Tag: Freedom of Religion

  • Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part III

    In my last posts, beginning Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I, I set out the doctrine of religious restraint and touched on some criticisms of it. I looked at and critiqued some of the key arguments in support of the doctrine of religious restraint. In this post I will look at the objection that the argument from respect is too thin, that applied consistently it excludes too much. I will conclude by looking at Audi’s response to this.

    (b)        Thinness

    A closely related problem is that if it is applied consistently the argument from respect excludes too much. If justification is limited to principles that no reasonable person can reasonably be expected to reject then little will be able to be justified. Glenn Peoples notes the problem;[31]

    Given this view of justification, you can only endorse a policy if it is such that it can be endorsed in light of the actual beliefs and goals held by the KKK, the Catholic Church and the humanist rationalist society.

    Wolterstorff observes that “in our actual societies, anyone who embraced this position would simply refrain from advocating any position whatsoever on any issue of importance to society.”[32] Quinn agrees, “as Wolterstorff notes, he knows of no law or policy that has come up for discussion in the United Sates in recent years that has had the support of a consensus of all the rational adult citizens.”[33]

    Gerald Gaus, who is otherwise sympathetic to the DRR, also agrees; he notes that, given Rawls’s requirement for consensus, public reason “loses its character as a liberal doctrine, for little, if anything, is the object of consensus among reasonable people.”[34] Kent Greenawalt argues that public reason is incapable of grounding policy on most contentious political issues.[35] Peter de Marneffe concurs.[36]

    Wolterstorff contends that public reason must be supplemented by ideas drawn from comprehensive doctrines or it will not be able to function as an adequate base for justifying many substantive policies. To make his point, Wolterstorff cites the welfare debate. Advocates for the varying perspectives appeal to ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’ but mean different things by these terms; they prioritise the relevant rights differently, they disagree as to how such rights should be weighed against social utility. It is unlikely that public reason, common sense and uncontroversial science can justify welfare legislation to a standard that all can reasonably accept. [37]

    Wolterstorff makes similar points over the fundamental premise in the abortion debate; equal protection has radically different meanings depending on how one interprets public reason’s answer to the question, ‘is the fetus a person or not?’[38] Eberle,[39] Quinn[40] and Jean Hampton[41] agree that public reason cannot settle the question as to whether a fetus is a person yet Rawls argues that public reason can settle the abortion debate (case in point: reasonable people disagree over the answers public reason can give). [42]

    Rawls’ version of the argument from respect is not the only one that faces these problems; similar issues arise with other conceptions of the DRR. Any attempt to ground the DRR in the notion that coercive legislation cannot be justified unless the reasons advanced can be grounded in the reasonably-held principles and beliefs shared by all people will face the same problem. This is evident when one examines other versions of the DRR which do not employ Rawls’ idea of public reason.

    Rawls employs public reason to place a restraint on all comprehensive viewpoints, whether religious or secular. Robert Audi’s position is less restrictive. Audi applies the restraint primarily to religious reasons. He proposes a principle of “secular rationale”, a principle of “secular motivation” and something he calls “theo-ethical equilibrium.”[43]

    His secular rationale principle claims that “one should not advocate or support any law or public policy that restricts human conduct unless one has, and is willing to offer, adequate secular reason for this advocacy or support.”[44] His principle of secular motivation goes further; “one should not advocate or promote any legal or public policy restrictions on human conduct unless one not only has and is willing to offer, but is also motivated by, adequate secular reason, where this reason (or set of reasons) is motivationally sufficient for the conduct in question.”[45] Theo-ethical equilibrium is “a rational integration between religious deliverances and insights and, on the other hand, secular ethical considerations … a mature, conscientious theist who cannot reach it [theo-ethical equilibrium] should be reluctant or unwilling to support coercive laws or public policies on a religious basis that cannot be placed in that equilibrium.”[46]

    Audi argues that “an adequate reason for a law or policy is a proposition whose truth is sufficient to justify it.”[47] He places the restraint on religious reasons;[48]

    A secular reason is, roughly, one whose normative force, that is, its status as a prima facie justificatory element, does not (evidentially) depend on the existence of God (for example, through appeals to divine command) or on theological considerations (such as interpretations of a sacred text), or on the pronouncements of a person or institution qua religious authority.

    Given that comprehensive secular perspectives are not excluded by this version of the DRR, it appears that Audi’s conception can escape the problem of thinness that Rawls’ public reason faces. Comprehensive secular viewpoints should provide people with a thicker perspective, broad enough to justify many substantive policies.

    However, an examination of the reasons Audi advances in favour of his version of the DRR will reveal this contention to be mistaken. By broadening public reason to adequate secular reason Audi’s position is thicker than Rawls’ but its asymmetrical treatment of religious and secular views puts it back in the path of the charges of incoherence and thinness. I will elaborate.

    Like Rawls, Audi offers a version of the argument from respect. He states “as advocates for laws and public policies, then, and especially for those that are coercive, virtuous citizens will seek grounds of a kind that any rational adult citizen can endorse as sufficient for the purpose”[49] [Emphasis added] In another article, he argues that[50]

    adherence to the principle of secular rationale helps to ensure that, in determining the scope of freedom in a society, the decisive principles and considerations can be shared by people of differing religious views, or even no religious convictions at all.

