Tag: Ethics

  • The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part I

    Implicit, if not overtly explicit, in much historic Christian moral reflection on feticide is a simple three-premise position. Firstly, that there is a divine law prohibiting homicide, the killing of a human being without adequate justification; secondly, a formed conceptus, a fetus, is a human being; and thirdly, that in all or most cases of feticide, justification for homicide is not forthcoming. In this study, I will refer to this line of argument as the Alexandrian argument, naming it after the Alexandrian Jews from whom it originated.

    The Alexandrian argument receives one of its clearest expositions by Philo. In his commentary on the Decalogue, The Special Laws, Philo argues that the law of God considered the killing of a formed conceptus to be homicide and hence a violation of the sixth commandment. [1] With this conclusion established, Philo offered an a fortiori argument against the widespread practice of infanticide in his day. If killing a fetus before birth were homicide, then killing children after birth would be as well. Therefore, the law condemned infanticide, like feticide.

    Like Philo, numerous, early-Christian writers appealed to feticide in a fortiori arguments against infanticide and appropriate the argument Philo expounds, examples include Athenagoras,[2] Tertullian[3] and Minucius Felix.[4] This argument against infanticide is also found in the Second-Century catechism The Apostolic Constitutions.[5] And is formulated by Pope Stephen wrote in 887 A.D.[6] Allusions to the Alexandrian argument also appear in the writings of Jerome,[7] Lactantius,[8] Gregory of Nyssa,[9] Cyril of Alexandria,[10] Theodoret,[11] Ambrosiaster[12] and Augustine of Hippo.[13]

    In the early Middle Ages the Alexandrian argument found its way into penitential literature, particularly the collections, The Canones Hibernenses (675 A.D), Bigotian Penitential,[14] Anglo-Saxon Penitentials (668-690 A.D), Capitula Deacheriana, Canoes Gregorii and Penitentiale Discupulus Umbrensium. Later through Ivo of Chartres, it was incorporated into official canon law in the The Concordia of Gratian (1160), the Compilationes of Bernard of Pavia and the official Decretals of Raymond of Pennaforte. The position also found its way into civil law; Bracton and Fleta appropriated the argument into English common law and on the continent, Canon lawyers: Ionnaes, Teutonicus, Henricus de Sequsio and the thirteenth-century jurists reinterpreted Roman law in light of Canon law.

    The claim that feticide was homicide was also defended by medieval theologians such as Peter Lombard (1095-1160), Albert the Great (1206-1280),[15] Thomas Aquinas.[16] [17] It was assumed in the causitical discussions of John of Naples and Antoninus. This led to a debate about the licitness of therapeutic abortion amongst his contemporaries and later theologians.

    The argument is also ecumenical. It is alluded to by Luther,[18] defended by Calvin,[19] Melanchthon[20] and Puritan writers Gullimeau in Child Birth[21] and William Gouge.[22]

    What is important for this study is that this debate demonstrates that casuistry of this sort was engaged in with a background acceptance of the Alexandrian argument. In her book Our Right to Choose, Beverly Wildung Harrison attempts to undercut this traditional of interpretation. Harrision alleges that the Alexandrian argument is based on a mistranslation of the Hebrew text. Harrison states,

    [W]hen the Pentateuch was translated into Greek by Alexandrian Jews in the second century, this Septuagint translation of Exodus 21:22 introduced a distinction between an unformed and a formed fetus uncharacteristic of the original Hebrew text. As a result, the original proscription against causing the death of a pregnant woman was transformed by translation into a command to exact the same penalty if a “formed” fetus died. Roman Catholic historian John Connery acknowledges that it was this mistranslation that motivated the Jewish thinker Philo Judaeus’s rigorous tract Two Ways that was adapted by the Christian writer of the Didache. The result, which Connery also grants, was that the mistranslation of the Septuagint influenced Christians far more than Jews. As Connery observes “Rabbinical Judaism, after the destruction of the temple, reverted to its own traditional interpretations of life in the womb as … part of the mother’s body”.[23]

    Harrison claims to be citing conservative, Catholic theologian, John Connery; however, an examination of the text suggests that the person she refers to is George Williams.[24] Numerous commentators have made the claim of mistranslation though they do not press it as an argument against the tradition as Harrison does. Harrison’s argument is based on apparent discrepancies between The Septuagint (LXX) and The Masoretic Text (MT) over the rendering of Exodus 21:22-25. The LXX translation of Exodus 21:22-25 reads,

    22 If two men fight and strike a pregnant woman, and her unformed embryo departs, he shall be fined; according as the woman’s husband lays upon (him) he shall give according to what is thought fit. 23 But if it be formed, he shall give a life for a life.[25]

    This differs from the MT,

    22When people who are fighting injure a pregnant woman so that there is a miscarriage, and yet no further harm follows, the one responsible shall be fined what the woman’s husband demands, paying as much as the judges determine.23 If any harm follows, then you shall give life for life, 24eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, 25 burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for stripe.[26]

    Harrison’s argument regarding this discrepancy consists of three claims. Firstly, she suggests that Christian prohibition of feticide is based upon the LXX, that early Christian writers aquired the LXX translation via the Didache. Secondly, she suggests that the MT, which in her view accurately captures the original law, did not consider feticide a major crime. Commenting upon the RSV translation of the MT, she states,

    [It] demonstrates that causing the death of a fetus did not constitute a major crime at that time; payment of a fine to a prospective father was considered adequate compensation for the miscarriage. Hurting or maiming a pregnant woman, on the other hand, was a serious penal offence equivalent to other life denying crimes.[27]

    Thirdly, she argues that the LXX mistranslates this law and incorporates a prohibition of feticide into the text that is not there.

