Category: Philosophers

  • Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Infantile Religious Morality

    In “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” Walter Sinnott Armstrong criticises William Lane Craig’s contention that theism, if true, provides an adequate foundation for morality. Armstrong contends that Craig’s position is “incredible”[1] and subject to a “cavalcade of devastating objections.”[2] He goes on to conclude that his criticisms do not just call into question Craig’s argument for a theistic based system of ethics, he contends that his arguments are conclusive against any theistic account of ethics that is compatible with Christianity. He states, “Other theists might try to give better arguments for a religious view of morality, I don’t see how they could avoid all the problems in Craig’s account without leaving traditional Christianity far behind.”[3]

    In several posts (see the related posts below) I have criticised some of the arguments Armstrong makes in this article. In this post I want to turn to another. The claim that “divine command theory makes morality childish;” Armstrong states,

    A second objection is that the divine command theory makes morality childish. Compare a small boy who thinks that what makes it morally wrong for him to hit his little sister is only that his parents  told him not to hit her and will punish him if he hits her. As a result, this little boy thinks that, if his parents leave home or die, then there is nothing wrong with hitting his little sister. Maybe some little boys think this way, but surely we adults do not think that morality is anything like this.[4]

    Its worth noting that Armstrong’s sketch is something of a caricature; the picture is of a little boy who thinks hitting is wrong because his parents will punish him if he engages in hitting. This tacitly implies that divine command theorists believe that actions are wrong because God will issue punishments to us if we do them. No divine command theorist to my knowledge holds this view. What we typically hold is that an action is wrong for a person to perform if a perfectly good, omniscient being (identified as God) commands that person to refrain from the action in question. The fear of punishment does not come into it.

    This point, however, is largely tangential because the heart of Armstrong’s position appears to be based on three ideas.

    [1] That some children see morality as dependent on the commands of their parents.
    [2] That it is inappropriate, childish or infantile for adults to view morality as being dependent on the commands of a parent.
    [3] That the conception of morality proposed by a divine command theorist is analogous to basing morality on the commands of a parent.

    Hence, divine command morality is infantile or childish.

    In responding to this line of argument, it is worth noting Armstrong’s argument is not new. In fact, it simply summarises an early argument made by Patrick Nowell-Smith in his widely-anthologised essay Morality: Religious and Secular. In this article all three of Armstrong’s premises are defended in more detail than Armstrong provides in the short paragraph above. I think that by critically examining Smith’s argument one can see the problems with Armstrong’s.

    Like Armstrong, Nowell-Smith argued, “religious morality is infantile.”[5] Similarly, like Armstrong, it is clear that Nowell-Smith’s target was a divine command theory.[6] Nowell-Smith’s thesis is that a divine command theorist possesses an ethical consciousness that is frozen or arrested at the pre-critical stage of a child. A mature adult whose cognitive faculties are functioning properly would have outgrown it.

    In arguing for this thesis, Nowell-Smith draws upon the theories of moral development proposed by Piaget.[7] According to Piaget, children start out with a view of morality that Nowell-Smith labels deontological, heteronomous and realist. Children view morality as obedience to certain rules (deontology) which hold because an authority figure, usually the parent, has promulgated them (heteronomous) and wrongdoing is perceived as any external action that violates these rules (realism). This view of ethics is appropriate for small children; however, as they mature and become more rational their consciousness changes. They begin to see the point of certain rules and understand the reasons behind them and the function of such rules. This is the stage where ethics become in Nowell-Smith’s words “autonomous.” Instead of just accepting a parent’s word for it the child learns to figure these things out for him/herself.[8]

    Nowell-Smith goes on to argue that these same features of heteronomy, realism and deontology are present in “religious morality” or more specifically, divine command theory. Consequently, divine command theory reflects a childish way of viewing ethics, one not worthy of a grown-up, educated adult.[9]

    Nowell-Smith’s analogy between divine command theory and childish morality ignores a fundamental disanalogy between the case Piaget describes and that of the divine/human relationship. As Richard Mouw has pointed out, Piaget views the transition from heteronomy to autonomy as corresponding to the time when a child begins to be on an increasingly-equal footing with his or her parents. The infantile stage of morality is appropriate while the child is in infancy because of its limited rationality and knowledge. In this state the child is unable to make decisions as competently as the adult, hence it relies on and defers to the judgement of adults. However, as the child grows equal to the parent in these respects he or she ceases to rely on parental judgement. He or she is now just as competent to answer these questions as his or her parent is and so his or her thinking becomes autonomous.[10]

    Consequently, Piaget’s model of development applies to situations where the subordinate is temporarily in a stage of inferiority to the authority but is undergoing a process of growth towards equality. It is when this equality is reached that the authority relationship is no longer appropriate. However, the relationship between adult humans and God is fundamentally different. Adults are not growing into divinity so that when mature they will equal God in rationality and knowledge. Rather, they are permanently in a state where they are inferior to God in these respects. In this context the failure to reach a moral consciousness that is equal to God’s is not a sign of arrested development and the infantile charge loses its sting. It is inappropriate for adults to behave like children but not inappropriate for them to fail to think like God.[11]

    Nowell-Smith’s argument, therefore, is unsound. I think the same response can be attributed to Armstrong’s argument. Returning to Armstrong’s three premises,

    [1] That some children see morality as dependent on the commands of their parents.
    [2] That it is inappropriate, childish or infantile for adults to view morality as being dependent on the commands of a parent.
    [3] That the conception of morality proposed by a divine command theorist is analogous to basing morality on the commands of a parent.

