Year: 2009

  • Guest Post: The Virtue of Christian Dogma

    The following is authored by Dominic Bnonn Tennant, of the blog Dominic Bnonn Tennant – Developing the Mind of Christ. Please support Bnonn by clicking through to his site. Bnonn writes:

    Damian over at ‘And Slaters Go Plop’ has recently written on Dogma, arguing against its intellectual legitimacy, and asking how we can avoid it. He says,

    By ‘dogmatic’ I am describing an absolutist kind of belief that, if I could summarise in my own words, boils down to the fact that you would really rather hold to what you believe than accept an alternative even if the alternative is true. Dogma is the belief you refuse to interrogate.

    Dogma in Christianity
    “I consider my dogmatism an intellectual virtue”I’d like to note, for the record, that this is not how dogmatism is typically perceived in Christianity. Dogma is a mainstay of biblical Christianity, and where it is rejected the religion crumbles. Dogma is there whenever a doctrine is taken as authoritative, or presupposed as true—such as when we treat the Bible as the word of God. So, for the sake of avoiding confusion, let it be noted that Christians do not define dogma in such a negative way. That is not the primary meaning of the word, as most dictionaries reflect. William Shedd’s Dogmatic Theology, for instance, is a seminal and highly positive dissertation on the theoretical truths of faith concerning God and his works.

    Why is dogmatism bad anyway?
    As regards this colloquial, negative view of dogmatism, however, some questions need to be asked. Damian seems to be taking absolutism in one’s beliefs as inherently undesirable, assuming we do want truth. But this doesn’t seem a very sustainable attitude if he wishes to be consistent and avoid special pleading.

    A dogma, he says, is the belief you refuse to interrogate. But what of beliefs which are not readily interrogatable? Presumably, for instance, we all believe that our sense perception correlates accurately to a real, external world. Is that belief undesirable or unlikely merely because it cannot be readily interrogated? In fact, since we resist attempts to interrogate that belief, and don’t take them seriously, are we acting in a poor or intellectually shoddy manner? It certainly doesn’t seem so. Thus, there look to be at least some beliefs we may hold quite rightly and properly as being basically unquestionable, without shirking our philosophical responsibilities. Why is it, then, that Christians should not take the divine inspiration of Scripture as such a belief? Damian needs to make a better case as regards the negative nature of dogmatism, spell out just when it does and does not apply, and why.

    “should he jump up in dismay and hire a private detective to find me and stake out my home to verify that, indeed, I am a real person who makes real blog posts?”Similarly, what of beliefs which are held on good grounds? Damian presumably thinks he has good grounds for believing that I am a real person and not, say, an advanced computer program writing posts in a convincingly human way. Should he be condemned for resisting the compulsion to interrogate his belief in my existence as a real person on every possible occasion? Were someone to say to him: Your belief in that chap Bnonn Tennant is dogmatic because you refuse to interrogate it! should he jump up in dismay and hire a private detective to find me and stake out my home to verify that, indeed, I am a real person who makes real blog posts? In fact, is he not being entirely rational to refuse to interrogate this belief, in the absence of any good evidence that it is false? If so, why should a Christian be criticized for refusing to interrogate his belief in God, when he has no good reasons to think that it’s false?

    Good reasons
    And what, indeed, would constitute a good reason for thinking that God doesn’t exist? No doubt Damian believes there are many. But on the other hand, a delusional out-patient from the halfway house down the road might think that there are good reasons for believing I don’t exist and am in fact a complicated artificial intelligence. He could probably find all sorts of evidences which, if looked at the right way and with the right mindset, seem quite compelling; and he might produce all sorts of arguments showing that Damian really has the burden of proof. Should Damian be persuaded—should he even look at these evidences or accept this burden of proof—if he already knows that the fellow is a schizophrenic who reverts to believing that Christian bloggers are really internet-capable AIs whenever he’s off his meds? If not, why should a Christian act differently when he knows from Scripture that atheists are self-deceiving fools who deny the existence of God because of their sin?

    The skeptic’s false humility
    The last point I’d like to make is as regards Damian’s assertion that if we refuse to honestly put our beliefs to the test then we ought to show a little more humility when telling others what we ‘know’ to be true. As I’ve already suggested above, this is a perfectly silly attitude to knowledge—its implication being that a belief which is not tested cannot constitute knowledge in any proper sense.

    Even ignoring his obvious imposition of a scientific method of knowledge-acquisition onto religious or philosophical matters, where it doesn’t belong, is this reasonable? Does Damian need to verify my existence, for example, before he can say that he knows I’m not an artificial intelligence? Is this the way he really operates in terms of making knowledge claims? Or take another example: say he sees an acquaintance, Roger, at the supermarket. He doesn’t speak to Roger for whatever reason, and no one else at the supermarket knows him, so Damian is the only one to recognize him. Say Roger is arrested the next day on some charge. Damian thinks Roger can’t be guilty, because he saw him at the supermarket at the time the crime was committed. Is Damian really going to say that he does not know Roger was there, since he did not (and no longer can) test that belief? Is it reasonable for me to get up before the jury when he is testifying in Roger’s defense, and say that he ought to show a little more humility when telling them that he ‘knows’ Roger is innocent? Or imagine the situation is reversed, and Damian ‘knows’ Roger is guilty on a similar basis. Is this sort of stringent view of things really sensible? How would it cash out in the real world?

    Maybe Damian means to confine this constraint on knowledge to religious claims. This seems arbitrary, but it doesn’t get him anything in any case, since Christian beliefs enjoy far better attestation than the trivial amount of support in the example above. In fact, Christians have excellent grounds for saying that they know certain things—so why should they shuffle and slink and pretend false humility, as if they really aren’t certain when they are? A Christian grounds his beliefs in God’s word—does he then need to interrogate these beliefs, or find ways to test them, in order for them to constitute knowledge? Of course not.

    The plain fact that they are God’s own testimony is all the justification required. Thus, rather than being commendable, this “humility” of which Damian speaks is despicable. Imagine a Christian who knows the gospel witnessing to someone as follows:

    I don’t presume to say I know this, but, well, I believe you’re under God’s wrath and liable to judgment if you don’t repent and trust in the work of Jesus. And…well, I don’t know that Jesus really existed…but I’m sure you should believe anyway!

    This is certainly an ignoble way of witnessing. If we, in fact, have good reasons for believing the gospel—if we indeed know the gospel to be true—and then do not urgently entreat others to heed it, attempting to persuade them of its truth as well, we aren’t being “humble”. We are being cads. It doesn’t matter if we have tested our knowledge, or if we can defend it against attack. Speaking for myself, I can—but some Christians can’t for whatever reason. That doesn’t invalidate what they know. Christians don’t accept Damian’s views on epistemology, and neither should they.

    So let’s not throw around the “dogmatism” charge too hastily. I am proud to be a dogmatic Christian, and I consider my dogmatism an intellectual virtue. Saying that I am dogmatic is essentially the same as saying that I am a presuppositionalist in my Christian philosophy—a position which I’ve defended on many occasions. If Damian or other atheists would like to dogmatically oppose that, let them start by showing that it even makes sense to do so.

    If you are interested in guest posting on MandM see our guest posting policy.

  • The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part VI

    This post marks the conclusion in my series on The Alexandrian Argument. Having addressed whether Exodus 21:22-25 deals with a miscarriage or premature birth, whether the harm mentioned in verses 22 and 23 refers to the woman or the fetus and whether the punishments in the relevant clauses are qualitatively different, I will return to the original question which motivated this investigation.