    If these three contentions are correct then the Alexandrian argument simply rests upon a mistranslation of scripture. Moreover, Harrison contends that if this mistranslation were corrected and the correct interpretation followed, the Torah should lead those who wish to be faithful to scripture to support feticide as licit.

    In response I will examine whether each of Harrison’s contentions are correct. From the outset I will grant Harrison’s assumption that the MT accurately captures the original and that the LXX is the later translation. I will also grant her point that the argument has origins in Alexandrian Judaism and the LXX. (I have already defended this claim elsewhere so I cannot consistently reject it here). The discussion will then ask whether each of Harrison’s other claims are correct.

    Does the Masoretic Text Consider Feticide a Major Crime?
    Harrison claims that the law “demonstrates that causing the death of a fetus did not constitute a major crime at that time; payment of a fine to the prospective father was considered adequate compensation”.[28] She is not alone in making this argument. In an influential textbook James Rachels argues,

    The scriptural passage that comes closest to making a specific judgment about the moral status of fetuses occurs in the 21st chapter of Exodus. The chapter here is part of a detailed description of the law of the ancient Israelites. Here the penalty for murder is said to be death; however, it is also said that if a pregnant woman is caused to have a miscarriage, the penalty is only a fine, to be paid to her husband. Murder was not a category that included fetuses. Clearly, the Israelites regarded fetuses as something less than full human being.[29]

    Similarly, Graham Spurgeon argues,

    [I]f you cause the death of the fetus, you merely pay a fine; if you cause the death of the woman, you lose your own life. Thus the Bible clearly shows that a fetus is not considered a person. If the fetus were considered to be a person, then the penalty for killing it would be the same as for killing the woman – death.[30] [Emphasis original]

    These arguments all rely on three interpretative judgements some of which are reflected in the N.R.S.V. translation cited above.

    (a) That the case under discussion is that of a pregnant woman being struck and then miscarrying as a result.

    (b) That vv 22 and 23 distinguish between whether there is or is not, harm to the woman.

    (c) That the punishments rendered in each case are qualitatively different. If the fetus is killed, the punishment is “only a fine”, indicating it is not a serious offence. On the other hand, if the woman is killed the penalty is more serious. It is death.

    I think that (a) and (b) are defensible but that (c) is not.

    In my coming posts I will address each in turn starting with my next post where I will address whether the passage refers to a miscarriage.

    [1] Judaeus Philo, “The Special Laws III,” in The Contemporary of Josephus, Translated from the Greek, trans. by Charles Duke Yonge (1993) (108)(109).
    [2] Athenagoras, A Plea for the Christians, 35.
    [3] Tertullian, Apology, 9.8.
    [4] Minucius Felix, Octavius, 30.
    [5] Apostolic Constitutions, 7.3 and Teaching of the Twelve Apostles, 5.
    [6] Epistle to Archbishop of Mainz.
    [7] Jerome, Letters, 121.4.
    [8] Lactantius, De Opifico Dei, 12, 17.
    [9] Gregory of Nyssa, On the Holy Spirit Against Macedonius.
    [10] Cyril of Alexandria, De Adoratione in Spirtu et Veritate, 8.
    [11] Theodoret, Questions on Exodus, 48.
    [12] Ambrosiaster, QQ Veteris et Novi Testamenti, 23.
    [13] Augustine, Commentary on the Heptateuch, 2. 80.
    [14] Penitentiale Bigotianum, 4.2, 2-4.
    [15] Bonaventure, Commentarium in Librum IV Sententiarium, d 31 dub 4.
    [16] Thomas Aquinas, Commentarium in Librum IV Sententiarium, d 31.
    [17] Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II II Q64 Article 8.
    [18] Ewald M Plass, What Luther Says: An Anthology, (St Louis, MO: Concordia Publishing House, 1959) 509, cited in G. Willams, “Religious Residues and Presuppositions in the American Debate on Abortion,” Theological Studies 31:1
    [19] John Calvin, Harmony of the Law, Vol. 3 http://www.ccel.org/c/calvin/comment3/comm_vol05/htm/TOC.htm.
    [20] Melanchthon, “Definitio Animae Usitata in Eccesia,” Corpus Reformatorum 13, cited in G. Willams, “Religious Residues and Presuppositions in the American Debate on Abortion,” Theological Studies 31:1 (1970).
    [21] J. Guillmeneau Child Birth 70-73, cited in G Willams “Religious Residues and Presuppositions in the American Debate on Abortion,” Theological Studies 31:1 (1970).
    [22] W Gouge, Of Domesticall Duties, Eight Treatises 506, cited in G. Willams “Religious Residues and Presuppositions in the American Debate on Abortion,” Theological Studies 31:1 (1970).
    [23] Harrison, Our Right to Choose, 136.
    [24] George H. Willams, “Religious Residues and Presuppositions in the American Debate on Abortion,” Theological Studies 31:1 (1970): 20. Connery, in fact, suspends judgement on the question of whether the LXX is a mistranslation and he says nothing about Philo being behind the Didache.
    [25] Isser, “Two Traditions:,” 30.
    [26] Exodus 21:22-25 N.R.S.V.
    [27] Harrison, Our Right to Choose, 68.
    [28] Ibid.
    [29] Rachels, Elements of Moral Philosophy, 50.
    [30] Graham Spurgeon, The Religious Case for Abortion (Asheville, NC: Madison and Polk, 1983), 16.