    Audi assumes that secular views are accepted by all whereas not everyone accepts the truth of religious premises. This is a big assumption. In fact some secular views are not accepted by all; religious people can and do reasonably reject secular views. This renders Audi’s position incoherent as adherence to Audi’s position, by Audi’s position, requires us to reject it. Quinn explains, [51]

    If the fact that religious reasons cannot be shared by all in a religiously pluralistic society suffices to warrant any exclusion of religious reasons for advocating or supporting restrictive laws or policies, then much else ought in fairness also to be excluded on the same grounds. For example, justification of a restrictive law or policy by an appeal to its maximization of utility should be excluded because many citizens reasonably reject utilitarianism. Indeed, it would seem that the appeal to any comprehensive ethical theory, including all known secular ethical theories, should be disallowed on the grounds that every such theory can be reasonably rejected by some citizens of a pluralistic democracy. And if justification of restrictive laws or policies can be conducted only in terms of moral considerations no citizen of a pluralistic democracy can reasonably reject, then in a pluralistic democracy such as ours very few restrictive laws or policies can be morally justified, a conclusion that would, I suspect, be welcomed only by anarchists.

    In addition, Audi’s position imposes a burden on religion that is not imposed on secularism despite secularism possessing the same features used to exclude religion. In the absence of some other factor, specific to religion and not applicable to secularism, the asymmetry is arbitrary. To escape this problem Audi would have to reject not only religious reasons but all reasons that are not “shared by people of differing religious views, or even no religious convictions at all.” However, if he takes this line, his position is rendered too thin and fares no better than Rawls.’

    (c)        Audi’s defence

    In a defence of his position against this line of critique, Robert Audi questions if the DRR is as thin as critics maintain, [52]

    I would think that if we stick to principles of justice, which form only a small part of a comprehensive view, and if we do not take agreement to imply unanimity as opposed to consensus, there is a better chance of agreement than on the whole of such a larger view. Perhaps the chance is still not good, … But is there not a strong consensus, at least among citizens of democratic societies, that justice requires not only equal protection of the laws but also laws that protect liberty, including political and religious liberty and freedom of speech, up to a certain level? There are of course disagreements on matters of detail…

    While it is true that most people hold to some conception of justice and equality, and affirm the right to exercise certain liberties, the details of their understanding of these norms are not as minor as Audi suggests. As I alluded to earlier, people can mean quite different things by these terms and can prioritise and weigh their importance quite differently. Closer examination of these “matters of detail” reveals substantive lack of consensus.

    Equal protection requires agreement over the question as to whom it applies. In Nazi Germany everyone was owed equal protection by the state; however, certain classes of people were deemed sub-human. Likewise with justifications offered for the new-world slavery as practised in the British Empire and antebellum United States, slaves did not qualify; similarly, with the abortion debate over the status of the fetus. Then there is the extent and nature of the protection to consider. Should the state regulate how many times a week one engages in exercise and eats fruit and vegetables on the grounds of protecting the health of its people or should it simply protect people from aggressors? Is Audi suggesting that simply agreeing that such protection should apply equally to all is sufficient to make his case and what form that should take is mere detail? Unless supplemented by definitions as to its recipients, nature and scope the term “equal protection before the law” is a vague statement lacking substantive content.

    The liberties Audi lists are also fraught with difficulty in interpretation as reasonable people do not agree on them.  Are they negative or does the state have a duty to provide or subsidise them? The substantive content and meaning of the terms ‘freedom’ and ‘liberty’ is disputed depending on whether one is talking to a libertarian or a socialist. Then there are the problems specific to each liberty.

    Consider freedom of religion. Steven Smith has argued that, strictly speaking, it is inaccurate to claim there is such a thing as a right to freedom religion. Instead there exists a spectrum of views about religious tolerance. Diverse writers, such as Aquinas, Cromwell, Locke and Mill each agreed that some religious dissent should be tolerated by the state but disagreed both on the limits and on which religions should be tolerated in society. Smith concluded that as no state tolerates all religious sects and very few tolerate none, the idea of a concept of freedom of religion supported by some and opposed by others is illusory. Which account of religious tolerance is correct depends on comprehensive views; adjudication between different understandings of religious tolerance is not possible without appealing to some comprehensive view. Settling these matters from something like public reason or adequate secular reason seems extremely difficult.[53]

    Does freedom of speech entail prior restraint or does it stop at the initiation of force? What about content and the manner of expression? How should we define speech? Does it include a right to engage in hate, racist, blasphemous, defamatory or sexist speech? Is it acceptable to wear Nazi emblems or deny the holocaust?

    Reasonable people disagree over more than just the details; they disagree over the terms, the nature, the extent and hold to a different range of finite cases. People use and understand the relevant terms in very different ways. Audi misconstrues the situation when he argues there is unanimity in society on fundamental principles of justice. The thinness objection stands.[54]

    In my next post, Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part IV, I will look at Gerald Gaus’ attempt to salvage the argument from epistemic inaccessibility and will offer some critical analysis of this.


