Category: History

  • Contra Mundum: Slavery and the Old Testament

    “Why didn’t the Christian God ever explicitly and clearly condemn slavery?” This was John Loftus’ question in his book, Why I Became an Atheist: A Former Preacher Rejects Christianity. He posed it after sharing the following chilling account of slavery as practiced in the antebellum American south,

    He took her into the kitchen, and stripped her from neck to waist. He made her get upon the stool, and he tied her hands to a hook in the joist. After rolling up his sleeves, he commenced to lay on the heavy cow skin, and soon the warm, red blood came dripping to the floor … No words, no tears, no prayers, from his gory victim, seemed to move his iron heart from its bloody purpose. The louder she screamed, the harder he whipped; and where the blood ran fastest, there he whipped longest. He would whip her to make her scream, and whip her to make her hush; and not until overcome by fatigue, would he cease to swing the blood clotted cowskin.

    Loftus is not alone, it is often affirmed as an incontestable and obvious truth that the Bible supports slavery. Atheist philosopher Walter Armstrong substantiated this accusation with a citation from the book of Leviticus, “as for your male and female slaves whom you may have: you may buy male and female slaves from among the nations around you” (Lev 25:44 ESV).

    The ESV here uses the English word ‘slave’ to translate the Hebrew word ebed. The problem is that it is not at all clear that these two terms are analogous. In 1690 philosopher John Locke argued that an examination of the Old Testament’s references to an ebed shows that it is not the equivalent what we think of when we hear the term ‘slave.’ Locke is only one of many scholars who have come to the same conclusion.

    The Oxford Dictionary defines a slave as a “person who is the legal property of another or others and is bound to absolute obedience, human chattel.” Rodney Stark utilises a similar definition, “A slave is a human being who, in the eyes of the law and custom, is the possession, or chattel, of another human being or of a small group of human beings. Ownership of slaves entails absolute control, including the right to punish (often including the right to kill), to direct behavior, and to transfer ownership.” Timothy Keller astutely observes that the English term ‘slave’ carries connotations of new-world slavery as it was practiced in the British Empire and made infamous in the antebellum southern states of the US.

    In the British Empire and in many US states, slavery was governed under the Code of Barbados. This code was explicitly racist and described Africans as “heathenish, brutish, and an uncertaine, dangerous kinde of people.” It allowed owners to use, “unlimited force to compel labor without penalty even if this resulted in maiming or death.” It denied slaves due process rights and permitted owners to, in effect, kill their slave for any cause. It forbade slaves from marrying. It effectively prevented owners from setting their slaves free. Keller writes that, “The African slave trade was begun and resourced through kidnapping.” Stark notes that “20 to 40 percent of slaves died while being transported to the coast, another 3-10 percent died while waiting on the coast, and about 12 to 16 percent boarded on ships died during the voyage.”

    However, what the Old Testament refers to differs from slavery, so understood, in several important respects.

    First, an ebed was not acquired by kidnapping. Kidnapping a human being and selling that person as a slave was a capital offence in the Old Testament (Ex 21:16). Moreover, slave trading is implicitly condemned in the book of Revelation (Rev 18:13) and explicitly condemned by Paul as contrary to the law and sound doctrine (1 Tim 1:9-10).

    In the Old Testament an ebed was usually person who offered to work for another, free of charge, in exchange for a debt being cancelled. It resembled a form of indentured servitude.

    Second, the institution was not based on notions that ebed were of an inferior race. In fact, the opposite is affirmed. In the book of Job we read,

    If I have rejected the cause of my male or female slaves [Hebrew: ebed amah] when they brought a complaint against me; what then shall I do when God rises up? When he makes inquiry, what shall I answer him? Did not he who made me in the womb make them? And did not one fashion us in the womb? (Job 31:13-15)

    Here Job refers to an ebed as having a right to go to court and sue his or her “owner” in pursuit of his or her rights. Job bases this on the idea that both he and his ebed are equal, both are created by God.

    Third, as Locke noted, an ebed was not the property of another and could not be disposed of. To deliberately kill an ebed was a capital offence (Ex 21:20-21). Similarly, it was illegal to strike an ebed (Ex 21:26-27).

    However, some dispute this latter point on the basis of Exodus 21:20-21,

    If a man beats his male or female slave with a rod and the slave dies as a direct result, he must be punished, but he is not to be punished if the slave gets up after a day or two, since the slave is his property.

    Some interpret this passage to mean that because a “slave” is the property of another they can severely beat the slave and providing the beating is not fatal, there is no legal punishment. However, this fails to deal adequately with the context and the Hebrew text, the word translated as ‘property’ here is actually ‘silver’ (a reference to money) and the word translated ‘punishment’ here is not the usual word for punishment.

    Old Testament scholar Christopher Wright notes that the word implies “the shedding of the blood of the master of the slave” and so refers to capital punishment. It is used in direct contrast with the same word in the previous verse where it is stated that deliberately killing an ebed is to be avenged. Therefore, it does not say the person will not be punished for beating a slave, it says he will not be executed for it unless he kills the slave. For further evidence that the passage is not a license to beat, a couple of verses later even causing a minor injury on an ebed, such as a bruise, is explicitly condemned. The same contrast occurs in the passage immediately preceding where a free man who struck and killed another was to be “held responsible” but not if the person survived. It is clear, however, that the person was in fact to be legally punished as v 19 states he had to compensate his victim for the injury. Hence, in context the ‘held responsible’ is referring only to being held responsible for murder and is not speaking to the lesser charges of assault. What Ex 21:20-21 says then, is that if a person deliberately kills his or her ebed then that person is to be held responsible for murder and executed. If the slave “gets up after a day or two,” then the person is not to be held responsible for murder because the ebed is his or her “silver.”

    This makes sense as a few verses later, in Ex 21:26-27, striking a slave is explicitly prohibited and the legal punishment is for the ebed to go free. In The Old Testament, the penalty for assault was for the assailant to provide monetary compensation to the victim. This would create a quandary in this case as an ebed is in a position of servitude because he or she is in debt to the person he or she works for. In such a case the assailant would owe money to a person who owes him or her money. The Old Testament resolves the issue by declaring that even a trivial strike, such as causing a bruise (v21:25) should result in an immediate cancelation of the ebed’s entire debt, which would often result in a financial loss to the assailant. The New Testament similarly concurs, prohibiting “masters’ from even threatening their “slaves” (Eph 6:9) and to treat their “slaves” the way the “slave” is required to treat them.

    Further, unlike new-world slavery which was life long and where, under the Barbados Code, emancipation was effectively prohibited, an ebed could not be held in service for more than six years (Ex 21:2). Upon release, their employer was morally required to give them sufficient resources for them to be set up on their own feet (Deut 15:12-18) and the community left resources for them to live on for a year (Ex 23:10-11, Lev 25:2-7).

    These passages are often thought to refer only to Hebrew and hence Jewish slaves. Wright, however, argues that that in its original context the key word ibri designated a social class, not an ethnic group. This was the class of people who did not own land and in an agrarian economy survived by hiring themselves out to land owners.

    In fact, in the passage immediately before the verse Armstrong cites the Old Testament forbids any Israelite taking another Israelite as a ebed on the grounds that they are a “ebed of God” whom God has redeemed. Paul applies the same teaching to Christians prohibiting Christians from being sold as ‘slaves’ (1 Cor 7:23). Similarly, the Old Testament commanded people to prevent family members from becoming an ebed by paying their debts for them (Lev 25:48). Further, Paul, after writing to the Corinthians and encouraging them to “retain the place in life that the Lord assigned,” encourages slaves to purchase their freedom and to not remain in this position if it was possible to do so (1 Cor 7:21-22).

    Finally, if an ebed fled from an oppressive employer it was illegal to return him or her to “his master.” Instead, he or she was to live “wherever he likes and in whatever town he chooses” (Deut 23:15-16). It was forbidden to send an ebed back to his or her owner; contrast this with the practice in the antebellum south, the Fugitive Slave Act 1850 required the return of run-away slaves at penalty of law.

