Category: Christian History

  • Guest Post: Dan Brown’s History of Science

    This guest post was submitted by Dr James Hannam. Dr Hannam is a UK based historian with degrees in physics and history from the Universities of Oxford and London and a PhD in the history of science from the University of Cambridge. He blogs at Quodlibeta.

    The film adaptation of Dan Brown’s Angels and Demons was released this year and, on top of Brown’s new novel, appears to have done a roaring trade. Reports suggest that this is a better effort by director Ron Howard than his The Da Vinci Code, although most critics would feel that making a worse film would have been a stiffer test.

    For those lucky enough to be unfamiliar with the book, Angels and Demons is set in Rome where hunky Harvard symbologist Robert Langdon, played by Tom Hanks, is trying to prevent the Illuminati from detonating an anti-matter bomb.  According to Dan Brown’s alternative view of history, the Illuminati are a secret society of scientists (Copernicus and Galileo were, of course, members) who were persecuted by the Catholic Church.  After a great purge in the seventeenth century, we learn, the society went underground and plotted revenge. For some reason, it has taken them over three hundred years to get their act together.

    The Da Vinci Code launched the literary careers of a whole faculty previously-obscure professors of New Testament Studies. Admittedly, they had good reason for wanting to put the record straight about Brown’s distortions of early Christian history.  This time, it’s historians of science who might be upset by Brown’s misrepresentation. Because his contention that the Catholic Church has spent the last two millennia holding back the advance of science is as wrongheaded as the story that Mrs Jesus retired to the south of France with her kids.

    Of course, it’s not just Dan Brown who believes in the battle between science and religion. While few people think that the Illuminati really were a group of scientists suppressed by the Church, the perception of an eternal conflict between reason and faith is widespread. It’s true that the Church did make a single significant mistake in 1616, when it banned Copernicus’s opinion that the earth orbits the sun. But the subsequent trial of Galileo over the issue had more to do with papal self-esteem than astronomy. And even in this case, the Catholic Church was siding with the scientific consensus of the time. Still, you can’t manufacture an eternal conflict from a single example, so proponents of the hypothesis have had to resort to a different strategy – inventing the evidence.

    For example, in the book of Angels and Demons, Brown alleges that the Church had Copernicus murdered for his heliocentric model. While this is a more extreme allegation, there is a general belief that Copernicus feared persecution for his ideas. It’s widely thought that he refrained from publishing them until he was on his deathbed. In fact, he had circulated a pamphlet outlining his theory decades before he died. This was favourably received by senior churchmen and he was urged to publish by a cardinal. He even dedicated his great book, On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres, to the Pope.

    Alas, as long as the likes of Dan Brown sell far more books than historians of science, this is a myth that is unlikely to go away.

    James Hannam’s book God’s Philosophers: How the Medieval World Laid the Foundations of Modern Science is published by Icon. The best price we could find for it from a New Zealand bookseller, with free delivery, was through The Nile Online Bookstore at the above link. International readers can buy it through Amazon. As I have previously stated elsewhere, it would make a good Christmas gift…

    RELATED POSTS:
    The “Dark Ages” and Other Propaganda
    More on the “Dark Ages” and Other Propaganda
    Things They Don’t Teach you in Public Schools…
    The Flat Earth Myth
    Contra Mundum: The Flat-Earth Myth

  • Common Historical Myths About the Church

    This post is part update, part recycle.

    Earlier on in this blog’s life, I ran a small series of posts last year on common historical myths about the Church that  are so pervasive in society that most Christians fall for them. Anyway, after receiving some correspondence, I have updated this post, More on the “Dark Ages” and Other Propaganda.