    RELATED POSTS:
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part II
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part III
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part IV
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part V
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part VI

  • Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands: Part II

    In my last post, Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands: Part I, I made some critical remarks on Michael Tooley’s critique of William Lane Craig’s version of the divine command theory. Tooley contends that this theory implies the conditional that if God had commanded mankind to torture one another as much as possible then it would be obligatory to torture one another as much as possible, and makes the claim that this conditional is false. I argued that the arguments for the claim the conditional is false fail.

    In the second half of the post I criticised Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s claim;

    Moreover, even if God in fact never would or could command us to rape, the divine command theory still implies the counter-factual that, if God did command us to rape, then we would have a moral obligation to rape. That is absurd.[1] [Emphasis added]

    As I noted, Armstrong’s suggestion that the conditional is obviously false is far from obvious and in fact, runs contrary to the standard view of such conditionals in modal logic.

    In this post, I want to examine a defence of Armstrong’s position, that proposed by Louise Anthony in her article “Atheism as Perfect Piety.” I will argue Anthony’s defence also fails. I will then offer some reasons for thinking that the conditional Tooley cites is not false but true.

    Louise Anthony’s Defence of Armstrong’s Argument
    Louise Anthony suggests a repair to Armstrong’s argument. She notes,

    In standard modal logics, any counterfactual with an impossible antecedent is true. … Results like this are widely regarded as regrettable, in so far as one looks to formal modal logic to reconstruct ordinary reasoning with counterfactuals. I am going with ordinary intuitions, which do not treat all counterfactuals with impossible antecedents as true. [2]

    Anthony, here, claims that the standard view of modal logic is mistaken. Not all counterfactuals with impossible antecedents are true. An obvious problem here is that even if this is the case, it does not follow that the particular counterfactual being discussed here is false. The fact that some counterfactuals with impossible antecedents are false does not entail that this particular one is false.

    Suppose, however, one puts this argument to one side and grants that the counterfactual is false. What follows? I am inclined to think not much.

    Consider the structure of Anthony’s argument. She notes that the claim that right and wrong is coextensive with divine commands entails that if, per impossible, God commands torturing people as much as possible then it is obligatory to do so. The problem is that an analogous line of reasoning applies to any ethical theory. Three examples will demonstrate this.

    First, consider utilitarianism, the theory that an action is obligatory if it maximises the balance of good consequences over bad consequences. It follows from this that if torturing people as much as possible maximises good consequences over bad then torturing people as much as possible is obligatory. The utilitarian’s protestation that such a situation is impossible is unsuccessful because even if this situation is impossible the conditional is, according to Anthony, still absurd and hence, discredits the theory.

    Similar things apply with Kantianism, the view that an action is obligatory if and only if it treats rational creatures with respect; that is, treats them always as ends and never merely as means. It follows that if torturing people as much as possible treats them with respect then it is obligatory to torture people as much as possible. Of course, the Kantian would object that torturing people as much as possible is never something that constitutes respect but again, that does not matter. Even if the antecedent is impossible, Anthony maintains that the conditional is false and for this reason the theory should be rejected.

    The same is true with virtue ethics, the view that an action is obligatory if and only if, it would be performed by a virtuous person. It follows that if a virtuous person would torture people as much as possible then torturing people as much as possible is obligatory. Again, the virtue ethicist will protest that a virtuous person would never want to do that but again, if Anthony is correct, this is irrelevant. Her whole point is that even if the antecedent is impossible, an ethical theory with this implication is absurd.

    I maintain the same is true of any meta-ethical theory. Let P be any property one considers to be logically equivalent to the property of being obligatory. It will be true that this meta-ethical theory entails that if P is possessed by the action of torturing one another as much as possible then torturing other people as much as possible will be obligatory.

    Anthony’s argument is essentially that if we postulate logically impossible situations, absurd and false implications follow. Questions about what God would do in impossible situations is, as Craig points out, “is like wondering whether, if there were a round square, its area would equal the square of one of its sides. And what would it matter how one answered, since what is imagined is logically incoherent?”[3]

    Reasons for Thinking that the Conditional is True
    I have argued that attempts to show that the conditional, if God had commanded mankind to torture one another as much as possible then it would be obligatory to torture one another as much as possible, is false all fail. I am inclined to go one step further and maintain not just that there is no reason for thinking that the conditional is false but that it is, on reflection, obviously true.

