Category: Apologetics

  • Star of Wonder: Matthew’s Nativity Narrative and it’s Critics, Part three

    I have been considering the hypothesis that the star referred to in Matthew’s Gospel was a comet recorded by Han-dynasty astronomers in 5 BC. In a previous post, I examined an objection to this view that rested on two claims:

    • First, that in the late first century BC comets were universally interpreted as negative omens.
    • Second, that such a reading is inconsistent with the way the star functions in Matthew’s birth narrative.

    In that earlier discussion I challenged the first claim. I argued that ancient interpretations of comets were more nuanced than is often assumed. Comets were widely understood as portents of social and political upheaval, particularly the replacement of kings or dynasties. While this was indeed a negative omen for the ruler or dynasty about to be displaced, it could simultaneously be—and often was—understood as an endorsement of the incoming ruler.

    In what follows, I turn to the second claim: is this pattern of interpretation inconsistent with Matthew’s birth narrative? I suggest that it is not.

    1. The Star is a sign of Dynastic Change in Matthew

    In Matthew’s Gospel, the star is explicitly associated with a change of kings and dynasties. The second chapter opens as follows:

    Now after Jesus was born in Bethlehem of Judea in the days of Herod the king, behold, magi from the east arrived in Jerusalem, saying, “Where is he who has been born King of the Jews? For we saw his star in the east and have come to pay him homage.”

    At the time of the star’s appearance, the Hasmonaean dynasty—ruling since the Maccabean period—had already been displaced by Herod the Great. Herod’s designated heir in early 5 BC was Herod Antipater, then about forty years old, though this was changed later that year to Herod Antipas, who was only fourteen. Against this backdrop, the Magi’s claim that a star signified the birth of a new “King of the Jews” clearly implies dynastic upheaval: not merely the replacement of Herod himself, but the displacement of his entire line of succession.

    This is entirely consistent with the comet of 5 BC functioning as the star in Matthew’s narrative. A generation earlier, during the reign of Mithradates VI (120–63 BC), a comet was interpreted as heralding the birth of a king who would overturn Roman domination. Roughly sixty five years later, during Nero’s reign, Tacitus reports that a comet was widely taken as “an apparition boding change to monarchies,” prompting speculation about Nero’s successor and leading him to eliminate suspected rivals violently. Earlier still, Julius Caesar’s sidus—whatever its precise astronomical nature—was read both as marking the end of one regime and as legitimating Augustus as its heir. There is nothing unusual, then, about astrologers interpreting a comet as signalling the end of one dynasty and the rise of another.

    Why Judea?

    It might be objected that the Magi infer not merely the birth of a king, but the birth of a king connected specifically with Israel. Yet this inference is compatible with ancient astrological practice. The comet recorded by Chinese astronomers in 5 BC was said to appear in Qiān Niú, corresponding broadly to the Capricorn–Aquila region of the sky. Ancient astrology included a doctrine of astrological geography, according to which zodiacal regions were associated with particular lands, so that celestial phenomena occurring in a given constellation were taken to signify events affecting the corresponding territory.

    The most familiar version of this doctrine appears in Claudius Ptolemy’s Tetrabiblos (second century CE), which associates Judea with Aries. However, this reflects a later, highly systematised phase of Hellenistic astrology. As Stephan Heilen[i] and others have shown, earlier traditions—preserved in authors such as Teukros of Babylon (first century CE), Vettius Valens (second century CE, drawing on earlier sources), and Paul of Alexandria (fourth century CE, preserving older material)—tend to associate Capricorn not with Judea narrowly, but with Syria more broadly.

    This is historically significant because, in the late first century BC, Judea was commonly understood as part of the wider Syrian region, a usage reflected in contemporary geographical writers and later Roman provincial administration. Moreover, Syria proper no longer possessed a native royal dynasty in 5 BC. Other regions within the Syrian sphere were ruled by tetrarchs; however, none was experiencing dynastic instability of comparable scale or symbolic importance to that of Judea. On this basis, there is nothing surprising about astrologers interpreting a comet appearing in the Capricorn–Aquila region as signifying royal or dynastic upheaval in Syrian lands, with Judea as the most plausible concrete referent. [ii]

    Messiah, Divinity, and the Role of Jewish Interpretation

    Another objection is that the Magi interpret the star as signifying the birth of the Messiah or a divine figure. Yet Matthew’s text does not support this claim. The Magi announce only that a king has been born and that they know the general region from which he comes. They do not identify the child as the Messiah, nor do they know where in Judea he is to be found. This is why they ask, “Where is he who has been born King of the Jews?”

    It is Herod, together with the chief priests and scribes, who introduces the explicitly messianic interpretation. Upon hearing the Magi’s report, Herod gathers the religious authorities and inquires “where the Messiah was to be born.” The identification of the child as the Messiah thus emerges when the Magi’s message is mediated through Jewish expectations and scriptural interpretation.

    This pattern accords well with what we know of comet interpretation in the ancient world. When Halley’s comet appeared over Jerusalem approximately seventy- years later, both Josephus and the Zealots interpreted it as signalling the fulfilment of messianic prophecy—though they sharply disagreed about who the Messiah was. As I will argue in a later post, the period around 5 BC also coincides with heightened messianic expectation and intense paranoia on Herod’s part concerning prophetic threats to his rule.

    “Worship” and Royal Homage

    It is might be claimed that the Magi’s desire to “worship” the child implies divinity. However, the Greek verb προσκυνέω (proskyneō) denotes bodily homage and is commonly used of honour shown to human kings and superiors. In the Septuagint, David proskyneō Saul (1 Sam 24:8), Nathan proskyneō King David (1 Kgs 1:23), and the woman of Tekoa proskyneō David (2 Sam 14:4). In none of these cases is divinity implied. Matthew himself uses the term for a slave paying homage to a king in a parable (Matt 18:26), and Revelation 3:9 explicitly uses it in a non-divine sense.

    The Magi, then, say only that a new king has been born in Judea and that they wish to render him royal homage.

    1. The Star as a Threat to the Status Quo

    In Matthew’s narrative, the star is unmistakably perceived as a threat by the reigning king. Matthew writes: “When King Herod heard this, he was disturbed, and all Jerusalem with him.” The verb ταράσσω denotes agitation, alarm, or terror. Herod responds by ordering the killing of all male children in Bethlehem aged two years and under, based on the timeframe he had learned from the Magi.

