarks for guiding us on the way.  These rules, when he has leisure and opportunity for mature consideration, he will build on one another, erecting the whole fabric upon the basis of the summum bonum before described.  (Original emphasis)[10]

    Similarly, Paley’s argument that God wills the happiness of his creatures and so the commands God issues must be coextensive with promoting the happiness is ubiquitous in the tradition that preceded him. This argument is s found in Berkeley, Gay, and Brown Louden also documents the same argument occurs in Adam Smith and Joseph Butler [11]

    Finally, Paley’s exposition of this tradition was very influential. The principles became required text at Cambridge university Schneewind points out “utilitarianism first became widely known in England through the work of William Paley.[12] Paley, not Bentham being its most well-known exponent.  Similarly, Smith points out that Paley’s writings were once as well known in American colleges as were the readers and spellers of William McGuffey and Noah Webster in the elementary schools.[13]

    In fact, Paley’s influence is still seen clearly in John Austin’s work on Jurisprudence, in the early and late nineteenth century.  Mill himself appeals to the tradition:

    We not uncommonly hear the doctrine of utility inveighed against as a godless doctrine. If it be necessary to say anything at all against so mere an assumption, we may say that the question depends upon what idea we have formed of the moral character of the Deity. If it be a true belief that God desires, above all things, the happiness of his creatures, and that this was his purpose in their creation, utility is not only not a godless doctrine, but more profoundly religious than any other. If it be meant that utilitarianism does not recognise the revealed will of God as the supreme law of morals, I answer, that a utilitarian who believes in the perfect goodness and wisdom of God, necessarily believes that whatever God has thought fit to reveal on the subject of morals, must fulfil the requirements of utility in a supreme degree. …Whether this opinion is correct or not, it is superfluous here to discuss; since whatever aid religion, either natural or revealed, can afford to ethical investigation, is as open to the utilitarian moralist as to any other. He can use it as the testimony of God to the usefulness or hurtfulness of any given course of action.[14]

    Mill here explicitly rejects the idea that Utilitarianism does not recognize the revealed will as the supreme law of morals, and uses a line of argument very similar to Paley, whose writings Mill was aware of, to argue the contrary.

    Consequently, Utilitarianism then wasn’t a new or novel theory of ethics proposed by secular thinkers such as Hume and Bentham in the late 18th century. Nor did it develop in response to or in opposition to a conception of morality based divine commands or divine laws. Divine command theorists, in fact, had been advocating Theological Utilitarianism for decades before Bentham, and the popularity of utilitarianism in Anglo-American thought had a good deal to do with the popularity of theological utilitarianism.


    [1]J B Schneewind Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2002) 446.  Paley was, therefore, summarising an already existing, popular, school of thought.

    [2] See for example A. P. Brogan “John Locke and Utilitarianism” Ethics 69: 2 (1959), 79-93.

    [3] See Berkeley’s A Discourse on Passive Obedience (1712) and dialogues I-III of the   Alciphron (1732). Berkeley had included a systematic treatise on moral theory in the draft of A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), but the manuscript was lost, leaving historians to piece together his theories from his occasional writings.

    [4] Passive obedience: or, the Christian doctrine of not resisting the supreme power, proved and vindicated … In a discourse deliver’d at the College-chapel. By George Berkeley, M.A. Fellow of Trinity-College, Dublin. Available at https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ecco/004899015.0001.000/1:3?rgn=div1;view=fulltext

    [5] Clarke, Demonstration, Prop. XII; in Works, vol. II, p. 572.

    [6] Robert Louden notes this conception of God’s goodness was common in the 18th century and similar arguments can be seen in Smith and Butler see Robert Louden “Butler’s Divine Utilitarianism,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 12:3 (1995):265–280

    [7] See Stephen Darwall “Berkeley’s Moral and Political Philosophy,” in, The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley, Kenneth Winkler, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)

    [8] Robert Louden “Butler’s Divine Utilitarianism,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 12:3 (1995):265–280

    [9] John Gay “Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality” in Lewis Amherst Selby-Bigge, British Moralists, being Selections from Writers principally of the Eighteenth Century, vol. 2 [1897] available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/bigge-british-moralists-vol-2 accessed 26 Aug 2016

    [11] Robert Louden “Butler’s Divine Utilitarianism,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 12:3 (1995):265–280.

     [12] Schneewind, Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant 446.

    [13] Wilson Smith “William Paley’s Theological Utilitarianism in America” The William and Mary Quarterly Third Series, 11:3 (1954) 402–424

    [14] John Stuart Mill “What is Utilitarianism” available at https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/m/mill/john_stuart/m645u/chapter2.htm