Tag: Theology

  • The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part I

    Implicit, if not overtly explicit, in much historic Christian moral reflection on feticide is a simple three-premise position. Firstly, that there is a divine law prohibiting homicide, the killing of a human being without adequate justification; secondly, a formed conceptus, a fetus, is a human being; and thirdly, that in all or most cases of feticide, justification for homicide is not forthcoming. In this study, I will refer to this line of argument as the Alexandrian argument, naming it after the Alexandrian Jews from whom it originated.

    The Alexandrian argument receives one of its clearest expositions by Philo. In his commentary on the Decalogue, The Special Laws, Philo argues that the law of God considered the killing of a formed conceptus to be homicide and hence a violation of the sixth commandment. [1] With this conclusion established, Philo offered an a fortiori argument against the widespread practice of infanticide in his day. If killing a fetus before birth were homicide, then killing children after birth would be as well. Therefore, the law condemned infanticide, like feticide.

    Like Philo, numerous, early-Christian writers appealed to feticide in a fortiori arguments against infanticide and appropriate the argument Philo expounds, examples include Athenagoras,[2] Tertullian[3] and Minucius Felix.[4] This argument against infanticide is also found in the Second-Century catechism The Apostolic Constitutions.[5] And is formulated by Pope Stephen wrote in 887 A.D.[6] Allusions to the Alexandrian argument also appear in the writings of Jerome,[7] Lactantius,[8] Gregory of Nyssa,[9] Cyril of Alexandria,[10] Theodoret,[11] Ambrosiaster[12] and Augustine of Hippo.[13]

    In the early Middle Ages the Alexandrian argument found its way into penitential literature, particularly the collections, The Canones Hibernenses (675 A.D), Bigotian Penitential,[14] Anglo-Saxon Penitentials (668-690 A.D), Capitula Deacheriana, Canoes Gregorii and Penitentiale Discupulus Umbrensium. Later through Ivo of Chartres, it was incorporated into official canon law in the The Concordia of Gratian (1160), the Compilationes of Bernard of Pavia and the official Decretals of Raymond of Pennaforte. The position also found its way into civil law; Bracton and Fleta appropriated the argument into English common law and on the continent, Canon lawyers: Ionnaes, Teutonicus, Henricus de Sequsio and the thirteenth-century jurists reinterpreted Roman law in light of Canon law.

    The claim that feticide was homicide was also defended by medieval theologians such as Peter Lombard (1095-1160), Albert the Great (1206-1280),[15] Thomas Aquinas.[16] [17] It was assumed in the causitical discussions of John of Naples and Antoninus. This led to a debate about the licitness of therapeutic abortion amongst his contemporaries and later theologians.

    The argument is also ecumenical. It is alluded to by Luther,[18] defended by Calvin,[19] Melanchthon[20] and Puritan writers Gullimeau in Child Birth[21] and William Gouge.[22]

    What is important for this study is that this debate demonstrates that casuistry of this sort was engaged in with a background acceptance of the Alexandrian argument. In her book Our Right to Choose, Beverly Wildung Harrison attempts to undercut this traditional of interpretation. Harrision alleges that the Alexandrian argument is based on a mistranslation of the Hebrew text. Harrison states,

    [W]hen the Pentateuch was translated into Greek by Alexandrian Jews in the second century, this Septuagint translation of Exodus 21:22 introduced a distinction between an unformed and a formed fetus uncharacteristic of the original Hebrew text. As a result, the original proscription against causing the death of a pregnant woman was transformed by translation into a command to exact the same penalty if a “formed” fetus died. Roman Catholic historian John Connery acknowledges that it was this mistranslation that motivated the Jewish thinker Philo Judaeus’s rigorous tract Two Ways that was adapted by the Christian writer of the Didache. The result, which Connery also grants, was that the mistranslation of the Septuagint influenced Christians far more than Jews. As Connery observes “Rabbinical Judaism, after the destruction of the temple, reverted to its own traditional interpretations of life in the womb as … part of the mother’s body”.[23]

    Harrison claims to be citing conservative, Catholic theologian, John Connery; however, an examination of the text suggests that the person she refers to is George Williams.[24] Numerous commentators have made the claim of mistranslation though they do not press it as an argument against the tradition as Harrison does. Harrison’s argument is based on apparent discrepancies between The Septuagint (LXX) and The Masoretic Text (MT) over the rendering of Exodus 21:22-25. The LXX translation of Exodus 21:22-25 reads,

    22 If two men fight and strike a pregnant woman, and her unformed embryo departs, he shall be fined; according as the woman’s husband lays upon (him) he shall give according to what is thought fit. 23 But if it be formed, he shall give a life for a life.[25]

    This differs from the MT,

    22When people who are fighting injure a pregnant woman so that there is a miscarriage, and yet no further harm follows, the one responsible shall be fined what the woman’s husband demands, paying as much as the judges determine.23 If any harm follows, then you shall give life for life, 24eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, 25 burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for stripe.[26]

    Harrison’s argument regarding this discrepancy consists of three claims. Firstly, she suggests that Christian prohibition of feticide is based upon the LXX, that early Christian writers aquired the LXX translation via the Didache. Secondly, she suggests that the MT, which in her view accurately captures the original law, did not consider feticide a major crime. Commenting upon the RSV translation of the MT, she states,

    [It] demonstrates that causing the death of a fetus did not constitute a major crime at that time; payment of a fine to a prospective father was considered adequate compensation for the miscarriage. Hurting or maiming a pregnant woman, on the other hand, was a serious penal offence equivalent to other life denying crimes.[27]

    Thirdly, she argues that the LXX mistranslates this law and incorporates a prohibition of feticide into the text that is not there.

    If these three contentions are correct then the Alexandrian argument simply rests upon a mistranslation of scripture. Moreover, Harrison contends that if this mistranslation were corrected and the correct interpretation followed, the Torah should lead those who wish to be faithful to scripture to support feticide as licit.