    Contrary to what some contend, the Old Testament does not permit slavery. It is more accurate to say it tolerates indentured servitude under certain situations; the paradigm being where the servitude is voluntary, temporary, is done in exchange for payment of a debt where the alternative is starvation and destitution and only in situations where the servant is given the same basic legal rights as everyone else and is protected from abusive treatment. To suggest this picture fits with the opening quote above is a stretch to say the least.

    I write a monthly column for Investigate Magazine entitled Contra Mundum. This blog post was published in the April 10 issue and is reproduced here with permission. Contra Mundum is Latin for ‘against the world;’ the phrase is usually attributed to Athanasius who was exiled for defending Christian orthodoxy.

    Letters to the editor should be sent to: editorial@investigatemagazine.DELETE.com

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  • Can State Expropriation of Minerals be Justified? Part II

    In Can State Expropriation of Minerals be Justified? Part I, I set out a common law property rights argument drawing from the writings of jurists Blackstone and Locke as well as contemporary philosopher Ed Feser. I looked at what circumstances, if any, might justify the state taking of real property, looking specifically at minerals from the sub-soil of privately held property. In this post I identify and critique some of the purported justifications for the historic and current expropriation of property in New Zealand, using the examples of petroleum, gold and silver.

    II.        Purported Justifications
    One of the earliest attempts to justify an inroad into property rights in sub-soil was made in The Case of Mines. Three arguments offered by counsel for the queen are recorded which I have labelled excellence, necessity and currency:

    Excellence: “because gold and silver were the most excellent products of the soil, they should, ipso facto, go to the Queen, who was the most excellent person in the realm.”[29]

    Necessity: “That the King as head of the realm needed the money to keep up the army and enforce the laws.”[30]

    Currency: “That gold was necessary or coin or commerce, and the Crown ought to have it to mint,”[31]

    Whilst “none of the reasoning of the judges is given, just the bare decision”,[32] I will assume that the reasons offered by counsel were the reasons accepted by the court and address the merits of each in turn.

    The excellence argument is clearly problematic as it is not a given that the monarch will always be the most excellent person in the realm (especially when one pauses to consider the character and conduct of some of England’s monarchs). Further, even assuming that a monarch is the most excellent person in the realm, it would not follow that this attribute confers an automatic right to the most excellent form of every conceivable thing regardless of whether those things were owned by other people. Further, the assumption that gold is the most excellent of metals suggests that ‘excellent’ is being used in an economic sense to denote gold as the most economically valuable of metals. However, if this assumption is correct then the most excellent person must be the richest, which would entail that anyone wealthier than the queen was entitled to take her gold (an argument that I am fairly confident counsel for the queen did not intend).

    The other two arguments are more plausible. They both speak to the state’s need to be able to finance the discharge of its basic functions (i.e. defence, justice, minting the currency, etc) and, as such, are arguably extensions of the necessity justification. Given the then threat of Spanish invasion, the need to raise an army in times of war and the practical uses of gold and silver in the 16th century, these arguments may have had some merit. However, in contemporary New Zealand where the core functions of government are funded by taxation, where we keep a standing army and our currency is not minted from, or based on, gold and silver, the elements of necessity that ground the reasoning within The Case of Mines are not currently present.

    As current precedent The Case of Mines can justifiably affirm the principle that in situations of necessity, such as defence or natural disaster, where the state needs a particular mineral and cannot realistically obtain it from within its own lands or by trade then it might be justified in expropriating it from private citizens for the duration of the necessity. Something like this justification was arguably present in the passage of the Petroleum Act 1937. Oil had become a mineral of strategic importance to defence as the British Royal Navy fleet had converted to oil in 1914. This proved to be critical in their sea victories during WWI. In 1919 existing regulations governing the extraction of oil were extended to private land. Driven largely by the British Navy’s need for oil, a post-war search for oil in the British Colonies began.

    In 1927 a Petroleum Bill was drafted but abandoned. At the time, the petroleum industry was growing by itself; Shell and BP were both active in New Zealand, private agreements to extract petroleum were being struck and the national urgency in the wake of WWI was waning. However, as the 1930’s progressed, issues of national defence increasingly came back into focus;[33]

    The growing strategic threat from Japan and Germany caused the New Zealand government to focus on the need to increase investment by international oil companies in the discovery and extraction of New Zealand’s oil reserves – and on the ability of those companies to deal with a single owner (the government) as being ‘in the national interest’.

    The Petroleum Act 1937 nationalised all petroleum. The justifications cited were petroleum’s strategic importance in defence, the economy, transport and the preference of the oil companies to deal with a single party.[34] Whilst the appeal to national interests found broad support within society, the passage of the act was highly controversial.[35] It was disputed that the expropriation of private property was necessary to achieve the objectives and the lack of compensation was widely objected to, particularly so by Maori.

    The Waitangi Tribunal reports that “Maori shared in the wider endorsement, and their challenge was not to the intent to nationalise the resource but to the failure to pay landowners compensation for their loss of property rights under the common law and the Treaty.”[36] The 1937 Act did not grant royalties to the landowners despite the provision to do this initially being left open;[37]

    The approach of the government in 1937 and 1938 was based on the position that, where the ‘national interest’ justified action and where the owners of the confiscated rights could be presumed to share in the national benefits of the policy, no compensation for the loss of private property rights need be paid.

    The government of the day appeared to hold that property rights could be justifiably overridden without compensation on the grounds of “national interests.” Traditionally these were a mixture of strategic national security issues and economic benefits to the country as whole.

    A.        National Security Justifications
    Now earlier I suggested that the necessity justification may apply to such appeals; however, the strategic necessity arising from factors such as the threat posed by Germany, Japan, Spain or the British Navy’s need for oil is no longer present (the British navy is these days increasingly nuclear propelled and the New Zealand Navy barely has a fleet). Yet despite the change in the strategic situation, legislation asserting ownership of petroleum, gold, silver, and uranium to the state remain — in fact, post-WWII legislation has affirmed their position as state property “whether or not the land has been alienated” and has reserved additional minerals to the collection.[38] (In the case of the continued state reservation of uranium this seems rather odd given that it appears incapable of attaining the standard for military necessity given New Zealand’s nuclear free policies.)

    B.        Economic Justifications
    Peter Ackroyd suggests that taking property to acquire economic benefit was a driving justification for many of New Zealand’s past legislative acts. He cites from Hansard, “The Colony, however, could not afford to dispense with the mining industry, and every effort should be made by the Legislature to assist in maintaining its position.” [39]

    It is indisputable that a prosperous mining industry can contribute greatly to the progress of a society; however, whether the gain of this benefit, in and of itself, can justify the taking of another’s property seems rather dubious. Almost any taking of one person’s property by another will economically advantage the taker yet this does not typically justify taking (even if the taker invested the property in a way that ended up benefiting the takee). Every person has a right to retain their justly acquired property and to have the taking of it protected by law. Paternalistic justifications such as “it is economically good for you” are not normally grounds for overriding the rights of adults.

    In the event that someone does take from another, it is normal practice under the principles of restorative justice that the taker be required to compensate the takee. Likewise, when a state takes property in the name of national or economic interest it was recognised at common law that compensation must be paid. Further it is common to find this requirement in other jurisdictions. A recent survey of the constitutional legislation within 30 OECD countries showed that 28 expressly acknowledge property rights and 24 required expropriations of property rights to be adequately justified and to not occur without compensation.[40]

    In New Zealand the CMA provides compensation for the disturbance of the land caused by mining activities but not for the loss of the minerals. The situation is analogous to a judge ordering a burglar to fix the window broken during the burglary but permitting the burglar to keep the widescreen plasma TV he took from the house.

    As cited earlier, a justification commonly offered for the state’s failure to pay compensation is that “the owners of the confiscated rights could be presumed to share in the national benefits of the policy.” Lewis Evans, Neil Quigley and Kevin Counsell identify a problem with this line of reasoning;[41]

    This position will … only be justified if it can be shown that those affected by the confiscation of the private rights will receive benefits roughly equivalent in value to the share of the benefits that they would have otherwise received. In this case [the Petroleum Act], of course, no such analysis was done.