    [I hope I am being mysterious enough to make you want to check it out – especially you Bethyada]

    RELATED POSTS:
    The “Dark Ages” and Other Propaganda
    More on the “Dark Ages” and Other Propaganda
    Things They Don’t Teach you in Public Schools…
    The Flat Earth Myth
    Contra Mundum: The Flat-Earth Myth
    Guest Post: Dan Brown’s History of Science

  • Sunday Study: Interpreting the Sixth Commandment Part II

    In a previous post, Sunday Study: Interpreting the Sixth Commandment Part I, I discussed some translations of the sixth commandment of the Decalogue. I began with the King James Version (KJV), “thou shall not kill.”[1] I looked at problems with this translation most famously raised by Augustine. The New International Version (NIV) and New Revised Standard Version (NRSV) translate the word rasah as “murder” in an attempt to avoid these problems. However, as I noted in my previous post, this translation fails to capture accurately the use of rasah in Hebrew and turns the command into an empty tautology.

    Augustine’s Interpretation
    I want to suggest that an adequate understanding or account of the sixth commandment was suggested by Augustine or at least can be constructed from his writings. In Book One of The City of God, Augustine addressed the question of whether suicide is lawful and concluded that it is not. What is interesting is how Augustine interpreted and applied the sixth commandment in doing this.

    Augustine’s argument against suicide consists of three observations. Firstly, Augustine takes the commandment fairly literally as forbidding homicide. He states, “The commandment is ‘Thou shall not kill man.’”[2] We saw in the last post that there is a sensible basis for this. The term literally means to slay and is predicated only of human beings; further, while in most instances it is used of unjustified killing, it can be used of a lawful execution. The slaying of humans is a common meaning to the different nuances that its use takes in the text.

    The obvious problem for such a reading is that elsewhere the scriptures seem to allow, even command, killing in certain instances. This does not perplex Augustine,

    However, there are some exceptions made by the divine authority to its own law, that men may not be put to death. These exceptions are of two kinds, being justified either by a general law, or by a special commission granted for a time to some individual. And in this latter case, he to whom authority is delegated, and who is but the sword in the hand of him who uses it, is not himself responsible for the death he deals. And, accordingly, they who have waged war in obedience to the divine command, or in conformity with His laws, have represented in their persons the public justice or the wisdom of government, and in this capacity have put to death wicked men; such persons have by no means violated the commandment, “Thou shalt not kill.”[3]

    Augustine’s answer is straightforward. The universal prohibition is the general rule while the specific commands are the exceptions to this rule. The law prohibits homicide; however, the law must be read in its context and not in isolation and, when this is done, one realises that other commands and prohibitions offer qualifications or exceptions to this general rule.

    There are several reasons for accepting this way of interpreting the sixth commandment. Firstly, it is in other areas a matter of common-sense; as Bahnsen notes,

    Human communication by means of language would come to a grinding halt if it were illegitimate ever to express yourself by way of generalizations which do not explicitly acknowledge qualifications and exceptions. Lawyers may specialize in the fine print of complicated legal contracts, but even they do not speak that way in ordinary discourse. A father who asserts that his son is a fine basketball player is not guilty of falsehood or deception simply because he does not add that, of course, his son has some bad games.

    Generalizations which state an accurate summary or the prevailing principle are not, as generalizations, faulty or inaccurate.[4]

    In fact, not only is this a matter of common-sense, it is a method followed elsewhere in scripture. For example in Exodus 21:12,

    Anyone who strikes a man and kills him shall surely be put to death. However, if he does not do it intentionally, but God lets it happen, he is to flee to a place I will designate. But if a man schemes and kills another man deliberately…

    Here we see a universal principle “Any one who strikes a man and kills him shall be put to death” and then immediately this principle is qualified in the proceeding verses. Moreover, contrary to Bahnsen, this type of writing is common even in legal circles. Even contemporary, legal codes often have a general, universal principle laid down regarding homicide or assault and then add specific exceptions which one can appeal to as a defence to committing actions which fall within the broad definition of the general rule.[5]

    As Madeleine has pointed out to me, the legal maxim ‘lex specialis derogat legi generali’ (specific rules override general rules) is still used in legal interpretation today. She said,

    If my lecturer said to the class, I want you to go straight to the library and get started on your assignments but then he said, Madeleine and Matt I want to see you two before you leave he would not be saying that he did not want everyone to go straight to the library and start their assignments just because he gave a specific, contradictory instruction to Matt and I and he wouldn’t be saying that we did not have to go to the library to start our assignments after he had finished speaking to us (once the exception no longer applies) because his specific instructions to us do not override the general instruction to all.[6]

    Secondly, the hermeneutical principle of the analogy of scripture supports this kind of interpretation. We have a general command prohibiting homicide; then we have more specific rules commanding or permitting homicide in certain situations. To interpret the command as absolute and unqualified would be to render the text internally incoherent.