    The conditional states that torturing one another as much as possible is obligatory, in a particular situation; that is, a situation where a perfectly good omniscient being commands it. Now it seems inconceivable to me that any action, torture included, could be wrong under such circumstances. If torturing one another as much as possible is gratuitously evil and could never be obligatory then an informed perfectly good being would not command it. On the other hand, if torturing one another as much as possible had certain features that would lead a perfectly good being to overlook the evils the action contains and commend it then it would seem that torturing people in these circumstances would not be wrong. The reason we are inclined to take the counterfactual as absurd is because we think it is absurd that a perfectly good being would command anything of the sort.

    [1] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics Eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 106.
    [2] Louise Anthony “Atheism as Perfect Piety” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, Eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 82.
    [3] William Lane Craig “This Most Gruesome of Guests” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics Eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 172.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands: Part I
    The Euthyphro Dilemma Against Divine Commands I: Avoiding Strawmen
    The Euthyphro Objection II: Arbitrariness
    Euthyphro Objection III:The Redundancy of God is Good
    On the Meta-Euthyphro Objection
    Brink on Dialetical Equilibrium
    On a Common Equivocation
    Patrick Nowell Smith on Divine Commands
    Permissible Lies
    Theology, Morality and Reason
    The Meta-Ethical Argument for Christian Theism: A Response to Richard Chappell
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part I

  • Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands: Part I

    In a debate with William Lane Craig at the University of Colorado, Michael Tooley stated,

    There is a theory which has the consequence that there cannot be objective moral laws unless God exists—that’s the so-called ‘divine command theory of morality’. What it says is that an action is wrong because and only because God forbids it. And an action is obligatory because and only because God demands it. If that theory were right, then there would be an argument in support of the claim that Dr. Craig has advanced. But that theory is quite a hopeless theory because of its implications. One of its implications, for example, is that if God had commanded mankind to torture one another as much as possible, then it would follow that that action was obligatory. Perhaps Dr. Craig would be happy with that consequence. But many people, including many religious thinkers, are very unhappy with that consequence, and so have rejected the divine command theory of morality.[1]

    Tooley here appeals to a version of the Euthyphro dilemma; his argument contains two premises.

    First, that a divine command theory has a certain implication; it implies the following conditional, if God had commanded mankind to torture one another as much as possible then it would be obligatory to torture one another as much as possible.

    Second, Tooley thinks many people would be unhappy with this implication. Now I think Tooley is correct that the aforementioned conditional is an implication of the divine command theory. His phrasing of the second premise, however, is problematic; his stated reason is that many people are not happy with this implication but it is unclear why this is an objection. The fact that some people do not like an implication is hardly an objection against it. What is relevant is whether the conditional is true. For this reason, I take it Tooley is engaging in a rhetorical flourish and actually contends that this conditional is false.

    The crucial contention of Tooley’s critique, then, is that the conditional, if God had commanded mankind to torture one another as much as possible then it would be obligatory to torture one another as much as possible,is false. There are some problems with this contention. There are no reasons for thinking the conditional is false and there are good reasons for thinking the conditional is true. In the next two blogs I will defend these claims.

    Reasons for Thinking the Conditional is False
    The crucial contention of Tooley’s critique then is that the conditional if God had commanded mankind to torture one another as much as possible then it would be obligatory to torture one another as much as possible, is false.

    Unfortunately Tooley provides no argument for this conclusion, he simply asserts it. An examination of the literature suggests that typically two lines of argument are offered for this contention. Given Tooley offers no new reasons of his own, I will assume that he has one of these in mind.

    David Brink’s Argument against the Conditional
    The first is mentioned by Robert K. Garcia and Nathan L. King

    DCT [divine command theory] implies that it is possible for any kind of action, such as rape, to not be wrong. But it seems intuitively impossible for rape not to be wrong. So, DCT is at odds with our commonsense intuitions about rape.[2]

    A similar line of argument is made by David Brink who states,

    We might also notice a counter intuitive implication of voluntarism. Voluntarism implies that all moral truths are contingent on what God happens to approve. … Thus, for example, had God had not condemned genocide and rape, these things would not have been wrong, or, if God were to approve these things they would become morally acceptable. But these are awkward commitments, inasmuch as this sort of conduct seems necessarily wrong.[3]

    Brink here uses the examples of genocide and rape; however, I suggest that he would say the same thing about Tooley’s example of ‘commanding people to torture each other;’ hence, for clarity I will stick with Tooley’s example.

    Brink’s inference here has two premises; the first [1] is that the conditional, if God had commanded mankind to torture one another as much as possible then it would be obligatory to torture one another as much as possible, implies that it is possible for the act of ‘torturing people as much as possible’ to be obligatory. The second premise [2] is that it is impossible for the act of ‘torturing people as much as possible’ to be obligatory; such things are necessarily wrong, that is, wrong in all logically possible worlds. If [1] and [2] hold, the conditional Tooley refers to is false.

    The problem with this inference is that [1] is false. The conditional uses the term “if”, if God had … but this does not by itself imply that there is a logically possible world where such an action is obligatory. To get this conclusion one needs the additional premise that there exists a possible world where God issues such a command. Brink does not offer any reason for thinking this is the case; he seems simply to take it for granted.

    It seems dubious, however, that this assumption is true. Tooley defines God as “omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect”.[4][Emphasis added] Similarly, in his debate with Craig he states,

    I want to begin by briefly indicating how I’m going to understand the term ‘God’ in this next discussion. My view is that the question one should ask is, “What characteristics should an object possess in order to be an appropriate object of religious attitudes?”