    [31] Glenn Peoples Religion in the Public Square: Liberal Political Philosophy and the Place of Religious Convictions
    [32]
    Nicholas Wolterstorff “The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues” in Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (eds) Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, Lanham Md, 1997) 67-120, 154.
    [33]
    Philip Quinn “Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate” (2000) 60:2 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 486, 487 (book review), 488.
    [34] Gerald Gaus Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory (Oxford University Press, New York, 1996) 293.
    [35]
    Kent Greenawalt Private Consciences and Public Reasons (Oxford University Press, New York, 1995) 141-150.
    [36] Peter de Marneffe “Rawls’s Idea of Public Reason” (1994) 75 Pacific Philosophical Quarterly232.
    [37] Wolterstorff, above n 32, 103-104.
    [38] Ibid 104.
    [39]
    Christopher Eberle Religious Convictions in Liberal Politics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002) 217-222.
    [40] Phillip Quinn “Political Liberalisms and Their Exclusions of the Religious” (1995) 69:2 Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 35, 37-46.
    [41] Jean Hampton “The Common Faith of Liberalism” (1994) 75 Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 208.
    [42] John Rawls Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, New York, 1993) 243-244.
    [43]
    Robert Audi “Liberal Democracy and the Place of Religion in Politics” in Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (eds) Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, Lanham Md, 1997) 1-66, 25-37.
    [44] Robert Audi “The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of Citizenship” (1989) 18 Philosophy and Public Affairs 259, 279.
    [45] Ibid 284.
    [46]
    Audi, above n 43, 21.
    [47] Audi, above n 44, 284.
    [48] Ibid 278.
    [49]
    Audi, above n 43, 17.
    [50]
    Audi, above n 44, 290.
    [51] Quinn, above n 40, 39-40.
    [52] Audi, above n 43, 131-132.
    [53] Steven Smith Foreordained Failure: The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom (Oxford University Press, New York, 1995). (PhD Thesis, University of Otago, 2007) 118.
    [54] Paul Rishworth suggests these examples do not show there is no secular consensus but rather that there is a secular consensus at a high level of abstraction. Supervisor’s feedback from Paul Rishworth to Madeleine Flannagan dated 30 October 2009. This may be the case, however, the thinness objection does not maintain that there is no secular consensus; it maintains that there is no secular consensus thick enough to provide an answer to many substantive public policy questions. For Rishworth’s objection to stand, this higher level of abstraction would have to furnish principles thick enough to answer such questions and the examples above show that it cannot.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I

    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part II
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part IV
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part V
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part VI

  • Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part II

    In my last post, Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I, I set out the doctrine of religious restraint and touched on some criticisms of it. In this post, I begin looking at and critiquing some of the key arguments in support of the doctrine of religious restraint.

    II         Arguments for the Doctrine of Religious Restraint

    Of the reasons advanced in favour of the DRR most fall into one of two categories, an appeal to respect or arguments around the dangers of religion.

    A         Arguments from Respect
    Two variants of the argument from respect are common in the literature; one appeals to the golden rule, that we should do to others what we would have them do to us, the other is that religious reasons are epistemically inaccessible.

    1          The golden rule
    Audi advances a version of the golden rule;[12]

    Let us apply the do-unto-others rule to that case: one would not like having a different religious group, with which one deeply disagrees, press for its religiously preferred policies solely for religious reasons of its own, even if a good secular reason could be offered. … We are especially likely to disapprove of the dominance of religious motivation if the policy or law in question is backed by severe punishments.

    Audi expands a hypothetical example offered by Kent Greenawalt[13] where people advocated voting for candidates on religious grounds because they would protect animals. [14]

    Suppose, however, that much money must be spent in enforcement and that many jobs will be lost through the changes in the food sector of the economy, so that human conduct is significantly restricted, even if meat consumption remains legal. Then one might ask the religious voters in question whether they would accept comparable restrictions of their conduct, as well as similar job losses or mandatory shifts, on the basis of coercive legislation protecting the dandelion as a sacred species.

    Audi’s example imagines a “religious group, with which one deeply disagrees,” and gives the example of a belief in “the dandelion as a sacred species.” However, it is not just that one is being subjected to coercion on religious grounds, it is that the grounds are ones that we consider to be false. Lydia McGrew explains,[15]

    A major reason, perhaps the only reason, why many of us would not want other people to impose their religious standards on us is that we think their religions false, not that there is something special about religion. …. So the Golden Rule argument turns out to have very little to tell us about religion, specifically. [Emphasis added]

    Imagine the situation where a false secular belief is being imposed; an environmentalist political party seeks to impose a policy that the aesthetic value of dandelions requires all adults within society to make the same substantial sacrifices Audi refers to. The policy could be reasonably objected to in spite of its grounds being secular. The same is true in reverse. Consider a policy most people strongly agree with being proposed on religious grounds; a Christian party advocates the abolition of female circumcision on the basis that the practice conflicts with its religious belief of the body being sacred. The policy could attract widespread support despite its grounds being religious.