    It is therefore puzzling to object that comets were interpreted negatively, since in Matthew’s narrative the star is explicitly treated as a negative omen. Herod’s reaction mirrors that of Nero, who, according to Tacitus, was “perturbed” (terreo) by a comet interpreted as signalling dynastic change and responded by eliminating the suspected rival Rubellius Plautus.

    In both cases, a tyrant hears of a “star” appearing in the sky, interprets it as a sign that a new king will replace him, and responds with violence. It seems ad hoc to regard such a scenario as implausible in the case of Herod while readily accepting it in the case of Nero.

    A Dual Meaning: Threat and Endorsement

    Finally,  comets could simultaneously be understood as condemning the existing ruler and endorsing the incoming one. While Herod interprets the star as a threat, the Magi take it as a sign that they should render homage to the new king. Matthew, writing for a Christian audience, invokes the star to support the claim that Jesus is the Messiah.

    As I explained in my last post, this dual interpretation is well attested. The comet of 60 CE was taken to signify both Nero’s impending downfall and Plautus’s divine selection as his successor, prompting public support for Plautus. Mithradates VI interpreted comets at his birth and coronation as evidence that he was destined to overthrow Roman power. Augustus appealed to Caesar’s sidus to legitimise his own rule as the divinely favoured outcome of dynastic upheaval. Chaeremon of Alexandria similarly understood comets as signifying both the “removal of dynasties” and the “commencement of new ones.”

    As for comets and messianic expectation, both Josephus and the Zealots interpreted Halley’s comet in 66 CE as signalling the arrival of the Messiah, even while disagreeing about who fulfilled that role. Moreover, the oracle of Balaam—“a star shall come out of Jacob, and a sceptre shall rise out of Israel” (Num 24:17)—was widely employed in Second Temple literature to predict the coming of a ruler.

    Taken together, these considerations suggest that interpreting Matthew’s star as a comet of 5 BC is not only plausible but fits comfortably within well-attested ancient patterns of astronomical interpretation.


    [i] Heilen S., Barthel P. and van Kooten G. (eds.), ‘The Star of Bethlehem and Greco-Roman Astrology, Especially Astrological Geography’, The Star of  Bethlehem and the Magi, Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands, 2015, pp. 345–346 https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004308473_015

    [ii] See Mark Matney, ‘The star that stopped: The Star of Bethlehem & the comet of 5 BCE’ Journal of the British Astronomical Association, Volume 135, Issue 6, 401 (2025); DOI: https://doi.org/10.64150/193njt

     

  • Star of Wonder: Matthew’s Nativity Narrative and its Critics, part two


    In a previous post, I addressed the claim that no star could exist that moves or behaves in the way described in Matthew’s Gospel. I argued that Matthew’s Gospel uses language found in Greco-Roman writings to describe comets, and that a comet could act in the way Matthew described. I also argued that we have good evidence for the existence of a comet in 5 BC, the time Jesus was born.

    However, the idea that the star in Matthew’s Gospel was a comet faces an important challenge:

    At this time in history (and all the way into the Middle Ages), comets were regarded as omens of doom and destruction—the very opposite of good tidings. This was in part because of comet behavior. They were perceived in ancient times as breaking into the sky, ignoring the highly ordered and repetitive clockwork movement of the heavens. The Almighty could have chosen to use an ominous sign for the birth of Christ. Presumably, He can do whatever He likes. But if the purpose of the Star was to communicate something joyful to humankind, a comet seems an unlikely choice.

    There are two claims encapsulated in this objection:

    • First, that at this time in history (the 1st century BC) comets were universally interpreted as negative omens.
    • Second, that this is contrary to how the star is presented in Matthew’s Gospel.

     This post will address the first of these claims. The second will be addressed in a later post.

    Were Comets Universally Interpreted as Negative Omens?

    First, the claim that comets were universally interpreted as negative omens is misleading. In the first century BC, comets were almost universally seen as threats to the established political order. According to the 1st-century astrological poem Astronomica, they were harbingers of significant political upheaval affecting entire nations, and particularly kings—such things as the collapse of social order, civil wars, rebellion, death of kings, the arising of rivals to the throne, and the overthrow or replacement of kings.[1]

    The fact that comets signify political upheavals that threaten the current political order means they are a bad omen for the current political order and particularly for incumbent rulers. However, it does not mean they signify something that is bad for everyone. On some occasions, the downfall of one ruler could be construed as beneficial to another. When this happened, the beneficiary could interpret comets as a positive omen.

    Several examples will illustrate this:

    Example 1: Mithridates VI
    First, consider  these coins minted by Mithridates VI (134–63 BCE). Mithridates fought a series of wars against the Romans. In his day, Persian and Zoroastrian traditions were being interpreted to predict a king who would overthrow Rome (this is interesting because the Magi were Zoroastrian priests). Mithridates promoted himself as the fulfillment of these prophecies. You’ll notice the coins have stars on them. As part of this promotion, Mithridates minted comets on these coins.

    The context is provided by the Roman historian Justin:

    The future greatness of this prince even signs from heaven had foretold; for in the year in which he was born, as well as in that in which he began to reign, a comet blazed forth with such splendour, for seventy successive days on each occasion, that the whole sky seemed to be on fire. It covered a fourth part of the firmament with its train, and obscured the light of the sun with its effulgence; and in rising and setting it took up the space of four hours.[2]

    Justin writes around AD 160–230. However, he is paraphrasing from Pompeius Trogus’ work The Philippic Histories, written in the first century BC. Justin refers to two comets, one at Mithridates’ birth and another at his ascension. The existence of such comets used to be dismissed as legendary. However, subsequent studies of Chinese astrological records have confirmed that two such comets did appear at the time of his birth and ascension.[3] So, Mithridates and Trogus are referencing a real celestial event.

    What is important for us is how this event was interpreted. Justin cites a first-century author stating that a comet which appears for 70 days was a sign from heaven foretelling the rise of a great prince. For Rome, this was an ominous sign. Justin said Mithridates had an exceptional destiny. This destiny resulted in the attempted overthrow of Roman power in the eastern Mediterranean. Mithridates successfully overthrew and conquered several neighboring kingdoms and Roman-controlled territories, expanding his realm into a major empire around the Black Sea and Asia Minor. He also massacred tens of thousands of Roman citizens. This was bad news for the established Roman status quo. Mithridates was an obvious threat to the political order.

    Mithridates obviously viewed his mission differently. He did not view the comets as a negative omen. The idea that he was a serious threat to Roman power in the eastern Mediterranean was something he embraced. In effect, he is saying: “The cosmic sign that terrified the world was about me—I am the terror to your Roman oppressors.” This was a bad omen for the Romans but a positive one for their enemies. By minting coins bearing these comets, Mithridates shows he expected his subjects to interpret them in the same way he did.