    There is a subtle equivocation in this argument; turning to premise [2] that it is inappropriate, childish or infantile for adults to view morality as being dependent on the commands of a parent, as we saw, this is because an adult child has grown to a position where he or she is on par in terms of maturity, rationality, insight, knowledge, and so on, to the parent. The problem is once this is clarified [3] is false. The conception of morality proposed by the divine command theorist is not analogous to basing morality on par with the commands of a parent who is an equal as no divine command theorist thinks of adult human beings as being on par with God in terms of maturity, rationality, insight, knowledge, and so on.

    Of course there are other respects whereby the conception of morality proposed by divine command theorists is analogous to a conception that sees morality as dependent on the commands of a parent, so in this sense [3] is true. The problem is that these respects do not include the features of the relationship between an adult child and their parent that makes the conception inappropriate and so if correct then [2] would no longer be true. Either way the argument fails.


    [1] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 106.
    [2]
    Ibid. 108.
    [3]
    Ibid. 114.
    [4]
    Ibid. 109.
    [5]
    Patrick H. Nowell-Smith “Morality: Religious and Secular,” in Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy ed. Ian T. Ramsey (London: SCM Press, 1966) 95.
    [6]
    Ibid. 96. Nowell-Smith characterises the view he critiques as follows, “They have simply assumed that just as the legal propriety of an action is established by showing it to emanates from an authoritative source, so also the moral propriety of an action must be established in the same way; the legal rightness has the same form as moral rightness, and may therefore be used to shed light on it. … Morality, on this view, is an affair of being commanded to behave in certain ways by some person who has a right to issue such commands; and once this premise is granted, it is said with some reason that only God has such a right.”
    [7]
    Ibid. 100.
    [8]
    Ibid. 100-103.
    [9]
    Ibid. 103-108.
    [10]
    Richard Mouw The God Who Commands: A Study in Divine Command Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990) 12.
    [11]
    Ibid. 12-14.

    RELATED POSTS:
    On a Common Equivocation
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong on God, Morality and Arbitrariness
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part I
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part II
    Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands: Part I
    Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands: Part II

  • Rest in Peace William Alston

    Philosopher William Alston died peacefully in his home in Jamestown New York on 13 September 2009 aged 87; he had been diagnosed with  pancreatic cancer just a week earlier.

    Many of my readers will not know but Alston was one of the leading contemporary Christian Philosophers of the last fifty years. I discovered his writings while studying philosophy at the University of Waikato and have always found his discussions to be perceptive and insightful.  Alongside others such as Plantinga and Wolterstorff, Alston was one of my early Philosophical heroes and continues to be so.

    He wrote several excellent works in the area of epistemology and later turned his talents to contributing to the emergence of the Reformed Epistemology movement, which argues that belief in God can, in certain contexts, be properly basic: justified in the absence of any inference or argument for theism’s truth. Alston developed these insights in his ground breaking work Percieving God where he defended the rational status of mystic and religious experience, arguably one of the most significant discussions of the epistemology of religious experience since William James.

    Alston published several important essays on religious language;  critiques of the problem of evil, an excellent defence of the concept of divine action in the world, an interesting discussion on divine command theories of ethics and an inspiring spiritual auto-biography on his conversion to Christianity is published in God and the Philosophers: The Reconciliation of Faith and Reason.

    Alston’s work has influenced the current generation of Philosophers of Religion including, William Row, Alvin Plantinga, Robert Audi, George Mavrodes, William Wainwright, Daniel Howard-Snyder (who has on-line both a biography of Prof. Alston and a bibliography of his writings) and a number of others.

    Alston will be sorely missed. May he rest in peace. May the grace and peace of God be with his family and friends.

    Hat tip: Christian Theist

     

  • Darwinian Evolution, God and Ockham’s Razor

    In a previous post, Darwinian Evolution, Chance and Design, I argued that the contention that Darwinian evolution occurs by chance does not entail that it shows the world was not designed. Once one sees how the concept of chance is defined in evolutionary theory one can see that it does not rule out design.

    It is possible at this stage to argue that evolutionary theory rules out design by appeal to Ockham’s razor. Suppose one grants that chance is used in a limited sense to refer to the fact that, following Sober, “there is no physical mechanism (either inside organisms or outside of them) that detects which mutations would be beneficial and causes those mutations to occur.”[1] Or following Mayr, it means, “that there is no correlation between the production of new genotypes and the adaptation needs of an organism in a given environment.”[2] Suppose that evolution occurring by chance in this sense is well supported by the evidence. One could go on to interpret this theory in at least two ways; one might argue that evolution was in some sense guided by God or that it occurred by chance in a stronger sense that precludes design. Both arguments would be compatible with the empirical evidence. However, the sceptic could argue that the latter is preferable in virtue of the principle of Ockham’s razor, “entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily.”

