Tag: Philosophy of Religion

  • The Problem of Evil: Why does God Allow Suffering?

    One of the most common objections to the Christian faith is the problem of evil. Of all objections mounted against the Christian faith, prima facie, it does seem the most compelling, one of the hardest things for us to get our heads around.

    How does a Christian reconcile the fact of evil and suffering in the world in the face of a God that is omnipotent, omniscient and benevolent? If he is omnipotent then he knows about all evil before it occurs so why does he allow it? Surely if god is omnipotent then he can halt evil. If he is benevolent then why will not act against it?

    Marc raised the same question in the comments section of, Good Friday: Why Celebrate Easter? In the discussion that followed I charged him with special pleading, of holding Christians to a higher standard than the standard he tacitly holds skepticism to. As discussions in comments sections are often missed instead of continuing the debate with Marc I thought I would express myself more clearly here. In doing so I will borrow extensively from a talk Matt gave for the launch of Thinking Matters (which you will see when we finally get the video footage of the talk online). [Given the difficulties of footnoting notes and impressions from talks and knowledge obtained through years of discussions with one’s spouse (though some came from primary sources that I read myself) pretty much from this post from this point onwards, though not in entirety, should be seen as being authored by MandM as opposed to just me though it is posted by me because overall it I put it together.]

    Before addressing an objection of this nature one should first establish the correct approach to take towards addressing criticisms of the faith and be clear as to what constitutes a fair set of rules for the terms of engagement. Timothy Keller writes,

    All doubts, however sceptical and cynical they may seem, are really a set of alternate beliefs. You cannot doubt belief A except from a position of faith in belief B….

    The only way to doubt Christianity rightly and fairly is to discern the alternative belief under each of your doubts and then ask yourself what reasons you have for believing it. How do you know your belief is true? It would be inconsistent to require more justification for Christian belief than you do for your own, but that is frequently what happens.

    In fairness you must doubt your doubts. My thesis is that if you come to recognise the beliefs on which your doubts about Christianity are based, and if you seek as much proof for those beliefs as you seek from Christians for theirs – you will discover that your doubts are not as solid as they first appeared.[1]

    In making his assertions, Marc, criticised my beliefs from a position of belief, or faith, in the correctness of his own. He asked a standard of my beliefs that he did not require for his own.

    When one encounters a charge like the one Marc raised, I understand that even if Marc didn’t set the problem out in the manner the world’s top atheist philosophers might have done, his question nevertheless hides a disguised argument that warrants addressing. Daniel Howard-Snyder states,

    [T]he theoretical “problem” of evil is often expressed in the form of a pointed question. God is able to prevent evil and suffering and He would know about them before they happened, right? Moreover, since He is unsurpassably good, surely He would not permit them just for the fun of it. So why doesn’t He prevent them?[2]

    In the literature this argument is typically more formalised so that it reads something like:

    [1] That as God is omniscient and omnipotent (all-knowing and all-powerful) he would be both able to know about all the suffering that exists and act to prevent it;
    [2] Given that God is good, he would not allow such evil to exist unless he had a good reason for it.

    [2] is what Snyder calls a justifying reason “a reason that was compatible with his never doing wrong and his being perfect in love.”[3]

    These premises entail that if God exists then he must have a good reason for allowing suffering. I agree with Marc and those who have gone before him on this part of their objection, I am sure that God does had a good reason. However, the question that follows from here, which is typically “then, what is God’s reason for allowing suffering?” which I concede has powerful rhetorical force, contains a critical flaw.

    If one is to look at the question purely rationally it is should become apparent. This flaw is widely noted and discussed in the literature by the likes of Steve Wykstra, Alvin Plantinga, Peter Van Ingwagen, William Rowe, Micheal Tooley, William Alston, and Howard-Snyder to name a few.

    So what is this flaw? I have not contested the claim that if God exists then he must have a good reason for allowing evil. However this has not satisfied Marc who wants to know what that reason is. Asking this latter question tacitly attempts to add a further premise to the above argument,

    [3] If a Christian cannot provide a detailed account of God’s reasons in [2] then it follows that God has none.

    This assumed premise is the point at which the argument succeeds or fails. If the failure to provide God’s reasons in detail does not provide any grounds for thinking that God in fact has no reasons then failure to answer the question, while deeply perplexing and emotionally unsatisfying, does not establish a reason for rejecting God.

    Alvin Plantinga provides an illustration of the flaws inherent in [3]. Paraphrasing him; suppose I ask you too look in a tent and tell me if there’s a St Bernard inside. In this instance, I would have every reason to trust what you say you see as a St Bernard the sort of thing I would expect you to be able to observe if it were inside a tent. But suppose I ask you to look inside and tell me if there are any ‘no-see-ums’ inside the tent (a no-see-um is gnat with a big bite that is small enough to pass through the netting of a tent, as such it is too small to see). Now, I have no reason to trust your answer in this instance, as you can’t see no-see-ums. Here’s the problem; the sceptic is assuming that if there is a reason for our suffering then it is more like a St Bernard than it is like a no-see-um. However, this is simply assumed, not argued for. It is certainly, if not at least possible, that we suffer for a reason but that that reason may not be something that we can easily detect.[4]

    As Keller notes, “we see lurking within this hard nosed skepticism an enormous faith in one’s cognitive faculties. If our minds cannot plump the depths of the universe for answers to suffering, well there can’t be any!. This is blind faith of a tall order.”[5]

    For the problem of evil to succeed the sceptic must provide some argument as to why God’s detailed reasons for allowing evil are like St Bernards and such an argument must be grounded on premises that Christians are rationally required to accept or else we could simply escape the charge by justifiably rejecting the premise.

    Now if a finite human being, such as myself, with limited factual knowledge, limited perspective in time and space and an imperfect moral character cannot produce a good reason as to why evil occurs then I fail to see why the Christian must accept the conclusion: ‘therefore, God cannot possibly have any such reasons.’