    This leaves two other options; either one understands the general prohibition as the exception to the more specific ones or the specific ones as exceptions to the general rule. The former option is problematic. If a command permitting killing in a certain context is subject to an exception that you can never kill at all then the specific command is redundant and pointless. On the other hand, a general rule that states “do not kill,” except in certain specified circumstances is not redundant. This then seems the more sensible approach.

    A third reason for Augustine’s interpretation follows from a voluntarist understanding of the moral law. In several previous posts I have defended a voluntarist (divine command theory) account of the moral law; one that states that actions are right or wrong in virtue of their being commanded by God. On this account, what is fundamentally wrong about homicide is that it violates the law of God. Now, just as homicide is wrong because it violates the law of God, when God commands or permits homicide in a certain context the very property that makes killing wrong ceases to be present and hence the law is not being broken in that instance. It follows then that the killing in question is not wrong in this instance. This voluntarist understanding of Augustine’s position has a long history and is suggested by Bernard of Clairvaux[7] and Aquinas,[8] as well as those 14th century voluntarists such as Andreas de Novo.[9] Contemporary defenders of this position are Philip Quinn[10] and William Lane Craig.[11]

    Augustine’s position then is to interpret the command as a prohibition on homicide, understanding that in its context it is subject to qualification and exceptions provided elsewhere in the other commands of the law. His basic insight is that the law lays down the general principle “thou shall not kill man;” given that this is the general norm, one is to assume that any given act of homicide is prohibited unless the law elsewhere qualifies this rule or lays down an exception.

    This means that in practice the commandment forbids killing a human being without justification, where justification is construed as an excuse or permission granted by God’s law. In the absence of any other command or permission to the contrary, one should refrain from homicide. In this respect homicide differs from an action that is permissible. One does not need a reason or justification for engaging in a permissible action as one can do it for any reason at all or even no reason. However, because God condemns homicide one needs a reason drawn from the law of God itself before one can engage in it licitly.

    This interpretation clarifies Augustine’s argument that suicide is unlawful. Augustine justifies his conclusion by defending two points. Firstly, “he who kills himself still kills nothing else than man.”[12] Secondly, “It is not without significance, that in no passage of the holy canonical books can there be found either divine precept or permission to take away our own life.”[13] He adds, “in the commandment, ‘Thou shalt not kill,’ there is no limitation added nor any exception made in favor of any one, and least of all in favor of him on whom the command is laid!”[14]

    In other words suicide is homicide and the law does not qualify or grant exclusions to suicide, so suicide is unlawful. It is clear that this inference presupposes the interpretation of the commandment I have defended above. Homicide is unlawful unless the law of God provides grounds or exceptions to the general rule.

    In summation, the sixth commandment offers a general prohibition on homicide. This prohibition is binding unless a specific exception or qualification is found elsewhere in the law of God showing that a particular instance of homicide is licit. The procedure in applying the law is then as follows; first, ascertain whether the action in question is homicide and then ask whether it falls under any lawful exception. If an act is homicide then prima facie it is unlawful and a positive argument from some other command is needed to justify the action if it is to be defensible.


    [1] Exodus 20:13 KJV.
    [2]
    Ibid, 1:20.
    [3]
    Ibid, 1:21.
    [4]
    Greg L Bahnsen “Cross Examination: In Defense of Theonomy” The Counsel of Chalcedon XIV:5-6 (1992).
    [5]
    I am thankful to David Simpkin for bringing this point to my attention.
    [6]
    I am grateful to my wife, Madeleine Flannagan, for sharing this example she developed from Paul Rishworth.
    [7]
    Bernard of Clairvaux On Precept and Dispensation III.6.
    [8]
    Aquinas Summa Theologicae I-II q 800, a. 8, ad 3.
    [9]
    Andrea de Novo Castro Primium Scripturum Sententiarium d 48, q 2, a 2 Concl. 2. I.
    [10]
    Phillip Quinn “The Recent Revival of Divine Command Ethics” Research Philosophy-and Phenomenological Research (Fall 1990) 345-365.
    [11]
    William Lane Craig & Edwin Curley “Does the Christian God Exist?” A debate held at the University of Michigan (5 February 1998).
    [12]
    Augustine City of God 1:21.
    [13]
    Ibid.
    [14]
    Ibid.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Sunday Study: Interpreting the Sixth Commandment Part I