    Even if the state did undertake this analysis of costs and benefits, the justification fails to note that compensation does not actually introduce any additional cost. The following example will bear this out. A person owns a piece of property, P. P is worth a certain value, V. If the state expropriates P and fails to compensate the owner then the owner loses V. However, if the state does compensate the owner then the state loses the value of V. Either way, someone is going to pay the cost of V. The question is who should bear this cost – the private owner or the government? Both the loss and the cost remain the same regardless of who bears it.[42]

    Lewis, Evans & Quigley note that the absence of compensation increases the chance that the state will over-estimate the benefits of various takings and not accurately measure the costs.[43]

    Uncompensated confiscation is not justified by actions that are deemed by politicians to be ‘in the public interest’. It is too easy for interest groups who benefit from government actions but bear none of those costs to create the appearance of a public benefit when none in fact exists. If there is a public interest, its value must be quantified against the loss to the private property rights that would be destroyed by the action. In the absence of this accounting, government will overuse its power of eminent domain and will engage in actions that impose net costs on society as a whole.

    As shown above, compensating owners does not increase the cost to society but a policy permitting expropriation without compensation may.

    III.       Conclusion
    I have argued that there is a common law presumption in favour of property rights, which is based on a moral principle antecedent to state recognition. According to this principle, a state must justify any expropriation of property. While I granted that expropriation may be able to be justified on certain grounds, contemporary New Zealand does not currently meet such grounds. Expropriation on economic grounds is far more dubious and even if this ground could be justified, the absence of statutory provisions for compensation renders such takings unjust.


    [29] James Parcell “A Thesis on the Prerogative Right of the Crown to Royal Metals” (Government Printer, Wellington, 1960) 13.
    [30] Ibid 14.
    [31]
    Ibid.
    [32] Ibid 11. Parcell suggests that the report was a forgery or had been embellished.
    [33]
    Lewis Evans, Neil Quigley & Kevin Counsell “Protection of Private Property Rights and Just Compensation: An Economic Analysis of the Most Fundamental Human Right Not Provided in New Zealand” (2009) New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation (at 21 January 2010) 23.
    [34] Ibid 23-24.
    [35] Hansard and the national archives record fierce debate; breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi were alleged and the Petroleum Haka became part of New Zealand history.
    [36] Waitangi Tribunal The Petroleum Report – Wai 796 (2003) 29.
    [37]
    Lewis, Evans & Quigley, above n 33, 24.
    [38] Key examples: Atomic Energy Act 1945; Coal Act 1948, 1949; Iron and Steel Industry Act 1959; Mining Act 1971, which were all brought under the CMA.
    [39] Peter Ackroyd “Mining Legislation and the Reservation of Mineral Resources in New Zealand” [1988] NZLJ 41, 42.
    [40]
    Lewis, Evans & Quigley, above n 33, 43-48.
    [41] Lewis, Evans & Quigley, above n 33, 24.
    [42]
    I am grateful to Matthew Flannagan for the development of this argument.
    [43] Lewis, Evans & Quigley, above n 33, 41.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Can State Expropriation of Minerals be Justified? Part I
    Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part I
    Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part II

  • Can State Expropriation of Minerals be Justified? Part I

    New Zealand, like many nations, has a long history of the state taking real property, often without compensation. In this two part series I examine one sub-set of takings, minerals from the sub-soil of privately held property (although the argument herein could apply with equal force to any state taking). Drawing from common law, the writings of jurists such as Blackstone and Locke and contemporary philosopher Ed Feser, I look at what circumstances, if any, might justify taking. I then apply this to the current practice in New Zealand and ask is the practice justified, does it meet the standard?

    Drawing from Talmudic Law, the jurist Accursius of Bologna wrote the phrase cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos (to whom belongs the soil it is his, even to heaven and to the middle of the earth) as a gloss on Justinian’s Digest.[1] By the 16th century this maxim had become accepted common law doctrine for determining the extent of the rights enjoyed by a tenant in fee simple (“landowner”).[2] The English Laws Act retrospectively declared that “so far as applicable to the circumstances of the Colony of New Zealand,” all statute and common laws of England became “part of the laws of New Zealand.” [3] This was confirmed by the Imperial Laws Application Act 1988. Since 1840 to the present day there have been few instances where the court has held that a statute or common law of England was not applicable to the circumstances of the colony of New Zealand.[4] Hence, in the absence of statutes overriding it, the maxim is part of New Zealand law.

    Historically the rights of the landowner included ownership of the minerals in the sub-soil. “The grant of the land includes the surface and … all that is infra, i.e. mines, earth, clay etc.”[5] The sub-soil minerals were assumed to be conveyed along with the land, unless the conveyance instrument stipulated otherwise.[6]

    Land hath also, in its legal signification, an indefinite extent, upwards as well as downwards. … whatever is in a direct line, between the surface of any land and the centre of the earth, belongs to the owner of the surface; as is every day’s experience in the mining countries. So that the word “land” includes not only the face of the earth, but every thing under it, or over it. And therefore, if a man grants all his lands, he grants thereby all his mines of metal …

    Until the last century or so, the only minerals not subject to this doctrine were gold and silver.[7] In The Case of Mines, the court held “that by the law all mines of gold and silver within the realm, whether they be in the lands of the Queen, or of subjects, belong to the Queen by prerogative.”[8] When it came to ownership of other minerals the court held,[9]

    That if the ore or mine in the soil of a subject be of copper, tin, lead, or iron, in which there is no gold or silver, in this case the proprietor of the soil shall have the ore or mine, and not the Crown by prerogative, for in such barren base metal no prerogative is given to the Crown.

    Whilst gold and silver were the primary focus of the New Zealand government’s first legislative reservations of minerals,[10] successive legislation incrementally added all the “base” minerals (and more) mentioned in The Case of Mines into state ownership.[11]

    Initially the state only claimed the minerals contained in state land and reserved the mineral rights on alienation of its own land.[12] However, subsequent legislation saw all land subject to a retention clause on alienation that reserved, for the state, all minerals existing in their natural condition within that land.[13] Today there are still pockets of minerals that remain in private ownership, as some land has not been alienated since the passage of the relevant legislation. However, these minerals cannot be petroleum, gold, silver, and uranium as these minerals belong to the state regardless of whether or not the land has been alienated.[14] The state possesses an exclusive right to alienate (or grant a licence to alienate) the minerals it owns.[15] In many circumstances, land owners cannot refuse consent for prospecting, exploration and mining to occur on their land.[16]

    This state of affairs, with respect to the ownership of minerals, has eroded the rights of the landowner as mineral ownership has changed without the consent of the original owner. Further, this change in ownership occurred without the owner being compensated. Prima facie, this change of ownership cannot be said to be compatible with property rights.

    I.          Property Rights
    Property rights are often described as “a bundle of rights.” This bundle includes the full or limited right to access, use, assign, exclude others from and destroy property. William Blackstone identified property rights as “The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, … which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land.”[17]

    It is important to understand this quote in context. Blackstone grounded the legal right to property in a moral right that exists antecedent to the state.[18]

    There is indeed some difference among the writers on natural law concerning the reason why occupancy should convey this right, and invest one with this absolute property: Grotius and Puffendorf insisting that this right of occupancy is founded on a tacit and implied assent of all mankind that the first occupant should become the owner; and Barbeyrac, Titius, Mr. Locke, and others, holding that there is no such implied assent, neither is it necessary that there should be; for that the very act of occupancy alone, being a degree of bodily labour, is, from a principle of natural justice, without any consent or compact, sufficient of itself to gain a title;—a dispute that savours too much of nice and scholastic refinement. However, both sides agree in this, that occupancy is the thing by which the title was in fact originally gained; every man seizing to his own continued use such spots of ground as he found most agreeable to his own convenience, provided he found them unoccupied by any one else.