    William Alston has noted that the sceptic argument in this context is a bit like a person who, with no background in quantum physics, decided that when he failed to understand why the world’s best physicist held a particular view that if followed that the physicist obviously had no reason to hold it.[6]

    Suppose I am wrong. Suppose that the failure to provide an answer does mean that it is improbable that one exists and from this, that it follows the existence of God is improbable given the existence of evil. What follows from this? Nowhere near as much as you might think because the fact that the existence of God is improbable on one fact does not mean that it is improbable per se.

    Plantinga notes that there are many beliefs that we hold to which are improbable on some body of evidence we believe. If I was playing poker was dealt four aces, then this is highly improbable given the number of cards in the pack and number of possible combinations that I could have been dealt. Yet I am rational in believing that I was dealt four aces as I can see that I have four aces in my hand (to give but one defence).

    Moreover, it is well known that a belief can be improbable on one sub-set of beliefs a person possesses and yet highly probable by every thing that the person believes. For example, if I know my friend is French and I know that most French people cannot swim then my belief that my friend is a swimmer is improbable based on this set of evidence. On the other hand, suppose I know that my friend is a life guard by profession and that all life guards, even French ones, can swim. Then despite the fact that a belief is improbable on the basis of one set of evidence, it is not necessarily improbable on the whole.

    Finally the question needs to be raised about how well Christianity performs regarding the existence of evil relative to alternative views. Some Philosophers have suggested that the existence of evil might also make the non-existence of God impossible. I can only sketch the reasons briefly but they are worth noting.

    First, in order for suffering to exist sentient life forms must exist. However, there have been various discoveries from contemporary physics which establish that a universe evolving life is extremely improbable. For life to evolve there are around 15 constants necessary, each must have precise values and if they were off by a million or even one in a million, life could not evolve. Even if some of these constants had differed by 1 in 10 to the power of 60 then life could not evolve.[7]

    Second, some of the worst forms of evil involve human cruelty and evil but in order to identify these things as such this requires the existence of moral principles or rules that prohibit this kind of conduct and deem them as cruel or evil. Now one question that can be raised by many in the literature, William Lane Craig and J.L. Mackie spring to mind, is whether the existence of objective moral principles is likely on an atheistic view of the world.

    Is it likely that in a universe composed entirely of matter and energy that objective principles or rules could come into existence independently of any mind? Many people find this a puzzling question. My point is not to endorse (or reject) these lines of inquiry; it is simply to show that it is not obvious that the typical sceptical view is any more defensible given the existence of evil than belief in God is and more work would need to be done by the sceptic to show that it is.

    So my response to the problem of evil then is three fold. The objection relies on an assumption that is false or at any rate, an assumption that no reason is forthcoming as to why a Christian should accept it. Further, even if evil does make the existence of God improbable one would need further argument to show that this meant Christianity was irrational. Finally, even if the sceptic could do this it the problem of the mirror remains, one would need to show that the alternatives to Christianity, such as skepticism, were better able to account for the existence of evil. As none of these criteria have been met, I remain a Christian.

    [1] Timothy Keller Reason For God: Belief in an Age of Skepticism (New York: Dutton, 2008) xvii-xviii.
    [2] Daniel Howard-Snyder “God, Evil, and Suffering” in Reason for the Hope Within (Eerdmans 1999), ed. Michael J. Murray, 3, http://www.ac.wwu.edu/~howardd/god,evil,andsuffering.pdf.
    [3] Ibid, 4.
    [4] Alvin Plantinga Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford University Press: 2000) 466.
    [5] Keller Reason for God xvii-xviii.
    [6] William Alston “Some Temporary Final Thoughts on Evidential Arguments from Evil” in The Evidential Argument from Evil ed Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington Indianapolis, Indiana University Press: 1996) 317.

    [7] Francis S. Collins The Language of God: A scientist Presents Evidence for the Existence of God (Free Press, 2006) 75.

  • Maverick Philosopher on the Historical Atrocities Argument

    In making their case against theism many of the “new atheists” (indeed many of the old) commonly appeal to historical atrocities allegedly committed by believers in God. I was discussing this phenomena recently with Doug Geivett in the aftermath of the Craig v Hitchens debate. I cited the need for Christian apologists to rebut not only the contention that theism is false but also the contention that it is oppressive and dangerous. I proposed that someone of the calibre of Rodney Stark should address the sociological claims about the effect of religion on society to supplement the defences of its truth by scholars such as Bill Craig, Alvin Plantinga, etc. The full (ongoing) discussion can be found within the comments thread here.

    Yesterday I discovered this gem on the same topic on one of my favourite blogs of all time, Bill Vallicella’s Maverick Philosopher, (in fact the inspiration for MandM). I have reproduced a little below to whet your appetite and have furnished the necessary link to finish the meal. Enjoy.

    Extract Taken From:
    Is Religion the Problem? Why Isn’t Belief As Such the Problem? The Special Pleading of Some Atheists

    One of the arguments against religion in the contemporary atheist arsenal is the argument that religious beliefs fuel war and terrorism. Rather than pull quotations from such well-known authors as Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris, I will quote a couple of passages from one of the contributors to Philosophers Without Gods, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. His piece is entitled “Overcoming Christianity.” After describing his movement from his evangelical Christian upbringing to a quietistic rejection of Christianity, Sinnott-Armstrong tells us how he became an evangelical atheist:

    My quietism ended when current events taught me the dangers of religion. I had always known how religions, including Christianity, led to wars in the Middle East, Ireland, and so on. Many wars, of course, are not based on religion. Even religious wars result from non-religious forces as well. Nonetheless, it is hard to deny that many wars have been and continue to be fueled in large part by religious beliefs. It is no coincidence that terrorists are so often motivated by religion, since it is hard to get non-religious people to volunteer as suicide bombers. (76)

    It is true that people holding religious beliefs have used, and are using, their religious beliefs to justify war, terrorism, and such other evils as forced conversions and inquisitions. No reasonable person can deny this. But what Sinnott-Armstrong (S-A) says above in the second sentence is that religions lead to wars. Does he really want to say that religions lead to wars? All religions? Buddhism? I understand that there are some Buddhist terrorists. But surely a professional philosopher such as S-A can see the difference between (i) Some Buddhists are terrorists and (ii) Buddhism causes war and terrorism. If a Buddhist is a terrorist, this is an accidental fact about him; there is nothing in the essence of Buddhism that enjoins terrorism. No Buddhist qua Buddhist is a terrorist. It escapes me how the doctrines, precepts and practices of Buddhism cause war, terrorism and kindred evils. Similarly for Christianity. Plenty of atrocities have been committed by people who identify themselves as Christians. But that is not to say that the characteristic doctrines, precepts and practices of Christianity cause war, terrorism and the like. It is rather the opposite: when the doctrines and precepts of Buddhism and Christianity are acted upon they tend to mitigate human savagery.