    These examples suggest that the merits of the policy itself are what is important and not that the grounds used for its justification are religious or secular.[16] Audi disagrees;[17]

    Citizens in [a democracy] are naturally and permissibly resentful about coercion by religious factors…in a way in which they are not permissibly resentful concerning coercion by, for instance, considerations of public health. Even the moral errors of others are, for many, easier to abide as supports of coercion than religious convictions having the same result.

    McGrew responds by contrasting two cases; first she argues that, “A slave owner would not be permissibly resentful of the emancipation of his slaves on the grounds that their emancipation had come about as a result of religious arguments.”[18] Conversely she argues, a parent would “be permissibly resentful of the forcible administration to his perfectly healthy child of mind-altering drugs even if such a policy was argued for from secular premises.”[19] So it appears that[20]

    How permissible (if one means, as Audi must mean, something like “understandable” or “reasonable”) one’s resentment of some law is depends on how reasonable the law is. It does not depend upon the origin of the considerations that brought about the law but rather upon whether the law is good or bad, merely annoying or outrageous, and so forth.

    That we should do to others what we would have them do to us does not just apply to the religious. While it is true that most people would strongly object to having to abide by religiously-grounded policies they reject as false, it is also true that they would strongly object to having to abide by secularly-grounded policies they reject as false. Consider a Muslim woman who believes it is her religious duty to wear a burqa. The passage of a law requiring her to remove her burqa for her driver’s license photo would likely be offensive to her. A parallel golden rule argument would require us to oppose coercive laws drawn from secular grounds.

    2          Epistemic inaccessibility
    Simplified, the most prominent type of argument offered in support of the DRR is that in a pluralistic society, coercive legislation cannot be justified unless the reasons advanced can be grounded in the reasonably-held principles and beliefs shared by all people. People disagree over which religious views, if any, are correct; therefore, any coercive laws justified on religious grounds cannot be legitimate because not all reasonable people accept religious premises. As such, religious reasons are epistemically inaccessible. Eberle sums this up, “the norm of respect imposes on each citizen an obligation to discipline herself in such a way that she resolutely refrains from supporting any coercive law for which she cannot provide the requisite public justification.”[21]

    The paradigmatic and most influential version of this argument is that of John Rawls. Rawls argues that society [22]

    is always marked by a diversity of opposing and irreconcilable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines. Some of these are perfectly reasonable, and this diversity among reasonable doctrines political liberalism sees as the inevitable long-run result of the powers of human reason at work within the background of enduring free institutions.

    Rawls uses the fact of diversity of comprehensive viewpoints, present in a pluralistic society, to argue for his version of restraint. Any justification drawn from such distinct grounds will always be reasonably rejected by someone.[23] Given this, some form of restraint is necessary.

    Unlike most advocates of the standard view, Rawls’ version of the DRR does not only exclude religion but also other comprehensive secular doctrines that reasonable people disagree over. He notes,[24]

    Our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.

    Note that the reason that Rawls excludes comprehensive views is that “[not] all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse [such views] in light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.” Rawls argues that when comprehensive views are removed from consideration there remains sufficient common ground from which coercive laws can be justified to all reasonable people. Rawls refers to this “public reason,” which he explains as follows;[25]

    We start by looking to the public culture itself as the shared fund of implicitly recognized basic ideas and principles. We hope to formulate these ideas and principles clearly enough to be combined into a political conception of justice congenial to our most firmly held convictions. We express this by saying that a political conception of justice, to be acceptable, must accord with our considered convictions, at all levels of generality, or in what I have called elsewhere, ‘reflective equilibrium.’

    Public reason should comprise[26]

    presently accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning found in common sense, and the methods and conclusions of science when these are not controversial … we are not to appeal to comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines–to what we as individuals or members of associations see as the whole truth–nor to elaborate economic theories of general equilibrium, say, if these are in dispute.

    Whilst the boundaries being drawn this way enables Rawls’ position to escape the charge of asymmetry, his critics and even many of those who also advocate some form of restraint on justificatory reasons claim that his position excludes too much.

    (a)        Incoherence
    Nicholas Wolterstorff identifies several problems; [27]

    No matter what principles of justice a particular political theorist may propose, the reasonable thing for her to expect, given any plausible understanding whatsoever of ‘reasonable and rational,’ is not that all reasonable and rational citizens would accept those principles, but rather that not all of them would do so. It would be utterly unreasonable for her to expect all of them to accept them. It would be unreasonable of her even to expect all her reasonable and rational fellow theorists to accept them; the contested fate of Rawls’ own proposed principles of justice is illustrative. What is reasonable for her to expect is that her proposals will stir up controversy and dissent not only at the point of transition from the academy to general society, but within the academy.

    In short, there is no more hope that reasonable and rational citizens will come to agreement, in the way Rawls recommends, on principles of justice, than that they will come to agreement, in the foreseeable future, on some comprehensive philosophical or religious doctrine. It is odd of Rawls to have thought otherwise; [Emphasis original]

    The divisions in society over welfare, abortion, state funding of social projects, euthanasia, pornography, genetic modification of foods, climate change, capital punishment, Maori seats and so on seem very broad; in most cases no argument or reasons advanced for these issues are likely to be accepted by all reasonable people. That reasonable people will disagree over what constitutes public reason does, prima facie, seem plausible. If this is the case then Rawls’ position is incoherent.

