Category: Religion in Public Life

  • The Body Snatchers and the Problem of Pluralism

    As I was driving around Auckland this morning talkback was rife with people discussing the recent body snatchers case; an estranged father, against the wishes of both the deceased and her next of kin stole his daughters body and buried it in a family plot. Of course I remember the furor over the previous case, and my thoughts now are as they were then.

    What people seem unaware of, or at least have not articulated clearly, is that the controversy over this case is symptomatic of a deep problem with the popular liberal response to pluralism. Let me elaborate.

    The problem of Pluralism is this: we have in New Zealand people who hold to and live in accord with various differing “comprehensive views” as Rawls called them. A comprehensive doctrine can be theistic like Islam or Christianity or it can be secular like certain forms of Naturalism; Marxism, Liberal rationalism, humanism etc. However such views function as religions in that they answer fundamental questions such as who are we, what is the nature of good, what is real, etc. Now the problem such plurality creates is this: How does one maintain peace and order in a society characterized by radical disagreement over these fundamental questions? Each group believes (and cannot but believe) that their view is true and the others mistaken. Failure to find a solution to this problem can be deadly people can and have killed each other over these questions.

    In New Zealand the answer popularly given is “tolerance”. One should allow each person to believe and act in accord with whatever view they think is correct and no one should be compelled to adopt some form of enforced orthodoxy. However there is one immediate problem with this response. Sometimes believers in different comprehensive doctrines will interact with one another. Hence, there needs to be rules or norms governing the relationships between believers of different “comprehensive doctrines” and the obvious difficulty is that these different groups frequently disagree over precisely what the correct norms or rules which constitute our duties are.

    This is the case in the body snatchers incident. One group of people come from a community in which individual autonomy is an important value (this btw reflects certain religious and philosophical beliefs articulated in the late middle ages). Under this understanding of the world, when a person dies the individual who died can, prior to death decide ( within reason) how their body is to disposed of. Moreover certain relatives, become next of kin and aquire the responsibility to carry the deceased’s wishes out. The problem is that people from other cultures have quite different understandings of the world. I am not an expert on Maori culture and so will not try and elaborate. But the idea seems to be that individual autonomy is subordinated to the wider family and certain traditions which this family are required to uphold. Hence the wider community decides where one is buried in accord with their traditions regardless of the individual in questions wishes. Moreover there are different understandings of what constitutes membership in the relevant group. One group tends to think that if one is not brought up within a culture or does not conciously adopt it they are not part of a group that embodies this culture. Another however believes that mere biological lineage determines ones membership in the culture.

    In this case a person dies. According to group A the deceased is not part of group B and the right thing do do is X. According to group B, she is a member of group B and the right thing to do is Y. Y however is incompatible with X only one of the two options is possible. I maintain that there is no *culturally or religiously neutral* way of adjudicaticating this dispute. At the end of the day we must decide which view of the world is correct and side with the solution they propose.

    This case shows up the popular liberal response to the problem. The popular response is to suggest that the no group can impose the norms they believe in upon another group. Instead, norms governing relationships between practioners and believers of different comprehensive doctrines should be governed of norms that all reasonable people can accept regardless of their religious or quasi religious beliefs. This idea is often described as “public reason” the notion that there is a set of premises which are accepted implicitly by all reasonable people from which public policy regarding what rights everyone has can and coercive laws enacted can be decided.

    The problem, which this case shows, is that public reason is something of a myth. If one defines a “reasonable person” broadly there is simply does not exist a set of principles which is both accepted by all reasonable people and also sufficiently “thick” and comprehensive to provide a basis for answers to public policy questions. On the other hand if one defines “a reasonable person” narrowly to exclude radical disagreement the very concept of a reasonable person will depend on the truth of a particular comprehensive perspective for its plausibility. The debate over Gods existence is a good example. Alvin Plantinga has argued, correctly I think, that if God exists and created men in his image and then revealed himself to them, much of what Christians believe is probably rational. If however God does not exist, its probably a delusion. However, its impossible to come to an answer on the rationality of theism without presupposing a stance on the ontological question of its truth. In fact it’s difficult to see how one can come to an understanding of what constitutes a *reasonable person* if without appealing to premises specific to some comprehensive doctrine about what exists and what sort of beings people are.

