Category: God and Morality

  • Video: “Discussing Divine Command Theory” Special Guest: Matthew Flannagan

    Last week I was invited to be part of a discussion on divine command ethics in Google hangouts. The full discussion is now on-line as episode 22 of Ode to Dialogue: “Discussing Divine Command Theory.” Enjoy.

  • Ethical Supernaturalism is still more Plausible than Naturalism: Carrier’s Preliminary Objections

    Last year I had an article Is Ethical Naturalism more plausible than Supernaturalism: A reply to Walter Sinnott Armstrong published in the journal Philo. In the comments section a reader asked me to comment on a response to that article published by classical historian Richard Carrier. This post will be the first of several where I do so.Carrier

    In, Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism, I did two things. Firstly, I briefly explicated a conditional that has recently been proposed explicitly by William Lane Craig but which is also defended by several others, and secondly I rebutted several arguments raised against this conditional by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. Carrier argues my rebuttals fail, but before he does so he offers three preliminary arguments against the positive thesis I was defending against Armstrong. It is these that I will address in this post.

    The Contention

    The conditional I explicated as follows:

    Craig’s contention is that if theism is true then we can plausibly explain the nature of moral obligation by identifying obligations with God’s commands, analogous to the way “we explain the nature of water by identifying it with H2O, or explain the nature of heat by identifying it with molecular motion.” By “God” Craig means a necessarily existent, all-powerful, all-knowing, loving and just, immaterial person who created and providentially orders the universe.[1]

    Note three things.

    First, this is a conditional, if affirms that if theism is true then then we can plausibly explain the nature of moral obligation by identifying obligations with God’s commands.

    Second, I define the concept of God used in this conditional as a necessarily existent, all-powerful, all-knowing, loving and just, immaterial person who created and providentially orders the universe.

    Third, this conditional specifies the kind of grounding relationship I am addressing, one where the relationship between God’s commands and moral obligations is one of identity. It’s the same kind of (more…)

  • Dialogue with Randal Rauser

    When I was in Baltimore last November I caught up with fellow theologian and blogger Randal Rauser. Randal is professor of Theology at Taylor Seminary in Edmonton Canada.

    Randal and I have had some spirited but cordial exchanges in the past, including a panel discussion at the Society of Biblical Literature in 2010.While we do not always agree I find him to be a very astute critic of my work.

    Randal Rauser and Matthew Flannagan

    Randal asked to interview me in Baltimore on the topic “Matthew Flannagan on God, ethics, and divine commands” so the readers of his blog could get a take on the positions I have staked out. The interview is now available at the link above.

  • Matt to speak at the EPS Apologetics Conference in Baltimore on Morality and God’s Commands

    This blog’s Matthew Flannagan has been invited to speak at the 12th Annual Apologetics Conference of the Evangelical Philosophical Society in Baltimore, USA. The theme of this year’s conference is Reasonable Faith in an Uncertain World. Matt’s talk is titled “Morality and God’s Commands: Answering Common Objections.” The blurb for Matt’s talk is as follows:

    EPS Apologetics Conference

    “It is widely believed in contemporary philosophy that morality does not depend on God. Theories that attempt to identify our moral obligations with God’s commands are believed to be subject to several important objections. In this talk I will offer reasons for rejecting this position. I will clarify what it means to claim our moral duties depend on God’s commands and I will distinguish this claim from various misconceptions. I will then examine the most common objections to this position and that show they fail.”

    Matt is the only New Zealand speaker and he will be speaking alongside some of the top Christian thinkers and speakers in the world such as Dr. Gary Habermas, Sean McDowell, Dr. Paul Copan, Mary Jo Sharp, Dr. Craig Hazen, Dr. John Bloom, Greg Koukl, Dr. Mark Foreman, Patty Houser, Dr. Angus Menuge, and many more. You can see a full list of speakers here. Check out the sessions and tracks for the the EPS Apologetics Conference, which runs from 21-23 November 2013, and register here.

    Matt is also speaking at the annual meetings of the Evangelical Theological Society, on Feticide, and the Evangelical Philosophical Society, on Divine Commands re Abraham and Issac,  in Baltimore earlier in the week. (See Matt to speak at the 2013 Evangelical Theological Society in Baltimore on Feticide and Matt to speak at the 2013 Evangelical Philosophical Society in Baltimore on Divine Commands re Abraham and Isaac).

    If you are minded to support his and my fundraising efforts to get him to Baltimore for his 3 speaking engagements next week, please consider donating using one of the methods in the side bar.