    Rawls argues that we have a moral obligation to reject any view that “[not] all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.” Public reason will “alone give a reasonable public answer to all, or to nearly all, questions involving the constitutional essentials and basic questions of justice.”[28] However, as Wolterstorff pointed out, even the deliverances of public reason are such “that not all reasonable people will agree.” Wolterstorff’s reference to the lack of consensus on Rawls’ own “principles of justice” supports this claim. In A Theory of Justice Rawls attempted to expound on his idea of public reason to develop principles of justice that a society could be ordered by.[29] The reception to A Theory of Justice was not a consensus in favour; present in the literature are a number of rejections, offered by reasonable people, on anything from the conclusions drawn, through to the methods used, to the principles themselves.

    If we have a moral obligation to reject any view that “[not] all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational” and principles drawn from public reason are themselves things that not all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse then, by Rawls, we have a moral obligation to reject any principles drawn from public reason.

    Matthew Flannagan agrees,[30]

    Rawls rejects appeals to comprehensive doctrines because people can reasonably reject them and argues that there is a duty to not decide questions of basic justice this way. If this is true then we should reject appeals to public reason as well; in fact, we have a duty to not follow public reason.

    In my next post, Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part III, I will look at the objection that the argument from respect is too thin, that applied consistently the argument from respect excludes too much. I will conclude by looking at Audi’s response to this.


    [12] Robert Audi “Liberal Democracy and the Place of Religion in Politics” in Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (eds) Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, Lanham Md, 1997) 1-66, 30.
    [13]
    Kent Greenawalt Private Consciences and Public Reasons (Oxford University Press, New York, 1995) 67.
    [14]
    Audi, above n 12, 28.
    [15]
    Lydia McGrew “The Irrational Faith of the Naked Public Square” (2008) 1 The Christendom Review (at 2 October 2009).
    [16]
    Wolterstorff makes the same point, above n 3, 106.
    [17]
    Audi, above n 12, 32.
    [18]
    McGrew, above n 15.
    [19]
    Ibid.
    [20]
    Ibid.
    [21]
    Christopher Eberle Religious Convictions in Liberal Politics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002) 12.
    [22]
    Ibid 3-4.
    [23]
    The policy itself might be accepted as it may be able to be justified on grounds the person does accept, though these grounds are not immune from being reasonably rejected by other people. I am grateful to Glenn Peoples for the development of this point.
    [24]
    John Rawls Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, New York, 1993) 217. Note: Rawls limits his support of a form of the DRR in the policy areas of “constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice.” Rawls’ critics argue that his position commits him to holding to his version of the DRR for all coercive legislation; see for example, Wolterstorff, above n 3, 106; Glenn Peoples Religion in the Public Square: Liberal Political Philosophy and the Place of Religious Convictions (PhD Thesis, University of Otago, 2007) 88; Matthew Flannagan Is Historic Christian Opposition to Feticide Defensible in the 21st Century? (PhD Thesis, University of Otago, 2006) 200.
    [25]
    Ibid 8.
    [26]
    Ibid 224-225.
    [27]
    Nicholas Wolterstorff “The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues” in Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (eds) Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, Lanham Md, 1997) 67-120, 99.
    [28]
    Rawls, above n 24, 225.
    [29]
    John Rawls A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1971).
    [30]
    Matthew Flannagan Is Historic Christian Opposition to Feticide Defensible in the 21st Century? (PhD Thesis, University of Otago, 2006) 195.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I

    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part III
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part IV
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part V
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part VI

  • Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I

    In this series I set out the doctrine of religious restraint, the idea that in a pluralistic, liberal, society religious beliefs should not be utilised in the formation of public policy. I note that this doctrine entails an asymmetrical treatment of religious and secular beliefs, which appears to conflict with the central notion of liberal democracy that all people are equal and that the state should be neutral in respect to different conceptions of the good. I examine several key arguments in support of the doctrine and some defences of this asymmetry. I argue these arguments are subject to numerous difficulties and the asymmetry appears arbitrary and unjustified.

    As far back as the birth of liberal democracy commentators have proposed various forms of epistemological restraint on the nature and extent of the justifications offered for coercive laws. Justification is important because central to the concept of liberal democracy is the notion that all people are free and equal. Broadly speaking, the state must accord equal protection to all who come within its territory. Public policy must allow people equal freedom to live their lives as they see fit. Every adult must have an equal voice in the governance of society through the democratic process. Charles Larmore sums this up,[1]

    The familiar constitutional rights of free-expression, property, and political participation, though no doubt serving to promote the goal of democratic self-rule, also have an independent rationale. They draw upon that most fundamental of individual rights, which is the right [of every person] to equal respect.

    A diversity of beliefs, views and religions flourishes as people avail themselves of these liberties and come to different understandings about life, the world they live in, the meanings and purposes thereof. The fact of this plurality invites an important corollary to the concept of liberal democracy, typically formulated as the idea that the state must remain neutral with respect to the different religions and comprehensive viewpoints present within society.