    The idea is that that the hypothesis of unguided evolution is simpler, more in accord with Ockham’s razor, than the hypothesis that God guided evolution. The former theory explains everything in terms of natural causes without appeal to a supernatural being such as God; hence, to claim God did it is to add an extra entity and is superfluous. Something like this argument is sometimes given by scientists writing in the field. George Gaylord Simpson writes,

    Although many details remain to be worked out, it is already evident that all the objective phenomena of the history of life can be explained by purely naturalistic or, in a proper sense of the sometimes abused word, materialistic factors.[3]

    Similarly, Douglas Futuyma states,

    By coupling undirected, purposeless variation to the blind, uncaring process of natural selection Darwin made theological or spiritual explanations of the life processes superfluous.[4]

    In this post I will respond to this appeal to Ockham’s razor and identify two problems with this line of argument. The first is that Ockham’s razor is only one criteria used to adjudicate rival hypotheses; the fact that one hypothesis is preferable on grounds of simplicity does not entail that it is preferable all things considered. There are at least couple of other considerations to take into account.[5]

    One other consideration to bear in mind is which hypothesis is more probable? To answer this question one would need to assess whether the probability that the history of life coming to be by a process of guided evolution is significantly higher than the probability of life coming to be by an evolution of blind chance and it seems to me, on the face of it at least, quite plausible to suggest that the chances of life evolving by chance is significantly lower than its coming about by divine guidance. If this is correct, then while atheistic evolution gives a simpler or more economical explanation of the origin of species it is considerably less probable.

    A further consideration is that Ockham’s razor tells us that if two theories can explain the phenomena equally well then the one that postulates the least entities is the preferred one. For naturalistic evolution to be preferable to theistic evolution it would need to be argued that it explains all the data equally as well.[6] The person who proposes the above line of argument, however, does not do this; all he or she does is show that both theories equally explain the history of life on earth. However, the history of life is only one feature of the world that scientists seek to explain. Showing that your theory explains one feature as well as a rival theory is a long way from showing that it explains all features as well.

    This is important because one of the arguments theists offer is that God can explain numerous features of the world better, better than theism’s rivals. It has been argued that theism explains the origin of the universe, the continued existence of the contingent universe, the existence of laws of nature, the existence of cosmic fine-tuning, the existence and nature of objective moral duties  and so on. To show that unguided evolution is a better theory then, one would need to show that unguided evolution provides a better explanation of all these phenomena together than theistic evolution does. If it does not then theism explains the history of life equally as well as atheistic naturalism but it also provides a better explanation of various other features of the world, thus it is a better overall theory.

    So even if we grant that unguided evolution conforms to Ockham’s razor better than theistic evolution, it is not at all clear or obvious that this means it is a better theory, all things considered. Theistic evolution may be a significantly more probable theory and have significantly greater explanatory scope and comprehensiveness.

    A second problem with the appeal to Ockham’s razor is that what constitutes a simpler hypothesis in a given context depends on the background information one has about what exists. Plantinga makes this point,

    The theistic noetic structure already, of course, includes the existence of God.  Relative to that noetic structure, therefore, there is no additional Ockhamistic cost in the hypothesis of guided evolution.  As an analogy: suppose we land a space ship on a planet we know is inhabited by intelligent creatures.  We find something that looks exactly like a stone arrowhead, complete with grooves and indentations made in the process of shaping and sharpening it.  Two possibilities suggest themselves: one, that it acquired these characteristics by way of erosion, let’s say, and the other, that it was intentionally designed and fashioned by the inhabitants.  Someone with a couple of courses in philosophy might suggest that the former hypothesis is to be preferred because it posits fewer entities than the latter.  He’d be wrong, of course; since we already know that the planet contains intelligent creatures, there is no Ockhamistic cost involved in thinking those structures designed. The same would go for evolution; theists already accept divine design, and do not incur additional Ockhamistic cost by way of thinking of evolution as guided.[7]

    Plantinga’s insight is correct. He goes on to note that if we did not know the planet was inhabited by intelligent beings and the erosion hypothesis was not significantly less probable then an appeal to Ockham’s razor in favour of the erosion hypothesis would have “teeth.”  If this argument works at all, it only works if one begins with an agnostic perspective and then postulates “the existence of a divine designer in order to explain the course of evolution.” If, however, one already knows that God exists and rationally believes God and has created the world on other grounds then we do not violate Ockham’s razor by appealing to the existence of God to explain the evolutionary process.

    Evolutionary theory then might mean that an agnostic has reason for accepting atheistic evolution over theistic evolution as an explanation of the origin of species (I say “might” because the problem of relative probabilities and explanatory comprehensiveness still would need addressing). However, it does not show that those who believe in God, are irrational in doing so, nor does it provide a theist with any rational reason to reject his or her belief.

    Again then, it seems that evolution by itself does not make belief in God untenable. Before it could the objector would first need to show there were no other grounds for believing in God other than the evolution of life on earth. Then he or she would need to show that one could construct a theory that has as much explanatory power as theism and on which the evolution of life by blind chance was not significantly less probable than its occurrence by divine guidance. Only after both these things were done could evolution be used to defeat theism. It is evident, however, that evolutionary theory by itself establishes none of these claims. Whether they are defensible is a substantive philosophical question over and above anything established in contemporary evolutionary theory.