    I think that the answer to that is that a being, to be characterizable as God in that sense, should be a personal being, should be a being that is morally perfect, a being that is omnipotent, and a being that is omniscient..[5][Emphasis added]

    So, as Tooley defines his terms, the claim that there is a possible world where God commands people to ‘torture one another as much as possible’ is true only if there is a possible world where a morally perfect omniscient person would command this action.

    This is unlikely. The very reason Tooley cites the example, of ‘torturing others as much as possible,’ is because he views it as a paradigm of an action which can never be obligatory. Similarly, Brink mentions actions like rape and genocide because he thinks it’s impossible that such actions could be permissible. However, if this is the case then a morally perfect being would never command such actions. The argument by Brink, therefore, is unsound.

    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s Argument
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong suggests a second line of argument for the falsity of the conditional, if God had commanded mankind to torture one another as much as possible then it would be obligatory to torture one another as much as possible. Armstrong states,

    Moreover, even if God in fact never would or could command us to rape, the divine command theory still implies the counter-factual that, if God did command us to rape, then we would have a moral obligation to rape. That is absurd.[6] [Emphasis added]

    Armstrong uses the example of rape in place of Tooley’s ‘torturing one another as much as possible’. He claims that “even if God in fact never would or could command” such actions, the relevant counterfactual still follows and “that is absurd.”

    Armstrong gives no argument for the claim that the counterfactual is absurd, he simply asserts it as obvious. The problem is that it is not obvious. If there is no logically possible world where God issues such a command (and Armstrong concedes for the sake of argument that this is the case) then the conditional (which Armstrong refers to as the counterfactual) has a logically impossible antecedent; it is equivalent to statements like “if there were a round square, its area would equal the square of one of its sides.”[7] Whether statements like this are true or false is a difficult issue in contemporary modal logic. In fact, according to the standard view of modal logic, a conditional with a logically impossible antecedent is always true.

    Armstrong’s suggestion, then, that the conditional is obviously true is far from obvious and in fact, runs contrary to the standard view of such conditionals in modal logic.

    In my next post, Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands: Part II, I will look at attempts to overcome this.

    [1] Michael Tooley and William Lane Craig A Classic Debate on the Existence of God held at the University of Colorado at Boulder, November 1994, transcript accessed on March 21st 2009.
    [2] Robert K. Garcia and Nathan L. King “Introduction” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, Eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 11.
    [3] David O Brink “The Autonomy of Ethics” The Cambridge Companion to Atheism ed Michael Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 152.
    [4] Michael Tooley “Does God Exist,” in Knowledge of God Ed. Alvin Plantinga & Michael Tooley (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2008) 72.
    [5] Tooley and Craig A Classic Debate on the Existence of God.
    [6] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics Eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 106.
    [7] William Lane Craig “This Most Gruesome of Guests” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, Eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 172

    RELATED POSTS:
    Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands: Part II
    The Euthyphro Dilemma Against Divine Commands I: Avoiding Strawmen
    The Euthyphro Objection II: Arbitrariness
    Euthyphro Objection III:The Redundancy of God is Good
    On the Meta-Euthyphro Objection
    Brink on Dialetical Equilibrium
    On a Common Equivocation
    Patrick Nowell Smith on Divine Commands
    Permissible Lies
    Theology, Morality and Reason
    The Meta-Ethical Argument for Christian Theism: A Response to Richard Chappell
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part I

  • Marquis, Pruss and the Twinning Argument

    Augustine writes,

    And therefore the following question may be very carefully inquired into and discussed by learned men, though I do not know whether it is in man’s power to resolve it: At what time the infant begins to live in the womb: whether life exists in a latent form before it manifests itself in the motions of the living being.
    Augustine of Hippo, The Enchiridion, 85.

    I think Augustine’s comments ring true today. Like Augustine I believe there is good reason for thinking a fetus (a formed conceptus) is a human being and like Augustine I oppose destroying the conceptus at any stage in pregnancy. I am also inclined to agree with Augustine that prior to formation, the best stance to adopt is agnosticism if we do not know when the human being begins to exist; I have argued for this elsewhere.

    Madeleine asked Alexander Pruss to either help her understand or overcome an argument advanced by Don Marquis that had given rise to my agnosticism regarding the point at which a human being comes into existence (human being is defined as an organism, the killing of which constitutes homicide).

    My agnosticism is based on three things. The first is that I know of no reason for thinking an embryo is a human being at the time of conception. The second is that two arguments against this conclusion lead me to wonder if we can know this. The first is the twinning argument. The second is Don Marquis recent track-forward argument.

    Pruss, in his post, only addresses the twinning argument. Having read Pruss’s argument I think that he and I are in fundamental agreement; moreover, I think he provides reasons for accepting an agnostic position, at least with regard to identical twins.

    First, a brief summary of the twinning argument is necessary to give my readers some clarity as to what we are talking about.

    Prior to the time when an embryo receives a primitive streak, the group of cells which indicate the basic body plan of the embryo, an embryo can twin. Occasionally monozygotic twinning occurs and a single embryo splits to form two or more separate embryos. Many Theologians and Philosophers have argued that this fact provides strong evidence that human beings do not come into existence prior to 14 days post conception.