  • Sunday Study R 13: Romans, Revelations and the Role of the State

    In a previous post, Sunday Study: 666 The Number of the Beast, I exegeted Revelation 13’s infamous reference to the mark of the beast, in that post I argued that the first beast is a reference to Rome; a world empire, built on seven hills that ruled over all the nations of the earth at the time of John’s writing. The historical context of the book was the emperor cult; the roman state, in the person of the emperor, was considered a god and was to be worshiped. The reference to 666 (616 in some early manuscripts) was probably a Jewish literary technique known as gematria applied to Nero Caesar, who was the sixth roman emperor after the “Five” [who] have fallen”; and hence; is the one “who is.” In its historical and literary context then Revelation 13 was exhorting Christians, who lived during the Neroian persecution, to resist the emperor, to refuse to worship the state as divine and to resist Christian or Jewish religious authorities who encouraged them to do so. To see my full argument for these conclusions, readers should read the linked post above; here I simply want to revisit one important point that occurs in the text;

    And the dragon stood on the shore of the sea. And I saw a beast coming out of the sea. He had ten horns and seven heads, with ten crowns on his horns, and on each head a blasphemous name. The beast I saw resembled a leopard, but had feet like those of a bear and a mouth like that of a lion. The dragon gave the beast his power and his throne and great authority.(Re 13:1-2)

    The first beast, the roman emperor, is said to get its “power,” “great authority” and “throne” from the dragon. The imagery of the dragon is explained later in Rev 20 as “that ancient serpent, who is the devil, or Satan.” The text then explicitly states that the Roman Empire and the emperor’s authority, was satanic. While space does not allow me a full treatment here, the text goes on to predict the destruction of the Roman Empire and those who support it.

    Why the excursus into apocalyptic literature? Because it is important to put in context another, more well known passage, which is widely quoted; the locus classicus passage on obedience to the state in Romans,

    Everyone must submit himself to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been established by God. Consequently, he who rebels against the authority is rebelling against what God has instituted, and those who do so will bring judgment on themselves. For rulers hold no terror for those who do right, but for those who do wrong. Do you want to be free from fear of the one in authority? Then do what is right and he will commend you. For he is God’s servant to do you good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for he does not bear the sword for nothing. He is God’s servant, an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer. Therefore, it is necessary to submit to the authorities, not only because of possible punishment but also because of conscience. This is also why you pay taxes, for the authorities are God’s servants, who give their full time to governing. Give everyone what you owe him: If you owe taxes, pay taxes; if revenue, then revenue; if respect, then respect; if honor, then honor. (Romans 13:1-7)

    The contrast here is important, in both Revelation 13 and Romans 13 we have a reference to the roman emperor. In Romans the emperor’s authority has been established by God and he is a servant (minister) of God, Christians are called to submit, obey and to not resist the state. In Revelations 13 the Roman emperor and empire is said to gain its authority from Satan, is implicitly said to be a minister of Satan and Christians are called to not submit to or obey its demands to absolute obedience and worship.

    The contrast is fairly evidently explained by the different contexts the passages occur in. The book of Romans was written around 55-57 AD; this puts it just after the death of Claudius and during the early part of Nero’s reign. During this time, Nero was strongly influenced by Seneca the Younger and Barrus and his rule was widely considered to be competent and relatively enlightened. Revelation 13 is written later, after the great fire of Rome in 64 AD where Nero had transformed into the infamous persecuting, brutal, power-hungry tyrant he is immortalised as.