    In response I will examine whether each of Harrison’s contentions are correct. From the outset I will grant Harrison’s assumption that the MT accurately captures the original and that the LXX is the later translation. I will also grant her point that the argument has origins in Alexandrian Judaism and the LXX. (I have already defended this claim elsewhere so I cannot consistently reject it here). The discussion will then ask whether each of Harrison’s other claims are correct.

    Does the Masoretic Text Consider Feticide a Major Crime?
    Harrison claims that the law “demonstrates that causing the death of a fetus did not constitute a major crime at that time; payment of a fine to the prospective father was considered adequate compensation”.[28] She is not alone in making this argument. In an influential textbook James Rachels argues,

    The scriptural passage that comes closest to making a specific judgment about the moral status of fetuses occurs in the 21st chapter of Exodus. The chapter here is part of a detailed description of the law of the ancient Israelites. Here the penalty for murder is said to be death; however, it is also said that if a pregnant woman is caused to have a miscarriage, the penalty is only a fine, to be paid to her husband. Murder was not a category that included fetuses. Clearly, the Israelites regarded fetuses as something less than full human being.[29]

    Similarly, Graham Spurgeon argues,

    [I]f you cause the death of the fetus, you merely pay a fine; if you cause the death of the woman, you lose your own life. Thus the Bible clearly shows that a fetus is not considered a person. If the fetus were considered to be a person, then the penalty for killing it would be the same as for killing the woman – death.[30] [Emphasis original]

    These arguments all rely on three interpretative judgements some of which are reflected in the N.R.S.V. translation cited above.

    (a) That the case under discussion is that of a pregnant woman being struck and then miscarrying as a result.

    (b) That vv 22 and 23 distinguish between whether there is or is not, harm to the woman.

    (c) That the punishments rendered in each case are qualitatively different. If the fetus is killed, the punishment is “only a fine”, indicating it is not a serious offence. On the other hand, if the woman is killed the penalty is more serious. It is death.

    I think that (a) and (b) are defensible but that (c) is not.

    In my coming posts I will address each in turn starting with my next post where I will address whether the passage refers to a miscarriage.

    [1] Judaeus Philo, “The Special Laws III,” in The Contemporary of Josephus, Translated from the Greek, trans. by Charles Duke Yonge (1993) (108)(109).
    [2] Athenagoras, A Plea for the Christians, 35.
    [3] Tertullian, Apology, 9.8.
    [4] Minucius Felix, Octavius, 30.
    [5] Apostolic Constitutions, 7.3 and Teaching of the Twelve Apostles, 5.
    [6] Epistle to Archbishop of Mainz.
    [7] Jerome, Letters, 121.4.
    [8] Lactantius, De Opifico Dei, 12, 17.
    [9] Gregory of Nyssa, On the Holy Spirit Against Macedonius.
    [10] Cyril of Alexandria, De Adoratione in Spirtu et Veritate, 8.
    [11] Theodoret, Questions on Exodus, 48.
    [12] Ambrosiaster, QQ Veteris et Novi Testamenti, 23.
    [13] Augustine, Commentary on the Heptateuch, 2. 80.
    [14] Penitentiale Bigotianum, 4.2, 2-4.
    [15] Bonaventure, Commentarium in Librum IV Sententiarium, d 31 dub 4.
    [16] Thomas Aquinas, Commentarium in Librum IV Sententiarium, d 31.
    [17] Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II II Q64 Article 8.
    [18] Ewald M Plass, What Luther Says: An Anthology, (St Louis, MO: Concordia Publishing House, 1959) 509, cited in G. Willams, “Religious Residues and Presuppositions in the American Debate on Abortion,” Theological Studies 31:1
    [19] John Calvin, Harmony of the Law, Vol. 3 http://www.ccel.org/c/calvin/comment3/comm_vol05/htm/TOC.htm.
    [20] Melanchthon, “Definitio Animae Usitata in Eccesia,” Corpus Reformatorum 13, cited in G. Willams, “Religious Residues and Presuppositions in the American Debate on Abortion,” Theological Studies 31:1 (1970).
    [21] J. Guillmeneau Child Birth 70-73, cited in G Willams “Religious Residues and Presuppositions in the American Debate on Abortion,” Theological Studies 31:1 (1970).
    [22] W Gouge, Of Domesticall Duties, Eight Treatises 506, cited in G. Willams “Religious Residues and Presuppositions in the American Debate on Abortion,” Theological Studies 31:1 (1970).
    [23] Harrison, Our Right to Choose, 136.
    [24] George H. Willams, “Religious Residues and Presuppositions in the American Debate on Abortion,” Theological Studies 31:1 (1970): 20. Connery, in fact, suspends judgement on the question of whether the LXX is a mistranslation and he says nothing about Philo being behind the Didache.
    [25] Isser, “Two Traditions:,” 30.
    [26] Exodus 21:22-25 N.R.S.V.
    [27] Harrison, Our Right to Choose, 68.
    [28] Ibid.
    [29] Rachels, Elements of Moral Philosophy, 50.
    [30] Graham Spurgeon, The Religious Case for Abortion (Asheville, NC: Madison and Polk, 1983), 16.


    RELATED POSTS:
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part II
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part III
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part IV
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part V
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part VI

  • Christian Philosophy as Necromancy

    I believe my vocation as a Christian Philosopher and Theologian is to provoke people to wrestle with the existential questions they face regarding themselves and God and to challenge them to take Christian answers to these questions seriously.

    I was thinking about metaphors for the conversation my vocation requires me to engage in and I came up with the idea of Christian philosophy as Necromancy; Necromancy is the practice of communicating with the dead. In the religious or quasi-religious traditions of some societies it is believed that a person’s soul or spirit continues to exist after they die. The departed spirits can communicate with those still living and those still living can consult their knowledge and advice on matters of importance to them provided that the communication is done through a medium known as a necromancer. The necromancer is a person who is believed to have a special skill of discerning and interpreting what the departed spirits are saying and making this accessible to the enquirers. Similarly, the necromancer is able to put the questions of the enquirer to the departed. Necromancy is a two way conversation; the enquirers putting questions to the departed and the departed giving their answers through the necromancer.