    Blackstone appeals to John Locke’s polemic against absolute monarchy, which sets out the locus classicus for the justification of property rights.[19] Locke argued that human beings have a series of rights antecedent to the existence of civil government. The state serves people by protecting and recognising these rights. One such right is the right to property. Locke argued that people own their own bodies and as such their own labour. When one mixes one’s labour with previously unowned land one acquires a right to this land, subject to the proviso that one leaves “enough and as good … for others”[20]

    Edward Feser has suggested that Locke’s proviso is mistaken and that an initial acquisition of the sort Locke refers cannot be unjust;[21]

    This, it seems to me, is a clear implication of the assumption … that external resources are initially unowned. Consider the following example. Suppose an individual A seeks to acquire some previously unowned resource R. For it to be the case that A commits an injustice in acquiring R, it would also have to be the case that there is some individual B (or perhaps a group of individuals) against whom A commits the injustice. But for B to have been wronged by A’s acquisition of R, B would have to have had a rightful claim over R, a right to R. By hypothesis, however, B did not have a right to R, because no one had a right to it—it was unowned, after all. So B was not wronged and could not have been. In fact, the very first person who could conceivably be wronged by anyone’s use of R would be, not B, but A himself, since A is the first one to own R. Such a wrong would in the nature of the case be an injustice in transfer—in unjustly taking from A what is rightfully his—not in initial acquisition. The same thing, by extension, will be true of all unowned resources: it is only after someone has initially acquired them that anyone could unjustly come to possess them, via unjust transfer. It is impossible, then, for there to be any injustices in initial acquisition.

    If one mixes one’s labour with, and gains ownership of, previously unowned land then one acquires a property right to it, which in turn gives one the right to assign it to others. Given this, Locke’s proviso is unnecessary. Assignees of such land acquire the property rights along with the land. Unless another can establish that the initial acquisition was unjust or that there has been an unjust transfer at some point in the chain of ownership, the landowner’s property rights must be respected.

    The moral property rights of the landowner are not absolute in the sense of never being able to be overridden.[22] Although Blackstone suggests property rights are limited “only by the laws of the land”, he qualifies this in the very next paragraph,

    So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not authorise the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole community. If a new road, for instance, were to be made through the grounds of a private person, it might perhaps be extensively beneficial to the public; but the law permits no man, or set of men, to do this without consent of the owner of the land. In vain may it be urged, that the good of the individual ought to yield to that of the community; for it would be dangerous to allow any private man, or even any public tribunal, to be the judge of this common good, and to decide whether it be expedient or no. Besides, the public good is in nothing more essentially interested, than in the protection of every individual’s private rights, as modelled by the municipal law. In this and similar cases the legislature alone can, and indeed frequently does, interpose, and compel the individual to acquiesce. But how does it interpose and compel? Not by absolutely stripping the subject of his property in an arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained. The public is now considered as an individual, treating with an individual for an exchange. All that the legislature does is to oblige the owner to alienate his possessions for a reasonable price; and even this is an exertion of power, which the legislature indulges with caution, and which nothing but the legislature can perform.[23]

    Blackstone suggests property rights can be overridden for the public good provided that, public good is understood as “the protection of every individual’s private rights”, “the legislature alone” authorises it by law and the owner is compensated. Elsewhere he suggests that necessity might be a further option; a person in need “may demand a supply sufficient for all the necessities of life from the more opulent part of the community, by means of the several statutes enacted for the relief of the poor.”[24]

    Ed Feser elaborates on the idea of necessity or “absolute distress”,[25]

    The most obvious implication is that individuals in circumstances of what Cronin calls “absolute distress” have a right to the use of the resources of others, where the paradigm examples would be the starving man in the woods who takes food from a cabin, or a window washer who grabs a flagpole to break his fall from a building, or someone fleeing robbers who can only escape by running through someone else’s back yard. Someone in circumstances like these is not guilty of theft or the like, because for actions like the ones in question to count as theft, etc., the cabin owner or flagpole owner or homeowner would have to have such an absolute right to his property that he could justly refuse to allow others to use it even in the circumstances in question; and, according to natural law theory, no one could possibly have so absolute a property right. For the same reason, if some resource (say, the only remaining source of water in an area stricken by drought) became “absolutely necessary … to save the community or part of it from extinction,” then any individual who had heretofore privately owned that resource would have an obligation in justice to relinquish it.”

    Necessity can be a justifiable but limited inroad into property rights.  Feser argues that the necessity exception can extend to political situations,[26]

    It [necessity] is also what would justify the taxation required for the necessary functions of government (national defense, courts of law, etc.), since … the very existence of the community … depends on the state’s performance of these functions.

    Feser also suggests that necessity might,[27]

    justify taxation for the purposes of funding some measure of public assistance for those in absolute distress who are incapable of either finding work or getting help from family members and friends. For these circumstances would seem to be relevantly similar to those in which the starving man in the woods finds himself.

    Whilst the right may not be absolute, a prima facie property right exists. The burden falls on the expropriator to justify takings.[28]

    That we do in fact, in everyday life, put the burden of proof on the denier of claims to property is evidenced by the presumption that exists in law that the possessor of a holding is the rightful owner of it. This reflects our intuitive sense of justice in holdings. It is only (egalitarian) philosophers who—bizarrely—put the burden on the possessor to prove that we shouldn’t expropriate his holdings. Such philosophers are reminiscent of the epistemological skeptic who challenges you to prove you’re not dreaming, or are not a brain in a vat, or whatever—as if it were such strange logical possibilities, rather than the commonsense belief in the external world, that had the presumption in their favor!

    In Can State Expropriation of Minerals be Justified? Part II, I will set out some of the purported justifications for expropriation of property, using the examples of petroleum, gold and silver. I  will then analyse and critique these.


    [1] Yehuda Abramovitch gives a fascinating history of the origins of the maxim in “The Maxim ‘Cujus Est Solum Ejus Usque Ad Caelum’ as Applied in Aviation” (1962) 8 McGill LJ 247.
    [2] Bury v Pope (1586) 1 Cro Eliz 118; 78 ER 375.
    [3] 858 s1.
    [4] David Williams “Gold, The Case of Mines (1568) and the Waitangi Tribunal” (2003) 7 Australian Journal of Legal History 157, 165.
    [5] Mitchell v Mosley Cozens [1914] 1 Ch 438 at 450 (CA) Per Hardy MR.
    [6] William Blackstone “Chapter 2: Of Real Property; And, First, of Corporeal Hereditaments” in George Sharswood (ed) Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books (J.B. Lippincott Co, Philadelphia, 1893) Vol 1, Bk 2, Ch 2, s 19.
    [7]
    R v Earl of Northumberland (1568) 1 Plowden 310 [75 ER 472] (Case of Mines). Upheld in Woolley v A-G (1877) 2 AC 163 (PC); A-G v Morgan [1891] 1 Ch 432.
    [8]
    Case of Mines 510.
    [9] Ibid 511.
    [10] Gold Fields Act 1858.
    [11] In 1991 all incremental legislation relating to the extraction of minerals was brought under Crown Minerals Act subject only to Ngai Tahu (Pounamu Vesting) Act 1997.
    [12]
    Land Amendment Act 1913.
    [13] For example, Land Act 1948 and Crown Minerals Act 1991 (“CMA”).
    [14] CMA s10.
    [15]
    Permits to prospect, explore and mine minerals are granted under ss23-29 of the CMA.
    [16]
    Access to land is covered under ss49-80 of the CMA. A landowner might succeed at vetoing the exercise of a mining permit on his or her land (if it is not a mining permit for petroleum) but stands little success opposing the exercise of a permit to prospect or explore as the public interest grounds referred to in s66 of the CMA are very broad.
    [17] William Blackstone “Chapter 1: Of The Absolute Rights Of Individuals” in Sharswood, above n 6, Vol 1, Bk 1, Ch 1, s 139. This is similar to the opening flourish of property as “sole and despotic dominion” in Blackstone’s chapter “Of Property in General” below n 18.
    [18] William Blackstone “Chapter 1: Of Property, In General” in Sharswood, above n 6, Vol 1, Bk 2, Ch 1, s 9.
    [19] John Locke Two Treatises of Government (1690) Peter Laslett (ed) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1967), Second Treatise, Ch 5.
    [20] Ibid s 27.
    [21] Edward Feser
    “There is no such thing as an Unjust Initial Acquisition” (2005) 22 Social Philosophy and Policy 56, 58-59.
    [22] Although Blackstone describes property rights as absolute rights of people, it is clear from the context that  by ‘absolute’ he means a right a person has in the state of nature, that is, a right that exists antecedent to any state recognition. He does not mean absolute in the sense of never being able to be overridden.
    [23]
    Feser, above n 21.
    [24] Ibid.
    [25]
    Edward Feser
    “Classical Natural Law Theory, Property Rights, and Taxation” (2010) 27 Social Philosophy and Policy 21, 43.
    [26]
    Ibid 47.
    [27] Ibid.
    [28] Feser, above n 21, 11.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Can State Expropriation of Minerals be Justified? Part II
    Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part I
    Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part II

  • Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part II

    This two part series looks at the state of property rights under the current legislative scheme in New Zealand. Particularly I address attempts to suggest that the passage of Acts such as the Crown Minerals Act and the Resource Management Act have not significantly altered the  common law concept of property rights and the claim that William Blackstone himself conceded that property rights were subject to the legislature. I argue against these theses. Here in Part II, I critique the notion that property rights remain untouched by these controls by highlighting the shift from posterior to prior restraint, I conclude by placing the argument back through the lens of Blackstone’s qualifications on the absolute right to property that I argued for in Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part I.