    This post draws from parts of my paper “Does Evolution Make Belief in God Untenable?” given at the recent TANSA conference, Faithful Science? – Just How Well Do Science and Faith Get Along?


    [1] Eliot Sober “Evolution Without Metaphysics” (unpublished).
    [2]
    Ernest Mayr Toward a New Philosophy of Biology; Observations of an Evolutionist (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998) 98.
    [3] George Gaylord Simpson The Meaning of Evolution (Yale University Press, rev ed., 1967) 344-345.
    [4]
    Douglas Futuyma Evolutionary Biology (Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates Inc, 1986) 2.
    [5]
    Alvin Plantinga
    “Science and Religion: Where Does  the Conflict Really Lie?” (unpublished).
    [7]
    Ibid.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Darwinian Evolution, Chance and Design
    God, Darwinian Evolution and The Teleological Argument
    TANSA Faith and Science Conference
    Faith and Science Conference Write-Up

  • Recyling: Rawls on Religion and Public Life

    A common theme appeared in the comments section of my Investigate Magazine article, Contra Mundum: What’s Wrong with Imposing your Beliefs onto Others? Commenters suggested I had not addressed the standard liberal conception of the role of religion and public life, the view that no law should be based on premises that not all reasonable people accept. Mention was made of Rawls’ particular version of this argument so I thought it would be timely to recycle a series I wrote on this topic that many current regular readers might not have seen.

    Thanks to the wonders of WordPress’ more tag it is complete in this post.

    Rawls on Religion and Public Life

    One common line of argument for excluding theological premises from public debate is that not everyone accepts the truth of such premises. Any policy decisions based on such a purported divine law would be binding upon these people in spite of the fact they do not accept such theological doctrines.

    One obvious problem with this line of argument is that exactly the same thing can be said about many secular, non-theological, beliefs. Phillip Quinn articulates this point,

    … if the fact that religious reasons can not be shared by all in a religiously pluralistic society suffices to warrant any exclusion of religious reasons for advocating or supporting restrictive laws or policies, then much else ought in fairness also be excluded on the same grounds.[1]

    Quinn notes correctly that secular moral theories such as Utilitarianism or Kantianism, Intuitionism, Socialism, Libertarianism, can all be reasonably rejected in a philosophically-pluralistic society.

    Indeed, it would seem that the appeal to any comprehensive ethical theory, including all known secular ethical theories, should be disallowed on the grounds that every such theory can be reasonably rejected by some citizens in a pluralistic democracy. And if justification of restrictive laws or policies can be conducted only in terms of moral considerations no citizen of a pluralistic democracy can reasonably reject, then in a pluralistic democracy such as ours very few restrictive laws or policies would be morally justified, a conclusion that would, I suspect, be welcome only to anarchists.[2]

    One influential attempt to avoid these problems is proposed by John Rawls in Political Liberalism.[3] Rawls defends the thesis that it is wrong to appeal to religious or theological beliefs in debates pertaining to “constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice”.[4] Rawls does this on the same grounds that Quinn refers to above; such beliefs can be “reasonably rejected by some citizens in a pluralistic democracy”.[5] Rawls states,

    Our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.[6]

    (more…)

  • Darwinian Evolution, Chance and Design

    In a previous post, God, Darwinian Evolution and The Teleological Argument, I argued that evolution does not refute the teleological argument. Also, even if it did, a lot more significant philosophical work over and above any appeal to natural selection would be needed to infer from this that theism is rationally untenable. There is, however, a second concern lurking in this area; it is that Darwinian evolution shows that evolution occurs by chance. Chance is incompatible with design; hence, Darwinian evolution shows that biological organisms were not created by God. Del Ratzsch summarises the argument succinctly,

    [I]f it is genuine evolution, then the theory itself demands that the processes be governed by natural law and random chance … On the other hand, if its genuinely guided [by God], then the process must involve not chance but deliberately designed intervention.[1]

    The argument has two premises,

    [1] If evolution is guided [by God] then the processes must not involve random chance;

    [2] Genuine evolutionary theory demands that the processes be governed by natural law and random chance.

    I think this argument is mistaken. To be a valid argument, the word “chance” would need to be used the same way in both premises. The kind of chance that is incompatible with creation in [1] would have to be the kind of chance that is part of genuine evolutionary theory in [2].

    Alvin Plantinga has argued that when one examines how the word “chance” is being used in this kind of argument it is evident that the word is not being used the same way in both premises and that when the ambiguity is cleared up the kind of chance that is involved in contemporary evolutionary theory is compatible with the idea that God created human beings.[2]

    Let us turn to the first premise; [1] the claim that if evolution is guided [by God] then the processes must not involve random chance. This statement is true only if chance is defined a certain way, both that its existence is incompatible with the idea that God caused the event to happen (either immediately or indirectly via normal secondary causation) and that God did so intentionally and with purpose. To say then that an event occurs by random chance, on this definition, is to say the event was not caused, intended or planned by God.