    That’s what’s seen in this case. We have two very different views of understanding the world. Each one if true entails that a certain course of action is mandated. If certain notions of individual autonomy then the body snatchers are wrong. If one does not they are not. The problem is according to a popular conception of liberal democracy the state has to be neutral with regard to differing faith or quasi faith positions. It should not privilege any group by writing its views into law and demanding that the others who don’t accept the tradition live in accord with them. The state therefore can do nothing one way or the other. Interestingly that is precisely whats happend.

    There is a solution to this. It’s an older view, and it’s far less palatable to many modern or post modern people, but it has the advantage of being correct. On this view the whole popular liberal idea of tolerance is a chimera. In his book Reason in the Balance Berkeley Law professor Philip Johnson argues that while liberal societies do not (and I would add should not) have established Churches they must always have a defacto “established religious philosophy.” By religious philosophy Johnson means “a way of about ultimate questions” and by saying its esthablished he means not that “dissenters are subject to legal punishment” but that “it provides the philosophical basis for law making and public education”. People who dissent will be tolerated within reasonable limits and what constitutes a “reasonable limit” will be determined by the esthablished religious philosophy.

    In NZ the established religious philosophy ostensibly includes the proposition that killing non combatants in war is wrong hence Al Qaeda does not gain religious tolerance in NZ. In Saudi Arabia the established religious philosophy considers apostasy intolerable. In some “progressive” quarter’s today believing and teaching that homosexual conduct so violates the sensibilities of liberal orthodoxy that it cannot be tolerated. In each case we have a accepted orthodoxy and tolerance of dissenters limited by the values of the orthodoxy in question.
    In his book Foreordained Failure, Steven Smith demonstrates that there is no such thing as a right to freedom of religion which is upheld by some traditions and opposed by others. Instead there is a spectrum of views about religious tolerance that comes in degrees; no state tolerates all religious sects and very few states tolerate none. He notes that Aquinas, Cromwell, Locke and Mill all advocated and defended forms of religious tolerance. However, each disagreed as to which religions such tolerance should apply to and the proper limits upon those they disagreed with. Smith argues further that these differing accounts of freedom of religion all depended upon comprehensive views to justify them and one cannot adjudicate between them without appeal to such views. Attempts to articulate a right to freedom of religion from a neutral or public stance are quite hopeless.
    That’s what we have in this case. I think that those who stole the body should be prosecuted because I believe that the ideas about individual autonomy undergirding those who complain are correct and I think tolerance of diversity should not extend to allowing others to violate norms based on these ideas. Our political climate needs to stop hiding behind slogans of “tolerance” and “respect for diversity” and admit that it supports a particular religious orthodoxy and here are the limits on dissent. Then we can debate whether the orthodoxy is true. If we continue to hide behind the façade of “tolerance” and “respecting and celebrating all diverse view points” it will not be able to do anything in these situations.
  • Mayra Veronica and the Troops in Iraq: Where the Islamists Have a Point

    I am a fan of Bill Vallicella’s blog. A few days ago I found a post of his which is worth reproducing [link to post now broken Jan 2011]. He led with a picture of a scantily clad and busty Mayra Veronica and wrote:

    Don’t expect any more ‘eye candy’ on this site, but now that I have your attention I want to make a serious point. The well-endowed lass a picture of whom you see to the left has a name as beautiful as her body, Mayra Veronica. She was a guest on the O’Reilly Factor last night. She supports the troops in Iraq by going there and meeting with them, hugging and kissing them (that’s what she said!), signing photographs and posters, and distributing calendars. The ‘pin-up girl’ is of course nothing new — our fathers and grandfathers gawked at Grable — but one has to ask how much we have to teach the Iraqis. Islamic culture is in many ways benighted and backward, but it is not clear that our trash culture is much of an improvement. If they think that our decadent culture is what democracy is all about, and something we are trying to impose on them, then we are in trouble.

    Militant Islam’s deadly hatred of us should not be discounted as the ravings of lunatics or psychologized away as a reflex of envy at our fabulous success. For there is a kernel of insight in it that we do well to heed. Sayyid Qutb (Milestones, 1965, emphasis added): “Humanity today is living in a large brothel! One has only to glance at its press, films, fashion shows, beauty contests, ballrooms, wine bars and broadcasting stations!Or observe its mad lust for naked flesh, provocative pictures, and sick, suggestive statements in literature, the arts, and mass media! And add to
    all this the system of usury which fuels man’s voracity for money and engenders vile methods for its accumulation and investment, in addition to fraud, trickery, and blackmail dressed up in the garb of law.”