    The Extent of Property Rights
    The extent of a landowner’s rights is summed up by the maxim coined by the jurist Accursius of Bologna, cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos (to whom belongs the soil it is his, even to heaven and to the middle of the earth). By the 16th century this maxim became accepted common law doctrine through the judgment in Bury v Pope.[1] The English Laws Act retrospectively declared that “so far as applicable to the circumstances of the Colony of New Zealand” all statute and common laws of England became “part of the laws of New Zealand.”[2] Since 1840 to the present day there have been few instances where the court has held that a statute or common law of England was not applicable to the circumstances of the colony of New Zealand.[3] Hence, in the absence of statutes overriding it, the maxim is part of New Zealand law. In the absence of legislation to the contrary and existing rights of others, a landowner owns his or her property in subsoil and airspace.

    Relationship to Legislative Controls
    Legislation such as the Crown Minerals Act 1991 (CMA) and the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) represents a shift away from common law property rights.

    Since the enactment of the English Laws Act, which imported the “royal prerogative” with regards the “royal metals” (state ownership of gold and silver in its natural state regardless of whose lands it is found in)[4] into New Zealand law, the state has incrementally legislated the taking of minerals in privately owned land beginning with the Goldfields Act 1858 through to the CMA. Today almost all minerals existing in their natural condition within the land, whether privately or publically owned, are vested to the crown subject only to Ngai Tahu (Pounamu Vesting) Act 1997.[5] At common law, a landowner owned all the minerals in the subsoil of his land,[6] now the state does. No compensation for this change of ownership has been made on the part of the New Zealand state.

    The RMA fares no better. As Barker J affirmed in Falkner v Gisborne District Council;

    The [Resource Management Act 1991] prescribes comprehensive, interrelated system of rules, plans, policy statements and procedures, all guided by the touchstone of sustainable management of resources. The whole thrust of the regime is the regulation and control of the use of land, sea, and air. There is nothing ambiguous or equivocal about this. It is a necessary implication of such a regime that common law property rights pertaining to the use of land or sea are to be subject to it.

    Where pre-existing common law rights are inconsistent with the [RMA’s] scheme, those rights will no longer be applicable. Clearly a unilateral right to protect one’s property from the sea is inconsistent with the resource consent procedure envisaged by the Act; accordingly, any protection work proposed by the residents must be subject to that procedure.[7]

    Barker J effectively re-stated the principle that statute overrides common law by alluding to the RMA’s ability to restrict common law property rights to the point where those that conflict with the Act it “will no longer be applicable”.

    However, In Coleman v Kingston Hammond J argued that the substance of property rights remained intact under the RMA,

    The Resource Management Act floats, rather like oil on water, across the top of ownership rights without affecting the underlying substance. The Resource Management Act 1991 and the Property Law Act 1952 have different objectives and do not conflict.[8]

    Peter Twist in Principles of Real Property Law elaborates, “The Property Law Act 1952 dealt with the allocation and extent of property rights, whereas the Resource Management Act imposed overriding limitations on the exercise of those rights.”[9]

    This is essentially the same argument offered by the author of the Wikipedia quote. The suggestion that the RMA is compatible with property rights because property rights are defined as, a right to use one’s land as one see’s fit provided one does not breach any laws of the land, turns the concept of a property right into a tautology. It is true of any and every action a person can perform that they are legally free to engage in said action unless there exists a law against it. It is also true that, by definition, whatever is not illegal one is legally allowed to do. So the statement is meaningless and those who attempt to attribute it to Blackstone have committed a criminal act of jurisprudence.

    To function as a right some degree of presumptive force is needed. A legislature must have good reasons to override a right and the burden should be placed on the person seeking to restrict the right.

    Posterior/Prior
    The traditional common law restrictions on property rights, such as rights of others, actionable torts, constitute posterior restraints whereas legislative regimes, such as the RMA, constitute prior restraints. The distinction between posterior and prior restraints can be demonstrated using the example of the right to freedom of expression. The standard restrictions at common law on freedom of the press are libels that one can seek after or posterior to, speech occurring. The press are not subject to prior restraint whereby it is necessary to apply for publication approval to a state agency before each edition goes to print. The press are free from prior restraint to publish whatever written media they wish and it is the burden of those who consider the speech pernicious to bring an action after the fact.

    Now, one might point to the equitable remedy of injunction as an example of prior restraint; however, even in this case the burden in an injunction falls on the applicant to establish that the defendant is imminently likely to engage in conduct that will adversely affect the applicant or another and in any event, injunctions are not analogous to a prior blanket legislative scheme. It would be implausible and unpersuasive to argue that because common law recognises certain limited posterior restraints that this means that legislating a prior restraint, such as a requirement to have the state vet all editions of all publications for libel before they can be published, would be compatible with freedom of speech. The same principles apply with property rights.

    At common law the standard restrictions on property rights are either consented to by the landowner, with regards the rights of others or they are posterior restraints in the form of various actionable torts. Land owners at common law are not subject to prior restraint. They do not need to ask permission from the state to use their property in a particular way, they are free to use it how they wish. Posterior to them doing so, others can seek tortious actions, such as actionable nuisance, if an applicant can demonstrate, according to the rules of evidence, on the balance of probabilities, that the landowner has violated a rule of tort. Only then is the landowner liable. The presumption at common law is clearly in favour of the landowner and the burden falls on those who wish to restrict the owner’s use of property. The default position is that a landowner can use his or her property at his or her discretion; it is those who disagree with his or her use who must get permission from the state to encroach this.

    The RMA shifts the burden, in a great many instances of use, onto the landowner. It is the landowner, now, who must obtain permission and satisfy the state’s agent and his or her neighbours that the proposed activity is not pernicious prior to beginning the activity. The exercise of the landowner’s rights to use his or her land as he or she sees fit is abridged by the RMA. As we know, a law that prevents one from exercising a right abridges that right.

    What About the Public Good?
    Blackstone argued that property rights could legitimately be subordinated to the “public good” but only when taken by the legislature alone, when the owner was compensated or where there was a strong case for necessity. The legislative scheme confronting NZ landowners in the modern day fails to meet this standard. W. Ivor Jennings articulates the shift,

    The common law assumes the complete liberty of the land owner to use his land as he wishes, subject only to the law of nuisance … But the fundamental assumption of modern statute law is that the landowner holds his land for the public good. It may be subject to all kinds of control; it may be taken away from him altogether in a host of cases where the public needs it for other purposes.[10]

    Both the CMA and RMA permit the taking of landowner’s property without compensation. Traditional property rights under the maxim cujus est solum… and the doctrine of capture, for example, considered minerals, water and air that were on, in or above one’s property to be owned by the landowner. Under the CMA almost all minerals are now reserved to or owned by the crown with no compensation being awarded to the landowner for the loss of ownership. The RMA redefined air and water as public property, which a private landowner cannot use or discharge contaminants into, without express consent. In these examples, ownership of property has changed without the consent of the original owner and without the owner being compensated. The justifications offered are inadequate, as I argue in my paper “Can State Expropriation of Minerals Be Justified?” and I cannot see how sustainability, the concept the RMA is premised on,[11] could meet the threshold of necessity in the sense that Blackstone and Feser set out. Given this, the New Zealand legislative scheme cannot be said to be compatible with property rights.