    The takeaway is this: In the first century BC, a comet could be interpreted by people in the East as signifying the birth of a new ruler who would rise to overthrow and replace the existing rulers. This would be a negative omen for the existing social order and the incumbent rulers. However, it could also simultaneously be embraced as a positive sign by partisans of the new king.

    Example 2: Augustus Caesar
    Consider next these coins  from Augustus Caesar (63 BC–AD 14), who was the Roman Emperor at the time of Jesus’ birth. Augustus promoted himself as “son of God,” “saviour of the world,” “lord,” and described his reign as “the good news”[4] that Augustus had ushered in peace and stability. These coins are part of that promotion. Notice the coins have comets on them. Why? Pliny explains:

    The deified Augustus had deemed this comet very propitious to himself; as it had appeared at the beginning of his rule, at some games which, not long after the decease of his father Caesar, as a member of the college founded by him he was celebrating in honour of Venus Genetrix. In fact he made public the joy that it gave him in these words: “On the very days of my Games a comet was visible for seven days in the northern part of the sky. It was rising about an hour before sunset, and was a bright star, visible from all lands. The common people believed that this star signified the soul of Caesar received among the spirits of the immortal gods, and on this account the emblem of a star was added to the bust of Caesar that we shortly afterwards dedicated in the forum.” This was his public utterance, but privately he rejoiced because he interpreted the comet as having been born for his own sake and as containing his own birth within it; and, to confess the truth, it did have a health-giving influence over the world.[5]

    Pliny refers to a bright comet that appeared around 44 BC, commonly referred to as the Sidus Iulium (“Julian Star”) or Caesaris astrum (“Caesar’s star”) in ancient literature. The existence of this comet has been confirmed from Chinese records.[6] It appeared shortly after Julius Caesar’s assassination and was interpreted by the common people as evidence that Julius Caesar had been made a god. Augustus was Julius Caesar’s adopted son. So the inference can be made that he (Augustus) was declared the son of God. Pliny says that, in contrast to the common interpretation, Augustus himself took the comet as signifying him and as “containing his birth,” and Pliny accepts that the omen had foretold the positive influence his life and reign would have over the world.

    Here Caesaris astrum is viewed as a positive omen, signifying the benefits of Augustus’ reign. However, in the previous paragraph, Pliny has described comets as “a terrifying star and not easily expiated,” because “they overturn kingdoms, stir up wars, and change the condition of peoples.” As examples, he mentions comets that appeared during the civil war of 87 BC where Octavius was overthrown and replaced by Marius; the struggle between Caesar and Pompey, where Caesar gained control of Rome making himself emperor; and the poisoning of Claudius where Nero took control of the empire. These are all cases of significant political upheaval resulting in a change in regime.

    Is Pliny contradicting himself here? I don’t think so. Both these things can be true at the same time. Caesar’s death did herald political upheaval. It resulted in the War of Mutina, the Second Triumvirate, and the civil war between Antony and Octavian. These resulted in the end of the Roman Republic and the rise of the Roman Empire. Augustus rose victorious from these struggles and was the beneficiary of these upheavals.

    So, in Pliny we see both that comets were terrible signs predicting political upheaval involving an overthrow of the current kingdom and, at the same time, that they could be reinterpreted or reframed as positive signs of endorsement for the ruler who benefits from the change and also as signs of whatever benefits his reign brings about.

    Example 3: Tacitus and Nero — The Comet of AD 60
    Tacitus records a comet during the reign of Nero Caesar around AD 60:

    Meanwhile, a comet blazed into view—in the opinion of the crowd, an apparition boding change to monarchies. Hence, as though Nero were already dethroned, men began to inquire on whom the next choice should fall; and the name in all mouths was that of Rubellius Plautus, who, on the mother’s side, drew his nobility from the Julian house. … A belief spread that he was the candidate marked out by the will of deity; and he found numerous supporters in the class of men who nurse the eager and generally delusive ambition to be the earliest parasites of a new and precarious power. Nero, therefore, perturbed by the reports, drew up a letter to Plautus, advising him “to consult the peace of the capital and extricate himself from the scandal-mongers: he had family estates in Asia, where he could enjoy his youth in safety and quiet.” To Asia, accordingly, he retired with his wife Antistia and a few of his intimate friends.[7]

    Nero proceeds to have Plautus murdered while in exile.

    The same pattern is seen here. Tacitus tells us that a comet was widely understood as an “apparition boding change to monarchies.” This is clearly a negative omen for the current king, Nero. It signals to the people that he has been dethroned by the gods and will be replaced by a rival king. Nero is “perturbed” and attempts to eliminate rivals. However, the same omen is simultaneously interpreted by the same people as a divine endorsement of the new king and so gives their support to Plautus. The reason Nero exiles and murders Rubellius Plautus is because the people believe he is the candidate “marked out by the deity” and he wins “numerous supporters” as a result.

    So, in the first century AD, comets could and were interpreted as a sign that a king would be replaced by a new rival. This could be and was interpreted as a negative sign by the current king—so much so that he might murder potential rivals. At the same time, it could also, and did, signal divine endorsement of the rival, and hence motivate people to support him.

    Example 4: Josephus and the Zealots
    A fourth example is Josephus. In a previous post, I mentioned Josephus’ reference to Halley’s Comet as “a star resembling a sword, which stood over the city.” The full context is:

    Thus were the miserable people persuaded by these deceivers, and such as belied God himself; while they did not attend nor give credit to the signs that were so evident, and did so plainly foretell their future desolation, but, like men infatuated, without either eyes to see or minds to consider, did not regard the denunciations that God made to them. Thus there was a star resembling a sword, which stood over the city, and a comet, that continued a whole year.[8]

    He goes on to explain this:

    But now, what did the most elevate them in undertaking this war, was an ambiguous oracle that was also found in their sacred writings, how “about that time, one from their country should become governor of the habitable earth.” The Jews took this prediction to belong to themselves in particular, and many of the wise men were thereby deceived in their determination. Now this oracle certainly denoted the government of Vespasian, who was appointed emperor in Judea. However, it is not possible for men to avoid fate, although they see it beforehand.[9]

    Again, we see the same pattern. Both Josephus and the Zealots interpret the star (or comet) as a sign that a new king would rise up who would become governor of the earth. G. J. Goldberg explains that both Josephus and the Zealots’ interpretation is shaped by Jewish apocalyptic tradition.[10]⁸ The oracle of Balaam—“a star shall come out of Jacob, and a sceptre shall rise out of Israel” (Num. 24:17)—was widely used in Second Temple literature to predict the coming of a ruler. In this context, a star could naturally be understood as the sign preceding a messianic ruler.