    Does the Septuagint Mistranslate the Hebrew?
    Harrison claims that the Septuagint is a mistranslation that transforms a text that condemns killing pregnant women into a text condemning feticide. I have already disputed her reading of the MT. However, her third claim raises the question of the relationship between the two texts.

    In referring to the LXX as a translation, Harrison’s comments are unobjectionable. The LXX does not render the wording of the MT accurately and introduces a distinction that is not part of the text. However, this does not mean that the LXX misinterpreted the text; translation and interpretation are not the same thing. Mark Scott writes,

    It is commonly recognized that, in many passages, the Septuagint presents, in the Greek lingua franca, a gloss or commentary rather than a literal rendering of the Hebrew text, as the translators were attempting to embody — in a widely accessible form — then-current applications of the Scriptures.[1]

    If the interpreters of the LXX were trying to render an accurate commentary and faithful application of the law as opposed to a literalistic translation, then the pertinent question is not whether they translated it accurately but whether the LXX faithfully articulated its teachings and correct applications of them. I think that it did.

    There are three major differences between the LXX and the MT. First, the MT does not explicitly specify the number of men in the brawl. It opens with, “if men (plural) are fighting and they strike a pregnant woman”. However, the LXX explicitly mentions that there are “two” men fighting. Second, the LXX renders the final clause of v 22 as “according to an assessment”, whereas many English translations of the M.T. interpret this “as the judge determines”. Finally, the MT mentions harm done to the woman and the appropriate punishment. The LXX introduces the distinction between a formed/unformed conceptus.

    None of these appears straightforwardly to involve an error in interpretation. The first is of little significance when one realises that

    A careful examination of the relevant Hebrew biblical texts reveals that when the verb n.sh is used with the basic meaning “to contend”, or “to strive”, as opposed to “to fall into ruins”, no more than two adversaries are involved.[2]

    The difference between the Hebrew for “men strive” and the Greek “two men fight” appears to be merely semantic. I addressed the second difference earlier where I noted that the LXX’s rendition of the final clause as “according to an assessment” is a correct rendition of the Hebrew. This leaves the final two, the omission of harm to the mother and the formed/unformed distinction. These are clearly the most important.

    The LXX’s teaching about an assault upon a woman does not contradict the MT’s teaching on this question. While the LXX does not mention harm to the mother in this passage, causing harm to the mother falls readily under the other laws dealing with assault where an assailant is required to compensate his victim for damages suffered. Hence, its teaching on this question is essentially the same as the MT’s even if the presentation of it differs.

    Nor does the teaching of the LXX regarding feticide contradict the teaching of the MT. The MT states that if a person kills a fetus he or she must pay a fine based upon an assessment. While the mode of assessment is not specified, evidence suggests that there existed a practice that based it upon the age of the fetus. The LXX does not contradict this. It states that if a person kills a fetus he or she must pay an assessment and it bases the assessment upon the age of the fetus.

    The difference between the two is that the LXX specifies exactly how this assessment is to be carried out. It claims that when the conceptus is formed the payment must be a payment for homicide. The Hebrew is silent as to how the assessment is to be carried out so it does not deny that this is the correct way to carry out the assessment. Hence, the LXX is entirely compatible with the Hebrew here. As Scott notes, “This Greek interpretation of the passage reveals how the law had come to be applied over centuries of use, at least in the Alexandrian, Jewish community”.

    The distinction made between a formed and unformed conceptus strengthens this conclusion. The distinction appears to be drawn from Greek natural philosophy. Kapparis notes, “Formation was a crucial concept in connection with the human identity of the unborn in Hippocratic medicine”. [3] He adds,

    In the understanding of many, [Hippocratic doctors] the acquisition of human identity was not something that happened at birth but well before that, when the foetus was sufficiently formed to be considered a human being.[4]

    Kapparis draws attention to numerous examples of the formed/unformed distinction in numerous, ancient, embryological writings. Galen for example noted that two contemporary studies, The Commentaries on the Demonstration and On the views of Hippocrates and Plato, defended the view “That what is in the womb is already a living being when it is formed in all its members”.[5] Similarly, the Hippocratic study On the Nature of the Child, affirms that a conceptus “becomes a child” when it attains form.[6] A similar view appears to be expressed by Socrates in Platonic dialogues.[7]

    The formed/unformed distinction appears in numerous other works. Soranus mentions the distinction and suggests that abortions should be performed only when the conceptus is unformed.[8]

    Interestingly, authors who mentioned the formed/unformed distinction tended to place its occurrence at roughly the same time, though they differed on the precise details. Diogenes Laertius informs us of the Pythagorean view.

    This first creation [the conceptus] is formed in forty days, and then, in accordance with the law of harmony, the baby is perfected and born after seven, or nine, or maximum ten months.[9]

    Empedocles similarly argued that formation started on the 39th day and was completed on the 49th.[10] Asclepiades noted the formed/unformed distinction and suggested that for males formation occurred between the 26th and 50th days and females were formed around 60 days.[11] The tract, On the Nature of the Child, states a male fetus is formed after 30 days and female fetuses were formed on the 42nd day.[12] The author of On Seven Months Child, states a male conceptus is formed at 40 days while a female is formed after this.[13]

    Perhaps the most influential of Greek biologists was Aristotle. Aristotle developed the Hippocratic views with more sophistication. He argued that the soul was the life principle of the body. A conceptus began with a vegetative soul and then gradually acquired a sensitive soul. It became fully human when it achieved form, which occurred 40 days after conception for a boy or 90 for a girl.[14] Aristotle’s views were based on empirical investigations. Other biologists from the period also based their views on empirical observation either from miscarriages and abortions that had occurred in humans or on analogy with the embryological development with animals.[15]

    There appeared then to be an established distinction in ancient Greek embryology between a formed and unformed fetus. The similarity between the Hippocratic/Aristotelian position and the LXX can hardly be a coincidence. It appears Alexandrian Jews utilised the biological information of their day, concluded that a formed conceptus was a human being and hence applied the law accordingly. In many ways this is unsurprising because even with Palestinian Rabbinical Judaism, Aristotelian embryology was often appealed to by Jewish scholars. Several examples bear this out.

    The first comes from Nid. 3:2-7. Here the question arises about how the cleanliness laws recorded in Leviticus 12 apply to a woman who has miscarried. The law prescribes that a woman who has given birth to a child is unclean for forty days if the child born is a boy and eighty days if it is a girl. The question raised is when does miscarrying a fetus constitute giving birth to a child?
    The answer given is that a miscarriage qualifies as the birth of a child if the conceptus has the form of a human being. It is stated that this happens on the forty-first day after conception. The justification provided for this ruling is precisely the kind of empirical studies that Greek biologists had appealed to.[16]

    A second example occurs in Ker. 1:3-5. The law requires that after a woman has undergone her post-birth period of uncleanness she is required to make a sacrifice. The question is asked, does this apply if she miscarries a fetus? The answer is the same as in the previous case, after forty-one days the conceptus has form. At this stage, a miscarriage is considered the birth of a child.

    The third example comes from Bek. 8:1. Here the issue is the application of Exodus 13:12 where it states that a woman must redeem her first-born son with an offering. The question arises as to whether a child born to a woman who had miscarried previously is considered the first-born son. The answer is yes but only if the miscarried conceptus had not been formed which occurs at forty-one days after conception.