    The problem is that if chance is defined this way premise [2] is false; genuine evolutionary theory does not demand that mutations are not caused by chance, when chance is defined in this way. According to Eliot Sober, when the word chance is used in the context of evolutionary theory it means, “there is no physical mechanism (either inside organisms or outside of them) that detects which mutations would be beneficial and causes those mutations to occur.” Ernest Mayr makes a similar point, “When it is said that mutation or variation is random, the statement simply means that there is no correlation between the production of new genotypes and the adaptational needs of an organism in a given environment.”

    Defined in the manner of Mayr and Sober, chance is entirely compatible with the idea that evolution is caused, intended or planned by God. The fact that there is, “no correlation between the production of new genotypes and the adaptational needs of an organism in a given environment” and “no physical mechanism (either inside organisms or outside of them) that detects which mutations would be beneficial and causes those mutations to occur,” does not mean that the events had no cause and it certainly does not mean that they were not intentionally caused by God.

    To show that evolution occurred by chance, where chance is incompatible with divine design, contemporary biologists would need to show not just that no physical mechanism detects which mutations are beneficial and causes them and it would have to do much more than fail to produce a correlation between the “production of new genotypes and the adaptational needs of an organism in a given environment.” It would have to show that there was ultimately no supernatural cause to the process that intended evolution of human life to occur. Contemporary biology has not done this and it is certainly very difficult to see how it could do so without stepping outside the bounds of science, as currently practised, and venturing into controversial areas of philosophy and theology.

    [1] Del Ratzch Battle for Beginnings: Why Neither Side is Winning the Creation Evolution Debate (Downers Grove IL: Intervarsity Press, 1996).
    [2] Alvin Plantinga “Evolution and Design” in For Faith and Clarity: Philosophical Contributions to Christian Theology ed. James Beilby (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006) 201-217.

    This post draws from parts of my paper “Does Evolution Make Belief in God Untenable?” given at the recent TANSA conference, Faithful Science? – Just How Well Do Science and Faith Get Along?

    RELATED POSTS:
    God, Darwinian Evolution and The Teleological Argument

  • God, Darwinian Evolution and The Teleological Argument

    Does Evolution make belief in God untenable? At the recent conference, Faithful Science? – Just How Well Do Science and Faith Get Along? I presented a paper examining this question.[1] This blog series has grown from that paper and the discussions I had with the theologians and scientists in attendance at the conference.

    It is commonly argued that darwinian evolution renders belief in God rationally untenable because it refutes the teleological argument, commonly referred to as the argument from design. Darwin himself suggested this in his autobiography;

    The old argument of design in nature, as given by Paley, which formerly seemed to me so conclusive, fails, now that the law of natural selection had been discovered. We can no longer argue that, for instance, the beautiful hinge of a bivalve shell must have been made by an intelligent being, like the hinge of a door by man. There seems to be no more design in the variability of organic beings and in the action of natural selection, than in the course which the wind blows. Everything in nature is the result of fixed laws.[2]

    John Dupre adds, “Darwinism undermines the only remotely plausible reason for believing in God.”[3]

    However, this purported refutation of theism is far too quick for several reasons. First, the claim that darwinian evolution refutes the teleological argument is false. There are several different versions of teleological arguments. What is arguably true is that it undercuts one particular version, that proposed by William Paley in Natural Theology. Although, in a recent study Del Ratzsch has suggested Paley’s argument has in fact been misunderstood and when these misunderstandings are stripped away it is not clear that discovery of the laws of natural selection do refute it.[4] Nevertheless, to rebut one particular teleological argument is not to undercut them all.

    To justify the inference that darwinian evolution refutes teleological arguments one would need to show that darwinian evolution provides grounds for rejecting all such arguments. It does not. If one focuses on the contemporary literature, it is evident that there are currently several teleological arguments from design that are untouched by darwinism which are being seriously defended in the literature. These arguments may or may not be sound but whether they are or not has nothing to with darwinian evolution.

    Two examples will suffice to illustrate this; the first is the teleological argument proposed and defended by Richard Swinburne in The Existence of God. Swinburne proposed an inductive teleological argument based on “The orderliness of the universe.” Swinburne elaborates what he means by this;

    The temporal order of the universe is, to the man who bothers to give it a moment’s thought, an overwhelmingly striking fact about it. Regularities of succession are all pervasive. For simple laws govern almost all successions of events. In books of physics, chemistry, and biology we can learn how almost everything in the world behaves. The laws of their behavior can be set out by relatively simple formulae which men can understand and by means of which they can successfully predict the future. The orderliness of the universe to which I draw attention here is its conformity to formula, to simple, for mutable, scientific laws. The orderliness of the universe in this respect is a very striking fact about it. The universe might so naturally have been chaotic, but it is not—it is very orderly.

    Swinburne argues that theism explains this order and that its existence increases theism’s probability. Regardless of the merits of Swinburne’s argument, it is evident that darwinian evolution does not refute it. This is because darwinism, far from explaining away such laws, actually assumes their existence;

    Evolution can only have taken place, given certain special natural laws. These are first, the chemical laws stating how under certain circumstances inorganic molecules combine to make organic ones, and organic ones combine to make organisms. And secondly, there are the biological laws of evolution stating how organisms have very many offspring, some of which vary in one or more characteristics from their parents, and how some of these characteristics are passed on to most offspring, from which it follows that, given shortage of food and other environmental needs, there will be competition for survival, in which the fittest will survive.