    A wild exaggeration in 1965, the above statement is less of an exaggeration today. But setting aside the hyperbole, we are in several ways a sick and decadent society getting worse day by day. On this score, if on no other, we can learn something from our Islamist critics. The fact that a man wants to chop your head off does not mean that he has nothing to teach you. The decadence of the West is a huge and many-sided topic. I’ll mention just two trends. One is the degeneration of popular music, especially black music. There is a huge difference between Sam Cooke and the rap ‘artists’ popular today. Another is the drive to push all vestiges of religion out of public life. Since religion is the means whereby most people learn morality, the assault on religion is also an assault on morality.

    Of course, when I say that there is something to be learned from our Islamist critics, that in no way implies that their actions can be justified. They are murderous terrorists who need to be hunted down and killed, and the governments that support them need to be toppled. What I am opposing is a certain thoughtless attitude that says, “They are demons, I don’t want to understand them, and I shut my ears to everything they say.”

  • Imposing Your Beliefs Onto Others: A Defence

    Recently an acquaintance forwarded me a some comments about this blog on a internet forum. The critic, who goes by the handle Kaiwai stated:

    Matt Flanagan I find, yes, some of the things I agree with but there is generally speaking, a huge difference; I don’t set out to impose my views by way of legislation – if I want to ‘change the world’, I’d sooner set an example by living the life I preach, then hope that it’ll rub off on others

    I want to focus on one criticism levelled at me in this comment. It’s the objection that that I support “imposing my views onto others”. This criticism of religious conservatives is not new, I have seen it numerous times in the media and even some academics use it. In her book The Abortion Myth, bio-ethicist Leslie Cannold writes.

    The United States religious right, like most religious extremists, believe their political beliefs are actually God’s will. … [Feminism is opposed] to one religious groups imposition of its rather narrow version of morality on a pluralistic society.

    Cannold objects that any appeal to divine law as laid down in scripture constitutes an imposition of one’s view upon others and this is, she assumes objectionable. Feminists (such as her) she assures us oppose such things.

    I always find this objection strange, because despite widespread impression to the contrary there is nothing objectionable about imposing one’s moral beliefs or values upon others. I know this comment will strike many as absurd, so I will offer two arguments for this claim. Firstly, the contention that it is wrong to require others to comply with one’s moral principles is subject to serious counter-examples. Secondly, it is self-referentially incoherent.

    Turning to the first, consider an act like rape, assault or infanticide. I believe each of these practices is wrong. Further, I expect others to refrain from doing them. I even support their commission being considered a crime punishable by the state. However, if it were wrong to impose my moral beliefs upon others, my position on rape, assault or infanticide would be unacceptable. I would have to leave others free to choose whether they wished to rape or kill children and hold that my own qualms about these matters do not apply to others. This would be absurd.

    Secondly, the contention that it is wrong to require others to comply with one’s moral principles is self-referentially incoherent. This is clear when one realises the contention itself is a moral principle. Those who defend it assert that it is wrong to impose one’s beliefs upon others, that one is required to refrain from such an imposition and any attempts to do so should be prevented. However, given that this contention expresses a moral principle then those who defend it have no right to expect that others will comply with it, nor can they force people to do so. If it is wrong to require others to comply with one’s own moral principles then those who reject this principle, such as I, are free from having to follow it since no one has the right to impose it upon me.

    In fact, this contention that imposing your moral principles upon others is wrong has all sorts of curious consequences. Paul Hill believed that it was morally permissible to shoot abortionists. I think Paul Hill was wrong. However, if this contention is correct it is wrong for me to demand that Mr Hill comply with my beliefs as that would be forcing my beliefs on to him. Consequently, the laws that ban shooting abortionists are unjust as they impose someone else’s morality on to another. The same thing can be said about those who block abortion clinics and even those who blow them up. The alleged duty not to impose one’s beliefs onto others is a double-edged sword. Not only does it proscribe the criminalisation of abortion but it also proscribes making laws against preventing people from having abortions. It simultaneously entails both that people should be free to have abortions and free to force others not to have abortions. It is incoherent.

    By itself, the observation that people are imposing their beliefs upon others is of little consequence. However, perhaps I am being unchartible Cannold does not object to such imposition in an unqualified manner. Her objection is that it is inappropriate to impose certain kinds of moral principles upon others . The types of principles Cannold wants to reject as a basis for public debate are those she labels “narrow”. What is meant by this spatial metaphor is unclear; however, I presume she means that this is a minority view, held by only a small segment of society.