    Four things then are evident. Firstly, in translating the LXX Alexandrian scholars aimed at “a gloss or commentary rather than a literal rendering of the Hebrew text”.[17] They were “attempting to embody — in a widely accessible form — then-current applications of the Scriptures”.[18] Secondly, it was common practice even in Rabbinical Judaism to utilise Greek natural philosophy in applying the Torah to various issues. Thirdly, the dominant, Greek, natural philosophy placed an important stress upon form in determining the human status of a conceptus. Fourthly, the LXX appears to utilise this distinction in applying the Torah to the question of feticide.

    The best explanation appears to be that Alexandrian Jews utilised Greek embryology in an effort to apply the Torah to the question of feticide. The law told them that if a person killed a fetus they had to be punished based on an assessment of the maturity of the fetus. The science of the day taught them that a conceptus was human when it attained human form around 40 days post-conception. Hence, they concluded that if a person killed a formed conceptus this was homicide

    Consequently, the LXX is perhaps best seen as simply complementing the MT and offering an interpretation as to how to apply the law that it prescribes.[19] The scribes behind the LXX did not so much attempt accurate translation of the text but rather faithful interpretation of it to explain its requirements to others. The Hebrew text taught that if a man killed a fetus one was to base the punishment upon an assessment based upon its level of development. This is precisely what the Alexandrian Jews did. Utilising the empirical information of the day they made such an assessment and concluded that early in the pregnancy it constituted homicide. In order to determine if their conclusion were mistaken or correct, the time of hominisation must be assessed. It is not determined by examining the text. The text simply demands that the assessment be made. The question is whether it was made correctly. Are there good grounds for holding that a formed conceptus is a human being? If there are then the LXX does propose a faithful application of the law.

    [1] Mark Scott, “Quickening in the Common Law: The Legal Precedent Roe Attempted and Failed to Use,” Michigan Law and Policy Review 1 (1996) 204.
    [2] Nina Collins, “Notes on the Text of Exodus 21:22,” Vetus Testamentum 63: 3 (1993): 299.
    [3] Konstantinos Kapparis, Abortion in the Ancient World (London: Gerald Duckworth and Co, 2002), 44.
    [4] Ibid.
    [5] Galen cited in Kapparis, Abortion in the Ancient World, 46.
    [6] Kapparis, Abortion in the Ancient World, 46.
    [7] Ibid., 87.
    [8] Soranus I, cited in Kapparis, Abortion in the Ancient World, 43.
    [9] Kapparis, Abortion in the Ancient World, 39.
    [10] Ibid., 45.
    [11] Ibid.
    [12] Ibid.
    [13] Ibid.
    [14] Ibid., 17-18.
    [15] Galen sums the method up, “[t]his is apparent in abortions and in the dissection of pregnant animals” Galen cited in Kapparis, Abortion in the Ancient World, 44. Similarly, the author of On the Nature of the Child, cited in Kapparis, Abortion in the Ancient World, 45 wrote, “many women aborted a boy shortly before the 30th day and it looked unformed, but those who aborted on the 30th day or afterwards, looked formed. On a girl, after the abortion, the formation of members is accordingly visible after the 42nd day”.
    [16] Nid. 30b.
    [17] Scott, “Quickening in the Common Law,” 205.
    [18] Ibid.
    [19] It is worth noting that this conclusion about the LXX being compatible with the MT would follow even if one accepts the variant reading that pllm means “as the judges determine”. On this reading it is still the case that there is a monetary fine based on some objective assessment; one made by the courts. The LXX simply specifies how the assessment is to be made. Moreover, even if, contrary to what has been argued above, one holds to the view that the law does prescribe a harsher penalty for killing the woman than it does for the miscarriage it does not follow that the law considers a fetus to be less than a human.
    I noted in previously, that there is an important evidentiary difference between the two cases. In the case of the woman, an ancient Israelite judge could tell that the blow caused the death. In the case of a miscarriage, he could not. Hence, there would be a basis for a difference in punishment even if the fetus and woman were both considered human.

    RELATED POSTS:
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part I
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part II
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part III
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part IV
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part V

  • The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part V

    Having previously addressed whether causing the death of a woman is a capital offence, I will now examine how Exodus 21:22-25 views feticide.

    Is Feticide Condemned as a Minor Offence
    Harrison argues that the reference to a fine in v 22 suggests that the law considers feticide did “not constitute a major crime at that time”.[1] The text of v 22 provides no justification for this observation.

    The word translated as fine in the N.R.S.V. has a broader meaning than our understanding of fine. Rather it means punishment in general.[2] It is used in this text with an emphatic infinitive absolute, hence it is rendered, ‘the one responsible shall be strictly punished.’ This is not the language of a trivial offence.[3]

    Further, the text goes on to refer to the punishment. The offender must pay whatever the husband “demands”. This phrase certainly does not suggest compensation for a trivial offence. The very same phrase is used only nine verses later in the case of a goring ox. If the owner has been warned of the bull’s habit for goring and he does not keep it penned up, the punishment if the ox gores someone is “that the owner shall also be put to death, however, if payment is demanded of him, he may redeem his life by paying whatever is demanded”.[4] The reference to paying a fine “demanded of him” in this verse is to money paid in compensation for homicide.

    A final point to be noted is that this text punishes the destruction of a fetus. It explicitly states that a person who kills a fetus should be punished strictly. Punishment was only warranted if the action was a crime. Hence, under Jewish law killing a fetus was a crime. There is little justification for any inference from this passage to the conclusion that feticide was lawful.

    Moreover, it appears that it is considered unlawful because of the moral status of the embryo/fetus. There are several reasons for thinking this is the case. Perhaps the most significant one is seen by examining the phrase “and he shall pay as the judges determine”.[5] This rendition of the Hebrew phrase by the N.R.S.V. is widely conceded to be problematic.

    Firstly, the word rendered as judges by the N.R.S.V. is pllm. Whilst the verb of this root does refer to judging, the lexical meaning of judge for pllm is not very well established from its other occurrences in Scripture. Moreover, Speiser notes that even if pllm did mean ‘judges’ it could not carry the whole force of “as the judges determine”. He suggests that rendering pllm as ‘judges’ is an error analogous to interpreting the English word judicious as having the same meaning as judicial or interpreting justice as judgement.[6]

    Secondly, not only is the meaning of judges not well established for pllm, rendering it as judges in v 22 does not fit the context. The phrase as “the judges determine” introduces a tension into the text. It affirms that the offender shall pay what the husband determines and then immediately states he shall pay what the judges determine. This problem is exacerbated by Sprinkle’s observations that as a stylistic matter the case law in Exodus 21:20-23 does not directly mention judges.[7]

    A third reason for doubting the meaning of judges for pllm is that it contradicts other translations such as the LXX. The LXX rendition of the clause is not “as the judges determine” but rather “according to assessment”. In and of itself this is not decisive. I noted earlier that the LXX does at times differ from the MT. This fact alone does not automatically make such interpretations of the MT suspect. However, it does appear decisive when combined with the other reasons already cited. It is one thing to translate the MT in a way that contradicts the LXX when the meaning one is translating is well attested but when one is using a meaning that is not well attested, which does not fit the context and in a way that contradicts other ancient translations, it is problematic, especially because, as I will discuss shortly, pllm does have an attested meaning that does fit the context that agrees with the LXX.

    Loewenstamm suggests that pllm may be translated as “an objective assessment”. Citing a study by Yalon, he notes that in Talmudic Hebrew the word pllm has the idea of ‘investigate or assess.’[8] Speiser, who suggests the word means “estimate, assessment, calculation”, makes a fuller argument for this conclusion.[9] Applying this idea, the text would read, “the one who is responsible shall be strictly punished, he shall pay whatever the husband lays upon him according to an assessment”. This interpretation is preferable to the RSV for several reasons.