  • Is a Divine Command Theory Psychotic? Sam Harris on Divine Commands Part III

    William Lane Craig v Sam HarrisIn Sam Harris on Divine Commands Part I I criticised Harris’ characterisation of divine command meta-ethics. I refuted Harris’ contention a divine command theory is pscyopathic in Is a Divine Command Theory Pscyopathic? Sam Harris on Divine Commands: Part II. In this last post in this series, I will address Harris’s contention that a divine command theory reflects a “psychotic moral attitude”. Harris says a divine command theory is “psychotic because this is completely delusional. There’s no reason to believe that we live in a universe ruled by an invisible monster called Yahweh.”

    Harris’s argument in this regard seems to involve four premises. [1] A person can accept a divine command theory only if her or she believes in the existence of an invisible monster called Yahweh (which Harris earlier identifed as an “iron age God of war”); [2] there is no evidence for an invisible monster called Yahweh; [3] to believe something without evidence is delusional; [4] to be delusional is to be psyhcotic.

    Turning to [1], a divine command theorist holds that the most plausible account of the nature of moral obligations is that moral obligations are constituted by, or are identical with, God’s commands. God is understood by the theorist to be a being worthy of worship, a necessarily existent, essentially loving and just, omniscient, omnipotent, personal being who created, sustains and providentially guides the universe. Holding this position does not commit one to believing in an invisible monster or a stone-age God of war for two reasons.

    First, a divine command theory is compatible with being an athiest. Plantinga has noted that a person could argue that moral obligations are best accounted for in terms of God’s commands and then conclude from this that if God does not exist then moral obligations do not exist either. In this sense a divine command theory could be a premise in an atheistic argument for nihilism. Interestingly, when I was a grad student in the 90’s I attended a conference where one of the presenters offered an argument for nihilism very much along these lines.

    Second, most divine command theorists accept the existence of moral obligations. Most would accept, for example, that moral claims such as that it is wrong to torture children purely for entertainment are true, and that, the action of torturing children in this way actually has the property of being wrong, further, that it does so independently of whether we or our society believe that it does.

    A divine command theorist does not have to identify this God with Yahweh. Obviously, divine command theorists who are Jews or Christians will do this, but that’s in virtue of their Judaism or Christianity, it is not in virtue of their belief in divine command meta-ethics. Strictly speaking a divine command theorist could reject the identification and still maintain that moral obligations are best identified with the commands of God.

    Third, even if one does identify God with Yawheh, it is evident that such an identification would rule out construing God as “an invisible monster” who is, according to Harris, ” a stone-age God of war”. If Yahweh is identified as a loving and just, invisible person, then he is neither an invisible monster or a stone-age God of war. Of course, a person who held this view might grant that at one piont in history, perhaps in the late Bronze Age or early Iron Age, various people groups believed that Yahweh was a God of war, but by identifying God as Yahweh, such a person is explictly rejecting this conception. The fact that people once concieved of something a certain way tells us nothing about whether that thing is, in fact, that way. Harris may as well castigate contemporary atomic theory by pointing out that ancient greek atomists held scientifically indefensible understandings of an atom.

    So Harris’ [1], the contention that a person can accept a divine command theory only if they believe in the existence of an invisible monster is false.

    Turning then to [2], the contention that there is no evidence for the existence of an invisible monster called Yahweh. Harris’s argument is circular. Suppose, for the sake of argument, (more…)

  • In Defense of the Bible: A Comprehensive Apologetic for the Authority of Scripture

    In Defense of the Bible: A Comprehensive Apologetic for the Authority of Scripture

    In Defense of the Bible: A Comprehensive Apologetic for the Authority of Scripture

    Another of the books Matt has contributed to arrived from the publisher’s today. In Defense of the Bible: A Comprehensive Apologetic for the Authority of Scripture addresses and responds to the major contemporary challenges to the divine inspiration and authority of Scripture. It is edited by Steven B Cowan and Terry L Wilder and published by B&H Academic.

    The blurb from the publishers:

    In Defense of the Bible begins by looking at philosophical and methodological challenges to the Bible—questions about whether or not it is logically possible for God to communicate verbally with human beings; what it means to say the Bible is true in response to postmodern concerns about the nature of truth; defending the clarity of Scripture against historical skepticism and relativism.

    Contributors also explore textual and historical challenges—charges made by Muslims, Mormons, and skeptics that the Bible has been corrupted beyond repair; questions about the authorship of certain biblical books; allegations that the Bible borrows from pagan myths; the historical reliability of the Old and New Testaments.