    Implicit in this argument is the claim that a necessary condition for any principle to be utilised in public debate is that the majority accepts it as true. However, this is subject to numerous counter-examples. Consider a culture where the majority believes that a husband has the right to beat his wife. Would an advocate of majoritarianism contend that in such a society criticism by a feminist minority of this practice and the advocacy of norms forbidding spousal abuse is an unacceptable imposition of a narrow, feminist perspective in a pluralistic society? Would it be true that in such a society public policy could not be based on the moral principle that it is wrong for a man to beat his wife?

    Consider an Islamic society where the majority believe that conversion to a rival, monotheistic religion is immoral and should be a capital offence. Not to execute converts to Judaism or Christianity in such a society would, by this reasoning, be unjust. In societies where a racial majority thinks a racial minority is sub-human, it would be unjust to grant equal human rights.

    I think then the objection to imposing ones “narrow” beliefs on to others is misguided. What is wrong is not the imposition of someones values, but the imposition of values that incorrect, irrational, oppressive or unjust. If the principles expounded in Christianity are correct and accurately reflect justice then there is nothing wrong with imposing them on others. To label an appeal to these values as unjust because it involves such an imposition is to argue backwards.

  • The Question of Islam

    An interesting discussion of Islam has been occurring at Kiwiblog. Up until now I have merely chipped in to correct inaccurate claims about Christian beliefs and practices. However, for what its worth I’ll add my two cents worth here.

    Here is what I think the issues are.

    We are familiar with Christian teachings on the morality of violence. The just war theory of Augustine, Aquinas, Gratian, Vitoria, Calvin, Luther and Grotius have been pretty much codified into international law and things like the Geneva accords. They are now at least held up as the correct rules ( even if they are not always followed in practice) by liberal democratic societies. We are also familiar with various other ideas which come from Christianity the idea that individuals have inalienable rights which the state cannot transgress. Those non believers should be tolerated. That Government should be limited. That Church and state are separate institutions with degrees of autonomy from each other. That the state should be concerned with the temporal welfare of its citizens and not their welfare in the life to come. While it’s fashionable for people to attribute to these things to the enlightenment, in reality, much of this in is found in Medieval Theology and even in earlier writers like the Church fathers. The basic premises of course come from the scriptures.

    Now when we confront Islam we confront (a) a religion we know less about (b) a religion which historically has threatened parts of Europe with invasion and hence has been feared and (c) whose high profile practitioners seem to have very different understandings of these things. Some of them appear to believe direct killing of non combatants is permissible and they seem to not respect the Geneva accords. They appear to have more absolute governments. Have clerics exercising vetoing legislation and they seem to threaten people with death if they don’t convert etc.

    I guess the question is this: does this historically feared tradition have the same moral teachings about these things Christianity does? And if it does not what does that mean for religious tolerance? How far can a religion disagree with our current consensus on these types of questions before tolerance is no longer acceptable? And finally, if we tolerate it and large numbers of the population embrace this religion how will that change the cultural values and assumptions which our liberal institutions are based on?

    I do not know the answers to these questions. but I think they need to be asked and debated. Not dismissed as Islamiphobia. I also think that the debate should be informed not a banding about of stereotypes and caricatures about either religion.

    This latter point requires emphasis. If we see the discussion as it occurs today one side dregs up stereotypes of Muslims and attempts to quote the Koran out of context without examining the tradition, critical commentaries that responsible study of this document requires. Another side dregs up stereotypes of Christians and argues they are the *real* problem and predictably do the same thing. They argue that the scriptures support rape, torturing heretics we are told. Any debate on the question of religious tolerance which relies on slander, ignorance and prejudice towards religious minorities scares me. The alternative to tolerance is supression; which involves violence. If it comes to that then lets make sure we have been informed enough to make the right decision.

    I would also add that these questions are not new. Medieval Theologians like Aquinas supported religious tolerance for Jews and Muslims but and not for Heretics. This is because he perceived heretics to threaten the institutions of society whereas other monotheistic minorities did not. Latter, John Locke suggested that religious dissenters (what Aquinas would have called Christian heretics) should be tolerated provided they did not challenge the moral values essential to a free and just society. Locke advocated suppressing Christian groups that taught contracts could not be kept with heretics because that would undermine the co-operation needed to maintain a free and just society. He also supported the suppression of atheists because he felt belief in a moral law giver was a necessary foundation for such a society. Some contemporary Gay rights advocates seem to believe we should not tolerate evangelical Christianity because opposing homosexual conduct inevitably incites violence. Or is opposed to certain understandings of equality which they think justice requires. Libertarians draw the line at aggression, because they believe freedom needs to be based on everyone refraining from the initiation of force.