    Firstly, as the studies of Speiser and those mentioned by Loewenstamm make clear, this meaning is well attested. Examining the several occurrences of this phrase and its various derivatives in scripture, Speiser notes, “every single reflex of the base form of pll finds its natural and at times the only possible and hitherto absent, explanation in the same underlying concept of ‘assess’.”[10]

    Secondly, this meaning fits the context. I noted that “as the judges determine” renders the text contradictory, whereas the phrase “the one who is responsible shall be strictly punished, he shall pay whatever the husband demands according to an assessment” does not. This interpretation also fits the context well when one considers its overall structure.

    The text begins with a case that has two protases; one where there is no harm and another where there is harm. Each protasis is followed by a subsequent apodasis rendering a judgement. The second apodasis renders a judgement and then spells out a method for assessing the penalty, the lex talionis. It makes sense then that the first apodasis would mention an assessment.

    Thirdly, this translation makes sense of the LXX in two ways. First, it explains adequately why the LXX renders v 22 as “according to an assessment”. Second, as I will argue in my next post, the phrase “according to an assessment” also provides a plausible explanation as to why the LXX translators introduced the distinction between a formed and unformed conceptus into the text.

    Verse 22 then is rendered, “the one who is responsible shall be strictly punished, he shall pay whatever the husband demands according to an assessment”. The text denotes that the person shall be punished by an assessment. The evidence we have suggests that this assessment was not based upon the value of the fetus to the woman but upon the age and level of development of the fetus.

    Two lines of evidence suggest this. First, this was how contemporary legal codes of the time punished feticide. The ancient Hittite Law stated,

    16. If anyone causes a free women to miscarry- if (it is) the 10th month, he shall give 10 shekels of silver, if it is the fifth month he shall give 5 shekels of silver and pledge his estate as security. 17. If anyone causes a slave-women to miscarry, if (it is) the 10th month, he shall give 5 shekels of silver.[11]

    The Hittite Law has a close geographical, temporal and literary relation to the Mosaic Law. The Hittites lived in the same area as the Hebrews and Scriptural texts showed they mingled with the Hebrews. This Hittite legal code was in place at the same time and in roughly the same area.

    This shows that at around the same time and place as the Mosaic Law was drafted the legal practice determined the gravity of feticide by assessing the developmental level of the fetus. It is in this social and legal context that the Mosaic Law noted that the one responsible shall pay by an assessment. The most natural way of understanding this phrase is to understand it as referring to this type of method, one that Moses’ hearers would be familiar with.

    The second line of evidence comes from the LXX. The LXX interprets the law in a manner very similar to that of the Hittite code except it draws the line at the time of formation as opposed to 5 months gestation. As I will argue in my next post, the reference to formation displays Hellenistic influence. Nevertheless, a mode of assessment based upon fetal age would explain why the interpreters drew the conclusion they did. If the law prescribed that the penalty is based on the age of the fetus and contemporary Hellenistic biology teaches that formation is a crucial stage in development where the conceptus is hominised, then one would interpret the law in the way the LXX does.

    The above exegesis is reinforced when one notices how the law is presented in the Torah. The key contrast between v 22 and vs. 23-25 is over who the victim is and how the damages will be assessed. Verse 22 deals with a case where it is explicitly stated that there is no harm to the woman. It is mentioned that the fetus is killed and the damages are assessed, not based on harm to the woman but on an objective judgement about the status of the fetus. In contrast, vs. 23-25 specify that if the woman is harmed damages are to be based upon the amount of damage to her. Therefore, the law does not appear to view the induced miscarriage as merely an offence against the woman. The law bases the seriousness of the offence not on how much anguish the woman has suffered but on objective judgements about the moral status of the embryo or fetus. This status is based on the level of development the conceptus has undergone, a feature it possesses independently of its mother. This means that it was wrong to induce a miscarriage because the embryo/fetus has moral status.

    In my final post I will revisit Harrison’s claim that the Septuagint mistranslates the Hebrew in light of my series.

    [1] Harrison, Our Right to Choose, 68.
    [2] Kline, “Lex Talionis and the Human Fetus,” 196.
    [3] Ibid.
    [4] Ex. 21:31, N.I.V.
    [5] Ex. 21:22, N.I.V.
    [6] Speiser, “The Stem Pll in Hebrew,” 301-306.
    [7] Sprinkle, “The Interpretation of Exodus,” 9.
    [8] Samuel E. Loewenstamm, “Exodus XXI: 22-25,” Vetus Testamentum XXVII (1970), 359.
    [9] Speiser, “The Stem Pll in Hebrew,” 303.
    [10] Ibid., 304.
    [11] Hoffmeier, “Abortion and the Old Testament Law,” 44-45.

    RELATED POSTS:
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part I
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part II
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part III
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part IV
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part VI

  • Half April HalfDone Stats: MandM 6th Most Read Blog in New Zealand

    These rankings are not the official results for April, just an indication of the lay of the land and how the month is progressing for everyone.

    The top 10 New Zealand blogs on public discourse are shown below, the other 250 or so that made the rankings are over here.

    We have climbed 1 spot from last month and are now only 1 point away from number 5, watch out Not PC. We are still holding the number 1 Christian blog position.

    Tomorrow marks 6 months since we switched to our own domain so we finally have the full 6 months worth of Technorati authority, meaning that from now on, when our Technorati score is compared to another blog’s, it is a fair comparison.

    Blog Rankings
    As always, thank you for your blogroll links, backlinks, comments and visits!

  • Alvin Plantinga v Daniel Dennett: Evolution, Naturalism and Christian Theism

    Given how heavy and long some of our posts have been of late, I thought something more entertaining was in order (and because Matt has been asking me for weeks to put this up). Here is the February exchange at the APA between Alvin Plantinga and Daniel Dennett.

    By way of intro, I will quote from The Prosblogion who published an admittedly biased, nevertheless entertaining, play by play of the exchange that described Plantinga as “Abraham Lincoln” and Dennett as “Santa Claus” (if you know what they look like this is very funny);

    [O]n February 21st, the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association – the main professional body of American philosophers – hosted a kind of debate. I say “kind of debate” because one philosopher gave a paper, the other commented and the first philosopher replied and the floor opened for questions. But in fact the session was a debate.

    The debate was between Alvin Plantinga and Daniel Dennett. Plantinga is one of the founders of the Society of Christian Philosophers and one of the fathers of the current desecularization of philosophy. He is widely regarded – even by his critics – as one of the finest epistemologists of the last fifty years and one of the finest philosophers of religion since the Medieval period. Daniel Dennett is one of the New Atheists and is a well-known proponent of atheistic Darwinism and critic of religion. He is widely regarded – even by his critics – as one of the most important early philosophers of mind that opened the field to cognitive science and evolutionary biology. He has contributed enormously to the serious study of the mind and its relationship to the brain.

    This is a very good exchange that is hysterically funny in places as both Plantinga and Dennett possess great wit. It is very accessible, no PhD necessary to understand it. Those present were a veritable who’s who of US philosophy, atheist and theists alike, so watch (listen really) and enjoy.

  • The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part IV

    See the previous posts beginning here for the context that this post falls in. In this post I will address whether the punishments outlined in Exodus 21:22-25 are qualitatively different beginning with whether the death of the woman is a capital offence. In my next post I will ask if the text considers feticide a minor offence.