    The second example is the teleological argument defended more recently by Robin Collins. Robin Collins appeals to the existence of what has been dubbed cosmic fine-tuning, the contention that, “Almost everything about the basic structure of the universe–for example, the fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy–is balanced on a razor’s edge for life to occur.”[5] Frances Collins explains that for life to evolve there are around 15 constants necessary, each must have precise values and if they were off by a million or one in a million, life could not evolve.[6] Robin Collins argues that this fine-tuning is significantly more probable if theism is true than if atheism is true and hence confirms theism over atheism.

    I do not here wish to go defend (or criticise) this argument in any depth, my point is simply that darwinian evolution does not refute it. This is because the cosmic fine-tuning argument appeals to the conditions needed for life to evolve. The fine-tuning both Collins’ refer to are preconditions for the evolution of life to occur. As they are preconditions, evolution can hardly provide an explanation for this at all; even if it could, it is not clear that this would show that the probability of such fine-tuning occurring if atheism were true is as probable as it occurring on the background hypothesis of theism’s truth.

    Hence, darwinian evolution does not undercut teleological arguments. It is worth noting that even it did then the conclusion that Dupre and Darwin draw, that theism is rationally unwarranted, does not follow. Even if all versions of teleological arguments were refuted by Darwin, it does not follow that all the other arguments for God’s existence are undercut; even if they were, it could be the case that belief in God is justified independently of any argument. Let me briefly elaborate on both these ideas.

    The first, Dupre’s suggestion that the argument from design is the only plausible ground for believing in God, is simply false. In Two Dozen or So Theistic Arguments Alvin Plantinga sketched 26 arguments for God’s existence currently being defended in the literature. Earlier this year, Blackwell published the Blackwell Encyclopaedia to Natural Theology which contains current versions of 11 arguments used to defend the existence of God in the literature today. While the cogency of these arguments remains, like most philosophical claims, a subject of substantive debate it is undisputed that they exist and have been give serious and sophisticated advocacy from competent philosophers. To rebut them then requires serious philosophical argument not assertion.

    The suggestion then that a refutation of all teleological arguments dismantles the case for theism is false. A true refutation of the plausible grounds for theism would involve a detailed rebuttal of all of the arguments for theism, not just commentary on one type.

    Even if it were the case that teleological arguments were the only arguments for the existence of God, it does not follow that their failure would undercut the rational acceptability of theism. Such an assertion assumes that theism is rationally justified only if there is a good argument for it. It is widely acknowledged in epistemology that not all beliefs need to be demonstrated by argument to be rational. To claim they do creates a regress problem;

    If everything needs to be proven then the premises of every proof would need to be proven. But if you need a proof for every proof, you need a proof for your proof, and a proof for your proof of a proof and so on-forever. Thus it makes no sense to demand that everything be proven because an infinite regress of proofs is impossible.[7]

    To avoid this problem an influential movement in epistemology known as foundationalism maintains that at the base or foundation of one’s noetic structure are beliefs that one is justified in believing independently of any argument. These are called properly basic beliefs. Since the late 1970’s an extremely important movement within Philosophy of Religion, known as the reformed epistemology movement, has offered detailed and rigorous defences of the contention that for theists, belief in God can be a properly-basic belief. The most important defender of this position is Alvin Plantinga, though many others such as William Alston and Nicholas Wolterstorff have defended similar views. Plantinga notes the implication of this movement, “The demise of the teleological argument, if indeed evolution has compromised it, is little more of a threat to rational belief in God than the demise of the argument from analogy for other minds is to rational belief in other minds.”[8]

    It seems then that the claim that evolution undercuts teleological arguments is a non starter. Even if it were true, this conclusion only has significance if all other arguments for God’s existence are also refuted and an argument can be provided that shows that belief in God is not properly-basic. This would require significant philosophical work, over and above, any appeal to natural selection. It is evident then that by itself, darwinian evolution would prove very little except, at best, that one 19th century argument by Paley might be unsuccessful.

    [1] I am grateful to Alvin Plantinga who sent me a copy of his unpublished paper, “Science and Religion: Where Does the Conflict Really Lie?” which was extremely helpful in formulating my thoughts.
    [2] Charles Darwin Life and Letters of Charles Darwin ed Francis Darwin (NY: D. Appleton, 1887) Vol. 1 279.
    [3] John Dupre Darwin’s Legacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) 56.
    [4] Del Ratzsch Teleological Arguments for God’s Existence Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    [5] Robin Collins “God, Design, and Fine-Tuning” originally published in God Matters: Readings in the Philosophy of Religion eds Raymond Martin and Christopher Bernard (New York: Longman Press, 2002).
    [6] Frances Collins The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for the Existence of God (Free Press, 2006) 75.
    [7] Roy Clouser Knowing With the Heart (IVP, Downers Grove, 1999) 69.
    [8] Alvin Plantinga “Science and Religion: Where Does the Conflict Really Lie?” (unpublished).