    The argument goes as follows. Suppose a human being comes into existence at conception, let’s call this embryo Bob. Bob symmetrically splits into two forming two embryos, embryo A and embryo B. The question arises, what happened to Bob?

    There are only four possibilities.

    (a) Bob ceased to exist and two new individual human beings come into existence at twinning;
    (b) Bob continued as embryo A and embryo B came into existence at twinning;
    (c) Bob continues as embryo B and embryo A came into existence at twinning;
    (d) Bob is identical with both embryo A and embryo B.

    The objector argues that each of these options is acceptable.

    Pruss gives two main responses to this argument. The first is to deny that all of the options (a) (b) (c) and (d) are all unacceptable. The second is to call into question whether symmetric twinning actually occurs.

    Are (a) (b) (c) and (d) all Unacceptable Options?
    Pruss does not argue for the acceptability of (d) and for good reason, (d) leads to a straightforward contradiction due to the transitivity of identity. According to the transitivity of identity, if an object x is identical to another object y and y is identical to x then x is identical z.

    In (d) embryo A is identical with Bob, Bob is also identical with embryo B, hence by transitivity of identity, Embryo A should be the same organism as embryo B but clearly is not; as I noted, two separate embryos came into existence at twinning and two separate organisms cannot be the same organism.

    As I stated, Pruss does not address this but he does defends the possibility of (a) (b) and (c).

    Let’s turn first to (a); Pruss here suggests that this option is “not absurd” and gives an example of an amoeba; Pruss notes that when an amoeba splits into two we normally think the original one is destroyed and two new ones come into existence. So when the conceptus twins, the original one is destroyed and two new organisms come into existence.

    Jeff McMahan and Peter Singer have offered a response to this line of argument. McMahan suggests adopting (a) “is an embarrassment” for anyone who opposes abortion on the grounds that life begins at conception because they are committed to the claim that “it’s a terrible loss when one of us dies in utero;” hence, anyone who thinks hominisation (the coming into existence of a human being) occurs at conception is committed to viewing monozygotic twinning as bad and as tragic as the death of a newborn infant due to the demise of the original conceptus.

    Now I am not convinced by this line of reasoning entirely; if a newborn split into two and two new, genetically identical, infants were formed, it is not clear to me that we would consider this occurrence tragic, our attitudes to infants notwithstanding.

    Similarly, with Pruss’ brain splitting example, I don’t think that if we conducted a brain splitting operation on a human being and placed the two hemispheres of the brain into two genetically identical bodies we would not consider this to be on par with homicide, despite the fact that we admit that an adult human is human.

    Now, if cases like this happened we would be genuinely perplexed as these cases are extremely strange and bizarre, if they could happen we would end up with two beings that do not differ, either psychologically or physiologically, from the being of origin. So I agree with Pruss that this situation is possible and is not clearly or obviously unacceptable.

    However, I find it interesting that while Pruss defends this option as acceptable he backs away from endorsing it; he states that “if x in fact is going to symmetrically split in the near future, then maybe x is not identical with any far-future entity”[Emphasis added] he then refers the reader to his discussion of the other two cases. I think he is correct to do this; to show that an option is not false is not to show there are any reasons for thinking it is true.

    Turning now to (b) and (c); the standard argument against adopting either claim is that to do so is arbitrary, one cannot provide any reason for identifying Bob with embryo A that is not also a reason for identifying Bob with embryo B. Pruss response is to argue

    There might be some law specifying which of y and z gets x‘s soul, either in terms of some minor asymmetry (nobody thinks the asymmetry is total, with each half having the exact same number of molecules, in exactly the same positions) or stochastically (maybe it’s random where the soul goes), with the other output entity getting a new soul. Or it might be that God decides where x‘s soul goes.

    Now on the face of it this does not appear to address the objection; the objector argues that one can never be rational in affirming that (b) is the case without also affirming (c). Pruss provides no reason for saying you can. His position is simply that either option remains possible.

    I think something important can be ascertained from Pruss’ objection here and that is that the objector does not show; that either (b) or (c) are false. At best one can only show that that we cannot affirm either option nor can we deny either option has occurred. What the objector tells us here is that we cannot know at this stage.

    It we look at Pruss’ response then it seems what he tells us is that when we ask the question regarding a set of monozygotic twins, did they come into existence at conception? we do not know. It is possible they did not both come into existence when twinning occurred and it is possible that one of the two began at conception though we do not know whether this is the case and even if we did, we don’t know which one of the two was prior.

    Does Symmetric Twinning Occur?
    Similar conclusions apply to the other main argument Pruss provides against the twinning argument. He writes,

    last time I checked, we did not actually know that embryonic splitting is in fact symmetric. If it turns out that embryonic splitting proceeds by budding, the argument falls flat. Thus, the argument rests on an empirical hypothesis which is merely speculative. This is a problem: obviously, if the case for the lack of a right to life on the part of some organism is based on a merely speculative hypothesis, we should treat the organism as if it had a right to life until that speculative hypothesis is checked.

    Here Pruss argues that we do not know whether symmetrical twinning actually occurs and he argues that in the absence of any reason for denying that an embryo is human we should treat it as though it is. Now I don’t deny the first premise, all it does is again point out that when we are dealing with monozgotic twins, we do not know whether either or both came into existence at conception, as we do not know whether twinning is symmetric, where the above puzzles arise, or asymmetric, whereas Pruss argues they do not.