    And then there is the case of Gandhi whose principle of ahimsa (no-harm) derives from his Hinduism. Hinduism as understood and practiced by him surely did not lead to war and terroism. Did he perhaps not understand the principles of his religion? So it cannot be religion as such that causes war and terrorism. The central teachings of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity are anti-war and anti-terrorism.

    So one of the mistakes that people like Sinnot-Armstrong make is that they confuse the doctrinal content of a religion with the behavior of some of the religion’s adherents. … read the rest here [the comments are worth looking at too]


    RELATED POSTS:
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part I

  • The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part III

    This is the next installment in my series examining whether the Septuagint (LXX) translation of Exodus 21:22-25 is a mistranslation of the Hebrew Masoretic Text (MT). See the previous posts beginning here for the context that this post falls in.

    Is the Harm to the Woman or the Fetus?
    The RSV renders the word ason> in v 23 as kill and attributes it solely to the mother. Other translations render it as “mischief”, “serious injury” or “harm”.[1] That ason means some form of harm is well attested. Ason occurs only three other times in the Hebrew Bible.

    3 Then ten of Joseph’s brothers went down to buy grain from Egypt. 4 But Jacob did not send Benjamin, Joseph’s brother, with the others, because he was afraid that harm [ason] might come to him.[2]

    38 But Jacob said, “My son will not go down there with you; his brother is dead and he is the only one left. If harm [ason] comes to him on the journey you are taking, you will bring my gray head down to the grave in sorrow.”[3]

    27 “Your servant my father said to us, ‘You know that my wife bore me two sons. 28 One of them went away from me, and I said, “He has surely been torn to pieces.” And I have not seen him since. 29 If you take this one from me too and harm [ason] comes to him, you will bring my gray head down to the grave in misery.’[4]

    In each case it refers to Jacob’s fear that Benjamin will be harmed as his brother Joseph was. In the narrative, the harm that befell Joseph (or at least that Jacob thought had befallen him) was being killed by a wild animal. Moreover, its use later in the narrative is associated with the fear that he will be executed in prison.

    The question is whether in this context it refers to harm to the mother. Some translations render the passage as “no further harm”.[5] However, nothing in the Hebrew grammar demands this. In the Hebrew it is unspecified who the harm applies to and several arguments have been proposed suggesting that the harm is harm to the fetus and not the woman.

    Westbrook argues that the word ason means “a disaster for which no one can be held responsible”.[6] He then suggests ason is predicated of the child. Verse 22 deals with a case where one can assign responsibility and v 23 a case where one cannot. This interpretation has the added advantage of explaining the change from the third person “he shall pay” in v 22 to the first person “you shall pay” in v 23. In the first case the person responsible pays. In the second case, where the perpetrator is unknown, the whole community does.[7]

    The problem with this argument is that Westbrook’s claim that ason means “a disaster for which no one can be held responsible” is not well attested by the evidence. Moreover, as noted by Sprinkle several uses of ason in both the Hebrew Bible and in later Hebrew Apocrypha suggest the contrary.[8] For example, the fear that Benjamin would be killed in Genesis does not have this feature. His brothers agreed to take responsibility and his execution by Egyptian officials is not an event in which one is unsure of who is responsible. In addition, Jacob believed a wild animal caused Joseph’s death so it is doubtful that ason carries the nuance that Westbrook suggests.

    A second line of argument claims that the nuances of the word ason fit more naturally with the death of a fetus than the death of the mother. Kline argues,

    A calamitous loss involving serious injury or even death is denoted by ason. In the only other Biblical context where ason is found it describes the grievous calamity that Jacob fears will befall Benjamin on the Journey to Egypt. (Gen 42:4, 38; 44:29). The choice of this unusual word in Ex 21:22 (problematic if the reference were to injury or death of the woman, for which the more common terminology would be expected) is readily explained if ason refers to the less everyday circumstance of the calamitous loss of offspring by violently induced miscarriage. [9]

    Similarly, Jackson argues,

    [W]hy should an unusual word like aswn be used in Exod. xxi 23 to refer to death, when the ordinary verb mwt would appear to have served equally well? Fatal injuries are a common enough topic in the Misphatim, but on every other occasion the normal verb is used. There must be some reason why it is not used in Exod. xxi 22, 23. Part of the reason is that the word aswn, as is evident from the Jacob- Benjamin narrative, stresses the effect on the happening on some person other than the direct victim. Perhaps the best translation is “calamity”…[10]

    Later on in the same work he adds,

    Had it [aswn] referred to the woman, it would be impossible to understand why the normal word for death was not used. But where a foetus is concerned, any hesitation to use the normal terminology of death is quite reasonable…We have seen that elsewhere it emphasizes the effect of the death or serious injury upon someone other than the victim himself. [11]

    Neither of these arguments is compelling. Jackson’s argument is invalid. Jackson appeals to Gen 42:4, 38 and 44:29 where Jacob stresses that harm to Benjamin will cause him to die of grief and infers from this that ason means a harm that affects someone other than the direct victim but this does not follow. The fact that I note that the death of someone close to me will devastate me does not mean that the effect on a third person is written in to the meaning of the term death.