    This is not to say that the state must hold that all views are equally true, just or good. Likewise, it is not a requirement that the state must adopt the incoherent stance of affirming (as a truth) that there is no such thing as truth. Nor that it should not concern itself with injustice or deleterious conduct. What is meant by this requirement is that, as a body that exists to serve the people, it is not the state’s role to rule on what is or is not the correct philosophy, worldview or religion; each person must be free to determine this. The state being neutral in this way shows equal respect for the freedom of all people.

    When state neutrality is conjoined with the concepts of all people being free, equal and worthy of respect, it follows that coercive legislation needs justification. If people are worthy of respect then there exists a prima facie presumption against state coercion. A commitment to state neutrality entails that justification must be drawn from neutral grounds. I will refer to this view of liberal democracy as “the standard view.”

    Common to almost all versions of the standard view is some form of restraint on religious reasons being offered as a form of justification. Richard Rorty, alluding to Jefferson’s famous reference to a wall of separation, describes this as [2]

    the happy, Jeffersonian compromise that the Enlightenment reached with the religious. This compromise consists in privatizing religion — keeping it out of … “the public square,” making it seem bad taste to bring religion into discussions of public policy.

    The doctrine is more than just a restraint on religious reasons; Nicholas Wolterstorff expounds further;[3]

    Definitive of the position is a negation at this point: citizens (and officials) are not to base their decisions and/or debates concerning political issues on their religious convictions. When it comes to such activities, they are to allow their religious convictions to idle. They are to base their political decisions and their political debate in the public space on the principles yielded by some source independent of any and all of the religious perspectives to be found in society. … The source must be such that it is fair to insist that everybody base his or her political decisions, as well as public political debates, on the principles yielded by that source.

    Paul Rishworth writes, “some have contended that the nature of religious belief is such that, while it may be integral to individual autonomy and development, it has no proper role in public policy debates and that these ought to be conducted exclusively in secular terms that are equally accessible to all.”[4]

    Christopher Eberle and Terence Cuneo refer to this position as the doctrine of religious restraint (DRR) that they define canonically as[5]

    The DRR: a citizen of a liberal democracy may support the implementation of a coercive law L just in case he reasonably believes himself to have a plausible secular justification for L, which he is prepared to offer in political discussion. [Emphasis original]

    Eberle and Cuneo explain the implications of the DRR, “if a citizen is trying to determine whether or not she should support some coercive law, and if she believes that there is no plausible secular rationale for that law, then she may not support it.”[6]

    I           The Doctrine of Religious Restraint

    As Wolterstorff identifies in the quotes above, the restraint is negative; justifications for coercive laws must not be religious. The extent and nature of the independent source that acceptable justifications may be drawn from varies depending on which advocate one reads; all agree that a coercive law must be able to be justified by a plausible secular justification if it is to be neutral.

    Defenders of the DRR claim that it need not be codified. It is a moral requirement upon people regardless of their role within society; some form of censure rather than legal stricture is what is suggested. Rorty reflects this when he refers to it being “bad taste” to bring religion into the public square. Stephen Carter puts it clearly;[7]

    One good way to end a conversation – or start an argument – is to tell a group of well educated professionals that you hold a political position (preferably a controversial one such as being against abortion or pornography) because it is required by your understanding of God’s will. In the unlikely event that anyone hangs around to talk with you about it, chances are that you will be challenged on the ground that you are intent on imposing your religious beliefs on other people. And in contemporary political and legal culture, nothing is worse.

    There is an asymmetry present in most versions of the DRR; state coercion can be justified by some secular justifications but it can never be justified by religious justifications. In reviewing a definitive defence of the DRR advanced by Robert Audi, Philip Quinn observes;[8]

    These principles impose burdens on religious people that Audi nowhere suggests imposing on nonreligious people. … Audi does not propose that nonreligious people must be sufficiently motivated by adequate religious reason for their advocacy or support of restrictive laws or politicise. The lack of symmetry is striking.

    Eberle and Cuneo, in their discussion of the DRR, note the same asymmetry;[9]

    There is an important asymmetry between religious and secular reasons in the following respect: some secular reasons can themselves justify state coercion but no religious reason can. This asymmetry between the justificatory potential of religious and secular reasons, it is further claimed, should shape the political practice of religious believers. According to advocates of the standard view, citizens should not support coercive laws for which they believe there is no plausible secular rationale, although they may support coercive laws for which they believe there is only a secular rationale.

    Not surprisingly, the DRR is controversial despite its current orthodoxy. Religious believers are required to omit beliefs they understand to be true or hold as important when they grapple with public policy. Stephen Carter captures the sentiment well when he labels this “the separation of church and self.”[10] Yet defenders of the DRR maintain that some form of religious restraint is not only in accord with the notion of liberal democracy but essential to it, as Rorty puts it, “we shall not be able to keep a democratic political community going unless the religious believers remain willing to trade privatization for a guarantee of religious liberty.”[11]

    For the DRR to be as pervasively held in the literature, in society generally and within religious-freedom jurisprudence there must exist good reasons as to how the DRR does uphold the concepts of equal protection, freedom, voice and neutrality in spite of the charges critics level against it.