    The CMA and RMA constitute a significant abridgment of and inroad into the traditional property rights of landowners. The analogy of the RMA being like oil floating over water is a good analogy only if property rights are analogous to a cetaceous mammal struggling to rise to the surface to breathe through the oil slick. Just as oil floating over the water is an environmental disaster for any mammal trying to swim in it so too is the RMA a property rights disaster for landowners.


    [1] (1586) 1 Cro Eliz 118; 78 ER 375.
    [2] 1858 s1. Similar legislation exists in most countries with historical ties to England.
    [3] David Williams “Gold, The Case of Mines (1568) and the Waitangi Tribunal” (2003) 7 Australian Journal of Legal History 157, 165.
    [4] R v Earl of Northumberland (1568) 1 Plowden 310 [75 ER 472] (Case of Mines).
    [5] CMA s 10.
    [6] “The grant of the land includes the surface and … all that is infra, i.e. mines, earth, clay etc.” Mitchell v Mosley Cozens [1914] 1 Ch 438 at 450 (CA) Per Hardy MR.
    [7]
    [1995] 3 NZLR 622 at 632. Affirmed in several later cases.
    [8] (High Court, Auckland, AP 103-SW00, 3 April 2001) at para [28].
    [9] Peter Twist “The Extent of the Landholders Rights” in GW Hinde, NR Campbell, Peter Twist (eds) Principles of Real Property Law (Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2007) para 6.023.
    [10] W Ivor Jennings “Jennings” (1936) 49 Harv LR 426 at 436.
    [11]
    RMA s 5(2).

    RELATED POSTS:
    Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part I

    Can State Expropriation of Minerals be Justified? Part I

  • Freedom, Science and Christianity: A Response to James Valliant Part II

    Recently Peter Cresswell published a guest post by James Valliant, which originally appeared on SOLO. In Freedom, Science and Christianity: A Response to James Valliant Part I, I addressed Valliant’s claims that science and freedom of religion were unanimously opposed by Christians and the success of science and freedom of religion in Europe was solely due to the influence of pagan ideas which the church sought to suppress. Then in The Theological Foundations of the Enlightenment Philosophers, I further documented how Enlightenment defences of freedom of religion were grounded in earlier theological writings. Here I will continue my critique of Valliant’s article.

    3. Valliant contends that it is absurd to suggest that “the US declaration of independence is based on Judeo-Christian ideas.” His reasons, however, are once again based on ignorance of Christian intellectual history.

    First he ridicules the idea of Christian influence, “We are asked to believe that it took a mere 1,776 years of reading that darned Bible before any of those great and learned Christian scholars figured out its true political implications!” Valliant seems blissfully unaware that many ideas expressed in the declaration were expressed by Christian writers sometimes hundreds of years prior to 1776.

    The claim that there is a creator and that this is self-evident, are ideas that go back centuries in Christian theology. Moreover, the contention that people are created equal is found in the book of Job and would not have been contested by many medieval or patristic theologians.  Mark Murphy has noted that the idea of ‘consent of the governed’ was also accepted in political thought of the Middle Ages.[1] In fact, a form of ‘consent of the governed’ was actually a key feature of feudalism; under this system the monarch was elected or chosen by the land owners and could be deposed by the land owners.[2] Nicholas Wolterstorff has documented that the notion of natural rights had its origins in medieval canon law and theological reflections of the middle ages.[3] Many of the ideas expressed in the declaration were defended centuries earlier by Calvinist tracts such as Lex Rex and Vindicae Contra Tyrannos. In fact, medieval theologians criticised absolute monarchy, debated the question of just revolutions and so on resulting in the birth of the Magna Carta.

    The declaration simply repeats the argument for liberty, put forward by John Locke in his Two Treatise of Civil Government. Locke’s argument occurred in the context of an exegetical debate with Robert Filmer about whether or not the bible supported absolute monarchy. Locke’s main argument was that because human beings are created by God, they have an inalienable right to life and liberty and so could not licitly sell themselves or give another person arbitrary or total power over them. In making this argument, Locke actually appropriated an ancient rabbinical argument against slavery which was alluded to by the Apostle Paul (1 Cor 7:23) and is implicit in the Torah (Lev 25: 42). Paul’s appropriation of this argument was the basis for the Christian abolition of slavery in the early Middle Ages. Valliant’s ignorance about what Christians did not support or write about prior to 1776 does not mean that these texts do not exist.

    Valliant continues with the claim that Paul told Christians “to just ‘obey’ the governmental ‘authorities’ placed over us, because God has appointed them, by St. Paul himself, who likely wrote during the reign of the monster Nero.” This again is a caricature, as I have pointed out elsewhere, the context (which Valliant ignores) qualifies Paul’s command. Moreover, the passage Valliant cites was written during the early part of Nero’s reign when Nero was strongly influenced by Seneca the Younger and Barrus and his rule was widely considered to be competent and relatively enlightened. When Nero later degenerated into a monster the scripture, rather scathingly, describes Nero as a satanic beast whom Christians are required to resist – not obey!

    Valliant also seems blithely unaware of the fact that Paul wrote as a prisoner of Rome and was himself executed by Nero for refusing to pay homage to Nero (as were many other Christians). His picture then of Paul as a proponent of advocating unqualified obedience to Nero is simply inaccurate.

    4. Valliant similarly quotes Paul’s admonition to slaves to obey their masters in contrast to the US Framers who “thought slavery was evil, too, and it was this belief that provided the basis (e.g., see the Gettysburg Address) for later abolishing it” as evidence that abolitionist ideas originate from ancient Greek/Aristotelian thought and not Christian theology. Apart from the fact that Jefferson was himself a slave owner, Valliant’s understanding is extremely selective.

    First, opposition to slavery in various forms has a long history in Christian thought and practice. It predates the American Founding by hundreds, maybe, thousands of years. Early Christians advocated emancipating slaves, a practice exhorted by several leading theologians and early church councils.  W.E.H. Lecky contends that early Christian saints such as Melania, Ovidius, Chromatius, and Hermes, between them liberated almost 20,000 slaves.[4] Later, in 315, Constantine made it a capital offence to steal a child and bring it up as a slave. Justinian, in the 6th century, abolished earlier roman laws prohibiting the freeing of slaves. Similarly St Bathilde, a runaway slave who became the wife of King Clovis II in the 9th century, campaigned against the slave trade as did other notables, St Patrick in the 5th century, St Anskar in the 9th century and St Wulfstan, St Anselm in the 11th century. Rodney Stark notes that Christian opposition to slavery in the lead to its effective abolition within in Europe during the Middle Ages. Stark goes on to document that Pope Eugene IV (1431-1447), Pope Pius II (1458-1464), Pope Sixtus IV (1471-1484), Pope Paul III (1534-1549), Pope Urban VIII (1623-1644) issued papal bulls against slavery. In addition, the Roman Inquisition condemned slavery on 20 March 1686.

    All of the above occurred hundreds of years prior to the US Founding Fathers.[5] In fact, evangelical Christians, such as William Wilberforce, had brought about the abolition of slavery peacefully in the British several decades before the US fought a civil war over it. Moreover, Stark’s analysis shows that the earliest abolitionist tracts within the US were whttp://www.mandm.org.nz/wp-admin/post-new.phpritten by Puritans – actually by one of the judges at the Salem witch trials. The abolitionist movements in the US were overwhelmingly religious in orientation.[6] The suggestion then that opposition to slavery was without Christian precedent and was a novel idea proposed by the revival of pre-Christian ideas in the Enlightenment is implausible. The issue of slavery is a particularly bad example to substantiate Valliant’s thesis given that in the pre-Christian pagan world slavery was widely practiced and accepted. In fact Aristotle, Valliant’s pre-Christian Greek hero, famously defended slavery (in three chapters no less) contending the enslavement of other races was natural.[7]

    Valliant’s reading of scripture is also questionable. While it is true that Paul exhorted slaves to obey their masters, this by itself does not entail support for slavery anymore than my paying my taxes constitutes my agreement with taxation laws. Moreover, Valliant ignores the numerous other things both the scriptures and Paul stated about slavery, which contradict and condemn the practice of slavery that existed in America. In fact, the enlightenment philosopher who most influenced the US, John Locke, appealed to these very texts both explicitly and implicitly, to condemn slavery. Once again, Valliant ignores crucial facts of Christian intellectual history to come to his stereotypical conclusions.