    Moreover, both Kline’s and Jackson’s arguments suffer from the fact that the word ason is so rare in the Hebrew Bible that the samples they appeal to are too few to be decisive. The fact that the few references that occur have a special nuance is insufficient to ground an inference that this nuance is part of the meaning.[12]

    There is a more serious problem in attributing the harm as applicable to the fetus. The translation only makes sense if the passage refers to a premature birth and not a miscarriage. If the passage refers to a miscarriage then a miscarriage has occurred but the fetus did not die. This renders the text self-contradictory. I argued earlier that this text does refer to a miscarriage and that the premature-birth interpretation was subject to serious criticisms. In light of this, the argument ceases to be tenable. Once it is established that the text refers to a miscarriage the question of whom the mischief refers to is easily solved. If the blow has killed the fetus, it cannot be the fetus that is not killed in v 23. Further, if already dead, the fetus cannot be said to have undergone further harm.[13]

    From here I will address whether the punishments are qualitatively different. This will be split into two parts; the first will address whether the death of the woman is a capital offence, the second will ask if the text considers feticide a minor offence. The series will then conclude by returning to the question in the first part again asking, in light of the series, whether Harrison is correct in claiming that the Septuagint mistranslates the Hebrew?

    [1] See K.J.V., N.I.V., A.S.B. respectively.
    [2] Gen. 42:3-4, N.I.V.
    [3] Gen. 42:38, N.I.V.
    [4] Gen. 44:27-29, N.I.V.
    [5] The New Living Bible renders the passage this way.
    [6] Raymond Westbrook, “Lex Talionis and Exodus 21:22-25,” Revue Biblique 93 (1986): 52-69.
    [7] Ibid.
    [8] Sprinkle, “The Interpretation of Exodus,” 7-8.
    [9] Kline, “Lex Talionis and the Human Fetus,” 199.
    [10] Jackson, “The Problems of Exodus,” 275.
    [11] Ibid., 293.
    [12] It can be objected that these few rare occurrences are all we have to go on and indeed they are, however, the best response is to note this fact and claim that we do not have enough evidence to make a decisive rendition. It is not sensible to infer that because insufficient evidence is all there is that one can go beyond what it justifies.
    [13] A further point noted by Fuller in “Exodus 21:22-23:,” 172-173 is that a standard paradigm in some Ancient Near Eastern laws has a disjunction between a case where a blow is accompanied by a miscarriage and a blow where the woman is harmed or killed.

    RELATED POSTS:
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part I
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part II
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part IV
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part V
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part VI

  • The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part II

    In my previous post I gave a brief introduction to The Alexandrian Argument against feticide and noted Harrison’s claim that this argument is based on a mistranslation of the Hebrew by the LXX. In this post I will look at whether the passage refers to a miscarriage.

    Does the Case Deal with a Miscarriage?
    The RSV interprets the passage as involving a miscarriage. Verse 22 is rendered; “When men strive together and hurt a woman with child, so that there is a miscarriage”. This reading has been challenged. Calvin argued that it refers not to a miscarriage but to a premature birth.[1] Cassuto, who held the same view, summarises this reading as,

    The statute commences, And when men strive together, etc., in order to give an example of accidental injury to a pregnant woman and . . . the law presents the case realistically. Details follow: and they hurt unintentionally a woman with child—the sense is, that one of the combatants, whichever of them it be (for this reason the verb translated “and they hurt” is in the plural) is responsible—and her children come forth (i.e., there is a miscarriage) on account of the hurt she suffers (irrespective of the nature of the fetus, be it male or female, one or two; hence here, too, there is a generic plural as in the case of the verb ‘they hurt), but no mischief happens—that is, the woman and the children do not die—the one who hurt her shall surely be punished by a fine, according as the woman’s husband shall lay—impost—upon him, having regard to the extent of the injuries and the special circumstances of the accident; and he who caused the hurt shall pay the amount of the fine to the woman’s husband with judges . . . But if any mischief happens, that is, if the woman dies or the children die, then you shall give life for life, eye for eye, etc.[2] [Emphasis original]

    Before examining the arguments in favour of this reading it is important to note that many critics have dismissed this reading in far too cavalier a manner. Paul Simmons refers to an influential defence of this reading by Jack Cottrell[3] and responds by noting, “he stands virtually alone among scholarly translators and interpreters of this text. The novelty of his interpretation seems to be dictated more by necessity than by the text.”[4] Harrison expresses similar sentiments; “a fairly solid consensus” supports this NRSV interpretation.[5]

    This response is erroneous for two reasons. The claim itself is simply false. It is untrue that Cottrell is “virtually alone” amongst interpreters in reading the text this way; nor is his interpretation novel. Numerous, significant commentators, in fact, defended this interpretation. Calvin adopted it and scholars such as Keil,[6] Geiger and Dillman followed it. In the 20th Century exegetes as diverse as Wayne House,[7] Bernard Jackson,[8] Meredith Kline,[9] Walter Kaiser,[10] J Ellington,[11] J Weingreen,[12] Cassuto,[13] Gleason Archer,[14] K Hoffmeier[15] and Norman Geisler[16] have defended it. The New International Version (N.I.V) adopts this interpretation. In light of these facts, it is plausible to contend that the “solid consensus” Harrison refers to does not exist. Secondly, one does not ascertain the correct meaning of a text by counting heads. One does so by examining arguments in favour of the interpretation and establishing whether they are sound or not.

    Simmons offers several other criticisms of Cottrell, all of which fail for similar reasons. He notes that some “fundamentalist” scholars disagree with Cottrell. This response hardly constitutes a rebuttal, as numerous scholars do not agree with Simmons, including many whom Simmons would call fundamentalists, yet that alone does not entail that Simmons is mistaken. Moreover, the specific scholar Simmons mentions is Bruce Waltke. Interestingly, it was Waltke whom Cottrell was criticising in the article cited and Waltke promptly changed his opinion after reflecting upon Cottrell’s critique.

    Simmons goes on to note that the Talmud interprets this passage as a miscarriage and then states, “Although tradition does not establish truth, one would think that ancient interpretations would be helpful in dealing with awkward textual materials”.[17]

    In making this last point, Simmons undercuts his own argument. After all, is not the Septuagint itself an ancient interpretation? Parity of reasoning would lead us to conclude it was correct. Moreover, the Talmud argues that feticide violates the Noahic law against homicide, a position Simmons is specifically criticising. In addition, the dominant, Christian interpretation of the text in question has been to understand it as prohibiting feticide, again the appeal to traditional interpretation undercuts itself.