    Are the Punishments Qualitatively Different?
    Crucial to the arguments of Rachels, Harrison and Spurgeon is their claim that the punishments for killing the woman and killing the fetus are qualitatively different. Harrison states that the Masoretic text,

    [D]emonstrates that causing the death of a fetus did not constitute a major crime at that time; payment of a fine to a prospective father was considered adequate compensation for the miscarriage. Hurting or maiming a pregnant woman, on the other hand, was a serious penal offence equivalent to other life denying crimes.[1]

    Harrison affirms that because killing the fetus is only punished with a fine it follows that killing a fetus is not a serious crime. On the other hand, the law allegedly states that hurting a pregnant woman was equivalent to “life denying crimes”. Exactly what Harrison’s basis for this claim is, is unclear. Others who make the same line of argument are more explicit. Spurgeon is a paradigm. He writes,

    [I]f you cause the death of the fetus, you merely pay a fine; if you cause the death of the woman, you lose your own life. Thus the Bible clearly shows that a fetus is not considered a person. If the fetus were considered to be a person, then the penalty for killing it would be the same as for killing the woman–death.[2]

    Crucial to this line of argument then is the claim that while killing a fetus is punishable by fine, killing a woman is punished by death. This appears to rest on a literalistic[3] reading of v 23 where the phrase “life for a life” is understood as the killing of the assailant for the death of a woman.

    This reading of v 23 is disputed. The phrase “life for life” is the first part of an extended phrase which states, “you shall pay life for life, eye for an eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, branding for branding, wound for wound, stripe for stripe”, a phrase which has become known in the literature as the lex talionis.

    Is the Death of the Woman a Capital Offence?
    One influential interpretation argues that this phrase merely expresses a legal formula which is expounded in proverbial form. The principle is that whatever punishment is imposed (and in this immediate case the punishment is a fine) must be proportionate to the harm inflicted on the victim. Sarna notes “[r]abbinic tradition understood the biblical formulation to mean monetary payment and not physical retaliation”[4] and he defends this interpretation. Drazin notes that the Halacah in b. B.K 84a and Sanhedrin 79a and Mek each understand the phrase to refer to a principle of commensurate compensation.[5] Plaut states that “few passages in the Torah have been so thoroughly misunderstood” and suggests the text is best understood as requiring “the value of an eye for the loss of an eye”, “the value of a limb for its loss and so on”.[6] Rachels, Harrison, et al. do not engage with this tradition of exegesis. They appear merely to assume a literalistic reading without argument.

    There are, I think, good reasons for accepting the traditional, rabbinic exegesis on this point. Here I will provide six. While none of them may be decisive in themselves, jointly, I believe, they provide a strong case for reading v 23 in the traditional fashion.

    The first reason is how phraseology such as that found in v 23 functions in such a genre as Exodus is written in. As noted above, this section of the book of Exodus in terms of its structure, literary form and language parallels the structure and language of Ancient Near Eastern (A.N.E.) legal texts. Interestingly enough, the legal formulas such as ‘an eye for an eye or a tooth for a tooth’ are not uncommon in such codes. In Old Babylonian law the hand that assaults is severed, a man who kisses another’s wife has his lips cut off, a person who steals bees is to be stung by bees. A person who had thrown his victim into an oven was to be thrown into an oven. A man who raped another’s wife would be sentenced to having his own wife or daughter raped. A negligent builder whose house collapsed and killed another’s son would be sentenced to having his own son killed.[7] In fact, the Code of Hammurabi states that if a man knocks out the eye of one of the upper classes, his eye must be knocked out.[8]

    Westbrook notes that such laws “reflect the scribal compilers’ concern for perfect symmetry and delicious irony rather than the pragmatic experience of the law courts”. The method used in legal texts was “to set out principles by the use of often extreme examples”. He goes on to note “[s]ome law codes impose physical punishments and others payments for the same offenses, while some codes have a mixture of the two. There is not necessarily a contradiction.” He explains that “in highlighting one or the other alternative, the codes are making a statement as to their view of the gravity of the offence”.[9] Westbrook argues that serious wrongs “gave rise to a dual right in the victim or his family, namely to take revenge on the culprit, or to make composition with the culprit and accept payment in lieu of revenge”.[10] He goes on to note, “[t]his right was a legal right, determined and regulated by the court”. The courts could “fix the level of composition payment” making “revenge a contingent right, which was only revived if the culprit failed to pay”.[11] When talionic legal formulae occur in A.N.E. legal texts they merely express that the punishment be proportional to the crime. This could involve punishment in kind (which would be proportional to the crime) but in most cases it would probably involve monetary compensation. The phraseology is compatible with either.

    J Finkelstein makes a similar point reflecting on what appears to be very harsh capital (and sometimes vicarious) sentences in the code of Hammurabi and the absurdity and impossibility of putting them into practice. He states that Mesopotamian penalty prescriptions,

    [W]ere not meant to be complied with literally even when they were first drawn up, [But rather they] serve an admonitory function. If one would be bold enough to restate Hammurabi’s 230 as a direct admonition it might run to this effect: “woe to the contractor who undertakes construction and in his greed cuts corners”.[12]

    There is evidence then to suggest that when talionic formulae occur in A.N.E. legal texts they do not necessarily function as commandments to inflict literal mutilation in kind. They rather function as a kind of hyperbolic, ironical way of denouncing the crime and expressing a principle of proportionality.

    The second reason for understanding the lex talionis in this fashion follows on from the first. A careful reading of the Hebrew Bible suggests that something like what Westbrook and Finkelstein argue is true of the Torah. Verses 29-32 deal with a case where an ox gores another person to death due to negligence on the part of the owner. This is a case of negligent homicide as opposed to premeditated killing; the penalty rendered is that the negligent person shall be put to death. However, immediately proceeding this, provision is made for a monetary fine to be paid instead of execution. This suggests that the command to execute was not considered incompatible with payment of monetary compensation proportional to the offence. The phrase “he shall be put to death” is not always to be taken literally.

    In fact, this practice of substituting a monetary fine for a capital offence was common. Deuteronomy 22:22 states “If a man is found sleeping with another man’s wife” then “the woman and the man who slept with her must die”. Similarly, Leviticus 20:10 prescribes death for the crime of adultery yet in the book of Proverbs it is made clear that this penalty could be substituted for monetary compensation.[13] This again suggests that the phrase does not command or require execution but merely proportional punishment.