    In my next posts in this series, Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part II, I will look at some of the arguments for the doctrine of religious restraint. These are mostly variants of appeals to respect (such as the golden rule, epistemic inaccessibility) or arguments around the dangers of religion.


    [1] Charles Larmore quoted in Michael J Perry Under God? Religious Faith and Liberal Democracy (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2003) 36.
    [2] Richard Rorty “Religion as a Conversation-Stopper” (1994) 3:1 Common Knowledge 1, 2.
    [3] Nicholas Wolterstorff “The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues” in Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (eds) Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, Lanham Md, 1997) 67-120, 73.
    [4] Paul Rishworth “Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion” in Paul Rishworth, Grant Hushcroft, Scott Optican and Richard Mahoney (eds) The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2003) 277-307, 279.
    [5]
    Christopher J. Eberle and Terence Cuneo “Religion and Political Theory” (2008) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (at 9 August 2009).
    [6]
    Ibid.
    [7]
    Stephen Carter The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialise Religious Devotion (Basic Books, New York, 1993) 23-24.
    [8]
    Philip Quinn “Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate” (2000) 60:2 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 486, 487 (book review).
    [9]
    Eberle and Cuneo, above n 5.
    [10]
    Carter, above n 7, 1.
    [11]
    Rorty, above n 2, 3.

    This series was written as a supervised research paper in pursuit of my LLB. I am very grateful to a number of people who personally encouraged me, gave feedback, recommended  resources  or were good enough to supply me with their own – particularly my supervisor, Paul Rishworth; philosophers: Glenn Peoples, Lydia McGrew, Alexander Pruss, Francis J Beckwith, Nicholas Wolterstorff and my husband, Matthew Flannagan.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part II
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part III
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part IV
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part V
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part VI

  • The Question of Islam

    An interesting discussion of Islam has been occurring at Kiwiblog. Up until now I have merely chipped in to correct inaccurate claims about Christian beliefs and practices. However, for what its worth I’ll add my two cents worth here.

    Here is what I think the issues are.

    We are familiar with Christian teachings on the morality of violence. The just war theory of Augustine, Aquinas, Gratian, Vitoria, Calvin, Luther and Grotius have been pretty much codified into international law and things like the Geneva accords. They are now at least held up as the correct rules ( even if they are not always followed in practice) by liberal democratic societies. We are also familiar with various other ideas which come from Christianity the idea that individuals have inalienable rights which the state cannot transgress. Those non believers should be tolerated. That Government should be limited. That Church and state are separate institutions with degrees of autonomy from each other. That the state should be concerned with the temporal welfare of its citizens and not their welfare in the life to come. While it’s fashionable for people to attribute to these things to the enlightenment, in reality, much of this in is found in Medieval Theology and even in earlier writers like the Church fathers. The basic premises of course come from the scriptures.

    Now when we confront Islam we confront (a) a religion we know less about (b) a religion which historically has threatened parts of Europe with invasion and hence has been feared and (c) whose high profile practitioners seem to have very different understandings of these things. Some of them appear to believe direct killing of non combatants is permissible and they seem to not respect the Geneva accords. They appear to have more absolute governments. Have clerics exercising vetoing legislation and they seem to threaten people with death if they don’t convert etc.

    I guess the question is this: does this historically feared tradition have the same moral teachings about these things Christianity does? And if it does not what does that mean for religious tolerance? How far can a religion disagree with our current consensus on these types of questions before tolerance is no longer acceptable? And finally, if we tolerate it and large numbers of the population embrace this religion how will that change the cultural values and assumptions which our liberal institutions are based on?

    I do not know the answers to these questions. but I think they need to be asked and debated. Not dismissed as Islamiphobia. I also think that the debate should be informed not a banding about of stereotypes and caricatures about either religion.

    This latter point requires emphasis. If we see the discussion as it occurs today one side dregs up stereotypes of Muslims and attempts to quote the Koran out of context without examining the tradition, critical commentaries that responsible study of this document requires. Another side dregs up stereotypes of Christians and argues they are the *real* problem and predictably do the same thing. They argue that the scriptures support rape, torturing heretics we are told. Any debate on the question of religious tolerance which relies on slander, ignorance and prejudice towards religious minorities scares me. The alternative to tolerance is supression; which involves violence. If it comes to that then lets make sure we have been informed enough to make the right decision.

    I would also add that these questions are not new. Medieval Theologians like Aquinas supported religious tolerance for Jews and Muslims but and not for Heretics. This is because he perceived heretics to threaten the institutions of society whereas other monotheistic minorities did not. Latter, John Locke suggested that religious dissenters (what Aquinas would have called Christian heretics) should be tolerated provided they did not challenge the moral values essential to a free and just society. Locke advocated suppressing Christian groups that taught contracts could not be kept with heretics because that would undermine the co-operation needed to maintain a free and just society. He also supported the suppression of atheists because he felt belief in a moral law giver was a necessary foundation for such a society. Some contemporary Gay rights advocates seem to believe we should not tolerate evangelical Christianity because opposing homosexual conduct inevitably incites violence. Or is opposed to certain understandings of equality which they think justice requires. Libertarians draw the line at aggression, because they believe freedom needs to be based on everyone refraining from the initiation of force.