    I believe in my own field at least (and in more other fields than is often realised) that what I do is analogous to Necromancy. In the analogy, the enquirers are my audience, the Necromancer is the Christian philosopher and messages of the departed spirits are the subjects under discussion. The departed spirits are the great scholars and thinkers who have gone before us.

    Let me elucidate this a bit more fully. In philosophy many of the most significant writings are by people who are dead, people like Plato, Hume and Descartes. The same is true in religious education where one is trying to encourage people to understand and inculcate a theological tradition.

    A tradition is a body of purported knowledge (in religious traditions often revealed knowledge) handed down to the current generation from its ancestors. The point of studying tradition is to appropriate the wisdom (and to winnow out the folly) of the past and apply it to a contemporary context.

    While these people are dead, the issues they faced are of relevance to us today because many of the questions they addressed are questions we still encounter and want answers to; we want to know what is truth? What is the purpose for existence? What is knowledge? Who are we? What is God’s will? Etc. These people provided, often, carefully reasoned answers to these questions and the point of studying them is to try to appropriate their insights in our own context. Studying these people’s writings, if done properly, is not just to read these people but to enter into dialogue with them.

    Why did Plato hold the views he did? What were his reasons – are they cogent? If I offered a particular objection to his position how could it be responded to? When one reads the differing views of Plato and Aristotle who was correct? Why? In the debate between them, which arguments are sound and which are not? Can Plato’s position be modified to stand up to the criticism of Aristotle? And so on. To engage this subject properly it is not enough to just passively read; one must enter the debate and contribute to the discussion oneself. We do this because we have a stake in the questions involved and because the answers to these questions are important.

    So in a very real sense, religious education and philosophy are conversations with the dead. We have existential and philosophical questions we want answered and we “consult” the teachings of our dead ancestors to help us answer these questions; in doing so we enter into dialogue between us and them.

    As I noted, a necromancer is a person skilled at interpreting the teachings of the dead. This means the Christian philosopher must also be a scholar; he or she must understand these teachings and be in a constant two-way conversation with the dead him or herself. Her or she must also be able to articulate this conversation to others. His or her job is to try and take what he or she learns about what the dead have to say and then make it accessible to contemporary people and show them how it addresses the issues and answers they are asking.

    The Christian philosopher also functions as a medium of two-way conservation with the dead. He or she is to pose questions to his or her audience on behalf of the dead. She or he is to take what they have said and place it squarely in front of the audience, demonstrating the challenges this information raises to their lives. The Christian philosopher must also defend the teachings of the dead against misunderstanding and misrepresentation, to a degree he or she plays “devils advocate,” so to speak, by taking the side of the dead, for the sake of argument, against the questions and scepticism of his audience to get them to take what is said seriously and to not just flippantly reject it as the ideas of non-modern people.

    At the same time, the Christian philosopher should pose questions to the dead on behalf of the audience; he or she should offer the objections and questions that modern people raise to the dead and ponder their writings, critically evaluating what they have said.

    There is some weakness in this analogy; not all Theologians and Philosophers are dead. Even so, they usually write standing in a tradition or their writings are informed by their own reflections on the past. Hence, it must be stressed that a Christian Philosopher is not the only necromancer that exists. She or he is part of a community of necromancers, thus it is a communal project of discernment. This means that the teacher’s discernment and interpretation of the departed messages are not just based on his or her own insights but the shared insight of the necromancer’s guild. This may involve appropriation of other necromancer’s insights as well as critical commentary and interpretation of other necromancers; the conversation with the dead has horizontal as well as vertical elements.

    Others may object that my account here is too conservative, that it sees Christian philosophy as the inculculation of tradition. This is something of a caricature; what I am talking about is not mere inculculation but also a critical appropriation of tradition. I would add that the negative stance towards tradition expressed is such sentiments is based on certain enlightenment views of epistemology that I think are mistaken. The thinkers of the middle ages were much wiser than we are here in that they did not disparage everything from the past.

    Finally, necromancy is considered, in those societies where it is practiced, as a sacred vocation and I believe this equally applies for the Christian Philosopher and Theologian; we are assisting people to wrestle with and find answers to the deep questions they face about God and this is something that must not be undertaken lightly.

  • Capital Punishment in the Old Testament: 2

    In Capital Punishment in the Old Testament: 1 I suggested that the capital sanctions found in The Torah in most cases were not intended to be carried out, that instead there operated an implicit assumption that a person who committed a serious crime had forfeited their life and hence was to pay a ransom as decided by the courts as a substitute. One area where this claim seems to make particular sense is in the laws governing adultery that occur in the book of Deuteronomy.

    In the article I cited in the previous post, David Brink, addresses Deuteronomy 22: 13-21. Brink claims this teaches “that the community can and should stone to death any women whose husband finds she was not a virgin on her wedding night.”

    I’ll start with two minor points. First, Brink assumes that this is addressed to “the community,” by which I assume he means contemporary communities. This is false; it is addressed to ancient Israel’s community as any reading of the opening chapters of Deuteronomy clearly show. How The Mosaic Law relates to contemporary Christians is a detailed and vexed topic of biblical hermenutics yet Brink ignores the issues and simply assumes that it addresses us directly.

    Second, this text deals with adultery and not pre-marital sex. As Gordon Wenham notes pre-marital sex is addressed a few lines later in Deuteronomy 22: 28-29.[1] Wenham notes that the case Brink cites (Dt 22:13-21) deals with adultery.[2] In ANE law, betrothal was considered a binding marriage; women were betrothed young and often some time before they consummated the marriage. This case deals with betrothed women who after betrothal and prior to consummation has sex with a third party. As I note in footnote 15, this is a minor point. I am sure Brink is not allayed by the fact that she is to be executed for adultery as opposed to pre-marital sex, his problem is clearly execution related; that said, it is important that one not exaggerate what the text says.