    The difference between them is over who the relevant king is. The Zealots take the comet as an omen from God that Roman rule in Judea will be overthrown. This would be a negative omen for Rome. Consequently, they see it as a divine endorsement of their decision to rebel, and a positive omen for them. By contrast, Josephus sees the comet as an omen that the regime in Jerusalem will be overthrown—a negative sign sent from God against the Zealots. However, Josephus simultaneously understands the comet to be a sign of endorsement for Vespasian; it predicted his ascension to the throne.

    So, in first-century Judaism, a comet could be and was interpreted as a sign that a new king would arise and replace the current regime. This could be and was interpreted in light of messianic expectations. Such a comet was a negative sign for the current rulers who would be overthrown or replaced, but it would also be a sign of endorsement for the new regime.

    Example 5: Chaeremon of Alexandria
    My final example is Chaeremon of Alexandria, who was one of the leading Stoic philosophers of the first century AD—and significantly, a tutor to the young Nero prior to AD 47. One of Chaeremon’s works was a treatise On Comets. No surviving manuscripts of this work exist; however, fragments of it occur in the writings of Origen. Origen writes:

    It has been observed that, on the occurrence of great events, and of mighty changes in terrestrial things, such stars are wont to appear, indicating either the removal of dynasties or the breaking out of wars, or the happening of such circumstances as may cause commotions upon the earth. But we have read in the Treatise on Comets by Chæremon the Stoic, that on some occasions also, when good was to happen, comets made their appearance; and he gives an account of such instances. If, then, at the commencement of new dynasties, or on the occasion of other important events, there arises a comet so called, or any similar celestial body, why should it be matter of wonder that at the birth of Him who was to introduce a new doctrine to the human race…[11]

    Again, we have the same pattern: Origen tells us that, in his day, comets were understood to indicate significant upheavals in terrestrial affairs, such as “the removing of dynasties.” This causes “commotion” and hence indicates negative things are to occur. However, he tells us that Chaeremon had documented and taught that comets could also indicate that “good was about to happen,” such as at the “commencement of new dynasties.” This is the pattern we have seen above. In each case, a comet has been seen; in each case, it is taken as a negative omen for the dynasty being removed, but also as an endorsement of the replacement.


    [1] Manilius, Astronomica 1.809–814; 2.150–159, trans. G. P. Goold (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 67–69, 123–25.

    [2] Justin, Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus 37.2.1–3, trans. J. C. Yardley (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1994), 197.

    [3] Ho Peng Yoke, “Ancient and Mediaeval Observations of Comets and Novae in Chinese Sources,” Vistas in Astronomy 5 (1962): 127–225.

    [4] Here I am not putting a Christian “spin” on Augustus’s claims. It is common place in New Testament studies to observe that the Messianic language used by early Christians to describe Christ is the same language used to describe the roman emperor and the imperial cult.

    [5] Pliny, Natural History 2.93–94, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938), 207–09.

    [6] Ho Peng Yoke, “Ancient and Mediaeval Observations,” 144–45.

    [7] Tacitus, Annals 14.22, trans. J. Jackson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1937), 283–85.

    [8] Josephus, Jewish War 6.288–300, trans. H. St. J. Thackeray (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1928), 459–63.

    [9] Josephus, Jewish War 6.288–300, trans. H. St. J. Thackeray (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1928), 459–63.

    [10] G. J. Goldberg, “The Star of Bethlehem and Josephus,” Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha 13 (1995): 59–77

    [11] Origen, Contra Celsum 1.58, trans. Henry Chadwick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), 39.

     

     

     

     

     

  • Thinking Matters Talk: Does Morality Need God? Part Three:


    This year the New Zealand apologetics organization Thinking Matters ran a “Confident Christianity Conference” in Auckland. I was asked to speak at this conference on the topic. Does Morality Need God? Below is a slightly streamlined version of the talk I gave.

    This brings me to my second contention: If God exists, a divine command theory would provide a coherent account of our fundamental assumptions about moral requirements.

    I outlined four assumptions about the kind of requirements morality imposes upon us. These were

    1. Inescapability: moral requirements apply to us irrespective of whether following them contributes to any ends or aims we currently desire.
    2. Impartiality: moral requirements are justified from an impartial perspective.
    3. Authority: agents always have conclusive reasons to do what is morally required and never have sufficiently good reasons for doing what is morally wrong.
    4. Accountability: if something is morally required, we are guilty and liable to blame if we fail to do it and lack an adequate excuse.  

    I will make three points.

    First, If God exists, the assumption that wrongness is identical to the property of being contrary to God’s command would coherently account for all these assumptions. Consider the fact that moral requirements are “inescapable.” If God commands someone to do something, this command is addressed to them, regardless of whether it contributes to any ends or aims they currently desire. So, the imperative in question is inescapable.  Similarly, consider the impartiality of moral requirements. God is an all-powerful, all-knowing, essentially benevolent, and impartial agent. So what God commands is co-extensive with prescriptions that a benevolent, impartial person who was fully informed and reasoning correctly would endorse.  A command is also a paradigmatic example of a prescription that involves a demand for which we hold people accountable through standard practices such as blaming. That is how a command differs from other prescriptions, such as a piece of advice or a suggestion. So, if the property of being morally required is identical to the property of being commanded by God,  we would expect it to be true that we are accountable to moral requirements.

    Second, if God exists, the thesis that wrongness is identical to the property of being contrary to God’s command would vindicate the assumption that it is always in our long-term self-interest to follow impartial demands. A divine command theory entails that moral requirements are what we are accountable to God for doing. Unlike human beings, God’s commands are co-extensive with what is demanded from an impartial point of view, and people can never violate these norms secretly without being detected.  

    Third,  all attempts to refute a divine command theory have failed. It’s widely claimed that divine command theories were refuted by an argument called “The Euthyphro Objection.” This objection is named after a dialogue written by the ancient Greek philosopher Plato in the 4th century BC. Plato’s original argument is somewhat obscure and applied only to polytheistic religions (those religions that believe in many gods). However, the version used by philosophers today is an adaptation of Plato’s argument for use against monotheistic faiths. Critics of divine command theories appeal to three arguments loosely associated with Plato’s dialogue. These are (1) the anything goes objection, (2) the arbitrariness objection, and (3) the vacuity objection. I will address each of these briefly in turn.