    The irony of this, of course, is that many of defenders of one position view the others as being opposed to tolerance. As though tolerance did not come in degrees. Everyone is for tolerance of some religions and no one to my knowledge tolerates all religions. Because we have conducted the debate in this manner few people have been able to ask the real question : How far should tolerance extend?

    Aquinas’s question is still with us. When does error in Theology become serious enough for the state to step in?

  • Paul Litterick on Religion and Public Life: A second Look

    In a previous post I criticised an argument made by Paul Litterick for the conclusion that theological arguments should not affect public policy. Paul has responded saying that this post consisted of a “lengthy misrepresentation of [his] views”

    Now I do not wish to caricature anyone’s views. I would rather refute Paul’s actual arguments than ones he did not make. That way I have actually refuted them. So let’s look again at what Paul stated. The statement to which I was responding is the following:

    The only way it [theological moral arguments] matters to me is in the public political sphere. I am more of a secularist than anything else, I just think these sorts of arguments shouldn’t be effecting the vast majority of people who don’t share them and there is always a difficulty with arguments that are put over as being matters of faith, or matters of, say Christian Heritage of the nation and so and therefore we must do these things that they will take precedence over the views and the freedoms of everybody else.

    Here, Paul appears to express two concerns about theological arguments in the “public political sphere” (i) laws enacted on the basis of such arguments will take precedence override everyone else’s freedom and (ii) the majority affected by these laws do not share the beliefs to which the arguments appeal.

    Now that sounds very much like the objection is that laws enacted on the basis of theological premises will restrict the freedom of the majority who do not accept these premises. Certainly it’s a reasonable construal of Paul’s claims. And, as I pointed out in my previous post, this objection is problematic. Laws based on secular ethical theories also restrict people’s freedom and most people affected do not hold to the theories in question. Hence if this argument were sound it would exclude almost all philosophies from public discourse whether they were secular or religious.

    Nether the less, I accept that that may not be what Paul really meant. He has generously clarified his position. His view is rather that “a secular society is the best means of guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of all, regardless of their differing beliefs.”

    That is an interesting thesis. Unfortunately Paul only states it and provides no argument for it. That of course is not Paul’s fault he can hardly be expected to lay down all his reasons in a short comments section. But, it is also true that, in the absence of any argument, those who do not already hold this belief have no reason at all to accept it.

    It also seems to me that there is an ambiguity in Paul’s claim. One problem is that the truth of his thesis depends on what one considers to be “the rights and freedoms of all” another is that there are various different models of a secular society.

    Some examples will illustrate this. Take the model of a secular society proposed by Ayn Rand. It’s clear that on certain libertarian understandings of “the rights and freedoms of all” this model of a secular society will guarantee these rights and freedoms better than one which follows the premises and arguments proposed by religious conservatives. On the other hand, on the same understanding of “the rights and freedoms of all” listening to religious conservatives will guarantee our rights and freedoms much better than listening to the secularism of Karl Marx, or Chairman Mao.

    A further and related problem is that any attempt to compare the beneficent and malevolent effects of religion will depend in part on ones secular or religious philosophy in the first place. If the rights and freedoms of all includes a right to life, and fetuses posses this right, listening to religious conservatives will greatly decrease the abuse of human rights in this country. On the other hand if a woman has a right to an abortion, then it will not. However, it is not unlikely that some secularists and theologians may differ on the moral status of feticide or numerous, other substantive moral questions that affect the conclusion.

    It seems trivial to say that a Marxist society will guarantee rights and freedoms as understood by a Marxist and that a theologically conservative society will better embody the ideals of religious conservatives. It would also be question begging to exclude religious premises from the arguments from which one derives an account of rights and freedoms if this account is to be used in a premise for the conclusion that such arguments should be excluded from public policy debates.

    To substantiate Paul’s thesis what is needed is some: (a) account of the freedoms and rights of all (b) some non question begging argument as to why this account is correct as opposed to its rivals (c) some argument as to why secular philosophies always guarentee these rights and freedoms as opposed to religious ones. I am sceptical such an argument can be made. Of course I could change my mind if a compelling argument is forthcoming, but I am not holding my breath.

