Last week Jordan Hampton from Crash Course Apologetics interviewed me about chapters 12-13 of my book Did God Really Command Genocide. In this is the section of the book, I discuss divine command metaethics and critique some of the most important objections raised against divine command theories. The interview is nearly two and a half hours long. We go over every objection I respond to in the book. Enjoy
Category: Apologetics
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Divine Command Theory: answering classic and contemporary objections
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The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory: Another Response to Erik Wielenberg (Part three)
In Part One, I expounded the Psychopath objection to divine command meta-ethics (DCM) that has recently been defended by Erik Wielenberg. Wielenberg argues as follows:
R1) If God commands a person S to do act A, this command imposes an
obligation on S to do A, only if S is capable of recognising the requirement to do A as being extremely authoritative and as having imperative force.[1] There are some psychopaths who are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands. (empirical premise)
[2] So, there are some psychopaths to whom God has issued no divine commands. (from 1 and R)
[3] So, if DCT is true, then there are some psychopaths who have no moral obligations. (from 2 and DCT).
[4] But there are no psychopaths who have no moral obligations.
[5.] Therefore, DCT is false. (from 3 and 4)
In my last post, I contended this argument is crucially ambiguous; the word “obligation” occurs in both R1 and [3] and [4]. However, one can use the word “obligation” in an objective and a subjective sense. Objective obligatoriness (or rightness or wrongness) is the deontic status that an action has in virtue of its actual circumstances and consequences” By contrast, “Subjective obligatoriness (or rightness or wrongness) is the deontic status an action has in virtue of the agent’s beliefs about its morally relevant circumstances and consequences” (Smith (2010), 4)
I contend that the distinction between objective and subjective obligation makes trouble for the Psychopath Objection. For the argument to be logically valid, and avoid committing the fallacy of equivocation, the word “obligation must be used the same way in both premise [R] and premise [4]. When one examines Wielenberg’s argument; however, we find this is not the case. If we interpret the word obligation in the “subjective sense” premise [4] is not justified by the evidence Wielenberg offers. By contrast, if we interpret obligation in the objective sense, then [R] is unjustified.
The Subjectivist Interpretation
Let us begin first by interpreting [R] and [4] in the subjective sense:
(R1 Subjective) If God’s commands a person S to do act A, this command imposes a subjective obligation on S to do A, only if S is capable of recognising the requirement to do A as being extremely authoritative and as having imperative force.
[1] There are some psychopaths who are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands. (empirical premise)
[2*] So, there are some psychopaths to whom God has issued commands that generate no subjective obligations. (from 1 and R) .
[3*] So, if DCT is true, then there are some psychopaths who have no subjective moral obligations. (from 2 and DCT).
[4S] But there are no psychopaths who have no subjective moral obligations.
[5.] Therefore, DCT is false. (from 3 and 4)
If we interpret [4] in terms of [4S], then Wielenberg must contend not just that Psychopaths have objective obligations’ but also that they are subjectively obligated to refrain from immoral activity. He must hold that Psychopath’s act contrary to their own non-culpable recognition of what morality requires. The data he cites, however, does not support this. Consider the following examples, which Wielenberg cites to support premise [1]
The mainstream view of psychopaths in contemporary psychology and philosophy has it that they have significant neurological deficits that leave them with an absent or significantly diminished capacity for love, compassion, and guilt. They are often described as lacking conscience and are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands…(emphasis added) (Wielenberg (2018), 5)
‘Since their dysfunctional conscience does not stimulate moral feelings, psychopaths do not become aware of the constraints required to understand that they have obligations. Their conscience does not make them responsive to the constraining power of morality’..(Emphasis added) (Ibid., 6)
About one in twenty-five individuals are sociopathic, meaning, essentially, that they do not have a conscience … The intellectual difference between right and wrong does not bring on the emotional sirens and flashing blue lights, or the fear of God, that it does for the rest of us. … ‘[Psychopaths] do not appear… to be aware of the need to justify actions which infringe moral rules … [and] do not really understand the concept of morality’… ‘Psychopaths do not merely behave contrary to moral standards . . . but seem in some sense not even to understand the notion of a moral standard in any “serious” sense. (Emphasis added) (Ibid., 5-6)
Even more, telling is the conclusion Wielenberg draws from this data.