    The Anything Goes Objection

    One objection is that a divine command theory makes morality arbitrary because anything at all could be right or wrong. King and Garcia explain the alleged problem in this way:

    [Divine command theory] implies that it is possible for any kind of action, such as rape, not to be wrong. But it seems intuitively impossible for rape not to be wrong. So [Divine command theory] is at odds with our common-sense intuitions about rape.[1]

    This objection assumes it is possible for God to command rape. Divine command theorists contest this assumption. They do not contend that moral requirements depend on the commands of just anyone. They base moral obligations on the commands of God conceived in a particular way. God is an all-powerful, all-knowing, essentially loving, just, immaterial person who created the universe on their conception. Given this, the claim that God could command people to perform a horrendous act like rape holds only if it’s possible for an all-knowing, loving, and impartial person to command rape. This is unlikely. The reason critics use examples like rape is that they view them as actions that no virtuous person could ever knowingly entertain. However, suppose, for the sake of argument, it is possible for a just and loving, omniscient person to command rape. Rape would only be commanded in situations where a just and loving person, aware of all the relevant facts, could endorse it– and under these circumstances, it’s hard to see how one could take for granted it was morally wrong.

     Arbitrariness

    A pervasive objection is that divine command theories make morality arbitrary because that nothing is right or wrong prior to God’s command; God can have no reasons for issuing one set of commands instead of another. Oppy explains the objection.

    Could it have been, for example, that murder, rape, lying, stealing, and cheating were good because God proclaimed them so? Surely not! But what could explain God’s inability to bring it about that murder, rape, lying, stealing and cheating are good by proclaiming them so, other than its being the case that murder, rape, lying, stealing, and cheating are wrong quite apart from any proclamations that God might make?[2]

    However, this is implausible. Suppose God has character traits such as being essentially loving and impartial. In that case, God can and would have reasons for prohibiting actions like rape, murder, or cheating, quite apart from whether these actions are antecedently wrong. Antecedent to any command on God’s part, these actions won’t have the property of being morally prohibited. But they could still have other properties such as being cruel or harmful or unjust or detrimental to human happiness— or being expressions of hatred, for example. And a loving and impartial God could prohibit these actions because these actions have these non-moral properties.

    Divine command theories do not entail that morality is arbitrary. If anything, the opposite is the case. A divine command theory entails that actions will be wrong in virtue of certain non-moral properties those actions have. Non-moral properties would provide an informed, loving, and impartial person with reasons to prohibit those actions.

     Vacuity Objection

    A third objection is that divine command theories entail that the doctrine of the goodness of God is rendered vacuous. Someone can only be morally perfect if he has duties and acts in accordance with them. But, seeing God does not issue commands to himself, a divine command theory entails that God has no obligations. Consequently, God cannot be God.

    This objection assumes that God’s goodness should be explicated in terms of God faithfully discharging his duties. But there is no reason why we must understand God’s goodness in this way. In Christian creeds like the Westminster Confession, God’s goodness is understood as possessing certain character traits, such as being loving, impartial gracious, merciful, long-suffering, truthful, forgiving, etc. If God’s commanding an action makes it required, God cannot have an obligation to do these things; that does not mean God does not do them. God does not have to have a duty to do something in order to do it.

    To recap: unless we assume that prudential and impartial commands never conflict, we cannot account for our fundamental intuitions about morality. Second, secular accounts of the kind of accountability we have to morality undermine this assumption. Fourth, a divine command theory would, if true, both vindicate this assumption and coherently account for our fundamental assumptions about morality.  Finally, standard objections against a divine command theory fail. The conclusion is this. If we assume God exists, a divine command theory can coherently and defensibly account for these fundamental assumptions in a way a secular theory cannot.


    [1] Nathan L King, “Introduction”, in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 11.

    [2]  Graham. Oppy, Best Argument against God (Hampshire: Palgrave Pivot, 2014), 44.

  • Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma: Part II

    This is a talk I gave to the Philosophy Club at Glendale Community College in Phoenix, Arizona, this weekend. The talk was followed by a long discussion with some faculty, students at the college, and others who zoomed in.

     In this talk, I introduced and defended a divine command theory of ethics. The talk was divided into three parts. In section I, I set out what modern divine command theories of ethics typically contend. I distinguished this from some common misunderstandings in section II. In Section III, I discussed the Euthyphro dilemma. I will suggest this objection is not the conclusive rebuttal it is often assumed to be. In my first post, I reproduced sections I and II. This post will begin my discussion of the Euthyphro objection in section III. 

    In my last post, I argued that semantic and epistemic objections to a divine command theory fail. However, the most famous and important objection to divine command theories is an argument known as “The Euthyphro Objection”. After a dialogue written by the ancient Greek philosopher Plato in the 4th century BC. Plato’s original argument is somewhat obscure and applied only to polytheistic religions (those religions that believe in many gods). However, the version used by philosophers today is an adaptation of Plato’s argument for use against monotheistic faiths. Critics of divine command theories appeal to three arguments that are loosely associated with Plato’s dialogue. These are (1) the anything goes objection, (2) the arbitrariness objection, and (3) the vacuity objection. I will take each in turn.

    The Anything Goes Objection

    One objection is that a divine command theory makes morality arbitrary in the sense that anything at all could be right or wrong. King and Garcia explain the alleged problem in this way:

    [Divine command theory] implies that it is possible for any kind of action, such as rape, not to be wrong. But it seems intuitively impossible for rape not to be wrong. So [Divine command theory] is at odds with our common-sense intuitions about rape.[1]

    We can formalise the objection as follows:

    (P1) If the divine command theory is true, then whatever God commands is morally required.

    (P2) God could command rape.

    (C1) So, if the divine command theory is true, rape could be morally obligatory.

    (P3) But rape could not be morally obligatory.

    (C2) Therefore, the divine command theory is false.

    In response, divine command theorists have contested (P2) Divine command theorists do not contend that moral requirements are dependent upon the commands of just anyone. They base moral obligations on the commands of God conceived in a particular way. God is an all-powerful, all-knowing, essentially loving, just, immaterial person who created the universe on their conception. Once we realize this, the horrendous deeds objection appears to be unsound.