    The irony of this, of course, is that many of defenders of one position view the others as being opposed to tolerance. As though tolerance did not come in degrees. Everyone is for tolerance of some religions and no one to my knowledge tolerates all religions. Because we have conducted the debate in this manner few people have been able to ask the real question : How far should tolerance extend?

    Aquinas’s question is still with us. When does error in Theology become serious enough for the state to step in?

  • Jim Flynn’s suggestion: Contraception and Religious Freedom

    When I was teaching the history of early modern philosophy at Otago last year, one of my students told me I reminded them of Dr Jim Flynn. This was supposed to be a compliment. Flynn was highly regarded at Otago even those who considered themselves conservatives had good things to say about Flynn. I knew him by reputation only, having never had the privilege of meeting him. I did however learn one thing about Flynn during my stint at Otago: he is a left wing activist who is militantly secular.

    Recently Flynn has attracted negative attention for these comments.

    “I do have faith in science, and science may give us something that renders conception impossible unless you take an antidote,”

    “You could of course have a chemical in the water supply and have to take an antidote. If you had contraception made easier by progress, then every child is a wanted child.”

    Flynn here seems to view a situation where contraception was placed in the water supply an example of progress. Many have interpreted this to mean that Dr Flynn believes that the government should put contraceptive in the water supply? Flynn has claimed this is a misrepresentation of his comments.

    Dr Flynn told the Otago Daily Times he was merely trying to illustrate a point,
    not seriously suggesting contraception in the water supply. Considering the opposition to fluoride in the water, such a scheme would never go ahead, he said.
    But to have a contraception device that meant women had to take action to get pregnant instead of having to take a pill not to get pregnant, “would be wonderful”. “It doesn’t seem to me too controversial at all.”

    What really bothers me in this quote is that Flynn only states that such a policy is politically unfeasible. He does not appear to think it is unjust or violates people’s rights. I think this fact illustrates something important about the political culture in which we live.

    First let me state why I believe a policy of putting contraceptives in the water supply is unjust. It violates a persons freedom of religion. Let me explain: As a Christian Theist I believe that every person has a sacred responsibility to carefully consider ones conscience and act in accord with what one considers to be Gods will. The existence of this responsibility entails a freedom or right to carry it out. Now according to Roman Catholic teaching artificial contraception is a mortal sin which violates natural law. While this teaching is popularly associated with Catholicism Catholics are not alone in believing it, many of the Protestant Reformers also held this view, and many Protestants still do. Now I happen to disagree with them. I do not think contraception violates the law of God. However, I do acknowledge that these people believe sincerely that God commands this and because of this they have a right to refrain from using contraception if they choose. They have right not just to opt out of contraceptive practises but to not opt in in the first place.

    Now, there is an obvious objection to this argument: freedom of religion is a only prima facie right. Consider Sati a Hindu practise whereby a wife is burnt alive at her husband’s cremation. This practise was justly suppressed by the British in India. This however shows that freedom of religion is only a prima facie right and it can be overridden by other more weighty principles such as “do not kill innocent human beings”.

    But this is precisely where I see the battle lines being drawn in contemporary culture. While there is a broad consensus that there exists a prima facie right to freedom of religion. There is no consensus on when is it appropriate to override this prima facie right? Are you permitted to do so only when the religion advocates engaging in a seriously immoral action like homicide? Or is the promotion of social utility sufficient to override it? To make things specific: If it is good that every child be a wanted child is this good of sufficient weight to override the prima facie right to freedom of religion?

    This brings me to a crucial point: How one answer’s this question in fact depends on the theological perspective one adopts.

    Suppose one believes that belief in God is irrational on par with belief in Santa Claus or the tooth fairy and those traditional views about sexuality and procreation are simply homophobic misogynist bigotry. Suppose one is also a secular utilitarian and believes our duties consist not of following commands but of doing whatever maximises net utility. Then one is not going to grant the freedom to follow what one believes God commands a huge amount of weight in ones reasoning. Suppose a person stated that he was opposed to a utility maximising policy because he thought Santa Claus had informed him that Aryans’ were the superior race and this policy prevented him and his community living in accord with that belief. How many people would cease to support the policy? Most I think would be unmoved.

    On the other hand suppose one believes that God exists, that he issues commands to human beings that constitute our moral duties and that God holds people accountable for how well they discharge these duties. Then one will grant the freedom to act in accord with what believes to be Gods will much higher weight. Moreover, seeing one sees morality as “a set of rules or precepts of conduct, constituting a divine law”[1] one will not find utilitarian justifications of social policy plausible.

    Returning to the policy of putting contraception in the water supply from the perspective of some secular leftists there is nothing unjust about this policy. True the policy violates freedom of religion if that freedom is understood in Christian context. However, if we remove this right from this context and replace it with a secular context freedom of religion can be re-contextualised. Re-contextualised in a manner where Roman Catholicism does not fall under it. And where the freedom to be an evangelical protestant is viewed the same way current society views a Nazis freedom to be a Nazi something begrudging deferred to when the matter is not to serious, but easily overridden by important social policy.

    [1] Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 6.