    Third, as I argued in Part I, when The Torah prescribes that a person be executed, the implict assumption is that this will not be carried out but some lesser financial penalty will be inflicted as a ransom. This seems to be borne out by an examination of this law.

    Brink refers to Deuteronomy 22:13-21, in particular “if … the charge is true and no proof of the girl’s virginity can be found … the men of her town shall stone her to death.” What Brink does not focus on is the sentence if the charges prove to be false; if the husband is simply slandering his bride. In this instance the husband suffers three penalties, first he is subjected to some unspecified punishment which would be at the discretion of the court. It is clear that this is not execution because the text assumes that he will continue to be married to the women in the future. Second the husband shall pay “100 shekels of silver” to the father and lose his right to divorce. Wenham explains the rationale for this price:

    The husband claims that by giving him a dud wife (for his 50 shekels) his father in law had in effect stolen the sum from him. Two legal principles are therefore applicable those dealing with theft and false witness. The penalty for theft of deposited property is double restitution according to Ex xii7. But according to Deut xix19 and other ancient near eastern laws false witnesses were punished with the punishment the accused would have suffered if substantiated”[3]

    This explains the 100 shekels; the problem is that it raises an issue which Wenham is aware of. “[A]ccording to Deut xix19 false witnesses were punished with the punishment the accused would have suffered if substantiated.” If this law meant that substantiation of the husband’s accusation would actually result in the execution of his wife then the failure to substantiate his claim would mean that the husband would be executed, but he is not. Apart from the fine to the father, his other punishment is an unspecified punishment (which is not execution) and loss of his right to divorce. It appears then that the actual execution of the woman was not envisaged. Wenham suggests then a substitute must have been envisaged in this text if it was to be read as coherent and consistent with the other laws in Deuteronomy.

    This conclusion seems to be strengthened by several other passages that deal with the same topic. Two chapters later, Deuteronomy 24:1-5, The Torah deals with a case where a man divorces his wife, “who becomes displeasing to him because he finds something indecent about her.” This same passage is cited by Jesus in the synoptic gospels. David Instone-Brewer has argued, convincingly, that the reference to “something indecent” is interpreted by Christ as referring to adultery.[4] This passage then deals with the same situation as Deuteronomy 24; the text tells us she is divorced and by implication loses her mohar money but is silent on any other punishment. However, the woman is clearly not executed as she marries another man in v 2. This makes sense if the capital sanctions for adultery function as admonitory devices and in practice, a ransom was made as a substitute (possibly alongside a lesser sentence) but it does not make sense if a women who was discovered to have committed adultery by her husband was required to be executed.

    A similar picture emerges in a second passage Wenham cites. In the book of proverbs the author warns his son about adultery and refers to the judicial consequences that will ensue if he does not heed this warning.[5] It is clear that a ransom substitute is envisaged, moreover, it suggests that if the husband refuses to accept a ransom payment the adulterer will suffer blows and disgrace, note that execution is not envisaged. In fact, the discussions in Proverbs suggest the consequences will be financial loss and social ostracism. This all makes sense on the hypothesis mentioned in Part 1 but does not make sense if adultery was in fact punished by death. Wenham notes this point and draws the conclusion that in Deuteronomy 22:13-21 the law envisaged a substitute.

    In conclusion, sceptics like David Brink often cite passages like Deuteronomy 22:13-21 in horror to discredit Christianity. However, they erroneously assume superficial literalistic renditions of the passages in question. In this instance, the genre of the passage, in light of the common ANE legal practices and customs suggests that capital sanctions function as a kind of hyperbole and in practice a ransom was paid and the punishment mitigated.

    This practice is implicitly assumed in many of the Old Testament laws about homicide. Further, reading it this way renders the laws in Deuteronomy consistent with each other and with the reference to adultery in the book of Proverbs. I will add finally, that it also coheres better with our moral intuitions in the way a literalistic reading does not.

    [1] In “Bethulah: A Girl of Marriageable Age,” Vetus Testamentum 22 (1972) 326-348, Gordon Wenham points out that the same law is also spelled out in Exodus 22:15 and it is treated as a relatively minor offense; the penalty is simply that the man must pay the “mohar” to the bride’s father. A mohar was security money (50 shekels) that the groom paid to the bride’s father. It was held in trust for the woman in case the man later abandoned her or divorced her without just cause. See the discussion in David Instone Brewer Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible: The Social and Literary Context (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002).
    [2] Wenham “Bethulah: A Girl of Marriageable Age.”
    [3] Ibid 332.
    [4] Brewer
    Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible.
    [5] Proverbs 6.


    RELATED POSTS:
    Capital Punishment in the Old Testament: 1

  • Capital Punishment in the Old Testament: 1

    In “The Autonomy of Ethics,” David Brink writes that a literal reading of the Old Testament,

    [Y]ields problematic moral claims, such as Deuteronomy’s claims that parents can and should stone to death rebellious children (21:18-21) and that the community can and should stone to death any wife whose husband discovers that she was not a virgin when he married her (22:13-21). We have more reason to accept secular scientific and moral claims than we do to accept a literal reading of these particular religious texts.[1]

    In a footnote Brink refers to several other references to capital punishment in the Old Testament for various different crimes.[2]

    I respect Brink’s stature as an ethicist, however, as an interpreter of scripture his work has left a lot to be desired. That said, I find the kind of hermeneutics he employs common in sceptical literature, so I will address what he says here.

    One principle of interpreting literature is to interpret a text according to its genre. One does not read poetry, for example as science or scientific theorems as songs or math texts as romantic fiction. The book of Deuteronomy, in terms of its structure, literary form and language, parallels the structure and language of Ancient Near Eastern (ANE) legal texts. Many of the cases given are similar to the cases and laws in these texts. As such, this raises the issue as to how references to capital punishment function in such texts.