    [1] Mark Murphy “Natural Law, Consent, and Political Obligation” Social Philosophy & Policy 18 (2001) 70-92.
    [2]
    Regine Pernoud,  Those Terrible Middle Ages : Debunking the Myths (San Francisco: Ignatius Press,  2000) 128-129.
    [3] Nicolas Wolterstorff  Justice Rights and Wrongs (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).
    [4] W.E.H. Lecky History of European Morals: From Augustus to Charlemagne (New York: D. Appleton, 1921) 2:69.
    [5]
    Rodney Stark For the Glory of God: How Monotheism led to Reformations, Science, Witch-hunts and the end of Slavery (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
    [6] Ibid.
    [7] Aristotle The Politics Bk I iii, iv, v.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Freedom, Science and Christianity: A Response to James Valliant Part I
    The Theological Foundations of the Enlightenment Philosophers
    The Theology of the Declaration of Independence
    The “Dark Ages” and Other Propaganda
    Guest Post: James Hannam on Dan Brown’s History of Science
    Slavery, John Locke and the Bible
    666 The Number of the Beast
    R 13: Romans, Revelations and the Role of the State

  • Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part I

    This two part series looks at the state of property rights under the current legislative scheme in New Zealand. Particularly I address attempts to suggest that the passage of Acts such as the Crown Minerals Act and the Resource Management Act have not significantly altered the  common law concept of property rights and the claim that William Blackstone himself conceded that property rights were subject to the legislature. I argue against these theses. In Part I, I will look at the concept of a property right drawing from Blackstone, John Locke and Ed Feser paying particular attention to the context Blackstone wrote in.

    What is a Property Right?
    Property rights are often described as “a bundle of rights.” This bundle includes the full or limited right to access, use, assign, exclude others from and destroy property. William Blackstone, judge, jurist and professor of law who authored one of the most influential texts, Commentaries on the Laws of England, on the classical views of the common law and its principles, grounded the legal right to property in a moral right that exists antecedent to the state. His infamous statement at the beginning of his chapter “Of Property, in General” certainly seems to bear this out,

    There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.[1]

    This theme of property rights being paramount is found in other parts of his writings. In “Of The Absolute Rights Of Individuals” Blackstone identified property rights as “The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, … which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land.”[2] [Emphasis added]

    The latter part of this quote has been used by some to suggest that what Blackstone really meant to say was that one can use one’s land as one see’s fit provided one does not breach any laws of the land. I certainly have heard this in class from my Professors and it is prevalent enough to be left standing on Wikipedia,

    …the phrase is often presented without taking into account the greater context of Blackstone’s thought on the subject of property. Blackstone likely offered the statement as a rhetorical flourish to begin his discussion, given that even in his age, individual property rights were not sole and absolute. Property owners must rely on the enforcement powers of the state, in any event, for the realization of their rights.[3]

    Now I agree that the greater context must always be taken into account when chopping a few sentences out of a greater text, so let us do precisely this. Blackstone suggests that property rights are limited “only by the laws of the land”; to ascertain what he meant by this we must read the very next paragraph,

    So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not authorise the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole community. If a new road, for instance, were to be made through the grounds of a private person, it might perhaps be extensively beneficial to the public; but the law permits no man, or set of men, to do this without consent of the owner of the land. In vain may it be urged, that the good of the individual ought to yield to that of the community; for it would be dangerous to allow any private man, or even any public tribunal, to be the judge of this common good, and to decide whether it be expedient or no. Besides, the public good is in nothing more essentially interested, than in the protection of every individual’s private rights, as modelled by the municipal law. In this and similar cases the legislature alone can, and indeed frequently does, interpose, and compel the individual to acquiesce. But how does it interpose and compel? Not by absolutely stripping the subject of his property in an arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained. The public is now considered as an individual, treating with an individual for an exchange. All that the legislature does is to oblige the owner to alienate his possessions for a reasonable price; and even this is an exertion of power, which the legislature indulges with caution, and which nothing but the legislature can perform.[4]

    So qualified, we can see that although Blackstone describes property rights as absolute rights of people, it is clear from the context that  by ‘absolute’ he means a right a person has in the state of nature, that is, a right that exists antecedent to any state recognition. He does not mean ‘absolute’ in the sense of never being able to be overridden but likewise he does not have in mind the notion that the passage of any law, no matter its impact on the landowner, is compatible with property rights; what he is getting at is more limited than that.

    Blackstone suggests that property rights can be encroached for the public good provided that, public good is understood as “the protection of every individual’s private rights”, “the legislature alone” authorises it by law and the owner is compensated. Elsewhere in the same text he suggests that necessity might be a further option. A person in need “may demand a supply sufficient for all the necessities of life from the more opulent part of the community, by means of the several statutes enacted for the relief of the poor.”[5]

    Ed Feser elaborates on the idea of necessity or “absolute distress”,

    the starving man in the woods who takes food from a cabin, or a window washer who grabs a flagpole to break his fall from a building, or someone fleeing robbers who can only escape by running through someone else’s back yard. … if some resource (say, the only remaining source of water in an area stricken by drought) became “absolutely necessary … to save the community or part of it from extinction,” then any individual who had heretofore privately owned that resource would have an obligation in justice to relinquish it.”[6]

    The author of the Wikipedia quote was not wrong when he or she said that “even in [Blackstone’s] age, individual property rights were not sole and absolute.” It is true that the landowner’s rights were traditionally, at common law, subject to the rights of others. For example, lessees, easement holders, mortgagees held rights in another’s land. Tortious liabilities such as actionable nuisance, the doctrines of support and waste, etc are examples of the ability of others to dictate what a landowner does with his or her land. These restrictions were tied up with fact that every person has the right to enjoy his or her property, hence, the exercise of enjoying one’s property (or exercising one’s property rights) was limited by the degree it prevented another from enjoying theirs.

    Blackstone did not consider property rights to simply be legal rights. As I have stated a few times thus far, he grounded the legal right to property in a moral right that exists antecedent to the state,

    There is indeed some difference among the writers on natural law concerning the reason why occupancy should convey this right, and invest one with this absolute property: Grotius and Puffendorf insisting that this right of occupancy is founded on a tacit and implied assent of all mankind that the first occupant should become the owner; and Barbeyrac, Titius, Mr. Locke, and others, holding that there is no such implied assent, neither is it necessary that there should be; for that the very act of occupancy alone, being a degree of bodily labour, is, from a principle of natural justice, without any consent or compact, sufficient of itself to gain a title;—a dispute that savours too much of nice and scholastic refinement. However, both sides agree in this, that occupancy is the thing by which the title was in fact originally gained; every man seizing to his own continued use such spots of ground as he found most agreeable to his own convenience, provided he found them unoccupied by any one else. [7]

    He appealed to John Locke’s polemic against absolute monarchy, which sets out the locus classicus for the justification of property rights.[8] Locke argued that human beings have a series of rights antecedent to the existence of civil government, that is, they exist whether or not the state acknowledges them. A just state will protect and recognise these rights. One such right is the right to property. Locke argued that people own their own bodies and as such their own labour. When one mixes one’s labour with previously unowned land one acquires a right to this land subject to the proviso that one leaves “enough and as good … for others.”[9]

    Feser has argued that Locke’s proviso is mistaken and that an initial acquisition of the sort Locke refers to cannot be unjust.[10] If one mixes one’s labour with and gains ownership of, a parcel of previously unowned land then one acquires a property right to it. This acquisition, in turn, gives one the right to assign it to others. Given this, Locke’s proviso is unnecessary. Assignees of such land acquire the property rights along with the land. Unless another can establish that the initial acquisition was unjust or there has been an unjust transfer at some point in the chain of ownership, the landowner’s property rights must be respected.