    Whatever can be said of Cottrell’s interpretation, it cannot be dismissed by appeals to a false consensus or by noting that not everyone shares his position. The arguments in favour of it need to be examined.

    Arguments for the Premature Birth Interpretation
    Those who argue that the text deals with a premature birth as opposed to a miscarriage base their conclusions on three, lexicographical concerns. Firstly, they note that the Hebrew word that the RSV translates as miscarriage is not the normal Hebrew word for miscarriage, which is shakol. Shakol does not occur in the MT rendition of this text; instead, yatsa is used. Yatsa is a far more general verb that means ‘to come out.’

    Secondly, defenders of the premature-birth view point out that the normal Hebrew noun for a miscarried fetus, nefel, is not present either. Instead, what is said to come out is yeledium, a term that means children.

    Thirdly, defenders of this interpretation note that when yatsa modifies children in utero in the context of pregnancy the phrase nearly always refers to giving birth. This is evident from other passages in the Pentateuch.

    When the time came for her to give birth, there were twin boys in her womb. The first to come out (yatsa) was red, and his whole body was like a hairy garment; so they named him Esau. After this, his brother came out (yatsa), with his hand grasping Esau’s heel; so he was named Jacob. Isaac was sixty years old when Rebekah gave birth to them.[18]

    When the time came for her to give birth, there were twin boys in her womb. As she was giving birth, one of them put out his hand; so the midwife took a scarlet thread and tied it on his wrist and said, “This one came out (yatsa) first”. But when he drew back his hand, his brother came out, (yatsa) and she said, “So this is how you have broken out!” And he was named Perez. Then his brother, who had the scarlet thread on his wrist, came out and he was given the name Zerah.[19]

    The same use of yatsa referring to a birth occurs in later Hebrew writings,

    Cursed be the day I was born! May the day my mother bore me not be blessed! Cursed be the man who brought my father the news, who made him very glad, saying, “A child is born to you-a son!” May that man be like the towns the LORD overthrew without pity. May he hear wailing in the morning, a battle cry at noon. For he did not kill me in the womb, with my mother as my grave, her womb enlarged forever. Why did I ever come out (yatsa) of the womb to see trouble and sorrow and to end my days in shame?[20]

    Based on these facts it is claimed that the text deals with a case where the woman is struck so that she gives birth prematurely; nothing about the text suggests that the fetus dies. The phrase “and no harm follows …” quite naturally in this context refers to the fetus. The text then, according to this argument, states that if the fetus is born unharmed and survives then there is a fine but if the fetus is harmed the lex talionis applies.

    Initially this argument appears compelling and it is repeated many times in the literature. However, Russell Fuller has refuted it in a 1994 article.[21] Fuller examines various Ancient Near Eastern (A.N.E.) legal codes from roughly the same period as the Pentateuch and notes three important facts.

    Firstly, he notes that these codes enacted laws to deal with a case where a pregnant woman was struck by a man and miscarried as a result. The Code of Hammurabi, the Middle Assyrian Laws, the Hittite Laws and the Persian Laws all deal with this contingency. It appears to be a standard case in A.N.E. jurisprudence. Secondly, no legal literature of the period ever referred to or dealt with a case where a woman gave birth prematurely. Finally, those laws that do deal with an induced miscarriage use equivalent phraseology to the phraseology in the book of Exodus. A miscarriage is described as “her child drops out” instead of the standard technical terms for miscarriage. In some cases, the laws dealing with miscarriage use phraseology that is almost word for word identical with the text of Exodus 21:22 if they were transliterated into Hebrew. Fuller notes the implications of this.

    [I]n all Biblical and ancient Near Eastern legal literature and in almost all the general literature, there are no references to premature births. It simply was not directly addressed. Therefore if Moses were introducing a new, unique law, previously unknown (at least from the sources we now possess) to the general society and culture, concerning a premature birth, he would have avoided ambiguity and misunderstanding by using precise language, especially if similar laws from the broader society, such as laws concerning miscarriage, might have confused the issue. Moses, on the contrary, by using general language in Ex 21:22, most likely intended his readers to understand this law according to the broader context of society. Therefore he considered it unnecessary to insert lah after ason (or to write nepel instead of yeled) since that society and culture understood to whom ason applied[22]

    Fuller’s point is that if Moses were describing a premature birth it is highly unlikely that he would do so using language and terms that were almost identical to the language normally used in A.N.E. jurisprudence to designate miscarriage, especially if he were departing from the standard paradigm and introducing a new case. If Moses were departing from the paradigm then one would expect the author to depart from the normal phraseology rather than simply repeat it. Far from being evidence against the miscarriage interpretation, the use of yatsa yeledium in the context of A.N.E. legal code is evidence in favour of this reading. If one is drafting law on miscarriage, it is not surprising that one adopts language normally used in such laws.[23]

    The Premature-Birth Interpretation Refuted
    The arguments in favour of the premature birth interpretation fail. Further, the interpretation itself is very unlikely for several reasons.

    Firstly, the absence of contemporary, medical technology in the period when the A.N.E. texts were written would mean that the fetus surviving a premature, live birth would almost never happen. R N Congdon notes that only in the last six weeks of pregnancy would an infant’s lungs be sufficient to live outside the womb. He notes further that only a severe blow could cause a miscarriage at this stage. Such a blow would, in the majority of cases, cause injuries such as a fractured skull, uterine rupture or damage to the oxygen supply that would result in death. In a typical case, a child born prematurely because of such a blow would die within 48 hours.[24] In a non-technological era it is highly improbable that a situation would arise where a woman is struck so she goes into labour, gives birth and there is no harm to the child.