    In a study of ANE legal corpus, Raymond Westbrook notes that seemingly harsh penalties are common in such codes. In old Babylonian law, the hand that assaults is severed; a man who kisses another’s wife has his lips cut off; a person who steals bees is to be stung by bees; a person who had thrown his victim into an oven was to be thrown into an oven; a man who raped another’s wife would be sentenced to having his own wife or daughter raped; a negligent builder whose house collapsed and killed another’s son would be sentenced to having his own son killed, and so on.[3] In fact, the Code of Hammurabi states that if a man knocks out the eye of one of the upper classes, his eye must be knocked out.[4]

    Not only are these punishments harsh but they both appear inconsistent with the legal practice that occurred in these cultures and also with themselves in some instances. Westbrook notes “[s]ome law codes impose physical punishments and others payments for the same offenses, while some codes have a mixture of the two.”[5] Westbrook notes that the contradiction is only apparent because “in highlighting one or the other alternative, the codes are making a statement as to their view of the gravity of the offence.”[6] The laws “reflect the scribal compilers’ concern for perfect symmetry and delicious irony rather than the pragmatic experience of the law courts.”[7] The method used in legal texts was “to set out principles by the use of often extreme examples.”[8]

    Westbrook points to the practice of “ransoming” as providing an explanation of how this worked in application. In ANE legal practice a person who committed a serious crime would be considered to have forfeited their life or limb, this, however, did not mean they were executed or mutilated. Instead they could ransom their life or limb by making a monetary payment and/or agreeing to some lesser penalty, usually decided by the courts. This background was implicitly accepted and understood to apply.

    Westbrook is not eccentric in this view. J J Finkelstein makes a similar point reflecting on what appears to be very harsh capital (and sometimes vicarious) sentences in the code of Hammurabi and the absurdity and impossibility of putting them into practice. As Finkelstein notes, one law which states that a physician whose patient dies in surgery or is blinded by surgery is to have his hand cut off. Finkelstein remarks that “it is inconceivable that any sane person in ancient Mesopotamia would have been willing to enter the surgeon’s profession if such a law were literally enforced.”[9] On the other hand, “if a system of ransom were assumed where the life of the builder or his son could be redeemed and the hand of the physician could be redeemed by pecuniary ransom, these laws would not only have an admonitory function (for which the more graphic statement of the penalty–execution or mutilation–is more effective), but would also be practical as law.”[10]

    He concludes that Mesopotamian penalty prescriptions,

    [W]ere not meant to be complied with literally even when they were first drawn up, [But rather they] serve an admonitory function. If one would be bold enough to restate Hammurabi’s 230 as a direct admonition it might run to this effect: “woe to the contractor who undertakes construction and in his greed cuts corners”.[11]

    Interestingly many commentators of The Torah have noted it appears to operate with the same assumption. This is particularly evident with the laws regarding homicide. Ex 21: 29-32 deals with a case where an ox gores another person to death due to negligence on the part of the owner. The penalty stated is that the negligent person shall be put to death. However, immediately preceding this, provision is made for a monetary fine to be paid instead of execution. Joe Sprinkle comments,

    [V] 29 applies the principle of [life for life], a man whose negligence has caused the loss of a life forfeits his own life. But v. 30 goes on to show that this operates within a system that permits a payment of money to take the place of the actual execution of the offender.”[12]

    Sprinkle goes on to conclude, “In sum, there is good reason to suppose that the death sentence of v. 29 is mostly hyperbole to underscore the seriousness of negligence which threatens the life of another human being.”[13]

    A second example cited by Sprinkle occurs in the book of Kings. Here an incident is mentioned where a person has committed a capital crime. The sentence is announced “a life for a life”; however, the immediate context shows what this sentence was. “It will be your life for his life or you must weigh out a talent of silver.” Sprinkle notes that here again “’life for life’ in the sense of capital punishment has an explicit alternative of monetary substitution.”[14]

    Perhaps the clearest example is on noted by Walter Kaiser. In Exodus 21:13-14 the law clearly distinguishes between accidental and premeditated homicide. If a man who has struck another and killed that person (an analogous case to a man striking a woman and killing her) seeks sanctuary, he is to be provided it unless he “lay in wait” for his victim. Jackson notes that “lay in wait” referred to premeditated homicide.[15] In Numbers 35 the same law is expounded in more detail; a homicide where a person “lay in wait” is contrasted with a homicide where the assailant “attacked him suddenly without enmity.”[16] This appears to be a reference to an intentional but not premeditated attack such as a ‘crime of passion.’

    After laying out clearly and repeatedly that the a person who kills in pre-meditation “shall surely be put to death” the text goes on to state “’Do not accept a ransom for the life of a murderer, who deserves to die. He must surely be put to death… .” Bloodshed pollutes the land, and atonement cannot be made for the land on which blood has been shed, except by the blood of the one who shed it.” Unless there was an assumed practice of “ransoming” the lives of those under a capital sentence, this comment seems superfluous. Sprinkle notes “The availability of ransom seems to have been so prevalent that when biblical law wants to exclude it, as in the case of intentional murder, it must specifically prohibit it”.[17]

    In, Towards an Old Testament Ethics, Walter Kaiser draws the same conclusion,

    The key text in this discussion is Num 35:31: “Do not accept a ransom [or substitute] for the life of a murderer, who deserves to die. He must surely be put to death.” There were some sixteen crimes that called for the death penalty in the OT…. Only in the case of premeditated murder did the text say that the officials in Israel were forbidden to take a “ransom” or a “substitute”. This has widely been interpreted to imply that in all the other fifteen cases the judges could commute the crimes deserving of capital punishment by designating a “ransom” or “substitute”. In that case the death penalty served to mark the seriousness of the crime.[18]

    In my next post I will argue that this understanding of the references to capital punishment in The Torah makes best sense of the laws regarding adultery that Brink cites (also recently raised by Mark V in the comments section).