Notice that the problem here is not that DCT implies that psychopaths are not responsible for their immoral actions. There are robust philosophical debates about the extent to which psychopaths are legally or morally responsible for their actions (see, e.g. Malatesti & McMillan (2010) ). ….However, as far as I can tell, all parties to these debates would accept the claim about psychopaths upon which the argument of this article depends: psychopaths cannot grasp the authority and force of moral demands. As Erick Ramirez puts it, ‘psychopaths are said to suffer from moral blindness. Philosophers disagree on whether this moral blindness exempts them from responsibility for their bad behavior’ (Ramirez (2013), 244). As this remark suggests, the moral blindness of psychopaths is widely taken for granted – and that moral blindness of psychopaths is the foundation of the central argument of this article. Accordingly, the problem for DCT that I have advanced here is not that it implies that psychopaths violate moral obligations but are not (legally or morally) responsible for doing so; rather, the problem is that DCT implies that psychopaths have no moral obligations to violate in the first place. (Wielenberg (2018), 8)
This data, if accurate, undermines the claim that Psychopaths have subjective obligations. The evidence does not-unequivocally support the idea that they do what is wrong, given what they non-culpably believe about the situation. Wielenberg concedes Psychopaths are “morally blind” may “lack a conscience” “do not understand the concept of morality” and “lack the constraints necessary constraints required to understand that they have obligations.” His claim they have obligations carries no implications that they are culpable of their actions or culpably act contrary to what they discern to be obligatory. Consequently, [4S] is unjustified. [4] is only justified if Wielenberg is using obligation in the objective sense.
Objectivist Interpretation
This leads us to consider next an “objectivist” interpretation of the argument.
(R1 Objective) If God’s commands a person S to do act A, this command imposes an objective obligation on S to do A, only if S is capable of recognising the requirement to do A as being extremely authoritative and as having imperative force.
[1] There are some psychopaths who are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands. (empirical premise)
[2**] So, there are some psychopaths to whom God has issued commands that generate no objective obligations. (from 1 and R) .
[3] So, if DCT is true, then there are some psychopaths who have no objective moral obligations. (from 2 and DCT).
[4O] But there are no psychopaths who have no subjective moral obligations.
[5.] Therefore, DCT is false. (from 3 and 4)
If [4] is interpreted in terms of [4O], then [4] is plausible. Even if Pscyopath’s suffer from “a moral blindness” which prevents them from recognising their objective obligations, it is implausible to think Psychopaths lack objective moral requirements.
The problem is that now (R1 Objective) is no longer plausible. We saw above that Wielenberg argues for R by contending that standard responses to the promulgation objection rely on it. Wielenberg argued:
A distinctive feature of DCT is that a given human being has moral obligations only if a divine command is somehow communicated to that human being. This aspect of the theory is emphasised by many proponents of the theory. For example, Adams writes: ‘A command does not exist or have any force unless it is issued – that is, unless, it is in some way communicated’ (R. Adams (1999), 263). In defence of this position, Adams memorably remarks that ‘[g]ames in which one party incurs guilt for failing to guess the unexpressed wishes of the other party are not nice games. They are no nicer if God is thought of as a party to them’ (ibid., 261) (Wielenberg (2018), 2)
He immediately continues:
Stephen Evans similarly emphasises the importance of divine communication in this passage:
A law that was passed in secret and never revealed to anyone would hardly be binding on the citizens of a state. It is true that it is often said that ignorance of the law is not a valid excuse for not obeying the law, but this principle surely assumes that the law in question is a matter of public record and that the individual who should obey the law could have known about it. Something similar must hold for moral laws as well. (Evans (2013), 37)
In accordance with Adams’s view that ‘[i]n order to exist, a command… .must be communicated to those who are subject to it’ (R. Adams (1999), 263), I shall henceforth use ‘command’ to mean obligation-bestowing command. On this usage, no divine command is issued unless it imposes some moral obligation on those to whom it is issued (Ibid.)
This argument does not, however, seem plausible if by R we mean (R1 objective). On the face of it, Adam’s and Evan’s are using the word “obligation” in the subjective sense in these paragraphs.