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    Darwinian Evolution, Chance and Design

  • Religion and Science: A Response to Ken Perrott’s “Other Ways of Knowing”

    Ken Perrott, at Open Parachute, took issue with some comments I made in my recent defence of Plantinga’s stance on Evolution being taught in state schools. To gain focus let’s look at one thing I said to Ken in the comments section on that post,

    If the relevant evidence points towards a theory it does not follow that all the evidence points towards it. That’s because there might be evidence which science does not consider, such as theological claims, that are relevant.”

    I went on to say

    …on many issues the relevant scientific evidence is the only evidence, but on questions of origins that is not the case. The question of our origins is both a scientific and theological question so a correct examination of the issue will take into account both the theological and scientific evidence that is relevant to the question. To teach evolution is the true theory of origins one would have to show it is probable on all relevant evidence, and seeing science excludes relevant theological evidence from the discussion it cannot claim to have shown it’s true on all relevant evidence.

    Central to this argument is a distinction between all the relevant scientific evidence and all the relevant total evidence. The argument assumes that science, while a reliable method of gaining truth in many areas, is not the only source of reliable information we have about the world, that on certain topics we can also discover truths about the world through faith and revelation; hence, on these topics an accurate view of the world must utilise both sources of information.

    Ken was clearly displeased with this statement and labeled it the “other ways of knowing argument.” On his own site he asked me to respond to his criticisms; I will do so below.

    1. Much of Ken’s response to this appears to be based on a failure to grasp what I actually said. In the above citation I did not say that evolution was not true nor did I say evolution was not probable on all the relevant evidence. Everything I have said is entirely compatible with theistic evolution, where a person comes to a position based both on the scientific evidence and the theological reflection. I did not say, as Ken repeatedly attributes to me, that “theology trumps science” or that theological reflection is more reliable than science. What I said was that a theory which is probable on all the evidence, that is all the theological and all the scientific evidence, taken together, should be believed over a theory which is only probable on the scientific evidence alone. I also maintain the opposite is true; a theory which is probable on all relevant evidence, drawn from both theology and science should be believed over a theory which is supported by theological considerations alone.

    The issue then, is not that one discipline “trumps another,” it is that a theory is not worthy of consent unless it takes into account all the relevant information from both disciplines. I think that theological and scientific reflections are both reliable methods and our interpretation of both the theological and empirical data can be fallible.

    These clarifications address an awful lot of Ken’s argument such as his statement, “To assert today that we should revert to a pre-scientific era, that theology or philosophy should trump scientific knowledge, is to claim that mythology/logic/reason is more reliable than evidence.” Given that I never said that theology should trump science, this statement is irrelevant.

    Similarly, Ken’s claim that my position “is consistent with the Wedge strategy” is misleading. While it is true that my position is consistent with creationism, as I note above, it is also consistent with evolutionary theory. Contrary to what Ken thinks, the mere fact that two views are consistent provides no basis for linking the views together in a kind of guilt by association argument. Creationism is, after all, consistent with the view that Wellington is the capital of New Zealand; however, this does not mean that everyone who claims that Wellington is the capital believes that the world was created in six 24-hour days. Consider a less palatable example; Hitler’s belief in the superiority of the Aryan race is consistent with the claim that there is a city called Cairo this does not mean that anyone who remembers visiting Cairo is a Nazi.

    2. Ken’s response also appears marred by a failure to adequately understand the meaning of some philosophical terms I use. In the above citation I use the word “true,” Ken says, in response to my use of it, that “the word [truth] means different things to theologians, scientists and people on the street.” In fact, in the above citation I am using the standard Aristotelian concept of truth which is common to both disciplines. Aristotle stated, “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true.” By this definition the claim that the earth is round is true if the earth is, in fact, actually round, and it is false if the earth is, in fact, not round. Similarly in theology, the claim that God created the world ex nihilo is true if there is, in fact, a God and he did, in fact, create the physical universe out of nothing a finite period of time ago.

    Ken seems similarly confused about the meaning of the word “logic” and goes to great lengths to assert that “logic must follow evidence.” However, this simply shows he does not understand logic; logic is the study of rules of inference, that is, logic tells one how to deduce conclusions from evidence. Once this is realised, the claim that logic should follow evidence makes no sense. One cannot deduce or infer anything from evidence without logic in the first place.

    Similarly Ken’s suggestion that science is more reliable than logic is questionable. Science utilises logic to infer its conclusions from the empirical data; logic, therefore, is a presupposition of science that science needs if science is to conclude anything. Moreover, some axioms of logic clearly are more certain and reliable than many empirical claims, the claim, for example, that Both A and Not A cannot both be true, in the same sense, at the same time is more certain that speculations about how first life arose. Similarly with the rule modus tollens, something of which we can be relatively certain, which states: if A, then B, not B, therefore, not A.

    3. Putting aside these misinterpretations and philosophical mistakes, Ken’s main objection is,

    Implicit in the “different ways of knowing” argument, and hinted at by Matt in his comments, is the desire to change the science process to include theological “evidence” and claims that are not based on, or tested by, evidence. To give theology a “free pass.”

    Elsewhere he claims,

    It’s claiming a logic or justification for the theist belief without allowing the normal checking that should go with knowledge claims.”

    Here Ken raises a fairly standard argument:

    [1] that scientific claims differ from theological claims in that the former are empirically testable and the latter are not; [2] lack of testability disqualifies theological claims from being taken into account in theorising about the world.