    Pruss goes on to argue that when we don’t know we should treat the embryo as though it has a right to life. While I do not endorse this claim as it is phrased, I argued for a similar claim in my post; I argued that in cases where we do not know if an embryo is a human being it would be reckless and hence, gravely wrong to kill it because it might be.

    So in conclusion, I think that the twinning argument should give us pause about claiming that human beings come into existence at conception. We do not know whether twinning is symmetric or asymmetric. If it is the latter, we do not know whether anyone who is a monozygotic twin came into existence or conception or not. Either option is a possibility but we do not have the information to know which is option is correct.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Some Thoughts on Human Embryonic Stem-cell Research
    Is Abortion Liberal? Part 1
    Is Abortion Liberal? Part 2
    Sentience Part 1
    Sentience Part 2
    Viability
    Abortion and Brain Death: A Response to Farrar
    Abortion and Capital Punishment: No Contradiction
    Imposing You Beliefs Onto Others: A Defence
    Published: Boonin’s Defense of the Sentience Criteria – A Critique
    Published: Abortion and Capital Punishment – No Contradiction

  • South Park on Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research

    The flawed reasoning, commonly found in most media commentary on human embryonic stem-cell research, was not lost on the makers of South Park. I love how brutal South Park are in exposing PC rubbish; see the YouTube clips below.

    [There are two, fast loading, clips below; they are linked so that both will autoplay]

    Hat Tip: Say Hello to my Little Friend: The Beretta Blog and Podcast from Glenn’s blog “Yay for stem cell research. But why bring Embryos into it?“

  • Alexander Pruss on Marquis’s Transitivity of Identity Argument

    Matt gave an overview of his scepticism here that moral status is attained at conception, citing Don Marquis’ transitivity of identity argument placing moral status beginning at segmentation (14-21 days post-conception).

    Matt is agnostic as to whether moral status is acquired at conception but argues that unless there are good reasons for thinking the pre-segmentation embryo does not have human moral status, it is seriously immoral to destroy it. Agnosticism like Matt’s is not a good enough reason, so Matt opposes the destruction of embryo’s from conception despite not being convinced such entities possess human moral status.

    I intuitively felt the argument was flawed but could not articulate why or how which was frustrating – lack of philosophical training really bugs me at times. Baylor University’s Alexander Pruss has very kindly written a rebuttal of Marquis’s argument after I asked him to help me to either understand the force of Don Marquis’ continual identity problem or give me an argument to overcome it.

    Matt plans to look at it in detail this weekend but for those of you following the discussion on the matter back in the original thread it originated in I thought you might like to look at it too. I think Pruss’ argument is very good and it encapsulates the threads of the objection I had towards it in my own mind but lacked the ability to formulate clearly.

  • Some Thoughts on Human Embryonic Stem-cell Research

    Given Barack Obama’s reversal of the ban on federal funding for research on new lines of human embryonic stem-cells, I thought I might add my own thoughts on the issues around stem-cell research. My thoughts are somewhat tentative; largely because, unlike many in the media, I don’t see the issues as clear cut or as obvious as either side makes out.

    I want to address one really bad argument in favour of human embryonic stem-cell research which gets repeated ad nauseum in the media. This is the repeated claim that human embryonic stem-cell research holds “great promise;” this promise offers the hope of discovery of cures for numerous debilitating diseases. In the media this is often accompanied by stories about Hollywood stars such as Michael J. Fox and Christopher Reeves who suffer(ed) from Parkinson’s disease and spinal cord injuries respectively. We are informed that stem-cell research might hold the key to curing these kinds of conditions, the implicit assumption (not actually stated) is that: any action that promises to find a cure for horrible medical conditions is justified.

    Barack Obama apparently agrees with this argument as he stated,

    Medical miracles do not happen simply by accident … They result from painstaking and costly research from years of lonely trial and error, much of which never bears fruit and from a government willing to support that work.

    The problem with this line of argument is that this implicit assumption is false. Two examples will help illustrate the point; the first is from a leading proponent of abortion the second comes from a defender of human embryonic stem-cell research.

    Judith Jarvis Thomson points out that if a doctor painlessly kills a group of healthy patients and harvests their organs, an even greater number of people can be saved from potentially fatal conditions via organ donation.[1] It is, in fact, conceivable that forcing people to under go various medical procedures such as kidney or bone marrow transplants would result in numerous people being saved from fatal illnesses.

    Despite the ends, neither killing people nor enforcing compulsory transplants are permissible practices. Although such procedures may save people from or promote the happiness of others and in some cases might be life saving, they do so by unjust means; namely, killing and assaulting innocent human beings.