    Another example occurs in the book of Kings. Here an incident is mentioned where a person has committed a capital crime. The sentence is announced in terms of the lex talionis as “a life for a life”; however, the immediate context shows what this sentence was. “It will be your life for his life or you must weigh out a talent of silver”. Sprinkle notes “life for life” in the sense of capital punishment has an explicit alternative of monetary substitution”.[14]

    A final example occurs regarding the case of homicide. In Exodus 21:13-14 the law clearly distinguishes between accidental and premeditated homicide. If a man who has struck another and killed that person (an analogous case to a man striking a woman and killing her) seeks sanctuary, he is to be provided it unless he “lay in wait” for his victim. Jackson notes that “lay in wait” referred to premeditated homicide.[15] In Numbers 35 where the same law is expounded in more detail, a homicide where a person “lay in wait” is contrasted with a homicide where the assailant “attacked him suddenly without enmity”[16] which appears to be a reference to an intentional but not premeditated attack such as a ‘crime of passion’. The text goes on to prohibit accepting monetary compensation instead of executing the criminal only in cases of premeditated homicide. Walter Kaiser notes,

    The key text in this discussion is Num 35:31: “Do not accept a ransom [or substitute] for the life of a murderer, who deserves to die. He must surely be put to death.” There were some sixteen crimes that called for the death penalty in the OT…. Only in the case of premeditated murder did the text say that the officials in Israel were forbidden to take a “ransom” or a “substitute”. This has widely been interpreted to imply that in all the other fifteen cases the judges could commute the crimes deserving of capital punishment by designating a “ransom” or “substitute”. In that case the death penalty served to mark the seriousness of the crime.[17]

    Sprinkle makes the same point, “The availability of ransom seems to have been so prevalent that when biblical law wants to exclude it, as in the case of intentional murder, it must specifically prohibit it”.[18]

    It appears then that in both A.N.E. legal texts in general and in the Torah in particular, phrases such as “a life for a life” do not necessarily entail capital punishment. In cases where pre-meditated homicide is not involved and in cases where the homicide was unintentional but negligent, the Torah prescribes only that proportionate damages be imposed. This is significant because in the case under discussion, Exodus 21:22-25, we are not dealing with a case of premeditated homicide. The text deals with an accidental act caused through negligence. This is evident from the way the case is presented in v22. It starts by affirming that men (plural) are fighting and strike a pregnant woman. The woman is a third party and not one of the group fighting. This observation is further strengthened by the fact that most A.N.E. law codes that record the case deal with a single man striking a woman. Moses appears to depart from this paradigm in order to emphasise that the woman was a third party. The case, then, is of two people who are fighting each other and unintentionally strike a bystander causing a miscarriage. The case is not one of premeditated murder that by law required capital punishment but is of an unintentional killing brought about through negligence.

    Some commentators attempt to escape this conclusion arguing that the case is not one of unintentional homicide. Two reasons are usually provided. First, that Deuteronomy 25:11-13 records a case where a woman gets involved in a brawl between a man and her husband and it is argued that the same situation is envisaged here.[19] Second, it is argued that the verb ‘to strike’ nagaf in v 21 refers to an intentional attack upon someone and hence, when the passage asserts that the men strike nagaf a pregnant woman, they do so intentionally.

    Neither of these arguments is sound. The first is a non-sequitur. The fact that another law dealing with another case in Deuteronomy mentions a woman getting involved in a fight does not entail that this passage deals with such a case. The second is rendered problematic when one notes that just six verses later the verb nagaf is applied to a goring ox: “the notion that a goring ox is punished for its deliberate offence is quite absent from the mind of the Biblical legislator”.[20] Moreover, even if the woman did intervene in the fight and was struck deliberately this would still not be a case of premeditated homicide.[21]

    A third line of evidence favouring a non-literalistic interpretation of the lex talionis makes sense of the way the phrase is used elsewhere in the scriptures. In Leviticus 24, for example, it states “If anyone injures his neighbor, whatever he has done must be done to him: fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth. As he has injured the other, so he is to be injured”. This sounds like it enjoins literal punishment in kind. However, immediately it goes on to elaborate, “Whoever kills an animal must make restitution, but whoever kills a man must be put to death”. Here we see that while in cases of intentional homicide the punishment is literally life for life, it does not rule out monetary restitution for damage done to another’s property. It must also be noted that interpreted literalistically this passage in fact contradicts the laws regarding assault.

    The punishment laid down in the Torah for assault is to pay monetary damages, not to inflict injury for injury upon the perpetrator. Hence, to make sense of this rule in its context the lex talionis must be understood as enjoining proportional punishment, whether that be capital punishment in the case of murder or proportionate compensation in cases of damage to person or property.

    The same conclusion applies to Christ’s citation of the lex talionis in the Sermon on the Mount. Here the phrase “eye for eye” is contrasted with the rule “Do not resist an evil person” and Christ illustrates this latter rule with a case where a person turns the other cheek to a slap. Daube notes “Supposing for a moment the maxim ‘Eye for Eye’ had then meant actual talion for mutilation and Jesus had intended to attack this principle, would the case of a slap in the face not have been an excessively weak illustration of his new position?”. Would it not have been necessary “to give a far more serious example”?[22] Similarly, Daube notes that none of the other cases Christ mentions, such as being sued for one’s cloak or being forced to walk a mile, fit a literal talionis either.[23] On the other hand, Daube notes that Christ’s statements do make sense when the talionis is understood as enjoining proportionate damages. In rabbinic law of the period, a slap on the cheek was viewed as a paradigm case of an insult where there was no actual harm or damage to the victim. Moreover, the rabbinic exegesis of the period ruled that one could sue a person who insulted him or her in this fashion for damages proportionate to the shame or damage done to their pride. Christ then appeared to understand the talionis in a non-literalistic fashion and stressed to his hearers not to be petty and prideful in its application.[24]

    The above three lines of argument suggest that a non-literalistic interpretation of the lex talionis is supported by the genre of the text and the way the phrase is understood in the text itself and used elsewhere in the canon. This evidence by itself is insufficient. However, I think it is far more compelling when conjoined with three other facts about the immediate context of v 23.

    In the first place, the verse begins with the statement “you shall pay life for life”. As Sprinkle[25] notes the word translated ‘pay’, in the context of the surrounding passages, is best rendered as “to pay” as in “pay money”. In the previous verse, the verb appears as, “he who is responsible shall pay whatever is laid upon him”. Verse 19 states that the assailant will “pay” an injured man’s medical bills and expenses. Verse 30 states he “will pay a ransom for his life”. Verse 32 “he will pay thirty shekels of silver to his master”. When the word occurs again in the next chapter, it refers to paying bail. Sprinkle notes that, in addition, the context supports rendering the word “for” as it occurs in the phrase “life for life” in v 25 as to having the nuance “in compensation for”. In v 36, it is used for compensation provided for the loss of an ox. In v 37, it refers to the restitution paid in compensation for a victim’s loss. The context then supports reading v 23 as referring to a kind of monetary or compensatory payment.[26]

    The next thing to note is that a literalistic interpretation of v 23 does not fit the context and renders the passage internally inconsistent whereas the traditional, rabbinic exegesis coheres with the context perfectly. If one takes “life for life” to mean that a person is killed if they kill someone, then “wound for wound” or “an eye for an eye” would mean that assault is punished by assaulting the assailant and injuring the perpetrator in precisely the manner the victim was injured in. However, the text manifestly contradicts this. Only a few verses earlier in v 18 the law deals with a case where a person strikes another causing injury and the punishment is that he pays compensation commensurate with the injury. It would seem odd that a deliberate attack on a man is punishable by compensation but an accidental blow to a woman warrants mutilation.

    Compare this with the rabbinic interpretation. Verse 18 prescribes that a person who harms another by assaulting him or her must compensate him or her for his or her injuries. Verse 23 states the same thing. Assaulting a woman requires that one pay commensurate compensation. The rabbinic reading therefore coheres with the context while the literalistic reading does not.

    The final and perhaps the most compelling reason for the rabbinic interpretation is the text itself. Immediately after the lex talionis is proposed, the text seeks to apply it.