Consider Adam’s first, Adam’s repudiates a “picture of divine-human relations, one in which the wish of God’s heart imposes binding obligations without even being communicated, much less issuing in a command.” This is because “Games in which one party incurs guilt for failing to guess the unexpressed wishes of the other party are not nice games. They are no nicer if God is thought of as a party to them.” In this passage, the phrase “binding obligation” is being used synonymously with “incurring guilt”. The problem he is addressing is that that one cannot incur guilt unless one non-culpably knows what is required. This best fits the concept of a subjective obligation.
We can say similar things about Evan’s. Evans states that a law “passed in secret” would not be “is binding” on citizens. However, he explains what he means next sentence; it is about whether someone has a valid excuse due to non-culpable ignorance. Evans is talking about an obligation of which one is not culpably ignorant and so incurs guilt for violating. So, Evan’s is plausibly talking about a subjective obligation.
Conclusion
My conclusion, therefore, is that Wielenberg’s latest round in the dialectic on divine command meta-ethics is unsuccessful. His new Psychopathy objection commits the fallacy of equivocation. When he claims that God’s commands, do not impose an obligation unless the commandee is capable of recognising the requirement as both authoritative and as having imperative force he uses the word objective either in a subjective or objective sense. If he has in mind the former, then the very data he cites does not support his claim that Psychopaths have moral obligations. If he uses the word in an objective sense, then divine command theorists are not committed to denying Psychopaths have moral obligations.
Adams Robert Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics [Book]. – Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1999.
Evans C Stephen God and Moral Obligation [Book]. – Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013.
Smith Holly The Moral Clout of Reasonable Beliefs [Book Section] // Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics / book auth. Timmons Mark. – Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2010. – Vol. 1.Wielenberg Erik Divine command theory and psychopathy [Journal] // Religious Studies. – 2018. – pp. 1-16.
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The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory: Another Response to Erik Wielenberg (part one)
Recently, Erik Wielenberg has developed a novel objection to divine command meta-ethics (DCM). DCM “has the implausible implication that psychopaths have no moral obligations and hence their evil acts, no matter how evil, are morally permissible” (Wielenberg (2008), 1). Wielenberg develops this argument in response to some criticisms of his earlier work. One of the critics he addresses is me. In some forthcoming posts, I will respond to Wielenberg’s arguments. In this post, I will set the scene by explaining the argument and the context in which it occurs. Subsequent posts will offer criticism of the argument
- Wielenberg’s New Argument from Psychopathy.
Wielenberg calls his new argument the Psychopathy objection. The
Psychopathy objection is the latest move in the contemporary debate between Wielenberg and his critics over the defensibility of divine command meta-ethics. By divine command theory, Wielenberg has in mind the divine command meta-ethics (DCM) defended by Robert Adams (1999) (1979), William Lane Craig (2009), William Alston (1990), Peter Forrest (1989) and C. Stephen Evans (2013). This version of DCM holds that the property of being morally required is identical with the property of being commanded by God.In previous writings, Wielenberg has pioneered the promulgation objection to divine command meta-ethics. (see Wielenberg (2005), 60–65; Morriston (2009); Wielenberg (2014), 75–80). According to this objection, a divine command theory is problematic because it cannot account for the moral obligations of reasonable unbelievers.
In making this argument, Wielenberg takes for granted the existence of “reasonable non-believers” people whom “—have been brought up in nontheistic religious communities, and quite naturally operate in terms of the assumptions of their own traditions.” Similarly, “many western philosophers, have explicitly considered what is to be said in favor of God’s existence, but have not found it sufficiently persuasive.” Wielenberg assumes many people in these groups are “reasonable non-believers, at least in the sense that their lack of belief cannot be attributed to the violation of any epistemic duty on their part.” (Wielenberg (2018), 77)
Wielenberg argues that if the property of being morally required is identical with the property of being commanded by God, then these people would have no moral obligations. Seeing reasonable non-believers clearly, do have moral obligations it follows that, DCM is false.
Why do reasonable non-believers lack moral obligations, given DCM? Wielenberg cites the following exposition of the problem from Wes Morriston:
Even if he is aware of a “sign” that he somehow manages to interpret as a “command” not to steal, how can he [a reasonable non-believer] be subject to that command if he does not know who issued it, or that it was issued by a competent authority? To appreciate the force of this question, imagine that you have received a note saying, “Let me borrow your car. Leave it unlocked with the key in the ignition, and I will pick it up soon.” If you know that the note is from your spouse, or that it is from a friend to whom you owe a favor, you may perhaps have an obligation to obey this instruction. But if the note is unsigned, the handwriting is unfamiliar, and you have no idea who the author might be, then it is as clear as day that you have no such obligation.