    [1] David O Brink “The Autonomy of Ethics” The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, ed Michael Martin (Cambridge :Cambridge University Press, 2007) 159.
    [2] Ibid, note 17, 164.
    [3] See Raymond Westbrook, “The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law,” in A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law, Vol. 1, ed. Raymond Westbrook (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003) 74.
    [4] Code of Hammurabi, 195-196, also 199.
    [5] Westbrook “The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law,” 71-78.
    [6] Ibid.
    [7] Ibid.
    [8] Ibid.
    [9] J. J. Finkelstein The Ox that Gored (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1981) 34-35.
    [10] Joe M Sprinkle “The Interpretation of Exodus 21:22-25 (Lex Talonis) and Abortion,” Westminster Theological Journal 55 (1993) 241
    [11] Finkelstein The Ox that Gored 35.
    [12] Sprinkle “The Interpretation of Exodus” 238.
    [13] Ibid.
    [14] Ibid, 233-53.
    [15] Bernard Jackson. “The Problems of Exodus 21:22-25 (Ius Talionis),” Vetus Testamentum 23 (1973) 288-290.
    [16] Num. 35:22.
    [17] Jackson “The Problems of Exodus” 239.
    [18] Walter Kaiser, “Gods Promise Plan and his Gracious Law,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 35:3 (1992) 293.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Capital Punishment in the Old Testament: 2

  • Faith and Logic

    Recently, Patrick left the following comment in response Madeleine’s post on the Role of the State.

    “[L]ogic and reason are secular, even humanistic processes. Faith is neither of
    those. Logic and faith can be in conflict, I think. From a humanist viewpoint
    there is nothing particularly logical about believing in an invisible God.”

    Apologies to Patrick for whom I have great respect for and whom I have known for years but his statements are sufficiently common amongst evangelicals that they warrant some treatment.

    Essentially Patrick makes three claims:

    1) Logic and reason are secular, humanistic processes.
    2) Faith can be in conflict with logic.
    3) There is nothing logical about belief in an invisible God if you are a humanist.

    Starting with 3). Even if it is true that from a humanist view point there is nothing logical about believing in an invisible God it does not follow that in fact there is nothing logical about believing in an invisible God. This latter claim follows only if a humanist perspective is true.

    Now Patrick, I know, does not believe the humanist perspective is correct and neither do I so it is hard to see what the relevance of this is supposed to be. The fact that a perspective he and I think is mistaken has a particular view does not provide either of us for a reason for affirming the view.

    Further, the claim that it is “illogical” to believe in an “invisible” God is simply false. Patrick here seems to be speaking of the confusion that some Humanists espouse between the question of whether something is logical with whether something is visible. These are quite different matters. Affirming the existence of something is logical if the proposition is logically possible; that is, it does not entail a contradiction.

    However, there are many things that although logically possible, are not visible. In fact, there are many things that though logically possible are in fact false. Possibility after all is not actuality. A couple of examples may help illustrate this point. The claim that there exists promiscuous virgins, or married bachelors is illogical. This is because a person is promiscuous only if he or she has sex and a person is a virgin if they have not had sex. Similarly, a person is a bachelor if they are unmarried and can only be married if they are not unmarried. Hence, the claim that promiscuous virgins or married bachelors exist entails that a person both is and is not married and has and has not had sex. This is a contradiction and so violates a fundamental rule of logic.

    The claim that there is a field of red grass in my back yard on the other hand is false yet not illogical. There is nothing illogical about the concept of a red field of grass in my back yard; if I painted the grass in my yard this possibility would be actual, however, as a matter of fact the grass in my yard is green, but that is not because of any impossibility of it occurring.

    So the fact that God is invisible does not mean it is illogical. If one accepts that the only source of basic knowledge about the world is our five senses, one could argue that belief in an invisible God is unwarranted but this is different from saying it is illogical. I don’t think that the five senses are our only source of basic knowledge about the world (in fact I am inclined to think it is an incoherent claim, after all the claim “the only source of basic knowledge is our five senses” is itself something one can’t prove by hearing, touching, tasting or smelling and hence if this claim were true one could not be warranted in believing it).

    Turning now to 1); that logic is a secular or humanistic process. This is mistaken. Logic is simply a set of rules, most of which are intuitively obvious to properly functioning cognisers, by which one can infer conclusions from premises. Note this last point, logic simply gets one proposition, the conclusion, from other propositions, the premises.

    It in and of itself tells us nothing about what those premises are except that they cannot be premises from which one can infer a contradiction. The premises could be drawn from information gleaned from the five senses, or they could be drawn from revelation, or from memory or some other basic source of information. Nothing about logic rules out having premises that a person believes on the basis of faith. If faith is a basic source of information about God and the world then one can, and should, use logic to draw conclusions from premises obtained via this source.

    Perhaps Patrick things that logic is an unreliable method of inferring conclusions from premises. Christianity is true (and Patrick holds this) yet he thinks that logic and the Christian faith conflict. That seems to suggest that logic cannot be reliable.

    I think this position is problematic; for starters Patrick’s post was, after all, a reply to Madeleine’s. Madeleine had affirmed something and he was attempting to defend the negation of this affirmation. But if logic is unreliable this whole process makes no sense. Negation and affirmation assume the law of non-contradiction, a fundamental rule of logic. In fact without logic human language and discourse would break down and be impossible. Words can have meaning because they refer to something and not to something else and they do so consistently. If a term can mean one thing one day and the opposite the next with no basis or predictability one would never understand anything.

    Patrick also suggests that reason and logic are secular. In one sense he is correct; the word secular comes from the latin word which means temporal or of this world and it is true that logic is a process utilised in this world and for purposes in this world. This is not limited to reason and logic, in this sense of use theology is also secular at least when it is telling us about things of this world and how to live in this world.