    Final chapters take on ethical, scientific, and theological challenges— demonstrating the Bible’s moral integrity regarding the topics of slavery and sexism; harmonizing exegetical and theological conclusions with the findings of science; addressing accusations that the Christian canon is the result of political and theological manipulation; ultimately defending the Bible as not simply historically reliable and consistent, but in fact the Word of God.

    Contributors include R Douglas Geivett, William A Dembski, Mary Jo Sharp, Darrell L Bock and Paul Copan, with whom Matt co-authored a chapter entitled “Does the Bible Condone Genocide?”

    A couple of endorsements:

    Endorsements

    In Defense of the Bible is available in both Kindle and Paperback formats. Get your copy from Amazon or Book Depository or wherever you like.

  • Ad Hominens, Special Pleading, Straw Men & Red Herrings: John Loftus’ Response to MandM

    John Loftus has written a response to my post “There Probably are no Duties. Now Stop Worrying and Enjoy Your Life!” Before turning to Loftus’ critique, let me recap my argument. While my post was satirical, it was intended to make a serious point. This being that many common and influential critiques of theism are incoherent.

    To establish this I argued three things.

    [1] That many critiques atheists offer of theism are moral critiques. Atheists argue that historically theism has been intricately linked with various forms of social oppression and/or the sacred texts of theistic religions condone oppressive practices.

    [2] That such critiques presuppose or assume the existence of moral duties. The critic has to assume that these practices are wrong even though the religious believers condone them.

    [3] That if one accepts the standard arguments atheists use against theism then the presupposition that there are moral duties is unjustifiable because precisely analogous arguments can be used to show there are no moral duties.

    Now if these three contentions are true then there is a fundamental incoherence in many common critiques of theism. If Loftus is going to provide a rebuttal of these contentions then he needs to provide reasons for thinking one of these three contentions is false.

    Unfortunately, instead of engaging the argument, Loftus ignored it and attacked a string of red herrings.

    John LoftusLoftus’ first argument in Do You Want to Be a Christian Apologist? Part 10 was to assert that I am “intellectually dishonest”, although somewhat charitably he states I am probably not aware I am dishonest – presumably I suffer from profound self-deception. Apparently the truth of this claim is blatantly obvious to “us” [by which he apparently means the atheist community].

    Unfortunately, simply stating that I am self-deceived and asserting with great confidence that I am wrong is not actually tantamout to offering a reason for questioning [1], [2] or [3] above. If it did then one could easily demonstrate that Loftus’ own work is substandard, I could just assert that it is and that everyone knows I am right and hey presto there’s my proof .

    Clearly, this is not a method by which one can reliably establish the truth or falsity of the matter.

    Loftus second argument begins with him drawing from my preamble:

    “Some atheists offer moral critiques of theism; their claim is not just that belief in God is false or unjustified, it is that such irrational beliefs are intricately linked with immoral and oppressive practices. Moral outrage often motivates the critiques offered – one only needs to read the condemnation of religious wars, religiously motivated terrorism, inquisitions, witch hunts, the suppression of science, sexism, homophobia, and so on, which is so prevalent in many free thought writings. Similarly, one needs only to read the accusations, regularly repeated in popular atheist literature, that the Bible condones slavery, or genocide, or stoning cheeky children, or rape, to observe this.

    Note that behind this critique is the presupposition that there are moral duties. People have a duty to not engage in wars or acts of terrorism, religious people who promote sexist or homophobic practices are wrong for doing so. I think this is nonsense as it assumes there is such a thing as a moral duty, it assumes things religious people do can be wrong. This is false and here is why.”

    After citing me Loftus rejoins:

    “Note the diversion here? Instead of providing answers to skeptical arguments he’s asking how anyone can have a moral critique of the Bible who doesn’t believe it’s the inspired word of God. He’s special pleading. No one else, given the rules of his game, can offer a moral critique of the Bible. Not a Hindu, nor a Muslim, nor a Buddhist, nor even liberals like the late John Hick or Thom Stark, or process theologians….. Do they? Do pantheists have a moral basis for critiquing the Bible? Flannagan would also have to reject the Natural Law Ethics (NLE) of the Catholic church, for if Natural Law Ethics obtains then even atheists have a basis for their moral critiques of the Bible. …”

    Unfortunately this rejoinder has little rational merit at all.

    First, I do address the sceptical arguments in question. By defending [3] I argue that analogues of these arguments entail an obvious false conclusion and therefore they cannot be sound. This is clear from reading the section of the original post which Loftus does not cite.

    Second, contrary to what (more…)