In the same way, it seems that even if our reasonable non-believer gets as far as to interpret one of Adams’ “signs” as conveying the message, “Do not steal”, he will be under no obligation to comply with this instruction unless and until he discovers the divine source of the message. (Morriston (2009), 5-6)
I have responded to Wielenberg both in my book and in a recent article. I argued that Morriston’s argument contains a subtle equivocation. In the first line above, he expresses a disjunction. A person is not subject to a command if he does not know (a) who issued it, or (b) that it has an authoritative source. The example he cites, the case of an anonymous note to borrow one’s car, is a case where neither of these disjuncts holds. The owner of the car knows neither who the author is, nor whether its author has authority. We can illustrate this mistake, by reflecting on examples where, a person does not know who the author of the command is, but does recognize that it has an authoritative source.
Consider two counter-examples I offered, first:
Suppose I am walking down what I take to be a public right of way to Orewa Beach, New Zealand. I come across a locked gate with a sign that says: “private property, do not enter, trespassers will be prosecuted.” In such a situation, I recognize that the owner of the property has written the sign, though I have no idea who the owner is. Does it follow I am not subject to the command? That seems false. To be subject to the command, a person does not need to know who the author of the command is. All they need to know is that the command is authoritative over their conduct. (Flannagan (2017), 348)A second counter-example I provided was;
Suppose, for example, that an owner of one of the beachfront properties in Orewa puts up a sign that states “private property do not enter, trespassers will be prosecuted” and that John sees the sign and clearly understands what it says. He understands the sign as issuing an imperative to “not enter the property.” John recognizes this imperative is categorical and is telling him to not trespass; he also recognizes this imperative as having authority over his conduct, he also recognizes that he will be blameworthy if he does not comply with this imperative. However, because of a strange metaphysical theory, he does not believe any person issued this imperative and so it is not strictly speaking a command. He thinks it is just a brute fact that this imperative exists. Does this metaphysical idiosyncrasy mean that the command does not apply to him and that he has not heard or received the command the owner issued? That seems to be false. While John does not realize who the source of the command is, he knows enough to know that the imperative the command expresses applies authoritatively to him and that he is accountable to it. (Flannagan (2017), 351)
In the first example, I am aware of the command but do not know who issued it. Despite my ignorance of the source of the command, I know it is authoritative over my conduct, and hence can be said to be subject to it. In the second example, John does not believe he is being commanded. However, he discerns the imperative expressed by the command and is aware both that it authoritatively applies to him and that he is accountable for performing it. A person who doesn’t believe in God can be subject to his commands if he discerns the imperative the command expresses and percieves its authority.
Craig, (2018) Evan’s (2013) and Adams (1999) have raised similar counter-examples. In a dialogue at the University of Purdue between with Wielenberg Craig responded by citing my second example and discussed is subsequently on his podcast. Evan’s gives a similar counter-example. He imagines a person walking on the border between Iraq and Iran, who perceives a sign warning him to stay on the path. Because he is on the border, he does not know whether the Iranian or the Iraqi governments posted the command, yet he knows some government has issued it. (Evans (2013), 113-114) Adam’s argues: “We can suppose it is enough for God’s commanding if God intends the addressee to recognize a requirement as extremely authoritative and as having imperative force. And that recognition can be present in non-theists as well as theists.” (Adams (1999), 268) These examples all suggest that reasonable believers can be “subject to God’s commands” without believing or knowing that God exists.
In his most recent work, Wielenberg (2018) appears to concede the problem. He concludes that a reasonable unbeliever does not need to recognize moral obligations as God’s commands to be subject to them. However, he suggests this response to the promulgation objection raises a deeper worry. Wielenberg suggests that, behind the responses of Evan’s, Adam’s, Craig and myself is a “plausible principle” which he labels R.
(R) God commands person S to do act A only if S is capable of recognizing the requirement to do A as being extremely authoritative and as having imperative force.
R enables the divine command theorist to claim consistently that a reasonable non-believer has moral obligations. However, Wielenberg contends this comes at a cost; this is because when conjoined with DCM, R implies that Psychopath’s lack of moral obligations.