    However, I don’t think that Patrick intends this, he is using secular in the modern sense of the word where it means, godless or “practical atheism,” a view which either affirms the non-existence of God or acts for practical purposes as if God does not exist. In this sense, I think Patrick is clearly mistaken; as I noted above, logic simply gets one from a premise to a conclusion there is nothing in logic that entails an assumption that God does not exist. To claim that logic and reason are secular is like claiming that eyesight is secular or that memory is secular as these like and logic and reason are simply methods that human beings naturally use to gain information and understanding about reality. I think that God is part of reality. Just as we use our eyes to read scripture or we use our ears to hear a sermon and we use our memory to recall these things we can use logic and reason to infer conclusions from them.

    The medievals called this process faith seeking understanding. One starts with what one knows by faith and reasons from it to gain a comprehensive, coherent and accurate understanding of reality and answers to the fundamental and philosophical existential questions that we face. It is this project that the evangelical church needs to reclaim.

    If someone says that some aspect of Christianity is illogical they have merely stated it. To prove that it is illogical then they would need to provide us with a proposition or propositions that:

    a) are essential to Christianity;
    b) can be demonstrated to entail a logical contradiction by a valid argument form; and,
    c) utilise premises that Christians are rationally required to accept.

    In the literature some people claim to have done this but such claims are highly controversial and I have yet to come across one that has not been refuted. In light of this, it frustrates me many in the Church uncritically accept this claim and retreat without a single fight and then hide in a false, anti-intellectual pietism.

  • Theology, Morality and Reason

    In my previous post I mediated on the morality of lying. I suggested that a divine command theorist: a person who believes that the property of moral wrongness is the property of being contrary to God’s commands does not need to affirm that lying is wrong in any and all circumstances. In updating the post to which I was replying PC writes.

    UPDATE 2: Matt Flannagan agrees with my conclusion, but disagrees with both my reasoning and my assertion that the religionist is obliged to follow divine commandments without question. On behalf of her own religious beliefs, Lucyna
    disagrees with us both
    . It’s hard to keep up with a religionist!

    PC here conflates two separate issues. He is not alone in this, something like it often comes up amongst people I dialogue with for this reason its worth clarifying the issues here. There is a distinction between [1] Questioning a command one believes to be from God and [2] questioning the claim that a particular action is commanded by God. One can do [2] without doing [1] and doing [1] does not commit one t do doing [2].

    Contrary to PC I don’t support doing [1]. I accept that if God commands an action then one should obey it without question. Note this is a conditional statement, it states “if God commands an action” one does not need to accept that God has commanded an action, or even that God exists to accept this statement. In fact advocates of an ideal observer theory can (and do) hold to this conditional without accepting that God exists at all.

    The reason I accept this conditional is that it seems impossible for a person to coherently and rationally accept that God commanded and action and also to believe the action should not be done. The concept of God is that he is (i) rational, (ii) perfectly good and (iii) omniscient. Hence if God commands something then a rational fully informed perfectly good person commands the action. Under what circumstances then could it be rational to question the command of a fully rational perfectly good fully informed person. Is it that the commander is mistaken.? No, the commander is omniscient ( see (iii) . Is that he informed but is malicious? No it’s stipulated that the person is good (see (ii). Is that he has made a mistaken inference of some sort No, its stipulated that the commander is rational (see (i)) Is it that ones own judgement about what rules need to be inacted are just as good or better that God’s? Unless one is omniscient never ever irrational and morally perfect this will also be false. Hence I simply cannot see any sense in [1]. In fact I find the snarky insinuation that “accepting Gods commands without question” is obviously irrational simply puzzling. How could it be irrational to accept a command which is required by a perfectly rational being? Doesn’t the fact that a perfectly rational, good, fully informed being endorse this rule show that accepting it is compatible with being rational good and informed.

    Nor does denying that [1] is a viable option involve an uncritical, unreflective dogmatic, blind acquiescence to authority. Even if one rejects [1] it does not follow that one reject [2]. The fact that if God commands X we should obey it, does not mean we uncritically accept every claim that God has commanded X. Nor does it mean one does not utilise reason, facts, critical judgement etc in determining what God does command.

    Consider the issue of lying, which PC and I were discussing, it is not that I accept that God commands us to never lie under any circumstances but I have sometimes decide God is mistaken and so adopt a different rule. It is rather that I do not think that a perfectly good, rational being, does command us to never lie. If, as PC contends, its irrational or contrary to human flourishing to accept a rule forbidding lying to the Gestapo, then this entails that a rational being , informed of the facts who cared about our flourishing would not endorse such a rule. If then one is to maintain that God does endorse such a rule one needs to address the kind of arguments PC provides.

    I don’t think this is necessary because I don’t think God issues such a rule. I think that a careful exegesis of scripture provides evidence that they do not teach a non-contextual absolute prohibition on lying. That’s a critical judgement; reading and interpretation requires thinking, sometimes hard thinking. Moreover I think a reflection on the logic of rules suggests there is a kind of implicit exception of this sort, seeing I think that moral rules are divine commands that means I think God has made this exception.

    A final comment worth noting PC seems to insinuate that because Lucyna and I disagree on this issue, religionists ( by which I assume he means theists) are in some kind of trouble. It somehow calls into question theism or “religion” (whatever the term religion means). I often hear this line of argument but have never understood why any one would endorse it. After all don’t atheists sometimes disagree over specific moral issues. In fact don’t Libertarians and Randian’s sometimes disagree amongst themselves. But then why does not this disagreement call atheism and libertarianism into question?

    Today scientists agree that nature exists, they agree over the basic structure of nature and types of laws that govern its behaviour. However despite this they do disagree over numerous issues of how nature behaves, exactly what laws operate or how they operate in a given context. The same is true of Theology, one can accept that God exist and one can even agree on the basics of what God commands and yet still have disagreements over how these commands apply in specific circumstances. This no more provides a reason to denigrate theology and deny the existence of God than scientific reasoning provides reason for denying the existence of the natural world and denigrating science.

    Moral Theology does not involve people blindly accepting authority never reasoning or thinking that is a gross caricature, one who holds it has never read Aquinas, or Augustine, or Calvin, or Locke or Kant, or Berkeley or numerous other contributors to this enterprise. Why people who clearly have so little understanding of the subject pontificate on it in the name of critical informed reason, is frankly, beyond me.