    Don Marquis suggests a second case regarding experimenting on human beings and refers to the Tuskagee study where participants were not informed of their syphilis status and without consent were denied treatment for the purposes of medical research, the infamous Willowbrook experiments which involved experimenting upon mentally retarded children in order to ascertain information for fighting diseases such as Hepatitis and the Nazi experiments upon concentration camp inmates to learn how to combat hypothermia. Regarding these experiments Don Marquis notes

    The Tuskegee, Willowbrook and Nazi studies were wrong, not because they were bad and useless science, but because the human subjects in them were treated inhumanely … There is now a consensus, both in society and in academic bioethics that this is wrong even when the research will clearly benefit the common good. In short conformity with a respect for human subjects principle is a necessary condition of morally permissible research whatever its benefits.[2]

    I contend that Marquis is correct in these sentiments. What made such experiments wrong was not that they failed to bring about the significant results they aimed at but rather that the means they used to do so were unjust and involved disrespecting and degrading human beings. Hence, even if important advancements in understanding what syphilis does to the human body, how to combat hypothermia or hepatitis have been achieved the experiments should still be condemned.

    It seems clear the inherent assumption that, any action that promises to find a cure for horrible medical conditions is justified, is false. In assessing a method of medical research one needs to focus not just on the potential benefits of the research but also the means by which these benefits are brought about. In particular, one needs to ask whether the research involves activities such as killing human beings or subjecting them to degrading treatment without their consent.

    The problem of course is that in the human embryonic stem-cell debate this is precisely what is at issue. Human embryonic stem-cell research involves destroying human embryos. Hence, the central question must be,

    Is an embryo a human being at the point such destruction occurs?
    (Embryonic destruction occurs prior to segmentation, segmentation occurs around 14-21 days post conception).

    If it is then the fact that Christopher Reeves could have regained the ability to walk or Micheal J. Fox might find a cure for Parkinson’s disease are irrelevant. The fact that you are a Hollywood actor or the President of the United States does not mean that other people can be destroyed and killed for yours or others medical welfare.

    So, is an embryo a human being prior to segmentation?

    Let me state categorically that I know of no argument for the conclusion that an embryo is a human being at this stage. I believe there are good reasons for thinking a fetus is a human being, which I spelt out in my PhD thesis and I have defended in my academic publications and on this blog. I think that the arguments against attributing humanity to a fetus, such things as the claim that a fetus is not viable, is not sentient, lacks brain function, lacks self-awareness, etc all fail. But the fact that there are good reasons for thinking a fetus is a human being does not entail that there are good reasons for thinking that an embryo is prior to 14 days post conception.

    However, this is not as significant as one might think, because while their may not be any argument for accepting that an embryo is a human being at conception, there may be no good argument against this either. Further, a plausible argument can be made that in the absence of any reasons one way or the other, the morally correct thing to do is to refrain from destroying embryos.

    Take this analogy, which I have adapted from James Humber,[3] suppose I am in the bush hunting deer. I am informed by radio that at some point on Friday morning a party of school children is going to be hiking along the deer trail where I am hunting. After 9:00am on Friday morning I hear rustling and see movement in the bushes. Despite careful examination I am unable to ascertain whether the movement I see is a deer, another animal, the wind or a human being. Am I justified in shooting at the target?

    The answer is clearly no; in fact, even if the deer I am hunting has unusual shaped antlers which I could sell for millions of dollars on Trade Me, the proceeds of which I plan to donate to a local children’s hospital which will help many children be cured of diseases, it would still be wrong to shoot. This is because

    (i) I know that at some point in the morning, in that place a human being will be present;
    (ii) It is morning and I am perceiving a living object in that place; and
    (iii) I am unable to identify whether what I perceive is human or not.

    It would be an act of gross recklessness or negligence to destroy the target because these three facts are in play. Something similar seems to occur in the case of human embryo destruction.

    I know that at some point that, between conception and the fetal stage, a human being comes into existence. I know that an embryo is in existence at this period of time. Hence, unless I have reasons for thinking it is not human it is seriously immoral to destroy it.

    So the real question is whether there are any reasons for thinking that an embryo prior to segmentation is not a human being. The arguments, however, are quite tricky and deal with some interesting metaphysical questions about identity. Perhaps one of them is successful, but even if it is, the continual pontification about Christopher Reeves, Michael J. Fox or the constant reminder about the diseases that human embryonic stem-cell research may lead to cures for does not provide any reasons, at all, for thinking an embryo is not human or that research of this type is ethical. In fact Barack Obama has stated that he does not know at what point in development an embryo becomes human; when asked this questions he answered:

    Whether you are looking at it from a theological perspective or a scientific perspective, answering that question with specificity is, you know, above my pay grade.

    The fact that so many people, including the President of the United States, support destroying a human embryo without even bothering to address this central question is deeply disturbing.

    [1] Judith Jarvis Thomson “Killing Letting Die and the Trolley Problem” The Monist Vol. 59, p 205.
    [2] Don Marquis “Stem Cell Research: The Failure of the New Bioethics” Free Inquiry, Winter 2002 Vol. 23 # v1.
    [3] James Humber, “Abortion the Unavoidable Dilemma” Journal of Value Inquiry 9:2 (1975): 286.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Marquis, Pruss and the Twinning Argument
    Is Abortion Liberal? Part 1

    Is Abortion Liberal? Part 2
    Sentience Part 1
    Sentience Part 2
    Viability
    Abortion and Brain Death: A Response to Farrar
    Abortion and Capital Punishment: No Contradiction
    Imposing You Beliefs Onto Others: A Defence
    Published: Boonin’s Defense of the Sentience Criteria – A Critique
    Published: Abortion and Capital Punishment – No Contradiction