    We can put this in terms of a dilemma: consider (P2): (P2) only holds if it is possible for a fully informed, rational, loving and just person to knowingly command rape. However, this is unlikely. Critics cite examples of rape because they view it as an action that no virtuous person could ever knowingly entertain. So (P2) appears to be false. However, suppose; I am mistaken about this. It is possible for an essentially loving and just person to command rape. Rape, then, would only be commanded in situations where a just and loving person aware of all the relevant facts could endorse it. Under these circumstances, it is hard to see how (P3) could be maintained.

    Once we realize that God, as conceived by the divine command theorist, is essentially loving and just, it is difficult, if not impossible, to see how both (P2) and (P3) can be true. Whatever reasons we have for thinking (P2) is true seem to undermine (P3). By contrast, whatever reasons we have for accepting (P3) undermine (P2).


    [1]Nathan L King, “Introduction”, in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 11.

     

  • Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma: Part I

    This is a talk I gave to the Philosophy Club at Glendale Community College in Phoenix, Arizona, this weekend. The talk was followed by a long discussion with some faculty, students at the college, and others who zoomed in.


    In this talk, I introduced and defended a divine command theory of ethics. The talk was divided into three parts. In section I, I set out what modern divine command theories of ethics typically contend. I distinguished this from some common misunderstandings in section II. In Section III, I discussed the Euthyphro dilemma. I will suggest this objection is not the conclusive rebuttal it is often assumed to be. This first post will contain sections I and II. 

    I. What is a Divine Command Theory 

    For purposes of this talk, the term “divine command theory” will refer to the divine command meta-ethics defended by Robert Adam’s, William Lane Craig, William Alston, and C Stephen Evan’s. This theory contends that the property of being morally required is identical to the property of being commanded by God. [1] Where God is understood, in orthodox fashion, as a necessarily existent, all-powerful, all-knowing, essentially loving and just, immaterial person who created and providentially ordered the universe.

    Note three things about this thesis:

    First, it is a thesis about the nature of moral requirements, not about the nature of goodness in general. The concept of “good, is ambiguous, as is seen by the following statements “I had a really good dip in the spa pool last night”. Or “going on a low carb diet is good for you”. Or, “Carlos the Jakal was a good hitman”. The concept of the morally obligatory, or morally required, is not identical to the concept of what it is good to do. It might be good, even saintly, for me to give a kidney to benefit a stranger, but it is not an act I am obliged to do.[2] To be obligatory, an action must be more than just good or praiseworthy in some sense. Obligatory actions are actions we are required to do; another person can legitimately demand we do them. Omitting to do them without an adequate excuse renders one guilty and blameworthy. Others can justifiably blame you, censure you, and sanction you in various ways. 

    Nor is this is an idiosyncratic limitation of theory. While some critics of divine command theories characterize it as an account of “goodness” or of all “all evaluative properties.”  Almost all contemporary defenders of divine command theories; Quinn, Adams, Alston, Craig, Wierenga, Hare, and  Plantinga present a divine command theory of obligation, not goodness per se. Nor is this unique to modern divine command theorists; older divine command theorists such as William Paley, John Locke, George Berkeley, and Francisco Suarez limited divine command theories to accounts of moral obligations or requirements, not to goodness in general. 

    Second, the postulated relationship between moral requirements and God’s commands is one of identity. Mark Murphy refers to this sort of explanation as “informative identification”. Such as when “we explain the nature of water by identifying it with H2O or explain the nature of heat by identifying it with molecular motion”. We are aware of something we refer to as “water” and want to understand its nature. We answer this question by postulating that what we refer to as water is identical with H20; by doing this, we answer the question, “what is the nature of water?”. In this instance, divine command theorists attempt to explain the nature of a particular kind of moral property, the property of being morally required. The theory is that the property we refer to when we say “X morally required” is the property of being commanded by God.

    Third, this is a thesis about the relationship between God and morality. It is not a claim about the relationship between the bible and morality. To claim that moral requirements are identical with God’s commands is not to claim our moral requirements are identical with the commandments laid down in a particular sacred text. The thesis I laid out makes no mention of any sacred text such as the Bible, Quran, Hadith, Torah or Talmud. While many divine command theorists accept that God has revealed his commands in an infallible sacred text, some do not.

    Moreover, the claim that God’s commands are contained in some particular sacred text is not part of or entailed by a divine command theory itself. It is the result of other theological commitments they have. One could consistently be a divine command theorist without holding this. Divine command theories are ecumenical; they have had advocates within the Christian, Islamic, Jewish and even deist traditions.

    Of course, what role sacred texts should play in our moral thinking and decision-making is important. Whether God has infallibly revealed himself in such text is a question of great interest. However, it is not the question that the divine command theorist is addressing when he says moral requirements are identical with Gods commands.

    II What the Divine Command Theory is Not: Avoiding Strawman

    These clarifications as to what a divine command theory enable us to address two common objections to the theory: semantic and epistemic objections.

     1. Semantic Objections

    Harry Gensler expresses one common objection to a divine command theory. Gensler writes:

     “Imagine an atheist who says the following: “kindness is good, but there is no God”. If “x is good” meant “God desires x”, then this claim would be self-contradictory (since it would mean “God desires kindness, but there is no God”). But it isn’t self contradictory. So “x is good” doesn’t mean “God desires x”.[3]

    Gensler concludes that the phrases “X is good” and “desired by God” are not synonymous phrases. This is a conclusion about the meaning of moral terms and words. However, a divine command theory isn’t a theory about the meaning of moral terms. It is a thesis about the nature of moral properties. It contends that the property of being morally required is identical with the property of being commanded by God.

    Consequently, Gensler’s argument has an implicit assumption. If two phrases such as “x is wrong” and “X is contrary to Gods commands” are not synonymous in meaning, they cannot refer to the same property. 

     This assumption is questionable. Consider the example of water and H20; the phrase “x is a cup of water” is not synonymous with the words “x is a cup of H20”. The ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle could, without self-contradiction, claim “this cup is full of water and atoms don’t exist”. Yet that doesn’t entail that water is not identical to H20. “water” and “H20” are distinct non-synonymous ways of referring to what turns out to be the same property. The fact two phrases are not synonymous does not entail they are not referring to the same property. 

    Gensler’s argument appears to conflate two separate questions. The question of whether the words “x is morally required” has the same meaning as the phrase “God commands x” and the question of whether those words pick out the same or distinct properties. He mistakenly takes a divine command theory as answering the first of these questions, when it is proposed as an answer to the second.