  • Permissible Lies

    In wake of the return of the stolen victoria crosses and the Police claiming they are “honour bound” to pay the thieves the promised reward not PC argues that it is permissible to lie to an agressor. The standard example in the literature (which PC utilises) goes something like this: You are hiding someone fleeing for their life (modern examples use Jews in Nazi occupied territory). A murderer (modern examples usually use the Gestapo) come knocking on your door. They ask you if you know the whereabouts of their prey. Do you tell the truth?

    I agree with not PC that the correct answer to this question is no. I agree that the rule to not lie is restricted in scope, prohibiting lying to competent adults who are not violating our rights or threatening such a violation.

    Interestingly, not PC seems to think I am committed to rejecting this conclusion. He insinuates that Kantian and Divine Command approaches to ethics entail that one can never lie under any circumstances. He writes for example “that moral principles are neither “divine commandments” nor “categorical imperatives” — they are guides to action applying within a certain framework of conditions;”and latter he is more explict

    Unlike the ethics of religionists, Objectivism derives its moral principles not from stone tablets or burning bushes or caliphate commandments — not on what’s needed to live in heaven or paradise in some supernatural realm — but from from the needs of man’s survival and flourishing right here on this earth. The contrast with religious morality could not be greater: for the Objectivist, moral principles are guides to action intended to enhance and sustain one’s life. For the religionist however, moral principles are divine commandments that act like a ball and chain — a dogmatic straitjacket commanding one’s obedience, even if when talking to a Gestapo officer it could lead to your own death or that of a loved one. For the Objectivist, the answer to a Gestapo chief is outside the bounds of morality altogether: morality ends when the Gestapo chief’s gun begins. But for the religionist, telling the truth is an absolute necessity even if it entails the sacrifice of your life and that of your loved ones.

    Here PC is just plain wrong. While it is correct that many Catholic moral theologians support an unqualified prohibition on lying PC misunderstands the rationale they propose for this verdict. Catholic teaching on natural law as (expounded by people like Thomas Aquinas) is precisely that the moral law is derived from what conduces to human flourishing. Lying is prohibited because it is believed to be conducive to human flourishing. It is not prohibited because such a rule makes one fit for heaven or because its set down in tablets of stone promulgated by burning bush (apart from slander lying is not mentioned in the ten commandments) nor is it held to be correct because a priest or caliphate says so. Catholic theologians argue for this thesis from Aristotelian understandings of human flourishing. I think they are incorrect, but thats not an excuse for misrepresenting their position.

    Similar things can be said about Divine Command Theories (and contrary to PC not all “religionists” are divine command theorists) . Divine command theories (DCT) as propounded by Locke, Berkley, Paley, Suarez etc typically affirm that right and wrong are determined by God’s prescriptive will. However these thinkers go on to stress that God is a rational being who wills the flourishing of human beings and hence what God’s will is rational and God commands what promotes or leads or respects human flourishing in some way.

    But to the more substantive point.

    A DC theorist is committed to claiming that it is never wrong to lie in any circumstance, only if believes God has commanded this. Such a claim is often attributed to the Hebrew and Christian scriptures, but this is debatable to say the least. The Hebrew scriptures contain several passages where God approves of lying in certain contexts. One obvious example is the case of the Hebrew midwives in the book of Exodus. In the narrative Pharaoh orders that all Hebrew male children are to be killed at birth. The midwives respond by lying to Pharaoh about the births in order to protect them and are commended by God for their actions. There has been a huge amount of discussion of these passages and their application to moral theology on lying within Christian casuistry. So it is surprising people so often attribute naïve absolutism to moral theologians who take scripture seriously.

    Nor does a person sympathetic (as I am) to Kantian understandings of morality have to embrace the conclusion that’s its never wrong to lie. According to some Kantian’s (such as Alan Donagan) ethical principles have a logic such that one person cannot appeal to a principle for protection as a shield for breaking that principle or another equally as grave. Self defence is perhaps the clearest paradigm: a person cannot rationally appeal to an absolute right to not be killed if he uses that right as a shield to cover his killing of someone else. Such a position involves a contradiction of the will. And it rejects the universalizability of moral principles; the idea that what rules one lays down for others must, if they are moral principles, also apply to oneself.

    I am inclined to think that without something like this condition ethical principles would become incoherent. If one cannot justifiably use force to repel an attacker when the only way the attacker can be repelled is by force then the attacker has a freedom right to attack his victim. But surely if the claim it’s wrong to kill entails anything it entails that people do not have a freedom right to do kill others. Now, if one can use force against a person to protect ourselves and others from their attacks it seems hard to see why we can’t lie or deceive them to do so.

    What does this mean in the present context? It means that not PC is correct that the police are not bound by a promise to pay the reward to those who stole the Victoria Crosses. The Police would be acting licitly if they refused to pay. And nothing about being a divine command theorist or Kantian precludes one drawing this conclusion

    Let me add a final point in defence of PC’s conclusion. The standard argument against lying in this context takes a rule consquentialist line. It’s contended that accepting a rule that permits the police to renege on paying such rewards has bad consequences. Criminals in future cases may not divulge information necessary to solve crimes and hence peoples property will not be returned. The problem here, as with many appeals to consquentialism, is that there are other consequences of accepting this rule which point the other way. A rule where criminals get paid for returning what they steal makes stealing and ransoming pay and hence encourage stealing, kidnapping, ransoming etc.

    Consequently, if one is to appeal to positive consequences in a plausible way one needs to examine the total consequences of accepting the rule. One need’s to examine both how many crimes will be solved by accepting this rule and how much crime will be encouraged if we don’t and it needs to be shown that former good results outweigh the latter. To the best of my knowledge no one has ever done this calculation. Until they have the claim that consequences justify honouring agreements to thieves is unsubstantiated.