  • Religion and Public Life: A Response to Russell Brown and Paul Litterick

    Paul Litterick was recently interviewed by Russell Brown on Public Address. The topic predictably is his criticism of conservative Christian groups whom Russell appears to have no time for. Here I will make to criticisms of this broadcast, first one of Russell Brown and the second of Litterick.

    Turning first to Russell Brown; Brown mentioned in detail the New Zealand Association of Rationalist Humanist’s (NZARH) exposure of Bruce Logan’s plagiarism, elaborated how this damaged Maxim’s credibility and meant they had little media respectability as a result. It was also stressed on the show that this incident showed that they were a bogus think tank.

    However, Brown seemed almost silent about NZARH’s own apparent deception that both Litterick and I have discussed. Yet it is clear from what Brown does say that he does know about it but he omits to mention it – even in contexts where it is relevant.

    For example, Brown mentions that there was an interesting story about Littericks falling out with NZARH but will not go into the details and he queried why Litterick even made the issues of the falling out public but he never ventures to state what they were.

    There seems to me to be a clear double standard here. NZARH make media comment about religion and public issues, so do Maxim. If Logan’s deception is newsworthy and calls into question Maxim’s media credibility then why is this not equally true of NZARH?

    Moreover, if Brown feels it is acceptable to make Logan’s alleged plagiarism public, which he does on his show, why then does he query the appropriateness of bringing up NZARH’s actions on air? Is privacy something that applies only to secularists perhaps?

    Turning now to Litterick; Litterick states he has no issue with private faith but is opposed to religious values guiding public policy. This is because he is concerned that the views of one group of society (those with a religious faith) are being used to restrict the freedoms of everyone else in society, many of who do not accept the religious beliefs in question and may in fact openly reject them.

    Now this is a common line of argument. However, despite its pervasiveness, this argument is erroneous. In the literature on Religion and Public Life Christian Philosophers like Nicholas Wolterstorff, Christopher Eberle and Philip Quinn have published cogent rebuttals of it. Here I can summarise the issues.

    The main problem with this criticism of using religious beliefs to guide public policy is that exactly the same thing can be said about secular, non-theological beliefs. Beliefs that Litterick and Brown hold to and would advocate public policy changes on the basis of. Phillip Quinn articulates this point,

    … if the fact that religious reasons can not be shared by all in a religiously pluralistic society suffices to warrant any exclusion of religious reasons for advocating or supporting restrictive laws or policies, then much else ought in fairness also be excluded on the same grounds.[1]

    Quinn notes correctly that secular moral theories such as Utilitarianism or Kantianism, Intuitionism, Socialism, Libertarianism, can all be reasonably rejected in a philosophically-pluralistic society.

    Indeed, it would seem that the appeal to any comprehensive ethical theory, including all known secular ethical theories, should be disallowed on the grounds that every such theory can be reasonably rejected by some citizens in a pluralistic democracy. And if justification of restrictive laws or policies can be conducted only in terms of moral considerations no citizen of a pluralistic democracy can reasonably reject, then in a pluralistic democracy such as ours very few restrictive laws or policies would be morally justified, a conclusion that would, I suspect, be welcome only to anarchists.[2]

    Quinn is substantially correct here. There is special pleading going on whereby theological beliefs are rejected on certain grounds while secular ones are not, even though the same grounds and reasons should lead to their rejection as well. If it’s unjust to restrict a person’s freedom on the basis of beliefs held by only some members of the community and which are rejected by others then all laws are unjust.

    It could be added that such arguments are frequently incoherent. After all, such beliefs propose a moral viewpoint that many reject, the view that theological beliefs are not to be appealed to in public. Given that many reject this view, some people think that they should be appealed to in public, it should not be appealed to in public debate about policy. Moreover, since this position is generally defended by appeals to normative principles about freedom or pluralism or conceptions of equality that many reject, many of the arguments for this conclusion should not be utilised in public debate either.

    Perhaps, however, I am being uncharitable here, perhaps what Litterick means to assert is not that the religious beliefs can be reasonably rejected by some people – that would, as I note above, lead to anarchism – rather, his point is that a majority of people reject them. This too, however, is problematic.