According to Wielenberg “the mainstream view of psychopaths in contemporary psychology and philosophy” which is that lack “conscience and are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands”. Wielenberg states, “According to principle (R) above, since psychopaths cannot grasp morality’s authority and force, God has not issued any commands to them, and so DCT implies that they have no moral obligations” (Wielenberg (2018), 8)
Wielenberg summarises his argument as follows:
The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory
[1] There are some psychopaths who are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands. (empirical premise)
[2] So, there are some psychopaths to whom God has issued no divine commands. (from 1 and R) .
[3] So, if DCT is true, then there are some psychopaths who have no moral obligations. (from 2 and DCT).
[4] But there are no psychopaths who have no moral obligations.
[5.] Therefore, DCT is false. (from 3 and 4)
In the next few posts, I will criticise this argument. In my next post, I will argue that the argument is crucially ambiguous in some of its key terms. In a subsequent post, I will argue that these ambiguities undermine the argument.
Adams Robert Divine Command Metaethics Modified Again [Journal] // The Journal of Religious Ethics. – Spring 1979. – 1 : Vol. 7. – pp. 6-79,.
Adams Robert Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics [Book]. – Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1999.
Alston William Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists [Book Section] // Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy / ed. Beaty Michael. – Notre Dame : Notre Dame University Press, 1990.
Craig William Lane Debate: God & Morality: William Lane Craig vs Erik Wielenberg [Online] // Reasonablefaith.org. – February 23, 2018. – 8 10, 2019. – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6iVyVJAMiOY.
Craig William Lane This most Gruesome of Guests [Book Section] // Is Goodness Without God Good Enough? A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics / ed. King Robert K Garcia and Nathan L. – Lanthan: : Rowan and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2009.
Evans C Stephen God and Moral Obligation [Book]. – Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013.
Flannagan Matthew Robust Ethics and the Autonomy Thesis [Journal] // Philosophia Christi. – 2017. – 2 : Vol. 17. – pp. 345-362.
Forrest Peter An argument for the Divine Command Theory of Right Action [Journal] // Sophia. – 1989. – 1 : Vol. 28. – pp. 2–19.
Morriston Wes The Moral Obligations of Reasonable Non-Believers: A special problem for divine command meta-ethics [Journal] // International Journal of Philosophy of Religion. – 2009 . – Vol. 65.
Wielenberg Erik Divine command theory and psychopathy [Journal] // Religious Studies. – 2018. – pp. 1-16.
Wielenberg Erik Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless [Book]. – New York : Oxford University Press, 2014.
Wielenberg Erik Virtue and Value in a Godless Universe [Book]. – Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2005 -
The Naturalness of Belief: New Essays in Theism’s Rationality.
The book The Naturalness of Belief: New Essays on Theism’s Rationality recently arrived from the publishers and is available on Amazon. Matt contributed a chapter to this book entitled “Divine Commands and the Euthyphro Dilemma: Some Naturalistic Misperceptions” The Naturalness of Belief is edited by Paul Copan (Palm Beach Atlantic) and Charles Taliaferro (St Olaf College) and published by Lexington Books.
The table of contents is as follows:
Introduction
Part I: The Unnaturalness of Naturalism?
1. Naturalism and Naturalness: A Naturalist’s Perspective
—Graham Oppy
Part II: Foundational Considerations
2. Is Naturalism Natural?
—Charles Taliaferro
3. The Contraction and Expansion of Naturalism and the Theistic Challenge
—Charles Taliaferro
4. Taking Philosophical Naturalism Seriously
—R. Scott Smith
Part III: Theistic Belief, Science, and Naturalism
5. In What Sense Might Religion Be Natural?
—Justin Barrett and Aku Visala
6. Science, Methodological Naturalism, and Question-Begging
—Robert Larmer
Part IV: Axiology and Naturalism
7. Alienating Humanity: How Evolutionary Ethics Undermines Human Rights
—Angus Menuge
8. Divine Commands, Duties, and Euthyphro: Theism and Naturalist Misunderstandings
—Matthew Flannagan
9. Beauty: A Troubling Reality for the Scientific Naturalist
—R. Douglas Geivett and James Spiegel
Part V: Naturalism and Existential Considerations
10. Existential Arguments for Theistic Belief
—Clifford Williams
11. Psychological Factors Contributing to Atheism: Bad Father Relationships and Just Bad Relationships as in Autistic Spectrum Disorders
—Paul C. Vitz
12. The Cultural Implications of Theism versus Naturalism
—Paul Copan and Jeremiah J. Johnston
Part VI: Naturalism, Freedom, and Immortality
13. Theism, Robust Naturalism, and Robust Libertarian Free Will
—J.P. Moreland
14. Naturalism, Theism, and Afterlife Beliefs
—Jonathan LooseThe blurb from Amazon is as follows.