    Similarly, the specific literary context makes the differences clear. In Romans 13, after commanding Christians to submit to authority, the text goes on to give reasons as to why Christians are to do this, “He [the state] is God’s servant, an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer. Therefore, it is necessary to submit to the authorities, not only because of possible punishment but also because of conscience.” The reason we submit out of conscience i.e due to a moral requirement, is because the state is God’s servant and this is explicated as “an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer.” The context makes this clear when after spelling out that governments are God’s servants the text explicates this as “he [the state] is God’s servant to do you good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for he does not bear the sword for nothing. He is God’s servant, an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer.” In other words, the government acts as an agent of God in its function of commending good and punishing evil.

    Revelation 13, however, is not talking about the emperor punishing wrongdoing and commending good;

    The dragon gave the beast his power and his throne and great authority…. Men worshiped the dragon because he had given authority to the beast, and they also worshiped the beast and asked, “Who is like the beast? Who can make war against him?” The beast was given a mouth to utter proud words and blasphemies and to exercise his authority for forty-two months. He opened his mouth to blaspheme God, and to slander his name and his dwelling place and those who live in heaven. He was given power to make war against the saints and to conquer them. And he was given authority over every tribe, people, language and nation. All inhabitants of the earth will worship the beast–all whose names have not been written in the book of life belonging to the Lamb that was slain from the creation of the world. (Rev 13)

    Here the context is quite different; rome is a world empire, which makes war against other nations and through violence gains dominion over every tribe, nation and language. It is a state that demands worship and absolute obedience and which persecutes and murders innocent people. In this context, Christians are called to resist it and its authority is said to be from the dragon.

    This is vitally important because some people apparently misinterpret Romans 13 to support absolute dictatorship. A correspondent of Madeleine’s once wrote the following,

    “Everyone must submit himself to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established.” To be blunt the above makes me feel sick. I don’t think the Nazi regime, or fascist Italy can be compared to the individualism that occurred in the birth of the United States. How can you hold these in the same regard under the excuse that they’re established by God? The only bromidial, evasive and ludicrous comeback that the victims under those totalitarian regimes got was “its God’s purpose and plan” even if you don’t understand it just have faith and follow Christ.

    Madeleine’s correspondent here interprets Romans 13 to teach that dictatorships and totalitarian regimes are instituted by God and are morally on par with limited governments. He also seemed to think that throughout history Christian theologians have never addressed this issue but have just told people to “have faith and follow Christ” in the face of being governed by dictators and tyrants.

    Apart from the flawed understanding of the history of theology, the author here misunderstands the passage. Romans 13 needs to be read next to Revelation 13. When one does this one sees that the picture is quite different. Romans 13 says that states that use force, “the sword,” to punish the guilty and to defend the innocent act as Gods agents and hence, have legitimate authority which must be respected. Revelation 13 states that when states grossly exceed their mandate like the Nazi unjust conquest of other nations, persecution of the innocent and Hitler’s deification of the state are not exercising a legitimate, God given, authority but rather are portrayed as something satanic.

  • Good Friday: Why Celebrate Easter?

    Good FridayLast Sunday Christian, my eldest son, asked me “what is the point in baptism?” In the ensuing conversation it became clear that his real struggle was with the idea of ‘ritual ceremony’ and the symbolism involved.

    Christian has Aspergers Syndrome and is quite literal (which is is a typical Aspie trait). Ceremonies  are often metaphorical; symbols are repeated each time the ritual is enacted. Symbols have meaning only because they point to something literally correct that they symbolise. If this is the case, Christian would ask, why not just grasp the literal reality? Why go through all the bother of a symbol and a ritual? In the case of baptism, why not just live a life of repentance, faith and piety? Why do you need to have an elaborate ceremony symbolising cleansing, death Resurrection and new life? Can’t I just be a Christian?

    “For a brief moment it was like I could directly experience or perceive something of the glory of God and the deep cosmic significance of Christ’s death.”