    Implicit in this argument is the claim that a necessary condition for any principle to be utilised in public debate is that the majority accepts it as true. However, this is subject to numerous counter-examples. Consider a culture where the majority believes that a husband has the right to beat his wife. Would an advocate of majoritarianism contend that in such a society criticism by a feminist minority of this practice and the advocacy of norms forbidding spousal abuse is an unacceptable imposition of a narrow, feminist perspective in a pluralistic society? Would it be true that in such a society public policy could not be based on the moral principle that it is wrong for a man to beat his wife?

    Consider an Islamic society where the majority believe that conversion to a rival, trinitarian monotheistic religion is immoral and should be a capital offence. Not to execute converts to Judaism or Christianity in such a society would, by this reasoning, be unjust. In societies where a racial majority thinks a racial minority is sub-human, it would be unjust to grant equal human rights.

    There is a further objection to this argument. Many normative positions that are currently supported by the majority or a wide section of the populace were once minority views. Over time, however, the minority has persuaded others and or converted them to its cause. If “narrow” views are to be excluded, this type of reform is not possible. A minority would never be able to propose its ideas until it was no longer a minority view. However, it cannot cease to be a minority view unless it is proposed in the first place. Consequently, this stance freezes societies in whatever popular prejudices currently exist. The reforming minority that critiques contemporary culture would be effectively silenced if we were to hold that only the views of the majority are the just ones.

    So in sum: It seems to be that Russell Brown is inconsistent in his treatment of the issue and Litterick uses common but erroneous and, I think, discredited arguments to justify his secularist stance.

    [1] Phillip Quinn, “Political Liberalism and their Exclusion of the Religious,” in Religion and Contemporary Liberalism, ed. Paul Weithman (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 144.
    [2] Ibid.

  • Democracy and Legitimacy

    The founding statement of liberal political theory, John Locke’s Two Treaties of Civil Government, opens with the following statement:

    Reader, thou hast here the beginning and end of a discourse concerning government; what fate has otherwise disposed of the papers that should have filled up the middle, and were more than all the rest, it is not worth while to tell thee. These, which remain, I hope are sufficient to establish the throne of our great restorer, our present King William; to make good his title, in the consent of the people, which being the only one of all lawful governments, he has more fully and clearly, than any prince in Christendom; and to justify to the world the people of England, whose love of their just and natural rights, with their resolution to preserve them, saved the nation when it was on the very brink of slavery and ruin.

    Locke states his purpose in writing is to defend a military coup. Locke goes on to argue that a government derives its powers from the consent of the government for the purpose of protecting the rights of its citizens. Specifically a citizen’s right to life, liberty and property. He argues that if a government turns against these rights the people can justly overthrow it.

    The US declaration of independence reiterates this claim.

    We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from
    the consent of the governed. That whenever any form of government becomes destructive to these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.

    Two of the founding documents for liberal democracy maintain that a government can be legitimately overthrown if it uses its powers to infringe, as opposed to protect, the rights of its citizens. In some instances, the military have a duty to do this; often the military have sworn duty to defend the rights of its citizens with force. If the government begins to threaten these rights then this duty means the military have a duty to resist the government with force. This is not some crackpot, novel idea, it is part of our liberal heritage, it is also incidentally part of our Christian heritage. Aquinas argued in a similar vein, as did numerous Puritan writers such as Mornay, Rutherford, Milton, Buchanan.

    I say this because at 7:30 PM tonight on Campbell live a military coup was announced in Fiji. The immediate reaction from every commentator I saw was one of disgust because a democratically elected government had been overthrown. Now I am not saying I agree with the coup, I am quite willing to concede that the Military are acting unjustly. However, the mere fact that the government of Fiji was democratically elected does not mean its wrong to over throw them with a coup. If the government uses its power to punish the guilty with proportionate and humane punishments and they defend the rights of the innocent against aggression then I agree it is unjust to over throw them. But if the government of Fiji has used its power to deprive innocent people of there rights and to acquit those guilty of crimes then in certain circumstances the military are within their rights in staging a coup. The fact that the government was lawfully elected is irrelevant.

    When commentators in the media claim that a coup is wrong because the government is elected. They are in essence promoting the tyranny of the majority. They are suggesting that we have a duty of unqualified obedience to any leader which 51% of our peers support on election day, regardless of what this government does or orders us to do. They are deifying the majority and placing a democratic government in the place of God.

    A state’s legitimacy depends on what it does, not on how many people support it or how popular it is the year of an election. If upholds the law of God and the rights this law confers upon us it is worthy of support. If it turns against these, it is not. God and God alone is the only person worthy of unqualified obedience.