    Secondly, the law in Exodus in terms of its structure, literary form and language, parallels A.N.E. laws dealing with miscarriage. The Code of Hammurabi and the Middle Assyrian Laws all deal with cases where a man strikes a woman and she miscarries, but is not hurt herself, and a case where she is hurt. All use the same language and phraseology as Exodus does.[25] In fact, the description of an induced miscarriage in the protasis of a contemporary Hittite Law parallels the Exodus “down to the minute details of phraseology”.[26]

    Thirdly, in the Exodus law, the word yeledium (children) is plural; this makes sense if the text refers to a miscarriage. Sprinkle notes that a miscarriage would probably be described with a plural of abstraction so that yeled (child) was rendered “fruit” or “product of her womb”.[27] A similar way of referring to miscarried infants occurs in A.N.E. law. Conversely, if the word yeledium is simply a normal reference to children then the case law must envisage multiple births, a rare phenomenon. Surviving a premature birth in such a society would be extremely rare and the rarity of a premature, multiple birth compounds these improbabilities. A case where a woman was struck and had surviving, premature twins or triplets would be so improbable that it would hardly require specific legislation.

    Taken together; these factors provide a compelling case that Exodus 21:22 does not refer to a premature birth. If the text did refer to a premature birth, then one must conclude that the law introduces a case nowhere discussed before, which is almost never going to happen and the occurrence of which would be practically impossible, all the while utilising the same literary form that was normally used to refer to a miscarriage in the legal texts and case law of the period.

    Therefore, miscarriage makes significantly better sense in the context. If the text deals with a miscarriage it is not surprising that it uses the same language as other miscarriage cases in other A.N.E. legal codes or that it is set out in similar form to such laws. A miscarriage was a likely event and the plural language is readily explicable. The first of Harrison’s interpretive judgements is therefore defensible.

    In my next post I will address the question, is the harm to the woman or the fetus?

    [1] See the quote from Calvin that I reference in Part I.
    [2] Umberto Cassuto, Commentary on the Book of Exodus, trans. by Israel Abrahams (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1974), 275.
    [3] Jack Cottrell, “Abortion and the Mosaic Law” Christianity Today (March 16): 1973.
    [4] Paul Simmons, “Personhood, The Bible, and The Abortion Debate” (1990).
    [5] Harrison, Our Right to Choose, 68.
    [6] C Keil & Franz Delitzsch, Commentary on the Old Testament: The Pentateuch (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1976), 1.135.
    [7] Wayne House, “Miscarriage or Premature Birth: Additional thoughts on Exodus 21:22-25,” Westminster Theological Journal 41 (1978): 108-123.
    [8] Bernard Jackson. “The Problems of Exodus 21:22-25 (Ius Talionis),” Vetus Testamentum 23 (1973): 271-303.
    [9] Meredith Kline, “Lex Talionis and the Human Fetus,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 20 (1977): 193-201.
    [10] Walter Kaiser, Towards Old Testament Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing, 1983), 102-104 and 168-172.
    [11] John Ellington, “Miscarriage or Premature Birth,” Bible Translator 37:3 (1986): 334-337.
    [12] J. Weingreen, “The Concepts of Retaliation and Compensation in Biblical law,” Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy 76 (1976): 1-11.
    [13] Cassuto, Commentary on the Book of Exodus, 275.
    [14] Gleason Archer, An Encyclopaedia of Bible Difficulties (Grand Rapids MI: Zondervan, 1982), 247-249.
    [15] James K Hoffmeier, “Abortion and the Old Testament Law,” in Abortion, ed. James K. Hoffmeier (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1987), 57.
    [16] Norman Geisler, Christian Ethics: Issues and Options (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1989), 145.
    [17] Simmons, “Personhood, The Bible, and The Abortion Debate.”
    [18] Gen. 25:24-26, N.I.V.
    [19] Gen. 38:28-30, N.I.V.
    [20] Job 20: 14-18, N.I.V.
    [21] Russell Fuller, “Exodus 21:22-23: The Miscarriage Interpretation And the Personhood of the Fetus.” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 37: 2 (1994): 169-184.
    [22] Ibid., 183.
    [23] Madeleine Flannagan and Glenn Peoples suggest that the fact that the A.N.E. law uses similar phraseology to the Mosaic Law could be seen as evidence that all these laws referred to a premature birth and none referred to a miscarriage. I doubt this; first, no commentator of the laws in question, that I know of, has suggested such an interpretation. Second, a common paradigm in some of these laws is between a blow that causes a miscarriage and a blow that kills or harms a woman. In light of this, I suggest that the miscarriage interpretation is more likely.
    [24] Robert N. Congdon, “Exodus 21:22-25 and the Abortion Debate,” Biblio Sacra 146 (1989): 140-142.
    [25] Fuller, “Exodus 21:22-23:,” 182.
    [26] E.A. Speiser, “The Stem Pll in Hebrew,” Journal of Biblical Literature LXXXII (1963): 303. [27] Joe M. Sprinkle, “The Interpretation of Exodus 21:22-25 Lex Talionis and Abortion,” Westminister Theological Journal 55.2 (1993): 7-8.

    RELATED POSTS:
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part I
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part III
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part IV
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part V
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part VI

  • The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part I

    Implicit, if not overtly explicit, in much historic Christian moral reflection on feticide is a simple three-premise position. Firstly, that there is a divine law prohibiting homicide, the killing of a human being without adequate justification; secondly, a formed conceptus, a fetus, is a human being; and thirdly, that in all or most cases of feticide, justification for homicide is not forthcoming. In this study, I will refer to this line of argument as the Alexandrian argument, naming it after the Alexandrian Jews from whom it originated.

    The Alexandrian argument receives one of its clearest expositions by Philo. In his commentary on the Decalogue, The Special Laws, Philo argues that the law of God considered the killing of a formed conceptus to be homicide and hence a violation of the sixth commandment. [1] With this conclusion established, Philo offered an a fortiori argument against the widespread practice of infanticide in his day. If killing a fetus before birth were homicide, then killing children after birth would be as well. Therefore, the law condemned infanticide, like feticide.