    Christian’s observations came back to me strongly yesterday. For the last four weeks I have been teaching Ethics and Introduction to Philosophy for the religious studies faculty at St Peters College. This is part of my teaching diploma. I have to work in unpaid for a period of time so I can ‘learn the ropes.’ During the free periods I have tried to focus on research and publishing in various areas of the relationship between religion and morality (something readers of this blog will know is a keen interest of mine). My day, then, has been focused on teaching philosophy and ethics to college aged students (US readers note that ‘college’ in this New Zealand context means high school) and researching and writing for my field. At the days end I have been coming home and blogging, often on the same topics.

    Yesterday the head of faculty at St Peters invited me to go to the annual St Peters Easter liturgy. As a Protestant working at a Catholic College it is not compulsory for me to attend. However, he thought I might like to see how the college celebrates Easter. I stopped my writing for an hour and went down to the assembly hall to watch the liturgy. Much of it was traditional Catholic veneration of the cross, I should note that Anglicans do this as well, thrown in with some time of meditation and reflection on the passion of Christ. Now as a Protestant I have qualms around veneration of objects and symbols such as the cross; however, in the middle of the meditation I was struck again, as I am almost every Easter, with the reality of the events these rituals reflect on. For a brief moment it was like I could directly experience or perceive something of the glory of God and the deep cosmic significance of Christ’s death.

    This was not just the abstract grasping of true propositions about God and Christ, though this is certainly a valid part of it. It was deeper; one becomes consciously aware of the reality in a manner in which one can almost literally feel it. Rudolph Otto described such experiences as the sense of the numinous. There is a sense of awe, mystery, majesty, involved one becomes entirely quiet and almost sad yet the experience is one that is deeply attractive and compelling, one that you would not mind continuing for a significant length of time.

    Easter SundayFrom my late teens through to now I have had moments like this when the reality of God has become apparent and sometimes I have had literally hours where I have simply been struck with the awesome, majestic awareness of a sacred presence brooding all around me, one calling me towards a goal which I cannot see and yet am aware is there and also one that speaks to me out of the historical events of the death and Resurrection of Christ. It struck me at the time that this is why ritual is important. As an excessively cerebral person (or at least this is how one of my thesis supervisors once described me) Christianity can become simply an intellectual project, a research program where I simply expound and defend a philosophy. Rituals force me to focus and refocus over and over again on the realities behind what I do. Rituals force one to quiet one’s soul and really reflect at a level beyond the mere intellectual. It strikes me, also, that rituals like baptism are powerful because they engage the full senses. One sees, hears, there are dramatic symbols that one can use as opposed to mere abstract concepts.

    There is also an important time factor. One can draw a line in the sand and say here and now at this point in time I have committed to this. This is evident perhaps clearest in marriage. One could simply make an implicit commitment to be in an exclusive monogamous relationship with a member of the opposite sex and I think in principle this could constitute a valid marriage. However, the symbolism where you decide that today, at this time, you will make the commitment publicly before witnesses who will hold you accountable to that decision – accompanied by the symbolism of rings, an aisle, veils, etc – all these things, especially when the symbolism is interpreted correctly by those engaging in it, make the commitment that much more more powerful.

    A whole host of factors, visual, intellectual, social, are brought in and focused in one time and place enabling the event to be invested with a solemnity that is appropriate for its nature. My experience yesterday at St Peters reminded me vividly of the importance of rituals at a time like Easter.

    God created us as intellectual beings and one of my biggest criticisms of New Zealand evangelicism is the intellectual and cultural mediocrity which it often triumphantly celebrates in the name of “being a heart Christian” or in the name of a superficial emotional and devotional piety. But God also created us holistic persons with a mind, emotions and a will. We need time regularly to refocus ourselves and orientate our entire person on the realities on which our faith is founded. Some people with autism or Aspergers Syndrome may perhaps have a special gift whereby their whole person can be focused with just their intellectual awareness but most people are not like this.

    For myself, a philosopher/theologian whose faith is undeniably at times quite intellectual, this is the real value of Easter. Once a year there is a time when everything stops and there is time to focus, meditate and reflect with the whole person on what is central. While, I do not accept some aspects of the Catholic rituals I saw on Thursday the realisation of this need, the importance of ritual and repetition that engages the whole person, is the real strength of Catholic spirituality – one that Protestants can and should learn from and often neglect to their detriment.