Despite its name, “naturalism” as a world-view turns out to be rather unnatural in its strict and more consistent form of materialism and determinism. This is why a number of naturalists opt for a broadened version that includes objective moral values, intrinsic human dignity, consciousness, beauty, personal agency, and the like. But in doing so, broad naturalism begins to look more like theism. As many strict naturalists recognize, broad naturalism must borrow from the metaphysical resources of a theistic world-view, in which such features are very natural, commonsensical, and quite “at home” in a theistic framework.
The Naturalness of Belief begins with a naturalistic philosopher’s own perspective of naturalism and naturalness. The remaining chapters take a multifaceted approach in showing theism’s naturalness and greater explanatory power. They examine not only rational reasons for theism’s ability to account for consciousness, intentionality, beauty, human dignity, free will, rationality, and knowledge; they also look at commonsensical, existential, psychological, and cultural reasons—in addition to the insights of the cognitive science of religion.
Get your copy now, read it, and let us know what you think both here and on Amazon.
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“Robust Ethics and the Autonomy Thesis” Now Online
Recently, Philosophia Christi published Matt’s article “Robust Ethics and the Autonomy Thesis: A reply to Erik Wielenberg”. This article consisted of some critical commentary and responses to Erik Wielenberg’s book
Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism.Since then Matt’s article has received a little bit of unexpected attention. One of my arguments was discussed in a dialogue between William Lane Craig and Erik Wielenberg that took place at North Carolina State University earlier this year, and on the back of this, we have received several received requests to read the paper. It is now available here: Flannagan Robust Ethics PC 19 2 (1)
Permission has been granted from the Editor of Philosophia Christi to upload this contribution. Learn more about the Journal by going to www.epsociety.org/philchristi.
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Towards Belief Auckland, 26 and 30 November 2015 – with Dr Matthew Flannagan
Takanini Community Church in Auckland are hosting a Towards Belief event with this blog’s Matt.Towards Belief follows Australian pastor and host, Karl Faase as he travels to the UK, USA and Australia to interview more than thirty leading authors, speakers and academics as they seek to defuse the top belief blockers of our time. This 10-session DVD series responds to the questions of the seeker and clarifies the answer for the Christian.
Dr Matthew Flannagan, New Zealand theologian, apologist, author and teacher hosts the Towards Belief series for NZ churches, leadership teams, youth groups, study groups, small groups, and provides a Q&A opportunity as part of each session.

Why Towards Belief is important – Matt’s take:
In New Zealand today, there is a significant fall away rate of Christian youth upon attending University. A recent study by Fuller Theological Seminary in the US discovered that
one of the most significant factors in determining whether a person who comes to the Christian faith as a teenager endures years later is whether they have been able to adequately discuss their intellectual doubts and questions with Christian leaders.
Those who were able to explore such questions and gain some resolution were less likely to fall away whereas those who didn’t tended to leave the faith when confronted with questions at university.
In addition to this the rise of social media, and popular books by people like Richard Dawkins or even movies like the Da Vinci code has meant that skeptical attacks on the Christian faith have become more popularised and more accessible to audiences previously who would only have been confronted with such issues in higher education. In light of this it’s crucial that the Church be willing to address the standard questions people are raising.
The series introduction for pastors, youth leaders and key church staff involves free sessions involving Q&A and supper. Details are:
7pm, Thu 26th/Mon 30th November
Takanini Community Church
160 Great South Road, Takanini, Auckland
Register: info@takaninichurch.org.nzThere is lots more information about this event on the event organiser’s Towards Belief page, including information as to how to book a Towards Belief course for your New Zealand church, so check it out.
For more information in general about Towards Belief go here.
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Hear Matt’s Three Talks on “Questions People ask”
Recently Matt spoke at Orewa Community Church, as part of their series on “Questions People ask”. His three talks: “How can there be just one religion?”, “How does God allow suffering?”, and “Hasn’t Science disproved Christianity?” are all available to listen online to here.