    Whilst the right may not be absolute, a prima facie property right exists. If one takes possession of previously unoccupied land and mixes one’s labour with it or one obtains ownership of such land via a just transaction then, prima facie, one has rights over this land. The burden then falls on the taker to justify taking,

    That we do in fact, in everyday life, put the burden of proof on the denier of claims to property is evidenced by the presumption that exists in law that the possessor of a holding is the rightful owner of it. This reflects our intuitive sense of justice in holdings. It is only (egalitarian) philosophers who—bizarrely—put the burden on the possessor to prove that we shouldn’t expropriate his holdings. Such philosophers are reminiscent of the epistemological skeptic who challenges you to prove you’re not dreaming, or are not a brain in a vat, or whatever—as if it were such strange logical possibilities, rather than the commonsense belief in the external world, that had the presumption in their favor![11]

    In Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part II, I turn to the extent of the landowners rights, the relationship of property rights to legislative controls, looking at the CMA, RMA and recent judgments. I critique the notion that property rights remain untouched by these controls by highlighting the shift from posterior to prior restraint, I conclude by placing the argument through the lens of Blackstone’s qualifications on the absolute right to property.


    [1] William Blackstone “Of Property, in General” in George Sharswood (ed) Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books (J.B. Lippincott Co, Philadelphia, 1893) Vol 1, Bk 2, Ch 1.
    [2] Blackstone “Of The Absolute Rights Of Individuals”, above n 1, Vol 1, Bk 1, Ch 1, s 139.
    [3] “Blackstone and Property Jurisprudence” in William Blackstone accessed at 17 February 2010.
    [4]
    Blackstone, above n 1.
    [5] Ibid.
    [6]
    Edward Feser “Classical Natural Law Theory, Property Rights, and Taxation” (2010) 27 Social Philosophy and Policy 21-52, 38.
    [7] William Blackstone “Chapter 1: Of Property, In General” in Sharswood, above n 6, Vol 1, Bk 2, Ch 1, s 9.
    [8]
    John Locke Two Treatises of Government (1690) Peter Laslett (ed) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1967), Second Treatise, Ch 5.
    [9] Ibid s 27.
    [10] Edward Feser “There is no such thing as an Unjust Initial Acquisition” (2005) Social Philosophy and Policy 58-59.
    [11]
    Ibid 11.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part II

    Can State Expropriation of Minerals be Justified? Part I

  • The Theological Foundations of the Enlightenment Philosophers

    In my previous post, Freedom, Science and Christianity: A Response to James Valliant Part I, I criticised a recent post by James Valliant. I plan to put Part II of this critique online later this week (after Madeleine is clear of her exam on Tuesday to edit it). Here, I simply want to pick up on and further substantiate a point I made in Part I.

    On the SOLO discussion board, where Valliant’s article was originally posted and where I have posted some of my Part I response, Lindsay Perigo has dismissed my claims (notably without citing a single source) as “revisionist history.” I doubt very much anything I say will dissuade Perigo but for those like him, who react to this questioning of popular mythology with disbelief and scepticism, I ask them to compare the following enlightenment arguments for freedom of religion with some earlier patristic ones.

    Originally, Valliant argued,

    No, it was the horrible institution of Christian persecution, century after century, which inspired sensitive minds to first consider the idea of freedom of conscience, and, again, only with a good deal of philosophical help from those ancient, pagan sources, from Aristotle to Cicero — and from natural law to the experience of the Spartacus slave rebellion…. These are not to be found in the Bible, either. And, if they had been there, in any way, then why was this never noticed by the Councils, saints and theologians who piously taught what they thought was good Biblical policy, century after century after century?

    In response, I argued that, in fact, the defences of religious tolerance, proposed by enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke, Pierre Bayle and James Madison were often repetitions of the arguments offered by early Christian theologians such as Lactantius and Tertullian. Further, these pro-freedom of conscience arguments had been known to and given by Christian theologians for over a thousand years.

    These facts suggest it is mistaken to say that the idea of freedom of conscience was “first considered” after hundreds of years of Christian persecution and was developed from Pagan, as opposed to earlier Christian, sources.

    Turning to the enlightenment philosophers, let’s begin with James Madison,

    That religion or the duty we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, being under the direction of reason and conviction only, not violence or compulsion, all men are equally entitled to the full and free exercise of it accord[in]g to the dictates of conscience; and therefore that no man or class of men ought, on account of religion to be invested with peculiar emoluments or privileges, nor subjected to any penalties or disabilities.[1]

    Madison argues that true worship is based on conviction and therefore has to be voluntary; it is incompatible with coercion. His argument is not new, several Enlightenment defenders of freedom of religion made the same point. Below are two prominent examples. The first is John Locke,

    The care of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate, because his power consists only in outward force: but true and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind, without which nothing can be acceptable to God. And such is the nature of the understanding, that it cannot be compelled to the belief of anything by outward force. Confiscation of estate, imprisonment, torments, nothing of that nature can have any such efficacy as to make men change the inward judgment that they have framed of things.[2]

    The second is Pierre Bayle,

    It is evident then that the only legitimate way of inspiring religion is by producing in the soul certain judgments and certain movements of the will in relation to God. Now since threats, prisons, fines, exile, beatings, torture, and generally whatever is comprehended under the literal signification of compelling, are incapable of forming in the soul those judgments of the will in respect to God which constitute the essence of religion, it is evident that this is a mistaken way of establishing a religion and, consequently, that Jesus Christ has not commanded it.[3]

    Now compare these arguments with the following three examples from prominent, pre-Enlightenment, Christian Theologians.

    First, Aquinas, a 13th century theologian, discussed whether one should tolerate non-believers. In his discussion he summarised the following argument for an affirmative answer, which he attributed Augustine of Hippo, another theologian, who lived in the 5th century,

    Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.) that “it is possible for a man to do other things against his will, but he cannot believe unless he is willing.” Therefore it seems that unbelievers ought not to be compelled to the faith.[4]

    Second, Lactantius, a 4th century theologian,

    I should wish to know, when they compel men to sacrifice against their will, what reasoning they have with themselves, or to whom they make that offering. If it is made to the gods, that is not worship, nor an acceptable sacrifice, which is made by those who are displeasing to them, which is extorted by injury, which is enforced by pain….These things may indeed be said with justice. But who will hear, when men of furious and unbridled spirit think that their authority is diminished if there is any freedom in the affairs of men? But it is religion alone in which freedom has placed its dwelling. For it is a matter which is voluntary above all others, nor can necessity be imposed upon any, so as to worship that which he does not wish to worship. Some one may perhaps pretend, he cannot wish it. In short, some, through fear of torments, or overcome by tortures, have assented to detestable sacrifices: they never do that voluntarily which they did from necessity;[5]

    And finally Tertullian a 2nd century theologian

    It is a fundamental human right, a privilege of nature, that every man should worship according to his own convictions: one man’s religion neither harms nor helps another man. It is assuredly no part of religion to compel religion— to which free-will and not force should lead us— the sacrificial victims even being required of a willing mind. You will render no real service to your gods by compelling us to sacrifice. For they can have no desire of offerings from the unwilling.[6]

    Comparing these texts, it is, I think, fairly evident that Madison, Locke and Bayle repeated the same line of argument one finds in Aquinas (Augustine), Lactantius and Tertullian. Their arguments had been formulated and known and accepted for over a thousand years before the Enlightenment.

    So Randians remain free to make claims that no Christian thinkers supported freedom of religion until after the Enlightenment and that the Enlightenment thinkers did not get their ideas from Christian thinkers if they wish but supported examples, like the above, show that this is mistaken. This is not revisionist history (at least, not on my part). I would simply call it checking sources and comparing them.


    [1] James Madison Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments.
    [2] John Locke A Letter Concerning Toleration.
    [3] Pierre Bayle Pierre Bayle’s Philosophical Commentary trans AG Tannenbaum (New York: Peter Lang, 1686) 31.
    [4] Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologicae II II q. 8, obj 3.
    [5] Lactantius Epitome of the Divine Institutes 53, 54.
    [6] Tertullian To Scapula Ch 2.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Freedom, Science and Christianity: A Response to James Valliant Part I
    Freedom, Science and Christianity: A Response to James Valliant Part II
    The Theology of the Declaration of Independence