  • St Patrick’s Day: A Protestants’ Musings

    Today is St Patrick’s day. Many tonight will find themselves dressed in green, possibly slurring slightly, with a handle of green Guinness in one hand and most won’t really be certain as to why.

    Now one wonders why so many people who are not Catholic or Irish feel the need to celebrate a saint on 17 March. Some might say the cause for celebration is the excuse to consume Guiness – any excuse to drink… but the green? Who looks good in bright green and who wants to drink green food colouring?

    I thought it would be interesting to look into Patrick and see if there is something there beyond the green Guinness and the saint commemoration, which is more a Catholic thing, that protestants might find interesting.

    It was difficult to find anything concrete about the man; obviously the internet didn’t quite go back that far so I couldn’t just go and read his blog. Apparently historians haven’t fared much better as centuries of legend make sifting through the facts confusing and only two documents appear to have survived, a confession he wrote and a letter of excommunication he wrote to Coroticus.

    What does survive when one sifts through the legend and the documents is interesting.

    Patrick lived around 400 AD and when he was 16 he was kidnapped by Celts and taken to Ireland where he spent 6 years before escaping and returning to his family.

    At some point Patrick trained in the Church and then returned to Ireland as a missionary though apparently no one can associate him with any particular parish. Many accounts speak of his evangelistic approach as being that of an equal, someone who just got alongside his countrymen, rather than holding himself out as someone holding a special place in the church. It also seems apparent that he adopted Paul’s tactic of using the culture around him in his promotion of Christianity.

    St Patrick's DaySome credit him with lighting the Paschal Fire at Knowth to bring Celtic culture’s emphasis of fire together with celebrations for Easter; It is said he made the Celtic cross by combining the sun, another prominent feature of Celtic culture, with the cross. He used an object lesson of the shamrock (3-leaf clover) to explain the trinity to the then heavily Arian culture. It is also said he raised the dead, chased the snakes out of Ireland (though this could have been a metaphor for chasing the druids out instead).

    He claimed to have had visions including the one claimed as the earliest example of God having a joke with an Irishman; he claims God told him to leave Ireland (a journey of around 200 miles) and once he left he then had another vision telling him to return.

    How much is fact or fiction is historically uncertain and disputed but it all makes good legend.

    I did find it interesting to discover that originally the colour blue was associated with Patrick but around the 1750’s, probably due to the shamrock-trinity thing and Ireland’s rejection of paganism and adoption of Christianity, the association switched to green. If this is the case then protestants can wear green today without worrying about saint worship or aligning themselves with drunkeness; we can wear green to remember a man who served God and brought Christianity to pagan cultures.

  • What About the Poor? More on Sustenance Rights

    In my last post, What About the Poor? Sustenance Rights Examined, I noted the position of Nicholas Wolterstorff that, “If a rich man knows of someone who is starving and has the power to help that person, and chooses not to, then he violates that person’s rights as surely and reprehensively as if he had physically assaulted the sufferer.” I argued that as stated, this position is subject to three problems; first, that it leads to absurd consequences, entailing that I have a duty to give to every poor person I know about. Second, that it has totalitarian implications and third, that acceptance and practise of this principle would destroy any incentive people have to work.

    In a more recent article “Christianity and Social Justice,” Wolterstorff attempts to defend his thesis against the three criticisms I mention above.

    Turning to the first problem, Wolterstorff’s response is to note that “acknowledging a person’s right to some good does not imply laying on everyone else a duty to extend to that person that good.” This seems odd, if a right to sustenance on the part of the poor does not mean we are obligated to give them the means to sustenance, what bite does it have?

    Wolterstorff puts forward an interesting suggestion. Turning to the paradigm of a right to not be assaulted, Wolterstorff suggests that while we have a duty to not assault people we do not have a duty to protect every person against assault. However, he goes on to note that in addition to having a right to not be assaulted, people have a right against their society “to have practises” and “social structures” that protect them from assault. In particular, such things as a police force, courts and an army. Clearly, if the right does not just mean that members of society refrain from attacking people, it also means that these members have a duty support the police force. Further, if the police force is ineffective, people have a duty to try and improve it (through such things as voting and lobbying).