    But if there is serious injury, you are to take life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise. If a man hits a manservant or maidservant in the eye and destroys it, he must let the servant go free to compensate for the eye. And if he knocks out the tooth of a manservant or maidservant, he must let the servant go free to compensate for the tooth.[27]

    Verses 26-27 applies the principle expounded in vs 23-25. If a person is struck in the eye and her or his eye is destroyed then the assailant is required to compensate her or him for the value of an eye. Similarly, if a person knocks out her or his servants tooth he or she must compensate her or him for the tooth. This demonstrates that by stating “eye for eye” or “tooth for tooth” compensation is in mind. In this case, because the victim is a servant and indentured servitude in Israel was the result of debt, the assailant is required to write off all financial debts his victim owes him. The context clearly understands the lex talionis as the payment of commensurate monetary compensation.[28]

    Taken together these last three lines of evidence suggests that the phrase “eye for eye” is not intended to be taken literalistically. Taken literalistically the law contradicts itself. It uses language differently to the way the same phrases are used in the context, contradicts the surrounding laws and applies itself in a manner contrary to its meaning. On the other hand, the rabbinical exegesis accords with the phraseology of the immediate context, coheres with the surrounding laws affirming the same basic principle with regards to assault and also fits the immediate application of the principle in the very next verse. In light of these facts it is best to understand the phrase “eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise” as a proverbial formula expressing the principle that (in this case) damages awarded be proportional to the harm inflicted.

    In my next post I will look at whether the punishment for destroying a fetus is, as Harrison suggests, considered a minor offence.

    [1] Harrison, Our Right to Choose, 68.
    [2] Spurgeon, The Religious Case for Abortion, 16.
    [3] I use the word literalistic here in distinction to the word literal. Interpreting a passage in accord with the literal sense of the text in historical, Biblical exegesis did not preclude such things as metaphor or idiom. Literalistic interpretation does. This distinction is noted by Bruce Vawter, “the literal sense of a writer or speaker [is] the meaning he wished to convey by the words he used- not what the words themselves might mean independently of his use of them. The literal meaning of a metaphor is not what its component words signify by dictionary definition but what their combination means in a context that challenges the imagination. A metaphor metaphorises, that is, it transfers the surface sense of its words to apply to another area of existence, an analogue. When I say it was “raining cats and dogs,” surely no one would suspect I was affirming that the streets had been littered with the corpses of Pekes, Dalmatians and Tabbies after a recent downpour. Literalistically I had said that, literally I had not.” Bruce Vawter, “Creationism: Creative Misuse of the Bible,” in Is God a Creationist? The Religious Case against Creation Science, ed. Roland M. Fyre (New York: Scribners, 1983), 72-73.
    [4] Nahum Sarna, J P S Commentary: Exodus (New York: Jewish Publication Society, 1991), 126.
    [5] Israel Drazin, Targum Onkelos to Exodus (New York: KTAV Publishing House, 1990), 215.
    [6] W. Plaut, The Torah: A Modern Commentary (New York: URJ Press, 1981), 571.
    [7] See Raymond Westbrook, “The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law,” in A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law, Vol. 1, ed. Raymond Westbrook (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003), 74.
    [8] Code of Hammurabi, 195-196, also 199.
    [9] Westbrook, “The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law,” 71-78.
    [10] Ibid., 78.
    [11] Ibid.,
    [12] Finkelstein, “The Ox that Gored,” 35.
    [13] Prov. 6:34-35.
    [14] Sprinkle, “The Interpretation of Exodus,” 233-53.
    [15] Jackson, “The Problems of Exodus,” 288-290.
    [16] Num. 35:22.
    [17] Walter Kaiser, “Gods Promise Plan and his Gracious Law,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 35:3 (1992): 293.
    [18] Jackson, “The Problems of Exodus,” 239.
    [19] David Daube, Studies in Biblical Law (Cambridge: Cambridge UN.I.Versity Press, 1947), 108.
    [20] Jackson, “The Problems of Exodus,” 288.
    [21] A further point; given the medical technology of the day, it would be difficult to prove that a given miscarriage was in fact caused by a given blow. In light of this, it would be unreasonable to prosecute a person for premeditated homicide who struck a woman in a situation where a miscarriage occurred. Hence prosecuting them for a lesser offence of negligence would make more sense.
    [22] David Daube, The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism (London: Athlone Press, 1956), 256.
    [23] Ibid., 257-258.
    [24] Ibid., 254-265.
    [25] Sprinkle, “The Interpretation of Exodus,” 233-53.
    [26] Ibid.
    [27] Ex. 21: 23-26, N.I.V.
    [28] One response to this is to suggest that this law refers to indentured servants and not to free people. Hence, with a woman, who is not a servant, a literalistic talion applies. One could perhaps bolster this with an appeal to the fact that A.N.E. laws often prescribed different punishments for offences against different social classes. The problem here is that one of the major differences between the Torah and A.N.E. laws is precisely this point. Unlike the other laws, the Torah does not typically have a class stratified system of punishment for various crimes. Moreover, the laws in the preceding passages have told us that assaulting a free man is punished by a fine to compensate for injuries (see v 18). So the suggestion that compensatory damages for the assault are limited to the lower classes is false. In light of this it is difficult to believe that an accidental assault upon a woman would be treated differently. One could not plausibly suggest, based on A.N.E. legal precedents, that servants and free men have the same punishments but assaulting a woman is considered more serious. If anything, women are given a lower, not higher, status in A.N.E. legal precedents.

    RELATED POSTS:
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part I
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part II
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part III
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part V
    The Foundations of the Alexandrian Argument against Feticide Part VI
    An Eye for an Eye and Turning the Other Cheek
    Capital Punishment in the Old Testament: 1
    Capital Punishment in the Old Testament: 2

  • The Problem of Evil: Why does God Allow Suffering?

    One of the most common objections to the Christian faith is the problem of evil. Of all objections mounted against the Christian faith, prima facie, it does seem the most compelling, one of the hardest things for us to get our heads around.

    How does a Christian reconcile the fact of evil and suffering in the world in the face of a God that is omnipotent, omniscient and benevolent? If he is omnipotent then he knows about all evil before it occurs so why does he allow it? Surely if god is omnipotent then he can halt evil. If he is benevolent then why will not act against it?

    Marc raised the same question in the comments section of, Good Friday: Why Celebrate Easter? In the discussion that followed I charged him with special pleading, of holding Christians to a higher standard than the standard he tacitly holds skepticism to. As discussions in comments sections are often missed instead of continuing the debate with Marc I thought I would express myself more clearly here. In doing so I will borrow extensively from a talk Matt gave for the launch of Thinking Matters (which you will see when we finally get the video footage of the talk online). [Given the difficulties of footnoting notes and impressions from talks and knowledge obtained through years of discussions with one’s spouse (though some came from primary sources that I read myself) pretty much from this post from this point onwards, though not in entirety, should be seen as being authored by MandM as opposed to just me though it is posted by me because overall it I put it together.]

    Before addressing an objection of this nature one should first establish the correct approach to take towards addressing criticisms of the faith and be clear as to what constitutes a fair set of rules for the terms of engagement. Timothy Keller writes,

    All doubts, however sceptical and cynical they may seem, are really a set of alternate beliefs. You cannot doubt belief A except from a position of faith in belief B….

    The only way to doubt Christianity rightly and fairly is to discern the alternative belief under each of your doubts and then ask yourself what reasons you have for believing it. How do you know your belief is true? It would be inconsistent to require more justification for Christian belief than you do for your own, but that is frequently what happens.

    In fairness you must doubt your doubts. My thesis is that if you come to recognise the beliefs on which your doubts about Christianity are based, and if you seek as much proof for those beliefs as you seek from Christians for theirs – you will discover that your doubts are not as solid as they first appeared.[1]

    In making his assertions, Marc, criticised my beliefs from a position of belief, or faith, in the correctness of his own. He asked a standard of my beliefs that he did not require for his own.