     2. Epistemic Objections

    Many critics of divine command theories object that we know the truth of moral claims independently and prior to any beliefs they have about divine commands. This idea figures prominently in criticisms posed by Nowell Smith.[4], Lehrer and Corman[5], Louise Anthony[6]. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong[7]. Paul Kurtz provides an example:  

     If God is essential, then how can it be that millions of people who do not believe in God, nevertheless behave morally. On [the divine command] view they should not and so God is not essential to the moral life[8]

    Like the semantic objection I just discussed, this one is based on a confusion. This objection takes a divine command theory to entail that people cannot know what is right and wrong unless they first know what God has commanded. 

     However, this is incorrect. Divine command theorists contend the property of being morally required is identical with the property of being contrary to God’s commands. If two descriptions refer to the same property, that doesn’t entail we cannot know something answers one description unless we believe something answers the other. 

     It is a fact that water is identical to H20. This does not mean that we cannot know about the existence of water unless we first know about hydrogen and oxygen. The Polynesians who first settled New Zealand around 1300 AD were very good at navigating water: they knew what water was, what rain was, and how to discern currents and tides. They had lots of justified belief about water. However, they knew nothing about atomic or molecular theory. 


    [1]Robert M. Adams, “Divine Command Meta-Ethics Modified Again,” Journal of Religious Ethics 7:1 (1979): 76.

    [2] Example from C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 16.

    [3]Harry Gensler Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction (London: Routledge Publishing, 1988) 39.

    [4]Patrick H. Nowell-Smith, “Morality: Religious and Secular,” in Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy, ed. Ian T. Ramsey (London: SCM Press, 1966) 97.

     [5]James W. Cornman & Keith Lehrer, Philosophical Problems and Arguments (New York: MacMillan, 1979), 429.

     [6]Louise Anthony “Atheism as Perfect Piety” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, Eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2008),67-84

     [7]  Armstrong writes, “The divine command theory makes morality unknowable [because such theories entail] we cannot know what is morally wrong, if we cannot know what God commanded … we have no sound way to determine what God commanded.” For critique, See my “Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism: A Reply to Walter Sinnott Armstrong” Philo 15:1 (2012):19-37

     [8]Ibid 33-33, note the slippage in Kurtz statement; he goes from the claim that belief in God is unnecessary to live a moral life to the claim that God is unessential to morality. This is like arguing that; because people can fly successfully in planes without believing in the laws of aerodynamics, it follows, the laws of aerodynamics are not essential for flight.

  • Published in Sophia “Why the Horrendous deeds objection is still a bad argument”

    My paper, “Why the Horrendous deeds objection is still a bad argument” has now been published by Sophia here.  The abstract is as follows:

    A common objection to divine command meta-ethics (‘DCM’) is the horrendous deeds objection. Critics object that if DCM is true, anything at all could be right, no matter how abhorrent or horrendous. Defenders of DCM have responded by contending that God is essentially good: God has certain character traits essentially, such as being loving and just. A person with these character traits cannot command just anything. In recent discussions of DCM, this ‘essential goodness response’ has come under fire. Critics of DCM have offered various objections to the essential goodness response. This paper responds to these critics. I examine and refute six such objections: (a) the objection from counterpossibles, (b) the objection from omnipotence, (c) the objection from requirements of justice, (d) the objection from God’s moral grounding power, (e) the objection from evil and indifferent deities, and (f) the epistemological objection. I will maintain that despite all that has been said about the horrendous deeds objection in recent analytic philosophy, the horrendous deeds argument is still a bad argument.

    A pre-published copy is available on my academia.edu page. 

  • Dawkin’s dilemma: How not to answer the question “Why Be Moral?”

    In his bestselling book, the God Delusion, Richard Dawkin’s responds to the question: “If there is no God, Why be good?”Richard Dawkins

    Posed like that, the question sounds positively ignoble. When a religious person puts it to me in this way (and many of them do), my immediate temptation is to issue the following challenge: ‘Do you really mean to tell me the only reason you try to be good is to gain God’s approval and reward or to avoid his disapproval and punishment? …If you agree that, in the absence of God, you would ‘commit robbery, rape, and murder’, you reveal yourself as an immoral person, ‘and we would be well advised to steer a wide course around you’. If, on the other hand, you admit that you would continue to be a good person even when not under divine surveillance, you have fatally undermined your claim that God is necessary for us to be good.[1]

    Dawkin’s thinks someone who asks “if there is no God, why be moral?” is assuming that the Gods approval is the only reason they to do good. He attacks this assumption with a dilemma. Either this assumption is true, or it is not true. If it is true, the questioner reveals themself to be an immoral person. He is someone who refrains from theft, murder and rape only because God will punish him. We should shun and avoid someone like this. If the questioner’s assumption is not true, then the claim that there is no reason to do good without God is undermined. The fact he would continue to do what is right, even if God did not exist shows that he does have reason to do good even if God does not exist. 

    I think each step of this response is mistaken. 

    First, is it true that this question presupposes that threat of divine punishment is the only reason anyone has to refrain from immoral behaviour? I think the answer is clearly no.

    The question “why be good?” or “why be moral?” This question has a long history in western thought question going back at least as far as Plato’s republic. John Tilly explains that according to the standard interpretation of the question, it involves: 

    A request for a justification for giving precedence to moral reasons for action when such reasons conflict with other reasons (e.g., those of self-interest). Whenever moral reasons recommend one course of action and nonmoral reasons recommend another, why should I favor the first set of reasons? What argument could persuade me to do[2]

    This simple question has proved difficult to answer. So much so that, the 19th-century Philosopher Henry Sidgwick declared it to be “The profoundest problem in ethics”. During the 17th-19th[3] centuries, several philosophers argued this recalcitrant problem posed difficultly for any purely secular understanding of morality. Thomas Reid’s (1710–1796) summary is typical.

    What about cases where concern for our happiness on the whole conflicts with a concern for duty? This is a merely imaginary conflict; there can’t actually be any such opposition between the two leading principles. While the world is under a wise and benevolent administration, it’s impossible that any man should be a loser by doing his duty. So every man who believes in God, while he is careful to do his duty, can safely leave the care of his happiness to his Maker. He realizes that his most effective way of attending to his long-run happiness is by attending to his duty. But consider the case of an atheist who wrongly thinks his virtue is contrary to his happiness on the whole. … this man’s dilemma is without remedy. It will be impossible for him to act so as not to ·seem to himself to· contradict a leading principle of his nature. He must either sacrifice his happiness to virtue, or his virtue to happiness, and he has to decide whether it is better to be a fool or to be a knave! [4]

    Reid points out that the “why be moral?” challenge presupposes the existence of a dilemma: what duty requires contradicts what my long-term happiness requires. Because the “the world is under a wise and benevolent administration” Reid thinks such dilemmas are “imaginary”. They never, in fact, occur. However, they would occur if, contrary to fact, God did not exist. So, if atheism is true, some answer to this dilemma is needed if morality’s rational authority is to be vindicated.