    Like Philo, numerous, early-Christian writers appealed to feticide in a fortiori arguments against infanticide and appropriate the argument Philo expounds, examples include Athenagoras,[2] Tertullian[3] and Minucius Felix.[4] This argument against infanticide is also found in the Second-Century catechism The Apostolic Constitutions.[5] And is formulated by Pope Stephen wrote in 887 A.D.[6] Allusions to the Alexandrian argument also appear in the writings of Jerome,[7] Lactantius,[8] Gregory of Nyssa,[9] Cyril of Alexandria,[10] Theodoret,[11] Ambrosiaster[12] and Augustine of Hippo.[13]

    In the early Middle Ages the Alexandrian argument found its way into penitential literature, particularly the collections, The Canones Hibernenses (675 A.D), Bigotian Penitential,[14] Anglo-Saxon Penitentials (668-690 A.D), Capitula Deacheriana, Canoes Gregorii and Penitentiale Discupulus Umbrensium. Later through Ivo of Chartres, it was incorporated into official canon law in the The Concordia of Gratian (1160), the Compilationes of Bernard of Pavia and the official Decretals of Raymond of Pennaforte. The position also found its way into civil law; Bracton and Fleta appropriated the argument into English common law and on the continent, Canon lawyers: Ionnaes, Teutonicus, Henricus de Sequsio and the thirteenth-century jurists reinterpreted Roman law in light of Canon law.

    The claim that feticide was homicide was also defended by medieval theologians such as Peter Lombard (1095-1160), Albert the Great (1206-1280),[15] Thomas Aquinas.[16] [17] It was assumed in the causitical discussions of John of Naples and Antoninus. This led to a debate about the licitness of therapeutic abortion amongst his contemporaries and later theologians.

    The argument is also ecumenical. It is alluded to by Luther,[18] defended by Calvin,[19] Melanchthon[20] and Puritan writers Gullimeau in Child Birth[21] and William Gouge.[22]

    What is important for this study is that this debate demonstrates that casuistry of this sort was engaged in with a background acceptance of the Alexandrian argument. In her book Our Right to Choose, Beverly Wildung Harrison attempts to undercut this traditional of interpretation. Harrision alleges that the Alexandrian argument is based on a mistranslation of the Hebrew text. Harrison states,

    [W]hen the Pentateuch was translated into Greek by Alexandrian Jews in the second century, this Septuagint translation of Exodus 21:22 introduced a distinction between an unformed and a formed fetus uncharacteristic of the original Hebrew text. As a result, the original proscription against causing the death of a pregnant woman was transformed by translation into a command to exact the same penalty if a “formed” fetus died. Roman Catholic historian John Connery acknowledges that it was this mistranslation that motivated the Jewish thinker Philo Judaeus’s rigorous tract Two Ways that was adapted by the Christian writer of the Didache. The result, which Connery also grants, was that the mistranslation of the Septuagint influenced Christians far more than Jews. As Connery observes “Rabbinical Judaism, after the destruction of the temple, reverted to its own traditional interpretations of life in the womb as … part of the mother’s body”.[23]

    Harrison claims to be citing conservative, Catholic theologian, John Connery; however, an examination of the text suggests that the person she refers to is George Williams.[24] Numerous commentators have made the claim of mistranslation though they do not press it as an argument against the tradition as Harrison does. Harrison’s argument is based on apparent discrepancies between The Septuagint (LXX) and The Masoretic Text (MT) over the rendering of Exodus 21:22-25. The LXX translation of Exodus 21:22-25 reads,

    22 If two men fight and strike a pregnant woman, and her unformed embryo departs, he shall be fined; according as the woman’s husband lays upon (him) he shall give according to what is thought fit. 23 But if it be formed, he shall give a life for a life.[25]

    This differs from the MT,

    22When people who are fighting injure a pregnant woman so that there is a miscarriage, and yet no further harm follows, the one responsible shall be fined what the woman’s husband demands, paying as much as the judges determine.23 If any harm follows, then you shall give life for life, 24eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, 25 burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for stripe.[26]

    Harrison’s argument regarding this discrepancy consists of three claims. Firstly, she suggests that Christian prohibition of feticide is based upon the LXX, that early Christian writers aquired the LXX translation via the Didache. Secondly, she suggests that the MT, which in her view accurately captures the original law, did not consider feticide a major crime. Commenting upon the RSV translation of the MT, she states,

    [It] demonstrates that causing the death of a fetus did not constitute a major crime at that time; payment of a fine to a prospective father was considered adequate compensation for the miscarriage. Hurting or maiming a pregnant woman, on the other hand, was a serious penal offence equivalent to other life denying crimes.[27]

    Thirdly, she argues that the LXX mistranslates this law and incorporates a prohibition of feticide into the text that is not there.

    If these three contentions are correct then the Alexandrian argument simply rests upon a mistranslation of scripture. Moreover, Harrison contends that if this mistranslation were corrected and the correct interpretation followed, the Torah should lead those who wish to be faithful to scripture to support feticide as licit.

    In response I will examine whether each of Harrison’s contentions are correct. From the outset I will grant Harrison’s assumption that the MT accurately captures the original and that the LXX is the later translation. I will also grant her point that the argument has origins in Alexandrian Judaism and the LXX. (I have already defended this claim elsewhere so I cannot consistently reject it here). The discussion will then ask whether each of Harrison’s other claims are correct.

    Does the Masoretic Text Consider Feticide a Major Crime?
    Harrison claims that the law “demonstrates that causing the death of a fetus did not constitute a major crime at that time; payment of a fine to the prospective father was considered adequate compensation”.[28] She is not alone in making this argument. In an influential textbook James Rachels argues,

    The scriptural passage that comes closest to making a specific judgment about the moral status of fetuses occurs in the 21st chapter of Exodus. The chapter here is part of a detailed description of the law of the ancient Israelites. Here the penalty for murder is said to be death; however, it is also said that if a pregnant woman is caused to have a miscarriage, the penalty is only a fine, to be paid to her husband. Murder was not a category that included fetuses. Clearly, the Israelites regarded fetuses as something less than full human being.[29]

    Similarly, Graham Spurgeon argues,

    [I]f you cause the death of the fetus, you merely pay a fine; if you cause the death of the woman, you lose your own life. Thus the Bible clearly shows that a fetus is not considered a person. If the fetus were considered to be a person, then the penalty for killing it would be the same as for killing the woman – death.[30] [Emphasis original]

    These arguments all rely on three interpretative judgements some of which are reflected in the N.R.S.V. translation cited above.