    When one encounters a charge like the one Marc raised, I understand that even if Marc didn’t set the problem out in the manner the world’s top atheist philosophers might have done, his question nevertheless hides a disguised argument that warrants addressing. Daniel Howard-Snyder states,

    [T]he theoretical “problem” of evil is often expressed in the form of a pointed question. God is able to prevent evil and suffering and He would know about them before they happened, right? Moreover, since He is unsurpassably good, surely He would not permit them just for the fun of it. So why doesn’t He prevent them?[2]

    In the literature this argument is typically more formalised so that it reads something like:

    [1] That as God is omniscient and omnipotent (all-knowing and all-powerful) he would be both able to know about all the suffering that exists and act to prevent it;
    [2] Given that God is good, he would not allow such evil to exist unless he had a good reason for it.

    [2] is what Snyder calls a justifying reason “a reason that was compatible with his never doing wrong and his being perfect in love.”[3]

    These premises entail that if God exists then he must have a good reason for allowing suffering. I agree with Marc and those who have gone before him on this part of their objection, I am sure that God does had a good reason. However, the question that follows from here, which is typically “then, what is God’s reason for allowing suffering?” which I concede has powerful rhetorical force, contains a critical flaw.

    If one is to look at the question purely rationally it is should become apparent. This flaw is widely noted and discussed in the literature by the likes of Steve Wykstra, Alvin Plantinga, Peter Van Ingwagen, William Rowe, Micheal Tooley, William Alston, and Howard-Snyder to name a few.

    So what is this flaw? I have not contested the claim that if God exists then he must have a good reason for allowing evil. However this has not satisfied Marc who wants to know what that reason is. Asking this latter question tacitly attempts to add a further premise to the above argument,

    [3] If a Christian cannot provide a detailed account of God’s reasons in [2] then it follows that God has none.

    This assumed premise is the point at which the argument succeeds or fails. If the failure to provide God’s reasons in detail does not provide any grounds for thinking that God in fact has no reasons then failure to answer the question, while deeply perplexing and emotionally unsatisfying, does not establish a reason for rejecting God.

    Alvin Plantinga provides an illustration of the flaws inherent in [3]. Paraphrasing him; suppose I ask you too look in a tent and tell me if there’s a St Bernard inside. In this instance, I would have every reason to trust what you say you see as a St Bernard the sort of thing I would expect you to be able to observe if it were inside a tent. But suppose I ask you to look inside and tell me if there are any ‘no-see-ums’ inside the tent (a no-see-um is gnat with a big bite that is small enough to pass through the netting of a tent, as such it is too small to see). Now, I have no reason to trust your answer in this instance, as you can’t see no-see-ums. Here’s the problem; the sceptic is assuming that if there is a reason for our suffering then it is more like a St Bernard than it is like a no-see-um. However, this is simply assumed, not argued for. It is certainly, if not at least possible, that we suffer for a reason but that that reason may not be something that we can easily detect.[4]

    As Keller notes, “we see lurking within this hard nosed skepticism an enormous faith in one’s cognitive faculties. If our minds cannot plump the depths of the universe for answers to suffering, well there can’t be any!. This is blind faith of a tall order.”[5]

    For the problem of evil to succeed the sceptic must provide some argument as to why God’s detailed reasons for allowing evil are like St Bernards and such an argument must be grounded on premises that Christians are rationally required to accept or else we could simply escape the charge by justifiably rejecting the premise.

    Now if a finite human being, such as myself, with limited factual knowledge, limited perspective in time and space and an imperfect moral character cannot produce a good reason as to why evil occurs then I fail to see why the Christian must accept the conclusion: ‘therefore, God cannot possibly have any such reasons.’

    William Alston has noted that the sceptic argument in this context is a bit like a person who, with no background in quantum physics, decided that when he failed to understand why the world’s best physicist held a particular view that if followed that the physicist obviously had no reason to hold it.[6]

    Suppose I am wrong. Suppose that the failure to provide an answer does mean that it is improbable that one exists and from this, that it follows the existence of God is improbable given the existence of evil. What follows from this? Nowhere near as much as you might think because the fact that the existence of God is improbable on one fact does not mean that it is improbable per se.

    Plantinga notes that there are many beliefs that we hold to which are improbable on some body of evidence we believe. If I was playing poker was dealt four aces, then this is highly improbable given the number of cards in the pack and number of possible combinations that I could have been dealt. Yet I am rational in believing that I was dealt four aces as I can see that I have four aces in my hand (to give but one defence).

    Moreover, it is well known that a belief can be improbable on one sub-set of beliefs a person possesses and yet highly probable by every thing that the person believes. For example, if I know my friend is French and I know that most French people cannot swim then my belief that my friend is a swimmer is improbable based on this set of evidence. On the other hand, suppose I know that my friend is a life guard by profession and that all life guards, even French ones, can swim. Then despite the fact that a belief is improbable on the basis of one set of evidence, it is not necessarily improbable on the whole.

    Finally the question needs to be raised about how well Christianity performs regarding the existence of evil relative to alternative views. Some Philosophers have suggested that the existence of evil might also make the non-existence of God impossible. I can only sketch the reasons briefly but they are worth noting.

    First, in order for suffering to exist sentient life forms must exist. However, there have been various discoveries from contemporary physics which establish that a universe evolving life is extremely improbable. For life to evolve there are around 15 constants necessary, each must have precise values and if they were off by a million or even one in a million, life could not evolve. Even if some of these constants had differed by 1 in 10 to the power of 60 then life could not evolve.[7]

    Second, some of the worst forms of evil involve human cruelty and evil but in order to identify these things as such this requires the existence of moral principles or rules that prohibit this kind of conduct and deem them as cruel or evil. Now one question that can be raised by many in the literature, William Lane Craig and J.L. Mackie spring to mind, is whether the existence of objective moral principles is likely on an atheistic view of the world.

    Is it likely that in a universe composed entirely of matter and energy that objective principles or rules could come into existence independently of any mind? Many people find this a puzzling question. My point is not to endorse (or reject) these lines of inquiry; it is simply to show that it is not obvious that the typical sceptical view is any more defensible given the existence of evil than belief in God is and more work would need to be done by the sceptic to show that it is.

    So my response to the problem of evil then is three fold. The objection relies on an assumption that is false or at any rate, an assumption that no reason is forthcoming as to why a Christian should accept it. Further, even if evil does make the existence of God improbable one would need further argument to show that this meant Christianity was irrational. Finally, even if the sceptic could do this it the problem of the mirror remains, one would need to show that the alternatives to Christianity, such as skepticism, were better able to account for the existence of evil. As none of these criteria have been met, I remain a Christian.

    [1] Timothy Keller Reason For God: Belief in an Age of Skepticism (New York: Dutton, 2008) xvii-xviii.
    [2] Daniel Howard-Snyder “God, Evil, and Suffering” in Reason for the Hope Within (Eerdmans 1999), ed. Michael J. Murray, 3, http://www.ac.wwu.edu/~howardd/god,evil,andsuffering.pdf.
    [3] Ibid, 4.
    [4] Alvin Plantinga Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford University Press: 2000) 466.
    [5] Keller Reason for God xvii-xviii.
    [6] William Alston “Some Temporary Final Thoughts on Evidential Arguments from Evil” in The Evidential Argument from Evil ed Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington Indianapolis, Indiana University Press: 1996) 317.

    [7] Francis S. Collins The Language of God: A scientist Presents Evidence for the Existence of God (Free Press, 2006) 75.