    Nothing in this line of argument assumes that the only reason Reid has to do good is divine reward or punishment. Reid speaks of a dilemma between “two rational governing principles in the constitution of man.” [5]. A dilemma occurs when one has two options, both of which are problematic. We do have powerful moral reasons independent of our self-interest demanding us to do what is right. But we also have powerful prudential reasons pointing the other way. For Reid, Divine sanctions mean that prudential reasons never really point the other way. But they are not the only reasons in the equation. Reid is not atypical in this. Someone who asks, “if there is no God, why be good?” need not assume the only reason he or anyone else has for doing good is divine reward or punishment.

    However, let’s suppose for the sake of argument they did assume this. Dawkin’s attempted rebuttal of this assumption fails. Consider Dawkin’s discussion of the dilemmas first horn.

    “If you agree that, in the absence of God, you would ‘commit robbery, rape, and murder’, you reveal yourself as an immoral person, ‘and we would be well advised to steer a wide course around you’.[6]

    Dawkin objects that anyone who answers “yes” reveals themselves to be an immoral person. That may be true. But it is also irrelevant in this context. Remember what the question is: Dawkin’s interlocutor asks the question “Why we should always do what is morally right when it contradicts our self-interest?”. To answer, “because if you don’t, you are acting immorality” misses the point. Dawkin’s interlocutor knows it is immoral to act contrary to immorality. He is instead asking why he should side with morality and not self-interest in the first place.

    An illustration might help here. Imagine that a religious sceptic was asking “If God exists, why should I do what he says”? I doubt Dawkin’s would consider the response “because God tells you to and if you don’t, you aren’t following God” to be a satisfactory answer. The question is “why to obey God?”, answering “because God tells you to”  begs the very question at issue.

    The same thing is true when the question is “if there is no God, why be good”. Dawkin’s interlocutor is asking “if God does not exist, why always do what is required by morality”? The response “if you don’t you are immoral” begs the question in the same way. Just as the theist cannot cite God’s commands as a reason for obeying God’s commands, the atheist cannot cite moral requirements as a reason for obeying moral requirements.

    So Dawkin’s treatment of the first horn misses the point. What about the second horn? Dawkin’s writes.

    If, on the other hand, you admit that you would continue to be a good person even when not under divine surveillance, you have fatally undermined your claim that God is necessary for us to be good.[7]

    This confuses two separate questions. The original question was “why should you be good, without God”. The questioner doubts we always have reasons to do always what is right. However, this doubt is compatible with admitting that one would continue to do what is right without God. What you should do and what you would do are not the same thing. Dawkin’s argument here was anticipated and responded to by Henry Sidgwick :

    It was no use to say that if I was a moral hero, I should have formed a habit of willing actions beneficial to others which would remain in force, even with my own pleasure in the other scale. I knew that at any rate, I was not the kind of moral hero who does this without reason; from blind habit. Nor did I ever wish to be that kind of hero: for it seemed to me that that kind of hero, however admirable, was certainly not a philosopher. I must somehow see that it was right for me to sacrifice my happiness for the good of the whole of which I am a part.[8]

    Sidgwick accepts that if I am a highly moral person, I will have formed a habit of doing good actions. These habits will mean I will have a strong disposition to continue doing good when I believe it is not in my self-interest. But, this does not show that I really do have a reason for doing this. I could be just acting out of blind habit and prior commitment to morality. One possible response to the question, “why be good?” is to admit there is no reason and affirm we “must simply decide between the moral life and its alternatives.” [9] People can sometimes make arbitrary non-rational leaps of faith where they commit to some form of life without reason or rational grounds. If people never did this, the whole raison d’être for writing The God Delusion is undermined. The fact that morally upright people admit that they would always do what is right in the absence of God. Doesn’t show they have reasons to do so.

    Lets recap: Someone asks a serious sceptical question about Dawkin’s beliefs. His response is first to express outrage at an “ignoble.” [10] question and claim it is a “conversation stopper.” [11]. Then he paints a very uncharitable and inaccurate picture of the person who dares ask this ignoble question. Suggesting that religious believers who raise this sceptical challenge reveal themselves to be selfish egoists, amoral people we should consider shunning. When the believer objects that he isnt, in fact, an amoralist, Dawkin’s takes that as evidence the believer doesn’t really accept the sceptical challenge. The subtext is that anyone who really harboured this doubt about secular morality is a dangerous psychopath we are well-advised to keep away from. 

    For the reasons spelt out above, none of this count as a good answer to the question: why be moral without God” There may, or may not, be a good answer to this question. But if there is Dawkin’s doesn’t provide it. This seems to be more a case of passive-aggressive rhetorical bullying than substance. He responds to a sceptical question, not by answering it. But with sarcastic outrage, an insinuation the questioner is dangerous, evil, and should be shunned for asking the question. These are the kind of tactics one expects from cult leaders or so-called religious fundamentalists. One doesn’t expect it from someone who is supposed to be a proponent of rational scientific free inquiry. 


    [1] Richard Dawkin’s, The God Delusion (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2006) 226-227

    [2] John Tilley, “Two (Faulty) Responses to the Challenge of Amoralism” available at https://www.pdcnet.org/wcp20-paideia/content/wcp20-paideia_1998_0044_0248_0253 accessed 26/1/21 

    [3] Examples include Rene Descartes, John Locke, George Berkeley, John Gay, John Brown, Edmund Law William Paley, Thomas Reid, and Immanuel Kant, perhaps most famous for pressing this difficulty is Henry’s Sidgwick.

    [4] Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man, III iii. viii, 4 see http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/reid1788essay3part3.pdf accessed 12 January 2020

    [5] See, Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man, III iii. viii, 4 seehttp://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/reid1788essay3part3.pdf accessed 12 January 2020

    [6] Dawkins, God Delusion, 227

    [7] Dawkins, God Delusion, 227

    [8] See, Henry Sidgwick “Method of Ethics” Preface to the sixth edition.

    [9] See Tilley, Two (Faulty) Responses to the Challenge of Amoralism” available at https://www.pdcnet.org/wcp20-paideia/content/wcp20-paideia_1998_0044_0248_0253 accessed 26/1/21

    [10] Dawkins, God Delusion, 226

    [11] Dawkins, God Delusion, he has no answer to the question and hence nothing to say.