    Moreover, Wolterstorff suggests if “I see you about to get mugged when no policeman is in view – then I may be obliged to offer you my protection in a direct way.” Wolterstorff’s argument is that sustenance rights are analogous to the right to not be assaulted in this way. People have a duty to support whatever institutions or charities exist that alleviate poverty. If they are ineffective, they have a duty to reform them. Further, if one encounters a person in extreme necessity one is required to assist them in a direct way.

    Turning to the second criticism, Wolterstorff makes three points to get around the totalitarian implications sketched previously. First, he states that,

    the general idea behind having such a right to some good is that individual actions and social practices ought to be such that one enjoys that good. But the role of the government in practices which secure that right may be nil or negligible. Not all rights are enshrined by law. Sometimes in the early church the care for the poor of society was principally in the hands of the bishop.

    He goes on to note, correctly I think, that,

    Far from acknowledging that there is such a right, nothing directly follows as to what, if anything, governments should do by way of securing that right. In particular, it does not follow that the poor should be put on a dole supported by public taxation. In principle there is a wide variety of other practices which would undo the violation of this right, some of which the government would have little or no role.

    Accepting sustenance rights then, does not entail accepting massive public ownership or redistribution.

    Second, he tries to mitigate the objection by appealing again to the analogy with assault; “in our fallen world… we do not suppose that, in the face of all the aggressive impulses of human beings purely voluntary arrangements would suffice to secure our freedom from assault.” He goes on to note, “why should we suppose that, in the face of acquisitive impulses of human beings, purely voluntary arrangements would suffice to secure our right to sustenance?” Finally he notes, “it is true, indeed that there are dangers lurking when governments try to ensure that the rights of the poor are respected. But who would be so foolish as to argue that the armies and police forces that we assemble propose no threat?”

    Wolterstorff makes some pertinent points here. However, it is worth noting that if one takes the assault analogy seriously, several things are evident. First, the police and armed forces actually do not play as big a role in protecting us from assault as it may appear.

    The Police do not patrol everyone’s houses at night, nor does it have 24/7 video surveillance cameras set up on every home, nor do we have publicly funded burglar alarms. If people want any of these things, they hire private security guards, install privately owned cameras and buy their own alarms. The police are called when these systems fail and there is immediate danger.

    It is also worth noting that the ability of the Police to catch and prosecute assailants is limited by such things as the presumption of innocence, the need for warrants, probable cause, etc. In societies with lower crime rates, police typically have more sweeping powers, powers our society rightly rejects precisely to avoid the danger of excess state intrusion and its subsequent abuses. As such, if the state is to secure our rights to sustenance similar limits should apply.

    Turning to the third criticism, Wolterstorff states that while people do not earn their basic human rights by merit, such as the right to be free from assault or the right to liberty, the same is true of the right to sustenance. Wolterstorff notes correctly that a person can forfeit these rights by misdeeds; if a person attacks another his right to be free from assault is forfeited and I can strike him if necessary to defend myself. Similarly, if a person commits a crime they forfeit their right to liberty and can be imprisoned.

    In the same way, Wolterstorff suggests that the right to sustenance can be forfeited if a person is capable of providing for themselves but refuses to do so; just as a needy person has a right against society to sustenance, society has a right against those it supports that they will take responsibility for themselves when they can and not pass of their responsibilities onto someone else.

    As far as I can tell, Wolterstorff’s responses enable him to accept sustenance rights without falling into the problems mentioned in my previous post. It is worth noting, however, his response makes the claim that the poor have sustenance rights significantly qualified.

    What it means is that individuals in a society have a duty to support various institutions that aid and assist those who are unable to provide for their own needs. These institutions may or may not be run by the state but if they are, the state plays a last resort role and is subject to careful checks on its power. This picture may differ from that some proposed by certain types of Libertarian, particularly those who believe we have no obligations to support the poor at all, but it is hardly the charter for statism or massive public ownership