    (a) That the case under discussion is that of a pregnant woman being struck and then miscarrying as a result.

    (b) That vv 22 and 23 distinguish between whether there is or is not, harm to the woman.

    (c) That the punishments rendered in each case are qualitatively different. If the fetus is killed, the punishment is “only a fine”, indicating it is not a serious offence. On the other hand, if the woman is killed the penalty is more serious. It is death.

    I think that (a) and (b) are defensible but that (c) is not.

    In my coming posts I will address each in turn starting with my next post where I will address whether the passage refers to a miscarriage.

    [1] Judaeus Philo, “The Special Laws III,” in The Contemporary of Josephus, Translated from the Greek, trans. by Charles Duke Yonge (1993) (108)(109).
    [2] Athenagoras, A Plea for the Christians, 35.
    [3] Tertullian, Apology, 9.8.
    [4] Minucius Felix, Octavius, 30.
    [5] Apostolic Constitutions, 7.3 and Teaching of the Twelve Apostles, 5.
    [6] Epistle to Archbishop of Mainz.
    [7] Jerome, Letters, 121.4.
    [8] Lactantius, De Opifico Dei, 12, 17.
    [9] Gregory of Nyssa, On the Holy Spirit Against Macedonius.
    [10] Cyril of Alexandria, De Adoratione in Spirtu et Veritate, 8.
    [11] Theodoret, Questions on Exodus, 48.
    [12] Ambrosiaster, QQ Veteris et Novi Testamenti, 23.
    [13] Augustine, Commentary on the Heptateuch, 2. 80.
    [14] Penitentiale Bigotianum, 4.2, 2-4.
    [15] Bonaventure, Commentarium in Librum IV Sententiarium, d 31 dub 4.
    [16] Thomas Aquinas, Commentarium in Librum IV Sententiarium, d 31.
    [17] Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II II Q64 Article 8.
    [18] Ewald M Plass, What Luther Says: An Anthology, (St Louis, MO: Concordia Publishing House, 1959) 509, cited in G. Willams, “Religious Residues and Presuppositions in the American Debate on Abortion,” Theological Studies 31:1
    [19] John Calvin, Harmony of the Law, Vol. 3 http://www.ccel.org/c/calvin/comment3/comm_vol05/htm/TOC.htm.
    [20] Melanchthon, “Definitio Animae Usitata in Eccesia,” Corpus Reformatorum 13, cited in G. Willams, “Religious Residues and Presuppositions in the American Debate on Abortion,” Theological Studies 31:1 (1970).
    [21] J. Guillmeneau Child Birth 70-73, cited in G Willams “Religious Residues and Presuppositions in the American Debate on Abortion,” Theological Studies 31:1 (1970).
    [22] W Gouge, Of Domesticall Duties, Eight Treatises 506, cited in G. Willams “Religious Residues and Presuppositions in the American Debate on Abortion,” Theological Studies 31:1 (1970).
    [23] Harrison, Our Right to Choose, 136.
    [24] George H. Willams, “Religious Residues and Presuppositions in the American Debate on Abortion,” Theological Studies 31:1 (1970): 20. Connery, in fact, suspends judgement on the question of whether the LXX is a mistranslation and he says nothing about Philo being behind the Didache.
    [25] Isser, “Two Traditions:,” 30.
    [26] Exodus 21:22-25 N.R.S.V.
    [27] Harrison, Our Right to Choose, 68.
    [28] Ibid.
    [29] Rachels, Elements of Moral Philosophy, 50.
    [30] Graham Spurgeon, The Religious Case for Abortion (Asheville, NC: Madison and Polk, 1983), 16.


    RELATED POSTS:
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part II
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part III
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part IV
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part V
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part VI

  • Craig v Hitchens: Dissecting the Debate UPDATE 2

    The debate between atheist journalist Christopher Hitchens and Christian Philosopher and Theologian Dr William Lane Craig has finished.

    There is an, albeit very brief, summary of the debate here and a more comprehensive one from a Philosopher here. One point of interest is that Hitchens appears to have given up towards the end and “yields his entire closing speech”. It will be interesting to see the video and read a more detailed transcript to see exactly what transpired.

    I find this debate particularly interesting as when, along with the New Zealand Association of Rationalist Humanists, Madeleine and I organised Dr Craig’s debate with Dr Bill Cooke in Auckland last year, the most common claim we heard from amongst our rationalist co-organisers was “the debate would go very differently if Craig was up against Hitchens” (after conceding that Dr Cooke got slaughtered).

    I strongly had my doubts, so I look forward to seeing the video and comparing it with my thoughts on the Craig v Cooke debate.

    [We are thinking of having Thinking Matters Auckland, our Apologetics group, purchase a copy and then we will screen it at one of our seminars so stay posted].

    UPDATE:
    When Debunking Christianity puts up a post entitled William Lane Craig “Won by a Landslide” Against Hitchens I think it is safe for all to say Craig bested Hitchens.

    UPDATE 2:
    Common Sense Atheism states “Craig was flawless and unstoppable. Hitchens was rambling and incoherent, with the occasional rhetorical jab. Frankly, Craig spanked Hitchens like a foolish child.”

  • Does God Exist? Christopher Hitchens v William Lane Craig

    A live blog debate will be held between atheist journalist Christopher Hitchens author of the best-selling God is Not Great and Christian Philosopher and Theologian Dr William Lane Craig author of too many things to list here.

    They will debate the topic: Does God Exist? Catch the live blog debate here on Sunday 5 April 2009 at 3.30pm NZ time [4 April 2009 at 7:30 pm (PST)];

    Hitchens v Craig
    Dr Craig debated Dr Bill Cooke at Auckland University in 2008 on the topic “Is God a Delusion?” Video footage of that debate here.