    This argument is problematic and has been refuted numerous times in the literature; here I can be brief. Turning to [1] Larry Laudan notes “It is now widely acknowledged that many scientific claims are not testable in isolation, but only when embedded in part of a larger system of statements, some of whose consequences can be submitted to test.”[1] Take the claim that there is at least one electron in the universe. To test the truth of this claim we would need a theory about how electrons act under various conditions, what their predicted effects upon things would be and theories about how one could detect these effects if they occur and so on. Only with this kind of background information can we can use the relevant tools to test the predictions; however, in isolation, the claim that there is at least one electron is untestable.[2]

    Second, many theological claims are testable in precisely the same way. Take the claim made by Archbishop Usher that the world was created 6000 years ago. This claim is testable; we can muster empirical evidence to assess the age of the earth. The same is true for other theological claims; take the claim, for example, that the cosmos had a beginning in time, an implication of the theological views of St Augustine or that the universe is governed by laws that can only be discovered by empirical means, an implication of the voluntarist theology of the late middle ages or the claim made by 14th-15th century theologians that, contrary to some interpretations of Aristotlian physics, God did make the universe such that the earth orbited the sun or Augustine’s claim that God created the world with seed principles, via which, the whole creation of the universe could unfound over time or Bonaventure’s theologically based contention that the cosmology of his day was mistaken in claiming that the universe was infinitely old.

    Turning to [2] the suggestion that only testable claims can be utilised in answering a question about the world is also questionable. Ethical statements, such as, “it is wrong to cause pain just for entertainment” cannot be, by themselves, empirically tested yet in answering many questions about what we ought to do it is impossible to get an answer without appealing to them. Moreover, one cannot empirically test anything without presupposing some truths that themselves cannot be empirically established. Hume showed for example that it is impossible to non- circularly justify the reliability of inductive reasoning. William Alston has argued persuasively that one cannot empirically verify the reliability of one’s senses (the reason for this is quite obvious, to empirically demonstrate anything one needs to use one’s senses, and hence, one needs to presuppose the reliability of the source one is trying to prove the reliability of). It is hard to even conceive of a situation where basic axioms of logic, such as the law of non-contradiction, could be observably false. Yet science proceeds by presupposing the reliability of the senses, the reliability of inductive reasoning and the rules of logic.

    Ken’s central argument then is mistaken. His other arguments fair no better, such as his attempt to try to link my position with Stalinism;

    So what would the trumping of science by theology/philosophy be like? We have seen some disastrous examples. Such as Stalin’s promotion of Lysenko, trumping of science by Stalinist interpretations of Marxism-Leninism. This put Soviet genetic science back many years and led to the death and persecution of many scientists. In many ways the current theological/creationist/wedge attack on science is of a similar ilk to Stalinism.

    Apart from the fact that I did not espouse creationism or claim that theology trumps science, Ken here seems to think that telling state schools that they can teach a theory is true , as opposed to merely saying that it is the best scientific theory, is akin to arresting scientists, censoring their research, persecuting and executing them!

    Unfortunately, this logic can be turned on its head as the same logic would entail that refusal to teach Christian theology as the truth in state schools is akin to persecuting Christian theologians, censoring their research, persecuting them and executing them; hence, any atheist who objects to their children being taught religion at a state school is advocating some kind of quasi-Stalinist policy.

    Somewhat ironically, however, Ken makes some claims that if taken seriously suggest he is not adverse to religious persecution. Ken states that,

    He [Matt] argues that teaching evolution is actually teaching “fundamentalist children that their religious beliefs are false.” Well, of course that is a problem for fundamentalism, not science. We cannot ignore reality because some silly people are offended by it.

    Ken here implies that state schools should teach that a particular religious perspective is false if “that’s reality.” In other words, if a person’s religious beliefs really are false then it is not unjust for the state to teach this.

    Now as I stated in my original post and as I have repeated several times in correspondence with Ken, this argument is problematic. Both Ken and I agree that Islam is false, that Mohammad is not a prophet. If Ken’s claims were correct then, justice would require that the government run re-education programs for Muslim students telling them that Mohammad is not a prophet. After all, as Ken grants, “this is reality” and the religious sensibilities of other people cannot justify not teaching reality.

    Ken’s second argument is that to fail to tell children that evolution is true is “child abuse.” As I pointed out, however, if this were true then the many Muslim, Christian and Jewish parents who home school their kids with creationist texts or send their kids to private schools where creationism is taught should be arrested, charged with child abuse and punished at law on par with child abusers; further, their children should be placed in state care and sent to state re-education centres. The logical implication of both Ken’s arguments is religious persecution.

    Now I pointed both these points out to Ken when he raised them in previous discussions. Ken’s response was to apparently ignore the response and just repeat the argument. This, however, is not a rational response at all; simply repeating the same mantra over and over does not make it true.

    [1] Larry Laudan “Science at the Bar — Causes for Concern” Science, Technology and Human Values 7: 16-19.
    [2] For example see, Alvin Plantinga “Religion and Science” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Evolution should not be taught in State Schools: A Defence of Plantinga Part I
    Evolution should not be taught in State Schools: A Defence of Plantinga Part II